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Zhu Xi's Metaphysical System and the Role of *Taiji* (Great Ultimate)

Kim Han-sang

Abstract

There are many sayings ascribed to Zhu Xi on the topic of the Great Ultimate, or *Taiji*, in both the *Zhuzi Wenji* [*Collected Works* of Master Zhu] and the *Zhuzi Yulei* [*Classified Conversations* of Master Zhu]. However, it is not an easy task to attempt to understand the meaning of the term as presented in these works. Zhu Xi's comments on the subject often seem vague, roundabout or outright confusing. Some statements even appear to be tautologies. In this paper, I attempt to sort through Zhu's sayings in order to find out the role *Taiji* plays in Zhu Xi's metaphysical system, and to refute the notion that it is a concept that is "neither woven closely into Zhu Xi's philosophical system nor given its proper place within it," as some have claimed.

Following the Cheng brothers' view that "substance and function have the same origin" and that "between the hidden and the manifest there exists no gap," Zhu Xi early on subscribes to the theory of *tiyong* (substance and function) and applies it to describe the relation between *Dao* and *qi*(vessel). However, after the turnaround in his thinking concerning the status and function of the human mind in 1169, in his commentary on Zhou Dunyi's *Taiji tu shuo*, entitled the *Taiji tu shuo jie*, Zhu makes it clear that although *Taiji* is not something that is temporally prior to *yinyang* and that *Taiji* does not directly create things, it is a pervading presence in material things, and exists on a level different from that of objects. It is described as the metaphysical 'pivot of creation and transformation' within the universe, as well as the 'foundation of diverse phenomena and things.' Instead of equating *Taiji* with *ti*, and *yinyang* with *yong*, Zhu's *Taiji tu shuo jie* seeks to explain the relationship between the ultimate principle and physical objects by means of a more subtle theory. In the treatise, Zhu describes *Taiji* as *benran zhi miao* (the

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characteristic of metaphysical substance being unbounded by physical limitations), and the movement and quiescence within the phenomenal realm as *suocheng zhi ji* (the physical frame that carries the metaphysical principle with it). *Taiji* is something that is responsible for the transformation of things in the phenomenal realm, which is present in the midst of transformation and yet is itself unaffected in the process. Thus contained in the *Taiji tu shuo jie* is the idea that although *Taiji* is always present wherever *yinyang* is present, it is something that is clearly to be differentiated from *yinyang* and that cannot be reduced or equated at any stage with it.

Taiji comes to take on a more comprehensive character with the unfolding of the debate between Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan (1187-1189). In Zhu Xi's later thought, *Taiji* is understood to encompass both the *weifā* and the *yifā* realms of the mind, and to be present within the *yinyang* realm and outside of it. *Taiji* belongs to a level of existence different from that of *yinyang* precisely in that it is present both inside and outside of *yinyang*. Because *Taiji* is a principle that is both transcendent and immanent, it can be said to be absolute. Through the debate with Lu, *Taiji* comes to be equated in meaning with 'standard' or 'norm,' as well as the highest truth.

Zhu's theory of *Taiji* deals comprehensively with both activity within nature and that within the human mind. The theory of *Taiji* implies that although human ideals are inseparable from the natural tendencies of the universe, they are not subordinate or *posterior* to nature. For Zhu Xi, *Taiji* as reflective of human moral ideals (*ren yi li zhi*) represents an absolute norm that regulates the natural sphere, and as such, exists *a priori*, although manifested at all times in tandem with phenomena.

Keywords: *Taiji* 太極, *wuji* 無極, *tiyong* 體用, *benran zhi miao* 本然之妙, *suocheng zhi ji* 所乘之氣, the principle encompassing the *weifā* and *yifā* realms 未發已發之理

Introduction

What is the significance of the concept of *Taiji* (Great Ultimate) in Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130-1200) metaphysical system? What is its role in his Neo-Confucian philosophy? How does Zhu understand the term, which had existed in other philosophical contexts beforehand, and what is its relationship with the term *li* or principle? These questions have been posed ever since Zhu Xi appropriated Zhou Dunyi's 周敦頤 (1017-1073) *Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (*Taijitu shuo* 太極圖說) as one of the main frameworks of his metaphysical system, not only by Zhu Xi himself but also by numerous other scholars who have followed him in East Asia. The viewpoints of scholars on the topic of *Taiji* vary, depending on their respective assessments of Neo-Confucianism. From this it can be seen that one's understanding of *Taiji* is tied integrally to one's understanding of the nature of Neo-Confucian metaphysics. Even among modern-day 'New Confucians,' there is disagreement on how to define the character of Zhu Xi's metaphysics, and that of Neo-Confucianism in general.

Efforts to delve into the meaning of *Taiji* are hindered by the fact that Zhu Xi often does not seem to forward an exact definition of the term in his works. Comments by Zhu such as "*Taiji* is but the *li* of myriad things" (太極只是天地萬物之理)¹ are hardly informative. It cannot be denied however, that Zhu and his students regarded the term as important and engaged in discussions on the topic on a number of occasions. The first recorded conversation in the *Zhuzi Yulei* partially quoted above, as well as the first section of the *Jinsi lu* 近思錄 [Reflections on Things at Hand] (1178), the anthology of works by Northern Song scholars which Zhu compiled with Lü Zuqian 呂祖謙 (1137-1181) both begin with the topic of *Taiji*. Wang Maohong 王懋竑 (1668-1741) points out that Zhu Xi laboured at amending the texts of the *Commentary to the Four Books* (*sishu jizhu* 四書集註) and the *Commentary to the Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (*Taijitu shuo jie* 太極圖說解) for over 20 years, and that Zhu continued to engage in discussions over the *Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (*Taijitu* 太極圖) with his students up to a few days before his death.²

1 Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi Yulei* [Classified Conversations of Master Zhu], ed Li Jingde (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, [1270] 1986), *Juan* 1, Section 1 (hereafter denoted in the following abbreviated form, *Zhuzi Yulei*, 1-1). "太極只是天地萬物之理."

2 Wang Maohong, *Zhuzi nianpu* 朱子年譜 [Biographical Chronology of Zhu Xi] (Taipei: Shijie Shuju, 1973), 226-227; 341-42.

Scholars have traditionally regarded *Taiji* as the metaphysical principle that links the human and the natural realms as two aspects of a unified whole in Zhu Xi's philosophy. *Taiji* is seen to apply equally to humans and nature as a binding normative principle, and through it, the human and the natural spheres of existence are integrally connected. *Taiji* thus serves as the ground-providing principle of existence and the term has also come to be equated with 'heaven' (*tian* 天) and 'principle' (*li* 理) in Zhu Xi's metaphysical scheme.

In this paper, I attempt to show how Zhu Xi's distinct metaphysical system developed over time, centered around the notion of *Taiji*, and to demonstrate that the resulting metaphysical discourse is a unique depiction of the component aspects of reality that represents a significant departure from former discourse involving the traditional *tiyong* 體用 formulation. By sorting through Zhu's sayings on *Taiji* with the aid of recent studies on the chronological order of Zhu Xi's works³, I argue that there is a certain progression in the logical formation of Zhu Xi's metaphysics over time, and that the ensuing metaphysical structure is of central import to his philosophy. The gradual reinforcement of the metaphysical import of the term by Zhu Xi has to do with Zhu's preoccupation with the need to strengthen the ontological priority of *li* in his system of ethics.

Taiji within the Framework of Zhu Xi's *li-qi* 理氣 Metaphysical Scheme

Taiji is first mentioned in the "Great and Venerable Teacher" (*dazongshi* 大宗師) chapter of the *Zhuangzi* 莊子 in the context of 'sky.' The term comes to take on a cosmological or ontological meaning in the "Appended Remarks" (*Xici zhuan* 繫辭傳) of *the Book of Changes*, where the famous saying "The world of Change has the Great Ultimate; this produced the Two Modes; the Two Modes produced the Four Forms; the Four Forms produced the Eight Hexagrams"⁴ is recorded. Since

3 Most notable are the works of Su Jingnan, including the most recent *Zhuzi nianpu changbian* (1, 2) (Shanghai: Huadong Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 2001), in addition to the earlier works of Chen Lai and Tomoeda Ryutaro cited in the bibliography below.

4 *Book of Changes*, "Appended Remarks," pt. 1, ch. 11. "易有太極，是生兩儀，兩儀生四象，四象生八卦."

this comment appeared in the "Appended Remarks," after the Han dynasty there were two main accounts of *Taiji*: one regarded it as referring to the *Dao* in the Laozi, and the other saw it as a form of primeval all-encompassing *qi* or psycho-physical matter (*yuanqi* 元氣). Commonly explained as some original material substance of the universe, it was only with Zhu Xi's treatment of the subject in the Southern Song period in China that *Taiji* came to take on the meaning of principle or *li*. After Zhu Xi, the trend was often to revert to regarding *Taiji* as *qi*. The Ming dynasty scholar Wang Tingxiang 王廷相 (1474-1544), for example, viewed *Taiji* as 'qi in its undifferentiated and undivided whole state' 混沌未分之氣.⁵

Zhou Dunyi provided the impetus for a new account of *Taiji* in the Song period by making use of an existing diagram known as the *Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (*Taijitu* 太極圖) to set up a philosophical system embracing both the human and the natural realms within a single framework, based on the thought contained in the "Appended Remarks" to the *Book of Changes*. Various treatises on *Taiji* began to appear after Zhou wrote the *Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate*. Zhou introduced the term '*wuji*' 無極 [Indeterminate or Ultimate of non-being], which appears in the Laozi⁶ into the text, and links it with *Taiji* in the phrase, "Indeterminate, yet the Great Ultimate" (*wuji er taiji* 無極而太極). In doing so, Zhou opened up new possibilities for the explanation of the meaning of *Taiji* by Zhu Xi, who uses it as an important cornerstone of his metaphysical system.

Although Zhu Xi learned of *Taiji* as the 'principle of origin of the universe'⁷ from his teacher Li Tong 李侗 (1093~1163) as early as in 1161, it seems he did not take an active interest in the complex ontological dimension of the subject until he began to delve into the theory of human mind and human nature. It was under the influence of Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133~1180) that Zhu Xi came to consider *Taiji* in connection with *xing* 性 or human nature.⁸ In 1169, Zhu Xi postulates his 'theory of the two realms for the cultivation of the mind' (已發未

5 Ge Rongjin, *Zhongguo zhexue fanchoushi* (Heilongjiang: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 39-44.

6 *Laozi*, ch. 28.

7 *Yanping dawen* 延平答問, in Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi quanshu* [Complete Works of Master Zhu] (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe; Hefei shi: Anhui Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2002), 13.328-29.

8 Chen Lai, *Zhu Xi zhexue yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1987), 4-6.

發說 *yifa weifa shuo*), in which Zhou Dunyi's formulation "Indeterminate, yet the Great Ultimate" is equated with *xing*⁹ After Zhu Xi put forth a revised understanding of the mind's status and function in 'the new theory of equilibrium and harmony' (*zhonghe xin shuo* 中和新說) in 1169, *Taiji* in his system takes on the role of a metaphysical ground-providing principle for the regular cycles of quiescence and movement in both nature and in human mind.¹⁰ In nature there is 'quiescence in the *yin* phase' 陰靜 and 'movement in the *yang* phase' 陽動, the two being complementary aspects of the physical realm of nature governed by the ground-providing principle, which ensures that there is order, and a certain rightful mode of operation in the natural realm. A parallel phenomenon occurs in the human mind: there is 'gathering in or inward convergence in the *weifa* 未發 [not-yet-aroused] phase' and 'outward expansion or application in the *yifa* 已發 [issued forth] phase,' the two being complementary aspects of the cognitive and moral realm of the human mind governed by the ground-providing principle, which also ensures that there is order, and a certain rightful mode of operation in the realm of the human mind. Both phenomena represent activity in the world of *qi*, governed by the ground-providing principle of *Taiji*.

It is after Zhu Xi's monumental efforts to clarify the status and operative function of the human mind and human nature and the *subsequent* turnaround in his thinking in 1169 (*jichou zhi wu* 己醜之悟) that he begins to delve in earnest into the ontological problem of *li* and *qi*. There seems to have been a renewed awareness on Zhu's part that nature and man are governed by identical norms, and that the various dimensions of the human mind, namely the newly analyzed tripartite *xing* 性 [the original moral human nature], *qing* 情 [the affective aspect of the phenomenal mind] and *xin* 心 itself [the overall faculty or presiding power that adjudicates between *xing* and *qing*] needed to be explained in terms of its relation to the world at large. Thus the in-depth study into the moral and cognitive status of the human mind provided the impetus for a more thorough speculative inquiry into the theory of 'original substance' (*benti* 本體), which

9 Zhu Xi, *Zhu Xi ji* [Collected Works of Zhu Xi], eds. Guo Di and Yi Po (Chengdu shi: Sichuan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1996), 67-10: 3526. "周子曰: '無極而太極.' 程子又曰: '人生而靜以上不容說, 纔說時便已不是性矣.' 蓋聖賢論性無不因心而發, 若欲專言之, 則是所謂無極而不容言者, 亦無體段之可名矣."

10 Tomoeda Ryūtarō, *Shushi no shisō keisei*, revised ed. (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1979), 95.

culminated in the writing of the first draft of the *Commentary to the Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (*Taijitu shuo jie* 太極圖說解) in 1170. A revised version of the text was completed with an added preface by 1173, after undergoing various discussions with Zhang Shi and Lü Zuqian 呂祖謙 (1137~1181) and submitting it to corrections. The text was only made available publicly later in 1188 due to Zhu Xi's reluctance to make known disagreements among the three scholars to his enemies.¹¹

In the *Commentary to the Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate*, Zhu Xi takes recourse to the structure of Zhou Dunyi's the *Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (*Taijitu shuo* 太極圖說) to lay down the relation between *Taiji* and things in the phenomenal world. The reason for the choice probably had to do with the fact that the *Diagram of the Great Ultimate* itself, despite its tell-tale signs of influence from Daoist cosmogeny, and Zhou Dunyi's corresponding *Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate*, were both seen to possess a suitable comprehensive structure incorporating both cosmology and the theory of human nature. Zhu Xi felt that the diagram and Zhou's explanations were the most suited for representing his own philosophical scheme of linking the universe as macrocosm to human beings and the myriad of things as the microcosm (*capax universi*).¹² In the *Commentary to the Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate*, *Taiji* is not seen as some primordial undivided material stuff or matter, but is clearly stipulated as being the metaphysical *Dao* (太極, 形而上之道也) as well as containing all the principles of movement and quiescence and of *yin* and *yang* (動靜陰陽之理, 已悉具於其中).¹³

Because Zhu Xi's comments on the metaphysical concepts such as *Taiji*, *li* and *qi* are spread about throughout his works and are often vague, roundabout or outright confusing, with a few statements that even appear to be tautologies, some have claimed that *Taiji* is a concept that is "neither woven closely into Zhu Xi's philosophical system nor given its proper place within it."¹⁴ Interestingly enough, the argument in favour of the non-relevance of the concept of *Taiji* in

11 Su Jingnan, *Zhuzi dazhuan* (Fujian: Fujian Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1992), 280-281; 322.

12 *Zhuzi Yulei*, 68-89. "天地便是大底萬物, 萬物便是小底天地." *Zhuzi Yulei*, 95-57. "蓋人便是一箇小天地耳."

13 *Taijitu shuo jie*, in *Zhuzi quanshu*, 13.72-3.

14 Yamanoi Yu, "Chu Hsi and the Great Ultimate," in *Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism*, edited by Wing-tsit Chan (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 79-92.

Zhu Xi's system is often forwarded by those who wish to see *Taiji* as *qi* or as a code for the a *posteriori* 'pattern' or order in the physicalist universe. However, if one sorts through Zhu's sayings on *Taiji* with the aid of the above-mentioned recent studies on the chronological order of Zhu Xi's works, one finds that the certain progression in the logical formation of Zhu Xi's metaphysics is by no means incoherent, though highly speculative and difficult to understand at times.

At *first*, statements that describe *Taiji* as the 'ultimate li,' the 'totality of li,' the 'origin of all things' and the 'original substance of the universe' seem puzzling and make one wonder whether *Taiji* is a concept that is different from *li* which exists on a higher plane. In the *Zhuzi Wenji* [Collected Works of Master Zhu] and the *Zhuzi Yulei* [Classified Conversations of Master Zhu] there are phrases such as: "So-called *Taiji* is the single name given to the collection of the *li* of myriad things"¹⁵, and "The *li* that oversees the myriad things is *Taiji*."¹⁶ These expressions from Zhu Xi's latter years are not superfluous or over-the-top remarks but have to be understood in the context of his increasing inclination to assign an ontological priority to *li* (*lixian qihou* 理先氣後) over the years. It is therefore particularly important to trace the exact time and context of Zhu's comments on *li* and *qi* according to the changing contours of his thought over time.

Questions have also been raised as to whether the concept of *Taiji* is unrelated to Zhu Xi's canonical studies of the *Four Books* (*sishu* 四書) and the related theory of moral self-cultivation that derives from them, as the term does not even appear in Zhu Xi's *Commentaries on the Four Books* (四書集註), and only appears once in connection with Zhou Dunyi's *Taijitu shuo* in the *Questions and Answers on the Four Books* (四書或問).¹⁷ Although this is a legitimate question to ask, any attempt to discount the relevance of metaphysical and ontological issues from Zhu Xi's system can be very misleading, as they are hardly incidental and in fact integral to his system. The division of metaphysical and physical levels is indispensable to understanding his philosophy, including his theory of self-cultivation, which would take a radically different turn without its advocacy of the primacy of *li*. Admittedly, in places such as the *Record to Commemorate the Shrine to Studying Master Lianxi in Longxing Prefecture* 隆興府學濂溪先生祠記, Zhu

15 *Zhu Xi ji*, 78-14:4085. "蓋其所謂太極雲者, 合天地萬物之理而一名之耳." (Zhu Xi aged 50)

16 *Zhuzi Yulei*, 94-44. "總天地萬物之理, 便是太極" (Zhu Xi aged 65)

17 Yamanoi Yu, "Chu Hsi and the Great Ultimate," *Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism*, 83.

seems to play down speculative metaphysical thought, emphasizing instead the teachings found in the *Six Classics* and the *Four Books*. Zhu writes for instance that "however lofty Master Zhou's teaching on *wuji* and *Taiji* may be, it is not removed from the reality of everyday life, and the subtle inquiries into the profound workings of *yinyang* and the five elements are neither separate from the issues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, nor removed from matters of sturdiness and gentleness, of good and evil."¹⁸ However, this should not be seen as Zhu Xi's discounting the importance of metaphysical discourse, but rather as its affirmation in the overall context of its connection to his Neo-Confucian theory of self-cultivation and virtue ethics.

In the well-known first conversation in the *Zhuzi Yulei* of Zhu Xi in his latter years with his disciple Chen Chun 陳淳 (1159-1223), Zhu Xi offers the following account of *Taiji*.

Taiji is just the *li* of all the things in the universe. Seen from the perspective of heaven and earth, *Taiji* is present amidst heaven and earth. Seen from the perspective of individual things, *Taiji* is present among the myriad things. Even before heaven and earth have yet to exist, there must first be this *li*. The phrase [in the *Taijitu shuo*] that '[*Taiji*] moves to produce yang' is also just referring to this *li*, and the phrase '[*Taiji*] becomes still to produce yin' is also just referring to this *li*.¹⁹

Zhu Xi's reply gives an indication of his will to account for *Taiji* within the framework of *li-qi*. *Taiji* as principle is present in all things, and exists in tandem with them, and yet has an ontological priority to the phenomenal world. *Taiji* is that which exists *a priori* and gives order to the phenomenal world as the ground for existence. This formula is confirmed in later writings of Zhu Xi.²⁰ During his days serving as the governor-general of Nankang county (1179~1181), when he was about 50 years old, Zhu Xi began to use expressions such as 'the utmost *li*' to describe *Taiji*.²¹ Similar comments may be found in later sayings.²² Elsewhere Zhu refers to *Taiji* as 'exceedingly fine and

18 *Zhu Xi ji*, 78-14:4085-86. "蓋嘗竊謂先生之言，其高極乎無極太極之妙，而其實不離乎日用之間。其幽探乎陰陽五行造化之蹟，而其實不離乎仁義禮智剛柔善惡之際。其體用之一源，顯微之無間，秦漢以下，誠未有臻斯理者，而其實則不外乎六經論語中庸大學七篇之所傳也。"

19 *Zhuzi Yulei*, 1-1. "曰，太極只是天地萬物之理。在天地言，則天地中有太極。在萬物言，則萬物中各有太極。未有天地之先，畢竟是先有此理。動而生陽，亦只是理。靜而生陰，亦只是理。"

20 *Zhuzi daquan*, 36:9b; *Zhuzi daquan*, 36:13a.

21 *Zhuzi daquan*, 37:31b. "太極之義，正謂理之極致耳。"

22 *Zhuzi daquan*, 36:8b. "以此理至極，而謂之極耳。" "以其究竟至極無名可名，故特謂之太極。" (Zhu Xi aged 59)

all-good *li*,' and also defines it as the 'truly impartial basis of all transformation...also having the meaning of standard or norm.'²³ These formulations indicate that in his later years, Zhu Xi conceived *Taiji* as an *a priori* norm governing the phenomenal world, and that he also regarded it as characterized by pure good, before the transformations in the realm of *yinyang* take place and good and evil appear on the phenomenal level.²⁴

***Taiji* as the Pivot of Creation and Transformation and the Foundation of all Things**

The first engaged discourse by Zhu Xi on the topic of *Taiji* takes place in the *Commentary to the Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (*Taijitu shuo jie* 太極圖說解), which was completed after the establishment of his theories on human mind and human nature. In a letter to Yang Fang 楊方 (Zizhi 子直) in 1171, Zhu Xi outlines his thought on *Taiji* as found in Zhou Dunyi's *Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (*Taijitu shuo* 太極圖說):

Between heaven and earth there is none other than a constant cycle of the two tendencies of movement and quiescence without ceasing. This is what is known as 'Change' (*yi* 易). Behind the movement and quiescence is the principle of movement and quiescence, and this is what is known as *Taiji*. The Sage [Confucius] early on pointed to its existence and named it thus, and Master Zhou also drew the diagram and represented it in images, so as to clarify and bring it to light beyond doubt. Originally, the name '*ji*' 極 [extremity, basis] was taken from the meaning of '*shuji*' 樞極 [pivot, ground]. What the Sage referred to as *Taiji* was the root of all things. What Master Zhou called '*wuji*' 無極 [ultimate of non-being] made known the ineffable characteristic of being unbounded by physical limitations (*Miao* 妙), without sound or smell. However, the reason why [the *Diagram of the Great Ultimate*] talks of "Indeterminate, yet the Great Ultimate," and says that "*Taiji* is originally *wuji*" is not because *wuji* gave birth to *Taiji* after *wuji* or because *wuji* first existed before *Taiji*. Also, the saying "the five elements are *yinyang*" and "*yinyang* are *Taiji*" does not mean that *Taiji* gave birth to *yinyang* and the five elements after *Taiji*, or that *Taiji* first existed before *yinyang* and the five elements. The ineffable characteristic belonging to *wuji* of being unbounded by physical limitations was never

23 *Zhuzi Yulei*, 94-21. "太極只是箇極好至善底道理。人人有一太極，物物有一太極。周子所謂太極，是天地人物萬善至好底表德。" (Zhu Xi aged 65); *Zhuzi daquan*, 36:12b. "太極固無偏倚而爲萬化之本。然其得名自爲至極之極，而兼有標準之義。" (Zhu Xi aged 60, in the 6th letter to Lu Jiuyuan)

24 *Zhuzi Yulei*, 75-82. "太極中，全是具一箇善。若三百八十四爻中，有善有惡，皆陰陽變化以後方有。" (Zhu Xi aged over 62)

absent in the process of the formation of male and female, and in the transformation and creation of all things. The creed contained in this Diagram is inherited from the great *yi* 大易, and is completely opposite of Laozi's so-called "Things arise from being 有, and being arises from non-being 無," which holds that there really is a beginning and an end point to the process of transformation.²⁵

In the letter cited above Zhu Xi makes it clear that the relationship between *Taiji* and *yinyang* is not that of a temporal order of existence. *Taiji* does not give birth to the myriad things and does not exist temporally prior to things, but exists in tandem with them. In the formulation "Indeterminate, yet the Great Ultimate" (*wuji er taiji*), *wuji* is *Taiji* and *Taiji* is also *wuji*, and both terms refer to *li*.²⁶ The first line of the *Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate*, "*wuji er taiji*," is explained by Zhu Xi in his *Commentary to the Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate* as meaning that *Taiji* is a non-empirical entity that serves as 'the pivot of creation and transformation' and 'the foundation of things.'

The operations of heaven have neither sound nor smell. Yet this is really the pivot of creation and transformation, and the foundation of things of all kinds. Therefore it is called "Indeterminate, yet the Great Ultimate." It does not mean that outside of the Great Ultimate there is again an Ultimate of non-being.²⁷

The expression 'pivot of creation and transformation' 造化之樞紐 refers to *Taiji*'s role as the unifying order or principle of the growth and activity in the natural and human social realms. 'The foundation of things of all kinds' 品彙之根柢 implies *Taiji* serves as a basis or standard for the classification and coherent analysis of diverse events and objects.

The relationship between *Taiji* and *yinyang* are outlined in Zhu Xi's commentary to the second line of Zhou Dunyi's *Taijitu shuo*. The original text of the *Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (*Taijitu shuo*) runs as follows²⁸:

25 *Zhu Xi ji*, 45-17:2153-54.

26 However, if instead of "*wuji er taiji*" 無極而太極 the phrase in the *Taijitu shuo* is rendered as "from *wuji* to become *Taiji*" (*zi wuji er wei Taiji* 自無極而爲太極) as Zhu Xi noted was written in the section on Zhou Dunyi (*Lianxi zhuan* 濂溪傳) of the *History of the Song Dynasty* (*Guoshi* 國史), then *wuji* and *Taiji* would have to be seen as being divided into two and the former preceding the latter temporally and giving rise to it. *Zhu Xi ji*, 36-11:1577.

27 *Taijitu shuo jie* in *Zhuzi quanshu*, 13.72. "上天之載, 無聲無臭, 而實造化之樞紐, 品彙之根柢. 故曰, 無極而太極, 非太極之外復有無極也."

The Great Ultimate through activity generates *yang*. When its activity reaches its limit, it becomes tranquil. Through tranquillity [the Great Ultimate] generates *yin*. When tranquillity reaches its limit, activity begins again. So movement and tranquillity alternate and become the root of each other, giving rise to the distinction of *yin* and *yang*, and the two modes are thus established.²⁹

In the *Commentary to the Explanations of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (*Taijitu shuo jie*), Zhu explains that the meaning of *Taiji*'s 'activity' and 'tranquillity' is not that *Taiji* itself moves or becomes still, like an entity in the phenomenal realm. Rather the phrase is seen to signify that *Taiji* is the ground for 'quiescence in the *yin* phase' 陰靜 and 'movement in the *yang* phase' 陽動 of nature, and that the actual movement and tranquillity in the phenomenal realm is the frame or tool for the manifestation of this metaphysical reality, which is expressed as the 'flow and progression of the heavenly mandated principle in the world' (*tianming zhi liuxing* 天命之流行).³⁰ In the same passage, Zhu also defines *Taiji* as *benran zhi miao* 本然之妙 [the characteristic of metaphysical substance of being unbounded by physical limitations], and the movement and quiescence within the phenomenal realm 動靜 as *suocheng zhi ji* 所乘之機 [the physical frame that carries the metaphysical principle with it].

Taiji is the characteristic of metaphysical substance of being unbounded by physical limitations, and the movement and quiescence within the phenomenal realm is the physical frame that carries the metaphysical principle with it. *Taiji* is the metaphysical *Dao*, and *yinyang* is the vessel (*qi* 器) belonging to the physical realm. Therefore seen from that which is manifest, movement and quiescence occur at different times, and *yin* and *yang* occupy different places, and yet *Taiji* was never absent at any point between them. Seen from that which is hidden, where it is empty and obscure, without any trace of something going on, the principles of movement and quiescence and of *yinyang* are already fully present in its midst. Be that as the case may be, one cannot see the coming together at the start even if one were to push to the front, and one cannot see the coming apart at the end even if one were to pull back from behind. This is why Master Cheng said "Movement and quiescence have no traces, and *yin* and *yang* have no beginning." If not the one who knows the way, who can grasp this?³¹

28 *Taijitu shuo* in *Zhuzi quanshu*, 13.72. "太極動而生陽，動極而靜，靜而生陰。靜極復動，一動一靜，互爲其根。分陰分陽，兩儀立焉。"

29 Translation adopted with minor modifications from Chu Hsi, and Lü Tsu-ch'ien, *Reflections on Things at Hand*, trans. Wing-tsit Chan (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967), 5.

30 *Taijitu shuo jie* in *Zhuzi quanshu*, 13.72. "太極之有動靜，是天命之流行也。"

Zhu Xi introduces the term '*benran zhi miao*' 本然之妙 here which refers to the wondrous or ineffable characteristic of metaphysical substance of being unbounded by physical limitations. '*Miao*' 妙 is a term that is equivalent to the term '*shen*' 神, which appears in Zhou Dunyi's *Tongshu* 通書. The definition of '*shen*' in the *Tongshu* hints at the freedom and universal dimension of metaphysical entity, which is unbounded by the limitations and constrictions of particular time and space. Unlike physical objects in the phenomenal realm, it is able to "move while being still, and to be still while moving."³² Metaphysical entity or original substance (*benti* 本體) is able, through its ineffable characteristic of being unbounded by physical limitations, to preside over the realm of *yinyang* while being both present within it and at the same time, being distinct from it (不相離 不相雜). *Taiji* is that metaphysical entity which is one with the world of change and regulates it while accompanying it, without undergoing change itself. In an oft-quoted passage, Zhu Xi compares *Taiji* and *yinyang* to a man riding a horse: the man directs the horse to go places, and the horse carries the man along with it.³³

It can be seen that the concept of *Taiji* as '*benran zhi miao*' in the *Taijitu shuo jie* has, as Zhu Xi himself has differentiated in the letter mentioned above to Yang Fang, the dual aspects of 'original substance' or 'fundamental form' (*benti* 本體), and that of the 'flow and progression in the world' (*liuxing* 流行) respectively. This factor makes it stand apart from the description of *yinyang* which as the '*suocheng zhi ji*' belongs to the straightforward empirical physical world of sensation and material objects.³⁴ All this discourse indicates that *Taiji*, although always present within *yinyang* is not a concept that can be reduced at any stage to *yinyang* but that it is an entity which in Zhu Xi's philosophy is given a wholly different ontological status.

