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Scholar's Corner: Confucianism in and for the Modern World

The Need for Confucianism

Stephen C. Angle*

Readers of this journal are sure to be familiar with the scholarly debates over whether Confucianism can be, or even must be, made compatible with democracy. As valuable as these conversations are, they surely seem to privilege democracy—to make it, as Joseph Chan has complained, “the only game in town” (Angle et al 2018, 43). In this short essay, I propose to flip the implicit hierarchy upside down and ask instead whether contemporary Chinese political theory needs to be based on Confucian values. An answer to this question will depend on first clarifying what it means: At whom, exactly, is it addressed? What sort of “need” are we talking about? What is it to “base” theory on a set of values? I’ll argue that there is a way of understanding the question that does lead to a plausible affirmative answer, though in pluralistic, modern Chinese societies, there are also many routes to negative or implausibly positive replies. Successfully navigating the terrain these responses describe is a key challenge to Chinese political theorists of any background.

Let’s begin with the premise that the question is addressed to theorists in China and theorizing about all Chinese citizens. We could call this theorizing for China. The next preliminary issue is in what sense contemporary theories “need” to be based on Confucian values. This divides into two main possibilities. Perhaps, for some reason, we (for some “we”) *must* base our contemporary theories on Confucianism; or perhaps it would be *valuable* for us to do so. I acknowledge that the most natural reading of “need” is the former,

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but I believe that the reasons that have been offered for why theorists “must” base their work on Confucianism are highly implausible.

Beginning with the first reading of “need,” the claim would be that Chinese theorists, as they theorize about politics applying to all Chinese citizens, must base their theories in Confucian values. One argument that has been made for such a conclusion is that the Chinese people can only survive if they re-embrace Confucianism—and so their theorists must use Confucian theories to describe and prescribe Chinese politics. A crucial premise of this argument is that “Chinese culture=Confucianism.” Without Confucianism, there may still be people and a polity in the land around the Yellow River, but it will not be “Chinese.” (Strictly speaking, they will not be 中国人, people of the Middle Kingdom.) But of course, this is a bad argument, relying on an essentialism about “Chinese culture” that is easy to see and reject.

A slightly better argument for “must” is that only a Confucian-based political theory *successfully* will be able to describe Chinese norms and prescribe Chinese political forms. The idea here is that Chinese society, as a matter of fact, is so deeply Confucian that theory based elsewhere will fail to “take root” in the Chinese (i.e., Confucian) “soil.” The problem with such an assertion is that history seems to have already proven it wrong. No matter whether one chooses Chinese socialism or Taiwanese democracy, each seems pretty successful and not very Confucian. At the very least, neither is explicitly Confucian! If you ask about socialism “with Chinese characteristics,” I reply that the “Chinese characteristics” have more to do with markets and free enterprise than with Confucianism. To be sure, there are ways in which Chinese socialism and Taiwanese democracy are distinctive, and some of this distinctiveness is probably related to these societies’ Confucian heritage. Admitting this, though, is a long way from agreeing that political theories must be “based” on Confucianism in any significant way.

If we ask instead why it would *valuable* for Chinese theories to be based on Confucianism, we can see that there are a number of reasons to consider. The first is a weaker version of the idea just considered: instead of saying that only a Confucian-based theory

can succeed, we should consider whether a Confucian-based theory might be more successful, all else equal, than a theory without such a base. Sungmoon Kim has argued that the social lives of people throughout East Asia “are importantly encumbered by Confucian norms, habits, rituals, mores, or civilities, both positively and negatively, notwithstanding their increasing subscriptions to diverse moral and religious doctrines as private individuals” (Kim 2018, 192). In his various works Kim has drawn on modern South Korea to show ways in which legal and other decisions make more sense when we recognize the Confucian norms “encumbering” them. Basing (in some sense—see below) our theorizing on these norms is thus more likely to succeed, less likely to meet with confusion or to result in incoherence.

Other reasons for believing that basing modern theory on Confucianism can be valuable are less connected to the present norms of Chinese (or East Asian) people. It is plausible to think that a great intellectual tradition like Confucianism has within it important insights into the types of creatures humans are (or can be), the varieties of social organization most suited to us, and so on. A third reason—in addition to “success” and “insight”—is the value of preserving and reflecting on a diverse range of possibilities for humans. Writing about the importance of a rigorous historical approach to interpreting Chinese texts, Brook Ziporyn has spoken of the value of “safeguard[ing] the strangeness of the text” in just this vein (Ziporyn 2012, 13). Relatedly, there is value in taking seriously the views of theories whose origins lie outside the currently hegemonic cultures of so-called “Western civilization.” It is obvious that power has distorted the institutions in and through which we create and disseminate knowledge, so post- or anti-colonial efforts to articulate theories with alternative bases are inherently valuable (Jenco 2016).

In short, there are four good reasons that provide at least some support for basing Chinese theories on Confucianism: success, insight, diversity, and anti-colonialism. What does it mean, though, to “base” a theory on Confucianism? The key here is to realize that there is no single, fixed set of practices that can be labelled as “Con-

fucianism.” As many analysts have stressed, genuine traditions are characterized by internal diversity and rational (in the tradition’s own terms) debate (Shils 1981; MacIntyre 1998; Nussbaum and Sen 1989). As one puts it: “A tradition of enquiry is more than a coherent movement of thought. It is such a movement in the course of which those engaging in the movement become aware of it and in self-aware fashion attempt to engage in its debates and carry its enquiries forward” (MacIntyre 1998, 326).

There is ample evidence that modern Confucians are engaged in just such a project. As one of the most influential twentieth-century Confucians, Feng Youlan (1895-1990) put it, modern Confucians can and must “continue” the tradition rather than just “follow” it (Feng 2001, 4). “Following” past versions of the tradition would mean rigidly adhering to interpretations of the tradition from hundreds or even thousands of years ago. This kind of fetishizing of the past is almost always driven by extremist and ideological contemporary motives, and is also based on the false premises that (1) some earlier iteration of the tradition was pure, while more recent versions are mere interpretations; and (2) we have unmitigated access to this earlier, pure moment. Like many other traditions, Confucianism today has its “fundamentalists,” but their claims to be able to speak for an original Confucianism are deeply problematic (Angle 2014).

Instead of claiming to be able to directly mirror a non-existent “pure” Confucian past, therefore, basing modern theories on Confucianism inevitably involves careful argument about which values and ideas are most important and about how those values and ideas can best be realized in the present day. Rigorous historical scholarship can be part of this process—keeping in mind Ziporyn’s remark about “safeguarding strangeness”—but ultimately this cannot simply be about the interpretation of past texts. The texts are themselves diverse, making arguments with varying degrees of coherence. Basing modern theory on Confucianism therefore must be a philosophical project of “continuing” the tradition.

I have been arguing that in the context of modern China, there are plausible reasons to think that basing political theory on Confucianism is valuable. We should also recognize the potential pitfalls

of such an approach. As I move towards my conclusion, let me briefly consider four such worries. First is the concern that Confucians both historically and in the modern era have shown themselves to be too quick to compromise with unscrupulous powerholders and too willing to support authoritarianism (O'Dwyer 2019). In part this has to do with the traditional and present-day absences of independent bases of institutional power, which makes it too easy for Confucians to be coopted (De Bary 1991).¹ These are complicated issues well beyond the scope of this short essay to address, but suffice it to say that for Confucianism to be valuable as a base for modern Chinese theory, this question needs to be carefully addressed.

A second concern is that basing modern theory on a tradition like Confucianism is a poor choice for modern, progressive-minded thinkers because it plays to the strengths of conservatives. Kurzman has identified this as a problem for Islamic thinkers who try to meet traditionalists on their own turf but then show that the Islamic canon ought to be understood in a liberal way (Kurzman 1998). Similarly, it might be thought that conservatives are inevitably privileged when it comes to tradition-based arguments. Joseph Chan has one of the best responses to this kind of worry: shall we just leave it up to the would-be dictators to say what Confucianism can mean today? (Chan 1995) I would add that it is far from obvious, once one looks at the details, that conservative arguments really are better. As soon as one acknowledges that traditions can and should develop in response to new reasoning and new situations—a recognition built-in to Confucianism, as I have argued in many places—then we can begin judging competing positions on their merits.

My reference to looking “at the details,” though, brings me to a third concern: are detailed textual arguments really the strongest weapons in the arsenal of liberal- or progressive-minded Chinese intellectuals? Aren't these technical arguments less convincing than straight-forward appeals to values like autonomy or equality? (Jiang

¹ Jiang Qing's proposal for a Confucian “Academy” modelled on the Iranian Council of Guardians is hardly an improvement; as in Iran, Jiang's Academy it seems likely to just be another source of unaccountable, arbitrary power (Jiang 2013).

2018) In response, I suggest two points. (1) In the context of a broad and pluralistic debate about political values, it is surely a contribution to undermine the unanimity or obviousness of conservative Confucian claims. If we can simply show that the internal foundation of such claims is shaky, we may help to convince an audience to take them less seriously. (2) There is no reason that a progressive Confucian must confine him or herself to technical, textual arguments. Many Confucian arguments are broadly accessible and powerful—and furthermore are couched in language (like harmony or humaneness) that is likely to resonate with Chinese audiences.

A final objection to the value of using Confucian-based political theory in China runs something like this: in light of tragedies like the Cultural Revolution and the current rise of political repression, what China needs more than anything is whichever theory gives the strongest argument against tyranny and for the protection of the individual. Maybe a progressive Confucianism can generate such arguments, the objector may concede, but they simply are not as straight-forward as those of classical liberalism—and so, whatever values might accrue to Confucian-based theories are outweighed in the present context. I confess to feeling the pull of an argument like this. I am not sure, though, that all theorists must sing the same note in order to produce a powerful theoretical chorus. Instead of simply ignoring the values of diversity, anti-colonialism, and so on that I sketched earlier, liberals can collaborate with progressive Confucians on key issues. It is too strong to say that Chinese political theory today “must” be based on Confucian values, but even in light of the concerns that I have canvassed, I believe Confucian-based theories continue to be vital in today’s China.

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Moral Beauty and the Beast:

Ethical Dilemmas in the Mencius

Paul van Els*

Abstract

This article analyzes *Mencius* 7B.23, a concise passage that offers complex ethical dilemmas. It provides a close reading of the passage, along with relevant passages elsewhere in the text and, occasionally, in other texts. The narrow goal of the article is to present a coherent reading of the passage within the context of the *Mencius* as a whole. This reading suggests that while the passage touches upon a wide range of topics, including personal credibility and political responsibility, the overarching concern is on being a morally superior person, on the difficult dilemmas such people may face, and on how they would respond to them. More broadly, the article shows that while the philosophical practice of “weighing circumstances” (*quan* 權) allows moral agents in exceptional cases to break certain moral or ritual rules, Mencius seems unwilling to apply this discretion when morality as a whole, or the integrity of the person who embodies it (*shi* 士), are involved.

Keywords: Mencius, tiger, anecdote, morality, ethical dilemma, *shi* 士, *quan* 權

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The *Mencius* 孟子 is a revered Chinese philosophical text. Scholars readily admit to deriving “pleasure from *Mencius* as a work of literature,” as they place its supposed author, Mencius, on a pedestal as one who “besides being one of the greatest thinkers, happens to be one of the greatest stylists in the whole history of Chinese literature” (Dobson 1963, vii; Lau 1970, 222). The work is indeed both insightful and delightful, but it also contains passages that are hard to grasp, especially on a first read, because they do not “provide transparent information about the philosophical position he holds” (Geisz 2007, 190). This article analyzes one of those passages:

Qi was struck by famine. Chen Zhen said, “The people in the state all think that you, Master, will [make a plea to] distribute [from] the Tang for them again, but I apprehend you cannot do so again.” Mencius said, “That would be to act like Feng Fu. Among the inhabitants of Jin there was a certain Feng Fu, who was great at catching tigers. Ultimately, he became a great gentleman. Thereupon he [once] went to the countryside. There was a crowd in pursuit of a tiger. The tiger had its back to a crag, but no one dared to attack it. Seeing Feng Fu in the distance, they rushed to welcome him. Feng Fu rolled up his sleeves and alighted from the carriage. The whole crowd was pleased with him, but those who were gentlemen laughed at him.”¹

This passage raises many questions. For example: Who is Chen Zhen? What is the Tang? Did Feng Fu subdue the tiger in the end? Why would gentlemen laugh at him? How does Mencius judge their laughter? If he disapproves, does he consider them snobs who shy away from rolling up their sleeves to help others? In that case, why would he call them gentlemen? If he approves, does he applaud laughing at people who lend a helping hand? In that case, would he recommend *not* helping others? If so, does a relatively minor

¹ *Mencius* 7B.23: 齊饑。陳臻曰，“國人皆以夫子將復為發棠，殆不可復。”孟子曰，“是為馮婦也。晉人有馮婦者，善搏虎。卒為善士。則之野，有眾逐虎。虎負嵎，莫之敢撓。望見馮婦，趨而迎之。馮婦攘臂下車。眾皆悅之，其為士者笑之。” Translations in this article are my own. Translations from the *Mencius* are based on the *Mengzi zhushu* 孟子注疏 edition (cf. Zhao 2000). My translation of 7B.23 sticks close to the source text to facilitate discussion of textual issues (see below).

personal inconvenience, such as becoming a laughingstock, in his view outweigh the life-threatening tribulations of the multitudes? In short, what is the meaning of this passage?

The passage's perplexity explains its relative obscurity. Overviews of Chinese philosophy do not use it to illustrate Mencius's thought, and *Mencius* studies likewise tend to prefer interpretively more accessible examples from the text. Even translators treat the passage with underwhelming enthusiasm. For instance, Lionel Giles does not include it in his abridged *Mencius* translation (Giles 1942, 122). Others do include it, but either without explanatory comments (Couvreur 1895, 639–640; Ware 1960, 160; Lau 1970, 198), or with a few textual notes at best (Lyll 1932, 232; Dobson 1963, 50–51; Lévy [2003] 2008, 196). Some translators do touch on the meaning of the passage, but their encapsulations differ widely. Richard Wilhelm prefaces his translation of the passage with the Latin adage *tempora mutantur* (times are changed), which suggests that to him its import is that different times call for different approaches ([1916] 1921, 177). James Legge and Ernst Faber both speak of “dignity” when they put the passage in a nutshell (Legge [1861] 1991, 488n23; Faber 1882, 121). Irene Bloom calls it “a matter of credibility,” and Robert Eno sees it as an example of Mencius “tempering righteous action with pragmatism” (Bloom 2009, 161; Eno 2016, 156). Bryan W. Van Norden focuses on yet another aspect of the text, when he comments: “What is appropriate for a person to do depends upon his social role.” (2008, 189). The passage has been discussed by a few Chinese scholars, past and present. The discussions tend to be brief (one barely covers half a journal-page) and limited to one textual issue (discussed below). In English academic literature, the passage is used as an example by Sungmoon Kim (who aptly calls it a “largely unattended episode” in the *Mencius*) in his essay on political responsibility; by Myeong-seok Kim in his research into the sources of moral motivation in the *Mencius*; by Michael LaFargue in his portrayal of the sociohistorical background of a Chinese philosophical text; and by Robert Eno who, in his article on Mencian casuistry, synthesizes the passage in just one sentence (S. Kim 2010, 37–38; M. Kim 2014, 67; 2018, 74; LaFargue 1994, 89–90; Eno 2002, 197–198). In short, while scholarly attention is

not wholly absent, treatment of the passage tends to be brief, limited, and highly divergent.

In my view, the *Mencius* passage merits an in-depth study, as it is more insightful than a cursory reading suggests. A fuller understanding requires background knowledge, careful scrutiny, and a receptivity to this mode of expressing philosophical views. As Paul R. Goldin points out (2017, 55): “Chinese philosophy tends to demand a high level of interpretive participation from its audience.” This article “participates” through a close reading of the passage, supplemented by relevant passages elsewhere in the text and, occasionally, in other texts. This methodology follows the example of scholars such as David S. Nivison who pays meticulous attention to particular passages, phrases, and even words while never assuming that he understands their meaning (Van Norden 1996, 4–5). Accordingly, Nivison’s methodology involves reading relevant commentaries and translations, looking for glosses of words and paraphrases of key phrases, and preferring interpretations that attribute a sensible meaning to the text and cohere with the larger context. This is a slow method, as it involves pondering over seemingly insignificant issues such as the importance of the common word “again” (*fu* 復). As a consequence, this article may be a slow read at first, but a well-grounded interpretation of the passage has major implications, insufficiently brought out by earlier studies, as it reveals ethical dilemmas of considerable gravity, as well as Mencius’s treatment thereof. The dilemmas will be discussed in the latter part of this study (Sections 4–5), a discussion for which the former part (Sections 1–3) lays the groundwork.

The main goal of this article is modest: to provide a coherent reading of the passage within the context of the *Mencius* as a whole. This reading suggests that while the passage touches upon several topics, including personal dignity and political responsibility, the overarching concern is on being a morally superior person, on the difficult dilemmas such people may face, and on how they would respond to them. More broadly, the article shows that while the philosophical practice of “weighing circumstances” (*quan* 權) allows moral agents in exceptional cases to break certain moral or ritual rules, Mencius seems unwilling to apply this discretion when

morality as a whole, or the integrity of the person who embodies it (*shi* 士), are involved.

I. Close Reading

This section offers a textual analysis of the *Mencius* passage translated above. It addresses the narrative structure, sentence segmentation, and several key terms.

A. Narrative Structure

The translated passage is 7B.23, a section located roughly in the middle of the final chapter in the *Mencius*. The enclosing sections focus on other topics (7B.22 on the music of sage-kings, 7B.24 on destiny), thereby demarcating our section as a self-contained unit of text. Hence, a proper understanding of 7B.23 depends primarily on this textual unit itself.

The narrative structure of 7B.23 consists of an outer story and an inner story. The outer story, or frame narrative, is a simple dialogue (one question, one answer) about a famine. The inner story is an anecdote about a tiger. Importantly, the outer story does not fully envelop the inner story. The dialogue's answer relays the anecdote but does not continue afterwards. As a result, the final sentence of the textual unit as a whole concludes both stories, inner and outer. This leaves it to readers to contemplate how a tiger relates to a famine, and how both relate to the philosophy of the text that contains this nested narrative.

The format of the outer story is common in early Chinese philosophical texts, which attribute statements to so-called "masters" (here Master Meng, or Mencius), and those statements can be preceded by questions from others (such as rulers, pupils, and rivals). The format of the inner story is also conventional. It conforms neatly to the characteristic features of anecdotes in early Chinese philosophical texts, as described by Van Els and Queen (2017, 7–24). Accordingly, the inner story is short (44 characters), has one main protagonist (the tiger

catcher), and three discernible narrative components: a beginning, which provides the background (“among the inhabitants. . .”); a middle part, which tells the incident (“went to the countryside. . .”); and an ending, which reveals the consequence (“the whole crowd. . .”). The ending of anecdotes in general tends to be a punchline whose value lies, for example, in the “inculcation of a moral lesson” (Fadiman 1985, xvi). In this case the moral of the story is not instantly clear, as Mencius does not elaborate on the anecdote. Fortunately, we can gain clarity by continuing our close reading of the passage, which will ultimately suggest that his opacity might be intentional.

B. Sentence Segmentation

The text of 7B.23 is generally agreed upon, except for this string of characters: 卒為善士則之野有眾逐虎. The lack of punctuation in the original text tasks readers with the parsing of the string to create meaningful phrases. Three readings have been proposed:

- (1) 卒為善士. 則之野. 有眾逐虎.
- (2) 卒為善. 士則之. 野有眾逐虎.
- (3) 卒為善士則. 之野. 有眾逐虎.

In translation:

- (1) Ultimately, he became a great gentleman.
Thereupon he went to the countryside.
There was a crowd in pursuit of a tiger.
- (2) Ultimately, he became great.
Gentlemen took him as a model.
In the countryside there was a crowd in pursuit of a tiger.
- (3) Ultimately, he became a model for great gentlemen.
He went to the countryside.
There was a crowd in pursuit of a tiger.

Option (1) is the oldest and most prevalent reading to date. This is how Zhao Qi 趙岐 (d. 201), Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), Jiao Xun 焦循 (1763–1820), and others read the text (Zhao 2000, 462; Zhu 1983, 369;

Jiao 1987, 988–989). Option (2) was proposed by Liu Changshi 劉昌詩 (13th c.) and his younger contemporary Zhou Mi 周密 (1232–1298). It never gained wide currency, but at least one present-day scholar, Cui Aofei, favors this reading (Liu 1983, 507; Zhou 1984, 232; Cui 2012, 41). Option (3) was proposed recently in two separate publications: an article by Wang Changlin, and a brief research note by Qin Hualin and Ling Yu (Wang 2002, 64; Qin and Ling 2005, 31).

The different readings are facilitated by the ambiguity of Classical Chinese, in which words can have different semantic meanings and grammatical functions. In this case, *ze* 則 can be a conjunction indicating a temporal relation between phrases (here translated as “thereupon”) and a verb meaning “to imitate” (here translated as “to take as a model”); *wei* 為 can be a copula verb (“he *became*. . .”) and a passive marker (“he *was taken*. . .”); and *zhi* 之 can be a verb of motion (“he *went to*. . .”) and an object pronoun (“took *him* as a model”). In view of the many possibilities, how to determine what reading is best? We can start by recognizing that while the string of characters is problematic, the proposed solutions are not flawless either.

Option (1) reads *ze* as introducing a singular event (the outing to the countryside), even though it “typically refers to situations and expectations that reflect general patterns” (Kroll 2015, 586).

Option (2) separates *shan* 善 “great” from *shi* 士 “gentleman” and associates each with a different sentence (“. . . became great. Gentlemen took. . .”). However, the combination *shanshi* 善士 “great gentleman” occurs eight more times in the *Mencius* (once in 3B.6 and seven times in 5B.8) and is clearly a special term in the text (cf. LaFargue 1994, 58). Moreover, this reading does not specify how the protagonist *became great*, which is strange because the preceding sentence in the anecdote already declares that he *was great* at catching tigers. Finally, as Yan Ruojun 閻若璩 (1636–1704) points out, having “gentlemen took him as a model” immediately followed by “in the countryside there was a crowd . . .” introduces a narrative gap by not expressing that the protagonist made a trip to the countryside (Yan 1983, 391).

Option (3) suggests that the protagonist was taken as a model by great gentlemen because he was great at catching tigers, in which

case the ending of the anecdote, where gentlemen laugh at him for engaging in catching a tiger, makes little sense.

With each reading being somehow flawed, “in the end it is difficult to decide which side is correct” 很難決定究竟是那一面對, as Lu Xun (1881–1936) remarks with regard to this anecdote ([1934] 1963, 461). While it is admittedly difficult, there is a significant difference between the traditional reading (option 1) and the later proposals (options 2 and 3). The latter parse the text in ways that vitiate the narrative, but the former merely involves a lexical peculiarity, as *ze* rarely introduces specific events. Not only is this less problematic, but the particular usage of *ze* possibly even strengthens the narrative. The conjunction suggests a logical connection between two sentences. Specifically, it suggests that the protagonist went to the country *as a gentleman*, that is, after he had become one. The *Mencius* translation by Dobson expresses this most clearly: “Traveling in the countryside *in this latter capacity* he found the inhabitants pursuing a tiger.” (1963, 51, emphasis added).

C. Key Terms

The frame narrative opens with a statement about a famine in Qi 齊. This powerful state was something of a mecca for Mencius, who hailed from a nearby statelet. On several occasions he confabulated with King Xuan of Qi 齊宣王 (r. 319–301 BCE), and his political career included a brief stint as a minister of the state (*Mencius* 2B.6). In his world, famine in Qi was big news.

In the text, Mencius is asked about the famine by a certain Chen Zhen 陳臻. This person is known only from the *Mencius*. He occurs in one more passage, in which he also asks a question, leading Zhao Qi to call him a student of Mencius (*Mencius* 2B.3; Zhao 2000, 129). Two further passages mention a certain Chenzi 陳子, which possibly translates as “Master Chen,” whom Zhao Qi considers to be the same person (*Mencius* 2B.10, 6B.14; Zhao 2000, 143). Scholars commonly follow the commentator in seeing Chen Zhen, a.k.a. Chenzi, as a pupil of Mencius. “This is all that is known of him,” concludes Legge ([1861] 1991, 215). However, the various apparitions of Chen Zhen in

the *Mencius* offer two relevant insights.

(1) Three out of four passages involving Chen Zhen mention Qi. One passage discusses Mencius's resignation from office in that state, from which Dobson logically concludes that the student was with him towards the close of his tenure in Qi (*Mencius* 2B.10; Dobson 1963, 91–92). Following the resignation, the king wanted to keep Mencius in Qi by offering him a residence and a stipend. He conveyed the offer to a certain Shizi 時子, who relayed it to Chenzi, who told Mencius. This suggests that Chenzi was an associate of Mencius with ties to government circles in Qi. That he would ask about the famine in that state is understandable.

(2) All four passages involving Chen Zhen address the relationship between rulers and advisors, and highlight the latter's integrity and incorruptibility. In one passage, Mencius informs Chenzi that exemplary people refuse to serve rulers who do not treat them with proper respect, and who have no intention of implementing their advice (*Mencius* 6B.14). This is also a main theme in the passage about the famine in Qi, as we shall see.

Chen Zhen's question about the famine includes the words *fa tang* 發棠. The first word, *fa*, has a plethora of meanings. Here it is a verb meaning 'to distribute,' which specifically refers to issuing food to the hungry. As Yang Bojun (1909–1992) points out, the same usage of the word is found in the opening chapter of the text, where Mencius accuses a king of dereliction of duty, for the king “does not know to distribute” 不知發 food even when starved corpses fill the roads (*Mencius* 1A.3; Yang [1960] 1988, 333). The second word, *tang*, is obscure. It does not occur elsewhere in the *Mencius*. Zhao Qi notes that Tang was a town in Qi, which scholars have since identified as present-day Jimo 即墨 in Shandong 山東 province. In Mencius's time, this was apparently where Qi kept grain in store. Hence, the two words combined refer to the distribution of grain from the state granaries.

In his question, Chen Zhen uses the word “again” (*fu* 復), thereby alluding to an earlier famine in Qi, during which Mencius had apparently made a plea to open the state granaries for the relief of starvelings. While the earlier plea is not recorded in the transmitted

Mencius, famine is a recurring theme in the book. For example, Mencius tells the governing officer of Pinglu 平陸, a town in the western part of Qi: “In years of famine and starvation, the old and frail among your people fell dead in the ditches, while the able-bodied fled by the thousands in all directions.”² He also speaks with the ruler of Liang 梁 about famine in that state (*Mencius* 1A.3), and he avers that just like “years of scarcity cannot kill those who stockpile victuals, times of depravity cannot corrupt those who stockpile virtue.”³ Famine is clearly an important concern for Mencius. Whether or not there actually was an earlier occasion in which he pleaded with the ruler of Qi to open the state granaries is irrelevant, because the text makes it believable that he did. Hence, the main value of Chen Zhen’s use of the word “again” is not historical but philosophical, as repetition of action is a main theme in this *Mencius* passage.

Chen Zhen suggests that Mencius would not repeat his plea now that Qi is facing famine again. Mencius does not expressly agree, but merely notes that doing so would be to act like Feng Fu 馮婦. This person is virtually unknown in ancient Chinese literature. Even his name is remarkable. Feng 馮 is a common surname, but Fu 婦 means “woman.” Commentators hasten to explain that Feng Fu is not a woman surnamed Feng, but a man with the given name Fu. That Mencius feels the need to introduce this man (“among the inhabitants of Jin. . .”) suggests that Feng Fu was unrenowned. It is even possible that Mencius made him up. After all, Feng Fu’s native state of Jin was located several hundred miles from Mencius’s main area of activity, which conveniently complicates verification of the story. Hence, the opening line of the anecdote could be read as “somewhere far away there was someone who. . .” with the specific details merely adding a coating of credibility. Still, even if Feng Fu is a fictional character, this would make no difference for the meaning of the passage, which is not about historical accuracy, but about conveying a philosophical message through the medium of an anecdote.

² *Mencius* 2B.4: 凶年饑歲, 子之民, 老羸轉於溝壑, 壯者散而之四方者, 幾千人矣.

³ *Mencius* 7B.10: 周于利者凶年不能殺, 周于德者邪世不能亂.

II. Tiger Catcher

The anecdote told by Mencius suggests that Feng Fu as a young man excelled at catching tigers, which merits a closer look as this is no workaday occupation. Of the various words for hunting and catching animals in Classical Chinese, Mencius here uses *bo* 搏. The written form contains the stylized image of a hand, 扌, as a semantic element. The spoken form, now *bo*, in ancient times was closer to *pak*, which is possibly the onomatopoeic representation of a punch or a blow from the fist.⁴ If the latter conjecture is correct, the visual and oral forms combine to suggest a violent action involving hands. This coheres with the word's usage elsewhere in the *Mencius*. In the famed debate on human nature, Mencius says of water that “by striking it you can make it splash up above your forehead”⁵ In another dialogue he speaks of someone being “held down and detained” 搏執 (*Mencius* 4B.3). Both cases involve physical contact between the hands and an external object upon which they apply force, whether by splashing up water or holding down a person. The story of Feng Fu similarly involves physical contact between him and tigers, whom he fights and pins down with his bare hands. These fights require athletic ability, dexterity, and above all intrepidity. They are spectacular displays of his closeness to nature, both literally and figuratively. This is man at his most primitive; his animal nature comes fully to the fore. In the traditional Chinese dichotomy between “civility” (*wen* 文) and “martiality” (*wu* 武), the tiger fighter perfectly embodies the latter value.

When Mencius introduces Feng Fu as a tiger fighter, he mentions an extraordinary but no imaginary occupation. Animal fights of this kind were more common in ancient China than today. In those days, as Mark E. Lewis observes, the Chinese “battled animals hand-to-hand as displays of courage during hunts” (Lewis 1989, 154). An apposite example is an Ode 詩 titled “Senior Younger Brother in the [Hunting] Fields” 大叔於田 (*Maoshi zhengyi* 4.2; cf. Mao 2000, 333),

⁴ Baxter and Sagart (2014) reconstruct this word in Old Chinese as *pʰak.

⁵ *Mencius* 6A.2: 搏而躍之可使過額.

which contains these lines:

You bare your chest for the apprehension	禮褐暴虎
of a tiger to present to the lord's mansion.	獻於公所
Oh, younger brother, don't be reckless,	將叔無徂
beware or you'll sustain a laceration.	戒其傷女 ⁶

The Ode's portrayal of the younger brother baring his chest is reminiscent of Mencius's remark that Feng Fu rolled up his sleeves when he alighted from the carriage. Both vestimentary actions add colorful detail to the narration, and they signal an eagerness to engage in hand-to-paw combat. These men were not involuntarily thrown to the lions; they readily flung themselves at tigers!

Animal combat in ancient China occurred even at the highest echelons of society (Lewis 1989, 155). The Ode illustrates this, as it tells the story of Duan 段, the younger brother of Lord Zhuang of Zheng 鄭莊公 (r. 743–701 BCE). The first two lines depict Duan's intention to present his older brother with a feral gift as an unsubtle hint of his fearlessness and strength. In real life, Duan fearlessly led a rebellion against his brother in 722 BCE (*Zuoquan*, Yin 1; cf. Zuo 2000, 57–62). The last two lines of the Ode warn that his rashness may lead to injury, ostensibly by the tiger but possibly by his brother as well. In real life, the ruler of Zheng indeed crushed the rebellion.

Animal combat also occurred in the lower strata of society where, Lewis notes, the fights “were associated with men prone to violence,” such as “wastrel youths [. . .], criminals, and other marginal figures” (Lewis 1989, 155). If he ever lived, Feng Fu was probably one of those marginal figures, because Mencius introduces him as someone “among the inhabitants of Jin,” not as a member of the elite. His animalistic skills must have been of great use, because recent research shows that tigers roamed over most of China in those days (Kang et al. 2010, 337). Hence, there likely was a demand for dauntless men who could safeguard society from these ferocious creatures. In the literary world of the anecdote, this is reflected by the observation

⁶ My translation reflects the rhyme in lines 1, 2, and 4: *q^hra?, *s-q^hra?, and *nra? in the Baxter and Sagart reconstruction.

that the villagers “rushed to welcome him,” and that “the whole crowd was pleased with him.”

Not everyone appreciated men who were that close to nature. For example, Confucius 孔子 (551–479 BCE) would not put someone who fights tigers in charge of the army, because the commanding officer “must be someone who stands in awe of the task that he faces, and succeeds due to his predilection for devising strategies.”⁷ In Confucius’s view, the very qualities required for wrestling with wild animals, such as bravery and celerity, disqualify someone from overseeing the troops, which requires reflection and restraint, two qualities he clearly ranks higher. Others likewise recognized the dangers of martiality, especially when insufficiently accompanied by civility. They argued for a balance between the two, or even better, as one text puts it, “two measures of civility for each measure of martiality” 二文一武 (*Huangdi sijing* 1.5; cf. Chen 1995, 172). Mencius seems to share this sentiment, as he presents a new side of Feng Fu that outbalances his animalistic nature.

III. Gentleman

Mencius suggests that Feng Fu later in life became a *shi* 士. This term has several meanings, in the *Mencius* as well as in general. Absent a perfect equivalent in English, it is variously translated as “knight,” “scholar,” “official,” “gentleman,” and so on. The latter translation is adopted in this article, as it captures some of the versatility of the Chinese term. As a prominent cultural concept, *shi* occurs in many ancient texts, and features in several modern studies (e.g., Hsu 1965, 89–106; Yu 1987, 1–128). However, in order to understand what it means specifically for Mencius to call Feng Fu a *shi*, we must explore the meaning of this term in the *Mencius*, which mentions it over ninety times. The following overview is based on my analysis of all *shi* mentions in the *Mencius*.⁸

⁷ *Analects* 7.11: 必也臨事而懼，好謀而成者也。

⁸ For a comparable analysis, see LaFargue (1994, 69–94), who describes what he calls “Shih-Idealists” based on numerous *Mencius* passages.

Mencius broadly divides society into four levels (ruler, high nobility, low nobility, common people), and he associates *shi* with the third level. While the first two levels held the highest and often hereditary offices, *shi* offered various services to those above them (*Mencius* 3B.4). As men of service, *shi* barely outranked those below them. Mencius even mentions the lowest two social strata in the same breath when he speaks of “gentlemen and commoners” 士庶人 (*Mencius* 1A.1, 4A.3). He also notes that the starting emolument of a *shi* is comparable to that of a commoner who, when performing a public task, had to be compensated for not being able to cultivate the land (*Mencius* 5B.2).

What truly characterizes *shi* is not their social status or wealth, but their mentality. As Mencius puts it, “only gentlemen are capable of keeping a stable mind while lacking stable means.”⁹ They acquire this steady mentality through education. He gives the example of someone called Chen Liang 陳良, whose excellence in learning earned him the appellation “preeminent gentleman” 豪傑之士 (*Mencius* 3A.4). As educated men, *shi* were the intelligentsia of their time and nearly all philosophers, including Mencius, belonged to this social stratum. The education of *shi* was aimed not at erudition, but at moral cultivation. For example, Chen Liang is said to have “delighted in the ways of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius” 悅周公仲尼之道, two paragons of virtue (*Mencius* 3A.4). As cultivated men, *shi* observe core values such as “humaneness” (*ren* 仁) and “rightness” (*yi* 義) (*Mencius* 7A.33). On the latter value, *Mencius* says:

When impoverished, gentlemen do not lose hold of rightness. When accomplished, they do not stray from their path. By not losing hold of rightness, even when impoverished, they acquire character. By not straying from their path, even when accomplished, the people do not lose hope in them.¹⁰

As “practitioners of humaneness and rightness” 為仁義者 who “preserve the ways of the ancient kings while awaiting those who would learn

⁹ *Mencius* 1A.7: 無恆產而有恆心者惟士為能。

¹⁰ *Mencius* 7A.9: 士窮不失義, 達不離道。窮不失義故士得己焉, 達不離道故民不失望焉。

them” 守先王之道以待後之學者, *shi* are ideally suited to advise rulers (*Mencius* 3B.4). Similar to farmers, weavers, carpenters, and wheelwrights, who provide food, clothes, and other tangible goods, *shi* offer models of proper conduct. It may be difficult to appraise their intangible wares, but Mencius maintains that *shi* should be decently remunerated, presumably because of their impact. While other professions improve the livelihood of rulers, *shi* refine their behavior. In Mencius’s ideal world, rulers lead by example and their refined behavior permeates through society in what we may call “trickle-down morality.” The populace benefits from this, which is presumably why Mencius in the quotation above claims that “the people do not lose hope” in *shi*.

As advisors to rulers, *shi* had a solemn duty to speak truth to power. Mencius even claims that a state may perish without “gentlemen who offer admonishments” 拂士 (*Mencius* 6B.15). This epithet also applies to himself, as evidenced by many episodes in the text. Consider the well-known opening passage, where a king courteously welcomes Mencius in hope of enriching his kingdom. Mencius instantly asseverates that he only intends to discuss moral enrichment (*Mencius* 1A.1). “Everyone is shocked, reeling from [his] audacity in rebuking the king,” in Van Norden’s lively depiction of the scene (2011, 84).

