

# Chǒng Yag-yong's 'One and Only Mind': in Comparison to B. Lonergan's Cognitive Process

Yi Sook-hee\*

## Abstract

This paper focuses on the fact that Tasan Chǒng Yag-yong represents 'mind' with '*ling*(靈)' and then explicates the reason by applying Bernard Lonergan's cognitive process. Lonergan argued that human achieves the ultimate value and meaning through the cognitive processes of experiencing – understanding – judging – deciding / choosing. In so doing Lonergan developed the cognitional theory to elucidate human consciousness. Lonergan's cognitional theory is developed based on cognitive acts and its content, four cognitive processes immanent within one owns consciousness, and other conscious act that objectify the one's own conscious acts.

To apply Lonergan's cognitional theory on analyzing Tasan's concept of '*ling*' helps us to understand that Tasan had profound interest in the structure of mind. As his understanding of it had developed, empty *ling* (虛靈) - the great constitution(大體) - *ling* constitution(靈體)' that appear in his text correspond to the clarification process of his understanding of '*ling*.'

From the notion of 'mind constitution as empty *ling* (心體虛靈)' in the *Lecture on the Mean* (中庸講義 1789, 1814), Tasan's understanding of 'mind' can be seen generally. In 'the great constitution' of his *Old and New Commentaries of Analects* (論語古今註, 1813), he critically deliberates the

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\* Yi Sook-hee received her Ph.D. from Dept. of Religion, Sogang University in 2011 ("A Study on the Chǒng Yakyong's Religious Consciousness through the Concept of Yongche(靈體) and Haengsa(行事) in the Perspective of B. Lonergan's Cognitional"). Her area of interest includes comparative religion, dogmatics, history of religion, Chinese religion, and Confucian ethics. E-mail: [sookheey@gmail.com](mailto:sookheey@gmail.com)

relation between judgment of value and physical temperaments. In *Deep Examination of the Classic of Mind* (心經密驗 1815), as the understanding of value judgment transforms into the matter of value practice, the concept of 'ling' had been formulated to include preference(嗜好, which is nature 性 in Tasan's philosophy) toward value, value discernment (權衡, weighing), choosing and practicing values (行事, carrying out events). The concept of 'ling' had been standardized in *Reply to Yi Yeo-hong* (答李汝弘 1816), and *Critique of Namloe Hwang Jong-hŭi* (南雷黃宗羲序 1827) and in those had 'the one and only mind'<sup>1</sup> been mentioned. This paper thus proposes that it can be considered as a capability of consciousness.

The concept of 'ling,' that followed a discovery of the capability of consciousness and its three attributes, has shown the mechanism of consciousness that knows and applies value. Furthermore the universality of the concept of 'ling' can be recognized in correspondence with Lonergan's cognitive process. Most of all the implication of the concept of 'ling' is the discovery of the conscious subject that perceives and practices the value. The reason that we could find modern thoughts such as subject, reason, and rationality in Tasan's thinking is due to his rigorous inquiries into the notion of 'ling.'

**Keywords:** empty *ling*(虛靈), the great constitution(大體), ling constitution(靈體), conscious acts, conscious subject, conscious capability

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1 “心一而已。其發而爲心者，可千可萬” (*Reply to Yi Yeohong*); “同一心字 原有三等 其一以靈知之全體爲心 …其二以感動思慮之所發爲心… 其三以五藏之中主血與氣者爲心…第一第三 有一無二 若其第二之心 可四可七 可百可千”(Review on the Book of Mae).

## Introduction

This paper explores how Chǒng Yag-yong (1762-1836, Tasan hereafter) understood and developed the concept of *ling* (靈: *yǒng* in Korean; *ling* in Chinese). The character *ling* presents particular problems in translation. In this article, the term 'spirit' (靈) is left un-translated as '*ling*,' for the sake of deriving hidden nuances and second meaning when in conjunction with other terms, which is one of goals this article attempts to achieve. If I have to choose one suitable translation for the term '*ling*,' then, instead of the commonly translated word 'spirit,' 'human conscious capability' would be a better fit.

Tasan quested for mind(心)-nature(性) during his whole life. He expressed 'mind-nature' in terms of '*ling*(靈)-goodness(善)'<sup>1</sup> or 'nature(性)- *ling*(靈)'<sup>2</sup>. '*Ling*' is a word with which Tasan used to substitute 'mind' (心: *sim*, in Korean; *xin*, in Chinese)' and certainly it appears in many of his writings. It shows that Tasan had a profound interest about the faculty of thinking and understood much about the thinking capability, i.e., 'mind.' His understanding processes would become clearer to us when we divide his texts into three chronological categories: before his exile, during his exile, and after his restoration from the exile.

Firstly, before his exile, Tasan expressed 'mind' as 'empty *ling*(虛靈),' '*ling* illumination(靈明),' 'nature- *ling* (性靈)' as follows:

### A. 'empty *ling* (虛靈)'

*Lectures on the Great Learning* (大學講義)<sup>3</sup> (1789, 1814)<sup>4</sup>

1 "吾人之性, 既生既覺, 又靈又善" (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).

2 "性靈受之天命" (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

3 "無形之心 是吾本體 即所謂虛靈不昧者也" (*Lectures on the Great Learning*).

4 *Lectures on the Great Learning* is a revised edition of "Lecture of *The Great Learning* at Hŭijŏngdang"(熙政堂大學講義, 1789), a record of lectures that Tasan gave answers to the set of questions from King Chǒngjo. It is revised again after *Public Discussion of the Great Learning* (大學公議 1814).

B. '*ling* illumination (靈明)':

"Questions and Answers with the Doctrine of the Mean" (中庸策)<sup>5</sup>,

"Questions and Answers with Competent Person" (人才策)<sup>6</sup>,

"Questions and Answers with the Mencius" (孟子策)<sup>7</sup> (1790<sup>8</sup>)

C. 'nature *ling* (性靈)'

"Lectures at Söam" (西巖講學記)<sup>9</sup> (1795)

In the books he wrote before his exile, there was no trace of methodical thinking about 'mind.' Although there were statements about 'mind constitution as empty *ling* (心體虛靈)' in *Lectures on The Great Learning* (大學講義), but I suppose that it has been revised later than 1814 because his explanation about that is quite the same as '*ling* illumination in spiritual mystery (靈明神妙)' in *Old and New Commentaries of Analects* (論語古今註). We can nonetheless take a glimpse at his fragmentary thoughts about 'mind' in his works written during this period. Examining his thoughts we arrive at the following: 1) Tasan stressed the importance of thinking independently; 2) he deliberately thought about the relationship between material formless or immaterial 'empty *ling*' and formable or material 'body,' then decades later he brought out the term 'the mysterious unity of spirit and material (神形妙合)'; 3) he insisted that '*ling*' is bestowed by the Heaven (天).