31 Ibid. "蓋太極者本然之妙也，動靜者所乘之機也。太極形而上之道也。陰陽形而下之器也。是以自其著者而觀之，則動靜不同時，陰陽不同位，而太極無不在焉。自其微者而觀之，則沖漠無朕，而動靜陰陽之理，已悉具於其中矣。雖然推之於前而不見其始之合，引之於後而不見其終之離也。故程子曰，動靜無端陰陽無始。非知道者，孰能識之。"

32 *Zhuzi Yulei*, 94-16. "『通書』云，靜而無動，動而無靜，物也。動而無動，靜而無靜，神也。" *Zhuzi quanshu* 13.112. "動而無靜，靜而無動，物也。動而無動，靜而無靜，神也。動而無動，靜而無靜，非不動不靜也。物則不通，神妙萬物。"

33 *Zhuzi Yulei*, 94-50. "太極猶人，動靜猶馬。馬所以載人，人所以乘馬。馬之一出一入，人亦與之一出一入。"

34 *Zhu Xi ji*, 45-17:2153. "熹向以太極為體，動靜為用，其言固有病，後已改之曰，太極者本然之妙也，動靜者所乘之機也...然蓋謂太極含動靜則可(以本體而言也)，謂太極有動靜則可(以流行而言也)，若謂太極便是動靜，則是形而上下者不可分，而『易』有太極之言亦贅矣。"

This view of *Taiji*'s metaphysical character is repeatedly confirmed in Zhu Xi's later writings and conversations with his students, when he posits for instance that "*Taiji* is not subject to constraints in space, has no material form or body, and cannot be confined to any particular location."³⁵ In 1186, with the completion of his monumental treatise on *the Book of Changes*, the *Yixue qimeng* 易學啓蒙, Zhu also explains *Taiji* as "the name for [the state in which] images (xiang 象) and numerary distinctions due to unitary divisions (shu 數) have not taken shape, and yet the principles thereof are already present"³⁶. Elsewhere, in the letter exchanges with the Lu brothers, Zhu also depicts it as being "without form, but characterized by the presence of principle."³⁷

Taiji as '*benran zhi miao*' takes on a more firm position in Zhu Xi's thought as an absolute standard or norm after the debate with Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139-1193).

Formulation of *Taiji* as both Immanent and Transcendent in the Debate with Lu Jiuyuan

The debate between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan over the issue of *Taiji* takes place in 1188, when Zhu Xi was 59 years old.³⁸ In the process of carrying on the debate, Zhu further reinforces the metaphysical import of the term, which serves to strengthen the ontological priority of *li* in his philosophy. The debate contributes to sharpening the distinctiveness of Zhu Xi's metaphysical system as compared with those of his peers and predecessors.

Zhu and Lu had already confronted one another over differing interpretations of *the Book of Changes* earlier.³⁹ Lu Jiuyuan started the controversy in 1187, but the debate had actually begun earlier between Zhu and Lu's older brother, Lu Jiushao 陸九韶 (Zimei 子美) in 1185.⁴⁰

35 *Zhuzi Yulei*, 94-19. "太極無方所, 無形體, 無地位可頓放." (in 1188, Zhu Xi aged 59)

36 *Yixue qimeng*, ch. 2, in *Zhuzi quanshu*, 1.218. "太極者, 象數未形, 而其理已具之稱." (in 1186, Zhu Xi aged 57); *Zhu Xi ji*, 37-28:1652. "太極者, 象數未形之全體也." (in 1186, Zhu Xi aged 57)

37 *Zhu Xi ji*, 36-4:1568.

38 Su Jingnan, *Zhuzi dazhuan*, 685-686.

39 Su Jingnan, *Zhuzi dazhuan*, 690-91.

40 Zhu Xi had also carried on a debate over *Taiji* and *wuji* with the Lu brothers'

In this year Lu Jiushao met with Zhu to refute what he felt were the mistakes contained in the *Taijitu shuo*. The older Lu argued that '*wuji*' was an unnecessary concept that derived from the Daoists that did not need to be added on to *Taiji*, and that other than in the *Taijitu shuo* there were no mention of it in Zhou Dunyi's other seminal work, the *Tongshu*, or in the text of *the Book of Changes*. While Lu Jiushao affirms the relevance of the term *Taiji* itself, his interpretation of its meaning differs from that of Zhu Xi. In his reply, Zhu Xi defends the integrity of the whole phrase in the *Taijitu shuo* that includes *wuji* in connection with *Taiji*, arguing that *wuji* serves to define the character of *Taiji* as being without form, but characterized by the presence of principle.

You are most adamant in rejecting the first line of the *Taijitu shuo*. However, it seems you are unaware that if one does not speak of *wuji*, *Taiji* becomes equivalent to phenomenal things and insufficient to serve as the root of all transformation, and that if one does not speak of *Taiji*, *wuji* becomes mired in emptiness and silence, and unable to serve as the root of all transformation. Only from this one phrase do we know that the words [of Master Zhou] are subtle and boundless.⁴¹

Taiji as *wuji* is not a primordial material substance 一物; it is also different from the Buddhist notion of emptiness 空寂. It is the ground-providing principle behind phenomena that allow transformations in the phenomenal world to occur. In a letter to Lu Jiuyuan afterward, Zhu Xi mentions that *Taiji* is neither being 有 nor non-being 無.⁴² For Zhu Xi affirming the role of *wuji* in qualifying *Taiji* in the debate with Lu goes in hand with the affirmation of the role of the *weifa* 未發 [the pre-intentional and universal] realm of the mind after the establishment of the new theory of equilibrium and harmony on the status and function of the human mind, and both terms are an integral part of his metaphysical system.⁴³ The realm of the original substance (*benti* 本體) is "quiet without any movement" 寂然不動⁴⁴ or "empty and obscure, without any trace" 沖漠無朕⁴⁵, but the principle of transformation of the

student Liu Yaofu 劉堯夫 during his tenure as governor-general of Nankang county (1179-1181). See Su Jingnan, *Zhuzi dazhuan*, 693.

41 *Zhu Xi ji*, 36-3:1566. "只如太極篇首一句, 最是長者所深排。然殊不知不言無極, 則太極同於一物, 而不足為萬化之根; 不言太極, 則無極淪於空寂, 而不能為萬化之根。只此一句, 便見其下語, 精密微妙無窮。"

42 *Zhu Xi ji*, 36-10:1575. "太極之妙, 不屬有無, 不落方體。"

43 Son Yeongsik, *Iseong-gwa hyeonshil* (Ulsan: Ulsan Daehakgyo Chulpanbu, 1999), 320-324.

44 *Book of Changes*, "Appended Remarks," pt. 1, ch. 10.

myriad things is already present within it. The entire corpus of *li* is present in the *wafa* realm of the mind, to which one must take recourse in order to investigate things and extend one's knowledge.

In the fifth letter to Lu Jiuyuan on the 8th of November, 1188, Zhu Xi lays down his decisive arguments in favour of the metaphysical status of *Taiji*.⁴⁶ Zhu first posits that the '*ji*' 極 of *Taiji* 太極 [great or supreme extremity] signifies '*zhiji*' 至極 [utmost limit or extremity] and that it cannot, as Lu would like to have explained, be equated with the meaning of '*zhong*' 中 [middle or mean, appropriate]. *Taiji* is thus named to signify 'the utmost' in existence for the lack of a better name: it represents something ultimate to which there is nothing to add. The term signifies that *Taiji* serves as the ultimate standard or norm for all existing things. Zhu takes example from existing usage of '*ji*' to illustrate his point. '*ji*' in words such as *beiji* 北極 [north pole], *wuji* 屋極 [highest point in the house], *huangji* 皇極 [norms for the governance of society by the ruler], and *minji* 民極 [norms for the common people] all signify the highest point of an object or the center, the norm for something.⁴⁷ In other words *Taiji* exists ontologically on a different level from phenomena as a binding norm for human ethical conduct, even though it permeates phenomena and is never separated from it. Zhu Xi continues to define *Taiji*'s relationship with *yinyang* in a way that is markedly different from the traditional *tiyang* 體用 formulation⁴⁸ that is used to account for the existence of non-empirical entities.

The reason Master Zhou referred to '*wuji*' was because he regarded [*Taiji*] as being without spatial reference or physical form, existing before any phenomenal object existed, and at no time absent once objects came into being; and he regarded [it] as existing outside of *yinyang* while at no time not operating in the midst of *yinyang*. [It] pervades through all existence, is nowhere absent, and from the beginning could not be spoken of in terms of material attributes such as sound, smell, and physical traces.⁴⁹

45 *Henan Chengshi Yishu* [Remaining Works of the Henan Chengs], in Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, *Er Cheng ji* [Collected Works of the Two Cheng Brothers] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), 15-78. "冲漠無朕，萬象森然已具。"

46 *Zhu Xi ji*, 36-10:1573-77.

47 *Zhu Xi ji*, 36-10:1574. "聖人之意，正以其究竟至極無名可名，故特謂之太極，猶曰舉天下之極無以加此雲爾。初不以其中而命之也。至如北極之極，屋極之極，皇極之極，民極之極，諸儒雖有解爲中者，蓋以此物之極，常在此物之中，非指極字而訓之以中也。極者至極而已。"

48 Meng Peiyuan, "*tiyang*," *Lixue fanchou xitong* (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1989), 148-171.

49 *Zhu Xi ji*, 36-10:1575-6. "周子所以謂之無極，正以其無方所無形狀，以爲在無物之前而

Taiji is not in a *tiyong* or substance-function relationship with *yinyang*. In other words, *Taiji* and *yinyang* do not give rise to each other and are not interchangeable: one is a metaphysical entity, and the other is the physical reality which "carries" it. There is a clear division of the level of existence into two distinct realms. Just as the mind according to Zhu Xi is not just the phenomenal mind (*yifa* 已發) but made up of the two levels, metaphysical and phenomenal, of *weifa* 未發 and *yifa* respectively, *Taiji* exists on both phenomenal and metaphysical levels. *Taiji* is not separated from the world of *yinyang* and movement-quiescence, but it is also depicted as being "outside of it." This is a highly puzzling and incoherent formulation to understand if one analyzes it by means of formal logic. Rather, one has to interpret it as a religious statement which proclaims that the ground-providing metaphysical entity is both immanent and transcendent vis-à-vis the physical world. If *Taiji* were present only in the realm of *yinyang* or indeed the same in substance to *yinyang* but only modally different in the fashion of the *tiyong* formulation, it could not serve as the utmost norm or the repository of all *li*. However, if *Taiji* were only to be differentiated ontologically from the realm of *yinyang* it could not have a pervading presence in the phenomenal world of man and nature, and be in effective relationship with them. Interestingly, although all things in the world have partners and are paired up with them⁵⁰, *Taiji* is "just one unified whole and without pair." It is not something that exists relative to some other thing (*duidai* 對待), but stands on its own, as an absolute standard, being both immanent in and transcendent of the world.⁵¹

Lu Jiuyuan's position regarding *Taiji* sheds additional light on the characterization of Zhu Xi's metaphysical system. Although Lu also uses the term '*xing er shang*' 形而上, his meaning of the term is closer to 'nonempirical,' rather than to 'metaphysical,' and thereby diverges from Zhu's usage of the term. Lu regards *Taiji*, *yinyang* and the five elements as being identical in substance and only modally different,⁵²

未嘗不立於有物之後，以爲在陰陽之外而未嘗不行乎陰陽之中，以爲通貫全體，無乎不在，則又初無聲臭影響之可言也。今乃深詆無極之不然，則是直以太極爲有形狀，有方所矣。直以陰陽爲形而上者，則又昧於道器之分矣。”「答陸子靜(5)」, 36:9b.

50 *Zhuzi Yulei*, 95-65. "天地萬物之理，無獨必有對。”

51 *Zhuzi Yulei*, 100-31. "太極只是箇一而無對者。” Elsewhere, Zhu Xi mentions that the mind *xin* is also "without pair." *Zhuzi Yulei*, 5-22. "惟心無對." *Zhuzi Yulei*, 98-38. "惟心無對." '心統性情.' 二程卻無一句似此切。”

52 Lu Jiuyuan, *Xiangshan quanji* [Complete Works of Lu Xiangshan], *Sibu beiyao*

and is criticized by Zhu Xi for having confused the two ontological levels of metaphysical principle and the world of phenomena. In Lu's theory of original substance or *bentilun* there is no place for *qi* 氣, and there is identity between the mind, *li* 理 and the universe; hence no distinction is made between the metaphysical realm of the *Dao* and the physical realm of *qi* 器 (vessel).⁵³ In his system the boundaries between the mind and *li*, self and the other, subject and object are sought to be done away with, and he uses expressions such as *wujian* 無間 [no gap], *buge* 不隔 [no division], and *buwai* 不外 [no outside] to describe this ideal state of making no distinction.⁵⁴ For Lu *Taiji* signifies the state of appropriateness within the phenomenal world and not the metaphysical principle that acts as the norm for the operation of the natural and the human spheres. Correspondingly, he does not recognize the validity of metaphysical concepts such as *wuji* or *weifā*, regarding them as superfluous constructions that only serve to diminish the autonomy of the individual mind, with its unbounded power to connect with and become united to the entire universe.⁵⁵

Conclusion

Zhu's theory of *Taiji* deals comprehensively with both activity within nature and that within the human mind. The theory of *Taiji* implies that although human ideals are inseparable from the natural tendencies of the universe, they are not subordinate or *posterior* to nature. For Zhu Xi, *Taiji* as reflective of human moral ideals (*ren yi li zhi*) represents an absolute norm that regulates the natural sphere, and as such, exists *a priori*, although manifested at all times in tandem with phenomena.

Taiji does not just describe the way things operate in the universe; it prescribes an ideal state of existence for both nature and humans. There exists an ideal order of growth and change in the natural realm,

[Essentials of the Four Libraries] ed. (Taipei: Zhonghua Shuju, 1979), 23:5b. “太極判而爲陰陽，陰陽卽太極也；陰陽播而爲五行，五行卽陰陽也。塞宇宙之間，何往而非五行？”

53 Lu Jiuyuan, *Xiangshan quanji*, 22:5a. “此心此理充塞宇宙。”

54 Lu Jiuyuan, *Xiangshan quanji*, 20:b. “四方上下曰宇，往古今來曰宙。宇宙便是吾心，吾心卽是宇宙。千萬世之前，有聖人出焉，同此心，同此理也。千萬世之後，又聖人出焉，同此心，同此理也。東南西北海有聖人出焉，同此心，同此理也..... 宇宙內事，是己分內事；己分內事，是宇宙內事...”

55 Son Yeongsik, *Iseong-gwa hyeonshil*, 321.

and there also exists a corresponding ideal order of human development and fulfillment. The ideal order of nature is represented by the 'four qualities' of the first hexagram, *qian* 乾, in *the Book of Changes* (*Yijing* 易經)— origination, flourishing, advantage and firmness (*yuan heng li zhen* 元亨利貞). The ideal order of the human realm is characterized by the 'four virtues' of humanity or benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom (*ren yi li zhi* 仁義禮智). The presupposition behind the postulation of the four qualities and the four virtues is that the universe and human beings are both characterized by an affinity for life. The value and meaning that accompany the presence of life and the process of giving birth to life are integral to the operation of the world. Life is seen not as the by-product of accidental events resulting from random chemical reactions in a neutral physicalist universe, but rather as an inseparable and purposive constituent part of its dynamic creative reality. Humans share in this life and human life represents its finest manifestation. Humans are moreover charged with a form of stewardship for the rightful operation of the universe, so that "heaven and earth may find its proper place and the myriad of things be nurtured (天地位焉 萬物育焉)."⁵⁶ This is the vision consistently presented in the Doctrine of the Mean (*Zhongyong* 中庸), as well as in *the Book of Changes*. This is also the vision that is taken up in turn by Zhu Xi in his metaphysical system involving the concept of *Taiji*.

In the *Treatise on Ren* (*Renshuo* 仁說)⁵⁷, Zhu Xi characterizes heaven and earth as "having a mind that gives rise to myriad things in existence." Humans--and in fact all things--take this mind as their own.⁵⁸ This mind when applied to nature is a mind that is boundless in giving birth to life (*yangran shengwu zhi xin* 塊然生物之心). The same mind when applied to humans is one that warmly cares for other humans and seeks to benefit all things in nature (*wenran airen liwu zhi xin* 溫然愛人利物之心).⁵⁹ For Zhu Xi, the mind that gives rise

⁵⁶ *Zhongyong* 1-5.

⁵⁷ The *Treatise on Ren* (*Renshuo* 仁說) was written in 1172, when Zhu Xi was 43 years old.

⁵⁸ Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi daquan* [Great Compendium of the Works of Master Zhu], *Sibu beiyao* [Essentials of the Four Libraries] edition (Taipei: Zhonghua Shuju, 1970), 67:20a. "天地以生物爲心者也，而人物之生又各得夫天地之心以爲心者也。故語心之德，雖其總攝貫通，無所不備，然一言以蔽之，則曰仁而已矣。請試詳之。蓋天地之心，其德有四。曰元亨利貞，而元無不統。其運行焉，則爲春夏秋冬之序，而春生之氣無所不通。故人之爲心，其德亦有四。曰仁義禮智，仁無不包。其發用焉，則爲愛恭宜別之情，而惻隱之心無所不貫。"

⁵⁹ Ibid. "此心何心也？在天地則塊然生物之心，在人則溫然愛人利物之心，包四德而貫四端者也。"

to myriad things in existence can actually be characterized as *ren* itself. The operation of the universe proceeds in accordance with the essential character of life. The creation and unfolding of life is due not to selfish desire, but to a mutual concern, dedication and cooperation among all living beings based on *ren*. Zhu Xi's theory of *Taiji* refers to the ground-providing principle in such a congruous world characterized by *ren*. Being ethical in such a world does not entail alienation from nature, but rather, being in union with its innermost tendency. Thus nature shares the goal of making manifest the virtue of *ren* with humans.

This is significant for the devising of a new ecologically-conscious metaphysical theory for the modern age which does not give up on the relevance of human subjective moral agency, while seeking the mutual coexistence of humans and nature. There needs to be a balanced vision of man's place in the universe, which is neither inordinately anthropocentric nor excessively tilted toward deep ecology. The theory of *Taiji* can be regarded as a metaphysical representation of the viewpoint inherent in the traditional Confucian concept of *sancai* 三才, which advocates balance between the three basic constituent co-equal subjects of the universe-- heaven, earth and man (天 · 地 · 人)⁶⁰. The notion of *sancai* implies an organic holism linking the human and natural realms, in which the dignity of the empirical physical universe is affirmed. At the same time, the distinct status of human ethical norms belonging to its own *a priori* 'ideal world' is also affirmed. However, this ideal world of human ethical norms is not to be differentiated ontologically from the natural world, as it was brought into being through development inherent in nature. As the matrix of the structures giving rise to human ethical norms, nature itself can be said to be laden with value.⁶¹

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60 *Book of Changes*, "Shuogua zhuan" 說卦傳.

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朱子的形而上學和太極概念的作用

金 漢 相

中文摘要： 朱熹的太極是與“天”、“理”同級的，作為具有複合性和概括性的世間之根據的原理，是合自然與人間為一體的形而上學之理。當朱熹重新整理關於心的位相和作用的理論，提出中和新說之後，在他的體系中太極就成為自然(天地)的循環作用(陰靜、陽動)和心的作用(未發狀態中收斂、已發狀態中擴充)的根據。朱熹認為原有的體用的範圍不能體現太極與陰陽關係的特色，從而摸索更為精致的解說的框架。朱熹不認為太極和陰陽處於體用的關係，而是運用“本然之妙”和“所乘之氣”之語對太極的形而上學的特色進行說明。“妙”和“物”不同，擺脫特定空間的制約，描寫適當地貫通動、靜的本體的自由性和普遍的適用性。作為本體的太極主宰陰陽，因為神妙而區別於陰陽的層面。太極一邊流行，時常在陰陽之中與陰陽發生作用。在朱熹的形而上學體系中，太極雖然主宰變化，但是在變化之中太極是不變的，其位相在逐漸強化。

關鍵詞： 太極，無極，體用，本然之妙，所乘之氣，未發已發之理

Semiotic Analysis of Zhu Xi's Moral Psychology

LEE Seung-hwan

Abstract

This paper aims to clarify the theoretic scheme of Zhu Xi's moral psychology from a semiological point of view. According to the author's analysis, Zhu Xi's moral psychology is composed of two different semiotic frames: the horizontal arrangement of *li* and *qi*, and the vertical arrangement of *li* and *qi*. In Zhu Xi's theoretic scheme, the horizontal frame is applied to describe the ambivalent relationship between *li* (i.e. moral dispositions) and *qi* (i.e. non-moral dispositions), while the vertical frame is applied to explain the ontological relationship in which *li* (i.e. metaphysical principle) supervenes on *qi* (i.e. constitutive matter). While Toegye, by adopting the horizontal frame, tried to depict the ambivalent relationship between *li* (i.e. moral dispositions) and *qi* (i.e. non-moral dispositions); Kobong and Yulgok, by adopting the vertical frame, tried to explain the ontological relationship in which *li* (i.e. metaphysical principle) supervenes on *qi* (i.e. constitutive matter). The seeming discord of two semiotic frames made Chosŏn Neo-Confucian scholars split into two antagonistic groups. In this paper, the author, by explicating the two frames that Zhu Xi adopted, tries to lay a cornerstone to understand the reason why Toegye School and Yulgok School couldn't help but fall into never-ending controversy.

Keywords: Zhu Xi, Toegye, Yulgok, disposition, feeling, emotion, supervenience, covariance

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1. Three Semiotic Frames in Zhu Xi's Moral Psychology

Zhu Xi's theoretic scheme of moral psychology is composed of three semiotic frames: namely, horizontal, vertical, and generative. He adopts a horizontal frame (橫說) to elucidate the axiological relationship between *li* and *qi*, in which *li* (i.e. moral dispositions) and *qi* (i.e. appetitive dispositions) have an antagonistic relationship with each other. The horizontal frame is visually effective to show the ambivalent relationship between moral dispositions and appetitive ones.

On the other hand, Zhu Xi employs a vertical frame (豎說) to elucidate the ontological relationship between *li* and *qi*, in which *li* (i.e. the metaphysical principle) supervenes on *qi* (i.e. the constitutive matter). The vertical frame, as shown in Zhu Xi's analogy of a person riding a horse, is visually effective to designate the dependent relationship of *li* on *qi*. Vertical frame is useful to explain the reason why there are differences in human characters although every human is endowed with the same nature which is originally good. According to Zhu Xi, personal character (*xing* 性) varies in accordance with the change of bodily-matter (*qi*). This kind of explanation may be named 'the principle of covariance,' which means "a difference in bodily-matter necessarily entails the difference in character." In short, the vertical frame is applied to explain the supervenient relationship of *li* on *qi*, while the horizontal frame is employed to explain the antagonistic relationship between *li* and *qi*. The former is ontological, while the latter is axiological.

Zhu Xi also employs a generative frame (發說) in order to designate the transitive process in which an individual's subliminal disposition is actualized as a relational psychological event when it meets with a suitable condition. The transition from disposition (*xing* 性) to feeling/emotion (*qing* 情), from "not-yet aroused" (*wei-fa* 未發) to "already-aroused" (*yi-fa* 已發), from substance (*ti* 體) to function (*yong* 用) are explained in terms of generative frame in Zhu Xi's theoretic scheme.

In this regard, it can be argued from a semiotic point of view that the horizontal, vertical and generative frame all together constitute Zhu Xi's theoretic structure of moral psychology. Since his moral psychology is a synthesis of various intellectual traditions and texts over different periods and schools, his theoretic scheme sometimes seems to lack perfect coherence. It is also doubtful whether the

horizontal frame is in harmony with the vertical one in his overall structure. Moreover, it seems that he did not even attempt to integrate these frames into one well-woven system. Later, the seeming discord between horizontal and vertical frame led Chosŏn Neo-Confucian scholars to adopt only one frame among others, and asserted that their own understanding of Zhu Xi was correct and unalterable.

2. Disposition, Feeling/Emotion and Instantiation

Zhu Xi had an utmost interest in cultivating human character and dispositions. This is the reason why we call Zhu Xi's theory of mind and nature (*xin-xing* 心性) "moral psychology." Why is it so important to cultivate one's character and disposition? A simple answer would be as follows: You will lead a happy life only if you had a spouse with a good character; you will not get involved in any wrongdoing only if you had a friend with a good character; you will enjoy a peaceful time only if you elected an officeholder with a good character. A spouse with a bad character will give you an unhappy life; a friend with an indecent character will tempt you to learn bad habits; and a deceitful and corrupt public officeholder will make people to hope with a sigh that he just leave the office as soon as possible.

"Understanding other's personhood (*zhi-ren*, 知人)" is essential for one to lead a happy life. *The Book of Documents* (書經) states "Those who understand personhood thoroughly are called bright. Only those who are bright can choose and hire the talented."¹ In addition, Confucius, in answering to a disciple who asked about wisdom, replied that "wisdom is an ability to identify a personhood."²

Human character cannot be measured by a scale because it is not an attribute with shape and weight. This is the reason why *xing* (性) is regarded as above-forms (*xing-shang* 形上) in Zhu Xi's moral psychology. If you try to evaluate a person only by one's outward appearance, you are likely to fail. Even Confucius, one who had been admired as a sage, makes this error. When a disciple called Tan-tai mie-ming (澹臺滅明) came up to Confucius to ask a learning, Confucius

1 《尚書》(*shangshu*), <皋陶謨>. "知人則哲，能官人。"

2 《史記》(*Shi Ji*), <仲尼弟子列傳>. "問智，曰：知人。"

did not welcome him because of his ugly appearance. However, Tan-tai mie-ming not only cultivated virtues eagerly, but also behaved according to morality. He also became renowned for his highest virtues among people. Confucius accordingly confessed his mistake of misjudging a person as follows: "I made a mistake of Zi Yu (子羽, Tan-tai mie-ming's courtesy name) by misjudging his personality."³ It will be faulty to presuppose one's character as wild just because of his boar-like appearance. If you consider someone as reckless just because he looks like a wild boar, you are committing "a fallacy of false analogy."

The fact that one has a nice appearance does not necessarily entail that one has a good character. We come to know a person's character not by watching one's outward appearance, but by observing one's continuous actions. In other words, the consistency of one's words and deeds tells us what kind of a person one is, and what kind of dispositions one has. Here, the term "disposition"(性) refers to a comparatively steady and consistent tendency of action. Then, what is action? Action means an event in which one's subliminal disposition is instantiated in a suitable condition. A disposition of a person is actualized as psychological events such as feeling, emotion and a mode of thinking, as well as physical events such as action and behavior.

It may be reasonable to argue that a psychological event precedes a physical one from an ontological point of view. However, let us leave aside for a moment the expression "A psychological event is the cause of a physical one," because it may bring about unnecessarily complicated issues. If a preceding event is to be the cause of a physical one, the preceding event should also be physical. However, a psychological event is not physical. Accordingly, a psychological event cannot be the cause of a physical one. Therefore, I shall for now use the concept "motive" instead of "cause," although the term "motive" is relatively vague. Let me summarize what we have discussed in the above.

- ① It is essential for one to cultivate one's disposition for one's own well-being and prosperity.
- ② One's disposition is revealed to others through the consistency of one's actions.

3 《史記》(*Shi Ji*), <仲尼弟子列傳>.

- ③ The term “action” includes both psychological events such as feeling, emotion and thinking, and physical ones such as act and behavior.
- ④ [Although it is not always the case]⁴, psychological events usually precede physical ones.
- ⑤ Psychological events such as feeling, emotion and thinking are instantiations of one's subliminal disposition in a suitable condition.

3. Zhu Xi's Horizontal Frame: Four Beginnings(四端)-Seven Feelings(七情) and Moral Mind(道心)-Human Mind(人心)

(1) *Four Moral Dispositions*

One's disposition is actualized in psychological events (i.e. feelings and emotions) when it meets with a suitable condition. For instance, let us suppose that there is a person 'A' with a disposition of benevolence(仁). His benevolent disposition is not going to be manifested at any time. When 'A' perceives a child about to fall into water, he feels compassion all of a sudden. In this way, the benevolent disposition of 'A' is instantiated in a specific situation in which the very psychological reaction is on demand. The benevolent disposition is instantiated as a feeling of compassion not only when he witnesses a child on the verge of falling into water, but also when he perceives others suffering a pitiful misery or getting into a serious trouble. The term *xing* (性), in this sense, designates a steady and consistent dispositional trait or character tendency to be instantiated as a similar psychological event in a similar condition.

The disposition of benevolence is manifested as a feeling of compassion in a situation when you see others in pitiable misery or serious trouble. However, if you feel compassion when you see others are enjoying happiness and comfort, it can be said that your feeling of compassion does not correspond to the objective situation. This kind of un-situated reaction would be regarded as an emotional disorder.

⁴ There is also the case when a physical event precedes a psychological one. For instance, we feel a pain after being injured. However, I shall focus on the case when a psychological event precedes a physical one for our present interest in this article.

Inappropriate feeling is a result of one's inability to construe the objective situation. If one has difficulties in assessing a situation or expressing appropriate feelings/emotions, one cannot be regarded as a person of good character.

We can reasonably conjecture what kind of person one is by inferring from the feelings/emotions one expresses in a given situation. In *the Book of Mencius*, the feelings of compassion, shame, courtesy/modesty, and approval/disapproval are called four beginnings (四端) because these phenomenal clues enable us to speculate the hidden dispositions that one bears inside. This is what Zhu Xi meant when he says "comprehending the figure by observing the shadow (見影知形)." According to Mencius, the four beginnings are point-blank emblems by which human beings are distinguished from other animals. In other words, the four dispositions are what make us human beings *per se*. What follows is a moral-psychological explication of the four beginnings:

- ① Benevolence(仁): A person's benevolent disposition is instantiated as the feeling of compassion in a specific situation. One's compassionate feeling gives us a clue by which we can notice whether one is a person of benevolence or not. If one cannot have the feeling of compassion in a given situation where the feeling of compassion is on demand, one is neither benevolent nor decent as a human being.
- ② Righteousness(義): A person's righteous disposition is instantiated as the feeling of shame in a specific situation. 'Xiu(羞)' refers to a feeling of shame for oneself when aware of one's own mistake; while 'wu(惡)' refers to a moral resentment toward unrighteous deeds of others. The feeling of shame/resentment is a clue by which we can notice whether one is a person of righteousness or not. If one cannot have the feeling of shame in a given situation where the feeling of shame/resentment is demanded, one is neither righteous nor decent as a human being.
- ③ Propriety(禮): A person's disposition of propriety is instantiated as the feeling of courtesy and modesty in a specific situation. 'Ci(辭)' is the feeling of polite decline of what one does not truly deserve; while 'rang(讓)' is the feeling of concession to others who properly deserve it. One's feeling of courtesy and modesty gives us a clue by which we can notice whether one is a person of propriety or not. If one does not have the

feeling of courtesy and modesty in a given situation where the feeling of courtesy/modesty is demanded, one is neither courteous nor decent as a human being.

- ④ Wisdom(智): One's disposition of wisdom is manifested as the feeling of approval and disapproval in a specific situation. The feeling of approval and disapproval is rather closer to an immediate feeling about right and wrong than an intellectual reasoning or rational inference. One's feeling of approval and disapproval enables us to know whether one is a person of wisdom. If one does not have the feeling of approval and disapproval in a given situation where the feeling of approval and disapproval is demanded, one is neither wise nor decent as a human being.

According to Mencius, what differentiates humans from other creatures is the four moral dispositions, i.e., benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. The *Doctrine of the Mean* (中庸) states that moral dispositions are mandated(命) by Heaven. With the transmission of Buddhism into China, those dispositions mandated by Heaven soon became identified with the Buddha-nature which is thoroughly pure and undefiled. In the same vein, those pure and undefiled dispositions were also called 'original dispositions (本然之性)' due to the influence of *Surangama sutra* (楞嚴經). In addition, these pure dispositions were termed as 'genuine dispositions that all the creatures commonly share (萬物同一眞性).' They were also defined as 'dispositions of righteousness and dutifulness (義理之性),' 'dispositions of righteousness and justice (道義之性),' and 'dispositions identical with the virtues of Heaven and Earth(天地之性).' Tang dynasty Buddhist scholars regarded that character-dispositions of every human being is as pure as the dharma of the Universe, which is expressed in the famous proposition "*xing-ji-li* (性即理)." It means that the original human nature is identical with the dharma of the Universe. The Sung Neo-Confucian scholar introduced the very proposition into Confucian context, and as a result, claimed that every human being was endowed with the purest dispositions which are identical with the universal principle, *li* (理). This represents Neo-Confucian scholars' optimistic faith in human nature in terms of moral metaphysics.