When *shi* endeavor to offer well-intentioned advice to a head of state, they may expect that the advice be followed. This did not always happen, leading to two unpleasant scenarios:

(1) In the worst case, the advice could invoke the ruler’s wrath and lead to the advisor’s untimely death. An example well known to Mencius is Bi Gan 比干, whose unappreciated advice led to his gruesome end at the behest of Zhòu 紂, the infamous last king of the Shang 商 (16th–11th c. BCE) dynasty. In Mencius’s view, such examples should not deter *shi*, because “a strong-minded gentleman never forgets that he may end in a ditch, and a stout-hearted gentleman never forgets that he may forfeit his head.”¹¹ Speaking for himself, he adds: “I am very fond of life, but I am also fond of rightness, and if I

¹¹ *Mencius* 3B.1: 志士不忘在溝壑, 勇士不忘喪其元。

cannot have both, I will give up life and go with rightness.”¹² Ivanhoe illuminates Mencius’s view:

virtuous agents who face extreme adversity and risk death are fully aware of how bad it is and *intensely dislike* the prospect. Yet despite finding the thought of their own death repulsive, they do not turn away from such threats when these stand in the way of doing what is right. Ethically good people feel the danger and loathe the prospect of dying but are *unmoved* in their pursuit of the good. (Ivanhoe 2006, 230)

As Mencius himself puts it, a *shi* does what is right, even if it would kill him, and avoids what is wrong, even if it would benefit him, because “those who bend themselves can never straighten others.”¹³

(2) In a not-worst-but-still-bad scenario, the ruler simply ignores the advice. In that case, the advisor’s work would be in vain, and he dies what I would call a “vocational death,” which for a man devoted to service differs little from the physical death of someone whose unwanted advice cost him his life. Unappreciated by the ruler, the vocationally dead gentleman must seek his employ elsewhere. In Mencius’s words, if the person in charge is unworthy, “gentlemen keep themselves over a thousand miles away,” and only if he is worthy do “gentlemen from all over the world come to him in great numbers.”¹⁴

In summation, what does it mean for Mencius to call Feng Fu a gentleman? Zhao Qi relates it to Feng Fu’s courage as a tiger fighter (Zhao 2000, 462). Being a *shi* indeed requires a strong dose of courage, but it involves much more than that. Mencius generally presents *shi* as exemplary men who are well-educated and well-mannered, who have a highly developed sense of dignity and honor, and who—at the risk of life if need be—endeavor to do what is right. In other words, being a *shi* is not a logical extension of being a tiger fighter. Rather, it

¹² *Mencius* 6A.10: 生亦我所欲也，義亦我所欲也，二者不可得兼，舍生而取義者也。

¹³ *Mencius* 3B.1: 枉己者未有能直人者也。

¹⁴ *Mencius* 6B.13: 士止於千里之外；5A.1: 天下之士多就之。

involves a radical transformation from a martial temperament to a civility-driven mentality.

IV. Laughter

While Mencius presents *shi* as exemplary men, in the anecdote that he tells, they laugh at someone who helps others fight a tiger. This help can be seen as an expression of humaneness, which is a core value of the *shi*. Why, then, do they laugh at a man who lends a helping hand?

The answer, in my view, is rooted in Mencius's understanding of human nature. While he is known for the slogan "human nature is good" 性善, he actually describes humans in less positive terms. He espouses what I would call a scale of sophistication. At the one end, there are the uncouth who give free rein to their animal instincts; at the other, civilized people who bridle their instincts and behave appropriately at all times. The average person does not dwell in the center of the scale, as we might expect, but towards the lesser end: "humans have a propensity to fill their belly, dress warmly, and live comfortably; they are close to birds and beasts, were it not for education."¹⁵ In other words, in fulfilling our basic needs we are barely distinguishable from animals, and only learning (specifically, moral learning) can set us apart. As Roger T. Ames notes: "For Mencius, an undeveloped human being—someone who is resolutely uneducated and uncultured—is not in any important sense 'human'" (Ames 1991, 163).

Mencius famously assumes that all people (even the uncouth) possess "sprouts" 端 of moral behavior. Moral growth involves developing those inner sprouts, which requires dedication, perseverance, and above all, patience:

A peasant in Song was disappointed that his seedlings would not grow, so he pulled at them. Coming home dead beat, he told his family, "What a back-breaking day! I helped the seedlings grow."

¹⁵ Mencius 3A.4: 人之有道也，飽食，煖衣，逸居而無教則近於禽獸。

His sons ran out to inspect the seedlings, but they had already withered.¹⁶

Analogous to growth in nature, progress on the scale of sophistication cannot be rushed. It is “a learning process with which we must engage,” Xinzhong Yao notes, adding that the process only “gradually leads to the realization of our potential” (2018, 195). Ordinary people need a role model (parent, teacher, etc.) to guide them in this process and encourage them to do right, but *shi* have successfully learned to exhibit proper conduct of their own accord. In Mencius’s own words:

Those who await a King Wen before they bestir themselves are average people, whereas preeminent gentlemen bestir themselves even when there is no King Wen around.¹⁷

Proper conduct is “second nature” to gentlemen, or rather, the sprouts that were latent in their first and only nature are fully grown. On the scale of sophistication, they inhabit the positive end. It would be inconceivable for such a person, after a long process of careful self-cultivation, to suddenly slump to the negative end of the scale. Yet that is exactly what happened to Feng Fu.

As a gentleman on an outing to the countryside, he encountered frightened villagers who were unable to subjugate the sharp-clawed creature he was formerly trained to fight. Feng Fu now faced a dilemma (cf. Wang 2002, 63). If he rejected their appeal for help, he would show callous disregard for their distress. This would make him inhuman: not humane and barely even human. In one word, he would be a beast (*Mencius* 4A.17 brands such people as “jackals and wolves” 豺狼, as discussed below). However, if he heeded their plea, the ensuing hand-to-paw combat would rekindle his primal instincts and essentially reduce him to an animal as well.

Feng Fu may not have been aware of the dilemma. For him, helping others while at the same time enjoying his former profession

¹⁶ *Mencius* 2A.2: 宋人有閔其苗之不長而揠之者。芒芒然歸，謂其人曰“今日病矣！予助苗長矣。”其子趨而往視之，苗則槁矣。

¹⁷ *Mencius* 7A.10: 待文王而後興者凡民也，若夫豪傑之士雖無文王猶興。

meant putting his old skills to good use—a win-win situation for the villagers and for himself. This explains his instantaneous reaction. The locals had only just welcomed him when he “*immediately* bared his arms, and descended from the carriage.”¹⁸ On the spur of the moment, Feng Fu must have forgotten that the demeanor of a tiger fighter is incompatible with that of a gentleman.

The other gentlemen were not that forgetful. When they learned how easily Feng Fu fell into his old and ungentlemanly habits, they snorted with laughter. As a gentleman, Feng Fu must have undergone the long moral training that made them into sophisticated men who control their animal instincts. Yet as soon as the opportunity arose he charged at a tiger again. Myeong-Seok Kim calls this “emotional backsliding,” which is when “a person of some degree of moral cultivation falls back to succumb to his old temptation and do what is not morally desirable” (2014, 67). This retrogression shows that Feng Fu had not managed to shake off his old animalistic self. His refinement turned out to be no more than a thin layer of varnish. With his descent from the carriage to fight the tiger, he effectively excommunicated himself, unbecoming as it is for a gentleman to “engage in feats of such foolhardiness,” as Dobson puts it (1963, 51).¹⁹

Now that we know why the gentlemen in the anecdote laughed at Feng Fu, how does the narrator, Mencius, judge their laughter? He ends the anecdote rather abruptly with a remark in which he presents two diametrically opposed responses to Feng Fu’s descent: approval by the crowd (“pleased with him”) versus disapproval by the gentlemen (“laughed at him”). He does not express a preference for either response, leaving it to readers to assess them.

Given the overwhelmingly positive portrayal of *shi* throughout the *Mencius*, and the text’s suggestion that Mencius belonged to their group, as discussed in the previous section of this article, readers may reasonably assume that he would side with the gentlemen in

¹⁸ As translated by Legge ([1861] 1991, 488), who added the word in italics to highlight the immediacy of the action.

¹⁹ For similar remarks, see Legge ([1861] 1991, 489), Faber (1882, 121), LaFargue (1994, 90), and Van Norden (2008, 189).

disapproving of Feng Fu's behavior in the countryside. However, this assumption may be challenged by a similar ethical dilemma elsewhere in the text, which revolves around the question whether a man may lend a helping hand to a drowning woman if it violates the moral rule that prevents physical contact between (unmarried) men and women (*Mencius* 4A.17). In response to that dilemma, Mencius pulls an ideal tool from his philosophical toolbox: *quan* 權, variously translated as "weighing circumstances," "moral discretion," etc. In her in-depth analysis of *quan*, Griet Vankeerberghen (2005, 74) remarks that "moral or ritual rules are never absolute, and that the agent, occasionally, may face the necessity of breaking them," because "a failure to break the rules would have extreme and unpleasant consequences." Wielding *quan* enables Mencius to declare that a man is exceptionally allowed, and even morally obliged, to extend his hand when a woman is at risk of being swallowed by water. By parallel, he may hold that Feng Fu was morally obliged to bare his arms when villagers were at risk of being clawed by a tiger. Hence, readers could reasonably assume that he would side with the crowd in approving of Feng Fu's behavior in the countryside.

If readers can muster arguments and evidence for either view, why did Mencius not follow the anecdote with his final judgment of Feng Fu. We could conveniently argue that the text is corrupt, and that the judgment was somehow omitted from Mencius's statement in the course of the text's transmission. However, note that the statement is not only open-ended, but also open-started. When told that the starving population of Qi hopes that he will plead once again with their king to open the state granary, Mencius does not provide a straightforward answer, whether affirmative or negative, but merely states that it "would be to act like Feng Fu," which can be interpreted either way. Hence, it seems that the text is not necessarily corrupt, and that the ambiguity is deliberate. The underlying reasons may become clearer when we take a closer look at the frame narrative that contains the anecdote.

V. Repetition

The anecdote involving the tiger is a story within a story involving famine. When the Mencius character in the outer story speaks of acting like the Feng Fu character in the inner story, he draws a parallel between himself and the tiger catcher. This suggests that their situations are analogous. How, exactly, does the analogy work? This question is important, because the answer affects our understanding of the meaning of the passage as a whole.

One interpretation of the analogy is expressed most elaborately by Cui Aofei (2012, 40–41). In this interpretation, the tiger corresponds to the ruler, and catching the tiger to persuading the ruler.

Table 1. Target-Action Scenario

Protagonist	Target	Action
Feng Fu	tiger	catching the tiger
Mencius	ruler	persuading the ruler

There are several problems with this scenario. For starters, the ruler is not mentioned in the outer story, which renders a correspondence with the tiger in the inner story unlikely. Furthermore, in this interpretation the main message of the nested narrative would be that persuading a ruler is as dangerous as catching a tiger, and that just like Feng Fu may fail to catch the tiger, Mencius may fail to persuade the ruler. Indeed, several scholars apparently consider this to be the main takeaway from the passage, for they also think that Mencius expects another plea to be futile. For instance, Bloom notes that “Mencius evidently believed that his second request would be rejected” (2009, 161).²⁰ In my view, this reading may not be altogether plausible for two reasons.

Firstly, Feng Fu is introduced as a skillful tiger catcher, and nowhere

²⁰ For similar remarks, see Faber (1882, 121) and Eno (2016, 156).

does the text hint that he may lose. We may therefore reasonably assume that Feng Fu “presumably dealt with the tiger, though the text does not say so” (Dobson 1963, 51). One could, of course, argue that his skills had faded over time, or that even the best fighters at some point lose. However, in that case the main message of the passage would be a bland “quit while you’re ahead,” which is hardly the kind of advice one would expect from Mencius.

Secondly, nowhere does the text suggest that Mencius believes his request would be in vain. Even if that were the case, the main message would be a bleak “do the right thing, except when you think you may fail.” Mencius would not want to be associated with this defeatist outlook, which clashes with his aforementioned view that a *shi* does what is right, even if it would kill him.

My interpretation of the analogy is different. In my view, the tiger corresponds to the famine (both are problems), and catching the tiger to distributing grain (both are solutions).

Table 2. Problem-Solution Scenario

Protagonist	Problem	Solution
Feng Fu	tiger	catching the tiger
Mencius	famine	distributing grain

Both Feng Fu and Mencius faced a problem. For the former, it was a stray tiger that threatened locals in a rural area; for the latter, a famine that starved the inhabitants of a state. The two men did not cause these problems, but they were called upon to offer solutions: Feng Fu by the locals; Mencius by the people of Qi. Both men were hailed as potential saviors on account of previous successes in their respective fields: Feng Fu in catching tigers, Mencius in persuading rulers. In all these ways their situations are analogous, but the analogy falls short in two regards.

(1) As a former tiger catcher, Feng Fu has the ability to attack the problem directly, but Mencius lacks the authority to issue grain. He

can only address the problem indirectly, by imploring the authorities to do so. This has important implications, as we shall soon see.

(2) Fighting the tiger makes Feng Fu revert to his animalistic self, which from a *shi* perspective is inherently wrong, but asking the ruler to open the granary does not make Mencius an animal. Hence, the analogy he sees between the tiger catcher and himself is not in *what* they do, but in *repeating* what they do. Feng Fu is asked to fight again; Mencius to plead again. From a *shi* perspective, pleading for the distribution of grain is not inherently wrong, but repeating it is (cf. S. Kim 2010, 37–38).

To understand the problem of repetition, we may start by looking at Mencius's views on rulership. He maintains that the responsibility for order in a state lies with the person in charge. Order requires sensible governance, including agricultural policies that account for the possibility of a failed harvest so as to guarantee the continued nutrition of the populace. Famine, a manifest aberration of the orderly state, denotes failure of governance. Mencius leaves no doubt about who is to blame, when he tells a head of state:

When people starve to death and you say, “it wasn’t me, it was the harvest,” how does this differ from stabbing someone to death and saying, “it wasn’t me, it was the knife”?²¹

During a previous famine in Qi, which Chen Zhen hints at in the frame narrative, Mencius had apparently implored the ruler to issue grain, as an expedient measure for the emaciated and, presumably, as a warning for the ruler to improve his agricultural policies. That Qi now faces famine anew suggests that the warning has not been heeded, at least not adequately. “Considering the recurrence of the same problem,” Sungmoon Kim notes, “the famine was indeed man-made, which makes it a social problem affiliated with the failure of the local government’s public policy” (2010, 37–38). Failed policy not only caused the famine, but also exacerbated the hunger, because while people are starving again, the king had “apparently decided it

²¹ *Mencius* 1A.3: 人死則曰“非我也，歲也”是何異於刺人而殺之，曰“非我也，兵也。”

is not yet time to dip into the grain the state has stored up for such occasions” (LaFargue 1994, 98), even though Mencius’s previous plea had suggested this to be the proper course of action. Naturally, Mencius could repeat his plea to open the granary. However, as I mentioned earlier, he holds gentlemen who offer admonishments in high esteem. In this case, not repeating his request could be construed as an admonition through silence, for it gives the king a nonverbal schooling in who is responsible for the problem and its solution.

Mencius’s theory of political responsibility explains the merit of not repeating the plea, but not the harm of repeating it. Chen Zhen seems to have the latter in mind when he tells Mencius “I apprehend you cannot do so again.” This forces us to find a stronger explanation of why repetition would be wrong. As I have shown, when a *shi* offers advice to a ruler who fails to appreciate it, his talents are wasted and he should seek employ elsewhere. Suppose, hypothetically, that Mencius repeated his request. He would thereby acquiesce in the paucity of action following his earlier imploration, and implicitly admit that his advice need not be heeded, which weakens his credibility as an advisor. As Bloom (2009, 161) notes, “Mencius evidently believed that [. . .] he would lose a measure of credibility, as did Feng Fu when he reverted to an earlier role of tiger tamer.” More generally it diminishes the gravity of the role of advisor, which may explain why he expects to be derided by other *shi* if he were to act as Feng Fu. He would betray their dignity and no longer deserve to be in their midst. That, in my view, is why Mencius carefully ponders the consequences and presumably declines to repeat his plea for grain, though the text does not explicitly say so.

This raises the question of why *shi* identity is so important to Mencius. In the anecdote about the tiger, the villagers welcome Feng Fu to lend them a helping hand, and in the frame narrative about the famine, the inhabitants of Qi want Mencius to help them as well. If a helpful action pleases the multitudes, why would it matter that it displeases the relatively small group of *shi*? Feng Fu seems unbothered by this, for he charges at the tiger anyway, but Mencius is more cautious. I suspect that this is related to the opportunities of *shi* to do good. As a tiger catcher, Feng Fu can help only one village at a

time, but as an advisor to a head of state he would be able to enhance people's livelihood on a much larger scale. Sadly, he squandered this opportunity with his ungentlemanly behavior in the countryside. Unlike Feng Fu, Mencius seems fully aware that he faces a devilish dilemma:

- If he repeats his plea for the distribution of grain, he would help the ill-fed now, but diminish his credibility and his standing as a *shi*, and thereby limit his chances of offering similar help in the future.
- If he does not repeat his plea for the distribution of grain, he would leave the ill-fed to their fate, but retain his credibility and his standing as a *shi*, and thereby maintain his chances of offering similar help in the future.

This ethical dilemma is a real quandary over choosing between *actual* help-seekers in the present, and an unknown number of *potential* help-seekers in the future. If I am right in assuming that Mencius opts to *not* act like Feng Fu, he leaves the victims of this one famine to their fate, which his theory of political responsibility enables him to do, in hopes of aiding victims of disasters to come. While there is no good answer to the dilemma, as people die either way, Mencius seems to opt for the largest possible reach of his talents, which he expects to find in the future.

One might ask, as I did earlier, why Mencius does not apply *quan* here. After all, since he asserts that the perils of drowning override objections to physical contact between unmarried men and women, he could similarly argue that the perils of starving override objections to repeating a plea. However, this may be approaching it from the wrong angle, because what if Mencius actually did consider *quan*, and concluded that the situation did not warrant an exception? To explore this a little further, it may be worth quoting the passage on the drowning woman in full:

Chunyu Kun asked, "Does ritual propriety entail that, in giving and receiving, men and women must not touch one another?" "It does," said Mencius. "If your sister-in-law were drowning, would you

rescue her with your hand?" Mencius replied, "Only a beast would not rescue a drowning sister-in-law. While ritual propriety entails that in giving and receiving men and women must not touch one another, rescuing a drowning sister-in-law with a hand is a matter of expedience [*quan*]." "Then why is it that you do not come to the rescue now that the whole world is drowning?" Mencius replied, "When the world is drowning, you rescue it with the Way. When a sister-in-law is drowning, you rescue her with your hand. Do you wish me to rescue the world with my hand?"²²

The first part of this passage is often invoked in discussions of *quan*, for it illustrates the view that the moral agent may occasionally face the necessity of breaking moral or ritual rules. The latter part of the passage is less popular, but no less important. After Mencius asserts that extending a hand to rescue a woman is a matter of expedience, his contemporary Chunyu Kun, the quick-tongued courtier from the state of Qi, asks why Mencius would not lend a helping hand to rescue the world. Mencius thereupon draws a distinction between the means to rescue one person and the means to rescue the whole world. He ends with a rhetorical question that perplexes scholars. For example, Legge notes "I hardly see the point of the last question" ([1861] 1991, 308), and Lau suggests that "Mencius' final question seems totally irrelevant" (1963, 180). In my view, the rhetorical question serves two purposes, namely (a) to ridicule Chunyu Kun, by pretending to take literally the phrase "the whole world is drowning," which the courtier clearly meant figuratively, and (b) to make the important point that expedience does not apply when rescuing the world.

In his in-depth analysis of this passage, D.C. Lau distinguishes between instrumental and constitutive means to achieve goals (1963, 180). The hand is an instrumental means to rescue someone from drowning; it is one of several possible means (one could also use a stick); and it is morally neutral (a hand can be used for good or bad ends). The Way is a constitutive means to rescue a world in disorder.

²² *Mencius* 4A.17: 淳于髡曰“男女授受不親，禮與？”孟子曰“禮也。”曰“嫂溺則援之以手乎？”曰“嫂溺不援，是豺狼也。男女授受不親，禮也；嫂溺援之以手者，權也。”曰“今天下溺矣，夫子之不援，何也？”曰“天下溺，援之以道；嫂溺，援之以手。子欲手援天下乎？”

When rescued, the world is said to “have the Way” 有道, which suggests a strong bond between means and end. The Way is not morally neutral, because immoral usage equals “lacking the Way” 無道. Unlike moral or ritual rules, which in exceptional circumstances may be broken, the Way may never be compromised. When Chunyu Kun suggests that Mencius should treat saving the world as a matter of expedience (*quan*), he “did not realize that the price for such a compromise was so high as to defeat its very purpose” (Lau 1963, 184).

This brings us back to the tiger and the famine. It seems that in both cases, *quan* does not apply, because being a *shi* is a constitutive means to achieve goals. It is not a ritual prohibition that can be broken as a matter of expedience, but a lifestyle of the highest moral caliber that cannot be compromised, because even a single exception—fighting one tiger or repeating one plea—would defeat its very purpose. It would strip the moral agent of his gentlemanliness, his *raison d’être*.

In summary, when it comes to ethical dilemmas, Mencius seems to uphold a hierarchy. If a situation exceptionally calls for breaking a specific moral or ritual rule, this is allowable when observing the rule would yield worse consequences than violating it. However, if the situation affects the sum total of all rules (the Way), or the integrity of the moral agent (the *shi*) who embodies it, exceptions do not apply.

VI. Conclusion

In his article “Casuistry and Character in the *Mencius*,” Robert Eno draws attention to casuistic passages in the text. Such passages provide instances of how exemplary people—first and foremost, Mencius himself—respond to morally difficult situations. Exploring the case-specific responses enables readers to gain access to the authoritative morality of these sages. As Eno puts it, casuistic passages invite readers “to engage in a hermeneutic of personal exploration, approaching through imaginative acts of *verstehen* [understanding] the perspective of the authoritative sage” (2002, 189–190). The

methodology of *verstehen*, which he defines as “an empathetic grasp of virtue perspectives cultivated through hermeneutic probing of historical narratives,” can be challenging, especially when the narrative is unclear. The present article has attempted to understand the abstruse passage involving the reappearance of famine in Qi. If Mencius serves as an exemplary figure in the text, as Eno suggests, what are readers to learn from his response to this morally difficult situation? In my view, there are several take-aways from this passage, both methodological and philosophical.

While casuistic passages present specific cases of morally difficult situations, reading them in isolation would be unwise. The passages are embedded in a textual and cultural context, which may be helpful in understanding their full import. In this particular case it proved helpful to glance at other *Mencius* passages featuring Chen Zhen, as they tend to address the integrity of political advisors, a main concern in this passage as well. Similarly, other ancient writings illustrated the prevalence of tiger fighting, and the distaste for the practice by some scholars, particularly those of a Confucian persuasion. Finally, to understand the pivotal concept in this passage, *shi*, it proved vital to analyze portrayals of these men elsewhere in the *Mencius*.

This passage teaches readers that the *shi*-ideal, the perfect embodiment of the Confucian way, is sacrosanct to Mencius. The ideal cannot be abandoned, even in situations of dire need, and exceptions of moral discretion (*quan*) do not apply. Mencius views *shi* as people of the highest moral caliber, who care deeply for the wellbeing of others. They strive for the largest possible reach of their care, by improving the living standards of the people through guidance of those in power. They accept the sovereign’s authority, but not unconditionally, for they possess the wisdom and the courage to speak truth to power. In return they expect recognition, which entails that their advice is taken up. If recognition is not forthcoming, this violates their credibility and dignity, and forces them to look for rulers who do appreciate their insights, even if this means, as it seems to do here, that they must leave the emaciated to their fate. By opting to not address the life-threatening tribulations of the population of Qi, Mencius is making the point that for a *shi* something more important

is at stake: his principles. To him, these outweigh everything, even life. Mencius is willing to give up life, his own or that of others, to prevent the dilution of principles. After all, he who bends himself can no longer straighten others.

This passage also teaches readers that the *shi*-ideal represents a reflective frame of mind. It portrays Feng Fu as a rash character who acts, seemingly without thinking, based on his primary impulses. By contrast, the text reveals how Mencius, as a moral exemplar, responds to a similar situation, that is, with thought and restraint. He resembles the kind of military commander that was admired by Confucius. Strength and courage may be important qualities in battle, but impulsively charging at an opponent, whether human or feline, creates unnecessary exposure to risk. Wise commanders, and *shi*, make decisions only after careful contemplation.

Finally, the passage suggests that a reflective mind expresses itself through measured speech. Morally difficult situations involve painful choices. In this particular case, the choice is between, on the one hand, helping people now while losing one's credibility as a *shi* and, on the other hand, maintaining one's credibility as a *shi* while hoping to help people in the future. If my reading of the passage is correct, Mencius opts for the latter. It must be painful for him to turn a deaf ear to the cries of hunger coming from Qi, which may explain why he does not offer a straightforward answer to Chen Zhen's question, and responds with an allusive anecdote about a tiger catcher instead.²³ If he had made his choice explicit, he would have shown the people of Qi that he abandoned them, which someone who maintains that humans have "a heart that does not remain indifferent to others" 不忍人之心 simply could not do (*Mencius* 2A.6). Moreover, by not expressing his choice, Mencius forces readers to ponder the problem with him, thereby enabling them to come to their own *verstehen* of the course of action preferred by moral exemplars.

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²³ Wilhelm calls this *redend schweigen* ([1916] 1921, 177n21), which implies that Mencius remains silent on a certain topic, deliberately avoiding addressing it, while still talking.

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Integrating Care and Respect: *Early Confucian Ethics as Inclusive Ethics*

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Abstract

What it is commonly referred to as “early Confucian ethics” has its textual sources in two canonical Confucian texts—the *Analects* and the *Mencius*, and to a lesser extent, in the *Xunzi*. This article breaks fresh ground in the study of early Confucian ethics by defending a new interpretation that Confucian ethics is an *inclusive ethics* in the sense that all of its key notions contain the dual dimensions of care and respect. I call this “the inclusion thesis.” This paper will proceed as follows. First, I make some general remarks about the importance of integration of care and respect in ethics. Second, I distinguish between two ways of making ethics inclusive—(1) the integration by reduction and (2) the integration by complementation. Between the two, I suggest that the method of integration by complementation should be preferred. Third, I present two case studies to illustrate the importance of inclusivity of care and respect. Lastly, by meticulous exegetical analysis, I attempt to substantiate my inclusion thesis that early Confucian ethics is a moral theory in which care (or love) and respect are conceptually amalgamated through the complementary integration.

Keywords: Confucian ethics, respect, care, inclusive ethics, Confucius, Mencius

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I. Introductory Remarks about the Importance of Inclusive Ethics

According to Aristotle, the purpose of engaging in ethics is to become a good person, not merely to acquire knowledge. Studying ethics is not merely to know what is good and right but to do good things and perform right actions. Moral theory as practical philosophy is supposed to serve as a guide to our actions and a basis for evaluating them, but there are a variety of moral theories on offer, such as consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, which are not always compatible with one another. In many cases, they give conflicting counsels as to what we should do and how our actions should be appraised. The rise of the feminist ethics of care has certainly enriched our understanding of morality and provided a new conceptual framework in our theoretical toolkit, but the questions remain: Which of the above-mentioned theories is the best guide to our actions if they do not point in the same direction? On which theory should we settle as our practical guide? To resolve the difficulty, we ask: what is it that we as human beings ultimately want? While this is a question that falls under the heading of moral psychology, moral theorists do have an answer to it in an explicit or implicit form. Utilitarian ethicists would declare that we want happiness. A right action, according to them, is one that results in a net increase in happiness.¹ Kantian theorists would lay great stress on human autonomy. They urge us to respect every human being's autonomy and do things that do not infringe it.² Care ethicists would say that ultimately it is care (or love) that we want. The right thing to do, therefore, is one that establishes or strengthens a caring

¹ What utilitarian theorists refer to as "happiness" is "aggregate happiness", that is, the total happiness for everyone affected by the action, rather than the happiness of a particular individual. Thus, using utilitarianism as a guide may complicate a simple act of kindness because the agent may not know who else will be affected by her action besides the individual she is helping. I am grateful to Professor Ivanhoe for bringing up this point in his comments on a draft of this paper.

² It is sometimes called the principle of respect for persons, which is one of the formulations of Kant's famous Categorical Imperative.

relationship. An inclusive answer, however, would go something like this: If we are happier when more of our needs are met, and we need *both* love and respect from human interactions, then we will be happier when we are treated with *both* love and respect. As we can see, the inclusive answer is in line with maximizing happiness.

Kant calls love and respect “two great moral forces”—the former drawing us together while the latter keeping us at a respectful distance (Kant 1996, 568-569). But it is a challenge to achieve what may be called the Goldilocks’ distance—not too close, not too far, but just right. More than 2,000 years ago, the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551-479 BCE) recognized how difficult it is to maintain an optimal distance in human relationship.³ We can make use of the dual forces of love and respect to regulate our relationships because human relationships are dynamic, always in flux, and in need of constant adjustment. We cannot help but act, and our actions may either strengthen or undermine our relationships with others. Kant cautions us about the dire consequences of letting one moral force dominate the other because the immorality that ensues will destroy humanity. Kantian ethics, however, is not a paragon of balanced moral theory as it is favorably inclined toward the moral force of respect. On the other hand, the contemporary ethics of care is not an exemplar of balanced moral theory, either, as it leans decisively toward the moral force of love. Thus, there is a need for an inclusive ethics that can help us harness and coordinate the two great moral forces at the service of maintaining a harmonious relationship with others.⁴

³ In the *Analects*, Book 17, Confucius laments that in certain human relationships, too little social distancing can lead to insolence, whereas too much social distancing may incur resentment. It is a controversial passage, which I don’t intend to discuss in this paper, but his main point seems generally applicable.

⁴ I wish to thank the reviewer for raising the question of whether my inclusive approach can unite other-regarding virtues and self-regarding virtues, given the importance of self-cultivation in early Confucian ethics. While the issue is not a focus of my paper, I would like to address it briefly here: I would argue that other regarding care and respect and self-regarding care and respect are related. Mencius famously said, “The benevolent person loves others. The person of propriety shows respect to others. Those who love others are loved by them. Those who respect others are respected by them” (*Mencius* 4B.28, my translation. Mencius also made similar remarks in 4A.8 and 4A.10). If we care about and respect others, they tend to care about and respect us.

II. Reductive Integration vs Complementary Integration

In recent years, some scholars have done just that, by working toward an integrative ethical theory that incorporates both care and respect (Dillon 1992) or love and respect (La Caze 2005). It seems to me that there is more than one way to proceed in this direction. Such integrative projects can be pursued through different approaches. One approach may be referred to as “the integration by reduction” or “reductive integration” through which a key idea in one moral theory is reduced to a core idea of another theory. Robin Dillon, for example, argues that care—a core idea in the ethics of care—is a kind of respect, which is a key concept in Kantian ethics. She writes,

[T]here is a conception of respect for persons which incorporates many of the most characteristic elements of the care perspective. This conception . . . views caring for a person as a way of respecting her. Care, on this conception, is one kind of respect . . . it is a kind of respect we owe to all persons, not just to our loved ones and friends. . . . I believe we may find in a union of respect and care resources for a more integrative approach to moral theory and moral life. (Dillon 1992, 107)

It seems that the way her approach towards the integration of (the concepts of) care and respect is a case of integration by reduction because it attempts to reduce the idea of care to the notion of respect. In contrast, there is a different method by which an integrative project can be undertaken. Such a method may be called “the integration by complementation” or “complementary integration” according to which care and respect are seen as opposite and yet complementary

This will have positive impact on one's self-respect, which in turn tends to promote self-care. Confucius said, “The virtuous cultivate themselves to be respectful . . . they cultivate themselves in order to make others safe and at ease . . . they cultivate themselves to make all safe and at ease” (*Analects*, 14.44, my translation). As we can see, the purpose of self-cultivation is other regarding—to care about and respect others and community. If one does so, one's dignity and wellbeing will be enhanced because one will be honored and loved. Therefore, other regarding virtues and self-regarding virtues are mutually inclusive and reinforcing.

to each other; their polarity and complementarity are preserved as the integral components within a higher-order concept, which plays a more central role in moral and political agency and appraisal. In Dillion's reductive integration, respect plays the role of a higher-order notion that assimilates the idea of caring into itself. Nel Noddings, however, sees the notion of caring as the higher-order notion in relation to the idea of respect as she thinks that the desire to be treated with respect is a variant desire to be cared for. Noddings writes,

After a discussion with Jim Gibbs, a Stanford anthropologist, I was convinced that caring may not be universal. What is universal . . . is the desire to be cared for. . . . There is nothing moral about that desire in itself. But its universality makes . . . the caring relation... a primitive good. Manifestations of the desire to be cared for range from the absolute need of infancy to the aloof desire to be treated with respect that is so characteristic of mature persons in individualistic cultures. . . . [The caring] relation is everywhere taken as a basic good. (Noddings 1999, 38)

If the desire to be treated with respect is a variant of the desire to be cared for, as Noddings notes, then it seems reasonable to say that respect is a variant of caring because the desire to be cared for can be met with caring; the desire to be treated with respect can be satisfied with respect. If respect is reduced to caring, the distinction between them would evaporate into thin air. As a result, there would be only connectedness without separateness in human relationships; only intimacy without appropriate boundaries. There would be no room for being left alone. Having a personal space in which one is left alone to do or be what she wants to do or be, without interference from the state or others is what Isaiah Berlin refers to as "negative liberty" (Berlin 1958, 7).⁵ Respecting negative liberty is respecting people's negative rights such as the right to privacy. When Blaise Pascal says in his *Pensées* that all the unhappiness of men arises from the fact that they cannot stay quietly in their own chamber, he may have overstated his case to make a point but personal space is an

⁵ I am indebted to Professor Ivanhoe for suggesting this point.

important value. While respect not balanced by care would make us isolated like Leibniz's monads, care not tempered with respect would render us undifferentiated nonentities. When human relationship is dominated by care alone, it would be like a universe having gravity without the countervailing force to keep it in check, resulting in all matter squeezed into something like Parmenides' Being—a solid sphere of uniformity. In the absence of either care or respect, we would be deprived of a powerful tool to regulate and harmonize human relationships. Noddings's reducing (the concept of) respect to the umbrella notion of care would leave little personal space. "All you need is love" sounds good, but your life would certainly go better if you are also respected as a chart-topping artist. Dillon's and Noddings's seemingly opposite approaches are problematic because both involve a denial of the fundamental differences between respect and care (or love)—the "two great moral forces" that are supposed to pull us in opposite directions in moral life. To say that respect is a kind of care, as Noddings does, or care is a kind of respect, as Dillon does, is to obliterate their basic differences. If such differences are denied, then the project of integration becomes unnecessary. Since care (or love) and respect are not only opposite, but also complementary to each other, there are two kinds of errors that can be made with regard to their relationship: one is to deny or downplay their polarity, whereas the other is to deny or downplay their complementarity. By claiming care is a kind of respect or vice versa, Dillon and Noddings seem to have erred on the side of denying their polarity (or fundamental differences).

Why do these scholars use the reductive method of integration to unite care and respect if the two concepts are obviously distinct? The answer to this question seems to be twofold. First, in philosophy, science, and religion, there is a prevalent tendency to apply Oakham's razor to reduce the complexity of reality to a minimal number of fundamentals. The least number of fundamentals is, of course, one. This tendency may explain why in religion there is monotheism. In physics, there have been attempts to unify the four fundamental interactions into a single force on the basis of which an all-encompassing framework called the "theory of everything" is to be built.

There are a variety of monistic theories in philosophy. In ethics, as mentioned earlier, the all-important value for utilitarianism is aggregate utility. Respect for the moral law lies at the center of Kant's moral universe like a supermassive black hole. The concept of care plays a similar overarching role in the ethics of care. The attempt to reduce care to respect or vice versa is to turn morality into a single all-inclusive fundamental value. Einstein famously said, "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler."⁶ Trying to reduce what is irreducible is to make things simpler.

