Governance and Autonomy: 
Chen Fuliang’s Political Theory

SONG Jaeyoon

Abstract

In 12th century Southern Song China, the renowned Yongjia examination master and political thinker Chen Fuliang (1137-1203) redefined good government in opposition to the visions of state activism. He was among a large number of Southern Song literati who developed the new constitutional visions of a limited yet strong state. By reinterpreting the ancient classics, Chen Fuliang systematically argued that good government consists in the elaborate checks and balances between the central and local governments, state institutions and social organizations, public and private realms, and military power and economic resources. By developing his own constitutional theory of tension and balance, Chen Fuliang contributed toward shifting the paradigms of good government from “wealth and power” (fuqiang 富强) to “governance and stability” (zhi’an 治安).

Keywords: Southern Song, the Yongjia school, Chen Fuliang, stateactivism, Neo-Confucianism, Neo-Confucian political thought, wealth and power, governance and stability

* SONG Jaeyoon: Associate Professor, Department of History, McMaster University, Canada (jaeyoon.song@gmail.com).
1. Introduction

During the Southern Song period (1127-1279), the Chinese literati redefined good government through various channels of political discourse: histories (ancient, post-classical, and contemporary), classical learning, policy proposals (memorials), examination manuals, encyclopedias, literary writings, etc.1 In their writings, I have observed, Southern Song thinkers took seriously the following two questions: 1) how to maintain the unified system of administration across the empire without overriding local and regional concerns, and 2) what they could do as social elites in the private realms to contribute toward the governance of their dynasty. In this regard, governance and autonomy lay at the heart of Southern Song political thought.

By governance, I mean an enduring integrated order of numerous human groups, including governmental and non-governmental organizations; by autonomy, the self-government of responsible moral individuals and social groups.2 Apart from the general concept of government as “the formal institutions of the state and their monopoly of legitimate coercive power,”3 governance is useful for our understanding of Southern Song political thought for at least two reasons. First, from the Southern Song onward, with the transformation of the elite into so-called local literati, social communities and kinship organizations flourished within local settings;4 second, those who led those non-governmental networks and organizations, mostly the literati or gentry class, believed that their activities in such networks and organizations formed the foundation of political order.5

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1 For the history of Southern Song historiography and its political implications, see Hartman, “Chen Jun’s Outline and Details,” 275-281, and “The Making of a Villain,” 59-146; for Southern Song examination manuals as the channel for promoting political agendas, see De Weerd, Competition over Content; for Southern Song redefinition of good government, see Song, “Redefining Good Government,” 301-343, and Traces of Grand Peace, esp. chap. 14.
2 The term “governance” has gained ascendancy in political and sociological theory and public administration since the early 1990s, especially in globalization studies and development literature. The intellectual need for the concept of “governance” as distinct from “government” seems to have arisen from a theoretical need to conceptualize the roles of non-governmental organizations and human networks in a multi-national or global context. For this reason, many theorists tend to differentiate government from governance, e.g., “governance success and government failure,” and “governance without government,” etc. See International Social Science Journal 50 (March).
3 Stoker, “Governance as Theory,” 17.
4 For the transformation of elites in the Southern Song, see Hymes, Statesmen and Gentlemen; Bol, This Culture of Ours, esp. chaps. 2 and 9; Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, chap. 7.
5 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, chap. 4.
As government officials, Southern Song political thinkers proposed plans for ameliorating the institutions of their empire; as social elites, they sought to justify their activities in the local surroundings as being conducive to the order and prosperity of the state itself. In this regard, Zhu Xi (1130-1200), the Southern Song Neo-Confucian founder, was probably the most articulate. Throughout his life, Zhu Xi proposed policy plans for the government to remedy cumulative problems in state management. At the same time, he tried to persuade the literati that they could participate in the governance of the empire by fulfilling their obligations in their households and communities.\(^6\) A bottom-up construction of social order, as envisioned by Zhu Xi, presupposed a “literati activism,” that is, the voluntary participation of local elites in family reconstruction and community-building. With the growth of local society and the increase of the literati, Zhu Xi’s plan for “ordering the world” (jingshi 經世) would become dominant in later imperial China.\(^7\)

Before Zhu Xi’s school of thought became triumphant, however, a number of Southern Song literati were in competition.\(^8\) Among Zhu Xi’s rivals, the most notable was the so-called Yongjia 永嘉 school of statecraft, represented by Chen Fuliang 陳傅良 (1137-1203) and Ye Shi 葉適 (1150-1223) who both hailed from Wenzhou 温州, Zhejiang 浙江.\(^9\) Their political visions were not in perfect harmony with Zhu Xi’s.\(^10\) Zhu Xi criticized their negative influences on the literati of the day. However, they were commonly opposed to Northern Song (960-1127) state activism, a set of state-interventionist policies implemented by Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021-1086). Over and against Wang Anshi’s state activism, both Zhu Xi and the Yongjia thinkers proposed the ways in which to achieve optimal governance of the Song Empire without thereby increasing state power. We may say that Zhu Xi and the Yongjia statecraft thinkers interacted with and mutually influenced each other in intellectual rivalry. Then how did the Yongjia school of statecraft shape the

\(^6\) Zhu Xi developed this idea in full in his late compilation of the Three Rituals. For more information, see Song, “Kazoku, girei, zensei: Shu Ki reigakuno Shishödaka keisei,” 33-63.

\(^7\) For the changing conceptions of good government in the two halves of the Song period, see Hymes and Schirokauer, Ordering the World, esp. “Introduction”; Song, “Shifting Paradigms in Theories of Government.”

\(^8\) For the rise of Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism, see Tillman, Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi’s Ascendancy; Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, esp. “Introduction”; Bol, “Reconceptualizing the Order of Things in Northern and Southern Sung”; Tillman, “The Rise of the Tao-hsüeh Confucian Fellowship in Southern Sung.”

\(^9\) For a general introduction to the Yongjia school, see Zhou, Ye Shi yu Yongjia xuepai.