(2) *Moral Disposition (理) - Appetitive Disposition (氣) and Moral Mind (道心) - Human Mind (人心)*

Dispositions of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom are the emblems by which human beings are qualitatively distinguished from other animals. Mencius insisted that one cannot be a genuine human being if one lacks any of them. If so, do humans have only moral dispositions? Is not it true that even a sage should eat when hungry, and should drink when thirsty? Is not it natural that even a gentleman should bundle up against cold weather, and scratch his body when an insect bites?

Dispositions of longing for food out of hunger, wanting somewhere warm in a cold weather, or scratching an insect bite are natural instincts commonly shared by humans and other animals. As the dispositions of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom are manifested as moral psychological events such as compassion, shame, courtesy/modesty and approval/disapproval in suitable conditions, appetitive dispositions also are instantiated as the physio-psychological feelings such as pain, itch, hunger and thirst in various situations. The reason why I associate “the physiological” with “the psychological” is because these kinds of psychological feelings usually are accompanied by physiological symptoms.

No matter how wise one is, one will feel pain, itch, hunger, or thirst in given situations in which those feelings are needed for one's self-preservation. This is what Zhu Xi calls human mind(人心). I shall illustrate this with my personal story. A few years ago, I had the opportunity to visit a Daoist temple called *Qing yang gong*(青陽宮) in Sichuan Province, China. As other members of my company were leaving the temple after finishing sightseeing, I was left alone to read an inscription of an old monument. When I looked around the main hall in searching for my company, I noticed one Daoist monk with blue garb and topknot. He, darting his eyes around to assure that nobody was there, deftly ran to the altar and devoured fruits that people offered to Gods. When our eyes met, his face suddenly turned red. I detected his shame in his red face. I told him, “Even a super-wise person, as a matter of course, has to have a human mind (*shang-zhi ye you ren-xin de* 上智也有人心的).” After listening to what I have said, he breathed a sigh of relief and gave me a shy smile. When we feel disappointed in someone whom we expect much of, we

comfort ourselves by saying “She/he is also just a human.” This is the human mind. It is a craving that every organic creature equipped with a body naturally possesses for its own self-preservation. While *ren-xin* (人心) is the human mind to preserve one’s bodily life, *dao-xin* (道心) is the moral mind to live up to human decency, that is, the norms and expectations of a community.

One of Zhu Xi’s disciples asked, “Why does a super-wise man have a human mind?” Zhu Xi answered: “Does he not rub a wound or scratch a bite because he has a human mind?” Human beings certainly have both human mind and moral mind, and the former comes from the physiological instinct and the latter is from the righteousness and principle. The feelings of hunger, cold, pain, or itch belong to the human mind; while the feelings of compassion, shame, courtesy/modesty, and approval/disapproval belong to the moral mind. Even the super-wise man has both of them as other humans. The former is too precarious to be settled while the latter is too subtle and abstruse to be detected. Only when the moral mind be the master of the body, and make the human mind obey its orders, can a human being be good.⁵

Those who do not feel any hunger even though they skipped meals for several days would end up starving to death. Those who do not feel any cold even in a temperature of minus 20 degrees would end up freezing to death. Those who have a tumor in their intestines but do not feel any pain would likely die of illness. Those who do not feel itch from pus out of an abscess on their back would rot away. Accordingly, the physio-psychological feelings such as hunger, cold, pain, or itch are the essential feelings that every creature with flesh has to have for the sake of its own preservation. Zhu Xi therefore stated that even a super-wise person cannot but possess human mind. “Human mind” as a natural feeling of instinctive craving is value-neutral, but is susceptible to turn wrong. This is exactly the case when one steals food from others in order to fill only one’s own stomach, or robs clothes from others in order to get oneself warm.⁶ As a result, Zhu Xi claimed that human mind is tentatively

5 《朱子語類》卷62. “問：既雲上智，何以更有人心？曰：掐著痛，抓著癢，此非人心而何？人自有人心。道心，一箇生於血氣，一箇生於義理。饑寒痛癢，此人心也；惻隱羞惡是非辭遜，此道心也。雖上智亦同。一則危殆而難安，一則微妙而難見。‘必使道心常爲一身之主，而人心每聽命焉，’乃善也。”

6 《朱子語類》卷78. “呂德明問人心道心。曰：且如人知饑渴寒煖，此人心也；惻隱羞惡，道心也。只是一箇心，卻有兩樣。須將道心去用那人心，方得。且如人知饑之可食，而不知當食與不當食；知寒之欲衣，而不知當衣與不當衣，此其所以危也。”

dangerous even though it is value-neutral in terms of natural instinct.

In the *Introduction to the Doctrine of the Mean* (中庸章句序), Zhu Xi stated that human mind comes from the privacy of bodily nature (形氣之私) while the moral mind originates from the rightness of original nature endowed by Heaven (性命之正).⁷ The term “*xing-qi-zhi-si* (形氣之私)” refers to individuality of material body. Every human being possesses a body which is her/his own private possession. The body is not connected with or shared by others. In other words, the body is not public but private in its nature. In the meanwhile, the term “*xing-ming-zhi-zheng* (性命之正)” refers to the moral dispositions mandated by the Heaven from which moral mind is actualized. In this sense, moral dispositions are somewhat like a communicative network that connects individuals with public world harmoniously. Moral dispositions are instantiated in a specific situation in which norm-conformity for the community life is on demand, and manifested in the form of moral mind. On the other hand, appetitive dispositions are instantiated in another situation in which craving for self-preservation is required, and manifested in the form of human mind.

In 《*Zhu Zhi da-quan*, 朱子大全》, one of Zhu Xi's disciple called Li Shouyue (李守約) concisely explained that the origin of human mind is dispositions flowed from the material body (形氣之性); while that of moral mind is dispositions flowed from the Way and righteousness (道義之性). Zhu Xi agreed with him that the two modes of mind (i.e. human mind and moral mind) have their own origins i.e. dispositions flowed from the material body and that flowed from the Way and righteousness respectively.

The Book of Mencius suggested two different sources of dispositions and mandates (性命) in the chapter of <pursuing something delicious with mouth>. Appetitive disposition, pursuing delicious food to comfort one's bodily needs, is a disposition flowed from the material body (形氣之性), which a superior man does not consider as the true nature of humans. On the other hand, a disposition for father to be benign to son, or for a sage to put the Heavenly Way (天道) into practice, is that flowed from the Way and righteousness (道義之性), which a superior man takes as the true nature of humans. This is the case when the sage king Shun (舜) mentions that humans have both human mind (人心) and moral mind (道心). Therefore we should practice two minds into action with discretion. Zhu Xi responded to Li Shouye “You are absolutely right!”⁸

7 《中庸章句》(Zhongyong zhangju), <序>. “心之虛靈知覺，一而已矣，而以為有人心 道心之異者，則以其或生於形氣之私，或原於性命之正。”

Appetitive dispositions to comfort one's bodily needs (namely, the disposition flowed from material body, 形氣之性) are actualized in the human mind (人心); on the other hand, moral dispositions to live up to morality (namely, dispositions flowed from the Way and righteousness, 道義之性) are actualized in the moral mind (道心) in different situations respectively. Human mind and moral mind are two ambivalent modes of mind. If human mind wins, we are likely to become morally bad; if moral mind defeats the human mind, we are likely to be morally good. Zhu Xi emphasized that moral mind should be the master of body, and should make the human mind to obey its orders. According to Zhu Xi, human mind and moral mind, as well as disposition which flowed from material body (形氣之性) and that which flowed from the Way and righteousness (道義之性) are in an antagonistic relationship. As a result, these two modes of mind are in a conflicting relationship from an axiological point of view. From a semiotic point of view, Zhu Xi's juxtaposition of human mind and moral mind is a typical example of horizontal frame, which can be summarized in the following diagram.

dispositions flowed from the Way and righteousness (道義之性)	dispositions flowed from material body (形氣之性)
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Moral Mind(道心) Human Mind(人心)
<Horizontal frame: Juxtaposition of Human Mind and Moral Mind>

(3) Moral Disposition - Appetitive Disposition, Four Beginnings - Seven Feelings

Seven feelings of joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate, and desire altogether constitute a system of signs that every creature with material body should not lack for the sake of its own preservation, similar to physio-psychological feelings such as hunger, cold, pain and itch.

8 《朱熹集》(*Zhu Xi ji*) 卷55, <答李守約>. “《孟子》<口之於味>章, 言人之性命有此二端: 自口之嗜味以至四體之嗜安逸, 形氣之性, 君子有弗性焉, 自仁之於父子以至聖人之於天道, 道義之性, 君子性之. 猶舜所謂人心道心之在人, 特要精別而力行之耳. 看得儘好!”

If you cannot feel any fear (懼) when a wild animal is almost upon you, you are likely to be eaten. If you do not have a desire (欲) to eat even after starving for several days, you are likely to die of hunger. Also, if you cannot feel any love (愛) for an attractive partner even when fully grown, you cannot produce the next generation to continue your biological gene. If you do not feel any hate (惡) even though a thief breaks into your house and robs your property, you are likely to be exterminated. If you do not feel any joy (喜) at a field full of swaying golden rice plants after having worked drenched with sweat, you cannot survive at all. If you do not feel any sorrow (哀) even though crops, which you have struggled to grow, are wilting on their stalks and vines, you deserve to starve to death. In this way, these seven feelings such as joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate, and desire function as a sensor to sound a warning so that a human with material body can preserve itself, as do physio-psychological feelings such as hunger, cold, pain and itch.

The four beginnings of compassion, shame, courtesy/modesty, and approval/disapproval are the manifestation of moral dispositions to accord with the moral principle. If so, what kind of dispositions are those that generate seven feelings? Zhu Xi clearly announces that "Four beginnings are the manifestation of *li* (理) while seven feelings are the manifestation of *qi* (氣)."⁹ In this statement, Zhu Xi explains the proposition "disposition actualizes, and manifests in feelings (性發爲情)" from two separate perspectives. In other words, the moral disposition (i.e., *li*) when it meets with a situation in which the actualization of that disposition is on demand, actualizes or manifests in moral feelings such as four beginnings (四端); in the meanwhile, the appetitive disposition (i.e. *qi*) when it meets with another situation in which the actualization of that disposition is on demand, actualizes or manifests in natural feelings such as seven feelings (七情). In this way, Zhu Xi distinguishes moral feelings from natural ones from an axiological point of view, by tracing their origin back to two different sources of *li* and *qi*. This kind of juxtaposition is clearly based on a horizontal frame. Zhu Xi's horizontal explanation of Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings can be arranged in the following diagram.

9 《朱子語類》(*Zhu zhi yu-lei*) 卷83. "四端是理之發, 七情是氣之發."

<i>li</i> (理) Moral Disposition	<i>qi</i> (氣) Appetitive Disposition
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Four Beginnings(四端) Seven Feelings(七情)
 <Horizontal Frame: Juxtaposition of Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings>

(4) Synonyms Concerning Moral Dispositions and Appetitive Dispositions

Zhu Xi, regarding the origin of human mind (人心) and seven feelings (七情), employs various terms to designate appetitive dispositions; for example, *xing-qi-zhi-xing* (形氣之性), *xing-qi* (形氣), *xie-qi* (血氣), *ren-shen* (人身), and simply *qi* (氣), etc. He also uses various terms to designate moral dispositions which are the origin of moral mind (道心) and four beginnings (四端); for example, *dao-yi-zhi-xing* (道義之性), *yi-li-zhi-xing* (義理之性), *ben-ran-zhi-xing* (本然之性), *xing-ming-zhi-zheng* (性命之正), *tian-di-zhi-xing* (天地之性), and *tian-ming-zhi-xing* (天命之性), etc. Here we can find the variety of terms that Zhu Xi employs to designate moral dispositions and appetitive dispositions respectively. Those terms can be summarized in the following table:

<i>li</i> (理, Moral Disposition)	<i>qi</i> (氣, Appetitive Disposition)
道義之性 義理之性 本然之性 性命之正 天地之性 天命之性	形氣之性 血氣 人身 形氣之私 氣質之性 氣質 氣稟 氣習

Moral Mind · Four Beginnings Human Mind · Seven Feelings
 <Horizontal Frame: Juxtaposition of Two Kinds of Dispositions>

As mentioned above, let us pay attention to the point that those terms belonging to the label of *qi* do not directly refer to the physical body. In our daily conversation, we used to say “His *qi* (氣) is too strong” in order to describe his temperamental character, not to mention his physical body. This kind of ordinary expression actually means “His temperament is too boastful that he never yields to others.” Similarly,

the term '*xie-qi*' (血氣) does not refer to one's physiological body, but refers to the character trait of disliking inferiority to others. In the same vein, the term '*ren-shen*' (人身) has nothing to do with the physical body, but actually indicates human desires for food and sex, that is, the instinctive craving for self-preservation. '*Qi-zhi*' (氣質) or '*qi-bing*' (氣稟) also indicates temperamental tendencies which are inborn. Lastly, the term '*Qi-xi*' (氣習) refers to the habitual tendency acquired from social custom and surrounding environment. Therefore, it is fair to call these several terms to mean dispositional trait, acquired habit or instinctive trait as a disposition of '*qi*' (氣) together.

4. Zhu Xi's Vertical Frame: Supervenience (*cheng-ban* 乘伴) and Covariance (*gong-bian* 共變)

As discussed earlier, Zhu Xi explains the origins of human mind/moral mind, and four beginnings/seven feelings by adopting the semiotic device of 'horizontal frame.' On the other hand, he adopts a 'vertical frame' to explain the ontological relationship between the disposition flowed from original nature (本然之性) and that flowed from temperament (氣質之性).

Confucian scholars commonly held the metaphysical belief that every human being was endowed with a purely good nature. For instance, Mencius says that human nature is inherently good. The *Doctrine of the Mean* also states that human nature (性) is what Heaven has mandated. The Confucian belief that human nature is originally good, influenced by Buddhist theory that every being owns a Buddha-nature, gave birth to the concept of *ben-ran-zhi-xing* (本然之性).

Then, in reality, why are there differences among humans despite that every human being is endowed with the same purely good nature? This question is directly related to the famous Neo-Confucian thesis "*li-yi-fen-shu* (理一分殊)" which means "the principle is one, but its manifestations are many." Zhu Xi adopted various metaphors to explain the mechanism of "*li-yi-fen-shu* (理一分殊)"; for example, a moonlight reflected on thousands of rivers, soy sauce mixed with various qualities of water, and a person riding a horse, etc. Among these analogies, the metaphor of "a person riding a horse (人乘馬)" is the most effective one to answer the question raised above. In what follows, I shall explain the mechanism of '*li-yi-fen-shu*' by explaining Zhu Xi's analogy of "a person riding a horse."

Suppose that every rider has the same capacity to ride a horse excellently. However, in a real race, riders pass the finish line in a different order, say, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and etc. Why does it happen? It is simply because horses are different. Difference in horses causes the difference in rider's racing capacity. Even if two riders have the same capacity in horse riding, their capacities in a race are actualized differently due to the difference of the quality of horses. In other words, a rider's capacity of horse-riding is actualized differently in accordance with the quality of horses. This argument can be generalized in the following way; "difference in supervenient base entails the difference in what supervenes." Zhu Xi's famous thesis "If *qi* varies, *li* also varies in accordance with it (*qi-yi-li-yi*, 氣異理異)" is just about the case. This is Zhu Xi's theory of covariance.

Zhu Xi employs the theory of covariance to explain the ontological relationship between character-dispositions (性) and bodily-temperament (氣/氣質). According to Zhu Xi, difference in bodily-temperament entails the difference in character-dispositions, even though every human being is endowed with the same character-dispositions originally. He calls the character-dispositions defined by bodily-temperament "*qi-zhi-zhi-xing* (氣質之性)."

In sum, Zhu Xi's theory of supervenience is composed of three subordinate principles as the following:

(1) *The Principle of Dependency*

Li denotes the character-dispositions inherent in the bodily-temperament of humans. *Qi* indicates the supervenient base on which *li* is riding. Since *qi* is below-forms (形而下), it has the property of motion and rest, and can be perceived by sensory organs. In the meanwhile, since *li* is above-forms (形而上), it does not have the property of motion/rest, accordingly cannot be perceived by sensory experiences.

Li as character-dispositions (性) cannot exist independent of *qi*. This is the same case as the horse-rider who cannot run the race without riding a horse. Likewise, *li* cannot exist independent of *qi*, and should depend on *qi* for its own existence. In Zhu Xi's literature, "the principle of dependency of *li* on *qi*" is expressed by several spatial metaphors; such as 'relying on (*yi-fu*, 依附),'¹⁰ 'adhered to (*fu-zhe*, 附

10 《朱子語類》(*Zhu zhi yu-lei*) 卷6. "理無事, 則無所依附."

著),¹¹ 'riding on (*gua-da*, 掛搭)¹² and 'installed in (*an-dun*, 安頓),¹³ etc. Here, it is very important to note that although *li* is ontologically dependent on *qi*, however it does not imply that *li* is axiologically dependent on *qi*.

(2) *The Principle of Non-Reducibility*

According to Zhu Xi, *li* cannot be mixed with *qi*, since the former is above-forms and the latter below-forms. *Li* as metaphysical principle cannot be reduced to the physical (namely, *qi*); likewise, *li* as character-dispositions cannot be reduced to bodily-matter (namely *qi* or *qi-zhi*). If *li* could be reduced to *qi*, the world would become nothing but a chaos, that is, a disorderly motion of matters. If this were the reality of the world, it would be impossible to find any patterns, principles or laws inherent in a phenomenal world. For these reasons, just as Aristotle's notion of 'form' cannot be reduced to 'matter,' Zhu Xi's *li* also cannot be reduced to *qi*.

(3) *The Principle of Covariance*

Li is not able to move or rest by itself, but should supervene on *qi* in order to move or rest.¹⁴ This is similar to the case of a horse rider,

11 《朱子語類》(*Zhu zhi yu-lei*)卷1. “如陰陽五行錯綜不失條緒，便是理。若氣不結聚時，理亦無所附著。”

12 《朱子語類》(*Zhu zhi yu-lei*)卷1. “理又非別爲一物，即存乎是氣之中；無是氣，則是理亦無掛搭處。”

13 《朱子語類》(*Zhu zhi yu-lei*)卷74. “無那氣質，則此理無安頓處。”

14 Zhu Xi's statement “*Li* moves or rests by means of supervening on *qi*” is found in several parts of the *Zhu zhi yu-lei* (朱子語類). Following five examples reveal this idea clearly.

① 《朱子語類》卷94. “問：動靜者，所乘之機。曰：太極，理也；動靜，氣也。氣行則理亦行，二者常相依而未嘗相離也。太極猶人，動靜猶馬；馬所以載人，人所以乘馬。馬之一出一入，人亦與之一出一入。蓋一動一靜，而太極之妙未嘗不在焉。此所謂「所乘之機」，無極二五所以妙合而凝也。”

② 《朱子語類》卷94. “問：「動而生陽，靜而生陰」。注：「太極者本然之妙，動靜者所乘之機」。太極只是理，理不可以動靜言，惟「動而生陽，靜而生陰」，理寓於氣，不能無動靜「所乘之機」。「乘」如乘載之「乘」，其動靜者，乃乘載在氣上，不覺動了靜，靜了又動。曰：然。”

③ 《朱子語類》卷94. “動靜者，所乘之機。「機」，言「氣機」也。詩云：「出入乘氣機」。”

④ 《朱子語類》卷94. “周貴卿問：「動靜者，所乘之機」。曰：「機」，是關捩子。踏著動底「機」，便挑撥得那靜底；踏著靜底「機」，便挑撥得那動底。”

⑤ 《朱子語類》卷5. “先生「太極圖解」云：「動靜者，所乘之機也」。蔡季通聰明，看得這般處出，謂先生下此語最精。蓋太極是理，形而上者；陰陽是氣，形而下者。然理無形，

who cannot run the race by himself, but runs together with a horse by supervening on the movement of the horse.¹⁵

Zhu Xi's idea of covariance is very effective to explicate the proposition of "*li-yi-fen-shu*." What is the reason for human beings to have different character-dispositions although every human being is endowed with the same originally good nature? The body of a human being is composed of matters (*qi*), the difference of which results in the difference of each being's character-dispositions. In other words, the difference in *qi* entails the difference in *xing*.¹⁶ If there is no difference in *qi* which comprises two individual beings, then, their *xing* would be identical. For example, if two individuals are composed of the same *qi* which is totally pure and genuine, their character-dispositions will be equally pure and genuine, i.e. impartial and fair (中正). Sage kings such as Yao and Shun are the case.¹⁷

As discussed in the above, Zhu Xi employs the analogy of "a person riding a horse" to elucidate the idea of supervenience. In this sense, his theory of supervenience is based on the vertical frame from a semiotic point of view.

<i>Li</i> (理)	above-forms(形而上) · <i>Dao</i> (道) · <i>xing</i> (性)
<i>Qi</i> (氣)	below-forms(形而下) · <i>qi</i> (器) · <i>xing-qi</i> (形氣)

<Vertical Frame: *Li* supervenes on *qi*>

From a semiological point of view, Zhu Xi's vertical frame (豎說) is the result of re-arranging the horizontal frame (橫說) to an upright position. The transition from horizontal arrangement to vertical re-arrangement of *li* and *qi* causes a critical change in the concept of *qi*. In the horizontal frame, *qi* designates the appetitive dispositions which have an antagonistic relationship with *li* which stands for the moral dispositions. However, in the vertical frame, *qi* does not designate dispositions anymore, but designates the "ontological base" that loads *li* (i.e. character-dispositions). Zhu Xi gives a special name for this meaning of *qi* "*so-cheng-zhi-ji* (所乘之機)." In sum, *qi* in Zhu

而氣卻有跡。氣既有動靜，則所載之理亦安得謂之無動靜？

15 《朱子語類》卷94. "太極猶人，動靜猶馬；馬所以載人，人所以乘馬。馬之一出一入，人亦與之一出一入。"

16 《朱熹集》卷50, <答程正思16>. "形氣既異，則其生而有得乎天之理，亦異。"

17 《朱子語類》卷59. "堯舜自稟得清明純粹底氣，又稟得極厚，所以為聖人。" 《朱子語類》卷36. "天生聖人，氣稟清明，自是與他人不同。"

Xi's vertical frame does not have a connotation of disposition, but designates "ontological base" that carries *xing* (性) on. Zhu Xi uses various terms to designate the "ontological base": for example, *qi* (氣), *qi-ji* (氣機), *so-cheng-zhi-ji* (所乘之機), and *xing-qi* (形氣), etc.

The ontological base that constitutes a person's body has a significant influence on his character-dispositions. For instance, one who is seriously ill hardly has a feeling of compassion toward others who are in pitiable misery. It is because the physio-psychological condition that she/he is confronting causes her/him to be exclusively self-centered, and obstructs the actualization of her/his benevolent disposition. Additionally, those who are striving to survive in a war or disaster rarely have the feeling of shame even when they face an unjust situation. It is because their physio-psychological condition to care for the self diminishes their disposition of righteousness (We need to bear in mind that physio-psychological conditions of an individual are not unrelated to socio-economic environments surrounding oneself.) Therefore, a difference in *qi*, the supervenient base, brings about a difference in *xing* (性), which supervenes. Although human beings are endowed with the same *li* (moral disposition), the difference in ontological bases cause the difference in character-dispositions. This can be summarized in a following theorem: "a difference in supervenient base (i.e. *qi*) entails the difference in what supervenes (i.e. *li* or *xing*). This is what Zhu Xi meant by the proposition "*qi-yi-li-yi* (氣異理異)."

The concept of supervenience is useful because it can provide a logical answer to the question that "why are people's character-dispositions so different although every being has been endowed with the same nature?" It can also provide theoretic guidance in relation to the project of moral psychology, which deals with the problem of transforming temperaments and recovering the original nature. Zhu Xi classifies human temperaments into eight categories: namely, fair, partial, flexible, obstinate, clear, murky, pure, and mixed. Although every human being was endowed with the same nature which is originally good, in accordance with the difference of bodily-temperament, their actual character-dispositions show differences. Therefore, to recover the original nature, it is first required to transform the bodily-temperament, which is the supervenient base of one's character-dispositions. For instance, it is essential to transform one's partial temperament in order to change one's warped character. It is necessary to transform one's obstinate and prejudiced temperament in order to change one's stubborn and

self-justified character, and necessary to transform one's murky and mixed temperament in order to change one's dishonest and hypocritical character. This is Zhu Xi's idea of transforming the temperaments. He did not recommend a brain surgery or chemical medication for the transformation of temperaments. He instead suggested staying in seriousness and fostering the original mind (*ju-jing-han-yang* 居敬涵養) and investigating the principles of things/events and accordingly acquiring knowledge (*ge-wu-zhi-zhi* 格物致知).

character-dispositions (<i>xing</i> , 性)	
fair (<i>zheng</i> , 正)	partial(<i>pian</i> , 偏)
flexible & comprehensive understanding (<i>tong</i> , 通)	obstinate & lack of understanding (<i>sai</i> , 塞)
clear (<i>qing</i> , 清)	murky (<i>zhuo</i> , 濁)
pure (<i>cui</i> , 粹)	mixed (<i>bo</i> , 駁)

<Vertical Frame: Character-dispositions supervene on temperaments>

5. Semiotic Frames and the Divergence of Chosŏn Neo-Confucian Schools

In the above, I have discussed two major frames that constitute Zhu Xi's theory of moral psychology: horizontal and vertical. These two frames are useful in different contexts. The horizontal frame is effective in the context of moral psychology in that it makes it possible to trace the sources of two ambivalent groups of feelings (that is, four beginnings and seven feelings) to *li* (moral dispositions) and *qi* (appetitive dispositions) respectively; it also makes it possible to trace the sources of two modes of mind (that is, human mind and moral mind) to the disposition flowing from the Way and righteousness (道義之性) and disposition flowing from material body (形氣之性) respectively. In this way, Zhu Xi classifies psychological feeling-states into two distinguished groups, and traces the origin of those states back to two distinguished character-dispositions. As a result, we are able to reflect, transform and cultivate our character-dispositions. On the other hand, the vertical frame is helpful in explaining ontologically

why people come to have different character-dispositions, and guide people how to transform her/his malicious temperaments from a perspective of character psychology.

As shown in the above, Zhu Xi's theory of moral psychology is composed of two major semiotic frames, namely, horizontal and vertical. These two frames functioned as a railroad turnout for the divergence of Chosŏn Neo-Confucian schools. Chosŏn Neo-Confucian scholars had different views on Zhu Xi's moral psychology in accordance with their different understanding of the semiotic frames. Due to their dissimilar position on the frames, Chosŏn Neo-Confucian scholars could not reach an agreement, but remained parallel with each other. Chosŏn scholars put forth their opinions locked in only one of the frames, but could not realize what kind of frame their opponents were using.

Scholars from opposing schools could not grasp what kind of frame their opponents were based on, but fiercely criticized each other, arguing that the other party were totally ignorant about Zhu Xi's theory of *li* and *qi*. Even scholars belonging to the same school clashed over two frames. Chosŏn Neo-Confucian scholars' mutual misapprehension of the opposite party's frame led to miscommunication among themselves, and as a result, they criticized and attacked one another. For instance, Toegye (退溪, 李滉) and Kobong (高峯, 奇大升)'s debate on the origin of four beginnings and seven feelings is a prominent case. While Toegye, by adopting the horizontal frame, adhered to the ambivalent relationship between *li* (that is, moral dispositions) and *qi* (that is, appetitive dispositions), Kobong, by adopting the vertical frame, clung to supervenience relationship in which *li* (that is, the metaphysical principle) rides on *qi* (that is, the bodily-matter).

In addition, Wugye (牛溪, 成渾) and Yulgok (栗穀, 李珥) who were close friends in seeking the *Daq* disagreed with each other concerning the origin of four beginnings and seven feelings, also concerning the origin of human mind and moral mind. While Yulgok, by adopting the vertical frame, aligned *li* and *qi* in an up-down position; Wugye, by adopting the horizontal frame, arranged *li* and *qi* in a left-right position. Furthermore, Oeam (巍巖, 李柬) and Namdang (南塘, 韓元震) who belonged to the same Yulgok school, disagreed with each other because of their slanted views on the two frames. Namdang understood Zhu Xi's theory from a perspective of supervenience, that is, the vertical frame. On the contrary, Oeam

classified the key concepts of Zhu Xi's moral psychology into two antagonistic groups, and considered them in terms of axiological contrast, that is, the horizontal frame. The fierce debate between Oe-am and Namdang *finally* led the Noron (老論) school further split into two tiny sects: namely, Horon (湖論) and Nakron (洛論).¹⁸

Additionally, Hwaso(華西, 李恒老) and Ganjae(艮齋, 田愚), who were not affiliated with any school ties, even argued with each other in regard to the two semiotic frames. Hwaso, by conceiving the relationship between *li* and *qi* as conflicting one, proposed his argument on the basis of horizontal frame. But Ganjae, by insisting that *li* supervenes on *qi*, fiercely criticized Hwaso from a perspective of vertical frame. There was endless miscommunication, dis-communication and conflicts among Neo-Confucian scholars due to the divergent understanding of semiotic frames until the end of Chosŏn Dynasty.

As we have seen in the above, those semiotic frames that constitute Zhu Xi's moral psychology had functioned as a railroad turnout in Chosŏn Neo-Confucianism. This is the reason why we have to carefully re-examine Zhu Xi's theoretic scheme from a perspective of semiotic frames.

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18 For this issue, please see my article, "Namdang's theory of supervenience and his vertical frame," *Studies of Asian Philosophy*, Vol. 45(2012).

朱熹道德心理學的記號論的分析

李 承 煥

中文摘要：本論文爲了究明朝鮮儒學分爲兩大支脈的理由，從“記號配置方式”的觀點上分析其思想源泉的朱子性理學。從“記號配置方式”的觀點上來看，朱子性理學由橫說、豎說、發說等三個框架所構成。“橫說”是將在價值論的觀點上處於矛盾關係的兩個屬性(或傾向)左右展開，進行對比說明的記號配置方式；“豎說”是將形而上的“原理”乘著形而下的“材料”而共變的存在論的機制說明爲乘伴關係的記號配置方式；“發說”是爲了說明處於潛在態(未發)的一個屬性轉換爲現實態(已發)的存在論的轉換過程的記號配置方式。點綴朝鮮儒學史的無數性理論爭是由於構成朱子性理學的三框架中“橫說”和“豎說”的對立而產生的。例如，退溪立足於“橫說”，將“理”(道德傾向)和“氣”(欲求傾向)之間的矛盾關係說明爲道德心理學的傾向二元論，而高峰和栗穀則立足於“豎說”，將形而上的原理(即“理”)乘著形而下的材料(即“氣”)而共變的存在論的機制說明爲乘伴論。“橫說”和“豎說”之間的區別就使得朝鮮儒學不能一致而分爲兩個支脈。本論文指出，以“橫說”、“豎說”、“發說”等代言的“記號配置方式”才是能夠充分了解在朝鮮儒學史上展開的性理論爭的方法論的框架。

關鍵詞：朱子，退溪，高峰，栗穀，橫說，豎說，框架

Three Differences between Buddhism and Confucianism

----- Zhu Xi's Argument and Explanation

Li Cheng-gui

Abstract

This essay analyzes Zhu Xi's thoughts on the differences between Confucianism and Buddhism in the following three aspects: the characteristics of noumenon, the concern of ethics and the method of self-cultivation. In Confucianism, noumenon is "one"; in Buddhism, it is "two." In the aspect of ethical concern, Confucian ethics state that all is endowed by nature. However, Buddhism considers ethics as a burden and aims to get away from it. As for cultivating oneself, Confucianism recommends practices according to the natural order. On the other hand, Buddhism seeks peace and calmness in mind with intention. Therefore, Buddhism and Confucianism are different in both the root and the end. Zhu Xi summarized scholars' discussions on the differences between Confucianism and Buddhism since Bei Song dynasty and could inspire modern scholars as well. Nevertheless, Zhu Xi's misinterpretation of Buddhism in his analysis should not be forgotten.