The second reason is that among care theorists, there has been no agreement with regard to the nature of care, even though there exists a large and growing body of literature on care ethics since it burst on the scene decades ago (Held 2006, 29). In philosophy, this is not surprising because after thousands of years, we are still nowhere near a consensus about the nature of truth, justice, beauty, or some other important philosophical notion. Despite a lack of agreement, some definitions are more illuminating than others. According to Nel Noddings (1984), caring means focusing one's attention on the needs, desires, and preferences of those under one's care, and trying to understand a situation from their perspectives. However, paying attention is not nearly enough. Your adversary can closely study your feelings, needs, desires, and thoughts in order to find out your weaknesses to subdue you. Care is first and foremost an action that addresses perceived needs. According to Diemut Bubeck (1995, 129), care means meeting the needs of one person by another person, when those needs cannot possibly be met by the person in need herself. Care is "a response to a particular subset of basic human needs, i.e. those which make us dependent on others" (133). All babies and ailing elderly need care all the time; all healthy adults need care some of the time (when they get seriously ill, or incapacitated due to injuries). Sympathy (or compassion) motivates care as action. Care is based on negative appraisal in the sense that someone is in an unfortunate or unenviable position that calls for sympathy,

⁶ The quote is not found in his publications; he may have said it in a private conversation.

pity, or compassion. You need care if you are injured or sick and incapable of taking care of yourself. Respect, in contrast, is based on positive appraisal and is not motivated empathy, rather than by sympathy.⁷ We respect someone not because of her vulnerabilities or weaknesses, but rather because of her strength, dignity, superiority, excellence, or merit. In an influential paper, Stephen Darwall (1977) distinguishes between two kinds of respect—recognition respect and appraisal respect. Recognition respect is what we owe all persons as persons in so far as they are rational, free, and autonomous. It is what Kant has in mind when he says we should treat humanity as ends, not merely as means. According to Darwall (1977, 38), recognition respect is also conferred on “the law, someone’s feelings, and social institutions with their positions and roles.”⁸ Although Darwall does not discuss specifically respect for parents, it seems reasonable to

⁷ I would like to thank the reviewer who asked the question about the psychological underpinnings of care and respect.

In my response, I draw on the *Analects*, and Stephen Darwall’s works on empathy, sympathy, respect, and care. According to Darwall, a human being has two aspects: dignity and welfare. When someone’s welfare is being threatened, it arouses sympathy in us, which often leads to care. For Darwall, respect is not motivated by sympathy, but by empathy. Confucius taught us not to impose on others what we ourselves do not want. This is to treat others as equal to us who have desires and preferences that may or may not be the same as ours. But how do we know if others have desires and preferences as we do? Because we have desires and preferences and we project them into others who are outwardly like us. Such a psychological projection is empathy, which underpins respect. It reminds us that we should be circumspect in dealing with our fellow autonomous beings, not pushing them around like a piece of furniture. Exclusively care-based ethics is incomplete because we are not beings with welfare alone; exclusively respect-based ethics is one-sided because we are not beings with dignity alone. In spite of the fact that care and respect have different underpinnings, empathy and sympathy are not mutually exclusive, but mutually complementary. We need both sympathy and empathy to care for and respect one another, and therefore they work in tandem in a single integrated system of Confucian ethics.

⁸ Let me use the following case to illustrate why care and (recognition) respect are both needed. After President Ronald Reagan was shot and wounded, his doctors and nurses cared for him because he could not take care of himself; his life depended on the help of his caretakers. At the same time, though, they still showed great respect for him because of his status as president. For example, they would address him as “Mr. President,” rather than “Ron” or “Ronnie.” They would not say to themselves, “Since this guy is in a vulnerable position, let’s drop the formalities.” Military personnel would still salute him according to the relevant protocols.

classify parental respect as recognition respect because the family is a major social institution. I would also add *social norms* and *religious rituals* as the objects of recognition respect. When Confucius laments that some officials perform rituals (禮) without the proper attitude of respect (敬), he clearly has something like recognition respect in mind.⁹ By contrast, appraisal respect is not automatically conferred on all persons; to deserve appraisal respect, one must possess excellent character, ability, or skill. In Confucian ethics, *junzi* and *ren* are honorific designations for someone in possession of virtuous character traits, who deserves appraisal respect. Roughly, what distinguishes care from respect is that care is based on negative appraisal while respect is based on positive appraisal. Even recognition respect that is owed to all persons is based on positive appraisal because rationality, freedom, and autonomy are of great value. Another difference is that care implies *proximity*. “When I need help, she is always there for me.” “He offered me a shoulder to cry on when I lost my beloved pet.” Respect, however, implies *distance*. “Please respect the privacy of the grieving family during this extremely difficult time.” “Leave me alone.” Therefore, to say that respect is a kind of care or care is a kind of respect, is to downplay the fundamental differences between the two. On the other hand, to say that care is based on negative appraisal does not mean there being no positive appraisal at all. To assert that respect is based on positive appraisal does not imply there being no negative appraisal. Person A tries to save Person B in part because it seems to A that B is savable. If B has already died, A’s caring efforts will cease. Our *respect* for the privacy of a grieving family also involves some *negative* appraisal—the family is in a difficult situation and needs to be left alone.¹⁰ It seems to me that the method of integration by complementation is a better way to unite care and respect because it retains their polarity (differences) as well as their complementarity.

⁹ 子曰：“居上不宽，为礼不敬，临丧不哀，吾何以观之哉？”『论语』3.26（八佾篇）。朱子曰：“居上，主于爱人，故以宽为本；为礼，以敬为本；临丧，以哀为本。既无其本，则以何者而观其所行之得失哉？”

¹⁰ Despite their fundamental differences, respect and care are not mutually exclusive. When someone loses autonomy due to mental illness or dementia, recognition respect turns into care.

In the integration by complementation, the concepts of care and respect are incorporated into an inclusive idea that is situated on a higher conceptual echelon and plays a more central role in ethical and political agency, evaluation, and education. For example, filial piety in early Confucius ethics is such an inclusive and higher-order notion in which care and respect are united.

Having argued against the reductive integration, my main goal for the rest of this essay is to show that Confucian ethics exemplifies inclusive ethics in that all of its key concepts contain the dual dimensions of care and respect.¹¹ What we refer to as “early Confucian ethics” has its textual sources in two major Confucian classics—the *Analects* and the *Mencius*. It has been variously characterized as the ethics of *respect* (Wawrytko 1982), the ethics of *care* (Li 1994), *virtue* ethics (Ivanhoe 2000), *role* ethics (Ames 2011), and *relational* ethics (Connolly 2012). I call these characterizations “the five theses” about or “the five portraits” of early Confucian ethics: respect, care, virtue, role, and relation theses. This essay breaks fresh ground in the study of early Confucian ethics by defending a new interpretation that Confucian ethics is an *inclusive ethics* in the sense that all the key virtues it endorses contain the dual dimensions of care and respect. I call my new interpretation “the inclusion thesis,” which is not incompatible with all the aforementioned characterizations. For example, my inclusion thesis does not undermine the virtue thesis, nor does it downplay the importance of the role thesis or relation thesis. It can be seen as a synthesis that preserves the insights of both the respect thesis and the care thesis, and yet as a more comprehensive representation of Confucian ethics. Through meticulous exegetical analysis I attempt to substantiate that early Confucian ethics is a morality in which (the concepts of) care and respect are integrated into the following higher-order notions—

¹¹ In this essay, I use “inclusive” and “integrative” interchangeably. I also treat the terms of “love” and “care” as synonyms. These two terms are often used interchangeably in the literature of feminist philosophy. According to Virginia Held, some theorists don’t like the term “care” and have tried changing “the ethic of care” to “the ethic of love” (Held 2006, 9).

filial piety (*xiao* 孝), Goodness (*ren* 仁),¹² the virtuous person (*junzi* 君子), care-respect (*renyi* 仁義), and ritual (*li* 禮). In what follows, I will present two case studies to illustrate what might have motivated early Confucian philosophers to develop an inclusive ethics in which care and respect are coalesced into one organic unity. These cases will serve as a segue into the elaboration of my inclusion thesis.

III. Two Case Studies

The First Case: I use the following case to bring home the need for integration of care and respect in ethics. It is mentioned by Mencius (372-289 BCE) probably as a cautionary tale (*Mencius* 6A.10) against unbalanced philanthropy in particular and lopsided morality in general. The story, also included in the *Book of Rites* (*Liji* 禮記), is about an indigent man who dies of starvation after rejecting food offered him disrespectfully (Legge 1885, 194-195). It turns out that philanthropy was a common practice in ancient China.¹³ During difficult times, benevolent wealthy merchants, government officials, or monks would use their own resources to set up what was analogous to today's soup kitchens, food banks or food pantries to help sick or famished indigents. Presumably they were motivated by something like the ethic of care. However, in their eagerness to care for the unfortunate, they tended to skimp on courtesy. "Hey you! Here's something for you to chew on," the wealthy merchant shouted. It happened that the starving person approaching the soup kitchen was a Kantian, acutely aware of his human dignity and very sensitive to slights and insults. He took umbrage at not being addressed as Sir, and a lack of other formalities such as "welcome" and "please,"

¹² Arthur Waley translates *ren* 仁 as "Goodness" because he sees it as a notion of great generality. Like Waley, Edward Slingerland also renders *ren* as "Goodness." I adopt their translation as far as Confucius is concerned. When it comes to Mencius, however, even though he uses the same character 仁 as Confucius does, it no longer means the same. For Mencius it refers to sympathy, compassion or caring.

¹³ <http://history.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0830/c372327-28677004.html> (accessed September 1, 2020)

staggered away, and finally died of starvation. The story raises a question for utilitarian ethicists: When hunger meets food, there is supposed to be a happy ending—satiation; both the philanthropist and the starving person should be satisfied. But why in this case did their encounter result in the worst outcome—death? For Kantian and care ethicists, this story should be read as a cautionary tale about the importance of inclusivity of both care and respect because an inclusive ethics would have more resources to strike a balance between them. The proverbial “beggars cannot be choosers” turns out to be problematic, as the above tale suggests, because even a starving beggar on the verge of death can exercise his autonomy, wherein lies human dignity. As the above story indicates, caring not balanced with respect may result in failure or even tragedy. On the other hand, respect without caring can be equally inadequate, if not more so. Just imagine a world in which everyone is scrupulously respectful, but mothers do not feed their babies; adult children dutifully visit their ailing parents but never lift a finger to help them. It seems therefore that an integration of caring and respect would lead to a better human relationship.

The Second Case: In the *Mencius* 7A.19, there is a story about how Zengzi 曾子 (505-436 BCE), a disciple of Confucius, takes care of his father. The way Zengzi treats his father exemplifies both care and respect because in addition to providing his father with food and drink, he always consults his father about what to do with the unconsumed meat and wine after the old man finishes his dinner. However, when Zengzi himself grows old and has to be taken care of by his son, the young man never asks him what to do with the leftovers. In both cases the fathers are cared for by their sons, but there is a crucial difference: the way Zengzi treats his father is an embodiment of integrative care, which Mencius endorses, whereas the way his son treats him leaves something to be desired and that something is respect.

IV. Integration of Care and Respect in Confucian Ethics

A. The Mouth-Body Nourishing Care vs the Mind-Nourishing Care

The abovementioned cases lead Mencius to distinguish between two kinds of care—the mouth-body nourishing care (*yangkouti* 養口體) and the mind-nourishing care (*yangzhi* 養志) (*Mencius* 4A.19). While we immediately recognize the mouth-body nourishing care as care, the mind-nourishing care is, in fact, respect because the respecer acknowledges that the person under his care is his father and defers to his autonomy. To some extent, it is analogous to seeking the informed consent of a patient in a healthcare context. The contrast is clear: Zengzi's father was treated with both care and respect whereas Zengzi himself was cared for but not respected. It is not hard to see which of the two ways can lead to a more satisfying relationship and which is prone to resentment. It seems clear that for Mencius, the mouth-body nourishing care paired with the mind-nourishing care is conducive to a better caring relationship because it takes into account the fact that human beings desire not only to be cared for, but also respected, and Zengzi's way of caring for his father satisfies both. In all likelihood, Mencius' integrative thinking is influenced by his predecessor, Confucius.

B. Filial Piety as Integrative Notion

Confucius is dissatisfied with the prevailing opinion of his time according to which filial piety means no more than the mouth-body nourishing care, that is, providing parents with nourishment (*yang* 養). According to Confucius, there is something amiss with the conventional idea of care prevalent in his time. He asks rhetorically, "In the absence of respect (*jing* 敬), how can we distinguish providing for parents from providing for dogs and horses?" (*Analects* 2.7). Indeed, human beings have both physiological and psychological needs. Bertrand Russell observes, "The boa constrictor, when he has had an adequate meal, goes to sleep, and does not wake until he needs another meal. Human beings, for the most part, are not like

this” (Russell 2009, 447). Unlike the boa constrictor, human beings are not satisfied with the mouth-body nourishing care alone. What makes an inclusive care ethics more efficacious as a guide than either an ethic of care or an ethic of respect is that the former can counsel us to be mindful of the universal human desires to be cared for and respected, and to act accordingly.

If the desires to be cared for and respected are universal, their fulfillments must be good. However, such fulfillments require the cultivation of the virtues of care and respect, which is central to Confucian ethics. Mencius, for example, maintains that there is a two-fold approach to win the hearts and minds of the people—to provide them with what they need and not to impose on them what they dislike (*Mencius* 4A.9). “To provide them with what they need” is to care for them; “not to impose on them what they dislike” is to respect them. The two-fold approach, however, should not be construed only as a strategy for rulers or political leaders to gain power. For Mencius, the combination of the two familial virtues of filial piety and brotherly respect (*ti* 悌) is accessible to most people. It is a formula for social harmony because he believes that if everyone loves their own parents and respects their elders (and extends such love and respect beyond their own families), the world will be at peace (*Mencius* 4A.11; 1A.7).

For Confucius, the foundation of the two-fold approach to win the hearts and minds of the people is filial piety constituted by love of and respect for parents. In the opening chapter of the *Classic of Filial Piety* (*Xiaojing* 孝經), he identifies it as the all-important virtue possessed by the sage kings of antiquity, who, by exercising it, won the hearts and minds of the people who consequently lived in peace and harmony; there was no resentment between the rulers and their subjects (Hu 1999, 49). With such a far-reaching impact, filial piety has a humble beginning at home where it is instilled and cultivated (*Analects* 1.2). The state, as the family writ large, is the realm where filial piety can expand into the general virtue of Goodness (*ren*). In Confucian ethics, there are at least five integrative virtues having care and respect as their integral constituents: filial piety, Goodness (*ren*), the virtuous person (*junzi* 君子), care-respect (*renyi* 仁義), and ritual (*li* 禮). Since filial piety is considered a foundational virtue

in classical Confucian ethics (*Analects* 1.2), in what follows, I first present textual evidence to show that it is an inclusive virtue with both care and respect as its integral constituents. I then demonstrate that care and respect are also integrated into the rest of the aforementioned virtues.

The Confucian concept of filial piety is both philosophically interesting and pragmatically significant.¹⁴ It is philosophically interesting because there are two integral aspects to it—care and respect. It is pragmatically significant because the issue of caring for parents may very well become an important topic in public debate and moral discourse in years to come if the rate of population aging is to continue unabated. Caring for parents is a significant part of caring for senior citizens. While the former seems to be a familial and private matter and the latter a public health issue, for classical Confucian philosophers there is no sharp demarcation between the family and the state since they see the state as the family writ large. If, in the style of Mencius, every family could take care of their elderly parents in the inclusive manner discussed in this paper, the world would be a better place.

We can hardly overestimate the importance of filial piety as a fundamental virtue in the Chinese tradition. While filial attitude is highly valued in many different cultures around the world, the Confucian tradition's preoccupation with filial piety is extraordinary (Ivanhoe 2004, 189). Almost all early Chinese philosophers (perhaps with the exception of Yang Zhu 楊朱) concur that filial piety has pride of place in the Chinese ethos (Chan and Tan 2004, 1). Over the course of two thousand years the Confucian canon exerted and is still exerting enormous influences on the hearts and minds of the people in China as well as other Asian countries such as Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. Every aspiring public servant would take great pains to master the Confucian classics before taking the civil service examination. The pronouncements of Confucius, his disciples, and successors on the topic of filial piety are recorded in canonical texts such as the *Analects* (*Lunyu* 論語), the *Mencius* (*Mengzi* 孟子), the *Great*

¹⁴ For an insightful and systematic discussion of filial piety, see Ivanhoe (2004, 189–202).

Learning (*Daxue* 大學), the *Doctrine of the Mean* (*Zhong Yong* 中庸), the *Book of Rites* (*Liji* 禮記), as well as the *Classic of Filial Piety* (*Xiaojing* 孝經). The latter, as one of the most influential of Confucian classics, is comprised of eighteen short chapters and about eighteen hundred words, and yet this slender volume had been among the most widely read classics over the past two millennia thanks to the clarity and conciseness of its language (Hu 1999, 3). While its authorship is a matter of controversy, many scholars believe that it was probably written by Confucius' disciple Zengzi or his disciples based on the teachings of Confucius. This classic played a profound and enduring role in promoting filial care and respect in Chinese society because it instilled the idea of filial responsibility in the minds of the young during their most formative years.

That the meaning of the character “孝” is more than filial care can be seen from careful etymological and exegetical analyses. It seems that in the period prior to the time of Confucius, the character does not mean *caring* for parents. In the oracle bone inscriptions (*jiaguwen* 甲骨文) and bronze inscriptions (*jinwen* 金文), the character consists of two parts: one part represents an old person and the other a child (Holzman 1998, 186; Chen 2007, 2-11). This construction therefore may be read as symbolizing the parent-child relationship. According to Holzman, however, most inscriptive messages on the sacrificial vessels that contain the character seem to be of religious significance because they convey the intention of those who perform the ritual to make offering of their filial piety to their dead father, or their dead father and uncles, or to the ancestral temple (*ibid*). Thus, it seems clear that in its archaic usage the character is imbued with a strong sense of religious reverence for deceased fathers and their brothers. By the time of Confucius, however, filial piety has lost its religious significance and acquired the meaning of caring for parents in the sense of providing for them (*yang* 養).

Confucius is dissatisfied with this conventional understanding; he argues that parents deserve more than just physical sustenance—they deserve respect (*Analects* 2.7). Given the fact that the sense of respect is contained in the original understanding and practice, we may say that Confucius has restored in the meaning of filial piety

what is originally there in the beginning, namely the idea of (religious) respect that has since been extended from the dead to the living. This is consistent with Confucius' agnostic and humanistic stance toward supernatural entities. When disciple Zilu 子路 asks about serving the spirits of the dead, Confucius replies,

“You are not yet able to serve people—how could you be able to serve ghosts and spirits?” “May I inquire about death?” “You do not yet understand life—how could you possibly understand death?” (Slingerland 2003, 115)

Thus, for Confucius the notion of filial piety is humanistic and secular; it has the integral dimensions of both care and respect (for parents).

If filial care involves providing for parents, that is, attending to their physical needs and comfort, what does *filial respect* involve? The answer to this question can be found by examining the relevant passages in the *Analects*. There are four disciples who each ask Confucius a question about filial piety (2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8). Passages 2.7, cited earlier, is about why respect should be included in the conception of filial piety: parents should be valued in a manner befitting their dignity as human beings whose worth is, in Kant's words, “above all price” (Kant 1998, 42). Passage 2.8 concerns how filial care and respect should be expressed in one's countenance. Confucius observes,

What is difficult to manage is the expression on one's face. As for the young taking on the burden when there is work to be done or letting the old enjoy the wine and the food when these are available, that hardly deserves to be called filial. (Lau 1992, 13)

Filial piety is not simply about providing parents with food, doing chores, or running errands for them; more importantly, it is about *how* one does those things. There is a difference between caring for parents respectfully and caring for them disrespectfully. Caring for them respectfully requires ritual (*li* 禮). Confucius explains: “When your parents are alive, comply with the rites in serving them; when they die, comply with the rites in burying them and in offering sacrifice to them” (Lau 1992, 13). To serve parents is to care for them;

to serve them according to the rites (or rituals) is to care for them with respect; caring for parents with respect constitutes filial piety. Ritual, however, is only part of what it means to respect parents. To respect parents also means to comply with or defer to their wishes, preferences, or points of view. Confucius says,

In serving your parents you should try to dissuade them from doing wrong in the gentlest way. If you see your advice being ignored, you should not become disobedient but should remain reverent. You should not complain even if you are distressed. (Lau 1992, 33)

One of the meanings of respect defined by the OED is “due regard for the feelings, wishes, rights, or traditions of others,” which is what Darwall calls “recognition respect,” as mentioned earlier. Darwall writes,

What we must attend to here is . . . what she holds good and would want from her point of view. We may rightly think that unhealthy habits are harmful for someone, but think as well that respect tells against exerting undue pressure to induce her to change. . . . A person’s own values and preferences give her reason to realize and promote them, and others reasons to permit her to do so. . . . (Darwall 2004, 14-15)

What Confucius refers to as respect (*jing* 敬) for parents in the above passage is due regard for their feelings and wishes, and therefore falls squarely under the heading of recognition respect. For Confucius, respect for parents has two senses: (1) to treat them in accordance with rituals (*li* 禮) or not in contravention of them; (2) to treat them in deference to their preferences or points of view. Confucius sums up these two senses of respect in a nutshell—“*wuwei*” (無違), meaning “never act against.” However, “never fail to comply” does not entail blind obedience, as evidenced by his advice that one should try to dissuade tactfully one’s parents from what one perceives as mistaken views or decisions. But if they insist on them, it is wrong for their children to withdraw care or even resort to abusive tactics to force them to change their minds.

Not only is filial piety important in its own right, it is also indispensable for the overarching virtue of *ren*. In the opening chapter of the *Classic of Filial Piety* Confucius declares that filial piety (*xiao*) is the origin of all virtues (Hu 1999, 49). His disciple Youzi 有子 also emphasizes the foundational nature of *xiao* by saying that filial piety and respect for elders constitute the origin of Goodness *ren* (*Analects* 1.2). If the notion of filial piety is inclusive of care and respect as its integral dimensions, it stands to reason that the idea of *ren*, as an extension of filial piety, should also be constituted by the same elements.

C. *Ren* as Integrative Concept

Confucius' *ren* 仁 is one of the higher-order notions into which care and respect are integrated. For ease of reference, I label his understanding of *ren* as "the inclusive view of *ren*," which is supported by many passages in the *Analects*. Some scholars, however, hold a different opinion. Following Mencius, they see *ren* as the virtue of care (benevolence or compassion) excluding respect and other virtues. This construal may be called "the exclusive view of *ren*." In the *Analects* there is scanty textual evidence in support of the exclusive view of *ren*, although one particular passage, namely 12.22, is frequently quoted as such.

There is no denying that to the question about *ren* posed by the disciple Fan Chi 樊遲, Confucius' reply is "to love *ren* 人" (*airen* 愛人) (*Analects* 12.22). Due to the ambiguity of the term *ren* in the classical context, however, it would be rash to automatically assume that *airen* in 12.22 means "to love everyone," as the proponent of the exclusive view of *ren* tends to do. According to Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, *ren* in its classical usage has two senses: in the broad sense, it refers to human beings in general, whereas in the narrow sense it signifies officialdom (Yang 1980, 4). In fact, after Confucius answers his question about *ren*, Fan Chi 樊遲 immediately asks a second question about wisdom or knowledge (*zhi* 智), to which Confucius' reply is "to know *ren* 人." If Confucius' answer to Fan's first question about *ren* is unclear due to the aforementioned ambiguity of *ren* 人, his answer to

the disciple's second question about wisdom 智 can shed light on the first because Confucius does elaborate on it by saying that to know *ren* (*zhiren* 知人) means to promote the virtuous by placing them above those who are corrupt, and as a result the latter may reform themselves (12.22). Fan Chi, however, is not among Confucius' best and brightest disciples who know ten things upon learning only one thing (*Analects* 5.9)—he fails to grasp Confucius' elaboration, so he asks the disciple Zizhang 子張 for clarification. Zizhang demonstrates himself to be a competent explainer of Confucius' ideas—he uses two historical examples (the sage kings Shun 舜 and Tang 湯) to explain what it means to know *ren* 人. It turns out that to know *ren* 人 is *not* to know *people* in general, but to know who is virtuous and therefore should be promoted to a higher governmental position, and who is corrupt and therefore should be demoted to a lower rank. If so, then Confucius is talking about the responsibility of a ruler or high ranking official for building a virtuous government. If this is correct, we are in a good position to disambiguate the term *ren* 人 in Confucius' answer “*airen*” (愛人) to Fan's first question concerning the meaning of *ren*. *Ren* means to love the virtuous, rather than to love everyone indiscriminately. Needless to say, in order to love the virtuous and promote them to leadership positions, one must know who is virtuous and who is not. Therefore, to love the virtuous 愛人 implies knowing the virtuous 知人. If the above analysis is correct, it shows that the exclusive view of *ren* is based on a misunderstanding of passage 12.22 in the *Analects*. In contrast, the inclusive view of *ren* enjoys extensive textual support from the *Analects*, and consequently rests on a secure exegetic basis. Consider passage 17.6 in which Confucius defines *ren* as the exercise of five virtues everywhere under heaven. They are respect, tolerance, trustworthiness, diligence, and caring (*Analects* 17.6). Elaborating on these virtues, he goes on to say,

If you are respectful, you will not be treated with disrespect. If you are tolerant, you will win all. If you are trustworthy, people will entrust you with responsibilities. If you are diligent, you will accomplish much. If you are caring, it suffices that others will work for you. (*Analects* 17.6)

This passage is what Slingerland calls “an instance of the overarching virtue of *ren* being presented as the harmony of lesser virtues” (2003, 202). *Ren* is not only inclusive of caring, but also of respect as well as other virtues such as trustworthiness and diligence. Therefore, *ren* is a higher-order notion into which care and respect are integrated.¹⁵ Passage 12.2 also supports the inclusive view of *ren*. Confucius tells his disciple Zhonggong 仲弓 that if he wants to be a *ren* person, he should conduct himself in the following manner:

When abroad behave as though you were receiving an important guest. When employing the services of the common people behave as though you were officiating at an important sacrifice. Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire. In this way you will be free from ill will whether in a state or in a noble family. (Lau, 1992, 109)

Behaving “as though you were receiving an important guest” implies respect; employing “the services of the common people as though you were officiating at an important sacrifice” implies caring. By “the common people,” Confucius primarily refers to peasants, who constitute the largest labor force in his time; they are often ordered to engage in road building and maintenance, or other public works projects. Such labor-intensive undertakings can be ruinous to their livelihood if they interfere with sowing or harvesting (Kupperman 2006, 72-73). Thus, government officials can be said to exhibit empathic concern (caring) for the peasants and their families if they employ their labor on public works projects *only* in the proper seasons. Similarly, passage 1.5 substantiates the inclusive view of *ren* even though the term “*ren*” is not explicitly mentioned. Confucius says,

¹⁵ Virtues such as tolerance and trustworthiness may be called “attractive virtues” because trust and tolerance, like care, pull people closer. Diligence is not a moral virtue in the strict sense. Thus, it may be argued that of the five virtues under *ren*, three of them—care, trust, and tolerance—can pull people closer, whereas one virtue (respect) keeps people at a respectful distance. Both care and respect can be helped by diligence.

To lead a state of a thousand chariots, be respectful and trustworthy in performing your public duties; be frugal in your expenditures; love those who work for you; employ the common people only at opportune times (*Analects* 1.5)

Although there is no explicit context to indicate that Confucius is answering a question about *ren*, it is easy to see the similarity between this passage and passage 17.6. On both occasions, Confucius treats respect and care, alongside other virtues, as integral members of a set of virtues he believes a good government official should possess. For Confucius, *ren* is the name of a set of virtues rather than the name of a single virtue. While there's no denying that a point of agreement between Confucian ethics and contemporary care ethics is that they both take active other-regarding concern (care) as centrally important (Li 1994), not much attention has been accorded to the fact that Confucian ethics takes respect (*jing* 敬) as equally important as, if not more so than, care.

D. *Junzi* (君子) and *Ren* (仁) as Inclusive Notions

Besides Goodness (*ren* 仁), the virtuous person (*junzi* 君子) is also a notion into which care and respect are incorporated. Consider passage 5.16 where Confucius praises a famous statesman named Zi Chan (子產) who he sees as an embodiment of *junzi*:

[H]e had four of the characteristics of a virtuous person *junzi*: he was respectful in the manner he conducted himself; he was reverent in the service of his superior; in caring for the common people, he was generous and, in employing their services, he was just. (Lau 1992, 61, modified)

It is clear that for Confucius, care and respect are the integral parts not only of the notion of Goodness (*ren*), but also of the conception of the virtuous person (*junzi*).

While Confucius holds an inclusive view of Goodness (*ren*), i.e., *ren* as a higher-order notion inclusive of both care and respect,

Mencius identifies *ren* with care alone, and his view therefore may be called “the exclusive view of *ren*.” Confucius sees *ren* as an umbrella designator for more than one virtue, whereas for Mencius it stands for a particular virtuous disposition—benevolent concern or caring. However, just because Mencius sees *ren* as a particular virtue does not mean the kind of ethics he promotes is not integrative. For Mencius, the idea of the virtuous person (*junzi*) is a higher-order, integrative notion. He understands *junzi* as someone who retains in his heart benevolence (*ren*) and ritual (*li*), and such a person therefore loves and respects others (*Mencius* 4B.28). Mencius remarks, “To feed someone but not love him is to treat him like a pig; to love him but not respect him is to keep him like a domestic animal” (Lau 1970, 190). To feed and love someone is to care for her. Nonetheless, that alone is not enough—human dignity requires respect. So the virtue of care needs to be complemented by respect. While for Mencius, benevolence (*ren*) itself is not a higher-order notion, *ren* and *yi* 義 combined into a *compound notion* is. Thus, even though care and respect are not incorporated into Goodness (*ren*), they are integrated into the virtuous person as well as care-respect (*renyi* 仁義). In fact, the virtuous person (*junzi*) is someone guided by *renyi* in the sense that the latter identifies and determines right and wrong as well as decides how to live (Ramsey 2016, 914).

Mencius frequently presents *ren* and *yi* as an integrative notion—care-respect *renyi*. This is a crucial point about which his and his predecessor Confucius’ views differ. Their divergence does not escape the notice of the prominent Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi 朱熹 who quotes his predecessor Cheng Yi 程頤 as saying that Confucius talks only of one word—Goodness, but whenever Mencius speaks, he talks about care-respect *renyi* (Zhu 1984, 199). Even though *renyi* is comprised of two words, they function as one organic unity. In the opening chapter of the *Mencius*, there is an exchange between Mencius and a king. The king asks Mencius if he has any advice from which his state may profit. Mencius replies, “Why does Your Majesty have to say the word ‘profit’? *Renyi* is all Your Majesty needs” (*Mencius* 1A.1). In this passage, as in many others, Mencius presents *ren* and *yi* as an integrative idea, rather than two separate

notions. Passage 4B.19 is another passage in which Mencius treats *ren* and *yi* as an integrative notion—care-respect *renyi*. He observes that the sage king Shun 舜 follows the path of *renyi* (*you renyi xing* 由仁義行) rather than puts *renyi* into practice (*fei xing renyi* 非行仁義). Among many translations of the *Mencius*, D. C. Lau's is one of the few who treats the two words as representing a single, inclusive idea. He notices Mencius' unique use of *renyi* as a single term, which he translated as "morality" (Lau 1970, 236n1), or "moral inclination." However, his rendition is not always consistent. On some occasions, he reverts to treating *renyi* as two separated terms. Furthermore, the generic term "morality" fails to capture what makes Mencius' moral philosophy unique—its inclusivity of care and respect.¹⁶

What is *renyi*, then? Why does Mencius treat them as an integrative notion? Passage 7A.37 can shed some light on these questions. As quoted earlier, Mencius insists that to feed people without showing them love is to treat them like pigs while to love them without showing them respect is to keep them like domestic animals or pets. It seems that for Mencius, *ren* and *yi* are individually necessary for morality but neither of them is sufficient. Only when they are integrated into one can they be jointly sufficient. To understand his idea of *renyi* we must understand what he means by *ren* and *yi*, respectively. More than once, Mencius explains that loving one's parents is *ren* and respecting one's elders is *yi* (*Mencius* 4A.27; 7A.15). He goes on to say that if one loves one's parents and respects one's elders, there is nothing else for one to do except to extend such love and respect to the whole society. So it seems reasonable to say that

¹⁶ I am grateful to the reviewer who raised the question of why Mencius did not use *ren* and *yi* as a single inclusive concept when he presented his four *duan* 端 theory of human nature. My explanation is as follows: If Mencius had used *renyi* as a compound term denoting a single inclusive virtue, the number of virtues he was proposing would not be four, and therefore he would have had difficulty likening the four incipient virtues to the four limbs of a human being. He remarked, "Man has these four germs just as he has four limbs (Lau 1970, 83). He likened the four potential or nascent virtues to the four limbs of a human being in order to emphasize their innateness and universality. However, wild beasts like wolves and tigers all have four legs. Do they have four *duan* as well? I wonder if Mencius had thought through this implication.

for Mencius, love and respect are sufficient for moral life. Elsewhere, Mencius expounds the same idea when he says,

Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families; treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age and extend this to the young of other families (Lau 1970, 56)

Mencius is probably faced with a two-fold problem in constructing his own moral theory. As mentioned earlier, unlike Confucius' integrated notion of Goodness (*ren*) that includes both care and respect, Mencius' concept of benevolence (*ren*) in and of itself is not integrated. It may be speculated that on the one hand, Mencius is not satisfied with Confucius' notion of *ren* because in it the integral component of benevolence (love, compassion, or care) is not as conspicuous as he would like it to be. On the other hand, his own notion of *ren* as benevolence, while sufficiently prominent, is incomplete. So combining *ren* and *yi* into *renyi* would seem to be a good solution to the two-fold conceptual problem. For Confucius, *ren* designates a hybrid virtue inclusive of many particular virtues such as caring, respect, trustworthiness, loyalty, and so on, whereas for Mencius, *ren* is a monistic virtue of paramount importance. Their disagreement over *ren*, however, does not detract from the thesis I have been advancing in this essay. On the contrary, it seems to show that the two philosophers have each struggled in their own ways to work out a satisfactory solution to the political and moral challenges with which they are faced. There is a continuity between Confucius' conceptions of filial piety, Goodness (*ren*), the virtuous person (*junzi*) and Mencius' notions of the virtuous person (*junzi*) and care-respect (*renyi*)—the integrative thread of care and respect running through them all.

A. Ritual (*li* 禮) as Integrative Notion in the *Xunzi*¹⁷

So far, my discussion has focused on the teachings of two most famous classical Confucian thinkers—Confucius and Mencius. It is now time to further strengthen my thesis by arguing that Xunzi 荀子 (313-238 BCE), a great philosopher in the Confucian tradition, also lends support to my inclusion thesis. Although Xunzi's writings are not traditionally included in the Confucian canon, they undoubtedly make a significant contribution to the development of classical Confucianism. Are there any key notions in Xunzi's writings that include both care and respect as their integral dimensions? I submit that ritual (*li* 禮) is such a notion. Just as care-respect (*renyi* 仁義) is the most important leitmotif in Mencius' discussions, it is widely acknowledged that ritual is the central topic in Xunzi's writings (Goldin 1999, 55). In "Discourse on Ritual" (Lijipian 禮記篇), Xunzi argues that the *raison d'être* of rituals is to regulate desire satisfactions (*lizhe*, *yangye* 禮ぬ, 養也) (Yang 2008, 261; Hutton 2014). Since *yang* 養 means "nurture" or "to provide for," it stands to reason that *li* 禮 in this context means care. Elsewhere, he identifies respect (*gongjing* 恭敬) with ritual by saying explicitly that respect is ritual (*gongjing*, *liye* 恭敬, 禮也) (Yang 2008, 209). While ritual refers to a broad range of ritual rules and practices, it is the spirit of respect that gives unity to them.¹⁸ One might object that it is a synthesis on my part, but does Xunzi in his writings use a compound term like Mencius' *renyi*? The answer is in the affirmative. In his treatise "The Way to Be a Lord" (*Jundao* 君道), Xunzi deploys the compound term "respectful-loving" (*jingai* 敬愛). He writes, "May I inquire about how to be a person's son?" I say: Be respectful-loving [*jingai* 敬愛], and have utmost good form (Hutton 2014, 119, with the original Chinese characters added). In the treatise entitled "The Way to Be a Minister," Xunzi remarks,

[T]he person of *ren* is sure to show respect for others. There is a proper way to show respect for others. . . . If they are worthy, one

¹⁷ Xunzi 荀子 defines respect (*gongjing* 恭敬) in terms of ritual (*li* 禮). See Yang (2008, 209).

¹⁸ I wish to thank the reviewer for suggesting to me that "ritual" in the *Xunzi* signifies the rules of conduct and the virtue of propriety.

draws near to [*qin* 親] them and shows them respect [*jing* 敬]. If they are unworthy, one keeps them at a distance and shows them respect. There is to be respect for one and all, but the dispositions involved are of two kinds. (Hutton 2014, 139)

Xunzi not only uses a compound term to indicate the inclusive nature of love and respect, he also draws a distinction between respect-love (*jingai* 敬愛) and respect-fear (*jingwei* 敬畏), which I think is his unique contribution to Confucian inclusive ethics.¹⁹ It answers an important question for Confucian ethics as inclusive ethics whether we should love and respect the bad. Xunzi's answer is that for the good, i.e., the virtuous, the appropriate attitude or response is the inclusive respect-love, not just love alone or respect alone, but both. For the bad, i.e., the unscrupulous, the right attitude or response is the integral respect-fear—we should treat them with common courtesy (as all human beings have dignity) but keep them at a distance because while they are unworthy of love, they can inflict great harm as they have no moral scruples.

The preceding has led me to conclude this section by saying that in the Xunzi we also find clear textual evidence in support of the thesis that classical Confucian ethics is an inclusive ethics in which the notions of care and respect are integrated.