Secondly, during his exile he often used '*ling*' instead of 'mind (心)' and also used various terms such as '*ling* intelligence (靈知),' '*ling* (靈),' '*ling* constitution (靈體)' besides 'empty *ling*,' '*ling* illumination,' and 'nature *ling*.'

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5 “維天於穆之天 是靈明主宰之天” (“Questions and Answers with the Doctrine of the Mean” in *Yöyudang chönsö*).

6 “人之所以運用此百體者 以有靈明不昧者 主宰而翕張之”(“Questions and Answers with Competent Person” in *Yöyudang chönsö*).

7 “自鎖靈明 不敢思議”(“Questions and Answers with the Mencius” in *Yöyudang chönsö*).

8 It cannot be easily concluded the exact date when some chapters in *Yöyudang chönsö* (Collected Works of Yöyudang) such as “The Exam Paper in the *Analects of Confucius*”(論語大策), “Questions and Answers with *The Book of Mengzi*”(孟子策), “Questions and Answers with the Doctrine of the Mean”(中庸策), “Questions and Answers with Competent Person”(人才策) were written. It is only estimated that they had been written around 1790. On this, see P. Chöng (1994); I. Chöng (2000); and Keum (2011).

9 “蓋心之所發 有從天理性靈邊來者 此本然之性有感也” (“Lectures at Söam” in *Yöyudang chönsö*).

A. 'ling intelligence (靈知)':

"Correcting Funeral Rights" (喪儀匡)<sup>10</sup>

*Four Notes on Mourning Rituals* (喪禮四箋)<sup>11</sup>(1803)

B. 'ling (靈)':

*Textual Criticism of Spring and Autumn* (春秋考徵)<sup>12</sup>(1812),

*Old and New Commentaries of Analects* (論語古今註)<sup>13</sup>(1813),

*A Summary Opinion on Mencius* (孟子要義)<sup>14</sup>(1814),

*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean* (中庸講義補)<sup>15</sup>(1814)

C. 'nature ling (性靈)':

*Old and New Commentaries on the Analects*<sup>16</sup>

D. 'empty ling (虛靈)':

*Old and New Commentaries on the Analects*<sup>17</sup>

"Reply to Yi Yeo-hong" (答李汝弘)<sup>18</sup>(1816)

E. 'ling illumination (靈明)':

*Old and New Commentaries on the Analects*<sup>19</sup>,

*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*<sup>20</sup>,

*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*<sup>21</sup>,

10 "靈知慧識謂之魂" ("Correcting Funeral Rights" in *Yǒyudang chǒnsǒ*).

11 *Four Notes on Mourning Rituals* is a bound volume of "Correcting Funeral Rites" (喪儀匡, 1803), "Correcting the Instruments for Funeral Rites" (喪具訂, 1807), "A Discussion on Mourning clothes" (喪服商, 1809), "Differentiating Mourning Period" (喪期別, 1811). On this, refer to Yi (1996, 17).

12 "然上蒼下黃 都是無情之物 與日月山川均為氣質之所成 了無靈識之自用" and "上蒼下黃 有形有色 無靈無情" (*Textual Criticism of Spring and Autumn*).

13 "庶衆也 入國見人民衆多 覺天下生靈之衆 歎曰庶矣哉" (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

14 "是有靈之物乎 抑無知之物乎 將空空蕩蕩不可思議乎 凡天下無形之物 不能為主宰" (*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*).

15 "吾人之性 既生既覺 又靈又善" (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).

16 "性靈受之天命" (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

17 "天命之謂性者 謂天於生人之初 賦之以好德恥惡之性 於虛靈本體之中 非謂性可以名本體也" (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

18 "心體虛靈 妙應萬物 不可名言" ("Reply to Yi Yeo-hong" in *Yǒyudang chǒnsǒ*).

19 "人之大體 既生既知 復有靈明神妙之用" (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

20 "惟其道心所發 無形無質 靈明通慧者 寓於氣質 以為主宰"; "身者 靈明之體也"; "大體者 無形之靈明也"; "都把天地萬物 無形者 有形者 靈明者 頑蠢者 竝歸之於一理 無復大小主客" (*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*).

*Self-chosen Aphorism on the Mean*(中庸自箴)<sup>22</sup>(1814),

"Reply to Yi Yeo-hong" <sup>23</sup>

F. '*ling* constitution (靈體)':

*Deep Examination of the Classic of Mind* (心經密驗)<sup>24</sup>(1815)

His theoretical and methodical thoughts about 'mind' can be found in the books he wrote during the exile. In *Old and New Commentaries on the Analects*, for instance, Tasan substituted 'mind constitution as empty *ling*' with 'the great constitution(大體),' since he had intention of establishing a new meaning of the mind. Further he develops his opinion of 'the great constitution' in *A Summary Opinion on Mencius*. The term, 'the great constitution,' was replaced with '*ling*' and '*ling* illumination.' Eventually his theory of mind has been defined in *Deep Examination about the Book of Mind* and then 'the great constitution' is expressed as '*ling* constitution.' His theory of mind has been formulated in *Reply to Yi Yeo-hong* (1816) and revised in *Critique of Namloe Hwang Jong-hŭi* (1827) that he wrote after his restoration from the exile. The details of these procedures will be cleared in the following sections.

Thirdly, after his restoration from the exile, the term '*ling* intelligence' is predominantly used in his works. It suggests a subtle yet significant overturn. The transformation from '*ling* illumination' to '*ling* intelligence' seems to hold a notable meaning.<sup>25</sup>

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21 "天下萬民 各於胚胎之初 賦此靈明 超越萬類 享用萬物…人之受天 只此靈明"; "四心摠發於一箇靈明之體 靈明之體 汎應萬物 計其所發 豈必四而已哉" (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).

22 "蓋人之胚胎既成 天則賦之以靈明無形之體 而其爲物也 樂善而惡惡 好德而恥污 斯之謂性也"; "人方以靈明之全體爲性 其必以嗜好爲性者 何也"; "天之靈明 直通人心" (*Self-chosen Aphorism on the Mean*).