Keywords: Zhu Xi, Buddhism Confucianism Three Differences

Though Confucians in Song dynasty devoted themselves to finding differences between Buddhism and Confucianism and to judging them, Zhu Xi was not satisfied with the results. Why do we say so? First, though Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, Zhang Zai who were valued much by Zhu Xi for their hard work in distinguish the two philosophies, Zhu Xi was not satisfied with that.¹ Second, Xie Liangzuo, You Zuo, Yang Shi

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1 Li Chenggui: *Ru Shi Shi Yu Zhong de Fo Yao--Song Dai Ru Shi Fo Jiao Guan Yan Jiu*, Chapter two, Chapter three, Zongjiao Wenhua Chu Ban She 2007.

—three disciples of the two Chungs—regarded that Confucianism and Buddhism had same noumenon but different uses, which, according to Zhu Xi, was quite incorrect. Thus it is urgent to draw a line between Buddhism and Confucianism. What notable work had Zhu Xi done in this area?

Characteristics of Noumenon: “Noumenon and Its Function as One” vs “Noumenon and Its Function as Two”

Zhu Xi enumerated “*Taiji*, benevolence, nature, mind and sincerity” to describe noumenon in his *Jinsi lu* (*Reflections of Things of Heart*). According to Zhu Xi, these categories can be identified as *Dao* or Noumenon in Confucianism. As for the characteristics of the *Dao* or Noumenon, some descriptions in *Zhongyong* (*the Doctrine of Mean*) might be inspiring. For example, *Zhongyong* says “*Dao* is not far from human beings. If people alienate from others when they practice *Dao*, it is not the true *Dao*” (*Zhongyong* Chapter 13). This means that *Dao* is closely connected with people and its value lay and was embedded in people’s life. Another saying in *Zhongyong* goes, “*Dao* originates from common man and woman. At the same time, it is profound enough to understand the universe” (*Zhongyong* Chapter 12). This shows that *Dao* is profound as well as ordinary and it runs through the heaven and earth. A third sentence from *Zhongyong* says, “The feature of human nature is to merge inside and outside. Thus it can be applied at any time” (*Zhongyong* Chapter 25). This tells us that *Dao* is incarnated with both immanence and externality, which are inseparable. Obviously, these classic discourses inspired the scholars’ understanding of Confucianism in Song dynasty, specifically about the nature of the *Dao* and Noumenon. Zhu Xi’s discussion about the difference between Confucianism and Buddhism is very representative.

(1) *Relations between the different categories of Dao: Confucianism’s Dao is one while Buddhism’s is two.*

As mentioned above, Zhu Xi stated in *Jinsi lu* (co-written by Lv Zuqian) that things such as “*Taiji*, benevolence, nature, mind and sincerity” were considered as “*Dao*” But what is the relationship between these different categories? Are they isolated items or closely

connected to each other? Zhu Xi believed that to Confucianism, these categories are the same thing with different names, while to Buddhism, they are separated different from each other. He claimed that "the difference between Confucianism and Buddhism lies in that Confucianism considers *xin* (mind) and *Li* (the principle of universal order) as one while Buddhism separates them into two."² But why does Buddhism believe so? He analyzed that "we Confucians regards *xin* (mind or heart-mind) and *Li* (the principle of universal order) as one while Buddhism regards them as two. This is due to the different things they perceive around them and the different ways of understanding the universe. In Buddhism, the mind is empty, while Confucians believed that mind is seemingly empty but in fact contains the whole universe"³. This is to say that Buddhism believed that the mind, in itself, is empty and contains nothing, meaning they considered *xin* and *Li* as different things. On the other hand Confucianism believed though *xin* is empty but still contains whole universe and everything in it. In fact, it was the consensus among Confucians in Song and Ming dynasties that *xin*, *Li*, *Liang Zhi* (intuitive knowledge), benevolence are one. For example, once Cheng Yi said: "As to heaven, *Dao* is destiny; to Righteousness (Yi), reason (*Li*); to human beings, their nature; to their physical body. All of these are the same"⁴. Lu Jiuyuan said, "We have only one mind (Xin), one principle of universal order (*Li*). These two is not telling the different things and could never be separated."⁵ Wang Yangming also agreed that, "to different things, our mind (Xin) has different names. To objects, mind (Xin) is *Li*. When dealing with the daily affairs, mind (Xin) is righteousness (Yi). In human nature, it is virtuousness."⁶ The Noumenon of mind is nature (*xing*). Nature (*xing*) is *Li*."⁷ From these sayings, we can see that though in Confucianism *Dao* has been

2 Da Zhen Zi Shang, Hui'an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wen Ji, Vol.56, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(23), p.2689, Shanghai Guji Chu Ban She, Anhui Jiaoyu Chu Ban She, 2002.

3 Da Zhen Zi Shang, Hui'an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wenji, Vol.56, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(23), p.2691

4 Yi Chuan Xiansheng Yu Si, Henan Cheng Shi *Yishu* Vol.18, Er Cheng Ji, p.204, Zhonghua Shuju, 1981

5 Shu Yu Zeng Zhai Zhi, Lu Jiuyuan Ji Vol.1, Lu Jiuyuan Ji, p.4, Zhonghua Shuju, 1980

6 Yu Wang Chunfu, Wang Yangming Quan Ji Volum4, p.156, Shanghai Guji Chu Ban She, 1995

7 Chuanxi Lu, Wang Yangming Quan Ji Vol.1, p.24

expressed in different names with different connotations, essentially they are one. So *Dao* in Confucianism is the origin of life and creates creature, which is again called "various underlying principles of various objects acquiring from the original One" (*li-yi-fen-shu* 理一分殊). This is different from Buddhism. As Buddhism's mind (*xin*) and nature (*xing*) is empty with nothing, they are not comparable to Confucianism's benevolence, *Li*, and intuitive knowledge.

(2) Relations of Noumenon and its function: the Dao of Confucianism is one while Buddhism's Dao is two

Approaching from the aspect of noumenon and its function, we can see that Confucianism's *Dao* perceives its noumenon and function or operation as one without difference. For instance, Two Chungs said "mind is the only thing. Someone sees it by its noumenon; someone sees it by its function. All depend on what people see."⁸ Zhu Xi shared the same opinion on this issue. He said, "Though Buddhists focused on clearing up one mind, they did not know the noumenon of mind clearly. According to them, mind generates everything. In fact, in Buddhism's idea there are real things out of one's mind. Thus they do not reach the truth of the universe, as they cut off the contact between the inside and the outside. However, their preachers preach the obscure scriptures and doctrines and never would be willing to say there is another primordial origin apart from the mind. We Confucianism's *xin* (mind) is all-inclusive. It contains all things like time, order, destiny, penalty, and compassion, sense of shame, righteousness, and humility bestowed by the heaven. Nothing is left outside one's *xin* (mind). Meniscus believed one could know his nature when he devoted his mind therefore know the nature of the heaven. To keep and protect this *xin* (mind), to cultivate this nature are a way to serve the heaven. Could heaven and human, nature and destiny be separated?"⁹ In Confucianism, *xin* (mind) is time, order, destiny, penalty, compassion, sense of shame, righteousness, and humility bestowed by the heaven. To keep and protect this mind, to cultivate this nature is a way to serve heaven and know the nature of heaven.

⁸ Yu Lv Dalin Lun Zhongshu, Er Cheng Wen Ji Vol.9, Er Cheng Ji Vol.2, p.609

⁹ Yu Zhang Qinfu, Hui'an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wen Ji, Vol.30, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(21), p.1327

Thus there is no difference between the nature of human beings and that of heaven, nor is there any difference between the inside and the outside. However, the Buddhist concept of mind is not as such. To Buddhism, there are real things that exist beyond the control of one's mind. So it is hard for Buddhism to find the origin in the mind, which causes the gap between the inside and the outside. Buddhism does not understand the noumenon of mind and the "oneness" of heaven and human beings, the "oneness" of nature and destiny. In Zhu Xi's ideas, noumenon and function are in one to both mind (*xin*) and nature (*xing*). He said: "Though Buddhists say that they know mind and see the nature, they cannot spread their idea. The reason lies in that they separate the nature and mind into two different things. Sages would know their nature clearly and do according to that. All the teachings abide by this rule and originate from this 'oneness.' Though the universe is full of varieties of things and functions, they are all embraced in one's nature. Buddhism knows the nature. But when it comes to the function in daily life, they would forsake their monarch and father. This is just due to the rupture of the noumenon and the function."¹⁰ Though Buddhism knows mind and nature, they cannot apply their knowledge to daily life. So Buddhism's noumenon and function are separated, which can be seen from the fact that they abandon monarchs and parents to go to a temple to practice self-cultivation. On the other hand, Confucianism applies the knowledge of mind and nature to daily life. We can see that in Confucianism mind and nature are regarded as the noumenon. And this noumenon and its function are considered inseparable, while they are separated in Buddhism.

(3) Relations of perfect self-cultivation and benevolent governance: the Dao of Confucianism is one while Buddhism's Dao is two.

The so-called the interior and exterior of *Dao* could be interpreted as inner self-cultivation and outer benevolent governance. Inner self-cultivation is morally cultivating and growing oneself. It is about becoming a righteous person. Outer benevolent governance is efficiently administering social affairs. This is about how to behave in the society. To Confucianism, having a great personality and practicing it are one

10 Shi Shi, *Zhuzi Yulei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.2743.

and the same. For instance, on the topic of awakening, the Confucianism concept contains practical affairs, while Buddhism sees everything as a void. Zhu Xi said, "Buddhism's awakening is to do nothing, while Confucianism's is to see *Li* (the principle of universal order). When a Confucian awakens, he perceives everything in this universe to have its reason and position. Every human thing is reflecting the order of the universe. This is what is called time, order, destiny and penalty bestowed by the heaven."¹¹ Buddhism finds its final satisfaction in and stops at awakening. After having awakened, they would do nothing. However, Confucianism's awakening means knowing time, order, destiny, and penalty bestowed by the heaven and aims at dealing with the social affairs. We can say that Buddhism's awakening is quite similar to Confucianism's "inner respect and solemn to keep moral and soul cultivation" (敬以直內) but has no Confucianism's "outer righteous rules to regulate social practice" (義以方外): "Someone Asking: How does Buddhism have such things as "inner respect and solemn to keep moral and soul cultivation (敬以直內)"? Answering: They have introspection. However, this is different from Confucianism. Buddhism has no patience. Their final end is to hide in hermitage. We Confucians just put ourselves in the social life to deal with problems, to fix problems."¹² This is to say that although Buddhism's awakening has its own introspection to keep moral and soul cultivation (敬以直內), it lacks the ability to deal with social affairs. Without this outer function, Buddhism's inner cultivation is in vain; furthermore we can see that differences between Buddhism and Confucianism lie on rightness and wrongness as well. For another example, as to the idea of restraining oneself and observing proprieties (克己復禮), Zhu Xi believed that Buddhism just has the former—restraining oneself (克己)—but not the latter—observing proprieties (復禮). He said, "Restraining oneself means to strive to cultivate oneself. Observing the proprieties means to have everything regulated and appropriately planned in oneself. Restraining yourself naturally leads to observing the proprieties if every step is conformed to rules. This does not mean restraining oneself and observing the proprieties are two separate things. Buddhism only has theories and practices of restraining oneself which might result in chaos in the social order, such as the relationship of

11 Da Zhan Jianshan, *Zhu Zi Da Quan* Vol.46, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(22), p.2123

12 Cheng Zi Zhi Shu, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.96, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(17), p.2224

sovereign and chancellor turns into the relationship of father and son and father and son to sovereign and chancellor.”¹³ In the theory of Confucianism, restraining oneself means that one acts according to regulations and proprieties. Thus, restraining oneself and observing proprieties are one thing. Why? Restraining oneself belongs to the interior activities, while observing proprieties belongs to the exterior activities. But this does not mean that these are two different things. Observing proprieties is practiced in daily social life, which is quite different from Buddhism. Due to the fact that Buddhism disregards the human relationships between sovereign and chancellor, wife and husband, brothers and friends and ignores benevolence, righteousness, ritual, fidelity and filial obedience, even though Buddhism requires restraining oneself, it is just self-cultivation for the benefit oneself alone. Naturally, this can be regarded as having no “observing proprieties” and an isolation between the inside and outside. Zhu Xi clearly saw this, “Both Buddhism and *Daoism* exert great efforts on the cultivation of restraining themselves but cannot observe the proprieties. Though we cannot conclude that Buddhism and *Daoism* have their selfish desires, it is meaningless if they only practice restraining themselves inside, with no outside proprieties and rituals in their eyes.”¹⁴ Therefore, from the point of perfect self-cultivation and benevolent governance, *Dao* in Confucianism is one, while Buddhism is two.

(4) Relations of learning, practicing on the lower social level and knowing mandate of heaven on the higher level (下學上達): Confucianism's Dao is one, while Buddhism's Dao is two

In the theory of Confucianism, the so-called higher level refers to metaphysical *Dao* knowledge about morality, nature and destiny. The lower level refers to moral practice in society. Confucianism advocates merging the two levels together into one. Learning in the lower level equals to knowing on the higher level. However, Buddhism has just the higher level: knowing what is bestowed by heaven. Even this knowing of the higher level is inadequate in Buddhism. Zhu Xi said: "It is only after you learning and practicing in the society then could

13 *Lun Yu Er Shi San, Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.41, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(15), p.934.

14 *Lun Yu Er Shi San, Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.41, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(15), p.936

you know the nature and heaven. There exit some scholars learning and practicing but fail to know the knowledge bestowed by the heaven. This is caused by their improper method of learning and practicing. If the method is correct, they would achieve their final end of reaching the mandate of heaven. Buddhism focuses on the higher-level of knowing the mandate of heaven but ignores the lower-level of learning and practicing in the society.”¹⁵ Zhu Xi believed that, generally speaking, these two levels correspond to each other and are combined together. The lower level’s learning and practicing is the premise of the higher level’s knowing. If one does not practice well, this learning and practicing would fail to promote upward. Buddhism’s ignorance of the lower level leads to the meaninglessness of its higher level. The inconsistency of Buddhism’s lower level learning and higher level knowing also reflects on “respect”(敬). Confucianism values “respect” and pays less attention to “tranquility”(靜). They believed that one can observe and know things thoroughly by bearing “respect.” However, to do this, one has to accomplish every concrete thing with “respect.” Otherwise, the lower and higher level is inconsistent. “People’s mind tends to preserve with ‘respect.’ Without ‘respect,’ people’s mind might get lost. Both Buddhism and Daoism pay enough attention on ‘respect.’ But they only know one side of the coin.”¹⁶ Zhu Xi regarded the behaviour of boasting mind and nature without thoroughly learning *Li* as a malpractice. This is the same as Buddhism. Because Buddhism just knows the world of nirvana and neglects secular world. Zhu Xi said, “Everyone has the ability of judging right and wrong, which is the outset of knowing. Without this outset, one could not be regarded as a real human being. Thus learning how to judge right and wrong is one of ways to understand the universe and urgent for scholars to pursue. However, on this point, Mr. Zhang rejected it. I could see that he is on the wrong way to pursue the heavenly principles! This is just Buddhism’s idea on caring only about the supreme Bodhi and leaving the abilities of judging right and wrong. Alas! This is where Buddhism and Confucianism start to differ.”¹⁷

Analyzing, understanding and judging right and wrong is essential

15 *Lun Yu Er Shi Liu*, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.44, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(15), p.1018

16 Xue Liu, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.12, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(14), p.187

17 Zhang Wugou Zhong Yong Jie, Hui’an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wen Ji Vol.72, f *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(24), p.3476

in knowing the universe. Without this ability, it is just Ch'an's supreme Bodhi without right and wrong. This is also pointed out by Two Chongs, who said " Buddhism focuses on knowing the higher level, ignoring the lower level's learning and practicing, which breaks the noumenon and the function therefore is not the true *Dao*"¹⁸

To summarize, from the four aspects discussed above we can safely draw the conclusion that Buddhism and Confucianism are clearly different from each other. To Confucianism, noumenon and function, the inside and the outside, learning and practicing from the lower level and knowing the destiny of the higher level are "one," While to Buddhism they are separated into two. As two Chongs put it, "only realizing that lower level's practice and higher level's knowledge, noumenon and function, as well as the inside and the outside are one, could we say that is the idea of *Dao*"¹⁹ That is why Zhu Xi reiterated that we could not confuse the Confucianism's *Dao* and that of Buddhism's, saying "there are similarities between ideas of Confucianism and Buddhism. But the similarity only stays on the surface not in the immanence. We have to be careful. Master Ming *Dao* differentiated this, which is worth our savoring. He must have understood thoroughly, otherwise he could not see so clearly the difference between them."²⁰

Concern of Ethics: "Conditional Benevolence" vs "Unconditional Benevolence"

The difference between Buddhism and Confucianism in the aspect of ethics has always been a hot topic among Confucians. Nearly all Confucians agree that the idea of Buddhism does harm to ethics and is extremely different from the Confucian idea which exerts great efforts on building secular ethics among people and promoting peoples' morality. Then, in Zhu Xi's opinion, what is the difference between Buddhism and Confucianism in the aspect of ethics?

(1) *With or without the codes of ethics*

18 Henan Cheng Shi Cui Yan Vol.1, Er Cheng Ji Vol.4, p.1179 ,Zhonghua Shu Ju, 1981

19 Henan Cheng Shi Yi Shu Vol.1, Er Cheng Ji Vol.1, p.3

20 Da Wu Dounan, Hui'an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wen Ji Vol.59, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(23), p.2836

Zhu Xi believed that Confucianism has norms and standards which have to be followed. He said, "Someone asking: the reason why Confucianism is different from Buddhism is that Confucianism has norms and standards while Buddhism has no such things. My answer is that once we Confucians have understood and set up certain norms, we follow them. Buddhists tend to perform without fixed rules, which is the weak point of Buddhism."²¹ Just because Buddhism set no fixed rules to abide by, they have a wild manner in behaviors and no control in feelings. Zhu Xi commented, "Buddhists know to sit down. But when they sit, they could bear various sitting posture, such as sitting with crossed legs, with crossed feet, with inclined or upright upper body. Buddhists are tending to abuse emotions. They might become pleased or angry at what totally should not be without any reason. On the contrary, we Confucians sit straight like a bracket clock; stand upright like a pine tree with proper appearance. From this, we can see that Buddhism is unreasonable."²² That is to say, the Buddhists' behavior is rather casual and vulgar.

However, as Buddhism has its religious disciplines, how could it be criticized as floppy, infirm, feeble or casual? Zhu Xi analyzed this phenomenon, saying "Buddhism only teaches you to sit, to watch. However, Confucius teaches a step further from that. The Master said, "do not watch, listen to, speak or act when it is contrasted to ethics." It is the same when talking about how to deal with things and people in our daily social life. Confucianism steps further than Buddhism in teaching people to be respectful, solemn and loyal when contacting with others. Apart from these, Confucius required people to be respectful and stately when they are out or when they want to make people to work for them. That is why the Master said, 'To subdue one's self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue.'²³ Here, Zhu Xi indicated that Confucius taught us more beyond watching, listening, speaking and acting. He taught us how to do these things. He taught us not only the modus but the content as well. He taught us not only what these concepts are but also why they are as they are. This "why" is the ethics lacking in Buddhism.

21 *Meng Zi Er*, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.52, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(15), p.1134

22 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.2726

23 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.2725

(2) the degree of concern in ethics

Undoubtedly, Buddhism has its unique concern in the aspect of ethics. It is merely that this uniqueness differentiates itself from Confucianism. First, let us approach from the idea of "loving one's parents." Zhu Xi stated that, "Buddhism really knows a little about the heavenly principles. But they are too selfish even to consider life as parasitic. They want to know whom they are born into before this life. After knowing this, they cherish this as their own instead of sharing with others and tend to possess this forever, even after death. They treat their body as a temporary residence. If this 'residence' collapses, they would choose another one. Monk Huang Nie once sent a poem to her mother, saying, 'lodging temporarily in this old lady's house.' How heartless! He should be sentenced! However, Confucianism has never been so selfish. When we understand the heavenly principles from the very beginning, we follow them, apply them to the society, and share them with others. Only by doing this, ethics are self-evidently not invented. How could we possess them secretly?"²⁴ Though Buddhism has some idea relating to heavenly principles, Buddhists consider their biological body as a kind of temporary lodging place and have no idea that "every hair, every inch of skin of the our body are endowed by our parents." Thus, they have no affection for their parents and ethics perish.

Secondly, let us take a look from the aspect of "loving things or the environment around us." Zhu Xi believed, on this point, that Buddhism still cannot be compared with Confucianism. He demonstrated that, "person of noble character loves their parents. Then he would extend this love to the people. Further, he would extend this love to the things around him. He regards these things as equal. This love to them is impartial. Things around us could be classified into two: things of life, such as animals and things without life such as plants. Sages care about animals' life. They tell us not to fish with fine and closely woven net, not to kill baby deer, not to take away birds' egg, not to kill the pregnant and the baby animals. This is how sages sympathize with animals. As to the plants, sages tell us to hew the forest at the appropriate time. If the trees are too young to be hewed, then we should let them to grow. This is how sages show

24 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.2718

solicitude for plants. According to the opinion of Buddhism, every living thing has the potential nature to be a Buddha. Buddhists do not kill. However, please look at their glorious temple. They hewed trees without sympathy. Where is their affection? In the light of theory of one *Li* abided by and acquired by the various all (理一分殊), Sages have their own principles and extend them to the families, then to the people around them, then to the things around them. Sages' care about these three categories is different from each other. They are named as "loving families, caring about people and showing solicitude to the things around us." This is different from Buddhism which only know there exists one truth not knowing that this uppermost truth or *Li* could be acquired by various things in the universe. It is no wonder why Buddhism see all the living creatures as equal. For other things that they have no time or energy to attend to, they might impair them. On the other hand, we Confucians treat living creatures and those lifeless differently. Animals are indeed different from human being. They are still blood and flesh. This is where they are different from the plants."²⁵ From these words, we can see that Confucians tends not to kill baby animals and to hew trees at the right time, which embodies their ethics and ecological concern. Although Buddhism advocates nature of Buddha in every living creature and forbids killing, they do not hesitate when cutting down trees. In addition, Buddhism confuses human beings and non-human beings. They might do harm to things they pay little attention to. In this point, Confucianism is much more advanced than Buddhism, although Confucianism's love for creatures is not equally allocated. Now, let us come to Zhu Xi's third point: Buddhism prefers unconditional love to conditional love. "Ch'an considers love between father and son, between brothers as a conditional love. However, they extend their love to animals like tigers or wolves (e.g. feed the tiger with his own flesh). This is unconditional love. They mistake the unconditional love as a genuine one. Gan Jifu asked, 'benevolence is the reason we love, the virtue our mind possesses.' Shi Ju said, Buddhism's mercy is love.

However, Buddhists' love has no disparity, as they do not love their parents most. Master said: "Buddhists advocate unconditional love and mercy. I remembered they said, fusing the first impetus and unconditional love and mercy. This love and mercy of Buddhism has

25 Hui'an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wen Ji Vol.56, f *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(23), p.2691

no reason. Under this, they would love and show mercy to everything. Their love for families is regarded as a conditional love. That is why they abandon their parents but feed the hungry tiger with their own flesh. How ridiculous this is!"²⁶ In Buddhism there are two kinds of love: conditional and unconditional. The latter one is the genuine one. The starting point of Buddhism's love certainly is not in the family. Buddhists' love to others has no disparity. Despite this, Zhu Xi held that Buddhism's love is conditional. They love everything. Though Buddhists regard unconditional love as a genuine one, they forsake their families. This clearly deviates from normal human ethics. We can see that in the degree, reception and ways of love, Buddhism and Confucianism are quite different from each other. Confucius was quite grieved for not being able to devote himself as a vassal, a son, a brother, a friend. This would be unrequited love and incomprehensible in the eyes of Buddhists.

(3) the presence and absence of ethics in practicing

The ethics of Confucianism stems from secular life and concern daily social life. Confucianism's ethics serves social life. The ethics of Buddhism is featured by the theory of living out of society and has its special characteristics. However, Zhu Xi believed that the essence of the ethics of Buddhism is anti-ethical. "A certain man was going to abandon his family to be a Buddhist monk. He reported this to his local government and notified his younger brother. Unfortunately, his younger brother was not filial. His leaving his family meant that his mother would be left for no one to take care of. Master said with a frown, 'How they abandon the ethics!' someone said that this Buddhist monk is the eldest son of his family. Fang bomo said, 'Buddhism should not allow the eldest son to be a Buddhist monk. Master said, 'Even though it is permitted by the Buddhism, it is not appropriate."²⁷ In the opinion of Buddhism, it is a charitable behavior for you to become a Buddhist monk even though your aged mother is left at home without any support. However, to Confucianism, even a culprit has the obligation to support his aged mother and shall not leave his mother alone. From the above, we could see the apparent difference

26 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.3953

27 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.2741

between Confucianism and Buddhism. In the aspect of social ethics, Buddhism also shows their extreme contempt to and even negligence of the relationship between monarch and vassal, father and son. "Buddhism just sees the superficial things, not understanding the core idea. They believe that all the social relationship is an illusion."²⁸ Buddhism considers the relationship of any kind merely as an illusion. Naturally they think the same way of *Li* (理) in the social relationship. So, the theory of Buddhism destroys ethics. "Buddhism emphasizes on annihilation. They agree to live naturally and accept the death calmly. But they ignore the cultivation of oneself. That is why they are performing unreasonably, care nothing about monarch and father and do great harm to the ethics."²⁹ Human relations according to Confucianism's ethics demand people to be loyal to their monarch and to be filial to their father. But Buddhism pays no attention to these relations, therefore ruining ethics. Even compared to Lao Zhuang, Buddhism goes far beyond in ruining human ethics. "Someone may ask the difference between Buddhism and Lao Zhuang. The answer may be that Lao Zhuang annihilates the human relations not as thoroughly as Buddhism does. Buddhism completely destroys the ethics. Ch'an demolishes righteousness and reason. Fang Zilu said, 'Zhengqing asked the difference between Chuang-Tzu and Buddhism. I replied that Chuang-Tzu does not destroy thoroughly the ethics while Buddhism does. Buddhism destroys ethics. When it comes to Ch'an, righteousness and reason are demolished.' When Buddhism was first introduced to China, they just advocated cultivation according to their religious doctrine and did little about what Ch'an is doing today"³⁰. However, ethics is an indispensable aspect of sustaining the order of life and Buddhism cannot live without the order of ethics. Zhu Xi said, "The principles of heaven are not evadable. Though Buddhism and Laozi ruin ethics, they cannot elude away from that. For instance, they dump their father but follow and pay respect to their master. Their master takes disciples as sons. The elder disciple is respected as big brother. But this relationship is a faked one. We Confucians are defending a genuine one."³¹ Though Buddhism wants to be detached from human relations, they have to take on a teacher. The teacher

28 Zhou Zi Zhi Shu, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol. 94, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(17), p.2126

29 Meng Zi Shi , *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.60, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(16), p.1276

30 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.2719

31 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.2719

regards the disciples as sons, and the elder disciple as the older brother. All these relations in Buddhism are different from worldly ones. At least it is evidence that Buddhism could escape away from ethics. It is easy to reach the conclusion that Confucianism and Buddhism are not alike in the aspects of the norms of ethics, the degree of ethical caring, and the presence and absence of ethical practice. Zhu Xi explained these discrepancies as such:

There is one unique *Li* (理) in the universe. Thanks to this *Li*, heaven could be the heaven with it, earth could be the earth. All creatures among this world obtain their nature and become what they are because of this *Li*. *Li*'s frame is composed of both the three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues as specified in ethical code of Confucianism. It is prevailing everywhere and endlessly circulating. It comes from nowhere and exist eternally even after the extinction of all the creatures among this world. It circulates ceaselessly. If any Confucian could understand this, he is seeing the truth and the true features of the universe! When applying this truth in his daily life, he could make no mistakes and he knows the nature thoroughly and completely. A real Confucian conceives no selfish aims while cultivating himself, administering the country or even teaching their disciples. The reason is just that he follows the *Li* to accomplish the things. By following the *Li*, he could help the universe foster all things on the earth without leaving a single thing. Thus he could be comparable to the heaven and the earth. As for Buddhism, they deviate from the truth from the very beginning. With a wrong starting point, how could we expect them to behave correctly? Most likely that Buddhism hates that this *Li*'s prevailing and circulating endlessly everywhere makes them no place to stand, to *laissez-faire*. So Buddhists forsake their monarch, wives and children to live in the remote mountain area to find a so-called empty and quite place to hide away. How narrow is their outlook! How lost they are! Nevertheless, Buddhists have been thoroughly engrossed in their truth-seeking and working harder than others on that way. Reasonably, they make certain sense in seeking the truth. As for their words and behaviors, they thought their theories were abstruse and beyond language. They actually could turn a blind eye to our perpetual *Li*. They thought they are pointing a straight direction to people's mind. They actually do not know people's mind. They thought they would become a Buddha when they know the nature. They actually do not know the nature. They could be regarded as equivalent to the beasts as they ignore human relations in the society. They do not even know that they are guilty."³²

It the opinion of Zhu Xi, there is only one unique *Li* in the universe, which is the ultimate reason of all beings. With this *Li*, heaven is heaven, the earth is the earth, and the things in the world

32 Du Da Ji, Hui'an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wen Ji Vol.70, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(23), p.3376

are themselves. When *Li* turns into disciplines, they are three cardinal guides of monarch and vassals, father and son, husband and wife as specified in ethical code of Confucianism. When *Li* turns into norms, they are the five constant virtues as benevolence, righteousness, rituals, wisdom and sincerity. The universe and the society are formed by this *Li* which is prevailing and ubiquitous. Knowing this *Li*, Confucians can realize the origin and the true feature of the universe. Then Confucians' minds would spare no mistakes. They would cultivate themselves to help govern the civilians to help heaven in forging the people. At the very beginning, Buddhism strays away from the truth so that they have different ideas and behaviors. As for Buddhists' seeking the original mind and leaving their family for a remote temple, it is only because that they detest that *Li* is prevailing. Though they believe that their theory is great, it cannot be compared with the Confucianism which explores the truth of the universe. So Buddhism's idea of pointing directly to people's mind and tuning into a Buddha after knowing the nature is, in fact, not truly knowing the mind nor nature. They destroy ethics and make people act like beasts. Therefore, the difference between Buddhism and Confucianism is that Buddhism does not know the truth of the universe.