V. Concluding Remarks

If ethics is to help influence human behavior and regulate human relationships in order to augment human welfare and happiness,

¹⁹ Xunzi's distinction between respect-love and respect-fear is unique because it seems that neither Confucius nor Mencius had made such a distinction. In the *Analects* 12.2, Confucius taught his disciples to treat everyone as a great guest (*dabin* 大賓) regardless of their worthiness or a lack thereof. Mencius did not offer us a smart way to deal with a wicked thug who would insult and bully a worthy person in an outrageous manner (*Mencius* 4B.28). All the worthy person should do, according to Mencius, is to reflect on his own conduct, i.e., whether he has acted kindly and respectfully toward the scoundrel. In contrast, Xunzi would advise us to treat the thug with courtesy, then run away from him as fast as we can. You don't have to hang around with him or reflect on your own conduct; respect-fear is all you need.

the cultivation and promotion of the virtues of care and respect are indispensable. Given that we human beings universally desire to be cared for as well as respected, an integrative ethics into which both care and respect are incorporated is more advantageous than a moral theory that privileges respect over caring or vice versa. In this paper, I have distinguished between two approaches to unifying care and respect: (1) the reductive integration, which I have found problematic, and (2) the non-reductive or complementary integration, which is how care and respect are integrated in early Confucian ethics and which in my view is less problematic because in unifying the two, it also preserves the fundamental differences between care and respect, rather than reduces one to the other. I conclude that Confucian ethics is a morality in which the polarity of care and respect is preserved in unity that manifests itself in a number of higher-order notions—filial piety, Goodness, the virtuous person, care-respect, and ritual. Even though times have changed, and we have more technological implements at our disposal than the ancients, our desires for care and respect remain the same. Therefore, Confucian ethics as an inclusive morality still have an important role to play in moral life and its insights can still make a significant contribution to contemporary moral philosophizing.

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The Concept of “a Trust” and Its Relevance to the Right of Rebellion: *Mencius and Locke*

Sukhee Lee and Jongchul Kim*

Abstract

This paper explores whether Mencius defends the people's right of rebellion by applying the concept of a trust to his political thoughts. Although previous literature has developed several arguments on Mencius' position on the right, and there exists a deep controversy in their conclusions, those conclusions have several problems. 1) They are rather derivative of nearby theses, such as Mencius doctrine of human nature, Heavenly Mandate, or Kingly Governance. Related to this, 2) they do not suggest specific and proper criteria for a right to revolt so that the meaning of the right remains ambiguous in the literature. As a result, 3) the controversy is primarily an interpretational issue concerning the same paragraphs in the Mencius rather than a product of reasoning. This paper draws a comparison between Mencius and Locke's logic concerning the right of rebellion by reorganizing Mencius' political thought into the Lockean concept of a trust. By focusing on the critical difference of the role of the people between two philosophers, the paper concludes that Mencius does not support people's right of rebellion.

Keywords: contractual right, right of rebellion, a trust, Mencius, Locke

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I. Introduction

This paper explores whether Mencius defends the people's right of rebellion by applying the concept of "a trust" to his political thoughts. Since Mencius emphasized "the people" more than any other thinker in the Pre-Qin period, academics have paid much attention to Mencius' political ideology in connection with various modern concepts. This article aims to analyze Mencius' political thoughts, focusing on the concept of the "right of rebellion." Can it be said that Mencius approved of the people's¹ right of rebellion?

There are two conflicting positions in academia on whether Mencius admitted or not. For scholars who believe that Mencius admitted or defended the right, it is so evident that no argument is needed (Lee 1992, 248; Tu 1993, 6; Glanville 2010). Kim Choon-Shik argues that the Mencius' Mandate of Heaven ideology is based on the theory of mutual resonance between heaven and human beings, so the right to rebel against a monarch who has lost virtue is approved (Kim 1996, 38-45). Youn Dae-Shik argues that in Mencius' political thought, the moral completion of the monarch is a prerequisite of the political duty of obedience of the people. Therefore, Youn claims that the people can change their object of obedience against immoral monarch at any time and such a choice is rational (Youn 2002; 2005).

Some scholars argue that Mencius admitted the right of rebellion "limitedly." For example, according to Sungmoon Kim, Mencius thought that the people's right of rebellion had to be exercised according to the proper procedure. In order to avoid frequent political crises and confusion due to the reckless exercise of the right of rebellion, Mencius did not actively advocate its exercise. However, it does not mean that Mencius did not admit the right. Kim points out that, as Mencius did, Locke also added extremely difficult conditions

¹ In this paper, the term "*min*" 民 is used as a synonym for "the ruled" or "the people." Yet, it is quite uncertain the *min* includes the monarch, the nobles, the commoners, and the slaves in Mencius' terminology, and if his terminology in the *Book of Mencius* is coherent and consistent. For a study of *min*'s usage in the ancient Chinese literature, see Chang Hyeon-geun (2009) and Park Byoung-seok (2014).

to exercise the right of rebellion (S. Kim 2015, 170-171).² Yoo Mi-rim points out that in ancient China, the people were difficult to express their intentions and were regarded as having no such intentions (2004, 67). However, she concludes somewhat vaguely that the political thought of Mencius may develop into a revolutionary thought. This is because when looking at the relationship between Heaven and the people, the monarch is only an intermediary between the two, and it is the people who directly communicate with Heaven (Yoo 2004, 81-82). Other scholars argue that if the people are fully educated and morally mature, Mencius will advocate the people's right to revolt, suffrage, and even democracy (Bai 2008; Herr 2019). It means that even though Mencius admitted the right he could not advocate strongly because the majority of the people at that time were not educated.

According to the opposite view, Mencius emphasized the people's material welfare and moral enlightenment, not the people's role as political actors. It is true that Mencius is more radical than other thinkers of that time, but he also defended the ruler-centered absolute monarchy, and even the moral superior are to serve the monarch, not to replace the monarch (Pines 2009, 35-36). Although Mencius admitted that the righteous rebellion is legitimate, such radicalism considerably evaporates when we consider his doctrine of abdication that emphasizes the role of Heaven and the incumbent monarch. The expulsion of the monarch who is neither benevolent nor righteous is only approved in the exceptional circumstances in the past; that the people may overthrow the dynasty is a highly rhetorical device used to warn the monarch (Pines 2009, 72-79, 205-210). While ensuring the welfare of the people is the responsibility of the ruler and a legitimate source of authority in the first place, the people are only passive and reactive beings and have no right to rebel against tyranny (Angle 2012,

² In another article, Sungmoon Kim analyzes the views of Mencius and Xunzi on *shanrang* 禪讓 or *shanwei* 禪位—handing over of the throne to someone who deserved it because of high moral standing, and not because of the regular rules of succession—focusing on constitutionalism. According to this, Mencius' *shanrang* theory is not logically connected to the right of rebellion, but rather, Xunzi's theory of *shanrang* has more room to acknowledge the right of rebellion (S. Kim 2011, 378, 398).

38-43). The people themselves are not the agents who are responsible for getting rid of bad rulers, nor could harsh rule break any contract among the ruler and the ruled, and thus there was no right to rebel. Therefore, there is no people's revolution to be achieved, and there is no impulse for revolution in Mencius' political thought (El Amine 2015, 47). If we see the right of rebellion as 1) the case in which a monarch may lose the right to rule, 2) in this case he must be forced out, and 3) the people play an important role in the process, Mencius denies 3), so it is difficult to say that Mencius supports the right of rebellion (Tiwald 2008).

Although such conflicting views coexist, the above studies generally show the following, problems except for Justin Tiwald. First of all, they do not deal with the right to rebellion of Mencius directly, but they are rather derivative of nearby theses, such as Mencius' doctrine of human nature, the Mandate of Heaven, or Kingly Governance. In relation to this, secondly, they do not suggest specific and proper criteria for a right to revolt. As a result, the argument as to whether Mencius supported the right of revolt is a matter of interpretation, but it is hard to say that the conclusion was drawn as a result of a rational argument based upon principles. As A. Nuyen points out (2013), both claims concerning Mencius' stance on the right of rebellion have their own textual grounds within the *Mencius*, even if they interpret the same passage in opposite ways. In other words, based on the same phrases, one study argues that they can be considered to support the right to resistance, while the other research argues that it is difficult to say that the right to resistance is approved.

In order to overcome this problem, this paper approaches the subject in a different way from previous studies. Rather than refining the interpretive conclusion that Mencius does not support the people's right to revolt, this paper will present a logical structure that supports this interpretation. To this end, several words or the text from *Mencius* are analyzed and reconstructed based on the concept of a trust. The article is organized as follows. The second section examines the characteristics of the right of rebellion by analyzing Locke's logic that justifies the right of rebellion and examines whether the Confucian tradition, more specifically the political

thought of Mencius, can be discussed through a language of rights as such. The third section interprets Mencius’ political ideology by applying the concept of a trust and clarifies the political position of the people within Mencius’ trust scheme and argues that the people’s right of rebellion is not supported in Mencius’ political ideology.

II. The Right of Rebellion as Rights and a Trust

There seems to be considerable consensus among studies on the content of the right of rebellion. That is, the ruler can lose his/her sovereignty and may be forcibly ousted, and the people can play an important role in this process (Tiwald 2008, 270-271). However, by what logic is this right justified?

The right of rebellion is not a natural right because it is exerted to political power and political power is not a natural thing. It is also difficult to define it only as a legal right that is stipulated in the law and guaranteed by the law. Neither the Korean Constitution nor the US Constitution specify the right of revolt. The majority of the Korean legal theorists view the right to revolt as a basic right that is taken for granted without the stipulation of the Constitution (Oh 2009).³ To examine the nature of the right of rebellion, let us pay attention to Locke, who advocates the right in the clearest and most detailed way among the theorists of social contract.

A. Social Contract of Locke: Trust Contract and Justification of the Right of Rebellion

According to John Locke, all men are by nature equal and are free “to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons,

³ However, there are many conditions for the “exercise” of the right of revolt. The right of revolt should be exercised for the purpose of restoring the constitutional order (purposive requirement), the serious constitutional violation of the exercise of state power should be objectively clear (situational requirement), and furthermore, it should be a last resort for the exercise of the right of resistance (supplemental requirements) (Oh 2009, 174).

as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature “ (Locke 1988, §4). At this time, men have three powers; the freedom to enjoy innocent delights, power to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the Law of Nature, and the power to punish the crimes committed against that Law. As humans enter Political Society, they give up the latter two powers (§128). Therefore, a political society can be established exist only when all individual members abandon their natural powers and surrender them to the hands of the community (§87). At this time, political power should be exercised only for the public good (§3).

But what if political power is used for other purposes? Since the purpose of giving up what was enjoyed in the state of nature and entering into a political society is only to protect one's own liberty and property better (§131), if power is exercised according to private will rather than public will, the exerciser is no longer a public figure, but a single private person without power and therefore cannot ask people obedience (§151). In this case, power is transferred [again] to the people, who have the right to restore the original freedom by abolishing the existing legislature and establishing a new one (§149; §222). In order to achieve this, Locke advocates the defensive and active use of force (§155; §235).

Interestingly, although Locke repeatedly mentions that the people quitted, resigned, and gave up their natural rights (§87; §123; §128), when the purpose of such an action is violated, people will regain their original rights. In general, if an owner “gives up” his/her possession through a deal, he/she cannot intervene to its future use.. If the original owner is constantly involved in the way it is used or its purpose, he/she did not give up it actually. Thus, we can guess that such a deal is something special; Locke describes such a contract as a “trust”.

Applying the concept of “a trust,” Locke describes the nature of political power as follows. Political power arises from the “entrust” of natural right by people to the community. Though the executive scope of political power is quite free (§161; §164), this is within the extent of the trusters' original purpose (§139; §222; §226). In addition,

an exerciser of political power should act as a public figure because political power is given to him/her, by a trust. Therefore, if he/she acts or exercises the power according to his own private will, it is an act against the trust, and he/she becomes like ordinary individual without political power (§151; §239). And due to such a limitation of trusted power, the legislature cannot arbitrarily transfer its power (§142), and only the people, the trustors, are the final judges who decide whether the trust contract is being breached or not (§240; §242).

In fact, Locke borrowed the concept of a trust from the equity law. According to Jongchul Kim (2015, 185-186), the law of “a trust” had been systematized in the late 17th century after the Glorious Revolution in England. A Trust creates “double ownership”: legal ownership enjoyed by trustees and equitable ownership enjoyed by the settlers or beneficiaries of a trust. The foremost motive of a trust has been to avoid legal responsibilities attached to property rights and, by doing so, to make property rights endure even permanently. The owner of property avoids legal responsibilities by transferring legal ownership of the property to trustees, while retaining its equitable ownership, thus continuing to enjoy the benefits of ownership. Since the early thirteenth century, the landed class in England had used the trust—and its feudal form, the *use* of land—for various reasons, for example, because an individual wanted “to escape from his creditors; or feared that a conviction for felony would result in the loss” of his/her property and lands (Martin 2001, 8). However, the most important external force that the trust or use was intended to avoid was feudal duties and taxation to the king or the state. The trustees took a legal ownership of the land but at the same time become debtors because they must pay a dividend to the beneficiaries of the trust regularly and permanently. By the contrary, the settlers and beneficiaries are no longer legal owners but become *creditors* who can ask interest-payment and can avoid the responsibility of returning the land to the king. But at the same time, the settlers and beneficiaries remain *equitable owners* according to whose order the trustees must use the land. According to Jongchul Kim, this trust has evolved to various form of

capitalist financial schemes including modern banking and modern business corporations. Thus, Trusts has been identified by economic historians as important to the financing of British domestic industry and its overseas investment during the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Kim 2015). Even during the financial boom of the late twentieth century, which ended in the financial crisis of 2008, trusts were used extensively by mutual funds, pension funds, and asset-securitization trusts for fund-raising and limited liability (Kim 2015).

There seems to be no research directly dealing with the fact that Locke's claim that the nature of social contracts is a trust was influenced by the development of equity law and capitalist finance in late 17th century England. Nonetheless, Locke clearly defined political power as a trust between people and a representative government and thought that double ownership was established regarding political power: the equitable ownership of political power belongs to the people, while its legal ownership belongs to a representative government. Locke learned the concept of a trust when he deeply engaged in business and banking. We know that he actively expressed his views on the problems of the shortage of metal currency in Britain, the increase in credit transactions, the Bank of England and private financing in the late 17th century, and he himself invested a considerable amount in the banking industry (Cooper 2020). Like in a trust, even if the people have made a contract to give up, abandon, and transfer their natural rights, the people still retain have equitable ownership of those rights. For Locke, the right of rebellion can be understood as equitable right that equitable owners exert against unfaithful trustees who have breached fiduciary duties.⁴

⁴ Two theorists of social contract, Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, did not describe social contract as a "trust." Interestingly, both did not support the people's right to revolt.

B. Language of Rights and the Confucian Tradition

It is a well-known fact that during the 2,500 years after Confucius, Confucianism has not developed the concept of a "right" theoretically. Using this fact, many scholars have argued that Confucianism cannot be understood through the concept of rights we currently use. For example, Joseph Chan argues that it is unfair to understand political authority, *tianming* 天命 (Mandate of Heaven) in Confucianism as ownership of the world (Chan 2013, appendix 2). However, as Lee Seung-Hwan points out, we should not confuse the absence of terms with the absence of the concept itself. This is because the more complex the concept, the more likely the content of the concept is to exist scattered across various terms and expressions (Lee 1992, 246). Then, in order to examine whether Mencius advocated the right of rebellion, it would be logical to first see if Mencius had the idea of "rights."

According to some studies, the concept of rights can be found within the Confucian tradition. Lee Seung-Hwan refutes the claim that Confucianism has no concept of rights and points out that a society cannot exist if it completely lacks a certain kind of notion of "rights." He argues that if a society has no "right-related obligations," the act of paying back debt would not be a due payment but a "charity." And he also points out that ownership, sale, trading, promises, and the contracts of property would be impossible without rules that give rights and obligations. That is to say, to make a legitimate claim, rather than to ask someone for mercy, cannot be explained without the concept of a right (Lee 1992, 244-245). For example, according to Lee, in the story of an official who entrusted his wife and child to his friend and went to another country in *Mencius*, taking care of friend's wife and child is not in the realm of "goodwill" but a "duty" that occurred through a transaction (Lee 1992, 247-248).

The British legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart calls the rights arising from these kinds of transactions "special rights," which are characterized by the specific relationships and obligations with specific objects (Hart 1995, 183, 188). Special rights arise, simply put, through voluntary promises between the parties, in which case only the

promisee has the power to decide how specifically the promiser should behave and can free him/her from the obligation to fulfill the promise (Hart 1955, 184). In this regard, in a society where promises, contracts and transactions exist, the notion of special rights arising from these acts will naturally exist.

Of course, the above argument should not be read as saying that within the Confucian tradition all modern concepts of rights are found. Special rights are distinguished from general rights which are often referred to as human rights, the rights that everyone has to all. For example, freedom of expression is a general right. In this case, every other person has an obligation not to interfere with a person's act of speaking. However, Hart says that it is better to describe this as "no right" for anyone to interfere rather than as "obligation" (1955, 187-188). It can also be understood in the same context that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is the basis of modern human rights discourse, enumerates the rights of freedom, equality, and social rights in over 30 articles, but never mentions specific obligations.

There are also a number of studies attempting to discover human rights within the Confucian tradition. These studies either discover human rights within the Confucian tradition in a way that expands the concept of being a member of the human race, in ways that define the mutual obligations of various human relationships (Sim 2004; Lee 2012). They derive socio-economic and civic-political rights from the equal moral potential of human beings presupposed by Confucianism (S. Kim 2015). There is also a study that reveals the compatibility of the Confucian tradition with human rights, centering on the universal ethical *ren* 仁 (benevolence) (Chan 2013, 115-120). However, 1) human rights differ from the relationship of special mutual obligation between contractual parties, and 2) Sungmoon Kim and Joseph Chan do not make an explicit argument that "there are the various concepts of rights in Confucianism"; rather, they use a more moderate expression of "ideally compatible." Considering these two facts, it is unlikely that there is a solid consensus in academia as to whether there is a general idea of rights called "human rights" within the Confucian tradition. Nevertheless, since it is somewhat

clear that there is a notion of special rights in the Confucian tradition, the theoretical basis for an attempt to examine whether the right to revolt is supported in the political thought of Mencius using the language of rights is sufficient.

III. Reorganizing Mencius' Political Thought and the Role of the People as a Trust

In this section we interpret the political ideal of Mencius by applying the concept of a trust. While Locke's historical background was a turbulent period when the concept of a trust, which had developed over the centuries, finally received legal approval, there is no evidence that trust contracts such as those in Britain were prevalent in the Warring States period of China, when Mencius lived. Therefore, it would be difficult to say that Mencius developed his political thoughts with the concept of a trust like Locke. Although the term trust is not used, the rhetoric and metaphors used by Mencius can be reconstructed within the trust scheme—in other words, using the characteristics of a trust, such as the purpose of a trust, trustor/trustee, double ownership, "the world" as an object of ownership, public/private person distinction, and impossibility of transfer. By doing so, we will criticize the existing studies that argue that Mencius admitted the people's right of rebellion.

A. Reconstructing the Political Ideas of Mencius by Applying the Concept of a Trust

Let us reorganize Mencius' political ideas within the trust scheme. First, Mencius pointed out that the position of monarch has its own purpose, asking three questions to King Xuan of Qi.

Mencius said to King Xuan of Qi, "Suppose that one of the king's subjects entrusted (託) his wife and children to his friend and journeyed to Chu. On returning he found that he had allowed his wife and children to be hungry and cold. What should he do?"

The king said, "Renounce him."

"Suppose the chief criminal judge could not control the officers. What should he do?"

The king said, "Get rid of him."

"Suppose that within the four borders of the state there is no proper government?"

The king looked left and right and spoke of other things. (*Mencius* 1B.6).⁵

In another conversation, Mencius repeated a similar analogy to King Xuan—If a shepherd who takes other people's livestock has not been able to raise them properly, what should he do? Mencius said that in this case, the shepherd should not just watch the livestock die but return them to their original owner. Then, the king admitted that it is his fault if the people died of starvation and scattered due to famine. (*Mencius* 2B.4).

First of all, let us delve into the meaning of "託" in these conversations. Although "託其妻子於其友而之楚遊" is commonly translated into Korean as "left one's wife and children to a friend and journeyed to the Chu," several English translations consistently translate the verb "託" into "entrust" (Legge 1970; Lau 1979; Hinton 1998; Bloom 2009). This fact that the English translation uses the verb "entrust" does not lead us to argue that the original text should be interpreted as "a trust." Nonetheless, it is possible to reconstruct Mencius' political thought through the concept of a trust, just as such translation is accepted by Anglophone academia without much difficulty, and in this way, Mencius' remarks regarding political power can be interpreted in a fairly consistent manner allowing comparison with other thinkers, especially with Locke.

Let us pay attention to three things in the above conversations. First, through the analogy it is revealed that the position of the monarch has a specific purpose. Mencius narrated the parallels among "taking care of a friend's family entrusted," "ruling the sub-

⁵ de Bary and Bloom (1999).

ordinates," "receiving and raising other people's livestock" and "the monarch's governing the country." In other passage, Mencius told King Xuan the story of how rulership emerged, citing *Book of Documents* (Shujing). A monarch is a position created by Heaven, and Heaven sent down the people and then made a ruler for them to give favor to them (*Mencius* 1B.3). Sharing this perception, the king admitted that it was his fault that the people were in trouble due to a famine.

Second, through a metaphor, Mencius induced an answer that the monarch should also resign if he fails to perform his duty properly, but King Xuan did not mention his resignation while he admitted his faults. Nevertheless, the king does not refute the metaphor made by Mencius. If the king had considered this analogy inappropriate, he could have answered that the monarch should still be the monarch, unlike breaking up with a friend or dismissing a servant. However, the king does not refute this. Therefore, it can be said that the king also implicitly shared the notion of Mencius that the monarch's status has a unique purpose and that if the monarch fails to achieve it, he should step down. These two views are consistent with Joseph Chan's "service conception" (Chan 2013, ch. 1).

Third, even if a monarch should step down if he fails to perform his role properly just as an officer of the prison or a shepherd do, the purpose of a monarch differs from those of the officer and shepherd, because the monarch is not simply in charge of other people's affairs unlike the officer and the shepherd. Mencius repeatedly mentioned that the ruler possesses the world. (*Mencius* 2A.1; 3A.4; 5A.1; 5A.5). Even the tyrant, King Zhou (紂), owned the whole world and made everyone his servants (2A.1). Nevertheless, when asked by King Xuan whether a vassal can punish his king, Mencius replied that the person who harmed righteousness was a remnant enemy who is just an ordinary man rather than a monarch (1B.8). In sum, it can be seen that Mencius attributes the possession of the world to the status of a monarch, not to a particular individual monarch. The official status as a monarch is to be recognized only when the monarch meets the purpose of a trust. This is reminiscent of Locke's claim that if a ruler uses his political power arbitrarily, then the trust has been destroyed

and thus the king became a single private person (§151). Like Locke's claim, Mencius argued that a monarch is one who by virtue of his position owns the world but if he does not give benefit to the people and is cruel, he will no longer be a monarch.

In *Mencius*, the phrase describing the monarch as a trustee of a trust does not stop here. Mencius repeatedly says that the monarch owns the world, but nevertheless he cannot give it to others at will. When Wan Chang asked if Emperor Yao gave the world to the Emperor Shun, Mencius replied that that was not the case and even the son of heaven could not give the world to others (5A.5). Not only can they not give it, they cannot receive privately. It is not permissible to give the throne to others or take it from them at will, as it is also not allowed to hand over government posts without the king's approval (2B.8). In this context, when Yao-Shun and Shun-Yu handed over the emperorship to the wise men and when the emperorship had been inherited to the emperors' children since the beginning of the Emperor Yu, according to Mencius, these successions do not mean that these heavenly children have exchanged the world with each other (5A.6).

Joseph Chan rejects the interpretation that the ruler "owns" the Mandate of Heaven (天命) or the world in Confucianism. According to the ownership perspective, 1) the Mandate of Heaven grants the ruler ownership of the territory and people; 2) the owner of the throne can decide whether to hand over the throne to someone else since the property must be freely transferable; 3) moreover, in the owner-property relationship, the property is for the owner, the owner is not for the property. However, in the documents of Pre-Qin Confucianism, such as the *Book of Documents* (書經), *Mencius*, and the *Xunzi* (荀子), it is emphasized several times that political power is for the welfare of the people, and because the ruler cannot give the world to others at will, having the Mandate of Heaven and the world is better interpreted as "the right to rule rightly within a certain territory" (Chan 2013, appx. 2). However, Joseph Chan's refutation of the ownership interpretation can be resolved by employing the concept of "a trust." Within a trust contract, 1) The trustee's rights are also recognized as ownership and 2) The trustee's ownership is valid

only within the purpose of a trust.⁶ Interpreting the phrases "own the world" in *Mencius* from the perspective of a trust is advantageous in that it allows us to include those phrases in our interpretation without adding any special explanation.

To sum up, if we reconstruct the Mencius' political ideas by applying the concept of a trust, the purpose of the trust is to be benevolent to the people everywhere and to govern the country. And the monarch, who is a trustee, owns the whole world (public person) but becomes no longer a monarch but an individual (a single private person) if he violates the trust. Furthermore, the monarch owns the world, but he cannot arbitrarily transfer his possessions to others (non-transferability). So far, it seems very similar to Locke's political ideas in *Two Treatises of Government*. However, there are other elements of a trust that have not yet been addressed in this section. Who is the counterpart of the double ownership, namely the trustor who trusted the world to the king? In the Chapter 2, Locke pointed out that another party of the trust contract is the people, and the right of rebellion is an exercise of the equitable ownership when the trust is violated. Then, when Mencius' political ideas are reconstructed applying the concept of a trust, whether the people's right to rebellion is approved by Mencius can be confirmed by considering whether Mencius regarded the people as a party to the trust.

B. Heaven and the People in the Trust Scheme of Mencius

Now let us examine whether Mencius admitted the people's right to rebellion within a logical relationship. In this section, we look into whether the people can be recognized as trustors in Mencius' political thoughts. We will then further review the phrases that have been interpreted as the Mencius' support for the people's right to revolt, along with related prior studies.

⁶ Furthermore, Joseph Chan points out that in an owner-property relationship, property is for the owner, not the owner for the property. However, this does not mean a trustee does not enjoy any benefits, accepting Chan's service conception does not mean that the ruler only serves for the material/moral welfare of the people without any benefits that he can appreciate.

As in the interesting conversation cited in the preceding section, to whom should the monarch be accountable if he fails to fulfill his duties as a monarch? If you do not take good care of your friend's wife and children, you will be no longer making a relationship with your friend. If you do not feed other people's livestock properly, you will have to give them back to the owner (1B.6; 2B.4). If the people suffer from famine and the country is not well ruled, who should the monarch return the world to? When Lee Seung-Hwan claims that Mencius' ideas had the concept of rights even though he did not explicitly use the term "rights," he seems to have misunderstood the role of the people (1992, 247). In the case of livestock, Lee Seung-Hwan explains that the original owner of livestock has the right to receive the livestock back when the livestock is not properly cared for, and that the trustee has the duty to return the livestock after feeding the livestock well. But in the case of the wife and children, he explains that the wife and the children have "rights to be well taken care of." Due to this misunderstanding, Lee Seung-Hwan draws a rather strange conclusion. He claims that since the wife and children have the right to be well cared for, if the trustee fails to provide such care, they can claim to be taken care of, or even can free the maleficent trustee from the "duty to take good care of" them by taking care of themselves. Through these steps, Lee Seung-Hwan concludes that the government has an absolute obligation to improve the welfare of the people and keep the country stable, and if not, the people have the right to revolt (1992, 246-248).

Looking back at the structure of the trust at this point, it is clear what misunderstanding has occurred. In the case of Locke, it is the people who entrust political power to the legislature or the monarch⁷

⁷ Locke considered the legislative power to be the most important part of political powers. Thus, he classified several forms of government such as monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy by looking at in whose hands the legislative power is laid (§132). On the other hand, since the only available form of government for Mencius is monarchy, it seems permissible to ignore Locke's distinction between the legislative and the monarch here. In addition to this, Locke himself actually often weakened the distinction among political powers by saying "the Supreme [power]" in "a very tolerable sense" (§151) or "whether the Prince or Legislative" (§240).

in a trust contract. The people as a trustor play various roles and have rights-obligations relationship with the monarch. Locke's monarch is accountable to the people, who are the original owners of political power, because only the people have the power to dismiss their trustee (§240; §242). Although Mencius thought that the monarch who violates the trust is not a monarch (1B.8) the same as Locke did, he did not regard the people in the same way as Locke did at this point. In the parable of the *Mencius*, the people's role is similar to livestock's or a wife and her children's, not to the role of the friend who went to Chu or of the livestock owner. Is not it a bit strange to say that "Livestock have the right to revolt against the shepherd" because they starve?⁸ It is Heaven who holds the opposite part of the monarch in this right-duty relationship. In the first place, the subject who gave the people and made the monarch is Heaven (1B.3). It was Heaven that gave the monarch the world. and it is Heaven that decides whether to give the world to a wise man or to his son (5A.5-6).

However, when it comes to judging whether the trustee is acting in accord with the trust, Mencius left some room for ambiguous interpretation. While explaining that Heaven only sees and hears through the people, Mencius declared that "So Heaven and the people had given [the world to the son of heaven of Yao, Shun, and Yu]" (5A.5).⁹ Moreover, Mencius repeatedly emphasized the importance of the people. For King Xuan of Qi, who conquered the state of Yan, Mencius recommended that he should carefully hear whether the people are willing to take Yan or not (1B.10). Since the people are more precious than the dynasty and the monarch, only when obtained from the people does he becomes the son of heaven (7B.14). In other

⁸ Interestingly, Hart uses the same example to explain who has a right and who has a duty. If X promises to serve Y's mother in the absence of Y, X is obliged to serve Y's mother. At this time, Y's mother benefits from the fulfillment of X's duty, but X's duty belongs to Y, not to Y's mother. Therefore, Y's mother does not have the "right to be taken care of." Furthermore, only Y can exempt X from this duty. Here, the Hart says that "taking advantage" and "having the rights" should not be confused. (Hart 1955, 180).

⁹ Of course, in this passage Mencius added a prior condition that Heaven ordained all that became of Yao, Shun, and Yu, and that happened to the sons of those emperors (5A.6).

words, even applying the concept of a trust here, if we want to decide whether Mencius approved the people's right to revolt or not, or further, whether Mencius advocated popular sovereignty or not, we have to understand how Mencius think of the relationship between Heaven and the people.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that even on these interpretations at this point, what Mencius granted to the people is hardly "a right" or "a right to revolt." Mencius never acknowledged the people's firsthand agency, which, as Tiwald pointed out, violates the third criterion for the right of rebellion (Tiwald 2008, 270-271). The most active roles that Mencius grants to the people is their ability to choose the right virtuous judge when making a lawsuit and to become the people of a country that employs the well-field system and no miscellaneous taxes (2A.5, 3A.4, 5A.5-6).¹⁰ Even in the cases of Tang 湯 and Wu 武's revolt against the tyrants Jie 桀 and Zhou 紂 and King Xuan of Qi's conquest of Yan, the role Mencius grants to the people is to say whether they support this new ruler in the making. On top of that, only when the ruling monarch is as tyrannical as Jie and Zhou, does Heaven give the challenger a chance to ask a question and allow the people to answer that question (5A.6). If the ruler commits a big fault but not as ruthless as Jie and Zhou, nobles of the same surname with the ruler should admonish him first, and yet if the ruler remains incorrigible they can dethrone him and choose another among their family members. Nobles with different surnames, also should admonish him first and, yet if he proves to be incorrigible they should not overthrow him but just leave the realm. The people are not mentioned in this political action (5B.9). The people are sometimes called at the moment of an important decision to appoint a sage or put someone to death. Mencius recommended that the king should seek the counsel of ministers, various lords and the people before he makes those decisions. However, even in this case, Mencius advises that the monarch directly examines and makes a decision after hearing the people's opinion (1B.7). The monarch considers the people's will before making a decision,

¹⁰ Yet, immigrations for economic welfares are seldom considered as political resistance.

but here the people does not play any role of directly “approving” something.¹¹

On the other hand, Youn Dae-Shik (2002; 2005) states that Mencius’ Kingly Way Politics (王道政治) impose a political duty on both the monarch and the subjects to conform to each other’s moral nature bilaterally. He claims that it makes sense to warn the monarch that “if a monarch fails to achieve moral perfection, the subjects may not obey because the failure does not conform to their nature.” Adhering to the moral nature is a rational choice that suits their interests, and if the monarch fails to achieve moral perfection, the subjects are obligated to complete the monarch morally. It is said that this duty is further developed to the logic of the revolutionary idea that subjects should become monarchs (Youn 2005, 25). However, if the replacement of the monarch is the result of conforming to the moral nature or making a rational choice, it is somewhat questionable whether this is a matter to be expressed as a “duty.” In addition, since Mencius’ main listeners are members of the ruling class, and thus it is correct to interpret Mencius’ logic as a warning to the ruling class (Pines 2009), this is only a general statement of the fact that “no regime can be maintained if it loses public confidence,” and hard to say that Mencius defended the right of rebellion.

As a more moderate argument, some studies have shown that Mencius did not acknowledge the people’s agency because he believed that the people are not yet morally mature, therefore once the people mature, Mencius would admit their agency (Tu 1993, 6; Bai 2008, 27-28; S. Kim 2015, 166-174). This argument is quite persuasive in that Mencius believed in the universality of human nature and in moral equality. Even so, the maximum implication of this argument is that “If the people were morally mature, Mencius would also have advocated suffrage,” which seems to be quite a distance from the original claim that “the people have the right to revolt.”

¹¹ Tiwald says it is appropriate to interpret this as a “market research” rather than a “voting right” (2008, 278-279). Just as the results of the market research are only considered before the executive makes a judgment.

Let's summarize the above. First of all, if a heaven-people-monarch is placed within the trust scheme, the parties to the contract of the trust are Heaven and the monarch, and the people are the objects of the contract, not the "party to any rights." Furthermore, considering the various grounds in the text of *Mencius*, Mencius did not describe the people as agents. Interpreting in a liberal way the relationship between Heaven and the people in Mencius' thought and thus concluding that Heaven is the people have some textual basis, but the opposite is true as well (Nuyen 2013). To sum up, it would be difficult to say that Mencius approved the people's right to revolt unless there is clear evidence that he believed that the people are heaven.¹²

IV. Conclusions

In the above, we used the concept of a trust to reconstruct Mencius' political ideas, and through comparison with Locke, we explained why Mencius did not recognize the people's right to revolt. Although there is a general similarity that both Mencius' and Locke's political ideas can be interpreted as a trust scheme, Mencius and Locke put the people in different places within such a scheme.

On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that there are also fundamental philosophical differences between Mencius and Locke. The characteristics of Locke's ontology is that humans' attributes such as freedom, labor, and life are regarded as transferable things, and external things such as land are regarded as inherent attributes of a human being from birth (Kim Jongchul 2016, esp. II-III). On the basis of this ontology, Locke presupposed that man is "Master

¹² Locke's case is suggestive as a reference point for comparison. Today, while interpreting Locke's political thoughts we do not take much of his religious position into account. However, to the extent that the core premise of the *Two Treaties* is that man belongs to the Creator God (Dunn 1984, 294), Locke frequently and heavily calls on God in the *Two Treaties*. Thus, the secular interpretation that Locke simply called God as a rhetorical device for popular sovereignty is a clear fallacy. The progressive interpretation of Mencius seems to be making a similar error.

of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person, and the Actions or Labor of it” (§44), and then a social contract is established when each person transfers his/her freedom to Commonwealth. In other words, a political trust contract cannot be established without Locke’s unique ontology that “thingifies” labor, freedom, or rights and makes them separable from a person and transferable to others. Of course, this ontology was not unique to Locke but was shared with British intellectuals in the late 17th century (J. Kim 2016, 33). Interestingly, this kind of ontology can also be found in Abrahamic religions. For example, Esau, Isaac’s first son, sells “his birthright” to his younger brother, Jacob.¹³ When reconstructing Mencius’ political ideas through the concept of a trust, an important question would be whether the Confucian tradition generally shares this ontology or not. We can say that Confucianism would not regard “birthright” as something transferable, if inferring from the debate on nature, benevolence, and righteousness between Mencius with Gaozi and other contemporary thinkers.¹⁴ However, at the same time, Mencius described “the world” and rulership as transferable objects like things that can “be possessed” (有) and thus “transferable” to others.

The scope of this study is limited to discuss Mencius’ view on the right of rebellion, and thanks to this limited scope, this study can avoid discussing whether Mencius treated personality, rights, freedom, labor, and actions as something transferable as Locke did, or to put another way in terms of Confucianism in general, whether Mencius viewed that the human relationship between father-son, rulers-subjects, husband-wife, old-young, and between friends are transferable.

This paper made several contributions. First, it leads to understand Mencius in terms of the concept of “rights.” Existing research interprets various phrases such as overthrowing a tyrant that are scattered throughout the *Mencius* as a specific kind of rights, “the

¹³ Genesis 25.31-34, RSV-CE. Jacob said, “First sell me your birthright.”

