

Tasan on Virtue:

: Analysis through ‘Theory of Unaroused Mind’ and ‘Nature of Humans and Things’

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Abstract

The project of defining the philosophy of Tasan Chŏng Yagyong (茶山 丁若鏞, 1762~1836) has consisted mainly of efforts to bring to light the individuality of his thought, through either comparison with other schools of philosophy such as Chosŏn Neo-Confucianism (朝鮮性理學) or Western Learning called Sŏhak (西學), or through analysis in conjunction with same. However, scholars have also raised the need for a comprehensive examination of the internal logic and structure of Tasan’s body of thought itself, Tasanism if you will (茶山思想), in order to establish its uniqueness. This study purposes to address the latter issue by contemplating how Tasan’s unique understanding of virtue (德) is developed with self-consistency within his theory of the nature and the mind-heart (心性論).

Previous studies have significance in that they established the basic interpretations of Tasan’s concept of virtue, its relation to his theory of nature as preference (性嗜好說), and that the new interpretation of virtue has its philosophical aim in securing moral action. But there was little examination of how Tasan’s concept of virtue interrelates with not only his theory of nature as preference, but with other major discussions within his body of thought.

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Accordingly, this study aims to examine closely those themes within the theory of the nature of humans and things (人性物性論), and the theory of the unaroused (未發論), which relate to the concept of virtue. More specifically, this study will focus on the discussion of “differences between individuals (人人異)” from the theory of the nature of humans and things (人性物性論) and from the theory of the unaroused (未發論), on the discussion of understanding the “unaroused mind-heart (未發心),” and the resulting debate on whether the mind-heart of sages and ordinary persons are identical or otherwise (聖凡心同·不同). Through this examination, this study aims to demonstrate how the aforementioned themes are developed in relation to Tazan’s concept of virtue, and how the philosophical aim of achieving moral action is realized in detail through the reinterpretation of virtue.

Keywords: virtue (德), theory of nature as preference (性嗜好說), differences between individuals (人人異), the unaroused mind-heart (未發心), the mind-heart of sages and ordinary persons are not identical (聖凡心不同)

Introduction

The exposition and evaluation of the philosophy of Tasan Chŏng Yagyong (茶山 丁若鏞, 1762~1836, Tasan hereafter), one of the representative scholars of Practical Learning(實學) in the Late Chosŏn Period (朝鮮後期), has always been made in conjunction with the various discussions surrounding Practical Learning itself. As the exposition of Practical Learning, its unique characteristics and its relation to other schools of thought, such as Chosŏn Neo-Confucianism (朝鮮性理學) or Western Learning (西學), was always a major undertaking; so were there continuous efforts to compare and analyze Tasan's body of thought in conjunction with other philosophies. Simultaneously, scholars have also raised the need for a comprehensive examination of the internal logic and structure of Tasan's body of thought itself, Tasanism if you will (茶山思想), in order to establish its uniqueness. This study purposes to address the latter issue by contemplating how Tasan's unique understanding of virtue (德) is developed with self-consistency within his body of thought.

A discussion of Tasan's concept of virtue (德) can be observed in detail in his debate with Munsan Yi Chae Ŭi (文山 李載毅, 1772~1839) over the interpretation of the "Four Principles (四端)" chapter of the *Mencius*. It is well-known that Tasan criticized the established Neo-Confucian interpretation of *dan* (*duān*, in Chinese 端) as "clue" or "lead (端緒)," asserting that it should instead be interpreted as "beginning (端始)," "primary (端首)," or "fundamental (端本)."¹ His argument was that by interpreting *dan* (端) as "clue" or "lead (端緒)," as in Neo-Confucianism, and therefore regarding the Four Principles as the *li* which resides within (在內之理), people are left with no choice but to set aside their diligent efforts to carry out that which is good, and instead focus on inner cultivation after the manner of Buddhists, who spend their days in meditation and reflection.²

1 "端者始也, 端者首也, 端者本也" ("Reply to Yi Yŏ-hong" in *Yŏyudang chŏnsŏ*).

2 "仁義禮智, 知可以行事而成之, 則人莫不俛焉孳孳, 冀成其德. 仁義禮智, 知以爲本心之全德, 則人之職業, 但當向壁觀心, 回光反照, 使此心體, 虛明洞澈, 若見有仁義禮智四顆, 依倚髣髴, 受我之涵養而已, 斯豈先聖之所務乎" (*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*).

Zhu Xi's (朱子) school of Neo-Confucian thought, under the first principle of "Nature as *li* (性即理)," considers the Four Virtues (四德) to be the *li* which exists within human nature, and the Four Principles to be phenomenalized manifestations of that fundamental *li*. In other words, the Four Virtues and the Four Principles are understood to be in a relationship of essence (本體) and phenomena (現象). Therefore, in the matter of fulfilling morality, it is easy to emphasize the process of internally verifying *li*, the metaphysical truth which resides in our very nature and which is the ultimate moral standard, over specific outer actions or moral practices.³ Tasan's criticisms are directed at precisely this aspect.