Methodologies of Practicing Self-cultivation: "Performing according to Appropriate Time" vs "Extinguishing the Desire of Mind, Living a Cynic and Reputation-careless Life"

The only aim of all of Buddhism's creeds and canons is to help all living creatures become a Buddha and break away from the suffering social life. Different religious sects of Buddhism have different ideas on how to become a Buddha, and they bring forward a variety of ways self-cultivation such as exploring and realizing *Dao* teaching and learning, physical and spiritual practice. In the eyes of Zhu Xi, Buddhism's methodologies in practicing self-cultivation are quite different from those of Confucianism. Here, I will discuss Zhu Xi' idea on the difference from the above-mentioned three aspects.

(1) *Exploring and realizing Dao*

This refers to exploring and knowing the truth of things, of lives and of the universe. How are Confucianism and Buddhism different from each other? Zhu Xi said, "Hawks flying high to the sky and fish leaping deep in the sea are phenomenon perceived by our eyes. Buddhism talks also about these visible phenomena. But they could not see the profound meaning. We Confucians could see the norms and orders in these natural phenomena and apply these orders in setting human relations as monarch and vassals, father and son"³³. Here, hawks' flying and fish's leaping are metaphors, meaning that people practicing golden doctrines of mean could observe the natural law from the nature. Buddhism also talks about finding of truth and exploring *Dao* but they do not really understand *Dao*. Confucians can explore the truth of natural laws to set the order and proper position of everything in this world. Due to the disorder of Buddhism's ways of exploring the truth of *Dao*, it is getting farther and farther away from *Dao*. Zhu Xi also said, "Scholars are keen on discussing the similarities, differences, gain and loss between Confucianism and Buddhism. However, they have not seen the key points. Some people study Confucianism. But they count their breath to get carried away, neither sleeping nor waking up. Talking about things like nihility, peacefulness, burning bead and silent moon. This shows that they do not really know the truth. They do not know that in the six classical books of Confucianism and theories of Confucius and *Mencius*, we Confucianism never talks things that way. Why do you young Confucians should practice this way? If you pursue the truth of *Dao* in this promiscuous way, you are getting away from *Dao*"³⁴. That is to say that Confucianism's *Dao* contains no mysterious things such as "nihility, burning beads and silent moon." Pursuing *Dao* in this way only leads to nowhere in search for truth of the universe and sages. As for the truth of life, Zhu Xi said, "Your letter mentioned that Confucius focuses on things we could do while we are living. Buddhism discusses not only life of this life but life after death. Jia Anbo also holds the same opinion. I have discussed this in the letter to him. He showed contempt when he read the letter. Then is living

33 Zhong Yong Er, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.63, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(16), p.1373.

34 Da Wang Shugeng, Hui'an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wen Ji Vol.59, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(23), p.2815.

and death is one thing or two separate things? Is human and ghost one thing or two separate things? If they are one thing, it would be sufficient to focus only on the things and life of this life. If we exert ourselves to delve into the life after death, there is always estrangement and misunderstanding just as difference between the start and end point, light and darkness. I am quite worried about this.”³⁵ Confucianism believes that life and death are one, so they stop at talking about things of “this life.” Buddhism believes that life and death are two different ideas, so they study both. From the way of treating life and death, it can be seen that Buddhism’s way of pursuing *Dao* is incorrect, heretical and shallow. There is no generally acknowledged truth in Buddhism. Zhu Xi commented, “Sages say nothing about death. What could be said when a person is dead? Sages only talk about things of this life after being born and before death. We have to ponder over this carefully. Assistant minister Hu Mingzhong once correctly stated, “human beings are living creatures of life while Buddhism just says life after death. Living things are visible. Buddhism talks about the invisible. Buddhism does not distinguish good and bad. They regard the people who show respect to them as good and people who disrespect them as bad. Those who are disrespectful to Buddha might be sent to the hell according to Buddhism. Even a murder can go to the heaven if he follows Buddha.”³⁶ These words mean that in order to be free of the entanglement of the desire for worldly things, one can ignore the criteria of what is good and what is bad. On the other hand, Confucianism concentrates on eradicating heretical thoughts. Once this is done, then the truth of *Li* could reveal itself. Confucianism could face life and death peacefully without a sense of burden. Sages do not talk about life after death, for death is not worth speaking of. They only care about things that should be done this life. It is clear that Confucianism knows the truth of *Dao* which is easy to understand and common to see. Though Buddhism may know something about the truth of *Dao* which is wiser than other theories, they merely glance over the surface of *Dao* casually without knowing the true features of it. Confucians can get great character when they know the *Dao* while Buddhists do not. Zhu Xi held, “Confucianism knows *Dao* thoroughly

35 Da Wu Gong Ji, Hui'an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wen Ji Vol.43, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(22), p.1960.

36 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.2729.

and clearly. Buddhism only sees the nature's mystery without applying it on the worldly things. They just pass by *Dao* without pay full attention to."³⁷

(2) *Teaching and learning*

The inheritance of Buddhism is carried down by Buddhists' master and apprentice from generation to generation. It is realized through preaching and studying. In other words, the education of Buddhists' monk is an important step to further promote and develop Buddhism. Confucianism also takes education as main way of inheriting their thought. Among the three thousands students of Confucius, there are seventy- two sages. Among these sages, some handed down the classics or sacred books of Confucianism. Some preached. Zhu Xi believed that even in the aspect of educating students, Buddhism and Confucianism are different from each other. Confucianism focuses on reality in teaching. Buddhism lays particular stress on being static. He said, "In the aspect of teaching, sages emphasize on the human's behavior and action. For example, Confucius recommended that if one goes out of the home, one should take the manner of politeness as he is receiving a distinguished guest; if one is going to use the labor of the peasantry, he should also have the manner of solemnity and seriousness. He also told Yan Zi that benevolence is to restrain oneself and return to propriety. All these teach us to learn and understand through the experience of watching, listening to, speaking and acting. Buddhism tells people to remain still, to set their minds in darkness. And they call this is a way of *Dao*. Of course, this is not true. On the other hand, we have to notice that the superior level of Buddhism does not act this way. Only the inferior level of Buddhism practices this way."³⁸

Confucianism lays emphasis on people's behaviors and action while Buddhism lays it on the mind and stillness. The stillness of Buddhism is emptiness and annihilation. This stillness should be replaced by respect with a solemn manner. Zhu Xi said, "If one always gives priority to the 'respect,' he might sense solemnity inside and act gravely accordingly. By doing so, he would have his peaceful

37 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.2721

38 *Lun Yu* Shi Er, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.30, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu* (15), p.1097.

and healthy mind growing inside himself even without others' help. If one does not cherish this respect inside, he would not be able to keep his peaceful and healthy mind. He might have scattered mind. If there is any accidental thing, his mind is in turmoil. This would be his pain in the neck. Even though he can focus his mind, he has made a serious mistake for not giving his priority to the 'respect.' Actually, he is not able to focus his mind. The difference between Buddhism and Confucianism lies in here."³⁹ Respect(敬) here means having a lasting, solemn, serious and sincere manner in whatever things one may be dealing with. It is not a state of stillness. Just as Cheng Yichuan put it, "This inner respect and solemn to keep moral and soul cultivation (敬以直内) would make people feel void inside. He then can be impartial. Hence, if one has to handle affairs, he must take this 'respect' seriously."⁴⁰ In Zhu Xi's idea, emphasizing respect creates a different result from a situation in which such emphasis is lacking. Buddhism does not understand the profound implications of this respect. However, it would be ineffective to teach pupils self-cultivation just through ways of learning from stillness or practical experience without teaching them to bear respect inside. Zhu Xi said, "Master Ming Dao teaches his disciples to sit still as a form of self-cultivation. This is because at that time he has many followers doing studying together with him. They have little social affairs to care about. If we do not have affairs to deal with at hand, we may sit still to cultivate ourselves. But if we take this 'sitting still' as a daily routine and main way to practice self-cultivation, that is sitting in meditation in Buddhism! Only this 'respect' could combine 'stillness' and 'action' integrate them into one and make no difference between them."⁴¹ One should not practice sitting in stillness deliberately. Bearing the manner of 'respect' whatever he may do is the real road to self-cultivation. Therefore, this 'respect' is not void. Zhu Xi explained, "Master Lian Xi advocated 'peace and stillness.' In his theory, 'peace and stillness' could be regarded as a kind of 'respect.' That is why he also said 'one could acquire peace when having no desire.' If we interpret it as the void and quite, that would fall into

39 *Da Zhang Jingfu*, Hui'an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wen Ji Vol.31, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(21), p.1345.

40 Henan Cheng Shi Yi Shu Vol.15, Er Cheng Ji (1), p.149, *Zhonghua Shu Ju*1981.

41 *Da Zhang Yuande*, Hui'an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wen Ji Vol.62, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(23), p.2989.

Buddhism and *Daoism*.”⁴² Buddhism teaches their principles in a different way:

The world is declining and degenerating. Heresy arises from everywhere. In recent years someone uses fake Buddhism's theories to attack *Dao* of Confucius and *Mencius*. According to these heresies, exploring the truth of universe through reading and studying is forbidden. Their followers usually are found their minds lost. Even absent-minded, they might find some truth by chance. He then takes this founding as his own learning attainments. However, when observed from his manners, words his self-cultivation and governance of others, he is quite different from Confucianism's disciples. His pupils might be beclouded by him. For those reading without understand, thinking without coming up with insights, their methods are just like Buddhism's 'hard-thinking on a sentence by the Master' (看話頭). There are books called 'quotations from the wise men' on the market. The books discuss these things in great details. I have read some of them and understand ins and outs of their theory. As to the subtleties of both Buddhism and Confucianism, they are basically the same. What makes Confucianism's Sages worried is that after having attained enlightenment, Buddhists' monks believe more that the universe is an illusion of human's mind and they feel at ease about this. This is also why Buddhism is corrupting public morals. After the above analysis, it could be clearly seen which one is correct, which incorrect.⁴³

Buddhism regards exploring the truth through reading a great prohibition, Confucianism a great merit. Buddhism teaches people to admire and pursue the unknown and mysterious nirvana world while Confucianism teaches people to deal with the practical social affairs. Buddhism's way of teaching is mysterious, occult and corruptive to public morals. Confucianism's way of teaching is easy, obvious and beneficial to people's minds. Then the difference between Buddhism's and Confucianism's the way of teaching is clear at a glance. Zhu Xi also said, "We Confucianism sets the respect as a foundation, supplemented by exhausting the truths of universe. The difference between Buddhism and Confucianism lies in this foundation."⁴⁴ From these words, we can see that the foundation of Confucianism's teaching is respect supplemented by an exploration of the truth of universe. This will *finally* result in accomplishing Confucianism's ideal of being an inner sage so as to rule the outer world, which is not an idea included in Buddhism.

42 Zhou Zi Zhi Shu, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.94, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(17), p.2143.

43 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.2721.

44 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(18), p.2935

(3) Physical and spiritual practice

Buddhism's uppermost goal is to become a Buddha which requires both physical and spiritual practice. Confucianism's ultimate aim is to become a Sage which also needs practice physically and spiritually. Buddhism and Confucianism each has its own way of practicing. Zhu Xi believed that there were differences between Buddhism's practice and that of Confucianism's. In the modes of practice, Confucianism prefers reading books and obtaining knowledge by investigation. The next step is to cultivate one's moral character, to have a sincere mind and a righteous heart, and to nourish one's nature. As Confucianism's *Dao* lies in people's daily social life, Confucianism prefers natural cultivation rather than a forced, painstaking one.

Examined from a larger picture, every word in Buddhism's saying "Extinguishing the desire of mind, living a cynic and reputation-careless life, asking nothing from the society and pondering over wise men's doctrines could nourish our spirit and true self" is incorrect and ridiculous. As people's mind is a living thing, it can act or stay in stillness when necessary. Acting and staying in stillness accordingly might not only ensure one's bright future in pursuing the truth but also are the functions of the noumenon of our minds. I cannot see why this could be obtained only after living a cynic and reputation-careless life. What else, what is this mind? How to extinguish its desire? However detailed or rough are the words by the Sages, they are giving expression to the subtlety of Heavenly Principles. If one understands this, he could consummate himself as well as the nature. There is no alternative way, as the inside and the outside, noumenon and function are in one. How could they only exit for nourishing our spirit and true self? If one interprets Sages word this way, then he is far from understanding. The reason why Confucianism is different from heresy just resides clearly here.⁴⁵

Zhu Xi believed in obtaining knowledge by investigation (格物); it does not require one to extinguish one's desire nor to escape away from the society. According to Confucianism, the human mind should act when action is needed, and stay still when necessary. If we could do this, our future in pursuing the truth of benevolence would be illuminated. This is also noumenon and the function of the mind. Confucianism's practice on pursuing benevolence and obtaining knowledge lies in acting and staying in stillness accordingly, revealing and applying one's talent to serve the society when necessary, hiding

⁴⁵ Da Xu Shunzhi, Hui'an Xiansheng Zhu Wengong Gong Wen Ji Vol.39, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(22), p.1746.

away from the society and living a hermit life when not needed. Buddhism's satori is a practice purposefully pursued. Zhu Xi said, "Truth can only be judged as true or false. If truth is referred to as beyond language, this is Buddhism's fault. If one could only act after obtaining certain truth or knowledge, he might act because it is useful or because it is compelled. Then any practice is of no use! Satori is something that we Confucians steer away from and is heretical."⁴⁶ That is to say that there exist ineffable knowledge and an inconceivable world. This knowledge and world could not be understood by neither human's perceptual nor conceptual knowledge. They could only be reached by satori. To Zhu Xi, this is a fallacy, because knowledge could be classified into two: the true one and the false one. Such a thing as ineffable knowledge does not exist. If one only acts after learning or acquiring certain knowledge, one could only act either because of the benefit he might get or because of the obligation he has. Then why does one bother to practice physically or spiritually? Because once one has learned the truth of *Dao*, it is unnecessary to practice. Satori is exactly this. As Confucianism denies the existence of so-called inconceivable world and lays stress on practicing naturally, Confucianism does not approve the practice of satori. It warns Confucians not to get addicted to this concept. One idea that deserves notice is that Zhu Xi thought differently from Buddhism on what is truth and knowledge. The ineffable knowledge of Buddhism indicates the state and objective of knowledge while the judgment of being true or false refers to the properties of the knowledge. Therefore, satori corresponds to the ineffable knowledge. Obtain knowledge through reading and investigating echoes the true or false properties of knowledge. The same is also true that the inconceivable world needs deliberate satori and common social daily life needs no such things, as Confucianism thinks noumenon and function is in one. As the *Dao* of Buddhism is empty and illusive, their ways of knowing *Dao* is not orderly organized; their ways of teaching is biased, excessive, crooked and evasive; their ways of practice is self-conscious and contrived. Thus Confucianism contrasts Buddhism sharply in practice. Zhu Xi concluded that, 'Buddhism claims to know the truth of emptiness of universe. They want to keep detached from the earthly world and to get rid of material desire to

46 Xue San, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.9, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu*(14), p.144.

be a Buddha of no desire or trouble. As for other evil realms, creatures there are creatures of the hell, animals, hungry ghosts. Even they could follow a cultivated man and keep practicing Buddhism, they could only become a Bodhisattva instead of a Buddha. We Confucianism see the truth of universe is a real substance. Thus Buddhism and Confucianism are different from each other from start to finish."⁴⁷ But the question worth our notice is that whether the Zhu Xi' understandings of the ways of Buddhism's knowing of *Dao* comments on Buddhism's teaching and criticisms on their practice accord to Buddhism or not. The Buddhism's way of knowing *Dao* seems more than just a rational intuitive one. Even if it is rational and intuitive, could it be repudiated by the general rules of epistemology? As to the ways of teaching in Buddhism, they are various and resourceful. They have practices such as sutras chanting and questioning by the Master followed by quick answers by the disciples. Later on, they have koan and keen words. These methods of teaching are certainly of no value. In the aspect of practicing self-cultivation, Buddhism has varied and colorful and valuable resources. They emphasize and create ways of practicing self-cultivation. Becoming a Buddha is to a great extent the fruit of this practice. All these are not what Chu His called easy, simple and valueless Just as Zhu Xi himself put, "It is said that Buddhists practice very hard. In my opinion, we Confucians can hardly do that. Look at Buddhists! They absorb themselves in practicing self-cultivation from daytime to night time with their minds concentrated. Look at Confucians! We have multiple irrelevant intentions when we are learning. How far away from Buddhists we are in this aspect! The only pity is that Buddhists are not learning the correct thing and their assiduous practice is in vain! If we Confucians could practice as diligent as they are, what the situation would be! Nowadays, we Confucians have two deficiencies. One is aiming too high. The other is longing for shortcut. This phenomenon has something to do with their ambitions. For one, some Confucianists lose their purpose. For the other, they are learning too many things at one time. This miscellaneous situation makes these Confucians feel confused and not knowing where to start or stop."⁴⁸ Chu His means that although Buddhists do not learn correct things,

47 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu* (18), p.2721.

48 Shi Shi, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei* Vol.126, *Zhu Zi Quan Shu* (18), p.2723.

their hard work on their road of being a Buddha is worth following by Confucians.

The above explicitly discussed in details Zhu Xi's idea on the differences between Buddhism and Confucianism through three aspects of noumenon, the concern of ethic and the way of practicing self-cultivation. Unquestionably, Zhu Xi's idea on this topic is resourceful and insightful. He has contributed many some revelatory ideas in this area. All this betrays his deep knowledge and thorough understanding on the relation between Buddhism and Confucianism. However, as Zhu Xi paid too much attention on the contrasts between Buddhism and Confucianism and even believed that these contrasts are irreconcilable. He said, "Confucianism considers *Li* as ever existing and lasting, neither being created nor destroyed. Buddhism regards spirits the same way. Gui Shan once said that 'difference between Buddhism and Confucianism is delicate.' To me, the difference is like ice and fire!"⁴⁹ Treating Buddhism and Confucianism as fire and ice is not only in conflict with Zhu Xi's own system of Neo-Confucianism, but also hinders him from further understanding and gaining benefits from Buddhist resources as well. This is truly a regretful point in the history of the relationship between Buddhism and Confucianism.

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49 Buddhism, *Zhu Zi Yu Lei*, Vol.126, Complete Works of Zhu Zi(18), p.3934.

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儒學與佛教的三大差異

——朱熹的理解與分辨

李 承 貴

中文摘要： 本文選擇了“道體的特性”、“倫理的關懷”和“工夫的路徑”三個方面，對朱熹辨別儒佛差異的情形加以梳理與分析。在“道體的特性”方面，儒學是“一”，佛教是“二”；在“倫理的關懷”方面，儒學是以倫理乃天地所賜於人而為自然，佛教則以絕滅為事而視倫理為贅疣；在“工夫的路徑”方面，儒學是無心以動靜順時，佛教是刻意以棲心淡泊。因此，佛教與儒學不僅存在末用之異，也存在本體之別。朱熹對佛教與儒學差異的辨析，是對北宋以來儒者辨佛教、儒學之異的總結，對當今儒者辨別儒者差異也有啟示意義，自然，朱熹在辨析佛教、儒學之異實踐中所表現的對佛教的誤讀也是需要加以關注的。

關鍵詞： 朱熹， 佛教， 儒學， 三大差異

Balancing between Innate Morality and Moral Agency:

Zhu Xi's Interpretation of the Sixteen Character Teaching

LEE Jung-hwan

Abstract

It is of no exaggeration to say that the Mencian thesis that human nature is good consists of the core tenet of the entire Neo-Confucian tradition and that Zhu Xi's grand philosophical system is also designed mainly to undergird this thesis. However, this thesis involves a philosophical problem, which arises from the possible incompatibility between the spontaneity of human nature or innate morality and the moral will of an agent. The main objective of this article is to address this question inherent in Zhu Xi's philosophy, particularly through analyzing his interpretation of the sixteen character teaching—"Rexin 人心 is precarious; *daoxin* 道心 is subtle. Being discerning (*jing* 精) and being undivided (*yi* 一). Holding on to the mean (*zhong* 中)"—, which he extolled as the genuine essence of the teaching of the sages. This article reveals a dualistic feature underlying Zhu Xi's philosophical system, which, on the one hand, fosters the belief in human nature as the self-perfect source of morality and on the other, underlines a significant limitation in comprehending this innate morality by a moral agent. Ultimately, this article shows that he thus intended to seek a proper balance between the belief in innate morality and the moral responsibility of a voluntary agent in order both to avoid an excessive belief in innate morality, which is liable to radical subjectivism or antinomianism, and to defend the validity of practical principles prescribed in the Confucian classics, such as 'investigation of things (格物).'

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Introduction

Zhu Xi (朱熹: 1130~1200) constructed a grand philosophical system to undergird *Mencius'* thesis that "human nature is good."¹ He thus placed this controversial thesis on firmer ground, consequently resulting in the rise of the first and enduring orthodox perspective on human nature, a key subject in Chinese intellectual history. Concerning Zhu's theory of human nature, the present work particularly concerns the relationship between human nature and moral agency.

Zhu's explanatory system is constructed not only to demonstrate the innate goodness of human nature as an objective truth. In a normative sense, he also identifies human nature with norms and values (or *li* 理) that a moral agent can, and ought to, realize through practice. A problem arises from the point that he thus unites spontaneity and morality in the conception of human nature. Due to the possible incompatibility between the spontaneity of human nature and the moral will of an agent, one's belief in innate morality may also conflict with one's voluntary moral practices. This problem is not unique to Zhu, but it is inherited from *Mencius*.² However, the metaphysical and ontological system underpinning Zhu's arguments renders this problem rather provocative, compelling him to address it in order to uphold the thesis of innate morality.

I will approach this problem inherent in Zhu's theory of human nature from two distinctive perspectives. *first*, at the theoretical level, I will investigate the way in which he reconciles two dimensions of morality—innate morality of human nature and voluntary moral agency. Without this connection, his explanatory system would involve a large gap between descriptive statements about human nature and normative statements concerning moral practices. *Secondly*, and more

1 As for Zhu, there is no nature pertinent only to human being, at least in his metaphysics. It is universal for all sentient beings. However, I translate "*xing* 性" into human nature only to avoid confusion with other meanings contained of nature.

2 For this, see A. C. Graham, "What Was New in the Ch'eng-Chu Theory of Human Nature?," in *Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism*, ed. Wing-tsit Chan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), pp. 138-157.

specifically, this problem leads to the question of how his formulation of diverse practical principles such as “investigation of things” fit into his explanatory system, because the validity of such principles is predicated on the voluntary commitment of a morally-bound agent.

I will first elaborate on the relevancy of this problem to Zhu’s theory and then explore his approach to it. I call special attention to his interpretation of the so-called “sixteen character teaching”—“*Rexin* 人心 is precarious; *dao xin* 道心 is subtle. Being discerning (*jing* 精) and being undivided (*yi* 一). Holding on to the mean (*zhong* 中)³—, which he extolled as the genuine essence of all precepts transmitted from the sages in antiquity.⁴ This simple formula does not directly relate to his conception of human nature. Yet, it will throw a fresh light on practical implications he intends to impart to his theory both on human nature and practical principles, which easily escapes our attention when delving into his remarks on human nature exclusively.⁵

A Summary of Zhu Xi’s Theory on Human Nature

Zhu’s theory of human nature has been widely discussed. In this section, I will recapitulate it so as to efficiently fathom its otherwise complicate explanatory structure. The structure is formed, broadly speaking, in empirical, metaphysical, and ontological parts.

Certainly, Zhu adopts an empirical approach from *Mencius*. The following quotation is a part of Zhu’s comment to *Mencius*’ argument for the goodness of human nature on the ground of empirical evidence such as “four sprouts” and “spontaneous and immediate response to a baby crawling toward a well.”

Owing to the manifestations of [morally good] *qing* [from within like four sprouts], we can see the original [features] of human nature (*xing zhi benran* 性之本然). It is analogous [to the situation] that a thing is placed

3 For the translation of the sixteen character teaching, Daniel K. Gardner, *Learning to Be a Sage : Selections from the Conversations of Master Chu, Arranged Topically* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p.166, with my changes.

4 Zhu Xi, the Preface to the *Zhongyong*. For the significance of the sixteen character teaching in Qing Kaozheng 考證 scholarship, see Benjamin A. Elman, *From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China*, pp. 40-70.

5 For example, see Donald J. Munro, *Images of Human Nature : A Sung Portrait* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).

in [something else,] and clues [about this thing] emanates outwardly [from within].⁶

The basic premises underlying this passage are as follows: Human nature exists within each and every human being, but a certain epistemological gap exists between human nature and the mind of an agent (the mind as the cognitive faculty). We cannot directly perceive human nature *per se* because it is a sort of metaphysical entity ("beyond form" [*xing er shang* 形而上] in Chinese terminology). Therefore, our empirical understanding of human nature must rest on a certain medium (here, "clues") between human nature and our mind. This medium, which is called "*qing* 情" in Zhu's terminology, refers comprehensively to the contents of mental states such as feelings, intentions, desires etc, that *spontaneously* arise in the process of responding to external stimulus.

Then, it follows that it is by and large true that among the wide range of *qing* we experience mental states that an agent cannot dispute against its moral quality like "four sprouts." As *Mencius* illustrates with the example of the "spontaneous and immediate response to a baby crawling toward a well," provided that such morally good mental states arise in a genuinely 'spontaneous' fashion without the involvement of factors such as premeditation of an agent, we can infer that there must be an innate 'cause' of such mental states within the self. It can also be inferred that such mental states represent a certain moral quality intrinsic to the self.

Up to this empirical approach, Zhu's argument largely runs parallel to that of *Mencius*, so both of them encounter the following problem alike: As Gaozi's argument implies, mental states that *spontaneously* arise do not always accord with morality. It is more likely that we experience mental states conforming to morality less often than the opposite cases. Therefore, we can also infer from this fact that there must be another cause or causes that give rise to morally neutral or bad mental states as well. Therefore, it is an arbitrary choice if one identifies the cause of morally good mental states exclusively with human nature, because, if so, it is equally plausible to identify the cause(s) of morally bad or neutral mental states with human nature, as Xunzi did.

6 Zhu Xi's Commentary to the *Mencius*, 2A.6: …因其情之發,而性之本然,可得而見,猶有物在中,而緒見於外也.

As A.C. Graham has explicated, *Mencius* can defend his thesis of innate goodness, “only if” it holds that the mind “is continually active, judging the relative importance of our various appetites and moral inclinations ... and distinguish[ing] between the nourishing [of the innate potentialities] or the harmful [to them].” In this conceptual framework, the spontaneity of human nature does not contradict the will of an agent. According to Graham, *Mencius* views human nature as incipient potentialities—innately good but imperfect as it is—so that it necessitates the proper and active involvements of an agent to help it “complete its development.”⁷ That which is important in this context is what proper practical principles an agent should follow in order to successfully carry out this “completing” task. Indeed, for Neo-Confucian thinkers, the *Mencius* is one of the major sources for such practical principles as “exert the mind to the utmost” (*jinxin* 盡心) and “nourish one’s nature” (*yangxing* 養性), to name a few.

In contrast, Zhu Xi addresses this problem by way of introducing a metaphysical framework. His interpretation of Zhou Dunyi’s (周敦頤: 1017-1073) *Diagram of the Great Ultimate* in relation to the conceptualization of human nature can be outlined as follows: Everything in the world is composed of *li* and *qi* in pair. The mind is also a thing, so it is also comprised of *li* and *qi*. Despite the synthesis of *li* and *qi*, the *li* constituent remains intact in the mind. By definition, *li* is ‘universal’ as well as good and right. Therefore, when explaining spontaneous mental states with reference to *li* and *qi*, good and right cases must be related to *li*. In addition, the innate *li* as a whole is a counterpart of the Great Ultimate in the mind. Therefore, the *li* constituent of the mind is also as ‘perfect’ and “exhaustively equipped” (*quanji* 全具 or *wanli xianbei* 萬理鹹備)⁸ as the Great Ultimate itself.

Yet, spontaneous mental states cannot be fully explained with regards to the goodness of *li* alone, because it includes morally bad and neutral cases as well. So, Zhu brings in Zhang Zai’s (張載: 1020-1077) ontological concept of “embodied nature” (*qizhi zhi xing* 氣質之性):⁹ Everything in the world is comprised of the distinct

7 Graham, "What Was New in the Ch'eng-Chu Theory of Human Nature?," 117-132.

8 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen* 大學或問, in *sishu huowen* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2001), p. 3; Zhu Xi, *Mengzi jizhu* 孟子集註, 6A:4.

9 For the distinction between nature in its original state and embodied nature, see Chen Lai 陳來, *Zhu Xi zhexue yanjiu* 朱熹哲學研究 (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 1990), pp. 165-170.

components of *li* and *qi*. In reality, *qi* and *li* cannot not be separated from each other (*bu xiang li* 不相離) in order for a thing to exist and function properly. Likewise, the *li* constituent of the mind cannot be in isolation, but it must be embodied in the physical constitution. When the mind is in function, mental states arise as its results—i.e., “manifestation” [*fa* 發]—, but they cannot be explained with *li* alone; the physical constitution also shares the responsibility for them.¹⁰ Simply put, the *li* constituent is manifested necessarily in conjunction with the physical constituent, because the former is embodied in the latter, so it is called “embodied nature.”

Despite the inseparability of *li* and *qi* in reality, however, Zhu argues that these two constituents do not completely fuse into a single entity, either (*bu xiang za* 不相雜). Regardless of the variances in the physical qualities of an agent, the original state of the *li* constituent maintains its pure quality. So, when being manifested, its original quality still remains pure and distinctive ‘to a certain degree.’ (I will return to this issue in the following sections.) Distinguishing from the mixed form of embedded nature, he calls it “nature in its original state” (*benran zhi xing* 本然之性). By presupposing two distinctive states—metaphysically pure and ontologically real—within a single category of human nature, he attempts to conceptually defend the thesis of the innate pure goodness of human nature. In so doing, he also finds a way to explain both good and bad mental states, simply ascribing the cause of good and right mental states to innate *li*, while that of morally bad or neutral to the physical.

Zhu Xi, then, identifies this pure *li* constituent with human nature (*xing ji li* 性即理). From this, it is also inferred that this innate universal goodness is perfect in and of itself, and therefore can be counted as the sufficient source of morality for an agent to cope with any situation he falls in. Besides, the goodness of this *li* constituent is an objective truth that is predetermined when being “given” (lit., “endowed by Heaven” [*tianming* 天命]) to each and every human being. Therefore, mental states caused by innate *li* must also be objectively good and right, if the cause-effect relationship is not interrupted by external factors. In addition their contents, which ultimately constitute our moral knowledge, are also objectively given, far from being constructed by human beings. (*fei renli zhi suo wei* 非人

¹⁰ See, Zhu Xi, *Mengzi jizhu*, 6A:6.

力之所為¹¹ or *bu jia renli* 不假人力¹²).

To be brief, departing from *Mencius'* empirical approach, Zhu additionally attributes objectivity, universality, and self-perfection to the intrinsic features of human nature. His redefinition of human nature on a sophisticated metaphysical foundation, however, leads us to a question about the role of a moral agent in this structure.