¹⁴ For example, in Mencius’ arguments against Gaozi’s argument that “*ren* 仁 (benevolence) is inside and *yi* 義 (righteousness) is outside,” we can get a glimpse of Mencius’s perspective on the attribute of “white” of a white horse and the attribute of being “older” to someone. (6A.4).

people's right to revolt," without any careful or thorough conceptual work. However, since Mencius himself did not use the language of "rights," any attempt to discuss Mencius in terms of the right of rebellion must be preceded by arguments that show how to cast Mencius' teachings in terms of the concept of "rights." This article claims that there is plenty of room to reconstruct Mencius' statements applying the concept of "a trust," and when this is done, it can examine, as a matter of logical conclusion rather than a matter of interpretation, whether Mencius acknowledged the people's "right" to revolt, that is, whether the people, "have the right" to require the ruler to be accountable for the political failure.

Second, it contributes to making possible to compare the theories of Mencius and other modern thinkers through a common criterion when it focuses on Mencius' view over the right of rebellion. Attempts to analyze the characteristics of Mencius' political thoughts in the Kingly Way (*wangdao*) politics or the theory of Mandate of Heaven (*tianming*) may contribute to revealing the unique aspects of Mencius thought. However, but from a comparative point of view, these attempts have a drawback of not being able to provide a common criterion that is shared by modern thinkers. The discussion of analyzing Mencius' ideas through the concept of the right to revolt provides a criterion that allows Mencius to be compared with modern thinkers.

Even though this article concludes that Mencius did not grant the people the right of rebellion, which is the people's equitable rights for Locke, this conclusion does not mean that Mencius' ideas were politically conservative. Mencius' political thought was radical enough at the time. The ultimate role of the monarch in ancient China was to make sacrificial offerings to heaven and to predict and interpret the will of heaven (Ching 1997, chap. I). Mencius taught the monarch that the proper means to grasp the will of Heaven was to observe carefully the feeling of the people. This teaching constitutes a radical argument that shook the existing notion of political legitimacy. Moreover, Mencius argued that revolutionary dynasty replacement might be legitimate from time to time. Many metaphors of the *Mencius* suggest that the status of a monarch is not a natural

nor an inviolable right. In other words, the change of a dynasty is a frequent event, and Mencius said this phenomenon can be “just.”

Furthermore, throughout East Asian history, Mencius’ arguments have held strong political and practical implications. Paying attention to the case of the Korean peninsula, during the dynastic change between Goryeo and Joseon and the two coup d’état events that took place during the Joseon dynasty, revolutionary scholar-officials (*Sadaebu* in Korean) repeatedly emphasized that their actions were according to “the Mandate of Heaven that revealed through the feeling of the people.”

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The Role of Ancillary Motivations in Xunzi's Thought

Doil Kim*

Abstract

This paper focuses on some passages in the *Xunzi* 荀子 where Xunzi can be understood as allowing typical Confucian attitudes or modes of behavior such as polite deference or humility to be driven by a wrong motive such as self-interest, and explains why this understanding is mistaken in a broader context of the text. Even though Xunzi does not accept that one can take the Confucian attitudes or actions entirely out of self-interest, it is hard to deny that in those passages of concern, he allows the intervention of a certain extra motive that differs from the proper motives for the ideal Confucian attitudes or actions. For this reason, this paper characterizes the extra motive under the convenient label of an “ancillary motivation” and explains how it intervenes and operates in a benign way, namely by advancing the core Confucian values ultimately.

Keywords: Xunzi 荀子, ancillary motivations, deference, humility, the problem of wrong motivations, motivational purity, *cheng* 誠.

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I. Introduction

Early Confucians suggest various attitudes or modes of behavior, such as respectfulness, carefulness, polite deference, and humility. These are adopted to practice the core Confucian values or principles, such as *Dao* 道 (the Way), *renli* 仁義 (the Confucian formal rules of conduct), and *liyi* 禮義 (propriety). At some point, however, *Xunzi* seems to allow one to take those attitudes or actions out of self-interest. More particularly, in the “Zhongni” 仲尼 chapter, *Xunzi* appears to suggest that the king’s subject should take some of the aforementioned attitudes or actions to win the king’s favor and be chosen as his minister. If this reading is correct, *Xunzi* allows one’s self-interest, rather than the proper motives, namely a desire for realizing the core Confucian values, to provide at least part of the motivation that leads one to take the Confucian attitudes or actions. For convenience, I call this “the problem of wrong motivations.” In fact, the above reading is not correct when considered in the broader context of the *Xunzi*. I suggest another reading of the relevant passages that does not evoke the problem of wrong motivations.

On the other hand, the above reading is not entirely misleading because it cannot be denied that in the relevant passages *Xunzi* considers the intervention of a certain extra motive to be sometimes inevitable in addition to the proper motives for pursuing the core Confucian values. The question is how to characterize this extra motive in a way that avoids the problem of wrong motivations.

Moreover, in handling this question, there is another criterion that the characterization of the extra motive should meet, namely motivational purity. For *Xunzi*, one should be motivated single-heartedly to pursue the core Confucian values. With this criterion in mind, I attempt to characterize the extra motive in question as “the ancillary motivation,” which operates without causing one’s motivational set to be impure.

II. Wrong Motivations

Scrutiny of the three tactics (術) in the “Zhongni” chapter reveals conflicting ideas among them. The first and second tactics may cause the problem of wrong motivations, whereas the third does not. The heading of the first tactic is a brief summary of the matters the tactic deals with.¹ According to this summary, the tactic is used by the minister to keep his position as the king’s favorite and to maintain his political status without earning the enmity of others. To achieve these goals, Xunzi suggests, one should take up and pursue an extensive array of attitudes and actions. More particularly, he says:

If the ruler bestows high rank on you and exalts you, be respectful (恭敬 *gongjing*) to him and restrain yourself; if the ruler trusts you and treats you closely, be careful and circumspect (謹慎 *jinshen*) and let your demeanor show as if you are wanting in, for example, ability; even if the ruler treats you with distance, strive for complete oneness with him but do not betray him. Also, when you are in a high position, do not boast; when trusted, exercise humility (謙 *qian*); when you are offered riches and benefits, accept them only after refusing (辭讓 *cirang*) them politely and deferring to the ruler first, as if your good accomplishments do not deserve them.²

In this tactic, Xunzi mentions many more attitudes or actions, not just respectfulness, carefulness, humility, and polite deference as in the above. As is widely understood, all of those aim to enable one to practice the core Confucian values or principles, such as *Dao*, *li*, and *li yi*. For instance, in a passage of the *Xunzi*, respectfulness is mentioned as the manifestation of *li*.³ In the same passage, the gentleman (君子 *junzi*) is described as someone who finds ease in *li* and takes the attitude of carefulness, so that he would not do wrong

¹ “持寵處位終身不厭之術。” See Li (2000, 246).

² As to this translation of the part of the first tactic, I partially consult John Knoblock’s. See Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 59).

³ “恭敬，禮也。．．．故君子安禮樂利，謹慎而無鬥怒，是以百舉而不過也。” Li (2000, 299).

no matter what action he takes.⁴ In addition, Xunzi understands polite deference as what the ideal rulers, Tang and Wu, were adept at practicing.

Similarly, the heading of the second tactic is a brief summary of its function. It explains the second tactic as a method of excelling when holding a position of great importance and handling important matters appropriately, of gaining the favor of the ruler over a state of ten thousand chariots, and of being sure to eliminate sources of possible troubles for yourself.⁵ The second tactic suggests humility as well as the similar attitudes or actions mentioned above. It states, “In the conduct of official duties, the wise person, when he has the full amount, considers being deficient.”⁶ This figurative expression means that even after having fulfilled his duties, the wise person behaves as if he was deficient in his ability, quality, and the like. Moreover, the tactic ends by quoting the following saying of Confucius: “If a person is wise and still devoted to *qian*, he must be a worthy.”⁷

A tactic generally refers to a certain method adopted to achieve what you want, and, therefore, an attitude or action taken in the process of following a tactic inevitably evokes the thought of achieving a certain goal. The targeted goals in the headings of the first two tactics, namely winning the favor of the ruler, maintaining one’s political position by not losing the favor of the ruler or one’s colleagues, and still getting rid of possible troubles for oneself, are likely to provoke self-interest. For instance, if a person is respectful to others or behaves as if he does not really deserve his own accomplishments, he should be esteemed highly by others. However, if the person takes such attitudes to win the favor of a man of power and to remain in a high post, he seeks self-interest under the disguise of what is highly

⁴ To focus on the current topic, I do not explain the complication involved in interpreting *qian* 謙 (humility) in the tactics in the “Zhongni” chapter. However, I already discuss it in detail, in my paper. See Doil Kim (2020).

⁵ “求善處大重，理任大事，擅寵於萬乘之國，必無後患之術。” Li (2000, 119).

⁶ “故知者之舉事也，滿則慮謙。” Li (2000, 119). More extensive discussions of the relevant terms including *qian* and *qian** 慊 (deficiency) in this passage is presented in the aforementioned paper. See Footnote 4.

⁷ “孔子曰，... 知而好謙，必賢。此之謂也。” Li (2000, 119-120).

esteemed. Here, in the worst case, selfishness is camouflaged with a hypocritical attitude or action. Otherwise, at least, the Confucian attitudes or actions are motivated wrongly out of self-interest. In such cases, the problem of wrong motivations can arise.

This suspicion grows stronger when the first two tactics are compared with the third, which has a different heading, “the tactic that can work for every occasion over the world.”⁸ By drawing upon this third tactic, Xunzi explains, you will gain mastery in serving the ruler and become a sage in developing your personhood.⁹ This tactic also suggests attitudes or actions very similar to those mentioned above. Unlike the previous tactics, however, it suggests that one should adopt these attitudes or actions in a way that enables one to stand firm with the Confucian ideals (*lilong* 立隆) single-heartedly (*wuyi* 勿貳).¹⁰ The term *long* 隆 here refers to the core Confucian values or principles.¹¹ The ultimate goal of using the third tactic, then, lies not in winning the ruler's favor or avoiding any personal troubles in the future, but in practicing the Confucian core values or principles. In other words, the reason why one should not brag about one's own accomplishments in the presence of the ruler is not that one wants not to lose the favor of the ruler, but that one can thereby be in compliance with the core Confucian values or principles. Thus understood, the adoption of this tactic does not provoke the problem of wrong motivations.

The disagreement between the first and the second tactics on the one hand and the third tactic on the other needs to be resolved to understand Xunzi's thought more consistently. Prior to an attempt

⁸ “天下之行術。” See Li (2000, 121).

⁹ “天下之行術，以事君則必通，以爲仁則必聖。” In interpreting this sentence, I follow Zhang Jue's Chinese translation. See Zhang Jue (2015, 107). As to a similar interpretation, see Xiong Gongzhe (1995, 110). Knoblock's interpretation of the sentence is somewhat different. See Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 61).

¹⁰ “立隆而勿貳也，然後恭敬以先之，忠信以統之，愼謹以行之，端慤以守之。” In the above, I consult Knoblock's translation. See Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 61).

¹¹ The following annotators interpret *long* 隆 as *dao* 道: Wang Xianqian (1988, 113); Xiong Gongzhe (1995, 110); Kim Hak-ju (2001, 169). Zhang Jue interprets it as *liyi* 禮義. See Zhang Jue (2015, 107). Knoblock translates it as an high ideal and understands it as referring to *Dao* or *li* 禮. See Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 61). In the “Lilun” 禮論 chapter of the *Xunzi*, the same expression *lilong* 立隆 appears. In that context, it is obvious that *long* refers to *li* 禮. “禮豈不至矣哉。立隆以爲極，而天下莫之能損益也。” See Li (2000, 427).

to resolve it in the following section, it is worth noting that another passage in the *Xunzi* may evoke the problem of wrong motivations. In the “Chendao” chapter, Xunzi says,

“If one is persecuted and oppressed by a chaotic age, reduced to a life of utter poverty in a violent state, and one lacks any means to escape, then one should promote the lord’s refinements, and extol his goodness, avoid his ugliness and conceal his failures, speak of his virtues but never refer to his shortcomings. Make this one’s established customs.”¹²

This suggestion sounds like a survival technique that one might adopt in a predicament, as Xunzi seems to suggest that one should ingratiate oneself with one’s superior by covering up his faults and highlighting only his merits. Then, one’s attitudes or actions toward the superior may be driven by one’s self interest. If this reading of the above passage is correct, Xunzi’s suggestion provokes the problem of wrong motivations.

III. Xunzi’s Warning against Flattery

The disagreement among the three tactics cannot be resolved within the context of the “Zhongni” chapter. Even so, the previous readings of the passages in the “Chendao” and “Zhongni” chapters are misleading in consideration of a broader context of the *Xunzi*. Throughout the “Chendao” chapter, Xunzi criticizes ingratiation or flattery.

More particularly, for instance, Xunzi introduces the four grades of good and bad ministers, namely sham ministers (態臣 *taichen*), presumptuous ministers, meritorious ministers, and sage ministers, and then criticizes sham ministers.¹³ One of its Chinese characters *tai* 態 means “looks” or “appearance,” and it is used in the expression *tai*

¹² As to this interpretation, I mostly follow Zhang jue’s (2015, 185). In addition, I consult Hutton’s and Knoblock’s in terms of the translation. See Hutton (2014, 136) and Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 200).

¹³ “人臣之論，有態臣者，有篡臣者，有功臣者，有聖臣者。” Li (2000, 289). As to the above translations of each grade, see Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 197).

chen to refer to the appearance of flattering the ruler.¹⁴ In detail, Xunzi describes sham minsters as follows:

“Not only are they ill-equipped at unifying the people inside of the state, but they are also ill-equipped to repel disturbances from outside. The hundred clans feel no kinship with them, and the feudal lords do not trust them. Nevertheless, they are cunning and nimble, and they are a sleek talker; thus they are good at winning favors from their superiors.”¹⁵

Here, his criticism of flattery is clear. In addition, in the same chapter, Xunzi exhorts one not to flatter a mediocre ruler but only to remonstrate and wrangle with him.¹⁶ In the relevant passages, Xunzi draws distinctions among different levels of rulers, namely a sage ruler (聖君), a mediocre ruler (中君), and a violent ruler (暴君), and suggests different treatments in interacting with each of them. Xunzi also says that the practice of *yi* in the service of a mediocre ruler lies in being loyal and truthful without ingratiating oneself with the ruler, and in remonstrating and wrangling with him without being dishonest through flattery (Li 2000, 295). Xunzi is clearly opposed to flattery that seeks personal benefit. In line with this firm position, the first two tactics in the “Zhongni” chapter should be read differently.

IV. The Model of Mixed Motivations

Then, how can the first two tactics be re-interpreted in a way that avoids the problem of wrong motivations? A possible way around this trouble is to reconsider the selfish desires that intervene in adopting the tactics to be only secondary. For example, one may be *qian* (humble) on the basis of a combination of different motivations rather than a single one, and the principal motivation is independent

¹⁴ See Wang Xianqian (1988, 247) and Zhang (2015, 274).

¹⁵ “內不足使一民，外不足使距難，百姓不親，諸侯不信，然而巧敏佞說，善取寵乎上，是態臣者也。” Li (2000, 289).

¹⁶ “事中君者，有諫爭無諂諛。” Li (2000, 294).

of the selfish motivations that only intervene secondarily. In other words, such a selfish motive for maintaining one's own political position by not losing the favor of one's superior can be understood as playing a subordinate role to the proper and primary motive for practicing the core Confucian values or principles. In this line of thought, it can be argued that insofar as the primary motive for being humble is independent of the selfish ones, one can sidestep the problem of wrong motivations.

The phenomenon of intervention by such subordinate motivations is common in our experience. In everyday life, human beings do not always act exclusively with a single motivation. For example, while a person extends efforts to help someone else out of sympathy, he may simultaneously be motivated to pursue a personal sense of happiness by carrying out such good deeds. This additional motivation is self-interested. Nevertheless, it does not make the agent completely misguided in helping the other, insofar as it does not become the stronger and encroach on the other motive. This model of mixed motivations may accommodate a richer and more concrete view of human actions in daily life. Moreover, Xunzi does not completely reject the pursuit of personal benefits. He approves of it on the condition that the pursuit does not violate the core Confucian values or principles. In this regard, he says that the gentleman desires personal advantages (利 *li*), and, yet, he would not do things of which he disapproves.¹⁷

Furthermore, this model has the theoretical advantage of uncovering what Xunzi may implicitly have in mind when he suggests the three different tactics of the “Zhongni” chapter in a sequential manner. Perhaps, Xunzi considers the process of self-cultivation, in the beginning of which human beings whose nature is selfish according to his widely known thesis that human nature is bad should have difficulty in following the Confucian *Dao* as such without having in mind any personal gain. For this reason, Xunzi may try to encourage a layperson in self-cultivation by following the first and second tactics, which partly allows the intervention of selfish motivations. According

¹⁷ “義之所在，不傾於權，不顧其利，舉國而與之，不為改視，重死持義而不撓，是士君子之勇也。” Li (2000, 58).

to this line of thought, the third tactic is what can be adopted by a well cultivated person who can follow the Confucian *Dao* without being helped by any subordinate motivation. In contrast, the first and second tactics have more to do with Xunzi's conception of how a person should act in the process of self-cultivation rather than his conception of how a person should ideally act.¹⁸

The above lines of thought may be developed in a more detailed manner. Nevertheless, I do not steer the following discussion in that direction. In fact, Xunzi does not indicate such different levels of self-cultivation in terms of the three tactics in the "Zhongni" chapter, nor does he throughout the *Xunzi*.

On the other hand, the problematic motive in question may be understood not as a selfish one, but as an indispensable desire for self-preservation. In the "Rongru" chapter, Xunzi claims that the gentleman and the petty man are the same in liking what is beneficial and hating what is harmful.¹⁹ According to this, it can be claimed further that a gentleman, namely a well-cultivated person, may sometimes take polite deference mainly out of a proper motive for it, while having another desire for self-preservation in order to avoid harm against himself. Out of the latter, he may adopt the first or second tactic in the "Zhongni" chapter, thereby trying to win the favor of his superior. This extra motive can be a survival instinct for self-preservation in a predicament like dwelling "in a violent state" (in the "Chendao" chapter), rather than a selfish desire to increase one's own private interests. The intervention of this extra desire may not be completely problematic from the perspective of early Confucians, if this need for self-preservation does not encroach upon the proper motives for taking the typical Confucian attitudes or actions.

¹⁸ If this understanding of Xunzi is correct, Mencius should oppose Xunzi. Mencius draws the distinction between doing what is proper while being so naturally inclined and forcing oneself to do what is proper, with rejecting the latter. In contrast, Xunzi takes a positive attitude toward forcing oneself to do what is proper while not being so naturally inclined. With respect to this view of Xunzi's, see the "Xing" 性 chapter of the *Xunzi*; especially, see Li (2000, 540). Regarding the understanding of Mencius just explained, see Shun (1997, 157-158).

¹⁹ "好利惡害, 是君子小人之所同也." Li (2000, 60).

V. The Criterion of Motivational Purity

No matter how the extra motive under discussion is understood, Xunzi would not accept the model of mixed motivations when understood in the form explained in the previous section. Even though Xunzi does not completely reject the pursuit of personal benefits, he firmly believes that the gentleman should courageously not look after his own benefit in meeting the requirement of *yi*.²⁰ In this regard, attention needs to be paid to the third tactic in the “Zhongni” chapter that asks one to take the Confucian attitudes or actions by standing firm with the Confucian ideals single-heartedly. This suggestion is another criterion to meet when a person ideally acts.

More particularly, as soon as any self-interested motivation intervenes in the mind of an agent in acting to pursue the Confucian values, the purity in his mind cannot help being contaminated. This loss of purity prevents the agent from being driven wholeheartedly by proper motives. In the case of Mencius, another early Confucian thinker, the basic motivation for urgently reaching for a crawling baby who is about to fall into a well is *ceyin zhixin* (惻隱之心), namely compassion for the impending pain to which the baby is clearly exposed. Mencius asserts that no motivation other than the compassion, especially any selfish one, intervenes in such an urgent situation (Yang 1996, 79-80). For instance, the desire to gain recognition from the village for the good deed, or to continue acquaintance with the baby’s parents for a selfish purpose, should not enter into the agent’s mind. The agent could presumably be all the more motivated to help the crawling baby by virtue of such

²⁰ “義之所在，不傾於權，不顧其利，舉國而與之，不為改視，重死持義而不撓，是士君子之勇也。” (Li 2000, 58).

Knoblock’s translation for this passage is the following: “Staying with [yi] not swayed by the exigencies of the moment, not given to looking after his own benefit, elevating the interests of the whole state and assisting in realizing them, not acting to change his point of view, weighing the threat of death but upholding *yi* and not backing away from it—such is the courage of the scholar and gentleman.” See Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 1, 188). Here the expression “weighing the threat of death (重死)” may be based on one’s desire for self-preservation, as discussed similarly in the previous section. However, in this section, I explain that this interpretation is not necessarily correct.

additional desires for selfish gains.²¹ Nevertheless, this intervention is problematic from the viewpoint of motivational purity.

This idea of motivational purity is shared by Xunzi, as the aforementioned single-heartedness in the third tactic conveys this idea. It also reflects the notion of *cheng* 誠 (usually translated as sincerity), which is crucially discussed throughout many early Confucian texts, such as the *Mencius* and the “Daxue” 大學 chapter and the “Zhongyong” 中庸 chapter of the *Liji* 禮記. The “Bugou” chapter of the *Xunzi* contains a passage that promotes the notion, in which *cheng* is understood as the best way for a gentleman to cultivate his mind and make his mind have no other concern but upholding the core Confucian values.²² At this point, it is worth noting that the neo-Confucian Zhu Xi 朱熹 understands *cheng* as pertaining to the absence of any internal division of the mind oriented solely in one of the central neo-Confucian values or principles, *li* 理.²³

In short, the criterion of motivational purity has to do with maintaining *cheng* in the mind without the intervention of any other motives that leads to an internal division of the mind, thereby preventing the mind from being oriented entirely in pursuing the core Confucian values. Granting that Xunzi accepts the notion of *cheng*, the extra motives under discussion should be characterized without infringing the criterion of motivational purity.

²¹ Note that Mencius does not elaborate on his idea of *ce yin zhi xin* in the above way related to motivational purity, for his interest is in making the point that everyone is naturally equipped with such a moral motivation as *ce yin zhi xin*, and that this is empirically proved by the observation that everyone must act wholly upon the moral motivation, without being interrupted by any selfish desire, in an urgent situation in which a vulnerable creature is in fatal danger. This view of Mencius's quite obviously implies the motivational purity of the agent, though.

²² “君子養心莫善於誠，致誠則無它事矣。惟仁之為守，惟義之為行。” Li (2000, 47).

²³ See *Zhuzi Yulei* 朱子語類 (Zhu Xi 1986, 304). Kwong-loi Shun understands *cheng* as having to do with the heart/mind's being wholly oriented in an ethical direction. See Shun (2008).

VI. The Role of Ancillary Motivations in the Benign Model of Mixed Motivations

Based on the discussions in the previous sections, I examine another possibility that Xunzi does not consider the mixture of different motivations as such to be problematic. In the “Chendao” chapter, Xunzi says,

“If a person is worthy, and, yet, one does not respect him, this is [for one] to be a beast. If a person is unworthy, and, so, one does not respect him, this is [for one] to act like provoking a tiger. If one is like a beast, one will be in chaos. If one provokes a tiger, one will be in danger. Then disaster will reach one’s own body. . . . A *ren* (仁) person always respects others. There is an appropriate way for respecting other people: If a person is worthy, one honors him and respects him. If a person is unworthy, one fears him and respects him. If a person is worthy, one gives love to him and respects him. If a person is unworthy, one keeps him at a distance and respects him. In these cases, respect that one shows is one; the actual circumstances are twofold (其情二也).”²⁴

In the above passage, Xunzi explains different ways of showing respect to two kinds of people, namely a worthy person and an unworthy person. Especially, the treatment of the latter is compared to that of a tiger; in this respect, the latter is understood as a brutal person. Xunzi stresses that respect toward a brute is not different from respect toward a worthy person. In this regard, he says, “respect that one shows is one.” This means that even though there are distinctive ways of respecting different kinds of people, the main motivation is still the same kind of respect.²⁵

²⁴ “人賢而不敬，則是禽獸也，人不肖而不敬，則是狎虎也。禽獸則亂，狎虎則危，災及其身矣。 . . . 敬人有道。賢者則貴而敬之，不肖者則畏而敬之，賢者則親而敬之，不肖者則疏而敬之。其敬一也，其情二也。” Li (2000, 298).

²⁵ The above passage from the “Chendao” chapter includes a term that requires more explanations: the *qing* 情 of the last sentence, *qiqing eryl* 其情二也. First, as translated above, it may mean actual circumstances (實情). As to this interpretation, see Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 203). Thus understood, it refers to the two circumstances

It is important to note how Xunzi explains the different ways of respecting, namely the ways of respecting a worthy person and a brute: He understands this difference in terms of the intervention of different attitudes or emotions, such as honoring (貴) and giving love (親), on the one hand, and fearing (畏) and keeping at a distance (疏), on the other. More particularly, according to Xunzi, one should fear a brute but nevertheless respect him because he would act like a tiger and harm one, otherwise. In the same vein, the intervention of any extra motive in adopting the first and second tactics in the “Zhongni” chapter can be understood as happening in treating a violent and brutal ruler.

However, the extra motive at issue is not necessarily a selfish desire or a basic desire for self-preservation. Instead, it needs to be characterized differently to meet the criterion of motivational purity. In the “Chendao” chapter, Xunzi points out that one’s ruler is not always a sage king but more likely a tyrant. He then suggests,

“In serving a sage king, one just needs to listen to his orders and follow him and should not remonstrate and wrangle with him. In serving a mediocre king, one needs to remonstrate and wrangle with him and should not flatter him. In serving a violent king, one needs to make up for what is lacking in him and to remove what is wrong with him and should not break with or oppose him.”²⁶

in which one should show respect in different ways, mainly because the objects of respect are of different kinds.

Second, it may also mean a variety of mental attitudes, including feelings, emotions, or dispositions (情). As to this line of interpretation, see Hutton (2014, 139) and Li (2000, 299). If this is the case, the term refers to the two kinds of additional attitudes or emotions that accompany one’s respect, such as honoring or giving love in relation to a worthy person on the one hand and fearing or the attitude of keeping at a distance in relation to a brutal person on the other. In fact, it cannot be determined within the context alone which is the right connotation of the term.

No matter which one is more appropriate, however, Xunzi’s point in relation to the term is clearly this: The ways of respecting are twofold in relation to two kinds of object of respect, and this difference consists in the intervention of different attitudes or emotions directed distinctively to each kind of object of respect. For convenience, this kind of additional attitude or emotion may be called ancillary motivations.

²⁶ “事聖君者，有聽從無諫爭。事中君者，有諫爭無諂諛。事暴君者，有補創無撓拂。” Li (2000, 294).

According to this passage, when serving a sage ruler, one just needs to pursue the realization of the Confucian core values or principles simply by following the ideal ruler. In contrast, when faced with unavoidable situations where one serves a tyrant, it would be impossible to abide doggedly by the Confucian principles. Under the regime of a violent ruler, it is pivotal to avoid being ousted by losing favor with the ruler or by incurring the jealousy of fellow ministers, assuming one wants to pursue the core Confucian values and practice the Confucian principles *in the long run*. Only then could one gradually have influence on the tyrant and change him, ultimately guiding him to govern his regime in a way that is at least close to *wangdao* 王道 (the Confucian way of the true king). In this respect, Xunzi mentions in the “Chendao” chapter, “To employ the Perfect Way to enlighten the ruler, but in nothing to be inharmonious or discordant, and so be able to alter and change him, being constantly mindful of getting him to accept this. Such are one’s moral obligations in the service of a cruel and violent ruler.”²⁷

In the process of establishing harmony with a tyrannical ruler, the desire not to lose his favor and thereby to maintain one’s political position may inevitably intervene in one’s attitude of serving the ruler. However, such a desire should not lead one to flatter the tyrant. Neither is it simply based on a basic desire for self-preservation. Rather, it aims ultimately at realizing the Confucian ideals in the long run, even in violent circumstances where one more often finds oneself.

Finally, the extra motive in question can be named “the ancillary motivation” to differentiate itself from the other candidates discussed so far, such as selfish desires or desires for self-preservation. It is characterized as a motive that aims at something that may simply be misrepresented as personal advantages in the short term, but that works eventually as a means to realize the core Confucian values in the long run. Then, the intervention of an ancillary motivation would not violate the criterion of motivational purity because it does not prevent one from being oriented single-heartedly in the pursuit of the core Confucian values in the long run.

²⁷ “曉然以至道而無不調和也，而能化易，時闢內之，是事暴君之義也。” Li (2000, 295).

VII. Concluding Remarks

The function of ancillary motivations cannot cross certain limits. These limits can be conceived in terms of the early Confucian idea of timeliness (時): Confucians emphasize the importance of taking an appropriate attitude or action in a well-timed manner, depending on various circumstances. They believe that in the kaleidoscope of life, one should flexibly adapt oneself to changing circumstances without losing faith in the core Confucian values. An important implication of this belief is that as Mencius says, if the circumstance does not allow one to advance the Confucian *Dao*, one should rather withdraw oneself from the world and attend to one's own development in solitude.²⁸ Xunzi also treats such wisdom seriously throughout the text.²⁹ The claim can be made then that in the spirit of timeliness, Xunzi would say that while one may adopt some strategic ways of dealing with a corrupt or violent ruler, this is only true up to a limit, namely only if there is still some chance of success in changing the ruler.

The characterization of the ancillary motivation is not an issue raised by Xunzi. Even so, the discussion of this paper provides a meaningful viewpoint for anyone who follows Xunzi's suggestions in the "Zhongni" and "Chendao" chapters. In difficult circumstances and times in which one unavoidably serves a violent superior, one needs to check if any extra motive involved in taking the attitude of polite deference or humility toward the superior is not a self-interested desire, including a desire merely for self-preservation, but rather the kind of ancillary one that aims ultimately to attain the Confucian ideal in the long run.

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²⁸ "窮則獨善其身，達則兼善天下." Yang (1996, 304).

²⁹ For instance, in the "Zhongni" chapter, Xunzi says that the gentleman bends when the occasion requires bending, but straightens out when the occasion allows (故君子時詘則詘，時伸則伸也). See Li (2000, 122).

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A Criminological Test of Confucian Family Centrism

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Abstract

The present study analyzes how Confucian family centrism influences criminality within society. In many ways Confucian culture is Chinese culture, so to understand Confucian crime control practices is to understand China. Material relating to crime prevention was filtered out of prominent Confucian texts, and it was then evaluated and tested using NLSY97 data. The data was obtained from the first wave of responses produced by the NLSY97, with a sample of 4,599 males from the United States between the ages of 12-16. Confucian family centrism was linked to lower levels of delinquency and other negative life outcomes in males. Results showed that boy's delinquency, behavioral/emotional problems, and stealing were significantly lower with authoritative fathering, a style of parenting associated with Confucian family centrism. Furthermore, higher levels of parental monitoring exhibited by the residential father produced significantly lower levels of delinquency, substance abuse, behavioral/emotional problems, and stealing among boys; higher levels of parental monitoring are strongly Confucian family centric in nature. These findings hold even after controlling for numerous variables including ethnicity, age, the mothers parenting style, family income, and so on. This test of Confucian family centrism adds support to Confucian parenting theory and Confucian criminological theory.

Keywords: Confucianism, crime, parenting, family, NLSY97, Confucian family centrism

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Confucius (551-479 BCE), arguably the greatest and most profound of all Chinese sages, was deeply involved in crime prevention and crime related issues. Confucius was the Minister of Crime in his home state of Lu, and evidence indicates that his ability to reduce crime and control the citizenry was effective (Confucius 1971 [1893]). His self-control, social control, and deviance reduction philosophy, when instituted within his home state in his capacity as the Minister of Crime, was apparently so effective (the state of Lu was so safe, productive, harmonious, and crime free) that he became a threat to neighboring states, which, through a conspiracy among the leaders of these neighboring states, ultimately precipitated his removal from power. Crime related issues were at the forefront of much of Confucius', Mencius', and Xunzi's (the three great pre-Qin Confucians whose philosophy constitutes the foundation of Confucianism) professional work, and this significantly shaped their overall philosophy.¹

This is an examination of the Confucian theory of family centrism on crime prevention. Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, who were active from the 6th to the 3rd centuries BCE, are pertinent to criminal justice issues as they were regular consultants to feudal state leadership on issues of regulating, correcting, punishing, and controlling people. Thus, theory on the causes and remedies for crime were widely covered within their philosophical texts. Confucian family centrism is tested by NLSY97 data.

Studies have been produced on how extant legal systems relate to pre-Qin Confucian philosophy (Cheng 1948; Kim 2015; Lee and Lai 1978), and Braithwaite (2003, 2015) and Liu (2007) touched on Confucian theory in their work involving restorative justice, but no analysis or tests of Confucian family centrism from a criminological perspective have been conducted.

¹ The "pre-Qin" period is any time before the advent of the unification of China under the Qin Dynasty (the Qin Dynasty was in existence from 221-206 BCE).

I. Confucian Family Centrism

The Confucians believed that our natural disposition is that of gradations of love. We first and most intensely love those closest to us, our immediate family members, and we expand our love out from there at different levels depending on familial and proximal relatedness. Our love is strongest with our immediate family, slightly less strong with our extended family (aunts, uncles, cousins, distant cousins, and so on), then, as we move away from our family, our love diminishes more and more as we move to our distant relatives, to the community, the county, the state, and so on. Smith likened this love to a series of concentric circles, writing, “As for the increase of this heart-mind that is *hsin*, it expands in concentric circles that begin with oneself and spreads from there to include successively one’s family, one’s face-to-face community, one’s nation, and finally all humanity” (Smith 1991, 182; as quoted in Lan 2015). Bell and Metz observed that Confucianism extends its relational spectrum to explicitly include foreigners and even the animal kingdom, writing:

The web of caring obligations that binds family members is more demanding than that binding citizens (or perhaps legal residents), the web of such obligations that bind citizens is more demanding than that binding foreigners, the web binding humans is more demanding than that binding nonhuman forms of life, and so on. (Bell and Metz 2011, 88)

The position that the family is the center of authentic love is instrumental to the Confucian worldview, and it is considered paramount in crime prevention. Crime prevention takes place within the family as that is where the intense love and affection resides.

A. The Family

The family unit and family cohesion are central to Confucian remedies for crime. The family is the root of behavior acquisition and the nucleus of society. The type and quality of affection exhibited

between family members, and the moral lessons and ritual based guidance transmitted from parents to children represent a major factor in determining the children's future behavior—particularly in the self-control and morality required to suppress deviant behavior. This affection and guidance are to begin immediately after the child is born and continue unabated in an intense manner throughout childhood. Confucius (1971 [1893]) explains the initial phase of the parenting procedure, “It is not until a child is three years old that it is allowed to leave the arms of its parents” (17.21, 328). This quote is emblematic of the intense dedication and supervision expected of parents throughout their children's development. The pre-Qin Confucian book of ritual known as *The Book of Rites* or the *Li Ki*, which conveys the Confucian family centric worldview, describes how parents have the capacity to influence children, “He should be (as if he were) hearing (his parents) when there is no voice from them, and as seeing them when they are not actually there” (Legge 2016: Qu Li 1.11), and it explains how the son should behave toward his father:

In serving his father, (a son) should conceal (his faults), and not openly or strongly remonstrate with him about them; should in every possible way wait on and nourish him, without being tied to definite rules; should serve him laboriously till his death, and then complete the mourning for him for three years. (Legge 2016: Tan Gong 1.67)

Other more general examples of the extreme dedication to the family expected within Confucianism include Confucius's observation that:

Now filial piety is the root of (all) virtue, and (the stem) out of which grows (all moral) teaching. . . . When we have established our character by the practice of the (filial) course, so as to make our name famous in the future ages, and thereby glorify our parents:—this is the end of filial piety. It commences with the service of parents; it proceeds to the service of the ruler; it is completed by the establishment of the character. (Misc. Confucian School 1879, pt. 1, 465)

B. The Center of All Things

The family and the family as a unit is valued over all else within pre-Qin Confucian philosophy—even to the extent that it supersedes the law and the state. If the father engages in serious criminal behavior, it is expected, according to both Confucius and Mencius, that the son cover-up for the crimes of the father so that the father's crimes will not be detected by the authorities or that the father will not be apprehended by the authorities. The same holds true if the son is the criminal, wherein the father is expected to cover for the crimes of the son. Confucius (2008) explains:

The Duke of She told Master Kong [Confucius]: “In my locality there is a certain paragon, for when his father stole a sheep, he, the son, bore witness against him.’ Master Kong said: ‘In my locality those who are upright are different from this. Fathers cover up for their sons and sons cover up for their fathers. Uprightness is to be found in this.” (13.18, 51)

Mencius took this notion further, asserting that not only should a son aid in the flight of his criminal father, but that 1) he should cover for his father even if his father commits serious offenses such as murder, and 2) he should be prepared to ruin or greatly diminish his own life—even going so far as having a king abdicate his throne to save his criminal father—in the process. Mencius (2004) explains the acceptable behavior of an emperor when the emperor's father commits a serious criminal offense:

T'ao Ying asked [Mencius], “When Shun was Emperor and Kao Yao was the judge, if the Blind Man [Emperor Shun's father] killed a man, what was to be done?”