\(^10\) Regarding the concept of private property, for example, Zhu Xi and the Yongjia school were at fundamental odds. For a detailed analysis of their differences, see Song, “Debates on Just Taxation in Ma Duanlin’s Comprehensive Survey.”
ideological topography of later imperial China? How did they differ from, or resonate with, Zhu Xi’s way of “ordering the world”?

With the purpose of answering these questions, this article analyzes the political writings of Chen Fuliang in order to show how the Yongjia thinkers addressed the issue of “governance and autonomy” as well as to account for the far-reaching implications of their changing political visions in Chinese history afterward.

2. A Brief Biography of Chen Fuliang

In Rui’an 瑞安 Wenzhou, Chen Fuliang was born into a peasant family: his father was the first to be a literatus in the nine generations of the lineage. Orphaned at the age of nine, Chen Fuliang was raised by his grandmother. Poverty pressurized him to make a living by teaching, for which he had to master the then-current examination essays.  

Discontented with the then prevailing style of the standard examination writings, according to the official account, Chen Fuliang developed his own style of prose, which earned him a reputation as an exemplary examination master.  

By his late twenties, even before obtaining the Advanced Scholars (jinshi 进士) degree, Chen Fuliang had already gained a large following amongst examination candidates. He obtained the Advanced Scholars degree in 1172 and was appointed Controller-General (tongpan 通判) of Fuzhou 福州; however, due to his conflict with the wealthy families of the area, he resigned from the post, and for the following seven years, he made a living by teaching. From 1184 onward, he served in various posts as prefect, tutor for the heir apparent, senior compiler at the True Records Institute (shilu yuan 言録院), etc. Notably, when the Learning of the Way (daoxue 道學) was banned by the court in 1196, Chen Fuliang defended Zhu Xi, for which he lost office and retreated home to Ruian where he passed away in 1202 at the age of sixty-seven.

As the official Song History endorses, Chen Fuliang defined the examination standards for the 12th- and 13th-century Southern Song. De Weerdt explains the popularity of Chen Fuliang’s expositions by pointing

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11 Chen Fuliang xiansheng wenji, "Qianyan” 前言 (Preface), 1-3.
12 Songshi, 434.12886-12888.
13 Regarding the circulation of Chen Fuliang’s writings amongst examination candidates, see De Weerdt, Competition over Content, 90-97.
14 Songshi, 434.12886.
15 De Weerdt, Competition over Content, esp. chap. 3.
to his ability to address important issues of government by presenting historical events in a dramatic fashion: to borrow her expression, “dramatic situationalism.” Apart from the literary appeal of his prose, I will reconstruct his theory of government through a close analysis of his political essays.

3. Governance in Classical Antiquity

Because the Sishu 四書 (Four Books) compiled by Zhu Xi ascended as the standard Neo-Confucian texts from the late 12th century onward, Southern Song commentaries on the Confucian Classics, especially the Shujing 書經 (Book of Documents) and the Zhouli 周禮 (Rituals of Zhou), have not received due attention. The sheer number of Southern Song commentaries on these classics, however, speaks for their significance in Chinese intellectual history. Crucially, in the contents of these commentaries, I have noted that Southern Song political thinkers redefined good government for their time.

Southern Song political thinkers envisioned good government by reference to the Confucian Classics. Controversial as it was, the Zhouli describes in detail the basic institutions of the Western Zhou (1046-771 BCE) state, designed by the legendary lawgiver, the Duke of Zhou (c. 11th century BCE). With his revisionist commentary, Wang Anshi made this classic preeminent as the standard textbook for the civil service examinations during the New Policies era (c. 1068-1125). With the Jurchen invasion of the Northern Song in 1126, the literati began to criticize Wang Anshi’s state activism as the fundamental cause of dynastic collapse. Since the year 1127, we can identify at least five generations of political thinkers and statesmen who produced close to one hundred commentaries on the Zhouli. Amongst these exegetes, Chen Fuliang stands out as one of the most systematic and influential scholars of the Zhouli.

Chen Fuliang did not leave many memorials. Chen’s commentary on the Chunqiu 春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals) contains his insights into the methods of government. However, the case-specific nature of the Chunqiu led him to explain various cases of power struggle, which makes it too discursive a medium to inquire into the institutions of good government.

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16 De Weerdt, “The Composition of Examination Standards”; De Weerdt, Competition over Contents.
19 Southern Song commentators on the Chunqiu also discussed the constitutional framework
To understand how Chen Fuliang addressed the issue of governance, we should first turn to his commentary, *Zhouli shuo* 周禮說 (On the Rituals of Zhou), for one obvious reason. Unlike the other Confucian Classics, the *Zhouli* describes in painstaking detail the administrative structures of the Zhou government. For this reason, later political thinkers could develop their own views of good government with reference to this text. Especially, in regard to the relations between the central government (the royal domain) and the local governments (regional states), the *Zhouli* provides an overarching frame of reference. Chen Fuliang’s political theory is, therefore, most systematically expressed in his commentary on the *Zhouli*.

Though Chen Fuliang’s *Zhouli shuo* is no longer extant in its entirety, an extensive part of it is preserved in Wang Yuzhi’s 王與之 (fl. 1230s) *Zhouli dingyi* 周禮訂義 (Corrected Meanings of the Rituals of Zhou). By the 1230s Chen Fuliang and Ye Shi’s influences in Southern Song intellectual culture were still prominent amongst examination candidates. Not surprisingly, Chen Fuliang is one of the most frequently cited authorities (over 120 times) in the *Zhouli dingyi*, perhaps second only to Zheng E 鄭鶚 (dates unknown) who wrote in the same generation or probably a bit earlier.