Tasan, who interprets *dan* as "beginning (始)" and "fundamental (本)," views the Four Principles as the starting point and the basis from which the Four Virtues are realized. The Four Principles are the *dunamis*, the potentiality, of the Four Virtues (可仁可義可禮可智之本理),⁴ and it is through expanding the Four Principles that the Four Virtues are completed.⁵ As an example, he states that the name of Benevolence, *ren* (仁), is actualized after an act of loving a person. He also states that *ren* (仁), which encompasses all virtue, means that two people will fulfill all their duties toward one another, and as in the saying, "to overcome oneself and return to rituals (克己復禮)," the concept should be understood in terms of actual event (事) and practice (爲).⁶ As well, Tasan differentiates between the 'Natural Good (性善)' and the 'Human Good (人善)' at the end of his commentary on this passage: "By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart (性相近

3 See Chang (1998, 137-139).

4 "四心者, 四端也。… 惻隱等四心, 乃可仁可義可禮可智之本理而已。故人莫不有此四心, 而不得爲仁人義士, 行仁而後謂之仁人, 行義而後謂之義士。… 以其有四心故能成仁義禮智之德, 其本末內外乞留意焉" ("Reply to Yi Yō-hong" in *Yōyudang chōnsō*).

5 "四心者, 人性之所固有也, 四德者, 四心之所擴充也。未及擴充, 則仁義禮智之名, 終不可立矣" (*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*).

6 "案仁者, 人也。二人爲仁, 父子而盡其分, 則仁也(父與子二人) 君臣而盡其分, 則仁也。(君與臣二人) 夫婦而盡其分, 則仁也。(夫與婦二人) 仁之名, 必生於二人之間,(只一己則仁之名無所立) 近而五教 遠而至於天下萬姓。凡人與人盡其分, 斯謂之仁,(即所云仁民) 故有子曰 孝弟也者, 其爲仁之本(孝弟爲仁民之本) 仁字訓詁本宜如是。… 若有一顆仁德 原在心竅之內 爲惻隱之本源 則一日克己復禮 以下二十字 都泊然無味也。從來仁字 宜從事爲上看。(非在內之理)" (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*). Also refer to Note 2.

習相遠).” Tasan defines the ‘nature (性)’ of the Natural Good (性善) as that which is innate, in itself purely good; whereas Human Good refers to fulfilling virtue by pursuing nature (率性).⁷ Therefore, he also interprets the ‘pursuit (率)’ of ‘pursuing nature (率性)’ to mean ‘making an effort (用力).’⁸

To sum up Tasan’s words up to this point, it can be said that virtue is a concept which refers to the result of making an effort (用力) to manifest the Natural Good in the form of Human Good. Thus, the core of Tasan’s interpretation of virtue lies in the view of virtue as a practical concept which is established after practicing an actual action or event (行事). Tasan’s discussions of virtue, then, are focused on the issue of moral action.

Tasan’s reinterpretation of virtue demanded a revision of the Neo-Confucian first principle of “nature is the Principle *li* (性即理).” His new definition of nature (性) as preference (嗜好) is therefore inseparably related to his concept of virtue, the process of definition becoming the basis of his theory on human nature, in accordance with the new understanding of virtue.⁹ And if the reinterpretation of virtue relates closely to a change in the basic concept of nature (性), it is not difficult to reason that it will continue to be developed with relevancy within the major areas of Tasan’s system of thought concerning the nature of the human mind-heart (心性論).

The significance of preceding studies lies in the fact that they organized the concept of virtue as argued by Tasan, and broadly established how it relates to Tasan’s theory of nature as preference, as well as that the philosophical aim of such a view lies in securing moral action.¹⁰ However, studies on the internal structure of Tasan’s philosophy, focusing in detail on how it is materialized in interrelationship with his concept of virtue, have been somewhat lacking. There is a paucity of studies on the major issues of the theory of the nature of humans and things (人性物性論), and the theory of

7 “性善與人善，不同。性善者，謂天賦之性，樂善而恥惡，養之以善，則浩然以充，餉之以惡，則欲然以餒，明本性純善也。人善者，率此善性，正心修身，畢竟行義而成仁，以全其德者也” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

8 “臣對曰，率性有工夫。蓋性本純善，而人慾恒欲陷惡，必十分用力，循其本性，然後方可適道，則率性有工夫也” (Addition to the Lecture on the Mean).