“The only thing to do was to apprehend him.”

“In that case, would Shun [the Emperor] not try to stop it?”

“How could Shun [the Emperor] stop it? Kao Yao [the judge] had authority for what he did.”

“Then what would Shun have done?”

[Mencius]: “Shun looked upon casting aside the Empire as no more than discarding a worn shoe. He would have secretly carried the old man on his back and fled to the edge of the Sea and lived there happily, never giving a thought to the Empire.” (VII. A. 35, 153)

In this case, many will consider the behavior of the son or the father, when covering for the other, to be immoral and troubling, but it must be conveyed that if any behavior is expected to disrupt the unity of the family or dissolve the family it is to be rejected in favor of any action that will ensure the continuation of a united and functional family.²

The importance of the family in teaching and promoting virtuous behavior is paramount in the Confucian tradition. The lessons and examples passed down from parents to children, mainly through ritual, moral instruction, and forms of academic learning, were considered by the Confucians to be the root from which moral behavior springs. Confucius (2008) said this about the role of the family in the prevention of civil disorder:

Few indeed are those who are naturally filial towards their parents and dutiful towards their elder brothers but are fond of opposing their superiors; and it never happens that those who do not like opposing their superiors are fond of creating civil disorder. The gentleman concerns himself with the root; and if the root is firmly planted, the Way grows. Filial piety and fraternal duty—surely, they are the roots of humaneness. (1.2, p. 3)

² Critics such as Liu Qingping (2007) assert that this extreme form of family centrism, wherein filial piety is valued above all else and should not be criticized if in conflict with other moral principles, promotes and defends corruption and nepotism within modern Chinese society. It may strengthen familial bonds at the expense of the health and proper functioning of society, as well as at the expense of the moral development of the children and the moral framework of the family. It is worthy to consider if Confucius and Mencius had taken family centrism too far in these examples and in this theory, to the extent that general morality is weakened, and social wellbeing is compromised.

The root of humaneness is the family, particularly in the actions of the parents in the upbringing of children and in the filial piety reciprocated to the parents later in life. Who we become as human beings is a direct result of the type of family environment from which we emerge. Those who acquire the proper moral lessons and behavioral patterns will likely go on to be dutiful towards their parents, family, community, superiors, country, and ruler. Those children who engage in productive behaviors and interactions with their parents will engage in a continuation of these behaviors and interactions with other inhabitants within their communities and within society—which generates a harmonious society generally unburdened by civil misconduct and deviance.

C. Family Centrism and Authentic Love

Family centric gradations of love exhibited within society is, per the Confucians, evidence that the family is of most importance in the development and wellbeing of people. When authentic love and affection is strong, as it often is within an immediate family (relative to the love and affection shared between nonrelatives or strangers), people take it upon themselves to authentically nurture and provide for each other.

Among family members there is a greater *unconscious* drive to show love and sacrifice for one another when compared to other nonrelated members of society. Mencius (2004) explains:

Presumably there must have been cases in ancient times of people not burying their parents. When the parents died, they were thrown in the gullies. Then one day the sons passed the place and there lay the bodies, eaten by foxes and sucked by flies. A sweat broke out on their brows, and they could not bear to look. The sweating was not put on for others to see. It was as outward expression of their innermost heart. They went home for baskets and spades. If it was truly right for them to bury the remains of their parents, then it must also be right for all dutiful sons and benevolent men to do likewise. (III. A. 5, 63)

This sweating and instinctive turning away from the gruesome scene of parental decomposition represents a deep affection for close relatives. As a correlate, Mencius (2004) was once asked if people love one another equally, regardless of blood affiliation, and he responded, “Does Yi Tzu [the questioner] truly believe that a man loves his brother’s son no more than his neighbor’s newborn baby?” (III.A.5, 62-63). Mencius is conveying that a man will love a close blood relative more than a nonrelated person in the community. It is from this love that a dedication to the well-being of one’s children is generated. It is from this dedication to the children that, through moral and ritual based instruction, the children develop self-control and a working morality.

D. Education within the Family

Within the Confucian tradition, parents are expected to instruct their children on matters pertaining to morality, ritual, and general knowledge. This education is to be long-term, rigorous, and constant. The prominent pre-Qin Confucian text *The Great Learning* explains parental expectations, “What is meant by ‘In order rightly to govern the State, it is necessary first to regulate the family,’ is this: —It is not possible for one to teach others, while he cannot teach his own family” (Confucius [1893] 1971: *The Great Learning* IX.I, 370). Though this advice is directed toward the ruling classes in this instance, it speaks to two important elements within the family-education equation. The first, though it may seem rather obvious, is that parents must instruct their children. The second is that once parents have mastered the task of instruction within the home, they can then be considered capable of providing advice for others. Stated differently, if one is incapable, through poor instruction, incompetence, or other circumstances, of producing morally sound and competent children, their ability to instruct others and provide advice for community members may be seriously questioned.

Of high importance are the rituals that are expected to be taught and practiced within the family. It is within this ritual based framework of social behavior and social hierarchies that children are

expected to learn and practice many forms of self-control, filial piety, and hierarchy recognition, all of which is anticipated to result in greater personal control and diminished expressions of deviance and criminality.

Lastly, and importantly, Confucius, in his capacity as Minister of Crime, was confronted with a domestic dispute between a father and son. Confucius was prompted by a superior to execute the son for his being unfilial towards his father. Confucius refused this request, claiming the father had failed to properly educate his son on filial piety. From this episode, the importance Confucius placed on a father educating his son is clear. This event, interpreted and described by James Legge, transpired thusly:

A father having brought some charge against his son, Confucius kept them both in prison for three months, without making any difference in favour of the father, and then wished to dismiss them both. The head of the Chi was dissatisfied, and said, 'You are playing with me, Sir Minister of Crime. Formerly you told me that in a State or a family filial duty was the first thing to be insisted on. What hinders you now from putting to death this unfilial son as an example to all the people?' Confucius with a sigh replied, 'When superiors fail in their duty, and yet go to put their inferiors to death, it is not right. *This father has not taught his son to be filial* [emphasis added];—to listen to his charge would be to slay the guiltless. (Confucius[1893] 1971, 74)

Per Confucius, if parents fail to control and regulate their children through ritual, moral instruction, and in other scholastic education, their children will have a greater likelihood of exhibiting criminal behavior.

E. The Role of the Father

Of all the relationships that exist within the social hierarchy, the Confucians believed that the father-son relationship is the most vital. When this relationship is destroyed or severely disrupted—because of father absenteeism, the father lacking in morals or cultivation,

and so on—the future behavioral outlook of the son is not expected to be promising. Because of the father's failure to cultivate himself or understand his role within the upbringing of his children, the son will be unable to acquire the moral framework—a moral framework that is derived from instruction in ritual and morality—necessary to prevent deviance and wrongdoing. Thus, the father's position within the Confucian family system is vitally important and a major determining factor in the future behavior (criminal or otherwise) of his children.

It is, the Confucians argued, the responsibility of the father to teach his children and regulate his family. If the father is immoral, uneducated, and uncultivated, his ability to produce a vibrant and productive family will be greatly diminished. Mencius illustrates this point, "If you do not practice the Way yourself, you will not have your way even with your own wife and children" (Mencius 2004, VII. B.9). Confucius spoke of the importance of the father within family regulation when he said:

It is said in the Book of Poetry, "Happy union with wife and children, is like the music of lutes and harps. When there is concord among brethren, the harmony is delightful and enduring. *Thus*, may you regulate your family, and enjoy the pleasures of your wife and children." (Legge 1893: *Doctrine of the Mean* XV.V.2, 396)

Society comes secondary to, and functions as a product of, the operation and quality of the family system. Mencius explains the hierarchal nature of Confucian society in these general terms, "There is a common expression, "The Empire, the state, the family." The Empire has its basis in the state, the state in the family, and the family in one's own self" (Mencius IV.A.5, 79)

II. Evolutionary and Biological Explanations for Confucian Family Centrism

My aim in this section is to show that people have a natural pre-

dilection to engage in Confucian family centrism because it produces the greatest success for their offspring, thus making it more palatable for people to accept and implement. To make this argument, kin selection theory and the Cinderella effect are employed and analyzed within the context of inherited parenting behaviors and the future behavior and success of children. This section argues that people have inherited dispositions that favor ourselves and our own kin, and rather than try to overcome these ingrained dispositions, which may be difficult or nearly impossible on a large scale as it runs in opposition to the successful evolutionary mechanisms that have put us here today, we should work to better understand them, work to refine them to create a more just society, and promote those elements that are conducive to a flourishing society.

A. Kin Selection

The inherent need to provide greater love to close family members, as espoused in Confucian family centrism, can be tied to evolutionary theory and Darwinian natural selection, particularly as it relates to an adaptive strategy within natural selection known as kin selection. Kin selection is an evolutionarily theory developed by William Hamilton and John Maynard Smith, and later advanced and popularized by Robert Trivers in conjunction with his work on reciprocal altruism. Kin selection is a form of natural selection operating at the level of the family, or genetically related groups of organisms, instead of explicitly at the level of the individual. It is a method for gene replication or gene propagation utilized by some species, and it explains why people have evolved to behave altruistically to those who are genetically joined with them.

Genetic material maintains its continued existence through two main strategies, individual mating and kin selection. The first strategy, individual mating, is the survival and reproduction of the gene directly from within the body in which it is contained. This is accomplished when one gains access to a mate, and, through reproductive processes with one's mate, directly propagates one's genes into the next generation. It is the case of one person indi-

vidually spreading one's own genes through reproduction with another individual. The second method, kin selection, is the survival and propagation of one's genetic information by enhancing the reproductive success of those who carry similar genetic information (genetically related family members or kin). This is typically achieved by one member of a family sacrificing some or all genetic fitness (reproductive and survival capacity) to improve the genetic fitness of another member of the family or several other members of the family.

This type of sacrificial or fitness reducing behavior is acceptable from a gene-level perspective because in the game of gene propagation all that matters is that the gene is passed to the next generation, it does not matter which body the gene is in—and genetically related family members carry significant amounts of each other's genetic information. Those family members closely related to you likely carry greater amounts of your genes, while those more distant in family relation likely carry fewer of your genes, and nonrelatives carry fewer still. To put this in a proportional perspective, one-half of your genes are shared with your children, yet only around one-eighth of your genes mirror those of your cousin, thus, the odds that you would be willing to sacrifice fitness for your children (or be altruistic toward your children), as opposed to your cousin, are greater.

At the end of the day, as long as one's genes continue on into the future, then, from a genetic standpoint, success has been achieved. One body can sacrifice itself or lose a significant amount of fitness for another body, and this is perfectly acceptable from a gene-level perspective if that other body contains a substantial portion of the same genetic information as the sacrificial body. As Gottschalk writes, "If a gene in my body can find a way to assist any copies of itself that reside in another body, that gene will spread" (2002, 268-269). From a kin selection perspective, we can understand why parents stick around to raise their offspring: it is simply one genetic entity working to ensure the fitness of another genetic entity that shares its genes. One can see evidence of kin selection by examining the cellular relationships operating within a single body. Gottschalk explains:

The gene's-eye view can play hell with our common-sense ideas about an individual and a social group. But, it also allows you to see the "altruistic" sacrifice that your white blood cells make on behalf of all the other cells that are you. . . . Your body is like an ant colony wherein every "ant" (i.e. cell) is perfectly related to every other "ant." Thus, every cell in you submerges its interests to the good of the group. . . . The idea is to see through the organism to the replicating entities themselves. Even the altruism that occurs between organisms that are not genetically identical, is working in the interests of the genes that are shared. It is still the *copies of genes* that are benefiting. (Gottschalk 2002, 276)

Kin selection, through the general processes of natural selection, has effectively engrained within humans a predisposition to altruistically provide greater material goods for, and engage in a greater emotional connection with, those who share the same genetic information—with little or no expectation for reciprocity. This kind of relational behavior exists because it has been highly effective in the past in ensuring the continued existence of one's genetic information. People who possessed genes that predisposed them to behave altruistically (to show love) to others who shared their DNA (children, siblings, cousins, and so on) have historically passed on greater amounts of their genetic information, genetic information which contained these same altruistic genes, to future generations. As Gottschalk states regarding altruistic genes replicating altruistic genes, "The solution . . . is to think in terms of genes and to get altruistic genes to benefit themselves by benefiting other bodies which contain copies of the altruistic gene" (Gottschalk 2002, 270).

Viewed from a different direction, those humans (kin selection has not been selected for by many other species, but it has been selected for among humans) that possessed genes for, say, abandoning their offspring to fend for themselves after birth, were out reproduced by those who were endowed with genes that promoted altruistic behavior toward their offspring after birth. Thus, kin selection amongst humans has generally been a more effective reproductive strategy than, say, abandonment selection or universal love selection. Ultimately, because

this behavior is so effective, it essentially became the norm amongst humans. It should be noted that kin selection is simply an effective means to propagate genes into the future, and it does not hold moral superiority over, say, utilitarian theory advocated by Peter Singer (1981) and Joshua Greene (2013), which asserts that people, families, and societies be more inclusive in the care of others.

The genes that generate these neurocognitive mechanisms that promote this behavior exist because these genes are highly effective in propelling genes (themselves) into the future (Dawkins 1976). From a Darwinian perspective, it could be argued, to love someone is to invest altruistically in their genetic success/reproductive success—invest one's time, emotional energy, resources, and fitness—to engage in Confucian family centrism—so that another person, almost always another blood relative,³ can survive, become more reproductively fit, and pass on genetic information.

B. The Cinderella Effect

The “Cinderella effect” explains that the likelihood of a child being abused or killed by a parent is far higher when that parent is a not genetically or biologically related. Rates of child abuse in stepparent families far exceed that of biologically intact families (Daly and Wilson 1988; Schnitzer and Ewigman 2008; Stiffman et al. 2002). Stiffman et al. estimates that children “were eight times more likely to die” (2002, 615) at the hands of a non-genetically related adult living in their household when compared to a household that consisted of an intact, two biological parent arrangement.

Evolutionarily speaking, when a parent abuses their biologically

³ Non-family member altruism is much more prevalent when it is reciprocal. Reciprocal altruism between nonfamily members generally operates under different conditions and it necessitates different behavioral requirements (usually requiring the capacity for memory and punishment). The relationships and altruism being described here between family members are usually zero sum at the personal, non-gene level. For more on non-kin reciprocal altruism see Trivers (1971), and for a useful study on a Confucian interpretation of family and social relations seen through the lens of reciprocal altruism, see Nichols (2011, 618-622).

related child, the chances for that child to be successful in the propagation or continuation of the abusive parent's genes later in life is reduced (consider the reproductive implications of severe brain trauma from physical abuse or severe emotional and psychological abuse; the significance of this abuse extends to the death of the child, in that, if the child is killed his/her reproductive capacity is reduced to zero). Because the child, under these adverse conditions, has a reduced chance of propagating his/her genes, the genetic predisposition for this abusive behavior from a biological parent is greatly diminished—the genes that promote abusive behavior from parents to their biological children are more likely not to survive into future generations.

On the other hand, when a non-biologically related parent (usually the stepfather) abuses a stepchild, that behavior will often not affect the continuation of his abusive genes, and, thus, it will not affect the continuation of this type of abusive behavior. Gottschalk and Ellis (2010, 66) explain, "From an evolutionary perspective, individuals who harm close genetic relatives are less likely to pass genes on to future generations than are individuals who harm distant relatives or nonrelatives." In one of nature's sad twists, the stepparent's abusive behavior may help in the propagation of his abusive genes. By abusing his non-genetically related child, he is, in effect, forcing that child away from him, away from the home he shares with the child's biological mother, and, most importantly, away from his resources, so that he can begin to propagate his own genes with the child's mother and share his resources with his biological children.

This same type of behavior is witnessed repeatedly in the animal kingdom, usually on a more vicious level. When an alpha male lion gets old or shows vulnerability, another male lion will emerge, kill or drive away the alpha, take over the pride, and then usually proceed to kill all the previous alpha's cubs and begin to mate with the lionesses—starting the process of passing on his genetic information. Killing all the previous alpha's cubs also precipitates a renewed sexual receptivity amongst lionesses.

Therefore, when parents raise their own biological children (showing love in the Confucian sense), the likelihood for child abuse is

much lower than if the mother were to take a member of the outside community into the home to interact with and raise her children (Daly and Wilson 1988). The propensity for a relative to show love to a genetically related child, and, at the same time, not abuse the child, is significantly higher than a non-genetically related person. This is because the genetically related pair share a great proportion of the same genetic information and that genetically related relative wants that genetic information to prosper and propagate. The propensity for a non-genetically related person to show love to the child, and not abuse them, is reduced because they do not carry the same genetic information and, thus, this person is likely to be less concerned about the child's future reproductive success. This all likely operates on a subconscious level. Daly and Wilson summarize this reduction in affection due to genetic differences, "One implication is that substitute parents will often care less profoundly for "their" children than will genetic parents" (1988, 520).

The Cinderella effect is an indication of how difficult it is to overcome the inherent disposition to favor our own kin over others, wherein seemingly good and well-meaning genetically unrelated parents may become twisted due to unconscious evolutionary mechanisms and neglect, mistreat, and even abuse their unrelated children. Given this difficulty, accepting and improving on the Confucian family centric disposition may be of benefit. The Cinderella effect is also evidence of how the implementation of Confucian family centrism—wherein fathers remain with their families to raise, monitor, punish, and educate their own children, rather than have outsiders into their former homes to engage in this behavior—may produce more favorable outcomes for their children and for society. A united and engaged biologically related parenting framework (which is foundational to Confucian family centrism) is seemingly optimal for children, as kin selection and the Cinderella effect show, thus, likely making it easier to implement within society.

III. Parenting Styles

Confucian family centrism was tested by examining different parenting configurations to determine which arrangements reduced and which arrangements increased the probability for delinquency and other negative life outcomes. Baumrind (1966) promoted three main parenting styles, each encompassing a different degree of Confucian family centrism. These three styles are permissive, authoritative, and authoritarian and they are employed in a NLSY97 question to respondents in the current study. Maccoby and Martin (1983) later expanded on Baumrind's work with a two-dimensional parenting framework that included an "uninvolved" parenting style; this uninvolved style is also included in the NLSY97.

The following is an articulation of Baumrind's three parenting styles plus Maccoby and Martin's uninvolved style, all of which are combined in the NLSY97 and tested in the current study:

Permissive parenting: exerts limited control over children. Fathers engage their boys in a more relaxed, generous, friendly, and placating manner, working to appease their boys with gifts, good cheer, and acceptance rather than through supervision, moral lessons, and discipline. Permissive fathers severely blur the hierarchical boundaries between themselves and their boys, diminishing, though not necessarily eliminating, the controlling and educational value of Confucian style hierarchies. Permissive parenting provides limited Confucian family centrism with a relatively warm and relaxed parental disposition.

Authoritative parenting: this type of parenting represents the quintessential form of Confucian family centrism. Authoritative fathers engage in unswerving supervision and discipline, transmit and enforce moral standards of behavior through education, help their children when required, and praise their children's achievements. These authoritative fathers have a disciplinarian orientation, but it is generally instructive and motivational in nature. It generates a distinct hierarchy between fathers and their boys. The more authoritative the parenting, the more distinct the father-son hierarchy. Though, this authoritative parenting has limits. If it becomes too strongly

authoritative and disciplinarian, combined with a lack of compassion and a lack of educational properties, it gravitates into authoritarian parenting.

Authoritarian parenting: involves stern and overt discipline with little regard for the education or the development of children. It is harsh discipline without the Confucian centric investment in the emotional and cognitive health of children. Fathers set strict guidelines for the behavior of their boys and detail the responses for failing to follow the guidelines. Authoritarian fathers provide little by way of a healthy Confucian centric education for their boys; they make clear the obligations but do little to develop and educate their boys when the boys fail to meet these obligations.

Uninvolved parenting: provides limited affection and almost non-existent constraints over children. Fathers abnegate most parental responsibilities, namely those involving education, supervision, and attention, though they still provide the essentials (shelter, food, funding, and so on) for their children to survive. Uninvolved fathers provide little discipline and no education for boys. This type of laissez-faire parenting is far removed from Confucian family centrism.

IV. Current Study

If Confucian family centrism is instrumental in reducing the likelihood that boys engage in delinquency and criminality, then the main question is the following: Do Confucian centric parenting practices positively influence behavioral outcomes among boys?

To respond to the existing research gaps, the present study examined whether two NLSY97 parenting questions: 1) The residential fathers parenting style, and 2) The degree of parental monitoring by the residential father, each possessing different types of parenting, influence boy's levels of delinquency, substance use, behavioral/emotional problems, and stealing. The following are the NLSY97 parenting variables along with their corresponding hypotheses:

A. The Residential Fathers Parenting Style

Four parenting styles were examined in the residential fathers parenting style question: authoritative, permissive, uninvolved, and authoritarian. The authoritative parenting style is most closely aligned with Confucian family centrism, as it provides a clear and firm father-son hierarchy with educational development.

Hypothesis 1: Authoritative parenting possesses clear Confucian family centric elements; thus, it will produce the lowest probabilities for a) delinquency, b) substance use, c) behavioral/emotional problems, and d) ever steal anything greater than \$50 including cars.

Hypothesis 2: Uninvolved and authoritarian parenting do not possess clear Confucian family centric elements; thus, they will produce higher probabilities for a) delinquency, b) substance use, c) behavioral/emotional problems, and d) ever steal anything greater than \$50 including cars.

B. The Degree of Monitoring by the Residential Father

Confucian family centrism closely and effectively monitors the conduct of boys for purposes of control, discipline, punishment, and education.

Hypothesis 3: Monitoring scores NLSY97 range from 0 to 16; higher scores indicate greater parental monitoring. Monitoring behavior in the 10 to 15 range is best representative of Confucian family centrism; a score in the 16 range will be overly variable, possibly because of unhealthy parenting pressure, the “child effect” rather than the “parent effect,” or other issues found in scores on extreme ends of extended Likert scales. Thus, scores in the 10 to 15 range will produce the lowest probabilities for a) delinquency, b) substance use, c) behavioral/emotional problems, and d) ever steal anything greater than \$50 including cars.

Table 1. Hypotheses of the Current Study

Hypotheses	Brief descriptions	Supported by results (Yes/No)
1a	Authoritative parenting will produce the lowest probability for delinquency	Yes
1b	Authoritative parenting will produce the lowest probability for substance use	No
1c	Authoritative parenting will produce the lowest probability for behavioral/emotional problems	Yes
1d	Authoritative parenting will produce the lowest probability for ever steal anything greater than \$50 including cars	Yes
2a	Uninvolved and authoritarian parenting produce the greatest probabilities for delinquency	Yes
2b	Uninvolved and authoritarian parenting produce the greatest probabilities for substance use	No
2c	Uninvolved and authoritarian parenting produce the greatest probabilities for behavioral/emotional problems	Yes
2d	Uninvolved and authoritarian parenting produce the greatest probabilities for ever steal anything greater than \$50 incl cars	Yes
3a	Monitoring behavior in the 10 to 15 range will produce the lowest probability for delinquency	Yes
3b	Monitoring behavior in the 10 to 15 range will produce the lowest probability for substance use	Yes
3c	Monitoring behavior in the 10 to 15 range will produce the lowest probability for behavioral/emotional problems	Yes
3d	Monitoring behavior in the 10 to 15 range will produce the lowest probability for ever steal anything greater than \$50 including cars	No

V. Methodology

The data used for the current study was derived from the first wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 97 scores, which were taken in 1997. The NLSY97 is a program of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics that tracks the lives of a sample 4,599 males born between 1980-84. Respondents, with an initial age range of 12-16, are being surveyed longitudinally, beginning in 1997 to the present time.⁴

As suggested by Cramer and Bock (1966), a two-way MANCOVA was conducted on the means to help protect against inflating the type 1 error rate in the follow-up ANOVAs and post-hoc comparisons. A two-way MANCOVA was conducted to test the effects of two independent variables: 1) residential fathers parenting style 2) degree of parental monitoring by the residential father, on four dependent variables: 1) delinquency scores 2) substance use 3) behavioral/emotional problems, and 4) ever steal anything greater than \$50 including cars, while controlling for race/ethnicity, year of birth, the age of the biological mother when she had the first born, gross household income in the past year, net worth of the household according to the parent, biological fathers highest grade completed, biological mothers highest grade completed, and mothers parenting style.

A test using Mahalanobis Distance with a critical value of .001 identified no outliers, so no outliers were removed from the dataset.

A. Independent Measures: The Fathers Parenting Practices

The following are the two NLSY97 parenting variables that provide different methods of parenting:

The “parenting style” question was presented to the participants thusly: “Residential Father’s Parenting Style. 1 = Uninvolved, 2 = Permissive, 3 = Authoritarian, and 4 = Authoritative.”

⁴ Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. *National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort, 1997-2017 (rounds 1-18)*. Produced and distributed by the Center for Human Resource Research (CHRR), Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University, 2019.

The “degree of parental monitoring of the residential father” question was presented to the participants thusly: “Degree of parental monitoring of the residential father. Scores range from 0 to 16; higher scores indicate greater parental monitoring.”

B. Dependent Measures: Boys Moral and Behavioral Variables

The following are the four NLSY97 variables that were used to measure boys moral and behavioral outcomes:

The question of “delinquency” was presented to the participants thusly: “Delinquency score index. Scores range from 0 to 10; higher scores indicate more incidents of delinquency.”

The question of “substance use” was presented to the participants thusly: “Substance use index. Scores range from 0 to 3; higher scores indicate more instances of substance use.”

The question of “behavioral/emotional problems” was presented to the participants thusly: “Behavioral and emotional problems scale for boys. Scores range from 0 to 8; higher scores indicate more frequent and/or numerous behavior problems.”

The question of “ever stealing anything greater than \$50 including cars” was presented to participants thusly: “Have you ever stolen something from a store, person or house, or something that did not belong to you worth 50 dollars or more including stealing a car?” Scores were coded: 1 = yes, 0 = no.

VI. Results

A. Parenting Style on Delinquency, Substance Use, Behavioral/Emotional Problems, and Stealing

A statistically significant multivariate test was obtained from parenting style, Pillais’ Trace = .046, $F(12, 3015) = 3.93$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .02$.


Table 2. Adjusted Mean, Std. Error, and 95% Confidence Interval for Residential Father's Parenting Style (Youth Report)

Dependent variable	Residential father's parenting style	Mean	Std. error	95% confidence interval	
				Lower bound	Upper bound
Delinquency score index	Authoritarian	1.880 ^{a,b}	.169	1.548	2.211
	Uninvolved	1.339 ^{a,b}	.214	.920	1.758
	Permissive	1.262 ^{a,b}	.122	1.023	1.502
	Authoritative	1.266 ^a	.090	1.089	1.442
Substance use index	Authoritarian	.876 ^{a,b}	.099	.682	1.069
	Uninvolved	.740 ^{a,b}	.125	.495	.984
	Permissive	.885 ^{a,b}	.071	.745	1.025
	Authoritative	.732 ^a	.052	.629	.835
Behavioral/emotional problems scale	Authoritarian	2.777 ^{a,b}	.157	2.469	3.085
	Uninvolved	2.596 ^{a,b}	.199	2.206	2.986
	Permissive	1.987 ^{a,b}	.114	1.765	2.210
	Authoritative	1.962 ^a	.084	1.798	2.126
Ever steal anything >\$50 incl cars?	Authoritarian	.092 ^{a,b}	.025	.043	.140
	Uninvolved	.128 ^{a,b}	.031	.066	.189
	Permissive	.083 ^{a,b}	.018	.048	.118
	Authoritative	.038 ^a	.013	.012	.064

^a Coariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values:
year of birth = 1983.05, race/ethnicity = 3.21, age of bio mother at first born = 23.45
gross *hh* income in past year = 57050.66, net worth of household according to parent = 122486.82
biological fathers highest grade completed = 12.76, biological mothers highest grade completed = 12.85
residential mother's parenting style, youth report = 2.59
^b Based on modified population marginal mean.

1. Delinquency Score and Parenting Style

Univariate testing indicated that there was a significant difference among the four parenting styles (uninvolved, permissive, authoritative, and authoritarian) on delinquency scores (delinquency scores range from 0 to 10; higher scores indicate greater incidents of delinquency), $F(3, 1006) = 3.33, p = .019, \eta^2_p = .01$. Post hoc comparisons using Fisher's Least Significant Difference test indicated significant differences between two groups of parenting styles, wherein authoritative ($M = 1.27$), permissive ($M = 1.26$), and uninvolved ($M = 1.34$) parenting had significantly lower delinquency scores compared to authoritarian ($M = 1.88$) parenting.



Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values:
year of birth = 1983.05, race/ethnicity = 3.21, age of bio mother at first born = 23.45
gross hh income in past year = 57050.66, net worth of household according to parent = 122486.82
biological fathers highest grade completed = 12.76, biological mothers highest grade completed = 12.85
residential mother's parenting style, youth report = 2.59
error bars: 95% ci

Figure 1. The Effect of Parenting Style on Boy's Delinquency Scores

* Delinquency scores range from 0 to 10.
** Higher scores indicate greater incidents of delinquency.


As shown in figure 1, uninvolved, permissive, and authoritative parenting produced the lowest probability for delinquency and were significantly different from authoritarian parenting.

2. Substance Use Score and Parenting Style

Univariate testing indicated that there was no significant difference among the four parenting styles (uninvolved, permissive, authoritative, and authoritarian) on substance use (substance use scores range from 0 to 3; higher scores indicate greater substance use), $F(3, 1006) = 1.00$, $p = .393$, $\eta^2_p = .003$.

3. Boys Behavioral/Emotional Problems Scale (Youth Report) and Parenting Style

Univariate testing indicated that there was a significant difference among the four parenting styles (uninvolved, permissive, authoritative, and authoritarian) on the behavioral/emotional problems scale (scores range from 0 to 8; higher scores indicate more frequent and/or numerous behavior/emotional problems), $F(3, 1006) = 8.02$,



Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values:
 year of birth = 1983.05, race/ethnicity = 3.21, age of bio mother at first born = 23.45
 gross *hh* income in past year = 57050.66, net worth of household according to parent = 122486.82
 biological fathers highest grade completed = 12.76, biological mothers highest grade completed = 12.85
 residential mother's parenting style, youth report = 2.59
 error bars: 95% ci

Figure 2. The Effect of Parenting Style on Boy's Behavioral/Emotional Problems


- * Behavioral/emotional scores range from 0 to 8.
- ** Higher scores indicate more frequent and/or numerous behavior/emotional problems

$p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .02$. Post hoc comparisons using Fisher's LSD test indicated significant differences between two groups of parenting styles on boys behavioral/emotional problems, wherein authoritative ($M = 1.96$) and permissive ($M = 1.99$) parenting had significantly lower behavioral/emotional problems compared to authoritarian ($M = 2.78$) and uninvolved ($M = 2.60$) parenting.

As shown in figure 2, authoritative and permissive parenting, though not different from each other, were significantly different from authoritarian and uninvolved parenting for behavioral/emotional problems. Uninvolved and authoritarian parenting produced the greatest probability for behavioral/emotional problems, and they were not significantly different from one another.

4. Ever Steal Anything Greater than \$50 Including Cars and Parenting Style

Univariate testing indicated that there was a significant difference among the four parenting styles (uninvolved, permissive, authori-



Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values:
 year of birth = 1983.05, race/ethnicity = 3.21, age of bio mother at first born = 23.45
 gross hh income in past year = 57050.66, net worth of household according to parent = 122486.82
 biological fathers highest grade completed = 12.76, biological mothers highest grade completed = 12.85
 residential mother's parenting style, youth report = 2.59
 error bars: 95% ci

Figure 3. The Effect of Parenting Style on Stealing

* Stealing scores range from 0 to 1.

** Higher scores indicate greater incidents of stealing.

tative, and authoritarian) on stealing (yes = 1, no = 0), $F(3, 1006) = 8.02$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2_p = .01$. Post hoc comparisons using Fisher's LSD test indicated significant differences between two groups of parenting styles, wherein authoritative ($M = .04$) parenting had significantly lower stealing scores compared to uninvolved ($M = .13$) and permissive ($M = .08$) parenting.

As shown in figure 3, authoritative parenting produced the lowest probability for stealing and was significantly different from uninvolved and permissive parenting.

B. Degree of Parental Monitoring by the Residential Father on Delinquency, Substance Use, Behavioral/Emotional Problems, and Stealing

A statistically significant multivariate test was obtained from degree of parental monitoring by the residential father, Pillais' Trace = .15, $F(64, 4024) = 2.12$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .04$.

Table 3. Adjusted Means, Std. Error, and 95% Confidence Interval for Degree of Parental Monitoring by Residential Father (Youth Report)

Dependent variables	Degree of parental monitoring by residential father	Mean	Std. Error	95% confidence Interval	
				Lower bound	Upper bound
Delinquency score index	0	2.331 ^{a,b}	.319	1.705	2.957
	1	2.824 ^a	.331	2.175	3.473
	2	2.083 ^a	.268	1.558	2.609
	3	2.502 ^a	.260	1.991	3.013
	4	1.509 ^a	.196	1.125	1.892
	5	1.611 ^a	.206	1.208	2.015
	6	1.725 ^a	.209	1.314	2.136

	7	1.496 ^a	.198	1.108	1.884
	8	1.233 ^a	.160	.919	1.547
	9	1.251 ^a	.180	.898	1.605
	10	1.089 ^a	.199	.699	1.479
	11	.887 ^a	.268	.361	1.413
	12	.787 ^a	.357	.087	1.488
	13	.457 ^a	.546	-.614	1.528
	14	.575 ^a	.446	-.300	1.450
	15	.961 ^{a,b}	.414	.149	1.773
	16	.973 ^{a,b}	.779	-.555	2.502
Substance use index	0	.817 ^{a,b}	.186	.452	1.183
	1	1.625 ^a	.193	1.246	2.003
	2	.988 ^a	.156	.681	1.294
	3	1.343 ^a	.152	1.044	1.641
	4	1.108 ^a	.114	.884	1.332
	5	.713 ^a	.120	.478	.949
	6	.934 ^a	.122	.694	1.174
	7	.873 ^a	.115	.646	1.099
	8	.610 ^a	.093	.427	.794
	9	.719 ^a	.105	.512	.925
	10	.652 ^a	.116	.424	.880
	11	.539 ^a	.156	.232	.846
	12	.413 ^a	.208	.004	.822
	13	.673 ^a	.319	.048	1.298
	14	.378 ^a	.260	-.132	.888
	15	.656 ^{a,b}	.241	.183	1.130
	16	.439 ^{a,b}	.455	-.453	1.331
Behavioral/ emotional problems scale	0	2.788 ^{a,b}	.297	2.206	3.370
	1	2.821 ^a	.307	2.218	3.425
	2	2.845 ^a	.249	2.357	3.333
	3	3.099 ^a	.242	2.623	3.574
	4	2.515 ^a	.182	2.158	2.872
	5	2.473 ^a	.191	2.097	2.848


	6	2.482 ^a	.195	2.100	2.864
	7	2.305 ^a	.184	1.944	2.666
	8	2.069 ^a	.149	1.777	2.361
	9	2.161 ^a	.168	1.832	2.489
	10	2.380 ^a	.185	2.018	2.743
	11	1.688 ^a	.249	1.199	2.177
	12	1.611 ^a	.332	.959	2.263
	13	2.733 ^a	.508	1.737	3.729
	14	2.098 ^a	.414	1.285	2.911
	15	1.591 ^{a,b}	.385	.837	2.346
	16	1.434 ^{a,b}	.724	.012	2.855
Ever steal anything >\$50 incl cars?	0	.082 ^{a,b}	.047	-.010	.174
	1	.280 ^a	.049	.185	.376
	2	.082 ^a	.039	.004	.159
	3	.187 ^a	.038	.112	.263
	4	.019 ^a	.029	-.038	.075
	5	.067 ^a	.030	.008	.127
	6	.112 ^a	.031	.051	.172
	7	.083 ^a	.029	.026	.140
	8	.051 ^a	.024	.005	.097
	9	.029 ^a	.027	-.023	.081
	10	.051 ^a	.029	-.006	.108
	11	.034 ^a	.039	-.043	.112
	12	-.002 ^a	.053	-.105	.102
	13	.015 ^a	.080	-.142	.173
	14	.020 ^a	.066	-.109	.149
	15	.012 ^{a,b}	.061	-.108	.131
	16	.499 ^{a,b}	.115	.274	.724

^a Coariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values:
year of birth = 1983.05, race/ethnicity = 3.21, age of bio mother at first born = 23.45
gross *hh* income in past year = 57050.66, net worth of household according to parent = 122486.82
biological fathers highest grade completed = 12.76, biological mothers highest grade completed = 12.85
residential mother's parenting style, youth report = 2.59

^b Based on modified population marginal mean.