In his preface to *Zhouli shuo* (jin *Zhouli shuo xu* 進周禮說序), Chen Fuliang argues that misuse of this classic during the New Policies spawned skepticism among the intellectuals toward the classics in general. Wang Anshi propagated “the technique of wealth and power” by defining the *Zhouli* as a manual for the management of wealth. As the dynastic altar was destroyed and the agonies of the people intensified, intellectuals blamed Wang Anshi

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20 Wang Yuzhi’s *Zhouli dingyi* compiled in the 1230s includes almost the entirety of his comments on the *Zhouli*. See Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*, chap. 14. Chen Fuliang’s *Zhouli shuo* was organized into three parts, “Rectifying the Ruler’s Mind” (ge junxin 格君心), “Correcting the Essentials of the Court” (zheng chaogang 正朝綱), and “Balancing Dynastic Conditions” (jun guoshi 均國勢), each composed of four distinct topics. As the *Zhouli shuo* was a series of topical essays, it seems more likely that Chen Fuliang’s comments which were included in the *Zhouli dingyi* were mostly taken from the *Zhongguan zhidu jinghua* 周官制度精華 (Essentials of the Institutions of the Zhou Offices) which Chen Fuliang and Xu Yuande 徐元德 (*jinshi* of 1172; also from Wenzhou) compiled together. There might be some skepticism as to the authenticity of Chen Fuliang’s writings in the *Zhouli dingyi*. However, as Wang Yuzhi compiled this book only three decades after Chen’s demise and submitted it to the emperor, skeptics should first offer a reason for their doubt.


22 *Chen Fuliang xiansheng wenji*, 504-505.
for misusing the *Zhouli*. To guard against this classical skepticism Chen Fuliang wrote his own commentary on the *Zhouli*: “when those [skeptics] say that the Kingly Way cannot be realized and antiquity cannot be restored, they pleaded the effect of the [failed] attempt during the Xining 熙寧 period (1068-1077).”23 Furthermore, he praised Zhou rule as the paragon of good government. He thought it was possible to read the intents of the sage kings from the *Shijing* 詩經 (Book of Odes) and the *Shujing*, and their management of affairs from the *Zhouli*.24

In his commentary on the *Zhouli*, Chen Fuliang writes that the Song Dynasty embodied the principles of Zhou rule despite fundamental differences in military organization and government structure:

Our dynasty purely used [the methods of] Zhou governance. Once in a thousand years, Zhou governance emerged from our founding ancestor. Without wresting one man’s labor, [Taizu] nourished the imperial armies, and without employing a sub-official, Taizu could take full control of the government and abolish the Defense Command system [of the Tang and the Five Dynasties]. Although, on the surface, it differed from the ancient system of Zhou, the intentions of deep humaneness and munificent mercy were particularly far-reaching.25

Chen Fuliang argues that Taizu did actually revive the principles of Zhou rule in the Song founding. Rhetorical as it is, Chen Fuliang’s view of Taizu’s framework had far-reaching implications for his contemporary thinkers. Ye Shi, the most representative Yongjia thinker, also called for a radical downsizing of the armed forces based on the model of a slim military during Taizu’s reign: no more than two hundred thousand men strong.26 In the 1230s and 1240s, this idea would gain currency among examination candidates.27 Given the context, Chen Fuliang seems to have articulated this idea for the first time.

Like many other Southern Song scholars of the *Zhouli*, Chen Fuliang criticizes Wang Anshi’s misuse of the text for justification of his fiscal activism. However, in his view, the *Zhouli* contains dubious passages which

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23 *Chen Fuliang xiansheng wenji*, 504-505.
25 *Chen Fuliang xiansheng wenji*, 505: “本朝純用周政，千載一時，愛自蘇軾，不忍役一夫之力，而著禁旅；不欲使天下一吏，得以專政而羅方鎮制度，文為雖非周舊，而深仁厚澤意已獨至。”
27 In the 1240s, Lü Zhong 魯仲 developed this idea in full in his lecture notes on the history of the Song dynasty: *Leibian huangchao dashiji jiangyi*, 49-50.
allowed Liu Xin 刘歆 (c. 50 BCE-23 CE) and Wang Anshi to exploit it for their own purposes. For this reason many “former Confucians” (xianru 先儒) questioned the classical authenticity of the *Zhouli*. While acknowledging the grounds of their doubt, Chen Fuliang chose to save the *Zhouli* by articulating the general principles of Zhou rule.28 By doing so, he aimed at a fundamental re-interpretation of the *Zhouli* as a non-interventionist “Confucian” classic.

4. Governance and the Fengjian System

In the Confucian Classics, the *fengjian* 封建 or classic enfeoffment system is presented as the model of good government. In this framework of political feudalism, the sage rulers of antiquity divided up the territories into numerous regional states and entrusted them to the feudal lords.29 According to the *fengjian* system, each state was subdivided into a collection of small community-like vassal states in which feudal lords governed the people as parents raised their children; the idealized model of paternalistic rule, responding to the needs of the people, in a local setting.30 Although the *fengjian* system was terminated by the Qin Empire, the spirit of *fengjian* continued to inform the constitutional framework of later empires in Chinese history, as exemplified by the early Tang and early Ming policies.31 In the Northern Song, it seems to have been a taboo amongst political thinkers and statesmen to eulogize the *fengjian* system, the idealized model of good governance presented in the Confucian Classics. With the fall of Northern Song, statesmen and literati began to reflect on the weaknesses of the centralization policy initiated by the founding emperors, in order to preclude the reemergence of regional powers.

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28 Chen Fuliang concedes that in the *Zhouli* we cannot find anything concerning the principle of the ancient kings that the government should not struggle with the people over profit. However, his point is not to doubt the *Zhouli* but to come up with a more precise understanding of the underlying implications of the text. *Zhouli dingyi*, 24.7-8: “先王所以不與民爭利者，全不見於此書... 至使周禮之書，後人不得嘗試，夫周家之法，果如是耶，抑用之者，失其實耶。”

29 The number of vassal states in high antiquity was a central issue in the history of classical learning: tradition has it that the number of vassal states amounted to approximately ten thousand in the legendary Xia dynasty, three thousand by the Shang founding, and came down to one thousand eight hundred by the Western Zhou. Song, “Redefining Good Government,” 329.

30 For a description of the classic enfeoffment system, see Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*, chap. 13.