9 See Chang (1998, 148).

10 See Chang (1998), Chǒng (2001), and Paek (2009).

the unaroused (未發論), in particular, compared to studies related to the theory of nature as preference. Therefore, in this study Tasan's concept of virtue will be used as the viewpoint from which to consider the major issues of the theory of the nature of humans and things (人性物性論), and the theory of the unaroused (未發論), especially the debates on differences between individuals, the understanding of the unaroused mind-heart (未發心), and the subsequent debate on whether the mind-heart of sages and ordinary persons are identical or otherwise (聖凡心同·不同). The aim is to elucidate how Tasan's understanding of virtue is reflected and developed in the aforementioned debates, and how the problem of practicability, raised through the reinterpretation of virtue, is materialized. This will become part of the task, mentioned at the beginning, of defining the uniqueness of Tasan's thought through a rigorous examination of its internal structure.¹¹

The Problem of Virtue in the Theory of Humans and Things

During the Horak Debate (湖洛論爭), Oeam Yi Gan (巍巖 李柬, 1677~1721) and Namdang Han Wŏn Jin (南塘 韓元震 1682~1721) argued, each within the framework of the *li-qi* paradigm (理氣論), that humans and things possess the same nature (人物性同論), and that humans and things do not possess the same nature (人物性異論). Here the nature of which the identicalness between humans and things is being debated refers to the original/ intrinsic nature (本然之性). Oeam and Namdang's arguments are concerned with the differences between kinds, between humans and things: should the dividing *li* (分殊之理), the *li* at the level of division (分殊) at which *qi* begins to cause differences, be considered the fundamental, intrinsic nature, and therefore humans and

11 The reason for investigating Tasan's concept of virtue 德 through his theory of nature of human and things (人性物性論), and through his theory of unaroused mind (未發論) is that the two theories of Tasan have been developed carefully with a particular attention in building the basic structure of theory of mind and nature. The two theories also are the hotly debated topic between Ho (湖) and Rak(洛) region in Korea, which can serve as a preliminary discussion of comparison between Tasanism and Ho-Rak debate.

things considered to have differing natures? Or should only the *li* which is one *li* (理一之理) be considered the intrinsic nature, and therefore humans and things be regarded as having the same nature? The two scholars, however, agree that differences within a kind, the differences between human and human, thing and thing, are mainly a matter of the clarity or murkiness (清濁) of one's *qi* (氣). The two opinions are agreed that differences within the same kind (種內) are merely a matter of differences in the clarity or murkiness (清濁) of *qi* (氣), but divide according to their different approaches to the problem of understanding the *li* which is nature ("nature is the Principle *li* [性即理]") in its relationship with *qi* (氣).¹² But however complicated and intricate the details of the Horak Debate may be, a commonality is that in the end, the problem of 'difference' in the theory of the nature of humans and things (人性物性論) is always explained in relation to *qi* (氣). This is because within the *li-qi* paradigm (理氣論), 'sameness (同)' derives from *li*, while 'difference (異)' resides in *qi*, as per the proposition: "The Principle is one, yet divided into many (理一分殊)."

Tasan, however, is critical of explaining the issue of difference based on the qualities of one's *qi*, or temperament (氣質). To begin with, Tasan criticizes the development of a theory of the nature of humans and things (人性物性論) using theories of the innate and temperament (本然·氣質說), following the *li-qi* paradigm.¹³ As it is well-known, Tasan is of the opinion that

12 About details into Horak debate, see Chõn (2003) and Hong (2006).

13 Tasan's main criticism of 'original' (本然) and 'physical/temperamental' (氣質) nature lies first in the fact that the concept of 'original' is rooted in Buddhist notion that "there is no beginning; it is as it is" (無始自在). Secondly, the two terms seem to imply that there are two kinds of nature, one good (original nature) and the other evil (physical nature), while in fact there is only one good nature in human. On this, Tasan has the following statements: "案: 本然氣質之說, 直指心體, 發明隱微, 使吾人得以認己, 其功大矣. 然其命之曰, 本然, 恐與實理有差, 不敢不辨. 竊嘗思之, 天之降衷, 必在身形胚胎之後, 何得謂之本然乎. 佛家謂清淨法身, 自無始時, 本來自在, 不受天造, 無始無終. 故名之曰, 本然謂本來自然也. 然形軀受之父母, 不可曰無始也, 性靈受之天命, 不可曰無始也. 不可曰無始, 則不可曰本然. 此其所不能無疑者也" (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*). "人無二性, 如稻性好水, 再無好燥之性, 麥性好燥, 再無好水之性. 先儒謂性有二, 一曰本然之性, 二曰氣質之性, 乃云本然之性, 純善而無惡, 氣質之性可善而可惡. 遂謂孟子單據本然之性, 不論氣質之性為未備. 今人或以是為顯訟告子, 陰戴揚雄, 烏乎先儒亦何苦為是哉" (*Deep Examination of the Classic of Mind*).

humans and things are different in their nature, on the basis of his theory of Four Natures (性四品說).¹⁴ Tansen considers humans and things to be fundamentally different (原自不同)¹⁵ in their Heaven-dictated order (天賦之命) or their *li* decreed by place (所賦之理), and claims that morality, which he terms the nature of the righteous way (道義之性), is the substance of that fundamental nature which is unique to humans alone.¹⁶ The differences between kinds, then, in the case of humans and things, Tansen considers to lie in the specific differences in the substances of their natures, namely, whether or not they are possessed of the “nature of the righteous way (道義之性).”