23 "心之爲字 其別有三 一曰五臟之心 …二曰靈明之心 …三曰心之所發之心 … 孟子特拈其四心 以證仁義禮智之本 在於人心 與靈明本體之心 有幹枝之別耳"; "四心之發 發於靈明之本體 靈明之體 其性樂善恥惡而已" ("Reply to Yi Yeo-hong" in *Yōyudang chōnsō*).

24 "性者 吾人之嗜好也 先儒乃以爲靈體之專稱 其無差殊乎 若論靈體 其本體虛明 若無可惡之理 特以其寓於形氣之故 衆惡紛興 交亂本體 此本然氣質之說 所以不得不起也"; "然吾人靈體 若論其嗜好 則樂善而恥惡 若論其權衡 則可善可惡 危而不安 惡得云純善而無惡乎"; "總之靈體之內 厥有三理 言乎其性則樂善而恥惡…言乎其權衡則可善而可惡 …言乎其行事則難善而易惡…非吾人靈體之內 本無此三理也" (*Deep Examination of the Classic of Mind*).

25 It seems to be Tasan's intention that he substituted '*ling* illumination' with '*ling* intelligence.' However this issue will be quested in another article because of problems in interpretation.

A. 'ling intelligence (靈知)':

*Introduction to the Study of the Book of Change* (易學緒言<sup>26</sup>)(1821);  
*Self-inscribed Epitaph* (centralized version) (自撰墓誌銘 集中  
本<sup>27</sup>)(1822),

B. Critique of Namloe Hwang Jong-hŭi<sup>28</sup>(1827<sup>29</sup>)

'ling illumination (靈明)': *Self-inscribed Epitaph* (centralized version)<sup>30</sup>

Reviewing his texts as the above, it is revealed not only that the term 'ling' is the pivot of Tasan's theory of mind, but also that the expression of 'ling' has gone through various changes in meaning. Thus it is in this paper that I analyze the term 'ling' to be the pivot of Tasan's theory of mind. After tracing how Tasan adopts the term 'ling' in the place of 'mind,' it shall be revealed that what he refers to as 'ling illumination' and 'ling intelligence' actually connote 'the one and only mind' or 'the mind is one' in "Reply to Yi Yeo-hong" and *Critique of Namloe Hwang Jong-hŭi*.

## Interpretation of ling(靈) in B. Lonergan's Cognitional Theory

The faculty of thought is a topic of cognitional theory. Because cognitional

26 “道是何物 是有靈知者乎 竝與靈知而無之者乎 既云 心跡俱無則 是無靈知 亦無造化之跡” (*Introduction to the Study of the Book of Change*).

27 “性者 嗜好也 有形軀之嗜 有靈知之嗜” (*Self-inscribed Epitaph*).

28 “同一心字 原有三等 其一以靈知之全體爲心 若所謂心之官思 及先正其心之類 是也”; “後世學者 看性字太重 乃以性字 爲靈知大體之專稱 曰心統性情則謂心大性小 曰推原性命則謂心小性大”; “天之賦靈知也 有才焉有勢焉有性焉” (*Review on the Book of Mae*).

29 Chǒng Yak-yong wrote nine books compiled as *Review on the Book of Mae* in 1810, and revised them in 1834. In the book 5 to 9, he quoted extensively from Yŏm yak-kŏ (1636~1704)'s writing. “Critique of Namloe Hwang Jong-hŭi” is Tasan's critique, after reading Hwang Jong-hŭi(1610~1695)'s preface of Yŏm yak-kŏ's book, about inaccurate or brief explanation of Hwang Jong-hŭi. It is not exactly identifiable when Chǒng Yak-yong wrote “Critique of Namloe Hwang Jong-hŭi.” However, it can still be estimated that it had not been written before 1827 considering the time Tasan read Yŏm yak-kŏ's works, which took place around 1827.

30 “明德者 孝弟慈 非人之靈明也” (*Self-inscribed Epitaph*).

theory elucidates how people treat and process information in formulating knowledge, its focus lies not on the content of knowledge but on the cognitional activity itself.

Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (1904~1984), a theologian and philosopher, suggested a cognitive process that can be universally observed in human beings beyond the boundaries of the differences and distances of time, geographical location, and culture. Lonergan defined a high-level mental faculty that can process and formulate abstract and scientific information as 'consciousness,' and insisted that a certain set of consecutive cognitive activities such as experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding/choosing is immanent in consciousness. According to Lonergan, cognitive activities can be divided into 'knowing' and 'deciding/choosing.' 'Knowing' is consisted of three levels: 'experiencing,' such as sensing, perceiving, and imagining; 'understanding,' such as inquiry, insight, and formulation; 'judging' such as critical reflection, weighing the evidence, grasp of the virtually unconditioned, and fact of judgment. The different levels of knowing, that is 'experiencing,' 'understanding,' and 'judging,' are corresponding to the dimensions of consciousness empirically, intelligently, and rationally. The fourth and the highest level is that of 'deciding/choosing.' This level is accomplished on which we evaluate deliberately and choose responsibly.

In the level of understanding, what is aimed is to answer the questions of 'what' and 'why,' the judgment of fact about what is understood in the level of understanding. Namely, it is to ask reflective questions, 'is it so?' for example. Further, conscious subjects that deliberate 'what we are doing is worthwhile' go forward to the level of a judgment of value and decision. This highest level has the responsibility of our consciousness, a level on which knowing and doing coexist. We do not separately experience the cognitive operations, but acknowledge the unity of our consciousness.

Lonergan systematized this normative pattern of our conscious and intentional operations. What is preeminent in Lonergan's theory in particular is that the actual 'action' emerges in the highest level of cognitive process. In this regard he shares his interests with that of Tzanos whose theory of mind is all



geared toward actual practice of virtue.<sup>31</sup>

Because this article focuses on explaining *ling*, among Lonergan's cognitional theories, only cognitive acts (experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding/choosing), not their contents, are discussed. In that, we give particular attention to cognitive acts that are experienced 'twofold,' or in two-levels. Two-level cognitive action means that, when one concentrates on one's own conscious processes inside, one can be aware of (1) a cognitive act that is directed toward outer objects, and (2) another cognitive act that objectifies one's cognitive act itself. The latter is the introspection of consciousness in self-cultivation theory.

Now we turn our attention to how Lonergan's cognitive process corresponds to Tasan's insight on humans' cognitive ability. Tasan's understanding of human consciousness develops from empirical and physiological, to axiological and practical. Through such a cognitive process Tasan has derived the unique, multifaceted concept of *ling*.