A Conceptual Test¹³

Even at his earliest stage of philosophical inquiries, Zhu Xi was keenly aware that a serious philosophical problem was involved in the relationship between human nature and a voluntary agent. In this regard, the following letter, written in 1177, is highly suggestive:¹⁴

When Shun and Yao transferred [the sixteen character teaching,] [what they] called *renxin* or personal desire is not like what people [now usually] mean by personal desire. Suppose that one has a slightest *intention* of holding on to it (i.e., the Way). Then, although [one may] say [it is] originally the manifestation of *daoxin*, it eventually cannot be excluded from the range of *renxin*. This is [what Cheng Yi (程頤: 1033-1107) meant by saying that] “if acting as a man, there will be insincerity. The reason that Yanzi 顏子 also had [the moments of being] not-good comes from this difference.”¹⁵ If saying there is insincerity, how can it signify other than personal desire? There must be no such intention [of holding on to it] at all, and thus *spontaneously* (*ziran* 自然) and *effortlessly* (*congrong* 從容: lit., naturally or leisurely) conforming to the Way. Only then, it is *pure* (*chun* 純) *daoxin*. The [practical principle] of “always be doing something” [in the *Mengzi*] means, instead, one’s comprehension of this *li* and the [following] efforts of “preserving and nurturing” it. In this light, [this practical principle also] differs from the so-called pure *daoxin*.

Yet, once having already observed the original source (*benyuan* 本原), [one has to] *subsequently* make the efforts of “being discerning and undivided” so as to approach the purity [of *daoxin*]; there is the proper procedure in between. Although [the efforts of] “being discerning and undivided” is not

11 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, p. 5.

12 Zhu Xi, *Zhongyong huowen*, in *sishu huowen* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2001), p. 59.

13 I acknowledge that this second and following third chapters of the present paper are partially based on a revision of my doctoral dissertation, Junghwan Lee, "A Groundwork for Normative Unity: Zhu Xi's Reformation of The "Learning of the Way" Tradition" (Harvard University, 2008), pp. 200-234.

14 For dating this letter, Chen Lai, *Zhuzi shuxin biannian kaozheng* 朱子書信編年考證 (Beijing: Sanlian shu dian, 2007), p. 153.

15 Cheng Yi, *Henan Chengshi Yishu* (hereafter, *Yishu*), in *Ercheng ji* 二程集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju edition, 1981), 11.126:11.

excluded from [the range of] *renxin*, [one] should follow this [principle] so as to completely overcome personal desires and entirely recover Heavenly Principle. Without following this [practical principle,] there is no likelihood [that one can ever] achieve [the pure *daoxin*].¹⁶ (Italics added)

Zhu Xi herein attempts to address the problem of the conflict between the concept of human nature and the necessity of voluntary moral practice. *first*, he pushes the conceptual test of *daoxin* to the extreme. Here, *daoxin* is a generic term referring to the mental states that have manifested purely from human nature or Heavenly Principle. "Purity," specifically,, signifies not only the goodness of such mental states in its evaluative quality but also "spontaneity and effortlessness" in its mode of manifestation. From the side of an agent, "purity" negatively implies the state of the mind that is absolutely free from any type of voluntary engagements of an agent in the "spontaneous and effortless" manifestation of innate morality. Conceptually speaking, therefore, all types of intention or will of an agent are considered as inappropriate interruptions in this self-perfect spontaneous process, which Zhu Xi here identified as "*renxin*" and "insincerity." Given that all intentions are extraneous to the spontaneous manifestation of *daoxin*, it makes no difference whether such intentions are initiated by good purposes or not, whether they are formed through appropriate deliberations or not, or whether they are believed to bring out desirable consequences or not.

On the basis of such strict conception of *daoxin* (or "pure *daoxin*"), Zhu calls attention to its potential incompatibility with any type of practical principles, including those prescribed by the sages. For example, this conception directly contradicts *Mencius'* practical principles of "always be doing something without expectation. Let the mind not forget its objective, but let there be no artificial effort to help it grow." Despite the warning against the involvement of "artificial efforts," this instruction unambiguously requires voluntary engagements of a moral agent (i.e., "always be doing something" and "let the mind not forget its objective"). Evidently, this problem is

16 Zhu Xi, "*Da Zhang Jingfu* 答張敬夫," Zhu Xi ji (hereafter, *ZXJ*) (Chengdu Shi: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), 32.1377-1378: 蓋舜禹授受之際.所以謂人心私欲者.非若衆人所謂私欲者也.但微有一毫把捉底意思.則雖雲本是道心之發.然終未離人心之境.所謂動以人則有妄.顏子之有不善.正在此間者是也.既曰有妄則非私欲而何.須是都無此意思.自然從容中道.才方純是道心也.必有事焉.卻是見得此理而存養下功處.與所謂純是道心者.蓋有間矣.然既察本原.則自此可加精一之功而進夫純耳.中間儘有次第也.惟精惟一.亦未離夫人心.特須如此克盡私欲.全復天理.儻不由此.則終無可至之理耳.

equally applied to the practical principle of “being discerning and undivided” in the sixteen character teaching as well as to that of “efforts of preserving and nurturing” in the *Mengzi*, both of which are cited in the quotation above.

This conceptual test of *daoxin* carries a risk of placing the argument on the horns of a dilemma, revealing the conceptual conflict between the spontaneity of human nature and the necessity of voluntary efforts. On the one hand, the thesis that human nature is good necessarily means that its manifestation must be spontaneous. Spontaneity, by definition, precludes the involvement of any external cause such as premeditation, artificial efforts, social rules, or practical principles. On the other hand, the thesis that human nature is good does not mean the moral perfection of individuals. In other words, individuals do not naturally become a moral being. Therefore, it is necessary for individuals to make voluntary efforts in order to practice moral self-cultivation. However, the necessity of voluntary efforts may threaten the validity of the thesis that human nature is good.

In the quotation above, Zhu attempts to reconcile the concept of *daoxin* with the necessity of voluntary moral practices of an agent without compromising the concept of *daoxin*. He separates the process of the spontaneous manifestation of human nature and the simultaneous cognition of it—“having already observed the original source”—from the *subsequent* practical engagement—“being discerning and undivided.” By associating the latter with *renxin*, he defends the validity of the relationship between human nature and an agent in an epistemological fashion. In so doing, he retains the concept of *daoxin* as pure spontaneous manifestations of human nature and situates the scope of voluntary efforts at the part *posterior* to this pure manifestation and cognition (“observing”).

Instead of resolving the conflict, Zhu’s separation in the quotation above seems to make the problem rather salient. *first*, in relation to moral practice, as he states, if one strictly applies this conception of *daoxin*, thus completely precluding all voluntary efforts, no practical principle can pass this conceptual test and lapse into the category of *renxin* with no exception. Therefore, it seems that in this framework, an agent has no other choice but to eliminate all voluntary mental activities from the mind and fully entrust the guidance arising from within. This line of thinking evokes Daoist self-negating principle of “effortless action” (*wuwei* 無爲) as well as the Buddhist approach of

eliminating all mental activities such as “thinking and measuring” and “discriminations” (*siliang fenbie* 思量分別) from the mind. As a matter of fact, that which provoked the discussion above in the first place was Cheng Yi’s statement quoted in the letter. It reads as follows:

Sages act as Heaven, and worthies act as a man. Even though it is not comparable to ordinary people, [the reason that] Yanzi also had [the moments of being] not-good comes from this difference. This is like having the self; those who have reached [the stage of] no-self are sages....¹⁷

In this passage, Cheng Yi overtly confirms that complete selflessness is the necessary precondition to achieve perfect conformity to the manifestation of Heavenly Principle. Nevertheless, as Zhu points out above, an effort to preclude voluntary engagements also belongs to the category of *renxin*. This does not mean that selflessness is out of the question, as long as it refers to a sort of mental state of the mind. It may *happen spontaneously* without the involvement of voluntary efforts. However, it is apparent in Zhu’s argument above that this precondition is not something that an agent can voluntarily achieve, demonstrating its incompatibility with the validity of all practical principles and corresponding efforts.

In addition, this approach gives rise to an epistemological problem as well. Zhu’s account above is grounded on the premise of an agent’s cognition of “the original source” or “the manifestation of *chaoxin*.” Here, *chaoxin* is implicitly identified as the sole medium between human nature and an agent. The “purity” of *chaoxin* categorically rules out the involvement of moral judgment or moral deliberation of an agent. If subjective moral judgment or deliberation is involved in *chaoxin*, it would blur the distinction between the objective account that human nature is good and the subjective account that moral qualities of human nature are determined by moral standards that an agent imposes on it. Furthermore, the phrase of “once having already observed the original source” specifies that innate *li spontaneously* manifests itself in the form of mental states, and *consequently* an agent passively gains genuine knowledge about it. As is stated earlier, because human nature *per se* is beyond direct

17 Cheng Yi, *Yishu*, 11.126:11. Also see, Cheng Yi, *Yishu*, 11.121:13; *Henan Chengshi cuiyu* 河南程氏粹語, in *Ercheng ji* 二程集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju edition, 1981), 1.1190:4 and 2.1255:4; and Cheng Yi, “*Wuwang* 無妄,” *Yichuan Yizhuan* 伊川易傳 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju edition, 1981), 2.822-823.

perception, one's understanding of human nature rests solely on *daoxin*. Therefore, in this framework, the effectiveness and efficiency of *daoxin* in revealing innate *li* to an agent is critical in bridging the epistemological gap between human nature and an agent. If one cannot perceive *daoxin* in a proper manner, one comes to be in lack of moral knowledge. Human nature is the ultimate source of moral knowledge, and *daoxin* is the only medium between an agent and human nature. In his later interpretation of the sixteen character teaching, however, Zhu alters this premise about *daoxin* and establishes the relationship between human nature and voluntary moral agency on a substantially different basis.

Epistemological Limitation between Human Nature and Moral Agency

The following quotation is a part of Zhu Xi's preface to the *Zhongyong*, the *locus classicus* of his mature interpretation of the sixteen character teaching.

<A> (A-1) The mind [as the faculty of] numinous perception (*xuling zhijue* 虛靈知覺) is one. (A-2) However, the reason that there is difference between *renxin* and *daoxin* is that [what the mind perceives] sometimes stems from the personal physical constitution and sometimes originates from the rectitude of mandated human nature. (A-3) According to the difference in what is perceived, [the mind] can become either precarious and insecure or very subtle and hardly perceptible, [but it does not mean that there are two minds]. (A-4) Nonetheless, human beings cannot exist without the physical, therefore even the most intelligent cannot be without *renxin*; [human beings] cannot exist without human nature, therefore the least intelligent also cannot be without *daoxin*.

 (B-1) When these two are *mixed in the mind*, and [one] does not know how to (or, the necessity to) *govern* (*zhi* 治) it, the precarious will be more precarious, while the subtle will be subtler. (B-2) Then, there will be no way that universal Heavenly Principle overcomes subjective personal desires. (B-3) "Being discerning" is to examine the difference between these two so as to make them not be mixed (*za* 雜); (B-4) "being undivided" is to protect the rectitude of the original mind so as not to be deviated (*li* 離) from it. (B-5) If committing oneself to these [practical principles] without even a short abeyance (*jianduan* 間斷), and thus making *daoxin* always be the master (*zhu* 主) of the self and *renxin* always listen to the order (*tingming* 聽命) [from *daoxin*], the precarious will be secure, and the subtle will be manifest. (B-6) Then, one's movements and stillness as well as words and deeds will be naturally free from errors of excess or deficiency.¹⁸

This statement consists of two parts: descriptive and normative. Part A describes the relationship, as well as definition, of the mind, *renxin*, and *daoxin*. In Part B, he infers from Part A the necessity of a voluntary agent's engagement while specifying relevant practical principles.

In Part A, the relationship of the mind with *renxin* and *daoxin* is explained mainly in an epistemological sense. Zhu clears off the linguistic confusion by distinguishing the mind of itself from *renxin* and *daoxin*.¹⁹ The mind of itself is defined primarily as the faculty of perception (A-1), and both *renxin* and *daoxin* equally belong to the category of the perceived from within (A-2). *renxin* and *daoxin* seem distinct in kind. *renxin* indicates the mental state of the mind when perceiving something "stemming from the personal physical constitution," whereas *daoxin* refers to the mental state of the mind when perceiving something "originating from the rectitude of mandated human nature."

Epistemologically speaking, the difference in terms of origination, however, is not sufficient for an agent to distinguish one from the other. Insofar as *renxin* and *daoxin* both belong to the category of the perceived from within, they must be distinguishable in the process of perception by the mind. Differently put, given that they are perceptively different, the difference between them needs to be explained in terms of distinctive qualities as well. This leads to the question of what such distinctive perceptive qualities would be.

In this preface to the *Zhongyong* spontaneity does not appear as a distinctive quality for discerning *daoxin* from *renxin*. In comparison to the letter analyzed in the previous section, Zhu here presents a new comparison between *daoxin* and *renxin*. Largely, *daoxin* is still defined as genuine and spontaneous manifestations of innate *li*. By contrast, *renxin* is not identified as intentionality of an agent any longer. Instead, *renxin* also refers to spontaneous mental states arising from within. He thus disqualifies spontaneity and effortlessness as the main criteria for discerning one from the other.

18 Zhu Xi, "*Zhongyong zhangju xu* 中庸章句序," *ZXJ*, 76.3994-3996.

19 Beyond a linguistic problem, this subject-object relationship was a critical issue Zhu coped with in order to solve the paradox of "two minds," thus confirming the unity of the mind. For this, see Junghwan Lee, "Moral Agent and Practical Will in Zhu Xi's Theory of Self-Cultivation: Centering on the 'the Antinomy of Two Minds'" (in Korean). *Chul Hak Sa Sang* (Institute of Philosophy, Seoul National University) 37 (2010), pp. 25-66.

A new definition of *renxin* is introduced to encompass diverse essential features of human life, which are inborn and spontaneous. The examples with which Zhu Xi illustrates it consistently highlights the “indispensable and inextirpable” (不可得而滅) aspects in human life that “the most intelligent cannot be without”²⁰ (A-4): Basic desires, for example, for food, which is necessary for all human beings to properly preserve their life;²¹ instinctive inclinations such as “when cold, one [*spontaneously*] comes to have the desire to be warm”;²² unconditioned reflexes such as “being pinched, feel pain; being tickled, feel ticklish”;²³ instantaneous emotional responses such as delight and anger;²⁴ evaluative responses such as “feeling pleasure, when eyes look at a beautiful object,” and so forth.²⁵ This set of examples clearly indicates that Zhu attributes the quality of spontaneity to *renxin* as well as to *daoxin*, implying a perceptual resemblance between them in terms of the mode of manifestation.

Zhu further argues that although *renxin* and *daoxin* are different in kind, they are “mixed” in the same sort of matter (*tong yi shi* 同一事); not only *renxin* but *daoxin* also relates to, for example, the desire for food when one is hungry.²⁶ What makes *daoxin* differ from *renxin* is, that is to say, whether this desire is satisfied in accord with the moral rule (*li* in Zhu’s term) pertinent to it or not.²⁷ (B-6) In other words, relating to the difference between *renxin* and *daoxin*, his description underlines its indistinguishable feature, thus narrowing down the intrinsic difference between *daoxin* and *renxin* to moral quality (or *li*) alone.

Intentionality is associated, instead, with the mind, which is defined as “the master of the self” (*yishen zhi zhu* 一身之主) and the role of which is to “govern” *renxin* and *daoxin*. (B-1) The necessity of governing *daoxin* as well as *renxin* derives from its intrinsic quality. “Precariousness” of *renxin* does not imply immorality, but it indicates

20 *Zhuzi Yulei* 朱子語類 (hereafter, *ZZYL*), Zhonghua shuju edition (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1994), 62.1487:1, 78.2010:1, 78.2010:2, and 78.2011:2.

21 *ZZYL*, 78.2010:2, 78.2010:2, and 78.2012:3.

22 *ZZYL*, 62.1486:4, 62.1487:2, 78.2009:6, 78.2010:3, 78.2011:2, 78.2011:3, 78.2011:4, 78.2011:5, and 78.2016:1.

23 *ZZYL*, 62.1486:1

24 *ZZYL*, 78.2011:2

25 *ZZYL*, 62.1486:3, 78.2009:4, 78.2010:2, and 78.2012:3.

26 *ZZYL*, 56.1331:2. Also, see *ZZYL*, 40.1031:3 and 43.1111:1.

27 *ZZYL*, 78.2011:2 and 3.

its strong epistemological and motivational force of driving people to feel, think, or behave accordingly, but independently of morality.²⁸ Therefore, this body of “indispensable and inextirpable” epistemological and motivational forces needs to be controlled in accord with *daoxin* or the perceived *li*, which is encapsulated in the phrase “making ... *renxin* always listen to the order [from *daoxin*].” (B-5)

In contrast, “subtlety” of *daoxin* signifies a certain kind of weakness. As moral knowledge, *daoxin* is too “subtle and hardly perceptible” to be distinguished from *renxin* or less discernible than *renxin*. As a moral motivation, *daoxin* is too weak to override *renxin*’s driving force by itself. In the same vein, he also describes such attributes of *daoxin* as “difficulty in illuminating [it]” (*nanning* 難明)²⁹ and “difficulty in [its] manifestation” (*nanxian* 難顯 or *nanzhu* 難著).³⁰

Zhu’s consistent emphasis on the subtlety of *daoxin* coheres with his claim that the realization of innate *li* rests primarily on the voluntary engagement of an agent (to be precise, the mind), both in discerning the “hardly perceptible” moral quality of *daoxin* against *renxin* and in reinforcing its weak motivational force so as to actually put it into practice. (B-5) “Being discerning” corresponds to the former discernment of *daoxin* vis-à-vis *renxin*, which most likely manifest in “mixture.” (B-3); “being undivided” signifies the latter reinforcing process of binding oneself not to be “deviated” from the *li* gained through the former discerning process, and thus actually acting in accord with it. (B-4)

Nonetheless, the necessity of the involvement of voluntary discernment in particular involves a risk of undermining the primary thesis that “human nature is good.” This thesis is as much a normative as a descriptive statement. In order to fully substantiate it, Zhu’s explanatory system needs to expound on the way that a morally-oriented agent is actually able to comprehend and realize innate goodness by properly perceiving *daoxin*. As we have seen in the letter analyzed in the previous section, the voluntariness of an agent does not necessarily contradict this thesis, given that *daoxin* can *spontaneously* manifest innate goodness (or *li*) and that the agent can perceive it without confusion.

28 ZZYL, 62.1486:3, 62.1486:4, 62.1486:5, 62.1486:6, 62.1486:7, 78.2009:4, 78.2009:6, 78.2010:1, 78.2010:2, 78.2012:2, and 78.2010:3.

29 ZZYL, 78.2010:3.

30 Zhu Xi, “*shangshu* 尚書,” *ZXJ*, 65.3436; ZZYL, 78.2009:4.

In the preface to his commentary to the *Zhongyong* however, Zhu proposes the discerning task as the foremost action that a voluntary agent should take in relation to the manifestation of human nature. In his definition, human nature is “exhaustively equipped” with all *li*—in other words, human nature is the ultimate and perfect source of norms and values required for an agent to act morally. Note that human nature itself is beyond direct perception, and *daoxin* is one and only medium through which an agent can comprehend innate *li*. Therefore, the effectiveness of the discerning task has a direct bearing on the efficiency in acquiring knowledge of innate *li* and, ultimately, in realizing it through practice.

Conversely, Zhu derives the necessity of the discerning task from “subtle,” “hardly perceptible,” and “indistinguishable” attributes he imposes upon *daoxin*. Supposing that manifestation of innate goodness is mostly clear and distinct, the discerning task would be rather futile. By pointing to such attributes, he signifies the inefficiency, although not complete ineffectiveness, inherent in the perception of *daoxin*, which entails that an agent cannot efficiently or sufficiently gain moral knowledge of *li* from its ultimate source. Put another way, such attributes of *daoxin* suggests a substantial limitation between human nature and a moral agent, arising from the inefficiency of human nature in manifesting innate *li* as well as a significant constraint for an agent to acquire moral knowledge of innate *li*.

The objective of “discerning” task is to distinguish the good and right from the bad or wrong among *spontaneously* arising mental states of *daoxin* and *renxin*. An agent would have the intention of carrying out this task, only if the agent believes that good and right mental states actually arise, that such mental states are distinguishable, and that the agent has the capacity of discerning one from the other.

Relating to the relationship between human nature and an agent, Zhu’s conflicting accounts of the discerning task—its practical necessity and its actual inefficiency—may turn his theory of human nature to be a type of subjectivism. *firstly*, given that one has little knowledge of moral norms and values manifesting from human nature but has to discern it properly, one cannot help but draw upon moral standards that one has gained from external sources. This contradicts with the thesis that human nature is *objectively* good; rather, it suggests that human nature *becomes* good in accordance with moral standards that an agent imposes on it. In addition, if human nature is the one and

only source of *li*, but it is mostly obscure (“subtle”) to an agent, where can the agent perceive such *li* in the first place?

Zhu escapes such dilemma by suggesting the practical principle of “investigation of things” (*gewu* 格物). He thus requires one to turn attention to external sources—“things in the world” (*tianxia zhi wu* 天下之物)—rather than exclusively relying on human nature.³¹ This well-known practical principle may not need further explication, but one thing to note is that without presupposing a certain epistemological gap between human nature and a moral agent, the practical principle of investigation of things becomes good-for-nothing. If one believes that human nature *spontaneously* manifests itself in one’s mind, and thus providing one with sufficient moral knowledge in an efficient and effective fashion, one can find no proper reason to pay attention to external things.

When Zhu turns attention from the internal human nature (or *chaoxin*) to external things, he in effect attenuates the practical implication of the thesis that “human nature is *li*” and its capacity as moral guidance. For, no matter how cogent his explanatory system is in undergirding this thesis, the validity of investigation of things is predicated on the premise that the manifested innate *li* (or *chaoxin*) is hardly perceptible, therefore one cannot fully fall back on human nature for moral knowledge in practice.

Conclusion: Balancing between Human Nature and Moral Agency

Up to this point, we have drawn two mutually exclusive conclusions: Zhu Xi’s explanatory system is designed, on the one hand, to foster the belief in human nature as the self-perfect source of morality and on the other, to underline a substantial barrier in comprehending this innate morality and thus extending it to action. This pair of seemingly inconsistent accounts can also be found in his commentary to the *Zhongyong*.

Zhu’s comment to Chapter 1 of the *Zhongyong* begins with the

31 Zhu Xi’s Supplementary Chapter for *Gewu* and *Zhizhi* in his Commentary on the *Great Learning*.

note that “Human nature that Heaven confers [on us] is that which all *li* in the human world come from. ... [We should manage our lives] in compliance with human nature,”³² and thus unambiguously bolstering the belief in innate morality. In Chapter 20, conversely, a reader will come across the following passage:

If one has not reached the stage of being a sage, one cannot but have personal human desires, therefore one’s virtue cannot be entirely genuine. Given that one cannot comprehend [what is right] without thinking, one must choose what is good, only then is one able to illuminate what is good; given that one cannot hit upon what is good without effort, one must firmly hold it fast, only then is one able to make the self genuinely united with the *li*. This is what “the Human Way” (*rendao* 人道) [in the *Zhongyong*] means.³³

In this statement, Zhu does not straightforwardly disprove the possibility of “spontaneous and effortless” guidance of innate *li*. Yet, by allowing only sages to claim it, he indirectly but overtly instructs his readers not to pursue blindly such a supreme capability.

In essence, by constructing a dualistic explanatory system, Zhu intends to seek a proper balance between the belief in innate morality and the moral responsibility of a voluntary agent. In the eyes of Zhu, the former alone carries a risk of driving people to behave as they please, rather than guiding in moral direction. He says, “If seizing and grabbing of hands [are the genuine functions of nature,] can we call seizing a knife and randomly killing people also human nature?”³⁴ Generally speaking, due to the dissemination of Chan Buddhism and then to the ascendancy of Neo-Confucianism, a strong belief in innate capacity continued to prevail throughout the latter half history of pre-modern Chinese philosophy. On the other hand, this long-lasting trend often provoked great concern about its intrinsic liability to promoting radical subjectivism or antinomianism.

In response, Zhu systematically puts forward practical principles drawn from the Confucian classics. In the preface to the *Zhongyong* he argues that this classic is a work to extensively “explicate” the sixteen character teaching. He then links each phrase in this formula to various practical principles in the *Zhongyong* and the *Great Learning*: ‘What Heaven has conferred’ (*tianming* 天命) and ‘to comply with

32 Zhu Xi, *Zhongyong zhangju*, Chapter 1.

33 Zhu Xi, *Zhongyong zhangju*, Chapter 20.

34 ZZYL, 126.3022:1.

human nature' (*shuaixing* 率性) in the *Zhongyong* refer to *daoxin*, 'choosing what is good, and firmly holding it fast' corresponds to 'being discerning and undivided'; and "a superior man always hits upon what is right" (*junzi shizhong* 君子時中)³⁵ refers to 'holding on to the mean.'³⁶ He continues to relate "extensive study, accurate inquiry, careful reflection, and clear discrimination" to "the means to choose what is good and become knowledgeable," and "earnest practice" to "the means to hold it fast and become benevolent."³⁷ He also prescribes the formulae of "investigation of things" and "extension of knowledge" in *the Great Learning* as the ultimate methods in "illuminating what is good" and "choosing what is good," and relates "making the intention authentic," "squaring the mind," and "cultivating the self" to "holding it fast."³⁸

As we have seen in his letter previously analyzed, however, Zhu is also well aware that owing to the incompatibility between spontaneity and intentionality, the belief in human nature can hardly be consistent with practical principles, even if one has sufficient reason to conclude that such principles are good in every respect. This problem prompts him to readjust the relationship between human nature and the voluntary action of an agent so as to fit a set of practical principles into it.

Zhu addresses this underlying problem by postulating a significant, but not unbridgeable, gap between human nature and an agent. In interpreting the sixteen character teaching, by attributing spontaneity both to *daoxin* and *renxin*, he makes them indistinct in terms of the mode of manifestation, thus imposing a certain degree of epistemological barrier for an agent in comprehending innate *li*. Figuratively speaking, instead of emphasizing one over the other, he describes human nature to be subtle and obscure in its manifestation, somewhere between complete opacity and complete transparency. Thus, he defends the thesis of innate morality by not entirely ruling out the empirical possibility of "perceiving" it, while simultaneously authorizing voluntary practices to turn this dim and ambiguous

35 Both James Legge and Wing-tist Chan translate "shizhong" as "maintaining the Mean," but Zhu Xi said in the commentary "there is no case that [a superior man] does not hit the mark." (*wushi buzhong* 無時不中)

36 Zhu Xi, "*Zhongyong zhangju xu*," ZXJ, 76.3995.

37 Zhu Xi, *Zhongyong zhangju*, Chapter 20.

38 Zhu Xi, *Zhongyong huowen*, p. 87.

experience into clear and distinct moral knowledge on the other.

Consequentially speaking, however, this dualistic approach does not give a definite solution to the problem of subjectivism and eventually leads to toning down his claim that human nature is good, particularly in a practical sense. In Zhu's conception, this claim signifies that because the moral quality of human nature is objectively predetermined, strictly speaking, it is not reconcilable with the moral judgment or moral deliberation of an agent. To the contrary, his emphasis on the subtlety of *chaoxin* necessitates the involvement of an agent in "discerning" what is good from what is not, implying that the moral status of *chaoxin* hinges largely on the moral judgment of an agent.

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本有道德性與道德主體之間的均衡： 朱子的十六字教解釋

李 定 桓

中文摘要：孟子的性善論作為新儒家傳統的核心教理，朱子的哲學體系也是為了支持這一命題而創立的。這一主張絕非誇言。然而性善論的命題中包含著人的本性的自然發生性(或本有道德性)與主體的道德意志之間的兩立不可能性的哲學問題也是事實。本論文的目的在於，通過分析朱子對十六字教“人心惟危，道心惟微，惟精惟一，允執厥中”的解釋，考察內在朱子哲學體系中的哲學性問題。由此，一方面強化對於作為道德性的根源的人的本性的信賴，另一方面指出，強調源於道德主體的本有道德性的理解內在著一定的局限性的朱子哲學體系的雙重性格。最後指出，朱子試圖通過它尋找對本有道德性的信賴與意志主體的道德義務之間的均衡點。朱子通過這種均衡，一方面防止了對本有道德性的信賴轉向極端主觀主義或者反律法主義，另一方面防禦了諸如格物之類的儒家經傳中道德實踐原則的妥當性。

關鍵詞：本有的道德性，道德意志，十六字教，人心，道心，道德實踐原則

On Zhu Xi's Distinction between Heavenly Principle and Human Desire

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Abstract

Zhu Xi's distinction between heavenly principle and human desire (理欲之辨) has been more often than not criticized by modern men, either as asceticism or as "demolishing humans with heavenly principles" (以理殺人). It should be acknowledged that errors are bound to occur should one employ modern languages to re-interpret ancient thoughts. For one thing, the discourse system internal to ancient times presupposed a self-evident premise that is different from that in modern times, a difference which, if ignored, will surely lead us to misinterpretations and misunderstandings. As a matter of fact, such misinterpretations and misunderstandings can be seen at the various levels of a modern reading of Zhu Xi's distinction between principle and desire. In recent years, misunderstandings on such concepts as human desire (人欲), human mind (人心), or partial profit (私利) have received certain attention among scholars, an attention that has far to go yet in order to free itself from the shackles of modern contexts. By way of contrast, misunderstandings of other concepts, such as heavenly principle (天理) and the sage (聖人), have not received due reflection so far. Misinterpretations offered by such scholars as Feng Youlan (馮友蘭) and Mou Zongsan (牟宗三) are still popular among modern students of Zhu Xi, thus showing in a nutshell a coarse distortion of ancient ideas in modern contexts. These misunderstandings have not only hidden from view the profound meanings of Zhu Xi's arguments, but also the intension of Zhu Xi's theory of principle as a whole. This article attempts to offer a clarification of Zhu Xi's distinction between principle and desire, through examining the different contexts of ancient and modern times and the self-evident premises therein, so as to reveal an alternative path of exploring the profound ideas in Zhu Xi's Theory of Principle.

Keywords: Zhu Xi 朱熹, Human Mind 人心, Dao Mind 道心

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Part 1. Natural Desire (自然之欲) and Man-Made Desire (人爲之欲)

In Zhu Xi's theory on Confucianism, his distinction between principle and desire is of central importance. The central thesis of the whole theory is "to learn to be a sage" (學以至聖), with as its general cardinal principle "to keep heavenly principle and to eliminate human desire" (存天理滅人欲). As Zhu Xi argued, "Innumerable words from the sages and worthies serve only one purpose: to teach man to understand heavenly principle and to eliminate human desire" (*Conversations of Master Zhu, Arranged Topically* - 朱子語類, hereinafter referred to as "*Yu Lei*" for short, Vol.12). The most fundamental mark of sagehood is "to completely eliminate human desire with the prevalence of heavenly principle" (人欲淨盡, 天理流行), for which reason "to learn to be a sage" will *finally* be summed up as "to keep heavenly principle and to eliminate human desire." The problem lies in the exact definition of what human desire and heavenly principle are. More importantly, what is sagehood? A modern man invariably starts from his own self-evident premise(s), offering impudent answers to these questions that can contribute nothing but misunderstandings. For purpose of clarification, we will start from the concept of human desire, so as to offer a full account of Zhu Xi's distinction between human desire and heavenly principle.