The Neo-Confucian view, which uses temperament (氣質) to explain differences, was most strongly criticized by Tansen for its explanation of differences between individual humans:

Truly it would be far from the truth to believe that good and evil (善惡) are decided by the clarity or murkiness (清濁) of the temperaments (氣質) we are given at birth. If one is endowed with clear *qi* and therefore becomes noble and wise (上知), that person is compelled to such goodness; how can this be good? If one is endowed with murky *qi* and becomes mean and foolish (下愚), this person is also compelled to such evil, and how can this be evil? Therefore, while temperament (氣質) can easily make one wise or foolish, it cannot make a person good or evil. As Mencius said, “Yao and Shun are the same as all men”; truly Shun became Shun-like through the carrying out of filial piety (孝) and brotherly love (友愛), not through the making of such elaborate astronomical instruments as the armillary sphere (璣璣玉衡). Now, if we told people that all should study astrology (曆理) and make

14 Tansen adopts both four (性四品說) and three kinds (性三品說) of nature in his work. Here I adopt the former.

15 “然臣獨以爲本然之性，原各不同。… 乃其所賦之理，原自不同。… 天賦之命，原自不同故也” (*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*).

16 “然苟欲甚分，當分四等，荀子曰水火有氣而無生，艸木有生而無知，禽獸有知而無義，人有氣有生有知有義，此合理之言也。…… 然則氣質之性，人物之所同得，而若所云道義之性，惟人有之，禽獸以下所不能得。今先正之言，反以爲本然之性人物皆同，而氣質之性人與犬不同，顧安得無惑哉。” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

armillary spheres, they would search for the door, fleeing in alarm. But if we told people that all should carry out filial piety and brotherly love, after the manner of Shun, nobody would limit themselves and say that it is beyond their capabilities, be it the most foolish of persons, possessed of the murkiest of *qi*. Therefore, how can we say that Mencius's words, that all can become a Yao or a Shun, are in the least bit distanced from the truth? Thus, as temperament (氣質) is unrelated to good and evil, it should be acceptable to abolish the theory of temperament.¹⁷

Tasan saw temperament as being possibly a factor in the creation of individual differences between the wise and the foolish (慧鈍), but as being unrelated to issues of good and evil (善惡). From his point of view, humans are universally the same in that they have the morality of good as their unique nature, and have the potential to actualize that morality. He also considers that this point of view is in accord with the original stance of Confucianism as illustrated in the words of Mencius, that any person can become a sage (聖人) like Yao or Shun (堯舜).

Tasan criticizes the theory of temperament by arguing that if good and evil individuals are seen to be temperamentally so, and therefore the problem of individual differences in the realization of morality becomes simply a matter of differences in their innate temperaments, a deterministic view of morality is inevitable. In other words, as the realization of good or evil is constrained by what manner of *qi* one is endowed with, people will limit themselves in their endeavors to carry out morality, finding no reason for voluntary effort. Tasan regards the carrying out of specific acts of good, such as filial piety (孝) or friendship (友愛), to be the main factor in a person's becoming a sage like Yao or Shun.

17 “苟必以稟受之清濁，爲善惡之所以然，則違於實者，多矣。受清氣而爲上知，則是不得不然之善也，何足爲善。受濁氣而爲下愚，則是不得不然之惡也，何足爲惡。氣質能使人慧鈍，不能使人善惡，有如是矣。孟子謂堯舜與人同，誠以舜之所以爲舜，在乎孝友，不在乎璿璣玉衡。今使天下之人，人人皆推究曆理，以作璿衡，則望門視色，駭而走者多矣。今使天下之人，人人皆孝友如舜，則受至鈍甚濁之氣質，未可曰行不得而力不足，特自劃而不肯爲耳。則孟子謂人皆可以爲堯舜，豈一毫過情之言哉。氣質之於善惡，其不相關如此，則氣質之說，雖廢之可也” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

Tasan discusses this in more detail in two passages of his Commentaries on the Analects (論語古今註), the passage on “By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart (性相近 習相遠),” and that on “There are only the wise of the highest class, and the stupid of the lowest class, who cannot be changed (上知與下愚不移).” Tasan interprets “by nature, men are nearly alike (性相近)” as meaning that nature, as the inherent preference (nature of likes and dislikes) of a person, is identical for both the sage and the ordinary person, while the “practice (習)” of “by practice, they get to be wide apart (習相遠)” refers to the habits of learning (見聞之慣熟), which develop increasing differences according to what a person acquaints himself or herself with.¹⁸ Therefore, Tasan argues:

If we speak of phases of 'advanc[ing] in virtue, and cultivat[ing] all the sphere of his duty (進德修業), we know that Shun never ceased to carry out good towards other people, progressing in virtue step by step, since the time that he was a fisherman, a potter, a farmer who worked in the fields and tilled the earth; how can we say 'he cannot be changed (不移)'? The daily progress of an evil man into evil is no different. How can there exist a person who is complete from birth, so that he can never be changed? The superior man progresses upwards (上達) and the mean man progresses downwards (下達), but in the beginning all progress from the same middle ground.¹⁹

Tasan uses phases of 'advanc[ing] in virtue, and cultivat[ing] all the sphere of duty (進德修業)' to explain the differences between the sage and the wicked, stating that sages like Shun are the result of ceaselessly practicing good and advancing in virtue, while the wicked are the result of the opposite process. The inherent nature is identical in sage and wicked, but the difference

18 “補曰性者，本心之好惡也，習者，聞見之慣熟也。補曰好德恥惡之性，聖凡皆同，以此之，故本相近也。親賢狎小之習，甲乙有殊，以此之，故終相遠也。… 孔曰君子慎所習。案孔之此註，深中經旨，毫髮不錯” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

19 “若論其進德修業之層級，則舜自耕稼陶漁，以至為帝，無不取於人為善。其步步移動，一息不停可知，何以謂之不移也。惡人之日進其惡，亦當如此。世豈有生來成熟，無復可移者乎。君子上達，小人下達，其本皆自中層起程也” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

in the specific practices of that nature is what eventually leads the two farther and farther apart.²⁰

Confucianism traditionally maintains that human nature is good, and the essence of that human nature is in morality. Therefore the differences in nature between humans and things leads directly to the issue of qualitative differences in essential morality, and the matter of differences between individuals boils down to the differences between individual realization of morality.²¹ To Tasan, explaining the differences between persons by the Neo-Confucian theory of temperament carried with it the risk, not only of being unable to establish the potential for realizing morality, but also, since the resulting good or evil becomes a deterministic given, of discouraging people from voluntarily making an effort to take moral action.

Tasan's claim is that the basis of differences between humans, as part of a theory of the nature of humans and things, exists in the results of continuously carrying out specific acts of good. Virtue is not an inherent principle residing in the mind-heart, but a concept which completes itself after specific events of action, namely, that of doing good in one's relations with people. Therefore, the attainment of virtue is the result of practical action, and this reveals the differences in individual manifestations of morality. These differences in moral actions are what bring about the differences between individuals.²² A sage is one who has advanced in virtue through ceaseless practice, to its very completion, while an evil person is one who has arrived at the opposite result.

From the above, we can see that in the debates on differences between individuals (人人異), from his theory of the nature of humans and things (人

20 “案狂聖之性，本只相同。克念而習於善則升而為聖，罔念而習於惡則降而為惡。雖可聖之人，罔念則移於狂，雖易狂之人，克念則移於聖。其不肯升者，名曰下愚，其不肯降者，名曰上智” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

21 The above phrase “qualitative difference” does not only refer to the actual existence of different kinds of moral content. It boils down to how one interprets the issue of “the whole and partial (偏全) realization of the ‘Five Constant’ (五常)” On this see Chen (2002, 100-127).

22 “案狂聖之性，本只相同。克念而習於善則升而為聖，罔念而習於惡則降而為惡。雖可聖之人，罔念則移於狂，雖易狂之人，克念則移於聖。其不肯升者，名曰下愚，其不肯降者，名曰上智” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

性物性論), Tasan's concept of virtue acts as the basis for his explanation of the differences between individual manifestations of morality. It is because Tasan understands virtue to be a practical concept that he explains the differences between individuals in terms of differences in their attainment of virtue through practicing morality.

The Problem of Virtue in the Debate on Minds

To Tasan, who saw humans as being set apart from things in that they only, as an innate characteristic, were possessed of the morality he called the "nature of the righteous way (道義之性)," the differences between individuals mainly arose from the matter of manifesting and fulfilling that nature (道義之性). Based on his concept of virtue, whether or not one continuously achieves virtue is a straightforward reflection of one's degree of morality manifestation. This being said, the focus then shifts to the issue of how 'manifestation of virtue' is possible, and how it is accomplished, which can be examined in detail in Tasan's discussion of the unaroused (未發論).

It is well known that the idea of 'unaroused (未發),' in Zhu Xi's (朱子) school of Neo-Confucian thought, can be summed up thus: 'thought as yet unborn (思慮未萌),' 'things as yet unreached (事物未至),' and 'understanding as yet undawned (知覺不昧).' But Tasan considers the unaroused (未發) to be only a matter of the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure (喜怒哀樂); that is, the 'unaroused (未發)' mentioned in the *Doctrine of Mean* (中庸) refers only to the unaroused emotions of joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure (喜怒哀樂) as per the original text, and does not mean that all thought (思念) will be unaroused. Therefore he continuously asserts, concerning the idea of the unaroused, that the unaroused (未發) which the *Doctrine of Mean* (中庸) refers to is not the state of being unaroused in the whole cognitive process in one's and mind-heart (心知思慮).²³

23 "經但曰喜怒哀樂未發而已, 何嘗曰一切思念, 都未發乎" (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).
"未發者, 喜怒哀樂之未發, 非心知思慮之未發" (*Self-chosen Aphorism on the Mean*).