Like many other Southern Song commentators, Chen Fuliang also emphasizes the fengjian system as the basis of ancient Zhou rule. His approach to the Zhouli is both theoretical and historical. He clarifies the textual ambiguities by employing various classical sources, explicates the intents behind institutions, and interprets their political implications by employing his vast knowledge of history. The feudal lords were divided into a hierarchy of five ranks: duke (gong 公), marquis (hou 侯), earl (bo 伯), viscount (zi 子), and baron (nan 男). However, Chen argues that this hierarchy was merely a formal distinction. In terms of the size of the enfeoffed territories, only three levels existed: three hundred li square for marquises; seventy li square for earls; fifty li square for viscounts and barons. This had persisted since Xia and Shang times. Chen Fuliang observes that in the Zhou, the three-tiered hierarchy in the fengjian system remained the same.32

Having simplified the structure of the ancient fengjian system, Chen Fuliang explains why the fengjian system remained stable for so long until the Zhou ruling house was eclipsed by the rising hegemons of the Spring and Autumn Period (c. 771-476 BCE). In his view, it was not because the fengjian system reinforced regional powers, but because the central government in the royal domain could successfully preserve a balance between the royal domain and the regional states, and between the regional states themselves:

The former Confucian [Zheng Xuan] said that “the Duke of Zhou conquered the Nine Provinces and established the five tiers of hierarchy.” This is outrageous! Even the sages could not abolish the way of strengthening the trunk and weakening the branches! Now [we see] that the royal domain for the Son of Heaven with the area of one thousand li square is called the state of ten thousand chariots, and within it the feudal lords were given their share of land. If a duke was given five hundred li square within the royal domain, does it make sense? In the “Overseer of Feudatories” section [of the “Offices of Summer” of the Zhouli], each regional state of one thousand li square, four dukes should be enfeoffed, and one hundred barons should be enfeoffed. If we follow this plan and divide up the state, to speak of the great, the number of states enfeoffed to dukes should be no more than four; to speak of the small, the number of land enfeoffed to barons could amount to one hundred. This is what is meant by “to weaken the power of regional states by dividing them up into numerous segments.” If we followed Zheng Xuan’s interpretation, disasters like the Seven States’ Rebellion of the Han and the military governors of the Tang must have occurred a long time ago in the Zhou.33

32 Zhouli dingyi, 15.30b-31a.
Ironically, in Chen Fuliang’s view, the secret of the Zhou fengjian system lay not in the strengthening of the regional states (local/regional governments) but in the strengthening of the royal domain (the central government). Zheng Xuan’s mechanical application of the numbers misrepresented the regional states as excessively strong, much like the military governors of the Tang. Therefore, Chen Fuliang emphasizes the centripetal aspects of fengjian rule, lest another Warring States period recur.

The Southern Song historian Lü Zhong 凌中 (jinshi of 1247) develops this idea to pay homage to the founding emperor Taizu’s original framework. In this view, the late Tang disorder is a radical deviation from the fengjian ideal. Ironically, the seemingly centralized framework of Taizu’s government embodies the fengjian principle. The most important point is the fragmentation of regional states into numerous baronies. In Hu Hong’s 胡宏 (1105-1161) essay, “one thousand eight hundred states” (qian babai guo 千八百國) represented the ideal number of prinicipalities under the leadership of the Son of Heaven in the royal domain.34

On the relations between the regional states, Chen Fuliang makes an interesting comment. In antiquity, he observes, viscounts and barons should be under the control of marquises and earls. While marquises and earls should submit tributes and taxations to the royal domain, viscounts and barons should not themselves travel to the capital of the Zhou: “If, during the Zhou period, all of the one thousand and eight hundred states convened in the capital, it would not only be impossible but would also have been the source of great trouble given their conditions. How could small states have endured it?”35

By this view, the obligations of small states toward the royal domain should remain moderate. Conversely, the royal domain should effectively control the marquises and earls as they maintain charge of the smaller states. Song literati often compared marquises and earls to “the joints of the body,” and therefore, to prefectures and counties. In this context, the smaller states might well be viewed as the ancient equivalents of villages or local communities. Chen Fuliang believes that there should be a limit to the

33 Zhouli dingyi, 15.31b: “先儒謂周公斥大九州, 更置五等, 妄也。強幹弱枝之道, 雖聖人不敢廢。今天子之畿, 方千里, 謂之萬乘, 而內諸侯朝食采於其中, 隨於方五千里封公, 可乎? 職方之制曰, 凡邦國千里, 封公則四公, 男則百男, 假假設言之, 亦是為建國之率。假如九州, 州方千里, 大之封公, 不過四國, 小之封男, 雖於百男, 可也。是謂兼建而少其力。苟如先儒之言, 則漢七國, 唐藩鎭之稱, 作於周, 與矣。”

34 Hu Hong ji, 230-231.

35 Zhouli dingyi, 15.35b-36a: “陳君舉曰: 古者, 子男小國, 只得聽命於侯伯。侯伯以其朝聘貢賦之數, 返於天子。自周制, 子男之國, 不能盡歸之京師, 而後世乃自列司簿尉盡歸之吏部, 亦其多事也。宣王中興, 亦只理書牧伯而已。故為侯在韓, 召虎在淮, 申伯在荊, 方叔在齊, 周時, 尚有千八百國, 如必盡至京師, 不特不可行, 其勢必至煩擾, 小國何以堪之.”
fragmentation of regional states, so that a proper balance between the royal domain and the regional states, as well as between the regional states themselves, could be redressed.

On relations between the regional states, Chen Fuliang writes: “In general, when large and small states mutually support, and not eliminate one another, it is called “balance” (jun 互). If this balance is destroyed, from the Son of Heaven down to the feudal lords, nobody could govern it all.”36 The balance between the regional states collapsed as, in later Zhou, the feudal lords began to commandeer unlawful profits from their territories, usurping powers to transform themselves into hegemons. The state of Qi took control of mountains and oceans, and the state of Jin privatized the land of Xun and Xia. Worst of all, the Royal House of Zhou had to give tribute to the state of Wei for survival. Qin “woefully” guarded against the rampancy of feudal tyrannies and established commanderies and counties. Now the situation was at the other extreme of “serving one man with what nourished one thousand eight hundred sovereigns in the regional states. For this reason only the emperor enjoyed wealth and power while commanderies and counties were weakened.”37

Chen Fuliang’s recognition of relative autonomy for smaller states might contain significant implications for elite leadership in various forms of descent groups and communal families in the Southern Song. Communal families that had not separated for at least five generations resembled the kinship system described in the classics.38 The elite could represent themselves as the de facto carriers of the ancient fengjian ideal. As mentioned above, Hu Hong’s “One Thousand Eight Hundred States” emphasizes the autonomous participation of small states as necessary for governance led by the Son of Heaven.