### Tasan's Formulation of the Concept '*ling*(靈)'

Tasan pondered upon various expressions that could substitute for the term 'mind.'<sup>32</sup> Given his profound deliberation about 'mind,' it can be assumed that he must have had his own interpretation of it. Instead of using 'mind' he substituted it with 'empty *ling* (虛靈)' in *A Lecture of The Great Learning*, 'the great constitution(大體)' in *Old and New Commentaries on the Analects and A Summary Opinion of Mencius*, and '*ling* constitution (靈體)' in *Deep Examination about the Book of Mind*. From this we notice that his understanding of 'mind' has been sophisticated and developed over time.

31 “雖然論性論心 將何用也 明善者 將以誠身 論性論心者 將以行事 孟子論惻隱之心者 將擴充此心 以之仁覆天下” (“Reply to Yi Yeo-hong” in *Yōyudang chōnsō*).

32 “其所謂虛靈知覺者 未有一字之專稱 … 曰心 曰神 曰靈 曰魂 皆假借之言也 孟子以無形者爲大體 有形者爲小體 佛氏以無形者爲法身 有形者爲色身 皆連屬之言也” (*Deep Examination of the Classic of Mind*).

### ***Tasan's understanding of empirical consciousness***

The cognition occurs within consciousness, so there is a difference between 'cognitive acts' and 'conscious acts.' According to Lonergan, the empirical level of cognitive acts includes sensing, remembering, imaging, perceiving and so on. Since Tasan would not have known the exact, current definition of 'cognitive acts,' a more general term 'consciousness' is used here instead to make the point.

In *A Summary Opinion of Mencius*, Tasan says that mind decides whether or not to follow the information perceived by the sensory organs as eyes and ears.<sup>33</sup> He also holds biological and physiological cognitional acts<sup>34</sup> such as perceiving, moving, and eating go through different level of cognitive process from that of mind, the main faculty of thoughts. This means that we have not to misunderstand that Tasan excluded the empirical level from the cognitive acts but to understand that he argues that the empirical level should be presided by mind. Even though empirical cognitive acts are differentiated from thinking capability in that it has to be presided by mind, there is no doubt that it is also a part of the various levels of mind, i.e., thinking capability. So it is evident that Tasan understands mind not as unconscious or subconscious but as highly intelligent, reasonable and responsible.

### ***Tasan's understanding of intelligent consciousness***

In intelligent consciousness there are cognitive acts which are expressed and formulated in concepts, suppositions, definitions, postulates, hypotheses, and theories.<sup>35</sup> Tasan seems to have been absorbed in the understanding level of

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33 “物與我之相接 其門路在於耳目 耳收聲而納之於心 目收色而納之於心 是其職耳 耳目但修其職分而已 顧何嘗使此心強從其所納哉 … 其能或從而或違者 以心官之能思也” (*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*).

34 “大抵人之所以知覺運動 趨於食色者 與禽獸毫無所異” (*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*).

35 See Lonergan (1978, 252).

the cognitive acts such as inference and inquiry “with which we can realize reason.”<sup>36</sup> In *Old and New Commentaries on the Analects* he explains this level of cognitive acts. He explains ‘*ling illumination in spiritual mystery* (靈明神妙),’ the operations of the great constitution by exemplifying the ability of symbolization for “‘image of change (易象),’ the ability of mathematical thinking for ‘number of change (易數),’ and the seamless capability to be well-versed in ‘astronomy and almanac,’ and the intelligence of Judgment (彖) and Image (象).”<sup>37</sup> It is easily recognized that Tasan is here much interested in the level of understanding, given he has deeply and avidly read the Western science books, in the areas of astronomy, almanac, and agricultural measurements. Actually he studied *Euclidis elementorum libri* which Johann Terrenz (1576~1630) had translated into Chinese, and constructed a wall around the city of Suwon to which the Western technologies were applied. Tasan mentioned the ability of creating and inventing machinery or of mastering technical skills as one of the important abilities of ‘mind.’

#### *Tasan's understanding of the rational consciousness*

According to Lonergan, there are two levels of judgment operating in the cognitive act: the judgment of fact, as in judging truth and falsity of affairs, and judgment of value, as in assessing virtue, generosity, love and so on. Judgment of value appraising which is ‘worthy’ or things one ‘ought to do’ is different from factual one, and Tasan gives more weight to judgment of value than judgment of fact. We can see how he understands ‘mind’ with regard to the judgment of value through his concept of ‘the great constitution’ (大體).

Tasan expresses ‘mind constitution as empty *ling* (心體虛靈)’ as ‘the great constitution.’<sup>38</sup> In old Classics, ‘the great constitution’ denotes Heaven-endowed original goodness. Yet ‘the great constitution’ in Tasan’s context indicates ‘mind’

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36 “妙悟萬理” (*Lectures on the Great Learning*); “推萬理而盡悟” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

37 “天文曆法象象之妙 有能全悟而不滯者矣” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

38 “心者 吾人大體之借名也” (*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*).

whose function is divided into three levels: the sensory level of plants and trees(草木); the conscious level of birds and beasts (禽獸); the rational and axiological level of humans, who can make value judgment and apply thoughts to action. He intentionally redefines 'the great constitution' as follows:

In old Classics, the original constitution of empty *ling* is referred to as 'the great constitution': the manifestation of the great constitution is referred to as 'Tao-mind (道心)': what the great constitution likes and dislikes is referred to as 'nature (性).' "What Heaven mandate is called nature (天命之謂性)" means, at the beginning of human existence Heaven bestowed upon original constitution of 'empty *ling*' (虛靈) the 'nature' that prefers virtue and hates evil. It does not mean to equate nature with original constitution.<sup>39</sup>

In old Classic, 'original constitution of empty *ling*,' i.e., the 'great constitution,' is the good human or the nature of righteousness (道義之性). The 'great constitution (大體)' here is to be contrasted with a 'small/ lesser constitution (小體).' On the hand, what Tasan refers to as the 'original constitution of empty *ling*' is a higher category having a property or inclination (性) that prefers virtue and hates evil. Hence, the original constitution of empty *ling* is, for Tasan, 'mind' – that is why he calls as 'the great constitution.'