When discussing the substance of one's thoughts, knowledge and mind-heart (心知思慮), Tasan points out the following: 'to watch oneself carefully (戒慎恐懼),' 'to carefully reflect (慎思),'²⁴ 'to deliberate (窮理),' 'to ponder righteousness (思義),' and 'to consider (商量)'²⁵; the sage's method of cultivating the mind-heart (治心之法) has its basis in such activities. By rejecting the previous Neo-Confucian concept of the unaroused (未發) as relating to the whole process of cognition in one's mind-heart (心知思慮),²⁶ Tasan establishes that learning while in the unaroused state (未發時) is also achieved through the active exertion of the mind-heart (心).²⁷

Tasan's understanding of the unaroused (未發), that it is not the state of being unaroused in the whole cognitive process of one's mind-heart (心知思慮), becomes closely involved with the interpretation of 'achievement of centrality and harmony (致中和)'.²⁸ Tasan interprets the character '*chi* 致' to mean, in this phrase, 'to arrive through great effort (用力推致)'. Centrality (中) and Harmony (和) are understood to be stages of learning, the name of virtue achieved (成德之名),²⁹ resulting from activities of great effort.³⁰ They

24 “易曰，寂然不動，感而遂通天下之故。…特以佛氏論心，每以寂感爲說，程門諸公以爲兩家之說，泐然相合，其論未發已發，專以此句爲證。然聖門治心之法，有慎思無入寂，有戒恐無默存。故思而不學，學而不思，孔子戒之，…孟子曰心之官思，思則得之，未聞曰心之官寂，寂則感之也。經但曰喜怒哀樂未發而已，何嘗曰一切思念，都未發乎。喜怒哀樂未發之時，胡獨無戒慎恐懼乎” (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).

25 Refer to Note 35.

26 Refer to Note 24.

27 Tasan's method of cultivation before the mind is aroused contains the cognitive aspect of mind. He emphasizes “watching oneself carefully when alone” (慎獨), and this is closely related to his notion of Heaven 天 which plays a vital role in his entire life and thought. He believes that through such a method of self-cultivation can one reach the state of “bringing about the mean” (致中) or “maintain the mean” (執中). On this, see Cho (2009, chapter 3).

28 Tasan regards that the term ‘centrality’ (中) and ‘harmony’ (和) can be seen as one letter, ‘centrality’: “中者，中和也。庸者，有常也。未發而執中，既發而中節，則中和二字，合之爲中一字，未爲不可” (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*). In Neo-Confucianism, ‘centrality’ corresponds to unaroused ‘nature’ and ‘harmony’ to already aroused ‘emotion,’ which brings about a difference in metaphysical or existential level. On the other hand, for Tasan ‘nature’ is ‘inclination’ which is on the same existential/metaphysical level with ‘emotion’; moreover, the difference between ‘unaroused’ and ‘aroused’ also lies only on emotional outburst. ‘Centrality’ and ‘harmony’ hence are same in that they are both a kind of virtue that requires an active working of mind. He thus diminishes difference between the two.

29 “中和二字，乃成德之美名，必用力推致而後，乃爲吾有，豈可於不用力之前，先有中和之德，釘著人心

are not to be considered nature and emotions (性, 情), or substance and function (體, 用), as in Neo-Confucianism. Centrality and harmony are virtue (德) manifested through taking practical action. Here, 'chi (致)' is a term referring to that practical action one takes in order to achieve the virtue of centrality and harmony, or in other words, the activity of learning while in the unaroused state (未發時). Therefore, Tasan's claim that the unaroused (未發) is not the state of being unaroused in the whole cognitive process of one's mind-heart (心知思慮), establishes the activeness and autonomy of the mind-heart which makes possible such acts of learning.³¹ In the state of being unaroused, it is possible to actively manifest the virtues of centrality and harmony through the whole cognitive process of one's mind-heart (心知思慮). In this manner, Tasan secures the standing of the unaroused mind, which is capable of virtue-manifesting activity, within the 'theory of learning in the state of the unaroused (未發工夫論).'

In the Horak Debate (湖洛論爭), one of the major points of dispute raised in the discussions of the unaroused (未發論辨) was the issue of whether the mind-heart of sages and ordinary persons are identical or otherwise (聖凡心同·不同). This stemmed from differences in how the scholars understood the concepts of unaroused (未發) and mind-heart (心).³² Likewise, Tasan discusses the problem of whether the mind-heart of sages and ordinary persons are identical or otherwise from his own understanding of unaroused mind-heart (未發心).