It is well-known that the Neo-Confucian predecessor Zhang Zai 張載 (1020-1077) conceived of the family writ large as the modern equivalent of the ancient fengjian system.39 In a similar vein, Ye Shi’s emphasis on the role of the rich in achieving social integration also presupposes a dispersed network of self-governing communities. In their views, the central government should play a minimal role in social integration. In this sense, Chen Fuliang’s conception of fengjian informs the intellectual trend of the time.

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36 Zhouli dingyi, 21.14: “大抵大小相維，而不相踰越。是之謂均。苟不均，則自天子達諸侯，不得專有之。”
37 Zhouli dingyi, 21.14-15: “周季，諸侯，始擅不昕之利。齊韓山海，桃林之塞，邠殽之地，營實私之，僭侈滋甚，往往稱霸，甚者，至周貢貢百二十金於魏以易溫圃，秦人痛惡之，罷侯置守，以養千八百國之君者署一人，而山澤陵池之入，特為禁錢屬少府，由是人主獨富強，而郡縣單弱。”
38 Ebrey, “The Early Stages in the Development of Descent Group Organization,” 16-61, esp. 29-34.
39 Zhang Zai ji, 258-260.
5. Fiscal Decentralization

Chen Fuliang made many emphatic statements on the non-interventionist management of wealth and the autonomy of the regional states in the *Zhouli* model. In his commentary on the *Zhouli*, he writes:

According to the grand plan of the Zhou, wealth should be stored in all-under-heaven, and should not be exhaustively sent up to the king [in the royal domain]. The Nine Occupations and the Nine Tributes [in the Ten Articles of the “Offices of Heaven”] were already not determined by the expenditures of the court. Because the Nine Levies should meet the numerous necessities of the [fiscal] year, even the Son of Heaven could not intervene in the process. This is because “to store” [wealth in all-under-heaven] should lie in the hands of the army of bureaucrats. This is because the Grand Minister should be in charge of saving. As it is up to the army of bureaucrats to store [wealth in all-under-heaven], even the Grand Minister could not encroach upon [the rights of] an official and make him follow his chief. Because the role of saving should lie in the Grand Minister, although the army of bureaucrats might have a mountainous heap of goods, [the Grand Minister] could not dare arbitrarily wield his authorities over his subordinates. In this way, the subordinate officials were divided between the two ministers [i.e., the Minister of State and the Minister of Education], the public [transparency of financial management] was exhibited, and overstepping and encroachment [among the ranks of bureaucrats] were prohibited. Then would the Grand Steward tyrannically control the supplies of the state?\(^{240}\)

“To store wealth in all-under-heaven” is the principle of *laissez faire*, in opposition to fiscal centralization. Many Southern Song political thinkers upheld this view. Ye Shi also develops this idea in his emphasis on the rich people’s (*fumin* 富民) conducive role in society.\(^{41}\) Furthermore, Chen Fuliang argues that fiscal management should not be influenced by the demands of the court nor permit intervention by higher authorities, including the king and the premier. He cautions against the monopoly of power in the hands of one particular authority. In order to distribute overall economic resources to the population, the central government should first of all prevent the rise of an absolutist authority, and then establish the due processes of fiscal

\(^{240}\) *Zhouli dingyi*, 21.19a-b: “周之大計，富藏天下，不盡歸之公上。自九職，九貢，既皆不載於朝廷之經費，而以九賦益藏之百須，雖天子不得以意增損於其間者，則以其藏在羣有司。其節在大臣故也。藏在羣有司，雖大臣不能侵官，以順適其上。節在大臣，雖羣有司之積，若丘山而不敢專趨於下。然則分陳二卿，示公共，防踰越，而冢宰所以為獨制國用也矣。”

\(^{41}\) For a general introduction to Ye Shi’s political thought, see Song, “Critical Confucianism,” 27-47.
management by stipulating the roles and responsibilities of each office.

Chen Fuliang has in mind two negative examples of history, the Qin and Han empires. Since the Qin unified China, all state income came to belong to the Chamberlain for the Palace Revenues, which, Chen Fuliang argues, was no more than the private storage of the emperor:

Since the Qin exhaustively extracted the wealth and tributes of all-under-heaven to assign them to the emperor, all products of mountains, marshes, hills and ponds came to be privately stored for the Son of Heaven. In the institutions of the Han, they belong to the Chamberlain for the Palace Revenues in the service of the Son of Heaven.42

Chen Fuliang explains the cause of fiscal centralization in Han history. In the early Han, enfeoffed states were allowed to mint coinage and produce salt, which triggered the calamities of the Seven States’ Rebellion. For this reason, Emperor Wu of Han (r. 141-87 BCE) assumed full control over all territories and established the centralized system of managing salt and iron. On this, Chen Fuliang writes: “Although [Emperor Wu] suppressed the powers of the feudal lords, the sage kings’ intents not to pursue profit in order to benefit the people could no longer exist in full.”43

Chen Fuliang consistently criticizes the concentration of power in the hands of one man during the Qin and Han eras: all economic resources of the world were mobilized to serve one man. As mentioned above, Chen Fuliang believes that “wealth should be stored in all-under-heaven.” Ye Shi’s practical plans for fiscal cutback resonate with this idea of diffused wealth that Yongjia scholars generally embodied in their political theoretical writings.44 By contrasting the models of Qin and Han with Zhou, Chen Fuliang provides the theoretical ground for Yongjia laissez faire approaches to the economy. As noted, Chen Fuliang formulated this vision at a crucial moment when Southern Song literati were actively voicing their political visions. Chen Fuliang was among this group of literati who were developing such non-activist approaches to the Duke of Zhou’s management of wealth in a series of sophisticated theoretical treatises on the Zhou.45