1. Delinquency Score and Parental Monitoring

Univariate testing indicated that there was a significant difference among the degree of father monitoring on delinquency scores (delinquency scores range from 0 to 10; higher scores indicate greater incidents of delinquency), $F(16, 1006) = 4.29, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .06$. Post hoc comparisons using Fisher's LSD test indicated significant differences between two subsets of father monitoring, wherein monitoring levels of 0 ($M = 2.33$) through 3 ($M = 2.50$) had significantly higher delinquency compared to levels 8 ($M = 1.23$) through 15 ($M = .96$).



Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values:
year of birth = 1983.05, race/ethnicity = 3.21, age of bio mother at first born = 23.45
gross *hh* income in past year = 57050.66, net worth of household according to parent = 122486.82
biological fathers highest grade completed = 12.76, biological mothers highest grade completed = 12.85
residential mother's parenting style, youth report = 2.59
error bars: 95% ci

Figure 4. The Effect of Parental Monitoring by the Residential Father on Boy's Delinquency Scores


- * Fathers monitoring scores range from 0 to 16; higher scores indicate greater monitoring.
- ** Delinquency scores range from 0 to 10; higher scores indicate increased incidents of delinquency.

As shown in figure 4, monitoring behavior in the 8 to 15 range had the lowest probability for delinquency from boys. Monitoring behavior in the 0 through 3 range had the greatest probability for

delinquency. A monitoring score in the 4 to 7 range produced a probability for delinquency that fell between these two groups.

2. Substance Use and Parental Monitoring

Univariate testing indicated that there was a significant difference among the degree of father monitoring on substance use (substance use scores range from 0 to 3; higher scores indicate greater substance use), $F(16, 1006) = 3.61$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .05$. Post hoc comparisons using Fisher's LSD test indicated significant differences between two subsets of father monitoring, wherein monitoring levels of 1 ($M = 1.63$), 3 ($M = 1.34$), and 4 ($M = 1.11$) had significantly higher substance use compared to levels 8 ($M = .61$) through 12 ($M = .41$).



Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values:
year of birth = 1983.05, race/ethnicity = 3.21, age of bio mother at first born = 23.45
gross hh income in past year = 57050.66, net worth of household according to parent = 122486.82
biological fathers highest grade completed = 12.76, biological mothers highest grade completed = 12.85
residential mother's parenting style, youth report = 2.59
error bars: 95% ci


Figure 5. The Effect of Parental Monitoring by the Residential Father on Boy's Substance Use

- * Fathers monitoring scores range from 0 to 16; higher scores indicate greater monitoring.
- ** Substance use scores range from 0 to 3; higher scores indicate increased substance use.

As shown in figure 5, monitoring behavior in the 8 through 12 range had the lowest probability of boys engaged in substance use. Monitoring behavior in the 1, 3, and 4 range had the greatest probability for substance use. A monitoring score in the 5 to 7 range produced a probability for substance use that fell between these two groups.

3. Boys Behavioral/Emotional Problems Scale (Youth Report) and Parental Monitoring

Univariate testing indicated that there was a significant difference among the degree of father monitoring on boys behavioral/emotional problems (behavioral/emotional scores range from 0 to 8; higher scores indicate more frequent and/or numerous behavior/emotional problems), $F(16, 1006) = 2.51, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .04$. Post hoc comparisons



Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values:
 year of birth = 1983.05, race/ethnicity = 3.21, age of bio mother at first born = 23.45
 gross hh income in past year = 57050.66, net worth of household according to parent = 122486.82
 biological fathers highest grade completed = 12.76, biological mothers highest grade completed = 12.85
 residential mother's parenting style, youth report = 2.59
 error bars: 95% ci

Figure 6. The Effect of Parental Monitoring by the Residential Father on Boy's Behavioral/Emotional Problems


- * Fathers monitoring scores range from 0 to 16; higher scores indicate greater monitoring.
- ** Behavioral/emotional scores range from 0 to 8; higher scores indicate more frequent and/or numerous behavior/emotional problems.

using Fisher's LSD test indicated significant differences between two groups of father monitoring, wherein monitoring levels 0 ($M = 2.79$) through 6 ($M = 2.48$) had significantly higher behavioral/emotional problems compared to levels 11 ($M = 1.69$), 12 ($M = 1.61$), and 15 ($M = 1.59$).

As shown in figure 6, monitoring behavior in the 11, 12, and 15 range had the lowest probability for behavioral/emotional problems from boys. Monitoring behavior in the 0 through 6 range had the greatest probability for behavioral/emotional problems. A monitoring score in the 7 to 10 range produced a probability for behavioral/emotional problems that fell between these two groups.

4. Ever Steal Anything Greater than \$50 Including Cars and Parental Monitoring

Univariate testing indicated that there was a significant difference among the degree of father monitoring on stealing, $F(16, 1006) =$



Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values:
year of birth = 1983.05, race/ethnicity = 3.21, age of bio mother at first born = 23.45
gross hh income in past year = 57050.66, net worth of household according to parent = 122486.82
biological fathers highest grade completed = 12.76, biological mothers highest grade completed = 12.85
residential mother's parenting style, youth report = 2.59
error bars: 95% ci

Figure 7. The The Effect of Parental Monitoring by the Residential Father on Stealing

* Fathers monitoring scores range from 0 to 16; higher scores indicate greater monitoring.

** Stealing scores range from 0 to 1; higher scores indicate more stealing.

3.51, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .05$. Post hoc comparisons using Fisher's LSD test indicated significant differences between two groups of father monitoring, wherein monitoring levels 1 ($M = .28$) and 3 ($M = .187$) had significantly higher stealing compared to levels 7 ($M = .08$) through 12 ($M = -.002$).

As shown in figure 7, monitoring behavior in the 7 to 12 range had the lowest probability for stealing among boys. Monitoring behavior in the 1 and 3 range had the greatest probability for stealing.

VII. Discussion and Conclusion

The authoritative parenting style is representative of Confucian family centrism, and it likely produces the most promising psychological and social outcomes for boys, specifically in the realm of delinquency, behavioral/emotional problems, and stealing. The more Confucian family centric the fathering, the better the life outcomes for boys. If the father-son relationship becomes so intense, disciplinarian, uncaring, and noneducational that it reaches the level of authoritarian parenting, then negative life outcomes among boys will likely significantly increase. There seems to be only so much pressure and discipline boys can undergo before they rebel. Conversely, the more uninvolved or disinterested the parenting style, the more removed the parenting is from Confucian family centrism, the more that negative outcomes increase.

With both the extremes of uninvolved and authoritarian parenting considered unhealthy and weak/overly strong alternatives to Confucian family centrism, it leaves permissive parenting as the only other real competing parenting arrangement. Permissive parenting is relatively effective because there is real parenting and parental investment taking place (unlike uninvolved parenting), there may be some hierarchic functioning between father and son, and it is not overtly harmful parenting (like the authoritarian parenting style). Though somewhat effective, it is likely not as effective as Confucian family centrism in educating boys to properly navigate society. This is because it doesn't put into place a strong and healthy

hierarchical framework, it doesn't set explicit boundaries and limits that are closely monitored with the prospect for discipline and punishment for crossing these boundaries and limits, and it doesn't work to effectively educate on morality and social behavior through discipline.

High levels of parental monitoring by fathers, monitoring being a major component of Confucian family centrism, appears to significantly reduce delinquency and other negative life outcomes.

Three major claims are made here: First, authoritative fathering, representative of Confucian family centrism, produces lower rates of delinquency, behavioral/emotional problems, and stealing among boys. Second, higher levels of monitoring of boys by fathers, representative of Confucian family centrism, produces lower rates of delinquency, substance use, behavioral/emotional problems, and stealing among boys. Third, Confucian family centrism, within the confines of the variables explored in this paper, produces lower rates of delinquent and other problematic behavior among boys.

When fathers are not in the lives of their boys, are overly permissive or authoritarian in their parenting, or when they fail to effectively monitor behavior—when they are not engaged in Confucian family centrism—the ability for boys to later participate in society in a productive way is likely diminished. When boys are unable to properly operate, compete, and succeed in societies many hierarchies and competitive arenas, when they fail to climb the necessary hierarchical structures required to obtain reasonable social positions, they often turn to crime and gang activity as means to collect resources, achieve some form of social standing (even if it is standing among criminals), to lash out at a system that requires what they were denied/unable to provide, or some other criminal means to adapt to their circumstances (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955; Merton 1938). Ultimately, it is Confucian family centrism and the Confucian parenting practices encompassed within, during the early stages of boy's development, that appears to play a significant role in how boys later function within society.

The parenting dynamic takes place in a multifaceted social and economic environment consisting of many variables that may affect

delinquency and other behavioral outcomes. It is important to note the complex relationships inherent in parenting and future behavior. Confucian family centrism, i.e. authoritative parenting with high levels of monitoring, may be statistically linked with outcomes for boy's in ways that are not accounted for in the parenting dynamic. Parenting and the boy's responses to it may be linked because each one is a product of the same underlying variables, such as the family's sociodemographic makeup, teen parenthood, parent education, the boy's age, gender, and so on (Hay et al. 2006; Kesner and McKenry 2001; Pratt, Turner, and Piquero 2004). Additionally, the link between certain kinds of parenting and the boy's outcomes may be a product of "child effects" rather than "parent effects"—in that, boy's behavior may generate different kinds of parenting. To view Confucian family centrism as the overwhelming force determining future delinquency and criminality is to potentially miss a larger confluence of factors that may or may not conspire to be influential. Lastly, there may be some incongruity between using crime data derived from subjects in the United States to test the influence of Confucian theory. Future studies may employ crime data gathered from Confucian societies to test Confucian theory.

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Defending Constitutional Democracy on Confucian Terms: *Progressive Confucianism and Its Debate with Traditionalist Confucianism in Contemporary China*

Dongxian Jiang*

Abstract

In the twenty-first century, a growing number of “traditionalist Confucians” in Mainland China have been using Confucianism to justify authoritarian political arrangements as alternatives to constitutional democracy. In the face of this challenge, “progressive Confucians” argue that they can provide authentic Confucian justifications for constitutional democracy, and can counter traditionalist Confucians purely on Confucian terms by providing better interpretations of the Confucian tradition. This article argues that progressive Confucians may not be able to win the debate with their traditionalist rivals because they cannot defend their interpretations of Confucian texts as superior to rival interpretations, and because an endless debate on Confucian interpretation unwittingly diverts social critics’ attention from more urgent political issues in China, most notably political oppression. A better strategy, I argue, is for progressive Confucians to step out of the interpretive debate with the traditionalists and provide extra-Confucian reasons about the need to establish a constitutional democracy in the Chinese context.

Keywords: Progressive confucianism, traditionalist confucianism, constitutional democracy, authoritarianism, China

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I. Introduction

Confucianism has been strongly revived in contemporary China. Among intellectuals who invoke Confucianism to intervene into political debates in the Chinese context, two groups of Confucians stand out as providing important normative ideals for China's political future. On the one hand, progressive Confucians aim to develop the egalitarian and democratic potential of Confucianism and marry this reconfigured ancient tradition with constitutional democracy. On the other hand, traditionalist Confucians, by revitalizing the inegalitarian dimensions of Confucianism, attempt to criticize the alleged "universal values," or even "foreign ideals," of constitutional democracy and justify strongly hierarchical political arrangements. Although these two camps pursue diametrically different political agendas in the Chinese context, they both maintain this dispute as an intra-Confucian debate based upon complicated interpretations of Confucian texts. In particular, progressive Confucians aim to counter their rivals by demonstrating that progressive interpretations of Confucianism are superior to those offered by traditionalist Confucians, and that an authentic Confucianism they present has no reason not to embrace a constitutional democracy.

In this article, I aim to show that progressive Confucians' strategy in countering traditionalist Confucianism is wrongheaded because their obsession with an authentic interpretation of Confucianism unwittingly diverts their attention away from a more important and urgent normative issue facing China today: Why must constitutional democracy be established in China in the first place? I also argue that they may fail to win the debate with traditionalist Confucians, because they are unable to defend their interpretations of Confucianism as superior to rival interpretations, given the fact that the Confucian tradition yields multiple plausible interpretations due to its richness.

To illustrate my arguments, I focus on Stephen Angle's political theory, a leading representative of progressive Confucianism, and elaborate on his methodology in conducting social criticism, his interpretation of the Confucian tradition, and his justification for

constitutional democracy on Confucian grounds. I also reconstruct the arguments provided by Jiang Qing and his followers (such as Zeng Yi), who are widely regarded as intellectual leaders of traditionalist Confucianism in Mainland China, in order to show that they present an interpretation of Confucianism that is no less plausible than Angle's, thereby invalidating Angle's claim that progressive Confucianism is the most authentic version of Confucianism in our own age. This comparison between Angle and Jiang is meant to show that progressive Confucianism, despite its impressive work on reconfiguring Confucian resources for democratic purposes, neglects to substantiate the normative attractiveness of constitutional democracy, which originates from the modern West, in the Chinese context. In particular, by one-sidedly focusing on demonstrating the Confucian pedigree of his theory and rejecting the traditionalist interpretation of Confucianism, Angle fails to offer powerful antecedent reasons as to why constitutional democracy is good for the Chinese people, and why the best choice for Confucianism in contemporary China is to embrace democratic values and institutions, rather than restoring its hierarchical dimensions. If the most pressing political issue in the Chinese context is to establish the desirability of constitutional democracy, I suggest that progressive Confucians step out of the interpretive debate with the traditionalists and engage directly with the justification for constitutional democracy and its supporting values and institutions, such as political equality, civil and political rights, and democratic elections and deliberations.

The debate between progressive and traditionalist Confucianisms deserves special attention because among all versions of contemporary Confucianism, traditionalist Confucianism has most radically challenged the desirability of constitutional democracy in Mainland China and repeatedly asked the authoritarian Party-state to act on their behalf. Although the Confucian doctrines they promote are in tension with the Marxism nominally upheld by the Communist Party, they have made it very explicit that the best way to revive Confucianism is for the authoritarian state to adopt it as an official ideology (Jiang and O'Dwyer 2019). This willingness to ingratiate

themselves with the Party-state resonates with the Party's attempt to incorporate Confucian and quasi-Confucian discourses to overcome its legitimacy deficit, as has been observed by many scholars (Billioud and Storey 2007; Meissner 2006). Countering traditionalist Confucianism, therefore, is of utmost importance for anyone who cares about the fate of constitutional democracy in a future China.

This intervention in the progressive-traditionalist debate within Confucianism also has a broader implication. In 1987, Michael Walzer famously advanced the idea that the best model for progressive social criticism is what he calls "connected social criticism." In this model, the social critic should try to justify progressive values by mobilizing existing resources in the local culture, such as social values and foundational texts, rather than starting from foreign ideas or abstract philosophical principles (Walzer 1987). The best social criticism for Walzer is hence a game of interpretation, in which the social critic challenges the ruling power by reinterpreting the canons honored by the entire society in a progressive manner. Progressive Confucianism bears close similarities to connected social criticism. Therefore, by analyzing Angle's debate with traditionalist Confucianism, this article also aims to show the limits of Walzer's model: although progressive Confucianism can provide a normatively attractive version of Confucianism in modern China, it is doubtful whether it can defeat traditionalist Confucianism without resorting to important extra-Confucian arguments. Strategically speaking, therefore, progressive Confucians would counter their rivals more effectively if they set aside the model of connected social criticism and engage traditionalist arguments on extra-Confucian grounds.

II. Progressive Confucianism vs. Traditionalist Confucianism: Setting the Stage

The disastrous Cultural Revolution stimulated Chinese intellectuals to thoroughly reflect upon the desirability of communist ideals and Leninist practices. In the 1980s, the dominant intellectual atmosphere in China was a promotion of values and institutions such as the

rule of law, constitutionalism, human rights, and representative democracy. However, more moderate advocates of these principles were also curious about how China's traditions, despite the Maoist dismissal of them as feudal and reactionary ideologies, could provide positive intellectual resources for China's modernization and give these modern political values and institutions concrete Chinese characteristics. When Mainland China was under the rule of Mao, some Sinophone scholars outside, who labeled themselves contemporary New Confucians, developed various theories about the compatibility between Confucianism and constitutional democracy. Immediately after the Reform and Opening Up in early 1980s, these "overseas" Confucian philosophies were imported back to the Mainland. Works written by twentieth-century Confucians such as Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan were widely circulated among Chinese intellectuals. The political debate in the 1980s was by and large between liberals who regarded Confucianism as a cultural obstacle to constitutional democracy and moderate Confucians who argued that a modernized Confucianism could provide indigenous support for constitutional democracy.

Stephen Angle, among others, is the twenty-first-century successor of Overseas New Confucianism (hereafter ONC) in contemporary political theory. Inspired by Mou Zongsan's philosophy, Angle has provided one of the most theoretically cogent and philosophically rigorous versions of Confucian political theory that aims to justify the compatibility between Confucian ethics and constitutional democracy (Angle 2012). This "Progressive Confucianism,"¹ as Angle calls it, attempts to demonstrate the possibility of decoupling the philosophical basis of constitutional democracy (such as personal autonomy and popular sovereignty) from democratic institutions and marrying the latter with purely Confucian philosophical justifications. This particular strategy gives his defense of constitutional democracy

¹ In this article, I distinguish between "progressive Confucianism" (small p) and "Progressive Confucianism" (capital P). The former refers to other Confucians who share progressive views with Angle, while the latter exclusively denotes Angle's particular philosophy of Progressive Confucianism.

significant Chinese characteristics and thereby avoids the common accusation that advocating democracy's universal purchase only manifests Eurocentric cultural imperialism.²

Unlike in the 1980s and early 1990s, however, in the twenty-first century the popularity of ONC has gradually faded away, as a new group of Confucians have risen and started to challenge the assumptions, approaches, and concrete arguments of ONC, including Angle's Progressive Confucianism. Widely known as "Mainland New Confucians" (hereafter MNC), these intellectuals complain that ONCs have one-sidedly focused on providing Confucian justifications for constitutional democracy while ignoring Confucianism's ability to invent political institutions that are different from, and even superior to, this "Western" regime type. They thus label themselves "political Confucians" in order to emphasize their special interest in institutional design for a future China and future world, inspired by the ancient wisdom of Confucianism.

The scholar who initiated this new intellectual trend is Jiang Qing. According to Daniel A. Bell, who introduced Jiang's work to Anglophone political theory circles, "[i]t may not be an exaggeration to say that Jiang Qing has almost single-handedly succeeded in enriching debates about China's political future" (Bell 2013, 1). Originally a follower of ONC, Jiang from 1989 started to argue that Confucianism and constitutional democracy were not compatible, as the latter was imposed by Western forces who had no respect for

² Joseph Chan's theory of Confucian perfectionism also bears some similarities with Angle's Progressive Confucianism. Both of them attempt to decouple the philosophical basis of constitutional democracy from democratic institutions and marry the latter with Confucian philosophical justifications (Chan 2014a, 1-23). However, in addition to justifying electoral democracy upon Confucian ideals, Chan also argues that a second chamber in the legislature selected by peer and performance review should be established in a constitutional regime in order to balance the democratically elected lower house (81-110). This regime combines meritocracy with democracy and is different from Angle's idea that the Confucian theory of moral development justifies a more participatory form of democracy. Due to this difference, I do not discuss Chan's theory together with Angle's Progressive Confucianism, although his Confucian perfectionism is in line with many themes developed by Angle. Both wish China to adopt a constitutional democracy in the future, regardless of what concrete institutions this regime should include.

China's particular culture and history. By drawing on insights from *The Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals*, Jiang is famous for his promotion of the “tricameral system” that reflects the idea of Confucian triple legitimacy that he draws from the Gongyang text—the Heavenly Mandate, historical and cultural continuity, and the will of the people (Jiang 2013, 28). In his proposal, the House of Ru (Tongruiyuan 通儒院), composed of Confucian scholars selected by nomination, examination, and recommendation, shall represent the Sacred Mandate. The House of the Nation (Guotiyuan 国体院), composed of descendants of Confucius and ancient sages, representatives from different religions, and other contemporary worthy people, shall represent historical and cultural legitimacy. Finally, the House of the People (Shuminyuan 庶民院) shall resemble Western democratic parliaments and represent popular will (Jiang 2013, 41-42). To further guarantee the Confucian pedigree of this regime, Jiang also proposes a supervisory Confucian Academy composed of renowned Confucian scholars that is akin to the Guardian Council in Iran. This Academy is empowered as the ultimate guardian of Confucianism as an established state religion (44-70).

Jiang's theory has been criticized as being “fundamentalist, coercive, dogmatic, impractical, and out of touch with contemporary realities” (Angle 2018a, 87), but these attacks do not stop his ideas from being accepted and developed by his intellectual followers. In the 2010s, younger scholars such as Zeng Yi and Guo Xiaodong joined Jiang's camp. Although they do not enthusiastically promote Jiang's particular institutional proposal, they share his idea that the Gongyang strand in Confucianism is crucial for contemporary thinkers to invent and defend distinctively Confucian and Chinese political and social institutions. Zeng Yi, for example, rejects the ideal of “universal values” such as political equality and democracy and argues for a rebuilding of social hierarchy—including traditional gender hierarchy—in contemporary China (Zeng and Guo 2014). He claims that ONCs mistakenly believe that “traditional [Confucian] political thought lacked any fruitful contribution in terms of political institutions” and that they lack “the proper respect for the ancients' political, legal, and societal structures” (Zeng and Fang 2018, 115). In

terms of concrete institutional design, Zeng insists that Confucians must actively defend the Communist Party regime while gently persuading the Party-state to adopt laws, rituals, and institutions that embody core Confucian values (Zeng and Zhang 2015). In his most recent book, Zeng argues that Confucian scholars must seek to actively translate the ethical principles and rituals prescribed in Confucian canons into concrete legal practices in the real world and in so doing acquire the power and authority to rule the secular world in a way similar to the Islamic Ulama (Zeng 2018, iii-iv). This idea that Confucianism should regain its comprehensive domination over the entire society is in line with Jiang's political theory.

The Gongyang School represented by Jiang Qing and Zeng Yi does not exhaust the category of MNC. Along with the growth and diversification of this group, both Jiang's institutional design and his reliance upon Gongyang learning have been criticized by other political Confucians, many of whom are friendlier toward modern constitutional democracy (Angle 2018a, 95). Tongdong Bai, for example, honors the trailblazing role of Jiang but dismisses his theory as an "unrealistic utopia" (Bai 2010). He also proposes a "Confucian hybrid regime" that mixes electoral democracy with a legislative upper chamber selected by examination, expertise, and peer and performance review (Bai 2020, 72-79). To distinguish the Gongyang School from other MNCs, I call scholars like Jiang Qing and Zeng Yi "traditionalist Confucians." This label puts emphasis on their militant critique of modernity and constitutional democracy as well as their enthusiasm in promoting a comprehensive revival of Confucian practices based on their unwavering attachment to and special interpretations of the Gongyang strand. Compared with other MNCs, traditionalist Confucians pose the greatest threat to ONC and progressive Confucianism precisely because their reactionary impulse challenges the most basic values and institutions of a constitutional democracy, including political equality, the rule of law, the protection of civil and political rights, and the separation of religion and state, to which other MNCs do not thoroughly object.³

³ Take Tongdong Bai as an example again: although naming his book as "Against

Stephen Angle, among other ONCs, has most sensitively realized that this wave of anti-democratic thought must be combated. He continuously follows the development of traditionalist Confucianism in Mainland China and argues against their reactionary endeavors (Angle 2018a). What makes Angle's strategy particularly interesting and worth examining is his firm conviction that these traditionalists should be defeated purely on Confucian, rather than liberal democratic terms. In a roundtable discussion on "the future of Confucian political philosophy" at the University of Hong Kong in 2017, Angle emphasized that the most urgent task for progressive Confucians in the Chinese context was to offer a third choice beyond "traditionalist Confucianism" and "out-and-out liberal[ism]" (Angle 2018b, 49). He also suggested that those who call themselves "liberal Confucians" in China should drop this label and use "progressive Confucianism" in order to demonstrate their faithfulness to Confucianism and deflect the critique that they are merely promoting a Confucian version of liberalism (Angle 2019). In order to make progressive Confucianism relevant to ordinary people, Angle argues that progressive Confucians should also actively "engag[e] with concrete issues, in society, in our local societies that are timely and argu[e] from a specifically Confucian standpoint to a progressive critique or a progressive end" (Angle 2018b, 49).

Angle's claim that excavating Confucianism's progressive potential is better than straightforwardly asserting liberal democratic commitments, as liberals always do, invites us to examine whether

Political Equality," Bai firmly believes that one person, one vote should be preserved as the proper way to select lawmakers in the lower house. He also argues that the rule of law and the protection of civil and political rights, especially free speech, should be strongly upheld (Bai 2020, 68). This moderate position regarding constitutional democracy makes Bai's position closer to Joseph Chan's than to Jiang Qing's. Another example is Gan Chunsong, who suggests that Confucianism is compatible with Schumpeter's elitist conception of democracy, in which ordinary people can select, sanction, and delegate powers to competent elites in periodic elections (Gan 2012). Chen Ming, another leading MNC, is sympathetic to Jiang's idea that Confucianism should play a more religious role in contemporary China, but argues that Confucianism should serve as a "civil religion," rather than a state religion (Angle 2018a, 68, 90).

his strategy can effectively counter traditionalist Confucians, as discussed below.

III. Stephen Angle's Progressive Confucian Political Philosophy

A. Cross-cultural Engagement and Connected Social Criticism

Over the past two decades, Angle has developed a systematic theory of progressive Confucianism that justifies modern political values such as political equality, the rule of law, constitutionalism, and democratic participation purely on Confucian resources, and he repeatedly claims that his reconstruction of Confucianism is authentic to the Confucian spirit. The primary motivation for Angle to defend progressive principles on Confucian terms is his conviction that universalist discourses of philosophy and social criticism risk becoming cultural imperialism, i.e., the universalization of one particular cultural tradition (Angle 2010, 6). Even if we can avoid this danger and craft a minimalist set of universal criteria for cross-cultural criticism, Angle argues, we can only defend very thin, vague, and general values and “criticize egregious moral violations on the part of others” without providing a “full-fledged criticism” of a community’s values and practices (Angle 2002, 13-15). In addition, the endeavor to find minimalist, universalist standards across culture tends to regard cultures as separate and homogenous entities and treat common standards as a set of static values that can withstand change. However, since Angle regards and admires each culture as a heterogeneous complex in which change and contestation take place from time to time, he believes that a dynamic and open-ended strategy of cross-cultural dialogue is more appropriate to the dynamic nature of culture. As he claims in *Human Rights and Chinese Thought* (hereafter *HRCT*), “recognition of the internal complexity of cultures and traditions must be central to a successful account of cross-cultural dialogue; these complexities can make dialogue more difficult, but they also can give us one of the keys to fruitful dialogue”

(Angle 2002, 17).

Per Angle, therefore, when a foreigner encounters a given society and wants to criticize its values effectively, she can exploit the internal disagreement within that tradition, build alliance with a certain strand that is friendly to the critic's own convictions, and criticize that society purely on its own terms (Angle 2002, 69-72). In the Chinese context, for example, if a certain strand of Confucianism is more receptive to the ideas of human rights originated in the Western tradition, then a social critic can rely on this strand and justify human rights on Confucian terms.

Angle, like Walzer, firmly believes that an effective social criticism in China must closely engage with the entire Confucian tradition and rely on intricate interpretations and reconstructions to make Confucianism compatible with human rights and constitutional democracy. This approach of cross-cultural engagement also accounts for Angle's emphasis that his theory is an authentic "Confucian" philosophy, rather than an eclectic theory that arbitrarily mixes Confucian values and liberal democratic commitments. As I have mentioned in the last section, maintaining the Confucian pedigree and distancing himself from liberalism and other non-Confucian commitments are the hallmarks of Angle's Progressive Confucianism. For example, in *Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy* (hereafter *CCPP*), in which he most systematically elaborates his own normative political theory, Angle argues that "Progressive Confucianism" bears certain similarities to other contemporary 'progressive' social and political movements" and that "some contemporary Confucians are mistaken in not adopting these progressive values and institutions" (Angle 2012, 2). He attempts to justify his positions "as good Confucianism" and challenge "the Confucian legitimacy of others' positions" (8), including the positions of Jiang Qing, Daniel A. Bell, and other self-identified Confucians who advocate more authoritarian political arrangements. In doing so, Angle aims to show that their theories are not faithful to the Confucian tradition, either because they interpret Confucianism in a wrong way, or because they incorporate foreign thought on extra-Confucian grounds. This emphasis on "Confucian legitimacy"

indicates his attempt to maintain his debate with traditionalist Confucians as an intra-Confucian debate and to defeat his rivals purely on Confucian terms.

B. Neo-Confucianism as the Starting Point for Progressive Confucianism

To demonstrate the Confucian pedigree of his Progressive Confucianism, Angle compares different strands within the Confucian tradition and sides with those most favorable to modern progressive values and institutions. According to his narrative of the intellectual development of Confucianism, although the idea of moral equality was present in classical Confucianism (represented by the Five Classics, the *Analects*, *Mencius*, and *Xunzi*), especially in *Mencius*, it is later strands of Confucianism that developed this idea to a fuller extent, thus making them more receptive to modern progressive principles.⁴ Therefore, instead of focusing on reinterpreting and reconstructing classical Confucianism, as most contemporary Confucians are doing (Angle calls them “Neo-Classical Confucians”), Angle suggests that it is more promising to build a Confucian justification for progressive principles upon later strands of Confucianism.

In *HRCT*, for example, Angle offers two reasons as to why the attempt to derive human rights from classical Confucianism fails to provide robust contemporary Confucian theories of human rights. First, this attempt does not do justice to the complexity and dynamic nature of the Confucian tradition. According to him, “There are no classical Confucians alive today, nor have there been for centuries. If

⁴ In a private correspondence with me Angle argues that on certain issues, such as gender, classical Confucian thinkers may be more “progressive” than Neo-Confucians in most cases, therefore opening the possibility to build a Confucian justification for gender equality upon early Confucianism. I agree with Angle that this may be right. However, my reading of Angle’s works, as presented in this article, suggests that he has focused more on defending the idea that later strands of Confucianism are a better starting point for justifying a *constitutional democracy* in his Progressive Confucianism. As I will discuss below, Angle explicitly thinks that Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism is a better basis for defending equal political participation, and even a participatory form of democracy.

the question of whether Chinese culture is compatible with human rights is to be relevant, we need to look to more recent Chinese culture, in all its complexity.” Second, this attempt also leads to loose interpretations of not only Confucian texts but also ideas of rights. For Angle, “[r]ights have a distinctive conceptual structure that sets them apart from other moral commitments, like duties or ideals.” Although it is possible to find ideas in the *Analects* that resonate with some statements in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “this is very different from finding ‘rights’ in the *Analects*” (Angle 2002, 21). Similar concerns are also expressed in *CCPP*. Commenting on Tongdong Bai’s idea that the *Mencius* can be interpreted as supporting popular sovereignty, Angle argues that a careful reading of the *Mencius* indicates that for classical Confucianism, the people are no more than “a mere reactive mass, incapable of agency” in exercising political decision (Angle 2012, 40). He thus claims that Bai’s theory, along with many other attempts to derive progressive values directly from classical Confucianism, cannot avoid the charge of “a certain kind of ahistoricism” (15).

To prevent interpreting classical Confucian texts loosely and to show that Confucianism as a dynamic tradition has evolved progressively even before its encounter with Western thought, Angle uses later Confucian strands as the ground to justify human rights, political equality, and constitutional democracy. In *Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (hereafter *Sagehood*), the strand that Angle relies upon to develop his own political philosophy is Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism represented by Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and Wang Yangming (1472-1529). In Chinese intellectual history, the Neo-Confucian tradition was indeed one, if not the most, powerful strand from the tenth to the nineteenth century. It was endorsed by leading intellectuals in these centuries and canonized by the state as the authoritative interpretation of classical Confucianism (Angle 2010, 3-5). From Angle’s perspective, if he could justify progressive principles by resorting to Neo-Confucian arguments, his theory would be legitimized as an authentic Confucian political philosophy in our own time. In *CCPP*, Angle argues that his approach is superior because he “follows the tradition’s own

development more closely,” whereas other scholars fail to appreciate the changing and multilayered nature of the Confucian tradition (Angle 2012, 49). Therefore, Angle seems to claim that since Neo-Confucianism has largely superseded classical and medieval Confucianism, we’d better start our own political thinking from this more up-to-date version of Confucianism.

Moreover, another reason that Neo-Confucianism is a better starting point is that its theoretical core is friendlier to some modern values to which we are allegiant. As Angle points out in *Sagehood*, the Neo-Confucian idea of sagehood is attractive to modern people because its content has a significantly egalitarian characteristic. Per Angle’s narrative, sagehood is the central normative ideal in the entire Confucian tradition, but in its early periods, sagehood is marked by its elusiveness and inaccessibility to the common people. According to classical Confucians, including Confucius and Mencius, “sagehood becomes linked with creativity, political authority, keen perception, and most fundamentally, moral virtue” (Angle 2010, 14). Although Mencius explicitly claims that all men are capable of becoming a Yao or a Shun (*Mencius* VI.B.2), most other classical thinkers closely associated sages with the exercise of political authority, thus making the ideal of sagehood inaccessible to most people (14-15). According to Confucian exegetes from Han to Tang dynasties (second century BC to tenth century AD), “sagehood became such a high, mysterious state that they argued it was not accessible, even in principle, to most people” (16). Since the rise of Neo-Confucianism in the tenth century, however, the idea of sagehood had become increasingly egalitarian. From Zhu Xi onward, “the strong tendency [of the idea of sagehood] is to focus on the moral aspects of sagehood, and in particular, on its tie to virtue” (18). When it came to Wang Yangming in the fifteenth century, sagehood became almost totally disconnected from political authority and mysterious features. On this basis, Wang even claimed that “the people filling the street are all sages” (19). This is not to say that all ordinary people are already sages, but that sagehood is accessible to all, if they are determined to cultivate their virtues in accordance with a correct path of self-education. As shown below, this egalitarian ideal of sagehood serves as Angle’s starting point for

justifying political equality and constitutional democracy.

C. Confucian Justification for Constitutional Democracy

According to Angle's narrative of the development of Confucianism reconstructed above, although sagehood constitutes the core ideal of the Confucian tradition through and through, the moral equality and accessibility of sagehood were not mainstream until the rise of Neo-Confucianism. If egalitarianism is a constitutive part of modern progressive values, Angle suggests, then progressives in contemporary China should celebrate this intellectual development within Confucianism and try to further develop this tradition to justify democratic political arrangements. This is the most difficult task for Angle, not because it is difficult to find compatibilities between Neo-Confucianism and democratic values, but because it is difficult to demonstrate that a Confucianism supporting democratic institutions is still an authentic Confucian theory, rather than a mere fusion of Confucian and foreign traditions, as the traditionalists may contend. This authenticity issue is a central concern in Angle's *Progressive Confucianism* precisely because in premodern China, even the most egalitarian version of Neo-Confucianism such as Wang Yangming's supported a monarchical, hierarchical, and elitist political structure. Therefore, Angle has to demonstrate that an embrace of constitutional democracy is merely an internal revision, not a radical overhaul, of Confucianism.

In *CCPP*, an existing approach of marrying Confucianism with constitutional democracy that Angle finds inferior to his *Progressive Confucianism* is what he calls "Synthetic Confucianism." According to his definition, Synthetic Confucians are "Confucian philosophers who draw centrally on non-Confucian philosophical traditions. These individuals may identify with multiple traditions, seeing value and significance from multiple perspectives, and seek to integrate these in one synthetic form of Confucianism" (Angle 2012, 16). For Angle, one major motivation for Synthetic Confucians to use this approach is that they have "an antecedent, independent commitment to the other doctrines with which Confucianism is

being synthesized” (16). Bell’s bicameral meritocracy, for example, fits into the category of Synthetic Confucianism, as he “is seeking a way to combine democratic and Confucian values, and assumes an independent commitment to each” (53). In Angle’s view, while Bell regards his meritocratically selected upper house as a Confucian institution, he justifies the need for a democratic lower house not on Confucian grounds, but on the “profound need to institutionalize the democratic virtues of accountability, transparency, and equal political participation” (Angle 2012, 53; Bell 2006, 160-161). This “dual commitment” to Confucianism and democracy is something that Angle wants to avoid, as he aims to justify constitutional democracy “from the internal logic of Progressive Confucianism” instead of an independent commitment to democratic principles (Angle 2012, 32).

To achieve this goal, Angle adopts a strategy to distinguish between essential and non-essential parts of the Confucian tradition, and argues that Confucianism is in essence an ethical teaching of moral development, rather than a political doctrine aiming to justify authoritarian rule. According to Angle in the *CCPP*, even though the Confucian tradition is so dynamic that we can only say “Confucianisms” instead of “Confucianism,” there is still a “core” behind this tradition: “this core should be centered around the ideal of all individuals developing their capacities for virtue—ultimately aiming at sagehood—through their relationships with one another and with their environment” (Angle 2012, 1-2). This implies that, for Angle, traditional political structures and institutions, such as monarchy and social hierarchy, which Confucianism has supported for millennia, are not essential to the Confucian tradition, and if these structures and institutions impede equal moral development in a political community, then a faithful Confucian should even criticize them and seek for political arrangements that are better able to realize the essential ethical ideal.