Tasan considers Zhu Xi to have contradicted himself, making different arguments concerning the passage, 'unaroused joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure (喜怒哀樂未發)' in his *Textual Study of the Doctrine of the Mean* (中庸章句) and his *Inquiries into the Doctrine of the Mean* (中庸或問); and to have

者乎" (*Self-chosen Aphorism on the Mean*).

30 "慎獨君子存心養性之極功, 非通論天下人之性情也" (*Self-chosen Aphorism on the Mean*).

"中者, 聖人之極功也, 無工夫而致極功, 有是理乎" (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).

31 Tasan sees that the cognitive process of mind (心知思慮) actively participates in its choosing and deciding between good and evil. In this context, even if 'unaroused,' the mind secures moral activity and autonomy. On this, see Cho (2009, Chapter 4).

32 On Horak debate over 'unaroused mind,' and on their interpretation of 'mind' which is essentially 'qi,' see Mun (1995) and Ch'oe (2008).

therefore caused confusion among contemporary scholars as to whether this passage should be understood to apply in the same way to all persons (通論衆人) or is meant to apply only to the superior man (單言君子), if it should be understood as nature and emotions (性, 情), or substance and function (體, 用) of the true mind-heart (本心), or the manifested outcome (功效) of being cautious when alone (慎獨).³³ Tasan's view is that in the matter of emotions (情) such as joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure (喜怒哀樂), both the unaroused (未發) and the aroused (已發) are ordinary actions of the heart, possessed by sage and ordinary person alike. The 'centrality of the unaroused (未發而中)' and the 'harmony of the aroused (已發而和),' however, are regarded as not applying in the same way to all people (通論).³⁴ Why?

I, your subject (臣), will answer. unaroused (未發) is simply the unaroused state of the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure (喜怒哀樂); how can it be as the tranquil meditation (入定) of Zen Buddhism (禪家), thoughtless (思慮) as the dead tree or the burned-out ashes? Regardless of whether the emotions are unaroused, it is possible to watch over oneself (戒慎), possible to be cautious (恐懼), possible to deliberate (窮理), possible to ponder righteousness (思義), and possible to consider the changes throughout the world (商量); how can there only be no learning at the time of being unaroused? Centrality (中) is the great result (功效) of a sage's exceeding effort; is it in any way reasonable that one can arrive at that great result of exceeding effort, without making an effort to learn? While the sage cultivates the mind-heart, being cautious even when alone, and has thus arrived at the highest sphere, this state in which there is not yet any arousal of function (發用), because external objects (事物) have not been encountered, is called centrality.³⁵

33 “今按朱子於章句，以此節爲通論天下人之性情，於或問，以此中和之德，謂由於戒慎恐懼，兩義相盤，不能雙通。… 故或通論衆人，或單言君子，或以爲本心之體用，或以爲慎獨之功效，左傾右仄，趣不歸一，此學者之深恨也” (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).

34 “喜怒哀樂未發，平居之恒境，非心思慮之未發也” (*Self-inscribed Epitaph*).

“臣對曰衆人亦有未發已發，但未發而中，已發而和，非衆人之所得有也” (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).

35 “臣對曰未發者，喜怒哀樂未發而已，豈遂枯木死灰，無思慮，若禪家之入定然乎。喜怒哀樂雖未發，

As previously mentioned, centrality (中) and harmony (和) are virtues realized through endless self-cultivation, arrived at through great effort (用力推致). In other words, they are the name of virtue achieved (成德之名) by properly cultivating the mind-heart (治心), the great result of a sage's exceeding effort (功效) to watch oneself carefully (戒慎恐懼) and actively cultivate the whole cognitive process of one's mind-heart (心知思慮) by deliberating (窮理), pondering righteousness (思義), and considering the world (商量). That is the reason why it can be said that while a sage arrives at the state of centrality through active efforts to cultivate the one's mind-heart, the ordinary person (凡人) fails to arrive at such a state of mind-heart. From Tansen's concept of the unaroused mind, sages and ordinary people end up being different because while the unaroused state of the emotions is identical for the two, the mind-heart, which is active in knowing and thinking even in that unaroused state, has elements of difference in the sage and the ordinary person.