Then, why does Tasan situate human mind – the thinking capability Tasan named as 'great constitution – in the place of 'nature' as in "what Heaven mandate is called nature"? It is related to his understating of 'nature' as preference.<sup>40</sup> Since preference is not inevitable but probable, the 'nature' of the moral justice(道義) might, or might not, be revealed. Then what is needed is kind of a mechanism that can actualize the probable state. What can actualize the preference for goodness depends upon a rational subject, so what is crucial

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39 “其在古經 以虛靈之本體而言之 則謂之大體 以大體之所發而言之 則謂之道心 以大體之所好惡而言之 則謂之性 天命之謂性者 謂天於生人之初賦之 以好德恥惡之性 於虛靈本體之中 非謂性可以名本體也 性也者 以嗜好厭惡而立名”(Old and New Commentaries of Analects).

40 According to Chung (2009a, 4), 1811 is when Chông Yak-yong first proclaimed that the word 'nature' in fact refers to 'preference/inclination.'

is the faculty of thinking that deliberately discerns what is valuable and that willingly practices it. This way, Tasan emphasizes the function and status of 'mind' as he understands 'nature' as preference for goodness. That is why Tasan re-defined 'Heaven-mandated nature' as an 'affection (情) to prefer virtue' and 'capability(能) to choose goodness'<sup>41</sup>; in a textual form, it is expressed as 'nature(性)- ling(靈)' in *Old and New Commentaries on the Analects* and later on, as 'ling(靈)-goodness(善)' and 'ling illumination' in *Addition to the Lecture on the Mean* (中庸講義補).<sup>42</sup>

However, 'affection to prefer goodness' is universal for it is given to all; so is the mechanism to reveal it, i.e., 'capability to choose goodness': Then, why in reality does the difference between saints and ordinary people exist? In this matter Tasan answers that the physical temperament are not the reason. He holds that only human has the moral ability to evaluate and choose goodness. Yet Tasan's notion of 'the great constitution' already includes non-human's physical properties, such as the sensory 'nature' of plants and trees and that of birds and beasts.<sup>43</sup> Then the lowest (sensory) level of nature is extended to the biological, physiological and psychological level of human. It is hence necessary for Tasan's 'the great constitution' to include, however implicit, the physical elements. This is the problem in the context of judgment of value, because logically it is concluded that the unique human ability to evaluate depends on the innate physical properties.

Simply since it [physical temperament] is given from parents' lifeblood and mountains, streams, wind, force(山川風氣) it is not possible that there is no different physical properties; naturally, there is difference of lucid, turbid, thick, and thin(清濁厚薄). Thus 'the great constitution' is inevitably related to them; there is difference of intellectuality, stupidity, penetration, and blockage(慧

41 『與全』 [2], vol.3, 4, '中庸自箴', "天賦我性 授之以好德之情 畀之以擇善之能 此雖在我 其本天命也"

42 "人之受天 只此靈明" (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*); "性靈受之天命" (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*); "吾人之性 既生既覺 又靈又善" (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).

43 "惟一大體之中 含生如草木 知覺如禽獸 又能窮易象算曆數 而神妙靈通 不可曰一體之中 三性鼎立也" (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

鈍通塞). Also who has short *qi*(短氣) is reticent; who has heated blood(熱血) gets easily angry. Sweat when embarrassed; tearful when sad. These are all of evidences that 'the great constitution' and 'lesser constitution' are mysteriously related to each other and not separable. Although it seems to be two divided constitutions, if we discuss about the constitution, the constitution is only one.<sup>44</sup>

The 'mountains, streams, wind, and *Qi*'(山川風氣) is considered as environmental influences, parents' lifeblood as biological element, and the 'lucid, turbid, thick, and thin'(清濁厚薄) as individual intelligence, character and physical temperament.<sup>45</sup> Thus temperament, character, and intelligence are limited in that they are, to some extent, and predetermined by environmental and biological influence. Tansen admits that the physiologically and psychologically predetermined limitation or degree of intelligence may be perceived as unfair. However, he continues, it should not be the limitation for choosing and carrying out the moral action, for "negative influence by physical temperament and human desire is unavoidable even for those with the highest wisdom."<sup>46</sup>

Since [humans] are the mysterious unity of spirit and form (神形妙合), human nature(人性) is tinged with certain physical or temperamental aspects. ...This is what saints and ordinary persons are afraid of. Strong or soft element of the 'mountains, streams, wind, and *Qi*' (山川風氣), lucidity or turbidity of parents' lifeblood are the causes of intelligence and foolishness, and not the cause of good and evil.<sup>47</sup>

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44 “但其山川風氣 父母精血 受之爲氣質 不能無清濁厚薄之差 故大體之固於是者 隨之有慧鈍通塞之異 且氣短者寡語 血熱者易怒 愧則汗出 哀則淚落 皆大體小體 相須相關 妙合而不能離之明驗也 雖然 若論其體 只是一體” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

45 See S. Yi (2011, 99-100).

46 “乃氣稟人欲之所染 所謂上知之不能無者” (*Public Opinion on the Great Learning*).

47 “神形妙合 則人性之中 不能無氣質邊帶來者 … 若夫山川風氣之剛柔 父母精血之清濁 所以爲慧鈍 非所以爲善惡” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

Value judgment and cognitive acts are abilities fairly given to all humans,<sup>48</sup> and there is no difference between saints and ordinary people in that matter. Tasan understands that the personality of saints and ordinary people depends on the consequence of the subject's decision to act upon goodness or wickedness,<sup>49</sup> and to carry out actual good deeds, such as filial duty and brotherly/sisterly affection. He sees that the physiological and psychological aspects of physical temperament should not exert any influence on the problem of value. He ponders that the cognitive act for judgment of value is different from the level of experience and understanding.

Since the word 'the great constitution' refers to the nature (性) of non-human and human at the same time, this term as a consequence connotes physiological and psychological temperamental aspects. Tasan deliberates this problem logically, and then substitutes 'the great constitution' with '*ling* constitution' to effectively and clearly express his theory of mind. '*ling* constitution' does not have any deterministic aspect that compels or binds subjects like temperament does. In this vein, '*ling* constitution' is the concept that emphasizes the capability and autonomy of subject's thought.

### *Tasan's understanding of 'decision'*

Lonergan says that the emergence of the fourth level of deliberation, evaluation, and choice is a slow process; it means that it is hard for a subject to unite 'knowing' and 'doing' value within his consciousness. Lonergan understands that certain values such as virtue, generosity, and love do not exist before a subject is actively engaged in a specific activity to realize them. He founds the level of decision/choice following the level of judgment. Once a subject judges a value to be worthy of action, then the subject decides to stick to live in that way and takes the responsibility to actualize it.