Zhou Dunyi 周惇頤, the founder of the Theory of Principle (理學), focuses in *General Principles of the Book of Changes* (通書) on the issue of what sagehood is and how to become one. For him, "It was asked, 'Is it possible to learn to be a sage?' Zhu replied, 'Yes.' It was asked, 'Any critical point?' Zhu replied, 'Yes.' It was asked, 'Please tell me.' Zhu replied, 'Oneness is the critical point. Oneness is 'no-desire' (無欲). No-desire results in vacuity when in quiescence, and straightforwardness when in movement. ..." Here the focus of learning to be a sage is directly aimed at no-desire, or an absence of desire. Mencius argues that "there is no better way to nurture one's mind than few-desire (寡欲)," on the top of which Zhou Dunyi further emphasizes that "to nurture one's mind does not stop at few-desire, which should move forward to no-desire" (*Talk on the Pagoda of Nurturing Mind* 養心亭說). To nurture one's mind is a way to become a sage and worthy, while the crux of the matter is to move from few-desire to no-desire, which Zhu Xi discusses with his disciples:

Lian Xi 濂溪 said, 'to move from few-desire to no-desire,' lest man take it enough to have few-desire, for which he suggested that few-desire is not enough and that we have to proceed to and beyond no-desire. One can make efforts in his capability to reach few-desire. No one can reach no-desire but a sage. It was asked, 'But how to understand the word 'desire'?' Zhu replied, 'It is different. This few-desire is inappropriateness, such as partial desire. If the desire is to eat when hungry and to drink when thirsty, how can we stop it? But we need to attend to the appropriateness of such desire (*Yu Lei*, vol.94).

Only a sage can have no-desire, by which standard it is evident that should a common man arrive at no-desire, then he too will become a sage. The desire in this no-desire is exactly that learning to be a sage aims to eliminate human desire in its entirety, rather than some simple natural desires. The example of the former can be partial desire, something "inappropriate" (合不當如此者), while for the latter, the example can be "the desire to eat when hungry and to drink when thirsty," which is the appropriate. The key difference between the two is their value orientation, namely appropriateness (合當). A modern man, upon seeing the word of desire, will immediately think of simple natural or sensual desire – which is a neutral territory with value judgments already eliminated. It is a region under the jurisdiction of instrumental rationality in the name of science. Value judgments change nothing of this fact. Furthermore, only on the top of it can value judgements be constructed. For this very reason, compared with relative, subjective value assessment, it is an ontological *a priori*. This is indeed an important achievement of disenchanted or desanctified modern civilization, which has already become a self-evident premise in our mind. For this very reason, a modern man, upon seeing the phrase of "eliminating human desire," will immediately link it with asceticism in Middle-Age Europe, thus arousing an intuitive caution and indignation. However, in the eyes of ancient people, value refers not only to subjective judgment in juxtaposition with fact, but also to a certain fundamental trend that permeates cosmos and human life. It carries its own necessity that permeates facts, which is what Zhuangzi called "the ineluctable between heaven and earth." No territory on the Earth does not bear mark of it. On the contrary, it is what animates everything, thus occupying a life-and-death importance in human life experiences. For this very reason, it plays a supreme role in the human spiritual world.

Although this is not devoid of the problem of pan-valuation, it nevertheless is one of the self-evident premises for ancient people. For this, when discussing what a modern man refers to as natural desires, Zhu Xi is not in the least intended to be value-neutral:

As for mouth desiring to eat, eyes to look, ears to hear, nose to smell, and four limbs to ease, how do they become so by themselves? This is because of the naturalness of heavenly principle (天理之自然) (*Yu Lei*, vol.61).

Nothing outside exerts a greater attraction than the desires of eating, drinking and sex. If we reason with their source, they are inherent in man, who is bound to have them. Nevertheless, among them there is a distinction between heavenly principle and human desire, for which we should not make even the slightest mistake. ...Today people are unable to reason with things and trace back to their source. They do nothing more than to detest the attraction of things and to eradicate it completely. This is no difference from to shut our mouth and stomach for the propriety of eating and drinking, or to extinct human species for the propriety between husband and wife”(*Questions on Great Learning* - 大學或問).

In the eyes of a modern man, desire consists in an active give/take by the will, including not only such sensual desire as satisfying our bodily senses, but also spiritual desire that transcends sensuality. Natural desires mainly refer to the former, namely sensual desires at the level of the will. By way of contrast, desire has a much wider meaning. Emotion as the movement of senses is as much a desire as a will that actively pursues, both belonging to the movement of the mind, which can be called the “movement of the will.” Whether it be sense, emotion and will, or transcendental pursuit, as long as the inward natural organism has been triggered, then a desire will be conceived, a desire that mainly refers to the function of mind, namely interior intentionality. “Human mind is the sensing organ on our body, with its desires, such as ‘I desire benevolence,’ ‘to follow what my mind desires,’ and ‘Natural desire moves upon its sensing of things.’ How can we live without these desires?” (*Yu Lei*, vol.62). The natural function of mind, such as sense and desire, with an intentionality determined by the inward natural organism, is invariably “what we should possess and cannot live without,” which in a wider sense can be called “natural desire.” A thought, once conceived, carries with it certain intentionality, which then consists of desire. Ancient philosophers took great trouble with untiring patience in explaining varying kinds of intentionality such as distinguishing, cathartic,

judgement and action, which invariably emphasize activism of intentionality. For instance, as for "to like good looks" (好好色), "upon seeing looks, one desires to differentiate them and feels happy upon seeing good looks. Once happy, one likes it and then pursues it. Sensing, knowing, feeling, desiring and acting, are all in one and interconnected with each other, something that one cannot help." Whereas "mouth to eat and eyes to look" are desires, "I desire benevolence" is equally a desire, which is indispensable, as it is the "necessity" of Nature. More importantly, how to understand this "necessity" of Nature? The answer is none other than the notion that "everyone has it." In other words, where the "necessity" of Nature is not apparent, then we will need to "trace back to its root," which is the "certainty" of Nature. The reason that this desire is indispensable lies in that the agency in this intentionality is the active source of all sublime pursuits, for which by virtue of origin, this natural desire is not only non-value-neutral, but rather some complete goodness – it is the "naturalness of heavenly principle" by itself.

The desire to be eliminated during learning to be a sage is not this natural desire, but "human desire" opposed to "heavenly principle," which is also referred to as "partial desire" or "material desire." Nature is opposed to Mankind, therefore we can call it "man-made desire." Certainly, the desire of "I desire benevolence," in the modern perspective, is an active pursuit, which involves "human efforts." Nevertheless, for ancient people, it is regarded as spontaneous in accordance with the essence of heavenly mandate, thus being more natural than the tendency to seek advantage and avoid disadvantages. For Zhu Xi, natural desire is pure goodness, while the man-made one is evil, with no value-neutral intermediary middle ground in the between. "It was asked, 'Among 'to eat when hungry, to drink when thirsty, to put on fur coat in winter, and to wear lightly in summer,' what is the so-called 'heavenly calling' (天職)?' Zhu replied, 'This is what the Heaven teaches me to do. We have no choice but to eat when hungry, and to drink when thirsty. To pursue excessively the desire of eating and drinking is wrong. For the Heaven only teaches me to eat when hungry and to drink when thirsty. Since when does it teach me to pursue excessively the desire of eating and drinking?' (*Yu Lei*, vol.96). "It was asked, 'Between eating and drinking, what is heavenly principle? What is human desire?' Zhu replied, 'To eat and to drink is heavenly principle, but to demand delicious taste is a

human desire”(Yu Lei, vol.13, translation adopted from Chan 1989: 200). Obviously, “to eat when hungry while to drink when thirsty” is a purely natural phenomenon, thus being the necessity of Nature, for which Zhu Xi argues that “we can do nothing but satisfy it.” This necessity of Nature is also called “heavenly calling,” which at the same time becomes a certainty of Nature, which constitutes the “heavenly principle” by itself. The naturalness of heavenly principle consists of both the necessity and the certainty of Nature. “Man-made desire” is a dual violation of the naturalness of heavenly principle in that it adds an element of human contrivance to the basis of natural desire (thus violating the necessity of Nature). Moreover, it has rendered the orientation of desire to point towards what is against heavenly principle (thus violating the certainty of Nature). It is important to notice this “addition of the element of human contrivance,” which is the separation point between man-made and natural desires. For instance, the reason that “to excessively pursue voluptuous desires” or “to demand delicious tastes” is a human desire lies in the key that this “to excessively pursue” or “to demand” contains a human element. The consequence of this addition of the element of human contrivance is a violation of heavenly principle. The fundamental difference between “I desire benevolence” and “to excessively pursue voluptuous desires” is whether it accords with or violates heavenly principle. A modern man more often than not regards the difference between “to satisfy thirst and hunger” and “to demand delicious tastes” as a difference in degree in terms of satisfying biological imperatives. In the light of this perspective, it is a matter of heavenly principle if he seeks to satisfy basic human needs – any satisfaction exceeding this level will constitute a man-made desire. If understood in this way, Zhu Xi’s distinction between principle and desire will not be immune to the blame of asceticism. Nevertheless, what Zhu Xi himself has emphasized specifically is the value difference of “in/appropriateness” of these two desires. This difference is not in degree, but in substance.

As for mouth desiring to eat, eyes to look, ears to hear, nose to smell, and four limbs to ease, how do they become so by themselves? This is because of the naturalness of heavenly principle. Nevertheless, the principle is attached to force, with this muchness emanating from flesh and blood human body. For this a gentleman should not focus on this, but on the principle of heavenly mandate. He doesn’t really care about it, but attends to whether it is in accordance with principle. “There is Mandate, and also

Nature.' This 'Mandate' and 'Nature' are by virtue of principle. 'A gentleman does not call it 'Nature'; neither does he call it 'Mandate.' The 'Mandate' and 'Nature' here are explained in the light of force' (*Yu Lei*, vol.61).

What are the percentages of heavenly principle and human desire? Heavenly principle is originally large. Human desire, then, operates from within the heavenly principle. And even though it is human desire, human desire naturally contains heavenly principle. Someone asked: Isn't it that originally it was all heavenly principle? Zhu replied: At birth a person's all heavenly principle; human desire is produced later, without moral principle (*Yu Lei*, vol.13, translation from Gardner 1990: 181).

The difference between heavenly principle and human desire is fundamentally a matter of principle and force (氣). The thesis on principle and force is the ontological foundation of Zhu Xi's distinction between heavenly principle and human desire, which is not only concerned with "tracing the root of being" but also with "tracing the root of value." From the perspective of being, everything is derived from heavenly mandate; while from that of value, heavenly mandate in the very beginning is pure goodness without evil. The primordial heavenly mandate has a distinction between principle and force, for which the character of "ming" (mandate 命) can be regarded as the principle of heavenly mandate, from the perspective of principle; or as the force of heavenly mandate, from that of force. The Theory of Principle can be ontologically understood as a form of ontology immersed in values, rather than one from which to derive values. By virtue of origin, be it the principle or force of heavenly mandate, it is pure goodness, the naturalness of heavenly principle. Natural desire comes from the force of heavenly mandate and "manifests itself on the flesh-and-blood human body." If by "following it" we seek to excessively pursue it, then an element of human contrivance will be added, which then constitutes a man-made desire, with its excess as evil. To learn to be a sage is not to eradicate natural desire, but rather not to pay too much attention to natural desire. "We don't need to take it seriously. We just need to see whether this will turn out to accord with principle." It is derived from heavenly principle, but contradicts the latter. "Human desire, though being human, has in itself an element of heavenly principle naturally," which makes the difference between heavenly principle and human desire nuanced and subtle. From the perspective of the root of values, the manifestation of human desire is groundless and irrational, similar to "ignorance" (無

明) as in Buddhism, for which Zhu Xi calls it “without moral principle.” How to understand this series of interrelated propositions is the key to clarifying the distinction between heavenly principle and human desire.

Part 2. Human Mind and Dao Mind

All desires are derived from an inner mind, meaning an in-depth discussion of human desire will not be possible unless we focus on the issue of mind. Since the two Chengs (Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi) quoted from *the Book of Shang* (尚書) the means inherited from Yao and Shun, the distinction between heavenly principle and human desire has been intertwined with that between human mind and Dao Mind. In essence, “human mind is prone to fall, because of human desire; Dao Mind to subtlety, because of heavenly principle” (*Posthumous Works by the Chengs in Henan* - 河南程氏遺書, vol.11). The distinction between heavenly principle and human desire is focused on value judgment, which is used to explain human mind and Dao Mind, thus emphasizing its value connotations. For this reason, Zhu Xi in general agrees with what Chengzi said. “As Chengzi said, ‘Human mind, due to human desire, is prone to fall; Dao Mind, due to heavenly principle, to subtlety. Only by persevering on minutia and uphold it consistently will one be able to grasp the mean.’ This suggestion says it all’ (*Yu Lei*, vol.78). Nevertheless, from some of the surviving text, it does seem certain that he doubts this argument:

Dao Mind is able to sense the moral principle, while human mind to sense sound, look and smell. It is not that human mind is all-bad. If human mind is all-bad, we will not call it merely ‘prone to fall.’ Human mind is prone to walk towards evil, for which it is ‘prone to fall,’ If it is all-bad, then it will just fall, and not merely ‘prone to fall!’ ‘Prone to fall’ is something imminent, not happening yet. ‘Dao Mind is prone to subtlety,’ which is nuance and to sense in minutia. If we say ‘Dao Mind is heavenly principle, while human mind human desire,’ then there will be two minds. Human has only one mind, of which the part sensing the moral principle is Dao Mind, while that sensing sound, look and smell is human mind. The saying that ‘Human mind is human desire’ is wrong. Although someone endowed with superior intelligence may have none of it, yet it cannot be all-bad. Lu Zijing 陸子靜 also taught this saying to others. It is not that there are two minds. Dao Mind and human mind are just the same, with different sensibilities (*Yu Lei*, vol.78).

This conversation was recorded by Xiao Zuo 蕭佐, in which Zhu

Xi argues clearly that the two Chengs "said this wrongly." By the virtue of this, it is often argued that Zhu Xi differs from the two Chengs in emphasizing more the appropriateness of natural sensual desire. However, a careful examination of its context will point towards another direction. The two Chengs attempt to explain Dao Mind and human mind by virtue of heavenly principle and human desire, an attempt that, though direct in terms of value orientation, may set an example for latecomers, should they wish to follow their style of explanation, namely to speak lightly of the complexity of issues. For one thing, the two Chengs simply dichotomize human mind and Dao Mind. "Fang Bomo 方伯謨 said, 'Human mind and Dao Mind, as Yichuan 伊川 said, are just heavenly principle and human desire.' Zhu replied, 'Although it is so, this does not mean two things, like two stones hitting each other. It is just that this same human mind will be heavenly principle if following the moral principle, and human desire if following sensuality, for which we should understand it in terms of the boundary' (*Yu Lei*, vol.78). At this time, Zhu Xi specifically emphasizes that "human has only one mind," and that "Dao Mind and human mind are one." The difference between heavenly principle and human desire lies in the "appreciation" of this one mind of human. The essence of learning should be focused on the appreciation of the "demarcation boundary" between good and evil in this one mind. The classic expressions on human mind and Dao Mind by Zhu Xi can be seen from the following:

The vacuous and spiritual sense (虛靈知覺) of mind is just one. For those who believe that human mind is different from Dao Mind, they may think that it grows out of the partiality of corporeality and force, or from the propriety of Nature and Mandate, for which what is sensed is different. For this reason, they believe that the one is prone to fall, thus being uneasy, while the other is so subtle that it is difficult to discern. Nevertheless, to be a man, you have to possess this corporeality, for which even though endowed with superior intelligence, you cannot disown human mind; neither can you disown Nature, for which reason even if you have base imbecility, you will still have Dao Mind. These two are mixed in minutia. If we do not gain knowledge on how to deal with them, then the one prone to fall will be moved closer to fall, while the other prone to subtlety will be reduced to greater indiscernibility, until in the end, the impartiality of heavenly principle cannot triumph over the partiality of human desire" (*Introduction to Chapters from the Doctrine of the Mean*, 中庸章句序)

The human has only one mind, which comes from heavenly

mandate. "The vacuous and spiritual sense" is the mind, meaning that perception corresponds to what is perceived. "The perceived is the principle of mind, while the perceiver is the spirit of force" (*Yu Lei*, vol.5). The perceiver is produced by the force of heavenly mandate, namely the spirit of force. Nevertheless, perception in and of itself is not force. As is commonly argued, consciousness is a material function, while consciousness itself is not material. "The mind is the very essence of force" (*Yu Lei*, vol.5). This explanation holds true. The difference between human and Dao Mind lies in the key of what is perceived: if the perceived is "sound, look and smell," then it is the human mind, "derived from the partiality of corporeality and force"; while if the perceived is "moral principle," then it is the Dao Mind, "derived from the propriety of Nature and Mandate." "The partiality of corporeality and force" is the crux of the matter. It is not "the partiality of human desire," as it is harmless, though finite. From Zhu Xi's assertions on human mind, human mind is almost identical with natural desire. In the distinction between heavenly principle and human desire, natural desire directly equals "heavenly principle" or "the naturalness of heavenly principle." By way of contrast, in the distinction between human and Dao Mind, human mind is "prone to fall"; however, it is "not all-bad." Then, is human mind some value-neutral sensual desire? As is argued, "It was asked, 'Human mind does not begin without good, and only comes to no-good because of launching deliberation. In referring to human mind and Dao Mind, you said that human mind grows out of the partiality of corporeality and force. Is it not that once we have corporeality and force, we will also have this human mind?' Zhu replied, 'Some argued for it and some against it. If we speak of human mind alone, then it is all-good. If we speak of it against Dao Mind, then it will be toiling over things, which will lead to illness and pain'" (*Yu Lei*, vol.62). For the same human mind, there is a difference between "speaking of it alone" and "speaking against Dao Mind." If we "speak of human mind alone," namely the naturalness of heavenly principle, then "all is good," being pure goodness in value; if we "speak of human mind against Dao Mind," although it is not human desire, it is nevertheless closely related to human desire, thus becoming "toiling over things which will lead to illness and pain." Although it is not very evil, it has already been cast with a shadow of negative value.

Chen Chun 陳淳 once wrote to Zhu Xi to ask, "I find it doubtful

for you to say in *Introduction to Chapters from the Doctrine of the Mean* that 'to be a man, you have to possess this corporeality, for which even though endowed with superior intelligence, you cannot disown human mind.' Human mind is born so in terms of corporeality and force, not of man-madness. Nevertheless, the above quote says also 'growing out of the partiality of corporeality and force.' Why does it say 'partiality'? I'm afraid that the partiality is concerned with man's partial desire, which does not correspond to the saying 'even though endowed with superior intelligence, you cannot disown human mind.' What does it mean?" Zhu Xi answered that "The desires of hunger, thirst, warmth and coolness all grow out of my flesh and blood corporeal form, which everybody has. The so-called partiality is not all-bad. It is just that we should not indulge in it" (*Collected Works of Zhu Wengong* 朱文公文集 – hereinafter referred to as "*Collected Works*" for short, vol.57, "Answer to Chen Anqin 答陳安卿"). "To speak in general by virtue of corporeality and force" resembles a presentation of facts. In the historical context, it meant that human is born with a human form and endowed with a human mind. This is as natural, absent of human contrivance, in terms of heavenly principle, as bird can fly and fish swim. This is what Zhu Xi refers to as "speaking of human mind alone." In the distinction between human and Dao Mind, he is mainly referring to "speaking of human mind against Dao Mind." The finite corporeal form has natural needs, such as thirst and hunger, where the intention of human mind, though natural, is bound to egoism of the corporeal form. The term of "partiality" is to indicate that it is the source of "human, partial desire." If the intention remains here, and one pursues it without temperance and always actively "indulges" it, then the natural human mind bound to "the partiality of corporeality and force" will be led into excess, becoming the "partiality of human desire." Human mind will then turn into human desire.

It was asked, 'You said that human mind is the 'partiality of corporeality and force,' which are where mouth, ears, nose, eyes and four limbs belong.' Zhu replied, 'Yes.' It was asked, 'If so, then how can we call it partiality?' Zhu replied, 'It is just that these several things belong to one's own body, thus privately owned. It is incomparable to the Way, which is impartial. For this, the higher component has a source of partiality. Moreover, the state 'prone to fall' is not all-bad. It is just that it has a bad source' (*Yu Lei*, vol.62)

Jitong 季通 wrote to ask 'human mind from corporeality and force' as in *Introduction to Chapters from the Doctrine of the Mean*. Zhu replied that 'corporeality and force are not all-bad; they are just unreliable.' Jitong said, 'Both corporeality and force have goodness.' He doesn't know that the goodness possessed by corporeality and force comes from Dao Mind. As long as it comes from Dao Mind, then corporeality and force will be good; where it does not come from Dao Mind, once submitted to corporeality and force, it will turn into evil. (*Yu Lei*, vol.62).

To be more accurate, we cannot argue that "human mind is the partiality of corporeality and force," but only that "human mind is derived from the partiality of corporeality and force." If we "speak of human mind alone," and "speak of human mind against Dao Mind," both are the one and same mind, albeit with a departure in their value connotation. Cai Yuanding 蔡元定, among other scholars, apparently does not agree with this departure, thus insisting on "both corporeality and force possessing goodness." By way of contrast, Zhu Xi adds the term of "partiality" on the top of "corporeality and force," which is not simply to indicate certain neutral property of "private ownership," but rather to emphasize that this property of "private ownership" provides condition and possibility for natural goodness to turn into man-made evil, which is the source of the "partiality of human desire." Once we pay attention to this "root of partiality," the possibility of partiality will be turned into reality, which is what Zhu Xi terms as "once submitted to corporeality and force, it then will turn into evil." If we do not hold on to this "root of partiality" and instead pay attention to Dao Mind, then the possibility of partiality will turn into reality. Corporeality and force, together with human mind derived therefrom, shall remain naturally good in heavenly principle, for which Zhu Xi argues that "both corporeality and force possess goodness derived from Dao Mind." Therefore, the difference between good and evil lies essentially in whether we focus attention on the "root of partiality," namely whether Dao Mind is in command. "Once Dao Mind is in rule, then human mind will be moderated, where human mind shall invariably become Dao Mind" (*Yu Lei*, vol.78). "If Dao Mind rules, then human mind will turn into Dao Mind. For instance, in the Chapter X on 'Xiangdang 鄉黨' in the *Analects*, eating, drinking and clothing, are all from human mind. Nevertheless, for a sage, they are all the matters of Dao Mind" (*Collected Works*, vol. 51, "Answer to Huang Zigen 答黃子耕" No.9).

Even a sage will have to eat when hungry and drink when thirsty. Nevertheless, a sage can follow the Nature, without paying all his attention to it. For this very reason, the pure heavenly principle is the same with Dao Mind. Although Chapter X of the *Analects* seems to record only daily eating, drinking and clothing etiquette, which can be called "the spontaneity of human mind," in fact, the sage wills it from beginning to end towards righteousness and principle. The manifestation of eating, drinking and clothing carries with a will to heavenly principle, for which "they are nothing else but Dao Mind." Once Dao Mind is in command, and we do not focus our attention on the "root of partiality," then human mind is Dao Mind. If without Dao Mind in command, then we will surely focus our attention on the "root of partiality," and human mind will be led to excess, turning into human desire.

If we understand human and Dao Mind separately as individual sensual desire and moral consciousness, and human mind under the rule of Dao Mind as the overlap of the two intersecting "circles" of individual sensual desire and moral consciousness (Chen 1988: 170), then this will constitute a modern misreading. Both value-neutral "individual sensual desire" and narrow "moral consciousness" are modern concepts, in no correspondence to the concepts of human and Dao Mind as covered by ancient values. Moreover, as far as the "two intersecting circles" are concerned, this is exactly what Zhu Xi criticizes as the drawback of dichotomizing mind into two. Human has only one mind. "Ideas coming from human body are human mind, while those from righteousness and principle, Dao Mind" (*Yu Lei*, vol.78). "It is only a matter of one passing thought that one can choose to behave like not Yao [the sagacious emperor] but Jie [the evil one]. Then this one passing thought does really matter" (*Collected Works*, Vol.36, "Answer to Chen Tongfu 答陳同甫," No.8). If our thought is on the impartiality of heavenly principle, then it will be Dao Mind; if it is on the partiality of corporeality and force, then it will be human mind. In the rupture of Dao Mind, human mind shall rule. Even if we alternate between the two, namely "to mix in minutia," in the final analysis there is only one mind. A sage focuses his attention on Dao Mind without discontinuity, for which reason to learn to be a sage, we should "commit ourselves to this without the slightest interruption" (*Introduction to Chapters from the Doctrine of the Mean*). At this moment, human mind, though present, does not

deliberately conceive a will to rule, rendering it almost non-existent. "It is of necessity that our one mind should be only concerned with *Dao* and in a short while, human mind will be so much under control that it becomes almost invisible. That human mind and Dao Mind are in one resembles an absence of human mind. It is just that Dao Mind should be pure, as Dao Mind becomes apparent on the part of human mind" (*Yu Lei*, vol.78). Human mind is to conceive thoughts on human body, albeit with a distinction between natural and man-made ones. Where Dao Mind is in rule, man-made intentions of human mind will be suppressed, natural human mind will completely follow the guidance of Dao Mind, and only Dao Mind becomes apparent on the part of human mind, which can be termed as "human and Dao Mind in one," namely "Dao Mind as the ruler of one's whole body and human mind at its command" (*Introduction to Chapters from the Doctrine of the Mean*).

The tenet of the distinction between human and Dao Mind is for practice. The key to practice is to stick to the essence with consistency. "To stick to the essence means non-heterogeneity between the two, while consistency means to hold on to the propriety of primordial mind without departure" (*Introduction to Chapters from the Doctrine of the Mean*). Zhu Xi's concept of "primordial mind" (benxin 本心) emphasizes that both perception and the perceived are derived from the naturalness of heavenly principle. For the ordinary people, it seems difficult to hold on to the "propriety of primordial mind," as it is shadowed by human desire. When Yu Daya 餘大雅 asked "whether the demarcation between good and evil is just the impartiality of heavenly principle and the partiality of human desire," Zhu Xi immediately reminded him that "it will not help if we only stick to this saying. We need to test this mind, so as to gain a real appreciation of what constitutes heavenly principle and what constitutes human desire. We need to probe for understanding between extreme nuances" (*Yu Lei*, vol.13). To take the lead to talk superficially of human desire and heavenly principle will help in no way to really understand the complexity of "one mind with ten thousand changing ideas." For this very reason, Zhu Xi points out that "human has only one mind," and there is a necessity for us "to probe for understanding between extreme nuances." A value mutation from human mind to human desire occurs in an almost natural process of human pursuing without temperance natural desires. The so-called "focused perception"

(*jingcha* 精察) is to find the critical point of value mutation in this almost natural process, on the top of which to differentiate heavenly principle from human desire. "The boundary between heavenly principle and human desire is a shifting one. Thus Master Chou spoke simply of 'incipient movements not yet visible outside'" (Vol.13, translation from Gardner 1990: 182). An appreciation of this requires us to discern where mind conceives a thought, especially between a natural and man-made thought. "Human mind is to think of eating while hungry, clothing while cold. After thinking about eating when hungry, one reflects further on the appropriateness of eating. After thinking of clothing when cold, one reflects further on the appropriateness of clothing, which is then Dao Mind" (*Yu Lei*, vol.78). "To think of food when hungry and of clothes when cold" is a natural thought, while to decide on its appropriateness requires that our choice be subject to the rule of heavenly principle. For this reason, the distinction between "to eat when hungry" and "to demand delicious tastes" does not mean a difference in degree of satisfying natural needs, but a value difference between appropriateness and inappropriateness. A sage may also be a "great gastronome." As long as he deals with it appropriately, then it is all Dao Mind, which cannot be explained with reference to asceticism. As for appropriateness, the key is our attention: whether it is paid to heavenly principle or natural needs. In the former case, it will still be natural desire, capable of heavenly principle, while in the latter, it will become man-made desire harmful to heavenly principle. For the ordinary people, they more often than not deal with it inappropriately. When one pursues natural desire plus a focused attention, it will lead to the fall of human mind and Dao Mind being reduced to subtlety. As for the so-called "human mind prone to fall while Dao Mind to subtlety," "perhaps these two phrases are only concerned with impartiality and partiality, one being heavenly principle while the other human desire" (*Yu Lei*, vol.78). Different thoughts as conceived by the same mind do not differ in great measure from each other. Nevertheless, at the very moment a thought is conceived, there is already an opposition of impartiality against partiality, heavenly principle against human desire. The movement of human mind is more prone to human desire than to heavenly principle, with an increasing manifestation of the negative value. The antithesis of human mind against Dao Mind is in and of itself an implication of the value

opposition between human desire and heavenly principle, where human mind and human desire are on the one side, while Dao Mind and heavenly principle are on the other. "Human mind only sees the partiality of interests and sensuality there, while Dao Mind only sees the impartiality of moral principle here" (*Yu Lei*, vol.78). For this, the thesis of "human mind is human desire, while Dao Mind is heavenly principle" by the two Chengs holds true in the general value orientation, which Zhu Xi also affirms. On the one hand, Zhu Xi is dissatisfied by the superficial response by disciples quoting the two Chengs, where he emphasizes that there is only one mind, with complications therein. On the other hand, he also criticizes his disciples for emphasizing one mind only, while neglecting the obligation of differentiating good from evil on the subtlety of mind. His criticism is based on a direct quotation of the two Chengs:

Shun Gong 舜功 asked, 'There is no better way for a man to eliminate human desire than to appreciate heavenly principle. As long as one appreciates heavenly principle, then human desire will recede on its own.' Zhu replied, 'Yao and Shun said that it won't be so. Heavenly principle and human desire border on each other – but they are not two different things. It is neither that human mind will prevail completely, or Dao Mind will become perfect – it is just a matter of which side takes up a greater percentage. What we should do is to keep heavenly principle when it comes to heavenly principle, and eliminate human desire when it comes to human desire. ...In general, human mind and Dao Mind only border on each other. They are not two things, which can be seen from the later text on 'focusing on perception and oneness' (*Yu Lei*, vol.78).

Dou 竇 asked, 'when unlaunched and hidden inside, it remains thus subtle; when it is launched, albeit not in accordance with propriety, then it will be prone to fall. This is why the sage desires focus and oneness, and accordance with propriety,' Zhu replied, 'It is not so. Chengzi said, 'Human mind is human desire; Dao Mind is heavenly principle.' The so-called human mind is made up of force and blood (Zhu pointed at his own body). Lust or so, all come from this, for which it is prone to fall. Dao Mind is the mind endowed with benevolence, righteousness, rite and wisdom. The way that the sage deals with these two is precisely aimed at perceiving its essence and upholding consistency. Once the essence is perceived, then there will be a clear boundary between the two. If Dao Mind is upheld with consistency, then one will not be bothered by human desire. It resembles one thing being cut into two halves, with the one good and the other evil. What Yao and Shun could teach us the best of their experience is no more than this (*Yu Lei*, vol.78).