This has commonalities with how, in the preceding chapter on Tansen's theory of the nature of humans and things (人性物性論), his explanation of the cause of differences between individuals (人人異) is based on his new interpretation of virtue. Tansen criticized explanations of the differences between sages and ordinary people which relied on the theory of temperament (氣質說), and stated instead that differences arise according to whether or not one achieves virtue through manifesting one's inherent nature (本性). Differences in the practical achievement of virtue become the basis of revealing differences between individuals. And now, in the discussion of the unaroused, the potential foundation for such achievement of virtue is secured by establishing the activeness of cognitive process of one's mind-heart (心知思慮) when in an unaroused state. Centrality and harmony are the virtues which are completed by learning, through the cognitive process of one's mind-heart (心知思慮)

可以戒慎，可以恐懼，可以窮理，可以思義，可以商量天下之事變，何謂未發時無工夫乎。中者聖人之極功也，無工夫而致極功，有是理乎。聖人以慎獨治心，已到十分地頭，特不遇事物，未有發用，當此之時，謂之中也” (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).

while in an unaroused state. In conclusion, the difference between sages and ordinary persons lies in whether or not one is in a state of the mind-heart in which the achievement of virtue, or centrality and harmony, is possible. The sage's mind-heart is that which arrives at centrality and harmony through efforts in cultivating one's cognitive mind-heart (心知思慮), while the ordinary person's mind-heart fails to do so. This, unlike the arguments of the Horak Debate, which discussed the difference between the mind-heart of sages and ordinary persons from an ontological point of view according to understandings of *qi*, was a discussion of that difference from a very practical point of view.

Conclusion

Tasan's reinterpretation of virtue, as previous studies have shown, has the theory of nature as preference (性嗜好說) as its fundamental theory of human nature. This study aimed to explore how Tasan's concept of virtue develops within his body of thought, maintaining consistent philosophical aim and structural integrity. Although the study was limited in scope, exploring a few topics in the theory of the nature of humans and things, and the theory of the unaroused, it was possible to observe how Tasan's new understanding of virtue has close interrelationships within the body of his philosophy.

Firstly, in his theory of the nature of humans and things (人性物性論) Tasan finds the cause of differences between people (人人異) not in their differing temperaments, as in Neo-Confucianism, but in the differences in their practical manifestation of virtue. Secondly, by arguing in his theory of the unaroused that unaroused does not mean that the whole cognitive process one's and mind-heart (心知思慮) is unaroused, he establishes the status of the mind-heart, which is capable of learning even in the state of being unaroused in one's emotions, through the activities of cognitive process of one's mind-heart (心知思慮). Thirdly, based on this new understanding of the unaroused mind, he breaks away from the Neo-Confucian perspective that explains the difference between the mind-hearts of sages and ordinary persons

(聖凡心) through their relationship with *qi*. By explaining the differences between the mind-hearts of sages and ordinary persons through the success or failure to arrive at centrality and harmony, depending on whether the mind-heart has been strenuously cultivated through cognitive activities within one's mind-heart; this is an explanation in practical terms, instead of an ontological discussion.

By focusing on Tazan's concept of virtue, it is possible to discern the common thread running through his arguments regarding the differences between individuals (人人異) in his discussion of the nature of humans and things (人性物性論), and the difference between the mind-hearts of sages and ordinary persons in his discussion of the unaroused (未發論). That is, the achievement of virtue as a practical concept is confirmed to be the primary cause in both the differences between individuals and the difference of the mind-heart of sages and ordinary persons. Also, if the theory of nature as preference (性嗜好說) was the fundamental theory of human nature, on which the practical reinterpretation of virtue was based, the affirmation, in his theory of the unaroused, of the cognitive activity of one's mind-heart (心知思慮) when the mind is unaroused can be regarded as having established the status of the mind-heart, which is capable of manifesting virtue as a practical concept, and thereby laying the foundation for a practical theory of self-cultivation. And it can be said that Tazan's philosophical aim, found in his reinterpretation of virtue, is consistently present in all of the discussions mentioned above: namely, to reinforce moral practicability.

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从茶山的德概念看人性物性论和未发论 -以人性物性论中‘人人异’，未发论中‘未发心’的解释和圣凡心不同的研究为中心-

赵殷英

推究茶山丁若镛（1762~1836）思想的工作，不论是通过与朝鲜性理学还是与西学，亦或是与其他思想的比较分析，努力试图掌握其整体思想的潮流至今不息。同时，通过对茶山思想的内部逻辑和构成的综合性讨论，研究茶山思想的独创性也一直受到了关注。本论文继承了后者的问题意识，目的在于考察茶山特有的关于德的理解在其心性论的范畴里如何利用内在的整合性进行了展开。

先行研究中首先对茶山所理解的德概念的根本意义进行掌握，与性嗜好说的联系性，并阐明了德的新解释所指向的哲学性意图是为了扩大道德的实践性。但是不足之处是茶山的德概念并不是只在性嗜好说中才有，而是在整个思想体系里，与其他主要议题一样，在展开的过程中具有内在的相关性。

因此本论文将对其中人性物性论和未发论部分的德概念和相关的主题进行较为详细的研究。特别是以人性物性论中‘人人异’的论点，未发论中未发心的理解，及与此相关的圣凡心同·不同的论点为中心进行研究。通过这些研究，我们会对以下内容进行考察：相应主题如何利用与茶山德概念的相关性进行展开，在对德进行再解释时发现的道德实践性的扩大，如何在具体的实践中体现。

关键词：德，性嗜好说，人人异，未发心，圣凡心不同