48 “惟聖罔念作狂 惟狂克念作聖 明性與氣皆同也” (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).

49 “人惟不思 故恒犯罪惡” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*); “(…善惡之幾) 人心道心之交戰 義勝欲勝之判決 人能於是乎猛省而力克之 則近道矣” (*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*); “惟聖罔念作狂 惟狂克念作聖 明性與氣皆同也” (*Addition to the Lecture on the Mean*).

It seems that Tasan has pondered deeply about the difference between knowing and practicing values. He insisted that it is Heaven's mandate that humans have 'affection (情)' to prefer virtue over vice and 'capability (能)' to choose good instead of evil. In short, it is ability to 'decide' that human are endowed from the Heaven. Here, choosing (擇) refers to both knowing (知) and doing (行).<sup>50</sup> The level of judgment and decision/choice are clearly explicated in the concept of '*ling*' in *Deep Examination about the Book of Mind*. The three attributes of '*ling*'—nature (性) i.e., the preference, weighing (權衡) to discern values, and practice of affairs (行事, 'practice,' in short) that chooses values and put them into actions<sup>51</sup>— are parallel to Lonergan's cognitive act of decision/choice that makes actions based on the previous judgment.

I shall attempt here to interpret differently one of the attributes, i.e., 'practice'(行事), that is related to human condition in which, as Tasan claims, it is hard to perform goodness while it is always easy to be slipped into evil. Tasan explained the three attributes of '*ling*'; completely pure goodness (純善), status to be either good or bad (可善可惡), and status that is rather easily bad than good (難善易惡). In this context that is rather easily bad than good, 'practice,' is negative aspects of body as lackadaisical, greed. However we need at least to understand 'practice' on the perspective of knowing and doing, then could know why Tasan quested for 'mind.' Tasan's deliberation is the problem of doing good deeds as he mentioned. A physical body might be seen negatively in that it rather easily falls into wickedness, however it is of a necessary need since when 'goodness' is emerged by performing subject's actions, the actualized 'goodness' eventually can be considered as virtue. So body is necessary since it actualizes 'goodness.' A body has in part a negative condition of human being but at the same time such a tool for performing 'goodness' well. This is why Tasan presents the unities of spirituality and materiality (神形妙合), before discussing 'mind' in *Deep examination about the*

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50 “蓋擇者 學而知 勉而行之類也” (“Questions and Answers with the Doctrine of the Mean” in *Yōyudang chōnsō*).

51 “總之靈體之內 厥有三理 言乎其性則樂善而恥惡…言乎其權衡則可善而可惡 …言乎其行事則難善而易惡…非吾人靈體之內 本無此三理也” (*Deep Examination of the Classic of Mind*).



*Book of Mind*. It is explicit and strong to his emphasis about the relationship between consciousness and body. Later he developed from this into the relation of blood(血) and *Qi* (氣) that the consciousness governs the body in "*Critique of Namloae Hwang Jong-hŭi*."<sup>52</sup>

In thinking over the concept of 'great constitution,' Tasan often describes negatively the physical and temperamental attributes of body. He explains on the other hand that in the concept of '*ling* constitution,' the body is a positive, necessary element that performs and practices virtue: it is the practical body of the 'mysterious unity of spirituality and materiality' (神形妙合), which is governed by consciousness.

By studying the concept of '*ling* constitution,' we can see how deeply Tasan has thought over the judgment of value and decision. Since good and evil, for Tasan, are recognized after subject's deed or practice, then 'practice' (行事) becomes a crucial attribute of '*ling* constitution.' The 'practice' is based on another attributes, i.e., the inclination toward goodness and ability to discern values. By the concept of '*ling* constitution,' Tasan opens up a new horizon of mind that is subject's consciousness. His main concern lies in a subject's ability to discern value independently, to choose it voluntarily, and to do it responsibly. In a nutshell, the concept of '*ling* constitution' stresses the unity of knowing and doing.<sup>53</sup>

In addition, Tasan argues that humans would not conduct any good deeds if they were without Heaven-endowed 'nature' to prefer goodness over evil.<sup>54</sup> In this sense, Tasan evaluates that status of 'nature' as superior to 'weighing' and 'practice.'

### ***Tasan's Formulation of 'ling'***

The operation of '*ling illumination in spiritual mystery*' (靈明神妙), i.e., act of

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52 Refer to Note 57.

53 "行則必知 知則必行 互發而交修者也" (*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*).

54 "若無此性 卽雖智如神明 畢世而不能作絲髮之善矣" (*Review on the Book of Mae*).

mind, is a cognitive process of experiencing, understanding, judging and choosing/deciding. Thus 'ling' can be regarded as a conscious act. As Tasan becomes aware of the fact that physical temperament cannot affect on the judgment of value, and as he becomes more sensitive on the matters such as human capability of judgment and the volition for action based on 'knowing,' he resolutely uses the term 'ling constitution' describing his theory of mind.

In a period of over ten years Tasan has revised the text at least twice to define in more concrete terms his understanding of human mind. First of all, Tasan's formulates his concept of mind in *Reply to Yi Yeohong* (1816) as follows:

The character 'mind(心)' has three distinct meaning: First, it refers to the heart in the chest, one of the five internal organs. It is used in phrases like 'the heart is detached from the *Bi gan*(比干),' 'there are seven holes in the heart,' etc. Second, it refers to the mind of 'ling illumination.' It is used in phrases like 'each of us establish balance (中) in our mind' in *Book of Documents* (尚書), 'first rectify the mind' in *The Great Learning* (大學), etc. Third, it refers to what is revealed by the mind of 'ling illumination.' It is used in phrases like 'the mind of compassion' in Mencius 'the mind of shame at evil,' etc. The first and the second refer to the mind as a whole; as for the third, can be one, two, three, four, five, six, hundreds, or thousands of kinds.<sup>55</sup>

Such a theory of mind is slightly revised in "Critique of Namloe Hwang Jong-hŭi"(1827) as follows:

The same character of 'mind' originally has three levels. The first one is that the whole of 'ling intelligence' (靈知) that is called mind. It is the kind described in 'the function of mind is thinking' and 'first rectify the mind.' The second one refers to a revealed mind from

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55 "心之爲字 其別有三 一曰五臟之心 若云比干 心有七竅 是也 二曰靈明之心 若尚書曰各設中于乃心 大學曰先正其心 是也 三曰心之所發之心 若孟子所云 惻隱之心 羞惡之心 是也 第一第二 皆全言之者也 其第三則可一可二可三可四可五可六可百可千" (*Reply to Yi Yeo-hong* in *Yöyudang chönsö*).

affective (感動) and cognitive (思慮) aspects; it is described in 'the mind of compassion,' 'the biased mind' (非僻之心). The third one is the heart, one of the five internal organs, as described in 'this mind/heart to govern blood (血) and *qi* (氣),' and 'there are seven holes in the heart.'