42 Zhoulì dìngyì, 27.31a: “自秦隳天下之財賦，歸之公上，凡山澤陂池之賦，皆為天子私藏，而漢制屬之少府，以供養天子。”
43 Zhoulì dìngyì: “雖曰抑制諸侯之強，而先王不盡利以遺民之意，蕩然無復存矣。”
44 Song, “Critical Confucianism,” 44-47.
Given Chen Fuliang’s popularity as an examination master, it seems safe to conclude that the *fengjian* ideal to which Chen Fuliang subscribed was propagated through examination candidates. In other words, the *fengjian* ideal was widely accepted as the standard theory of government among Southern Song literati who would enter the ranks of civil service. We can trace the intellectual linkage of Chen Fuliang’s moderate, even *laissez faire*, view of fiscal policy to another Yongjia teacher, Zheng Boxiong 鄭伯熊 (c. 1124-1181), who wrote three essays entitled “Yicai lun” 議財論 (Concerning Discussions on Finance).46

In these essays, Zheng Boxiong draws on ancient ideas of the management of wealth. He begins the essay by noting that the *Zhongyong* 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean) and the *Daxue* 大學 (Great Learning), the two most important classics for moral philosophers of the day, also convey messages concerning the importance of finance.47 Then he describes the Three Dynasties as a benevolent welfare government in order to criticize the Qin, Han, and later dynasties, for having deviated from the ancient models of good government. Interestingly, he repeatedly uses an anti-autocratic argument, i.e., the concentration of national wealth in the hands of one man. “Since the Qin and Han times, [the government] served only one man with all revenues and tributes collected from the Nine Provinces in the Four Seas and felt it was not enough.”48 In Zheng Boxiong’s view, the ancient sages distributed riches among the population whereas late emperors monopolized them: “What the former kings gave to the people was exhaustively taken from [the people]. What was distributed among the people was thoroughly taken away.”49 This echoes Chen Fuliang’s opposition to fiscal centralization.

Luo Bi 羅泌 (?-after 1176), an obscure Southern Song *fengjian* theorist, declared that “*fengjian* [serves] the public [good] of all-under-heaven whereas *junxian* 郡縣 (the prefecture and county system) [serves] the private [interest] of one man. Because the *fengjian* system is for the public good, all men could pursue their private interests [under the *fengjian* system]. Because the *junxian* system is for private interest, the public and the private realms

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48 *Er Zheng ji*, 48-49.

49 *Er Zheng ji*, 49: “凡先王之與于民者，奪之盡矣。所以散之民者，斂之極矣。”
commonly collapse under the *junxian* system.”\(^{50}\) While these phrases might sound like clichés, this way of thinking underlies a fundamental paradigm shift in Southern Song theories of government. The *fengjian* doctrine gradually gained prominence in Southern Song intellectual culture. If this idea is combined with the idea of fiscal decentralization, it would become a powerful theoretical basis for tax reduction.

Ye Shi develops this idea into a systematic non-interventionist economic theory. The concept of governance entails the dispersion (not distribution) of economic power among the population. In fact, Chen Fuliang shared in this ethos. Zheng Boxiong, who is often viewed as the transmitter of the Learning of the Way (*daoxue*) and was closely associated with Chen Fuliang, articulated this idea in his essays on fiscal management. They commonly voiced a strong anti-autocratic and anti-despotic criticism of later Han and Tang emperors. In their view, good government should rely on self-generating sources of social power. A brief citation from the *Bamian feng* 八面鋒 (Eight-Sided Blade), which has often been attributed to Chen Fuliang, encapsulates his position on state power: “The state should regard the insufficiency of wealth as a constant [factor] and should not guard against the lack of supplies. It should regard generating wealth as an urgent [task] but should not will to collect wealth.”\(^{51}\)

### 6. Military Strategy

Chen Fuliang wrote a history of military institutions entitled, *Lidai bingzhi* 歷代兵制 (Military Institutions of All Dynasties). He begins the book with a brief description of the Zhou military system based on the *Zhouli* and other ancient classics. Like other comprehensive institutional histories, Chen Fuliang’s main purpose in this book is not simply to present the Zhou system as a model to follow, but to provide a complete survey of the preceding military institutions of the previous dynasties. Nevertheless, Chen Fuliang explicates the underlying principles of the Zhou military system in order to elucidate the problems of later institutions. Towards the end of the book, having surveyed various incidents which occurred in antecedent dynasties, Chen

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\(^{50}\) *Lushi*, 12.17a-b: “封建者，天下之公也。郡縣者，一人之私也。唯公也，故人皆得遂其私。惟私也，是故公私俱廢。”

\(^{51}\) *Bamian feng*, 1.1b: “國家當以匱財為常，勿以乏用為懲。當以養財為急，勿以聚財為急。”
Fuliang gives a critical analysis of the military problems of the Song dynasty.

Like other fengjian theorists, Chen Fuliang’s understanding of the Zhou military system is based on the balance of power between the royal domain and the regional states and between the regional states themselves. To guard against the formation of regional hegemons, as witnessed during the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Periods, Chen Fuliang emphasizes that the military forces in the Zhou were distributed amongst the population through the implementation of the well-field system. As the peasantry should have the most motivation to protect their own lands, they should form the solid foundation of military stability. At the same time, as the economic sources of power should be distributed among the peasant soldiery under the well-field system, it should prevent the concentration of military forces in the hands of an ambitious feudal lord.