To support this conception of the relationship between ethics and politics in Confucianism, Angle draws upon important intellectual resources from Mou Zongsan (1909-1995), a second-generational leader of ONC who not only relies heavily on Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism but also incorporates Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophy.

According to Mou, “[t]raditional Confucianism conceived of the ethical and political realm as continuous and unified. Either the most virtuous should rule or, in a concession to hereditary monarchy, rulers should strive to be as virtuous as possible and be guided by their still-more-virtuous ministers” (Angle 2012, 24). Mou, however, thinks that this extrapolation from morality (that all should strive to become sages) to politics (that the sage should rule) is wrong, because according to Neo-Confucianism, “achieving sagehood is an endless process,” and empirically speaking no one can become a real sage in his life span. But China’s imperial regime, which endows the supreme leader with unaccountable power, constantly gives tyrants who pretend to be sages the opportunity to “impose their vision of morality on the realm, with bloody consequences” (24). Once this political oppression happens, no other people can have the opportunity to actualize their equal moral potential to become sages anymore.

To prevent this periodical tragedy from happening again while retaining the Neo-Confucian commitment to sagehood, Mou borrows Hegel’s dialectics and argues that Confucian ethics should undertake a “self-restriction” or “self-negation” (*ziwo kanxian*) to create an independent political space for people to cultivate their virtues without being impeded and oppressed by the tyrant. In this political domain, the system of laws and rights, rather than the arbitrary will of the ruler, shall prevail. As Angle summarizes, in Mou’s theory, “[e]thical reasoning ‘restricts itself’ in order to more fully realize itself, and thereby allows for an independent realm of political value to exist” (Angle 2012, 28). This theory of “self-restriction” enables Mou and Angle to say that the imperial regime in ancient China is an unfortunate deviation from the Confucian core, and that it is a mistake for all preceding Confucians to support authoritarian forms of government. The regime that better serves the sagehood ideal, according to Mou and Angle, is constitutional democracy, a political regime based upon the rule of law, civil and political rights, and democratic procedures. Thus, Angle concludes that “[t]he institutions advocated by Progressive Confucians are valued not because of their ancient pedigree but because of their capacity to assist in the realization of the fundamental human virtues

that Confucians have valued since ancient times. Social structures that set barriers to the realization of virtue, therefore, need to be critiqued and changed” (18).

In sum, pressured by potential challenges that he is using external, and by and large Western liberal democratic standards to reconstruct Confucianism, Angle constantly demonstrates that he is merely following “the tradition’s own development” (Angle 2012, 49), and that “to whatever degree Progressive Confucianism converges with Western models. . . this follows from the internal logic of Progressive Confucianism, not from a desire to copy the West” (32). He accuses Neo-Classical Confucians of ignoring the dynamic nature of Confucianism, and Synthetic Confucians of diluting the purity of their commitments to Confucianism. Based on his strategy of cross-cultural engagement, Angle believes that he can use his Progressive Confucianism to defeat traditionalists like Jiang Qing purely on Confucian terms. In the next section, I will put Angle and traditionalists into dialogue and argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, for Angle to demonstrate that traditionalist Confucians are not authentic Confucians.

IV. Traditional Confucianism’s Rebuttal

In a brief review of Angle’s Progressive Confucianism, Leigh Jenco argues that while Angle, among other Confucians, is a philosopher most sensitive to the diverse and changeable nature of Confucianism, and consciously refrains from using external, especially modern Western standard to evaluate Confucianism, he remains trapped by “particular kinds of power relationships which sustain and transform Confucianism over time and space. . . . Confucianism in his analysis is figured as relevant and ‘modern’ only to the extent that it can accommodate the values of some form of liberal democracy” (Jenco 2017, 454-455). Jenco thus urges scholars to rectify this power relationship and restore Confucianism as an independent source of knowledge-production in the modern academy. She also suggests that the values Confucianism offers independently can be critical of

liberal democratic ideas and practices (Jenco 2015, 662).

Traditionalist Confucians may agree with Jenco's critique of Angle, and what they want to contribute to the modern world is precisely values and institutions that are highly critical of constitutional democracy. Jiang Qing, for example, asserts that "[a] glance over China's current world of thought shows that Chinese people have already lost their ability to think independently about political questions. In other words, Chinese people are no longer able to use patterns of thought inherent in their own culture—Chinese culture—to think about China's current political development" (Jiang 2013, 27). In this section, I aim to prove that traditionalist Confucians can challenge Angle on three reasonable grounds: First, a closer reading of Neo-Confucianism shows that the pursuit of sagehood does not require a constitutional democracy. Therefore, Angle's commitment to this regime is non-Confucian. Second, Confucianism's continuous support of authoritarian regime in its history suggests that hierarchical political arrangements constitute the core and essential part of Confucianism, and the political dimension of the Confucian core is reflected in Gongyang learning. Third, in terms of "tradition's own development," the Gongyang School is also a powerful strand in late imperial China, and is equally qualified in serving as a starting point for constructing a contemporary Confucian political theory.⁵

A. Constitutional Democracy Is Not Logically Required by Neo-Confucianism

As shown above, the hallmark of traditionalist Confucians is their favor of hierarchical forms of political system in which Confucian

⁵ My suggestion that traditionalist Confucians can challenge Angle on three reasonable grounds does not imply that Jiang Qing's political philosophy, including triple legitimacy and the tricameral system, is philosophically cogent and defensible. David Elstein (2015) has provided one of the best systematic critiques of Jiang's thought, and I agree with him that Jiang's theory has many loopholes and inconsistencies. However, the fact that Jiang is a bad Gongyangist does not imply that a better Gongyangist cannot emerge in the future. Jiang's role in contemporary Chinese intellectual history is to serve as a trailblazer. His substantive views about the Confucian polity are not the final words in the Gongyang revival.

elites supposedly wield uncontested power. They believe that pre-modern Confucians embraced monarchy and political hierarchy not without solid reasons and argue that these inegalitarian ideals remain attractive today. Because Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism is frequently employed by ONCs to support their progressive political vision, traditionalist Confucians tend to circumvent this strand and promote institutions based on other Confucian texts, most notably *The Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals*. However, I argue, on behalf of traditionalist Confucians, that even Neo-Confucianism is not a solid basis for justifying constitutional democracy on Confucian terms, and this is because for Neo-Confucians, moral self-cultivation can be achieved without the agent being involved in political activity.

As Angle correctly points out, Neo-Confucian thinkers made the ideal of sagehood accessible to ordinary people precisely because this ideal was thoroughly depoliticized. Unlike pre-Qin and early imperial Confucianism in which a sage was conceived of as a virtuous man wielding supreme political power, Neo-Confucianism emphasized the moral, rather than the political aspect of sagehood, and both Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming made it explicit that no political involvement was necessary for moral self-cultivation (Angle 2010, 14-22). Most famously, as Angle himself cites in *Sagehood*, Wang Yangming argues that the only criterion for a person to become a sage is that “his mind has become completely identified with universal coherence (*chunhu tianli* 純乎天理) and is no longer mixed with any impurity or selfish human desires (*wuren yu zhiza* 无人欲之杂).” Political participations and political achievements, which Wang calls “the abilities of sages,” are not essential for sagehood. “Therefore even an ordinary person, if he is willing to learn so as to enable his mind to become completely identified with universal coherence, can also become a sage, in the same way that although a one ounce piece [of pure gold], when compared to a 10,000 pound piece, is widely different in quantity, it is not deficient in perfection in quality” (Wang 1983, 119; cited from Angle 2010, 19). If Angle is faithful to this basic premise of Neo-Confucian conception of sagehood, then he should have recognized that participation in politics and government is not a requirement for

individual moral growth. In fact, Neo-Confucians held that ordinary social lives had provided abundant venues for people to develop their virtues, such as families, clan associations, the workplace, local schools, and charitable organizations. As long as a peasant son performs his filial duties well, he is on the right track of becoming a sage without having to serve as a minister in the royal court or participate in major political decisions (Chan 2014b, 790).

For this reason, traditionalist Confucians can argue that the Neo-Confucian ideal of sagehood is compatible with a hierarchical political system, as long as political hierarchies in the regime do not turn into a totalitarianism that radically inhibits the formation of meaningful social interactions. In Jiang Qing's institutional design, ordinary people have an important voice in the *Shuminyuan*, and the power of political elites is limited both by certain checks-and-balances mechanisms and by educational programs that cultivate rulers' moral integrity and humaneness. Although it is highly doubtful whether these constraints can effectively prevent power abuse, it still leaves spaces for ordinary people to cultivate their sagely virtues in a broad range of social activities. Even in contemporary China (a regime that Zeng Yi defends), where the Communist Party retains certain totalitarian means to control the society, it is still perfectly possible for a person to become a filial son or daughter, a responsible and loving parent, a trustworthy friend, a beloved teacher, and a hardworking employee, provided that they can purify their selfish human desires and identify themselves with universal coherence. Therefore, although the sagehood ideal in Neo-Confucianism requires political power to be within certain limits, it is still a far cry from justifying a full-blown constitutional democracy, let alone the kind of participatory democracy preferred by Angle, in which ordinary people are not only permitted, but also encouraged to play a role in making even the most important political decisions for the country (Angle 2010, 210-212).

B. Ethics and Politics as Co-Essentials of Confucianism

Angle's hasty justification for constitutional democracy, tradi-

tionalists may argue, reflects his implicit negative attitude toward traditional Confucian political thought: in addition to ethical teachings, premodern Confucianism cannot make any significant and creative contributions in political thinking and institutional design for the contemporary world. After all, Jiang Qing may ask, if Angle claims himself to be a faith Confucian, why does he choose constitutional democracy, born in the modern West, as their first resort when designing a Confucian polity, rather than choosing Confucian texts as his resort to look for useful insights? What enables Angle to admire traditional Confucian ethics while discarding traditional Confucian politics is the argument that compared with the ethical ideal of sagehood, the traditional, non-democratic political system is not an essential component of the Confucian core, and therefore can be replaced by constitutional democracy, a regime that Angle claims to be better able to realize the Confucian ethical ideal. It is precisely this conception of the relationship between Confucian ethics and Confucian politics that Jiang and his traditionalist followers want to challenge.

In contemporary China, the relationship between ethics and politics occupies the center of Confucian political debate. As David Elstein correctly points out, “[a]lmost all modern Ruist [Confucian] thinkers see a tension between the ethical and political sides of Ruism and make a choice about which is more important” (Elstein 2015, 23). As anti-democratic thinkers, traditionalist Confucians like Jiang Qing argue against one-sidedly defining the Confucian core as ethical rather than political. In his *Political Confucianism*, Jiang uses “heart-mind Confucianism” (*xinxing ruxue* 心性儒學) to refer to Confucian strands that give priority to individual moral development, such as Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism and ONC, and uses “political Confucianism” (*zhengzhi ruxue* 政治儒學) to label strands, most notably Gongyang learning, that focus more on building laws, rituals, social conventions, and political institutions to maintain social order and good governance. According to Jiang, these two strands jointly constitute the essential spirit of Confucianism, and the best contemporary Confucian theory should cover both aspects of the Confucian tradition. But since Overseas Confucians one-sidedly focus

on individual ethics while leaving politics to Western constitutional democracy, argues Jiang, his task for the time being is to develop a “political Confucianism” in order to recover the political ambitions of traditional Confucianism (Jiang 2003, 4-5, 51-52).

Angle has yet to confront this challenge. In his *CCPP*, he briefly criticizes Jiang’s theory by arguing that “Jiang’s idea that inner morality and outer politics are independent, parallel tracks is only tenable if moral development does not depend on a particular political form. We will see that Mou lays the groundwork for me to argue to the contrary: political (and social) institutional forms do matter to moral development, and often matter enormously” (Angle 2012, 32). Therefore, it seems that Angle still tacitly regards individual moral development as the core concern of Confucianism, without confronting Jiang’s argument that politics is also an indispensable component of the Confucian ideal. Based on his reading of the *Gongyang Commentary*, Jiang argues that there is an independent realm of “the political” in Confucianism that cannot be regarded as a mere means to the ethical end (Jiang 2003, 52). Laws, rituals, political institutions, and a hierarchical social structure help maintain a peaceful political order and achieve good governance, but for political Confucians, argues Jiang, order and good governance do not necessarily aim to maximize the moral development of each individual, though it leaves social spaces for the realization of the Neo-Confucian ideal of sagehood, as I have argued above.⁶

Therefore, if both ethics and politics constitute the core of Confucianism, then Angle cannot claim that his ethics-centered Progressive Confucianism is more authentically Confucian than Jiang Qing’s politics-centered Confucianism. Jiang can legitimately argue that by leaving institutional creation to Western democrats, Angle is underestimating the ability of Confucianism to invent its own political institutions in modern times.

⁶ This understanding of Confucianism echoes with Loubna El Amine’s recent work on classical Confucianism, in which she challenges the “ethics-first approach” and argues that Confucian masters judged the success of political rule—the establishment and maintenance of political order—by its own standard, “distinct from the standards the Confucians use for the assessment of individual life” (El Amine 2015, 10-11).

C. Gongyang Learning as an Influential Strand of Confucianism

Without resorting to extra-Confucian reasons to justify a constitutional democracy, there are still two strategies that Angle and other progressive Confucians could use to question the Confucian pedigree of Jiang Qing and his followers. The first strategy is to downplay the importance of the Gongyang strand in Confucianism (Elstein 2015, 152-153). Although Angle has never personally used this strategy, it could be argued that since the influence of Gongyang learning declined after its popularity in Han Dynasties, building a contemporary Confucianism upon this strand runs afoul of Angle's approach of "following tradition's own development" and connecting contemporary thinking to the latest and most influential strand of Confucianism.

This strategy, however, would not work well in refuting Jiang. After all, Jiang may reasonably retort that in Qing Dynasty, the Neo-Confucian strand already declined, and in the nineteenth century the Gongyang strand was powerfully revived to justify various reformist agendas (Jiang 2003, 48; Elman 1990; Wood 1995). For example, Kang Youwei (1858-1927), the most famous Gongyang scholar in late Qing, justified radical political reform in the 1890s based on his interpretation of the *Annals* according to Gongyang hermeneutics (Hsiao 1975). Therefore, if consciously following the tradition's own development counts as an important requirement for crafting contemporary Confucian theories, then it is legitimate for Jiang to build his political Confucianism upon the Gongyang strand.

However, Jiang and traditionalist Confucians can also justify their position without relying on the fact that Gongyang learning was revived in modern China. The distinctive feature of Angle's narrative of Confucian intellectual history is his emphasis on the dynamic nature of Confucianism against the Eurocentric assumption that Confucianism in particular and non-Western thought in general are static traditions without any progressive innovation. His *HRCT* and *Sagehood* aim to show that Confucianism is able to change in a progressive manner even without the stimulus of Western thought. For Angle, the rise of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and

Ming Dynasties should be celebrated precisely because Neo-Confucianism made significant advances in promoting the ideal of moral equality. Egalitarianism is therefore the normative standard for Angle to evaluate the level of desirability of different Confucian strands. However, for traditionalist Confucians who do not find moral and political equality attractive and desirable, Neo-Confucianism is regarded as an unfortunate regress in Confucian history, and therefore older strands of Confucianism, which place a greater emphasis on inequality, elitism, hierarchy, and patriarchy, should be revived as an intellectual authority for contemporary China. Therefore, even if the Gongyang School were not revived in late Qing, it is still legitimate for Jiang to return to more ancient strands of Confucianism for intellectual inspiration.

Pressured by the revival of Gongyang learning, on which almost all traditionalist Confucians rely, Angle and other progressive Confucians have employed another strategy to question the Confucian pedigree of their rivals—the attempt to show that Jiang Qing’s interpretations of key Gongyang texts are far-fetched. For example, Angle argues that a closer reading of Dong Zhongshu’s *Chunqiu fanlu*, an important Confucian work in Western Han Dynasty that draws heavily on Gongyang insights, shows that there is little text evidence to argue that Gongyang learning promotes three different forms of political legitimacy, a theoretical basis for Jiang’s tricameral system I described in Part II (Angle 2014, 504). In addition, Elstein argues, and Angle concurs, that “[t]he institutions Jiang proposes have almost no antecedents in Chinese history” (Elstein 2015, 154), and “[t]his is a problem for a position that claims to root itself in continuity with past Confucian institutional practice” (Angle 2012, 54). They hope to urge Jiang to live up to his own standard: If Jiang, as a self-claimed Gongyangist, really has a fundamentalist attachment to certain Confucian classics, then he should at least be faithful to textual evidence.

However, traditionalists are not helpless in the face of this challenge. The nature of the *Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals*, as Elstein correctly points out, is to decode Confucius’s hidden messages from the subtle wordings of the *Annals*, one of the five classics believed to be edited by Confucius himself

(Elstein 2015, 152). The *Gongyang Commentary* as a book in itself has concrete philosophical arguments, but as an exegesis of the *Annals*, its more profound contribution in Chinese history is a hermeneutical method that allows and even encourages later scholars to develop idiosyncratic interpretations of the *Annals*. In so doing, it opens a window for scholars in different dynasties to use this classic to respond to new political challenges to which no other classic has provided straightforward answers. The precise interpretation of the *Annals* “often varied from commentator to commentator and from age to age, depending on the particular problems that dominated each period” (Wood 1995, 60). By portraying Confucius as a “lawmaker” rather than a mere scholar and by pretending to develop innovative ideas from Confucius’s political teachings, Gongyang learning has the advantage of legitimating even the most radical political changes in a given time, whether revolutionary or reactionary. For this reason, Alan Thomas Wood asserts that “[f]rom the early Han to the end of the nineteenth century, the *Annals* were a source of guidance for scholars in need of inspiration in confronting the most fundamental political problems of their day” (Wood 1995, 21).

This hermeneutics is inherited by Jiang Qing. According to him in *Political Confucianism*, by decoding Confucius’s political teachings, Gongyang hermeneutics is guided by the ultimate spirit of “reforming, inventing, and establishing political institutions” (Jiang 2003, 160). One should never treat any particular doctrine advanced by a given Gongyangist in a given time as the only correct interpretation of the *Annals*, as this doctrine may not be suitable for solving new challenges in a different time. For this reason, Jiang can claim that he respects Dong Zhongshu and Kang Youwei without adopting the concrete institutions suggested by them in Western Han and Late Qing. Zeng Yi can also set aside Jiang’s theory of triple legitimacy and tricameral regime while insisting that he is following in Jiang’s footsteps.⁷

⁷ In a short essay on how to read Dong’s *Chunqiu fanlu*, Zeng also argues that a better way of comprehending this book is to treat it as an example of Gongyang hermeneutics. For Zeng, the concrete philosophical arguments presented by Dong, such as the interactions between Heaven and men and the doctrine of five elements, are less essential than the way he decoded Confucius’s esoteric teachings (Zeng 2017).

Therefore, while Angle and Elstein accuse Jiang's theory of being unfaithful to the *Chunqiu fanlu* and unprecedented in Chinese history, Jiang and Zeng could retort that these attacks misunderstand the nature of Gongyang learning. Even if it can be proved that Jiang is a bad Gongyangist, it is still possible for a better Gongyangist to offer a better Gongyang theory in the future.

V. Conclusion: From Progressive Confucian Political Theory to Progressive Political Theory

By raising these challenges on behalf of traditionalist Confucians, I do not mean to defend their political proposals, which are fundamentally problematic as political theories and extremely dangerous as political ideologies. My point is that Angle and his fellow progressives undervalue the reasonableness of the traditionalist understanding of Confucianism and the difficulty of confronting the traditionalists purely on Confucian terms. Most importantly, despite repeated emphasis on his authentic Confucian pedigree, Angle cannot persuasively demonstrate that he is not using external and modern democratic criteria to judge, select, and reconfigure Confucianism. I do not deny the possibility that Angle and progressive Confucians may ultimately provide better Confucian arguments to successfully refute traditionalist Confucianism, but if Angle seriously believes that constitutional democracy is good for the Chinese people and should be established at all cost, then these intricate interpretive debates within the Confucian circle may have the effect of diverting the progressives' attention from the most urgent task in contemporary China and blunting the critical sharpness of progressive Confucianism as progressive social criticism in the Chinese context. After all, even though one can argue that the "civic culture" of contemporary Chinese society still has a conspicuous Confucian characteristic, ordinary people, especially those experiencing unbearable injustices in their daily life, would not find these technical debates on Confucianism directly relevant to their struggles at all. Therefore, demonstrating progressive Confucianism as authentic Confucianism is relatively

non-essential compared with the justification for progressive principles embedded in progressive Confucianism, such as political equality, civil and political rights, the rule of law, and democratic procedures. A better strategy, I suggest, is to confront traditionalist Confucians more straightforwardly and transform an intra-Confucian debate around Confucian texts to an extra-Confucian debate about the desirability of constitutional democracy in China.

The primary reason for initiating an extra-Confucian debate about constitutional democracy is that traditionalist Confucians have already provided extensive extra-Confucian reasons for their conversion to traditionalist Confucianism, but few of them have been powerfully criticized and confronted by progressive Confucians, who one-sidedly focus on demonstrating that traditionalists are bad Confucians. In his reviews of Jiang and other traditionalist Confucians, Angle has repeatedly pointed out the “fundamentalist” feature of their attitude toward Confucian classics, and suggests that this blind attachment to an authority is out of touch with political realities in contemporary China (Angle 2014, 503-504; 2018a, 87). A political philosopher in contemporary time, argues Angle, should value Confucianism not because of its ancient pedigree, but because it can contribute something valuable for our modern life. A philosophical reconstruction of Confucianism, according to Angle, “aims to tell us what is true about human lives and values insofar as they relate to our lives together in political society. This is distinct from simply explicating what one or another tradition has said,” like what Jiang Qing has done (Angle 2012, 19).

This characterization of traditionalist Confucians as blind followers of Confucian authority without a sense of reality misunderstands the motivation of traditionalist Confucians and underestimates their political ambitions. Traditionalist Confucians were not born traditional Confucians; they became traditionalist Confucians because they were deeply disappointed with other available political doctrines that they once supported.⁸ For example,

⁸ Before publishing his first study of Gongyang learning in 1997, Jiang Qing was originally a Marxist, later a Christian liberal, and sympathized with the ONC. For more about his intellectual biography, see Bell (2013).

accompanying Jiang's fervent promotion of political Confucianism is his harsh criticism of democracy in Western societies and his insistence that China should not replicate this regime. In his answer to the question why China should be re-Confucianized, Jiang argues that democracy is responsible for the many contemporary "political diseases" such as selfishness, egoism, hedonism, consumerism, short-sightedness, and a negligence of common challenges for the entire humanity, such as climate change and other environment issues (Jiang 2016, 10). For Jiang, only by restricting popular sovereignty and rebuilding "sacredness" and political hierarchy can these issues be resolved. Therefore, as Elstein correctly mentions, there is a universalist dimension in Jiang's political Confucianism. "The kingly way is not just the solution to China's political problems; it is the universal solution for every nation" (Elstein 2015, 144). China's return to its own political tradition, according to Jiang, actually provides an example for other nations to see that liberal democracy can be replaced by a more desirable alternative. Zeng Yi concurs with Jiang's ambition. He emphasizes in an interview that the ultimate ambition of Mainland Confucians is not merely building a "cultural China" for narrow-minded nationalist purposes, but building a "political China" that can set an example for the solutions of fundamental issues facing humanity as a whole. It is for this purpose, Zeng argues, that Gongyang learning is relevant to our own time, because this strand of Confucianism is most insightful in providing worldly solutions to social, political, legal, and even spiritual issues (Zeng 2016).

These critiques of liberal democracy should be taken seriously not because they have offered profound theories, but because similar anti-democratic sentiments periodically reappear in different corners of the world, and sometimes cause political disasters.⁹ In addition, political scientists constantly remind us that democracy can easily fail due to the misbehavior of the elites, the negligence of

⁹ In a classic study of Sayyid Qutb, for example, Roxanne Euben famously argues that Islamic fundamentalism should not be understood as a phenomenon unique to the Islamic world, but as a political discourse mirroring Western critiques of modernity in post-Enlightenment periods (Euben 1999, 11). This observation applies to traditionalist Confucianism in China as well.

the masses, the hostility of foreigners, and various other accidents (Achen and Bartels 2017). If progressive Confucians think that a political regime as fragile, vulnerable, and volatile as liberal democracy is still normatively desirable for the Chinese people, then they must provide persuasive arguments independent from Confucianism to defend their commitments.

In conclusion, what ultimately gives rise to the disagreement between progressive and traditionalist Confucians is not their different understandings of Confucianism but their different attitudes toward modernity and liberal constitutional democracy. Progressives' argument that Confucianism should accommodate the trend of modernity suggests that they implicitly value the desirability of political equality, civil and political rights, and the rule of law, but traditionalists are not bound by these values, and have offered straightforward reasons as to why they are undesirable. In the face of their challenges progressives should offer extra-Confucian reasons to explain why the traditionalists' diagnosis of constitutional democracy is wrong, why the Chinese people need constitutional democracy to live a respectful life, why the traditionalists are mischaracterizing the political problems that the Chinese people are facing, and why their Confucian-inspired institutional proposals cannot resolve the most serious problems in contemporary China, such as corruption and political oppression. They should not merely assert the universal validity of progressive values, but show how these values are connected with the daily struggles of the Chinese people against the authoritarian regime under which they currently live. An intra-Confucian debate in which Angle frequently demonstrates his Confucian pedigree actually makes progressive Confucianism vulnerable to traditionalist Confucianism, but an extra-Confucian debate around the desirability of constitutional democracy can give progressives the weapon to confront traditionalists more effectively.

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The Code of Management for the Editorial Board of the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*

I. General Regulations

1. (Objective)

This regulation is established according to article IV-10-4 of the Regulations for the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (hereafter, ICPC). It comprises the regulatory guidelines for publishing the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture* (hereafter, *JCPC*).

2. (Mission)

- 1) To supervise publication of *JCPC* and the related affairs of acceptance, review, editing, and so on.
- 2) To set up rules and regulations for publishing *JCPC*.

II. Organization of Editorial Board

3. (Constitution)

The editorial board is comprised of editorial advisors, editorial councils, the chief manager (the director), the editor-in-chief, the head of the editing team, and other editing team members.

4. (Appointment of Editorial Advisors and Members)

The director of ICPC appoints editorial advisors and members among noted scholars of highest achievement, both in Korea and abroad.

5. (Terms)

The basic term for editorial board members is two years, extendable when necessary. The editor-in-chief is tenured by principle, in order for the journal to maintain its congruity.

6. (Chief Manager)

The director of ICPC is also the chief manager and supervises the editorial board.

7. (Editor-in-chief)

The editor-in-chief is appointed by the director of ICPC and is responsible for all editorial issues.

8. (Head of Editing Team, Editing Team)

The head of the editing team and the editing team's other members are appointed by the director of ICPC. The head of the editing team is responsible for general issues concerning editing, and the assistant head is responsible for assisting with related editorial matters.

III. Publication of *JCPC*

9. (Numbers and Dates of Publication)

JCPC is published twice in one year: on February 28 and August 31.

10. (Circulation)

The size of circulation for *JCPC* is determined by the editorial board.

11. (Size)

The standard size for *JCPC* is 176mm × 248mm.

12. (Editorial System)

- 1) Academic articles written in either Chinese or English.
- 2) Academic articles include: title, abstract, keywords, contents, bibliography, an abstract written in Chinese or English, keywords written in Chinese or English.
- 3) The English title and name of the author must be specified.
- 4) The affiliation of the author must be specified.
- 5) Regulations, bulletins, and materials other than academic articles may be included according to the decision of the editorial board.

IV. Submission of Articles and Management

13. (Subject and Character of the Submitted Article)

The subject of article includes:

- 1) Confucian thought and culture in Korea and abroad.
- 2) Analysis of books, translations, or research articles on related subjects published in Korea or abroad. It may include dissertations.
- 3) Critical reviews on academic trends, mainly in the arts and humanities, related to Confucianism and East Asian studies.

No certain qualification for submission is required.

14. (Number of Words)

- 1) A length of each article is limited to 25,000 characters for Chinese and 12,000 words for English, including the abstract, footnotes, bibliography, etc.
- 2) The number of words permitted for materials other than academic articles and reviews are to be determined by the editorial board.

15. (Submission Guidelines)

- 1) A general call for papers is always extended, but only articles submitted at least three months prior to the publication date are usually subjected to the review process for a specific issue.
- 2) Submissions should be forwarded to jcpc@skku.edu as an email attachment.

- 3) Abstracts in Chinese and English must include five or more keywords.
 - 4) If written jointly, the first (main) author and the second (joint) author, as well as their respective name, affiliation, area of research, part(s) of writing, must be noted.
 - 5) E-mail address(es) and phone number(s) must be provided for all authors.
16. (Control of Submitted Articles)
- 1) Submitted articles are, as they arrive, subject to a controlled process.
 - 2) Submitted articles are not returned, and copyright for published articles belongs to ICPC.

V. Reviewing Submitted Articles

17. (Obligation to Review)
- All submitted articles must pass the reviewing process.
18. (Regulations for Reviewing Board)
- 1) In principle, the editorial board will select three outside reviewers for each submitted article and commission them to evaluate the article. If two of the reviewers agree, the article can be published.
 - 2) In specific situations, the editorial board can precede the reviewing process by selecting two outside reviewers. If only one of the reviewers recommends publication, the editorial board can decide whether to publish or reject the article based on the journal's academic standards. In such cases, the editor-in-chief is supposed to make a written report to the chief manager (the director).
 - 3) If submitted articles do not meet the basic requirements of the journal (e.g., in terms of length, subject, etc.), the editorial board can decide not to proceed with the reviewing process and return the submission to the author(s). The editorial board can also ask the author(s) to resubmit after revision.
 - 4) In principle, the board of reviewers must maintain a just and fair attitude, and should not review articles written by scholars with whom they are personally affiliated.
 - 5) For the sake of fairness, the review process will remain anonymous.
19. (Standard of Review)
- 1) Articles will be reviewed for basic format (20%), originality (20%), clarity of subject (20%), logic (20%), and congruity (20%).
 - 2) The result will divide the articles into two groups: publishable and not publishable.

- 3) Articles evaluated as not publishable cannot be re-submitted with the same title.
20. (Feedback time)
Reviewers must submit their feedback on each article to the editorial board within two weeks from it was assigned to them.
21. (Reporting Back the Result)
The editorial board must report back to the author(s) as soon as the results of the reviewing process have been received.

VI. Revision of Regulations

22. (Principle)
This code of management is subject to change when 2/3 of the editorial board agrees, provided that more than half of the editorial board's members are present at the time of voting.

*** Other Regulations**

23. (Others)
 - 1) Other issues not written in this code will be treated following customary practices.
 - 2) The above regulations take effect from December 20, 2006.
 - 3) The editorial board will determine and deal with all other details concerning the above regulations.

Publication Ethics and Malpractice Statement

The editors of *JCPC* are committed to insuring the integrity of its published content and toward that end all authors, reviewers, and members of the editorial and advisory boards associated with the journal are expected to fully adhere to our publication ethics and malpractice policies as described below.

I. Authors

All authors must adhere to the following regulations; they must insure:

1. That their submissions are original research not previously published or under consideration for publication elsewhere and that they have taken all necessary precautions to avoid breach of copyright.
2. That they provide appropriate citation of all previously published works.
3. That they provide two versions of their manuscript in a format that complies with the journal's stated requirements, one disclosing academic rank and affiliation, one anonymous and intended for blind review.
4. That they disclose to the editors any conflicts of interest that may influence or appear to influence the integrity of the work submitted. For example, all sources of financial support for the research leading to the submission must be disclosed.
5. That all persons who have made significant written contributions to the submitted work be acknowledged as co-authors and the approximate contributions of all co-authors be clearly stated.
6. That they immediately inform the editors of any significant errors or problems with the submitted work that they might discover prior to or after publication so that the editors can either correct or retract the paper or acknowledge published mistakes that come to their attention.

II. Reviewers

All reviewers must adhere to the following regulations; they must:

1. Evaluate submissions purely on the basis of their intellectual merit and conformity with the stated aims and requirements of the *JCPC*.
2. Immediately inform the editors of *JCPC* in the case of any potential conflict of interest. For example, if the reviewer recognizes the author by the work and has any close professional or personal relationship with the author that might influence her or his judgement.

3. Maintain strict confidentiality in regard to the manuscripts they review. Reviewers may choose to share their identities with authors in cases in which the manuscript is accepted but they are not to share the manuscripts or any parts thereof without first securing the explicit permission of the author.
4. If they choose not to review a given submission, state briefly their reasons for declining.
5. Assume that their reviews will be communicated to the authors and so should take care to make clear any comments they intend only for the editors.

III. Editors

The editors are responsible for insuring that the review process is fair, swift, and as transparent as possible. In particular, they are tasked with implementing and maintaining the standards and process of peer review described in the following section. They are also responsible for investigating and deciding any apparent cases of misconduct that they perceive or that are brought to their attention as described in the concluding two sections of this statement of publication ethics and malpractice.

IV. Peer Review Process

The editors of *JCPC* read all submissions and make an initial judgment about whether to submit a received paper to the process of peer review. The editors may reject a paper without peer review if its topic or content fall outside the journal's stated mandate, is of poor quality, or does not comply with the journal's stated format. A decision not to send a paper for peer review will not be influenced by an editor's views about the authors or their home institution; the Editor-in-Chief will communicate the reasons for not advancing a given submission to the author.

If a submission is deemed appropriate in topic, content, quality, and format it will be sent out to two reviewers with the requisite expertise needed to evaluate the work for publication. Reviewers are asked to complete their reviews within two months of receipt and to provide clear reasons for judging the submission to be in one of the following four categories:

- Publish (as is)
- Publish after minor revisions (to be noted in the evaluation)
- Revise and resubmit
- Reject

JCPC applies double-blind peer review, the identity of both the author and reviewer is kept hidden. Authors can identify potential conflicts of interest and provide the names of up to two “opposed reviewers” at the time of submission. Authors are required to explain the reasons why identified opposed reviewers should not be asked to evaluate their work. While the editors of *JCPC* will give serious consideration to such identified opposed reviewers, they retain the right to invite whomever they deem appropriate and cannot guarantee that “opposed reviewers” will not be invited.

The editors will make the final decision concerning each submission and their reasons will be clearly communicated both to authors and their reviewers.

To help broaden and strengthen its cadre of potential reviewers, *JCPC* assumes that authors whose papers have been accepted by the journal agree to serve as reviewers for other manuscripts submitted to the journal.

V. Plagiarism

Plagiarism in any form is unacceptable; any suspicion of plagiarism will be vigorously investigated by the editors. If confirmed, plagiarism is sufficient grounds for immediate rejection of a submission and the offending authors will be banned from making further submissions to the journal.

Recycling of one's own previously published work should be avoided as much as possible and if deemed excessive by reviewers or editors can be grounds for rejecting a given submission. When the duplication of previous work is necessary for advancing a new argument or line of inquiry, the cited work must be properly cited and the extent of overlap with the previously published essay(s) must be clearly indicated in the submission itself.

VI. Procedures concerning Reports of Misconduct

The editors are committed to maintaining the highest ethical standards in managing the business of the journal and we encourage anyone who suspects misconduct to contact us immediately. Every report of suspected misconduct will be investigated collectively by the editorial team: i.e., the Editor-in-Chief, Associate Editor, and Managing Editor.

Under normal circumstances, the Editor-in-Chief is responsible for leading all investigations brought to the attention of the editorial team. Should the Editor-in-Chief be accused or implicated in a charge of misconduct, the Associate Editor will take responsibility for the investigation.

As part of the investigation the Editor-in-Chief or Associate Editor will contact both parties involved in any conflict; they will explain and ask them to respond to the accusation and will study and if need be further investigate their responses. No decision will be reached and no action will be taken without sufficient evidence of misconduct.

If the case involves another journal, its Editor-in-Chief will be contacted and both editorial teams will investigate and work to arrive at a shared decision.

The editors of *JCPC* fully endorse the International Standards for Editors and the International Standards for Authors published by COPE (Committee on Publication Ethics), <http://publicationethics.org/international-standards-editors-and-authors>.

Journal of Korean Religions

The **Journal of Korean Religions (JKR)**, the only English-language academic journal dedicated to the study of Korean religions, was launched in the autumn of 2010. It aims to stimulate interest in and discuss the study of Korean religions in various academic disciplines within the humanities and social sciences. A peer-reviewed journal, **JKR** is published twice a year, in April and October, by the Institute for the Study of Religion at Sogang University in Korea.

We are included in the Thomson Reuters *Arts & Humanities Index* and our digital version is available on *Project MUSE*.



Call for Articles

JKR invites contributions from senior and junior scholars researching all aspects of Korean religions from a wide range of perspectives, including religious studies, philosophy, theology, literature, folklore, art, anthropology, history, sociology, political science, and cultural studies. Articles submitted for consideration should be under 10,000 words in length including endnotes (bibliographies and appendices are additional) and should not have appeared or be under review or publication elsewhere. **JKR** also welcomes book reviews (up to 1,000 words) and review articles (up to 3,000 words).

All contributions or inquiries should be sent to the Managing Editor


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
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For submissions and further information, please contact:

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