The first and the third minds are just the one and only, not two; the second can become four, seven, hundreds, or thousands categories.<sup>56</sup>

The two texts share two common points. One is that to think 'mind' starts from its biological level, an internal organ. Another is that they discern 'mind' into two ways; 'the one and only' mind expressed as 'mind of *ling* illumination' or 'the whole of *ling* intelligence,' and the countless minds that can be revealed by the former. What I want to emphasize here is that Tasan understands the mind as the one and only mind. Tasan draws an analogy between the one and only mind the revealed-minds as the stem and the branches, which is essentially analogous to the ability to think and the contents generated.

However, there are at least three differences between the two texts: an explanation about governing blood and *qi* added to the heart, one of the five internal organs; '*ling* illumination' is substituted with 'the whole of *ling* intelligence'; and the variously revealed minds, that is modes of consciousness are explained more abundantly in the latter, *Critique of Namloë Hwang Jong-hŭi*.

Given that Tasan has deliberated and revised the concept of 'mind' as time went by, it is evident that he has maintained a profound interest in understanding human's capacity to think. Now the focus turns to how Tasan has interpreted 'the one and only mind.'

### ***My interpretation of 'Tasan's ling(靈)'***

56 "同一心字 原有三等 其一以靈知之全體爲心 若所謂心之官思及先正其心之類 是也 其二以感動思慮之所發爲心 若所謂惻隱之心 非僻之心 是也 其三以五藏之中 主血與氣者爲心 若所謂心有七竅 是也 第一第三 有一無二 若其第二之心 可四可七 可百可千" (*Review on the Book of Mae*).

Lonergan begins his cognitional theory by differentiating cognitive acts from the contents of the known, such as seeing colors and hearing sounds. The cognitive acts within consciousness can be described under certain patterns. Tسان insisted that there is the one and only mind and it reveals hundreds or thousands of minds, which are considered as cognitive acts and the contents generated by acts respectively. If the two can be distinguished, the capability to generate contents, i.e. the cognition itself that is not yet revealed to hundreds or thousands of various aspects can be developed in more detail. The awareness of cognitive acts can be extended to conscious capability. 'The one and only mind,' then, refers to nothing but conscious capability of humans.

Tسان seems to hold a notion of conscious capability that provides a strong support of his explanation about 'introspection (反觀),' described as 'self has to be restrained by self (以己克己)'. While previous studies have interpreted these concepts from the perspective of the self-cultivation, we can nevertheless identify the same from the perspective of cognitional theory, since Tسان is well-aware of cognitive acts in his explanation of mind. Further, from Tسان's explanations we are informed of cognitive acts (1) and another cognitive act (2) that gives attention to cognitive acts (1). Cognitive acts have two kinds, one is cognitive act (1) that achieves contents such as to concretely aware of principle (理) inside of one's body; the other is cognitive act (2) that objectifies the cognitive act(1). The cognitive act (2) that objectifies one's own cognitive act entirely refers to the activities of consciousness. The cognitive act (2) does not operate by being stimulated by external objects but starts to operate by objectifying the subject's consciousness. The function of cognitive act (2) is to operate on the cognitive acts (1). Thus, we can say cognitive act (2) is a kind of reflective consciousness.<sup>57</sup> The introspective, reflective consciousness is the cognitive act that leads to the awareness of subject's own conscious capability.

First of all, let us start with introspection (反觀). This is a way of

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57 "人心道心之交戰 義勝欲勝之判決 人能於是乎 猛省而力克之則近道矣" (*A Summary Opinion on Mencius*).

self-cultivation in Buddhism, that is called self-introspection into the mind of oneself (自觀自心). In *Deep Examination about the Book of Mind* (心經密驗), and *Public Opinion on the Great Learning* (大學公議), Tasan agrees that we are able to know the subtle, mysterious operation of mind through self-cultivation:

The mind-constitution, which is without form, is not same as working of a mouth and eyes, which has a certain form. There is a certain way to observe (觀) one's own mind. That is why Master Yǒn-pyǒng (延平) had taught one to observe the image of *qi* that is not yet emerged (未發前氣象). The previous Confucians have put emphasis on a marvelous operation of mind. Without introspection (反觀), how could we have known the marvelous operation of mind?<sup>58</sup>

Tasan's understanding of 'introspection' is to observe the 'marvelous operation' of the mind, i.e. the activities of consciousness, while in Neo-Confucianism the purpose of introspection is to illuminate principle (理), that is to set one's sights on consequences of conscious acts, i.e., the contents of acts. While Tasan disagrees with illuminating *li*, the contents of acts, he affirms another kind of introspection that is to be aware of the very cognitive act itself. In *Public Opinion on the Great Learning*, the method of introspection is described in a certain social context where a person meets another person; here, one must observe carefully where one's intention moves toward.<sup>59</sup> That is, Tasan's understanding of the introspection is to monitor where his cognitive acts move toward – selfish values (私) such as comfort and fame, or public moral values (道義) that transcends one's egocentric view. From such an explanation of introspection, we can infer that Tasan is keenly aware of cognitive act (2) that objectifies cognitive acts (1).

58 “心體無形 與口目之有形者 不同 自觀自心亦有其道 故延平教人 專觀未發前氣象 心之妙用先儒亟言之 不能反觀安知妙用如是” (*Deep Examination of the Classic of Mind*).

59 “存天理遏人慾 其機其會 在於人與人之相接 默坐反觀 亦必取我與人相接之際 一一點檢 乃有依據 可誠可正 反觀其未發前氣象 將何補矣 嗟乎” (*Public Opinion on the Great Learning*).

Secondly, in Tazan's explanation of 'self has to be restrained by oneself (以己克己),'<sup>60</sup> 'original self(本有之己)' and 'the self that have win over oneself (戰勝之己),'<sup>61</sup> we are informed of the conscious act at work. To illustrate, in the phrase 'self has to be restrained by one self' two selves are revealed, a self that wants to do what is not appropriate (禮), and the other self that does not allow to do such things. Both are conscious acts. The inner battle between self and other self is essentially a conflict between cognitive acts, between one conscious act (1) pursuing inappropriate, and the other conscious act (2) restraining the conscious act (1). In the like manner, understanding 'original self(本有之己)' and 'the self that have win over oneself(戰勝之己)' needs the two kinds of consciousness: one conscious act (1) that must be overcome, and the other conscious act (2) that objectifies and controls (1).