This is the institutional wisdom of the sage kings, generally known as “infusing the military into the peasantry” (yu bing yu nong 寓兵於農). Furthermore, the military forces as a whole should also be divided evenly between the royal domain and the regional states: “the military forces of the royal domain could not be arbitrarily dispatched” (jibing buqing chu ye 篤兵不輕出也) as, “even for the expedition led by the king himself,” Chen Fuliang writes, “he had to use the troops of the feudal lords” (tianzi qinzhen, yu yong zhuhou zhi shi 天子親政, 亦用諸侯之師). In other words, not only the feudal lords, but the king himself could not rise above the others to become an absolute power. Both the king and the feudal lords should be regulated by the intricate system of checks and balances. The strict rules concerning the legitimacy of military expedition described in the “Minister of War” of the “Offices of Summer” attest to the need for this delicate balance. As this system broke down in the Eastern Zhou period, great powers began to emerge, plunging themselves into a vicious cycle of warfare until the First Emperor of Qin unified the realms of ancient China in 221 BCE.

Chen Fuliang explains why the unified Qin system fell apart in fifteen years. Under the ancient sages’ principle of “infusing the military into the peasantry,” the people simply received proper education without being forced

52 Chen Fuliang articulates this idea in his description of the military organization of the royal domain, especially the Six Armies System (liujun zhi zhi 六軍之制) and the Integrating Forces of the Royal Domain (tongji zhi shi 通畿之師) based on the Zhoudi. The Six Armies System should be composed of 750,000 soldiers organized into the Six Villages. Each village should be divided into the well-field system to which the peasantry were assigned. See Lidai bingzhi, 1.1.a-b.

53 Lidai bingzhi, 1.3a-b.
into warfare. However, as Shang Yang 商鞅 (c. 395-338 BCE) introduced the legalist methods of prizing warring skills, gracing mass killers, and enslaving the coward, the people became mutinous and defiant. To preclude future rebellions, the First Emperor concentrated “sharp weapons” in the capital. He destroyed the walls and fortifications of the previous six states and frequently launched military expeditions to the frontiers. However, “he did not realize that any carved wood and erected pole could easily turn into weapons, and soldiers and slaves could sometimes transform themselves into brave generals and heroes.”

In brief, the cohesive centralization of the military forces without establishing any lasting systems of social integration led to the collapse of the Qin system. By contrast, “during the Three Dynasties and before,” writes Chen Fuliang, “the leadership of military power was diffused.” Alluding to various classics such as the Shujing and the Shijing, Chen Fuliang argues that in the Zhou system “the troops had no one particular leader and the generals had no great power.” For this reason, he argues, “although the military forces were prevalent in all-under-heaven, there could be no serious trouble.”

Chen Fuliang’s diagnosis of the problems in the Han military system is based on the same principle of power diffusion. He observes that the Han system reflected the basic spirit of the ancient Zhou system although it carried on with many Qin institutions. Therefore, he writes:

Although the institutions of the Han were based on the Qin, many of these were still similar to those in antiquity. The people of the Han constantly maintained their martial spirit although they were not fatigued by [being mobilized for] constant military expeditions. The state had the standing army, but it did not incur the expenditure of securing provisions.”

Following Emperor Wu’s military expeditions, several generations continued to abide by the initial program of “nurturing the people for the

54 Lidai bingzhi, 1.12b: “不知斬木揭竿，無非戰具，蒼頭斷役，徃徃皆賈勇豪傑也.”
55 Lidai bingzhi, 2.12b: “三代而上，兵權散主.”
56 For example, Chen Fuliang points to the passage in the “Guming” 顧命 chapter of the Shujing, in which Taibo orders Zhonghuan and Nangong Mao to lead the troops of the marquis Lú Ji of Qi, and the two ordered royal guards of one hundred to protect the Heir Apparent. Chen Fuliang presents this as evidence of the lack of privatized troops in Zhou. Lidai bingzhi, 2.12b.
57 Lidai bingzhi, 2.12b: “兵無專主，將無重權．”
58 Lidai bingzhi, 2.13a: “是以兵滿天下，居然無患．”
59 Lidai bingzhi, 2.4b: “漢制，劃巨頭秦，然多近古，蓋民有常兵而無常征之勞，國有常備而無聚食之貴．”
strengthening of the state” (yangbing fuguo zhi zhi 養兵富國之制), which Chen Fuliang believes encapsulates the spirit of the Han military system. However, Wang Mang’s (45 BCE-23 CE) usurpation of the throne destroyed the spirit of the dynastic founders. Emperor Guangwu 光武 (r. 25-57 CE) who regained the throne reinforced the prefecture and county system, contrary to the founding emperors’ original intentions.60

Chen Fuliang’s judgment of the Tang military system is two-pronged. Following the praise of the “Treatise on the Military” in the Xin Tangshu 新唐書 (New Tang History), Chen Fuliang recognizes the rationality of the militia (fubing 府兵) system. During times of peace peasant-soldiers could till the land, and in an emergency the central government would dispatch the general to solve the problem; once resolved, the soldiers would return to their lands and the general to the court. This was to prevent the general’s dominion of military forces as well as to secure the livelihoods of the people. Chen Fuliang writes: “If not to restore the well-field system, no military system is superior to the militia system. Alas! Later generations cannot esteem this!”61

Chen Fuliang is keenly aware of how the militia system gave way to the military commandery (fangzhen 方鎭) system, i.e., the troops of the military governors which led to the collapse of Tang. In other words, Chen Fuliang sees the inherent weakness of the militia system. He cites Du You’s 杜佑 (735-812) explanation as to why the early Tang period saw neither rebellions by generals nor seditions by low-ranking soldiery: the strongest generals were constantly engaged in military campaign against frontier states. Once this military tension loosened up, the militia system gave way to the volunteer military (guoqi 弩騎) system, and then to the military commandery system.

Then what alternative does Chen Fuliang present for the Song? Regarding the military system of the Song dynasty, Chen’s focus lies on the intentions of the Founding Emperor Taizu. As mentioned above, Lü Zhong in mid-thirteenth century Southern Song argues that the military system of the founding Song period fulfilled the spirit of the ancient fengjian system; they introduced the principle of tension and balance between the central and regional troops, and prolonged the appointment of military generals. Furthermore, Lü Zhong pointed out that the size of the military during Taizu’s reign was no more than two hundred thousand men strong. Chen developed these ideas a generation before.