After becoming aware of cognitive acts (1) and cognitive act (2), one's attention turns to the capability of consciousness. Tazan's 'the one and only mind' corresponds to the capability of consciousness. On this wise, 'ling(靈)' has various connotations – the cognitive act immanent within consciousness, the cognitive act generating contents, and the cognitive act reflecting on another cognitive act. All of them are emerged from a unified consciousness, i.e., the capability of consciousness. Thus, what Tazan's the one and only mind, i.e., *ling* (靈), ultimately refers to is the capability of consciousness.

## Conclusion

The reason that Lonergan developed his cognitional theory is because he believed that it is on the level of consciousness that we can possibly find truth and reality that goes beyond the partial, restricted truths that a certain society and its culture offer. Similarly, the reason why Tazan investigated deeply into

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60 “欲也者 人心欲之也 勿也者 道心勿之也 彼欲此勿 兩相交戰 勿者克之則謂之克己…然大體己也 小體亦己也 以己克己 何者非己” (*Old and New Commentaries of Analects*).

61 “孔子曰修己 曰古之學者爲己 此我本有之己也 孔子曰克己復禮仁 此我戰勝之己也 明有一己克此一己 既有二己 胡無二心 既有二性 胡無二心 君子之道 察乎此而已” (*Review on the Book of Mae*).

human 'mind' is to discover the ultimate truth and value. He has imagined a world filled with humaneness(仁) – the world built by each conscious subject who discovers value deliberately and performs it voluntarily. He has hence established a theory of mind that reveals the process of how to understand values and actualize it in our social reality.

The significance of Tasan's concept of '*lings*(靈)' can be summarized as follows:

Firstly, the concept of '*ling*' represents Tasan's awareness of the capability of consciousness. All our cognitive activities, such as the contents revealed by four beginnings (四端) and seven emotions (七情), memory, inference of reason, mathematical thinking, discerning and practicing values, creative arts and aesthetic skills (技藝), and even a penetrating insight into the nature of the Heaven or the ultimate reality, are possible with the body of '*ling*.' What encompasses all aspects of consciousness is '*ling*,' the capability of consciousness. Here, Tasan's theoretical framework is assessed as methodical and logical, given not only that he has shown a profound understanding of consciousness in general, but also that he has provided a simple, concise composition of conscious capacity, i.e., the division between 'the one and only mind' and 'revealed mind having various conscious aspects,'.

Secondly, the concept of '*ling*' is focused on the cognitive acts of judging and practicing values. Tasan sees what is crucial in becoming a moral sage is the subject's capability of thinking. He is far from thinking that good and evil are predetermined; he always maintains that human are autonomous and self-initiative, who can discern and practice good and/or evil with their capability of thinking. Thus, for him, humans are equal in that they all have capability of thinking and they are all open to become moral sages once they demonstrate their capability of thinking by carrying out virtuous acts.

Thirdly, '*ling*' persuades us to believe that all human are equal given the capability that they have in terms of thinking, and to deem that all subjects are dignified beings since the individuals has been given the capability of thinking from the Heaven. For Tasan, the capability of thinking is endowed

from the Heaven, something that belongs to supernatural attributes.<sup>62</sup> Tasan therefore praises and glorifies the fact that human are capable of thinking as follows:

How fortunate that mind can think! In glory, I say that this is why Heaven has given it to me!<sup>63</sup>

Since the natural and the supernatural are penetrated into each other through the capability of thinking, there is a certain religious connotation within the concept of '*ling*.'

Fourthly, '*ling*' is not limited within the aspect of consciousness. Since, Tasan sees, whether positively or negatively, that body and consciousness are organically unified, we have to be careful in interpreting '*ling*' as consciousness; that is, we have keep some distance from the dualistic or Thomistic interpretation of mind and body, which are at conflict with each other.

The significance of '*ling*' is, to put concisely, that it is a discovery of the conscious subject that autonomously judges values and self-initiatively practices upon them.

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62 “明善則必知天” (*Self-chosen Aphorism on the Mean*).

63 “心之能思 豈非幸歟 於是乎讚美之曰 此天之所以予我者” (A Summary Opinion on Mencius).



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## 丁若镛对‘独一无二的心（灵体）’的理解： 朗尼根认知过程的应用

李叔禧

本论文以丁若镛用‘灵’字代替‘心’字的这一点为着手点，用朗尼根（Bernard Lonergan）的认知论来进行了分析解释。朗尼根的认知论即人类通过体验-理解-判断-决断的认知过程，得出人类生存的最终意义和价值。这一理论展开的基础是：认识活动和作为认识活动结果的认识内容，认识活动中存在的四种认知活动，以及以自身的认识活动（1）为对象的另一种认识活动（2）。

如果将朗尼根的认知理论应用在分析丁若镛的‘灵’上，那么对丁若镛‘心’的关注就会增加，相应的对此的理解也会有更进一步的发展，对他所说的心体虚灵-‘大体’-‘灵体’等词语的理解也会更加明了。

在《大学讲义》（1789，1814）的‘心体虚灵’中我们可以看到丁若镛所理解的‘心’的一般性特征，在《论语古今注》（1813）的‘大体’中丁若镛批判性的看待了生理性·心理性的气质与价值判断的关系，在《心经密验》（1815）中丁若镛对价值判断的理解上升到价值实现的问题上，认为“灵体”这一概念是由以下三个要素形成的：对于价值先天的指向性（性），价值的分别（权衡），选择价值并去实现（行事）。“灵体”这一概念在《答李汝弘》（1816）《南雷黄宗羲序》（1827）中成立，‘独一无二的心’也是在这里言及的，本论文认为可以将此看作是意识的力量。

‘灵体’的概念即是发现意识力量，‘灵体’的三要素即是像我们展示了追求价值意识的机械论。‘灵体’这一概念与朗尼根的认识过程论也是相符合的，验证了其普遍性，而且这一概念的最大意义是能够发现认识和实践价值的意识主体，也是因此我们才能够发现丁若镛的思想中主体，理性，合理性中所具有的近代性特征。

**关键词：**虚灵，大体，灵体，意识活动，意识力量，意识主体