60 Lidai bingzhi, 2.8.
61 Lidai bingzhi, 6.3b: “自井田不復，兵制之善，莫出於此，惜乎後人之不能遵也.”
Chen Fuliang notes that by the time Taizu founded the Song and established a unified order in China proper by annexing the south and southwest, he had a crack army of no more than two hundred thousand. Taizu stationed one half of the troops in the capital and the other half in the frontiers in order to maintain a power balance between the two. It was for this reason that the Song dynasty witnessed no military conflicts between the inner and outer realms of the dynasty. At the same time, Taizu also applied the principle of mutual checks and balances within the capital, as well as appointing loyal and brave ministers in strategic points to guard against the possibilities of frontier disorders. Remarkably, instead of suppressing the rich, Taizu chose to ally with them: “rich houses establish the bureaucratic order (the qianmo system) in alliance with me and store wealth for the state.”\footnote{Lidai bingzhi, 8.4b: “富室釁我阡陌，為國守財耳.”} Taizu’s logic was that the rich would willingly yield their riches in times of urgency in the frontiers. For this reason, he did not raise the rates of taxation so that nobody harbored any grudges. Taizu also divided the soldiery from the peasantry with a view to establishing a small number of trained professionals to protect the people. In other words, Taizu linked the military garrisons with villages in a reciprocally supportive relationship. Taizu could thereby guard against the conflicts between the capital and outer regions. In brief, Chen Fuliang emphasizes the diverse methods of checks and balances that Taizu introduced in the military system according to the principles of mutual alliance between the capital and the outer realms, and a mutual restraint between the upper and lower ranks.

Chen Fuliang pays homage to the ancient Zhou military system, and eulogizes the Han and Tang systems for retaining the ancient spirit of “infusing the military into the peasantry.” Interestingly, when he describes Taizu’s system, he drops this notion, representing Taizu’s military system as something new in history. Furthermore, Chen shows how Taizu skillfully protected the underlying institutional principles of the ancient fengjian system. We have seen Lü Zhong elaborate upon these ideas in his lectures on the history of Northern Song.

Most importantly, Chen Fuliang implies the reduction of the military as the first step toward military security in the Southern Song context. The number of troops during Taizu’s reign remained at around two hundred thousand, but it tripled during the military conflicts with the nomadic empires during the Xianping period (998-1003), and peaked during the Huangyou period (1049-1054), reaching one million four hundred and ten thousand.
the same time, Chen Fuliang criticizes Wang Anshi’s mutual security (baojia 保甲) system because he thought it disregarded the original principle of infusing the military into the peasantry. In this regard, Chen Fuliang was neither a literalist nor a restorationist. He simply sought to apply only the principles of the ancient systems to his time.

7. Conclusion

Governance is predicated upon the productive cooperation of human networks and organizations, both governmental and non-governmental. Southern Song political thinkers addressed the issue of governance by shifting paradigms of good government for their time; instead of pursuing “wealth and power,” the motto of state activism emphasized by Wang Anshi, they generally called on the imperial court to achieve “governance and stability” (zhi’an 治安). As one of the most influential Southern Song political thinkers, Chen Fuliang systematically developed his theory of government, according to which state power should be limited.

Chen Fuliang used diverse channels of political expression to promote his visions of politics. In the field of classical learning, Chen developed his systematic theory of government through his commentaries on the Classics, especially the Zhouli. As to his view of antiquity, Chen Fuliang was not a fundamentalist calling for the restoration of the ancient systems; his study of ancient history was closely linked with his comprehensive survey of institutional history.

Chen Fuliang’s view of the fengjian or the classic enfeoffment system seems to have influenced a number of Southern Song classicists and thinkers. His depiction of the Zhou system emphasizes the importance of self-governing small states as the basis of a stable order. Chen did not explicitly endorse the rising number of communal families and descent groups as the modern equivalents of small community-like states. However, in conjunction with Ye Shi’s recognition of the rich in local society, it is possible to infer these implications.

Chen Fuliang understood the checks and balances between the royal domain and the regional states as being central to the fengjian system. He explicated the underlying principles of the system itself by illuminating the well-field system as an institutional deterrent to the prospect of regional hegemons. He did not argue for the restoration of the well-field system for

his time; contrarily, he praised Taizu’s active alliance with the so-called land-engrossed elites of day.

Chen Fuliang observes the underlying *fengjian* principle inherent in the military system at the time of the Song founding. His interest lies in the small and efficient military under Taizu’s leadership. Because, he argues, Taizu introduced the intricate system of *fengjian* in the highly centralized order of the Song founding, the military could be reduced to the minimum yet remain strong.

As to fiscal policy, Chen Fuliang strongly opposes fiscal centralization. He writes repeatedly that the sage kings stored wealth in the people, tacitly echoing Ye Shi’s explicit recognition of a rising commercial economy.

In conclusion, Chen Fuliang was among a long line of statecraft thinkers who sought to redefine state society relations in traditional China. According to his theory of good government, the strength of the state should be methodically adjusted (not too weak and not too strong) to achieve governance and stability in the vast territories of empire. Chen Fuliang believed in a thin framework of government, relying on self-governing small communities as the ideal model of governance.
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治理與自律——陳傅良的政治理論

宋在倫

中文摘要
大約在12世紀的南宋時期，著名的永嘉思想家陳傅良重新定義了善政的概念以反對北宋皇朝的國家行動主義。陳傅良和同時期的大量南宋士大夫們一起發展了憲政理論以限制國家權力。通過對儒家經典理論的再解釋，陳傅良系統地論證了一個國家良好的統治秩序取決于中央和地方政府、國家機關和社會組織、公共的和私人、軍事力量和經濟資源之間的微妙對立和均衡。陳傅良提出了自己的憲政理論主張，重新將南宋時期的國家主題定義為“治安”而不是“富強”。

關鍵詞：南宋，永嘉學派，陳傅良，葉適，國家主義，儒家憲政理論，儒家經學，富強，治安