Whether it be an appreciation focused on heavenly principle, or identifying Dao Mind and human mind as the unlaunched or the

already launched, it is incapable of emphasizing differentiated value judgments, which are exactly the key to differentiating the study by the Buddhist sages and worthies. Scholars influenced by heretics had their own opinions, but did not pay attention to differentiated value judgments. At this point Zhu Xi more often than not emphasizes an effort at the "demarcation boundary," so as to strictly differentiate heavenly principle from human desire on the complications of conceiving thoughts. As for those who offer superficial response by quoting the two Chengs, Zhu Xi emphasizes that the difference between heavenly principle and human desire lies in the number of thoughts conceived by the same mind. As for those influenced by heretics, Zhu Xi emphasizes that on the severalness in thoughts conceived by the same mind, there is a need to carefully discern the "boundary" between heavenly principle and human desire. For this, the distinction between human and Dao Mind will eventually have to rest on the boundary between heavenly principle and human desire, namely the differentiated value judgments on the severalness in thoughts conceived by the same mind. "Generally speaking, if a person is capable of standing firmly on the threshold between heavenly principle and human desire, he'll make great progress" (*Yu Lei*, vol.13, translation from Gardner 1990: 182). If arguably the distinction between heavenly principle and human desire is the general cardinal guide of learning to be a sage, then the distinction between human and Dao Mind brings the former to a greater depth, namely to enable the distinction between heavenly principle and human desire to reach the depth of inner mind. The final result will be a full appreciation of heavenly principle and human desire, by which all things at hand can be judged. In a word, the threshold of human and Dao Mind lies in differentiated value judgments, of which the practical maxim is no more than impartiality and partiality, righteousness and profit.

Part 3. Impartiality and Partiality, Righteousness and Profit

If we bring the distinction between heavenly principle and human desire to the details of daily life, then we will enter the debate on impartiality and partiality, righteousness and profit. For Zhu Xi, "there is only one issue of impartiality and partiality concerning man, while of the evil and the proper concerning the universe" (*Yu Lei*, vol.13).

"The thesis on righteousness and profit is the primary one for Confucian scholars" (*Collected Works*, vol.24, "Letter to Mr. Li from Yanping 與延平李先生書"). As Feng Youlan understands it, the distinction between righteousness and profit is the "entry point" to access *Daoism* (Feng 1988: 19). Nevertheless, the debate on impartiality and partiality, righteousness and profit is not some contingent, random entry point, but rather a must pass for the ordinary people to reach the land of the sages and worthies.

In learning, you'll benefit only if you make the one great advance. If you're able to ascertain the one point, the big point (i.e., moral principle), you'll see that the many small fragments are nothing but this one moral principle—and you'll feel pleased. Still, it isn't that you should ignore the fragments; but if you don't ascertain the critical point, even though you might understand the fragments somewhat, in the end you won't be pleased. 'Zeng Dian 曾點 and Qidiao Kai 漆雕開 knew what their great wishes were only because they already clearly understood the critical point.' Now, we should talk about what that critical point is: under heaven there is only one moral principle. In learning, you should desire nothing more than to understand this moral principle. Once you appreciate this, you will completely appreciate the distinctions between heavenly principle and human desires, righteousness and profit, impartiality and partiality, good and evil (*Yu Lei*, vol.8; translation from Gardner 1990: 101).

We should look to the big point for the moral principle, with which then we will be able to see a wide road ahead. We should not confine ourselves to the corner, with a narrow space for foothold, and we will bump into the wall every moment we move. Then we will have nowhere else to go. Today, when we examine heavenly principle, human desire, righteousness and profit, impartiality and partiality, as long as we can distinguish them clearly and test it on ourselves, then gradually we will appreciate something, with an increasingly wide road ahead (*Yu Lei*, vol.117).

In the context of the Theory of Principle, only the study of the sages and worthies is the real knowledge. In the light of this view, "there is only one moral principle in this universe, the appreciation of which constitutes learning." This only reason to appreciate is the "big point" (大處) of learning. What is it then? By virtue of the "critical point" (大意) as appreciated by Zeng Dian and Qi Diao Kai, this "big point" lies in one's own breast, which is the foundation for the sages and worthies. If this "big point" is blocked and one is concerned only with the fragments, then one will not become a sage or worthy. Once the "big point" is unblocked, then everything will be available. In order to unblock this "big point," we only need to differentiate clearly "heavenly principle and human desire, impartiality and partiality,

righteousness and profit," as well as to test it on ourselves. From this it can be seen the significance of the distinctions between impartiality and partiality, righteousness and profit.

The difference between impartiality and partiality is the mark between a gentleman and a little man. "The difference in conduct between a gentleman and a little man is like the opposition between *yin* and *yang* night and day. But the very demarcation between them is the im/partiality, which is a difference by a thin margin only" (*Collected Annotations on the Analects* – 論語集注, "On Government"). There is a clear value opposition between impartiality and partiality, for which the reason that this difference is "by a very thin margin" (毫厘之差) comes from the severalness in thoughts conceived by the same mind. For this, the "partiality" is referring to human contrivance, and to the partiality of human desire, such as partial intention or partial desire. The base of partial intention is the partiality of corporeality and force, which differentiates the I from the non-I. There are multiple types of partial intentions derived from human body. For instance, in Chapter IX of the *Analects*, "There were four things from which Confucius was entirely free: He was free from self-interest, from prepossessions, from bigotry and from egoism" (translation from Gu 1996, Vol.2: 406). As Zhu Xi explained, "self-interest is to conceive an intention; prepossession is *ex ante* preoccupation; bigotry is *ex post* stubbornness; egoism means one knowing only oneself and no others." "Self-interest is to conceive some contrivance, where my evil consummates." "Where there is egoism and an intention is conceived, then one will toil incessantly between the two" (*Yu Lei*, vol.36). When a partial intention is in motion, it is a man-made thought from the I with human body, thus contravening the naturalness of heavenly principle. As Zhu Xi argues, "as long as one has the mind on deliberate arrangement, then it is a matter of willing partial intention" (*Yu Lei*, vol.36). When it comes to the I in private self, then it turns into the evil of human desire. "When one is concerned only with his own dis/advantage," "only with doing things for personal gain" (*Yu Lei*, vol.36). Here, intention is contained in partiality, while egoism is the manifestation of partiality. The I of private self is different from that of human body, in that the latter is only separated from the non-I, which is still a matter of the naturalness of heavenly principle. By way of contrast, the I of private self "only knows *I* and no other," moving towards an opposition to and exclusion of the non-I. Once a

thought is deliberately conceived on the partiality of human body, then the I of private self is born. "A man who knows only himself wills only his partial intentions, as a result of which a hundred illnesses are born" (*Yu Lei*, vol.36). The I of private self only attends to his own interests. For this, the word "partiality" also means "private interest," which is different from objective personal interest. It is an egocentric, exclusive concern with one's own personal interests, or personal interest under this concern. The reason that a little man is different from a gentleman lies in this very "partiality," which is the biggest obstacle on one's way to becoming a sage and worthy.

In general anyone who has a self will have a partiality. When Zilu 子路 'was willing to share with my friends carriages and horses and clothing of costly furs,' he had a noble aim, which nevertheless did not depart from his corporal body. Yan Hui's aim of 'not to boast of my ability and to humble in my estimate of what I have done for others' was an aim nobler than Zilu's. Nevertheless, as for 'not to boast of my ability and to humble in my estimate of what I have done for others,' even if one has this ambition but knows no means to achieve it, still one half of the moral principle lies in his corporeality. Confucius was free from corporeality, not knowing which was his self and which were things. This is what we need to learn" (*Yu Lei*, vol.29).

As for this moral principle, simply because one cannot appreciate the whole of it, it may appear to have shrunk. This is what I fear most! How has the sage become so significant? People do not see the moral principle, the separation of corporeality, and that things and the I are separated into two! (*Yu Lei*, vol.29).

The big point of learning is in the human mind, which is the one moral principle. If this big point is not unblocked, then partial intention concerned with only oneself will narrow its boundary to a very small confine. The supreme concern of learning is to eliminate partial intention, which comes from the I of private self, namely to conceive thoughts on the top of human body. Human body as a form cannot be eliminated and it should not be, either. Nevertheless, mind and intention should transcend the corporeality of human body, and overcome the limit of human body. Zilu eliminated private interest, but not partial intention, where the thoughts in his mind were not transcending his human body. Yan Yuan 顏淵 eliminated partial intention, albeit not completely, where the thoughts in his mind were slightly tainted with a vestige of human body. Only Confucius successfully eliminated completely his partial intention, where the

thoughts in his mind "got rid of human body," and became integrated with things. Learning to be a sage is to reach the level of Confucius. The so-called human desire is partial intention and interest, while the so-called heavenly principle is this one moral principle, namely the sagacious level upon full elimination of partial intention. Heavenly principle thus is not some abstract principle.

The opposition to partiality is impartiality, which is mainly with reference to using one's mind. It is nevertheless not man-made. Impartiality should be natural, and of heavenly principle. If one feels involuntary in this aspect, then it must be due to his primordial mind being imprisoned by partial desire. The opposite of partial intention is impartial mind (公心), while that of partial interest is impartial interest, which does not negate objective individuality or personal interest. On the contrary, it emphasizes individual due or proper position, thus forming a common interest for the collective. The collective common interest is objective, with the property of its value being pure goodness. Impartiality interest is also for everybody, though not a simple addition of all individual interests. It refers to everyone taking his individual due and position in an organic collective. In case of "each with his due," then individual interest is "appropriateness," which is also righteousness, embodying a reasonable order of interests. Each and every individual accords with righteousness, then impartiality interest is the "sum of all righteousness," which means a maximization of collective interest.

It was asked, 'As Chengzi said, 'profit is where righteousness is at ease.' Is it that as long as the being is in accordance with the ought, then this shall constitute an ease?' Zhu replied, 'Yes. Only when things have achieved their due, then it will be profit. The monarch achieves his due as a monarch, subjects their due as subjects, father his due as father, and son his due as son. Is other kind of profit comparable to this? This word 'profit' is what *the Book of Changes* says that 'profit is the sum of righteousness.' Profit then is where righteousness is added up. Nevertheless, the explanation of that sentence is not so agreeable as this one saying, which can be used to explain that sentence. In the beginning, righteousness may seem not able to be summed up. It is separate and inviolable, thus being seemingly in conflict. When it is separated, all things have their right place, which then is harmony. Conflict is derived from unrighteousness, while righteousness is harmony with profit (*Yu Lei*, vol.96).

In the relation of the collective to individual interest, there exist two approaches with different orientations: one to attach primacy to individual interest, where the collective interest is the sum of

maximized individual interests. With this, the collective interest will affirm all reasonable motives to advance the maximization of individual interests, including individual natural needs and all kinds of extended desires. The other approach is to give priority to collective interest, the maximization of which depends on whether the structure of the collective is reasonable. For this, the maximization of individual interests must be premised on doing no harm to the reasonable structure of the collective, such that while affirming individual natural needs, it will surely offer appropriate moderation of all extended desires on the basis of such natural needs. The former is the fundamental orientation of the modern Western civilization, which can be called individual foundationalism, while the latter of the ancient Chinese civilization, which can be termed as collective foundationalism. Here I do not aim to discuss the reasonableness of these two approaches. My aim is to discuss Zhu Xi's thoughts on the basis of this approach of the ancient Chinese civilization. Impartial interest does not negate individual interest, only demanding that the latter accord with collective interest, which is "appropriateness" (righteousness). The appropriate or righteous individual interest should be maximized, as it will benefit the maximization of collective interest, which is also "each with his due." Under the premise of a maximized collective interest of the state, both the monarch and his subjects enjoy their respective due, thus achieving the maximization of their mutual interest. Under the premise of a maximized collective interest of the family, both father and son enjoy their respective due, thus achieving the maximization of their mutual interest. Of course, the family is premised on the state, while the state on the universe. As for individual, appropriateness depends on the comfort of his mind. "Comfort" (安) is an experience of value, occupying a top position in Confucianism. Comfort has a lower limit, namely to do no harm to other's reasonable interest. For one thing, the collective is an organic whole of individuals. To harm other's reasonable interest is to reduce the collective welfare. Comfort also has an upper limit, namely to sacrifice one's own interests for collective benefit. Comfort in general is situated between these two extremes, referring to that while one pursues the maximization of his individual persons, he can sense his own contribution to the maximization of collective interest, namely to experience the accomplishment of certain value. For Zhu Xi, "profit is where lie righteousness and comfort," which is better than "profit as the sum of

righteousness," as it contains this inner experience of value. On the surface, righteousness emphasizes the position and boundary of individuals in the collective, which cannot be violated – they are thus seemingly in conflict. In fact, as "each with his due," they are in harmony. To shift from "seemingly in conflict" to "harmony," we need to shift from an individual perspective to a collective one, which is effected through transcending human body. In terms of value language, it means impartiality triumphing over partiality:

To deal with things in accordance with the proper and great moral principle in the universe is impartiality; while with partial intention, then it is partiality (*Yu Lei*, vol.13).

Someone asked the difference between impartiality and partiality. Zhu replied, 'We can use a little thing in today's world as the metaphor. For instance, one doesn't care about something that is concerned with impartiality, while he cares incessantly in his breast about something of his private self. This is the distinction between impartiality and partiality (*Yu Lei*, vol.16).

Everything has two ends. The positive end is the impartiality of heavenly principle, while the negative one is the partiality of human desire. We should analyse all things to their ultimacy. Nevertheless, everyone's endowment of force has certain inclination, for which their opinions will differ. For instance, for those endowed with a firm force, then their opinions are mostly unyielding, and in their dealing with things, they may make mistakes for being too unyielding. For soft ones, their opinions are soft as well, while in their dealing with things, they may make mistakes for being too soft. We should cure inclinations in the endowment of force (*Yu Lei*, vol.13).

What lies behind value is interest, where impartial interest belongs to the collective, namely what is referred to by the saying of "the proper and great moral principle in the universe," while partial interest is an exclusive concern with one's own interest, namely what is implied by "the partial intention of one's own." Zhu Xi notices that the ordinary people are often indifferent to public affairs, and cling too much to personal ones. This is a spontaneous trend. Spontaneity signifies naturalness to a certain extent. Nevertheless, for the Theory of Principle, only impartiality, and not partiality, is the real naturalness of heavenly principle. For instance, we can sense this comfort in our mind during our pursuit of impartial righteousness, which is not possible in our pursuit of partial desires. This shows that impartial righteousness is originally in our mind, being the essence of heavenly

mandate and the naturalness of heavenly principle. The spontaneity of pursuing partial desire can only be explicated from within the force of heavenly mandate. The endowment of force on human is necessarily finite. The function of such endowed force, such as the eye's ability to see, is the naturalness of heavenly principle. Human mind is invariably attracted to good looks, which is a natural thought starting from finite human body, as well as a matter of the naturalness of heavenly principle. We pay attention to good looks, which is a man-made thought starting from the finite human body. This is not the naturalness of heavenly principle, but rather a form of inertia from the finite endowment of force, which is the source of partial intention and its spontaneity – an inertia that can only be moderate by a command of Dao Mind. Man is born with different endowments of force, which have their own respective inertia. For instance, the unyielding may be defective for being too staunch, which in essence has an inertia of finite endowment of force. This is an inertia that is different from normally endowed force and can only be gradually eliminated through a change in character. A sage almost has no inclination in his endowed force, which renders it is easy for him to achieve a no-attention to human body. By way of contrast, the ordinary people have their inclinations in endowed force, for which the inertia of inclination pushes the original inertia, making the spontaneity of men more towards the partiality of human desire. "To first moderate and cure the inclination of endowed force" can be an effective solution, as well as a compulsory module for changing character. It is a daily matter of "knowing things" and "moderating one's self" for analysing whatever at hand for a judgment of impartiality/partiality. The elimination of partial intention is impartiality mind. Where partial intention is completely eliminated, then one will reach the state of things-and-the-I-in-one (物我爲一), "not knowing which one is my self and which are things." This is the "general form of great impartiality," which is a complete return to the naturalness of heavenly principle.

The distinction between righteousness and profit, focused on nurturing moral principle, is a further level from that between impartiality and partiality, which is focused on eliminating private selfishness. In the distinction between righteousness and profit, profit means partial interest. In this sense, these two distinctions coincide. It is just that impartiality is slightly different from righteousness:

impartiality requires a shift in perspective, namely from an individual one to its collective counterpart, while righteousness returns to the individual perspective, emphasizing one's own deliberate recognition of one's position and duty in the collective, on the basis of which to regard such duty as his own share. Righteousness means that for different roles - monarch, subjects, father and son, each and every one has his own appropriateness and fulfils his share of duty. What lies behind righteousness is an affirmation of impartial interest, including the collective interest and reasonable personal interest. For this reason, the gentleman only attends to righteousness and not to profit. "Righteousness and profit are like the head and tail. Righteousness is appropriateness. A gentleman sees the appropriateness for this and that thing. His judgment accords with the respective appropriateness and then he will carry out action. Then why will it bring no profit? A gentleman attends only to righteousness and not to profit at the lower level. A little man knows only profit at the lower level and not righteousness at the upper one" (*Yu Lei*, vol.27). Righteousness and profit are like the two ends: once we take one end into account, the other will surely be included; if we fail to care for the other, then we will not do well in caring for this end. In general, a pursuit of righteousness contains profit, while a pursuit of profit may contradict righteousness. Profit or loss is always relative. Impartial righteousness as opposed to partial profit is only relative as well. Relative value can be computed rationally. The alternation between impartial righteousness and partial profit is in one's own mind, and in a "zero-sum" game. Rationality can help to compute the percentages of them. Nevertheless, when a gentleman's attention to righteousness reaches the level of "forgetting both things and the I" and the state of "general form of great impartiality," then public righteousness shall move from a relative status to an absolute moral principle, where the distinction between righteousness and profit will correspondingly be carried forward to a higher level.

We should set the appropriateness right without an attempt for profit, and illuminate the Way without a computation of utility.' Appropriateness should be set up right, not with a deliberate intention for such propriety, while the Way should be illuminated, not with a deliberate intention for such illumination, during which not to consider utility and profit. A benevolent man cannot help doing this (*Yu Lei*, vol.137).

In mid-Zhejiang, Zhuge Cheng 諸葛誠 said, "a benevolent man should set

the appropriateness right without an attempt for profit, and illuminate the Way without a computation of utility.' What Zhongshu said was wrong. I'm afraid that it is not righteousness. As long as it is righteousness, there will surely be profit. I'm afraid that it is not the Way. As long as it is the Way, there will surely be utility.' Zhu replied, 'It is not just so. Man will surely do it out of a pursuit of profit and utility, which is not the teaching. Although the achievement of the Way and righteousness will bring along profit and utility on their own, if the achievement of the Way and righteousness will not bring along profit and utility, then man will indulge himself in the pursuit of profit and utility at the cost of the Way and righteousness (Yu Lei, vol.137).

Moral principle requires the presence of a concern with value regardless of computation of profit/loss, thus characterized by a transcendence of utility. Not only does partial profit have to be eliminated, but also impartial profit cannot be focused on. Neutral profit or success will be tainted with a shadow of negative value in front of moral principle. This is the necessary requirement of completely eliminating every miniscule human desire. The source of partial intention is to focus on corporeal form and human body, deliberately conceiving thoughts therefrom. In order to completely eliminate partial intention, there is a need to eliminate deliberation at the fundamental level and let the naturalness of heavenly principle in its full play. Corporeal form and human body separate things from the I, a separation that, though indispensable in the eyes of a sage, can disappear only in the mind of a sage. Every deliberate attempt to set up a goal for pursuit is based on such separation. In the terms of modern philosophy, this is a presumed separation of subject and object. As long as the separation between things and the I, subject and object, holds sway in our mind, then the basis for partial intention will remain and even will become in and of itself miniscule partial intention. Moral principle is an elucidation of value upon eliminating all elements of human contrivance, thus being the naturalness of heavenly principle. First of all, moral principle is the naturalness of heavenly principle. The benevolent pursue moral principle, not "deliberately," but out of a necessity "outside one's own control." A "deliberate" pursuit, even if of *Daq* will carry a vestige of utilitarianism. Moral principle is absolute. It is not opposed to utility, but transcends the latter and is above it. When moral principle raises the demands of transcending utility and eliminating all "deliberation," the path to the "general form of great impartiality" becomes accessible. The so-called notion of "once moral principle is achieved, then utility

shall arrive with it in due course" is to bring down the absolute moral principle and make it descend on the plane of relative public righteousness. This notion of "utility arriving in due course" certainly is also relative and sometimes it may not "arrive." To understand moral principle from the relative plane will surely relativize moral principle or even make it a utility. As a result, moral principle will be lost, with only utility remaining. Secondly, moral principle is an elucidation of value. Moral principle is different from impartiality, which emphasizes the naturalness of heavenly principle, while moral principle emphasizes the heavenly principle of Nature. To restrain one's self for eliminating selfishness is impartiality, of which the ultimate state is the "general form of great impartiality." For one thing, a departure from human body to reach the state of "things-and-the-I-in-one" in this "general form of great impartiality" signifies certain power of infinity. Nevertheless, this power of infinity does not explicitly clarify its value connotation, whether it be Daoist Nature or Confucian benevolence and righteousness. For this, Zhu Xi argues that "things-and-the-I-in-one" is "not the noumenon of benevolence, but its measurement" (*Yu Lei*, vol.6). "The so-called 'things-and-the-I-in-one' can be seen in that there is nothing that benevolence loves not, rather than benevolence as the real noumenon" (*Collected Works*, Vol.67, "On Benevolence"). Benevolence is the complete virtue, thus being the source of moral principle. Moral principle signifies the Confucian value orientation of centering upon benevolence. This patent value connotation is more impressive than the distinction of impartiality and partiality in its highest state.

Part 4. Heavenly Principle and Sage

The distinctions between human and Dao Mind, impartiality and partiality, righteousness and profit, are no other than an extension of that between heavenly principle and human desire to a greater depth and in greater details. The state of sagehood means a complete elimination of human desire and the prevalence of heavenly principle. Then, what is heavenly principle? What is sagehood? In modern context, what does heavenly principle mean? Why should we learn to be a sage or worthy? These are of greatest importance for us today to understand the debate on heavenly principle and human desire, and even Neo-Confucianism in the Song and the Ming dynasties.

Modern scholars more often than not understand Zhu Xi's principle or heavenly principle as abstract universal law or moral principles. For instance, Feng Youlan (1988: 159-64) regards it as universal idea or "the prescription of genus" through logical abstraction, while Mou Zongsan (1999: 76-86) takes it as different from the conception of genus, and a metaphysical "transcendental why" derived from the "existential being" through logical reasoning. As Zhu Xi argues, "Things in the universe surely have their own 'why' and 'ought' rules, which are called the principle" (*Questions on Great Learning*). The interest of modern scholars has almost been concentrated on the "why"; they have at best a passing thought on those 'ought' rules." For them, the "ought" apparently indicates certain moral principles without a profound meaning, while the "why" question resembles more of the top secret in *logos* in Western philosophy, thus having greater room for explanation. This choice and attitude have communicated a deeply-rooted prejudice on the part of a modern man. It logically grows out of the knowledge, background and spiritual structure of the modern man. Or it has those self-evident premises unique to the modern man, premises that have offered specific classification of human knowledge and spiritual life, as well as a logo-centric judgment and the assignment of weight to different parts upon classification. However, all these premises were non-existent among the ancient people, who had their own self-evident premises. Only when we reveal these ancient premises through modern language, premises upon which to contextualize the thoughts of the ancient people, will it be possible for us to find a proper place for them, so as to understand their real meaning and reveal their true secrets.

As long as we leave aside our prejudice and start from the concrete background of Zhu Xi's use of the "why" and the "ought," then it will not be too difficult to understand the meaning of this pair of concepts. Zhu Xi's authoritative assertion on principle is "the 'ought' as 'one cannot help,' and the why as the unchangeable" (*Questions on Great Learning*) in things. In this assertion "it" may not refer to things, but to the "ought." For this Zhu Xi argues, "Heavenly Mandate, namely the prevalence of Heavenly Way and endowment on things, is the reason for the 'ought' in things" (*Collected Annotations on the Analects*, Vol.1, "On Government"). The "moral principle" as Zhu Xi pursues mainly refers to that of the "ought," not that of objective

laws in things (although not excluding the latter). His own explanation of "the moral principle for the 'ought'" is that "the 'ought' things include filial piety to parents and respect to the elders. If we reason with its moral principle, then why is it so? A scholar may not know the principle. Where the sage reaches this level, the principle will become self-evident. If we use it with great efforts for a long time, it will manifest itself as well" (*Yu Lei*, vol.23). The "why" is to deduce the moral principle of the "ought," thus at a deeper level than the latter, which can only be understood by the sage, while the ordinary people are "ignorant of it." The "ought" is the essence of principle through and through. Without it, there will be no principle. It has an obvious feature in "one cannot help" (不容己). Whether it be the sensibility of mind, the utility of eye and ear, or the constancy of things, "all will surely have the 'ought' rules that they cannot help," or "all will invariably possess the 'ought' rules respectively and they cannot help it by themselves" (*Questions on Great Learning*). The so-called "one cannot help" means that the "ought" principle has been driven by a necessary force, outside the "deliberate" human contrivance. "Even a benevolent man cannot help himself in this." "We need to serve our fathers like Shun, ... we need to serve our monarch like Shun and Duke of Zhou. ... All invariably being so is just because of the 'ought' reasons, for which he surely cannot help himself" (*Yu Lei*, vol.63). The principle is natural, including the 'ought' of Nature and the 'necessity' of Nature, without any element of human contrivance. This in and of itself is an unstoppable force. For this reason, the "why" also includes, or more importantly refers to "one cannot help" and the "reason for being so" (因甚如此) that help to deduce the principle of the ought. As argued, "Someone asked there was originally a moral principle for the 'why' in the Chapter on 'knowing things.' [Zhu Xi] answered, 'We have read it afterwards. Moreover, we should appreciate that the 'ought' is the essence. If one can notice anywhere that there is an element of 'one cannot help,' then one can avail tacit understanding" (*Yu Lei*, vol.17). In our definition of principle, the "ought" is the key, the "essence." As for the "why," we need to really experience the power of "one cannot help," only on the basis of which we can achieve a tacit understanding. Whether the purpose of our reasoning is for the "ought" or "one cannot help," the result will be the same: to follow heavenly mandate.

When Guo 郭 asked, 'Is there anything that can help us to understand the moral principle of the 'why' and the 'ought' rules?' Zhu replied, 'The moral principle of the why is at a higher level. For instance, the reason that the monarch is benevolent is because he is the brain, while all the people and lands are within his dominion and he will naturally resort to benevolence and love. It will not work without benevolence and love. This is not to say that a monarch will have to be benevolent and loving. It is just that it is a matter of appropriateness. We can illustrate this with a family, in which the parent loves everyone in the family, care about things in the family – this is a matter of appropriateness, as if the Heaven had made it appear so. When I reflect on it often, I may find it seemingly risible. As long as we see the source, then it becomes natural. Again, the reason that the father is gentle and son filial, is because the father and son belong to the same force. The same body splits into two, for which that they love each other is so even if out of our expectation. As for other relations, they are just the same, all made so by heavenly principle. They cannot be made so by coercion! ...This is because of its origin that makes it so, not because of any deliberate arrangement. In the past Guishan 龜山 asked one scholar, 'Upon seeing a child falling into well, one will feel terror and compassion in his mind. Why is it so?' The Scholar said, 'It is naturally so.' Guishan said, 'To say 'It is naturally so,' is it enough? We should know where it comes from and then benevolence will not be far away from us.' This saying by Guishan is very good' (*Yu Lei*, vol.17).

This conversation was recorded *Shen Xian* 沈僩, when Zhu Xi was already sixty-nine years old. Thus it is a relatively good example of Zhu Xi analysing the "moral principle of the 'why'" in his old age. It is different from "each genre of things having its own principle" as argued by Feng Youlan, or "to derive an affirmation of being from its existence" as argued by Mou Zongsan. For the monarch, why should he necessarily "choose benevolence by himself" simply because all the people and land belong to him? This is not a logical necessity, but only a necessity of value experience. The position and duty of the monarch will make it easier to experience the whole nation as a unity. As long as it is a unity, then benevolence is natural, not some "have-to-do." Father and son "are of the same force in their origin," which makes it easier to experience a unity of them, for which fatherly gentleness and filial piety become natural. All things in the universe are no other than a unity, for which the monarch should bestow benevolence upon the people and love all things. If we reason in this way, then in due course, "there is only one moral principle in the universe and all our learning is to appreciate this moral principle." To know things in the universe will be connected at this point. In this reasoning, logic has no power, while power comes from outside logic,

from recognition inside one's mind. For this, Zhu Xi specifically emphasizes that we "really need to see" this, and that we "need to test our daily utility against this." To achieve this real experience, the premise is to broach the limits of our own human body, completely eliminating the partiality of human desires conceiving thoughts on the top of our body. In the final analysis, the reasoning of this "why" can be traced back to heavenly mandate. "Its being is determined by its origin, not through deliberate arrangement or teaching." Since "the principle commands it being so, as if the Heaven makes it so," this principle is "heavenly principle," with the naturalness as its biggest feature. "Heavenly principle makes it so, for which it excludes human contrivance by force." Nevertheless, as a scholar (not yet a sage), simply to argue that "it is naturally so" is not enough, as he has neither yet really experienced nor able to express fully the force of "one cannot help" and the "unchangeable firmness" in the naturalness of heavenly principle. Only "knowing where it comes from," namely to really experience the source of heavenly mandate, will make it possible for us to achieve an absolute certainty in value distinction, as well as the unstoppable force of value motive.

Heaven is the ultimate source of Confucian value and power, which cannot be deduced through logic, while in fact, it is only an expression of faith. The two Chengs have "brought to flesh" the term of "heavenly principle" and the reason for this being unprecedented lies in its closer connection of Confucian value with the source of heavenly mandate. As a Confucian value connected to the source of heavenly mandate, heavenly principle is not only the highest concept of the Theory of Principle, but the emblem of Confucian faith in the age of the Theory of Principle. If explained in modern language, heavenly principle means some absolute, infinite, ultimate power, which on the one hand is a depth that cannot be fathomed by human reason and that can only be experienced by throwing oneself completely in, while on the other hand, it elucidates value. Through the mutual effect of reason and experience humans can grasp such elucidated value. It is the light from the deep, a translucent light of reason shining from a fathomless depth that transcends reason. All beings and meanings have to derive from this depth and be shone upon by the light of the deep. In its illumination, the fear of nothingness will be completely conquered, while life shall achieve certain infinite, divine affirmation. This ultimate power or light of the

deep lies in the innermost part of human mind, being the nature of heavenly mandate. For this very reason, for believers, the only important matter is to clear off obstacles and enable the inner ultimate power or light of the deep to manifest itself and play its role without obstruction. This is exactly the state of "human desire being completely eliminated and the prevalence of heavenly principle," so as to completely conquer the fear of nothingness, as well as to offer an infinite affirmation of the being and meaning of life in some experience that transcends self. Heavenly principle of this kind is the object of faith, not a result of logical reasoning, as logical reasoning can only touch upon the elucidation of value, hence incapable of reaching the fathomless depth. For the modern man, especially for the secular wisdom that leaves aside religion, the greatest obstacle to understanding Zhu Xi's heavenly principle is a disrespect and ignorance of faith. By contrast, in the ancient times, faith had an important role in life, implicated in reflection, thoughts and behaviour as the most profound self-evident premise.

To elucidate this self-evident premise of faith among ancient people by modern language exceeds the limit of this article. Nevertheless, we can offer a tentative reading of the "sagehood" as a first step towards this goal. Moreover, a sage can be described by "pure heavenly principle," meaning an accurate understanding of sagehood is the best reference for us to understand heavenly principle correctly. Arguably, all the theory and practice in the Theory of Principle is to become a sage and worthy. Then, why should we become sagacious and worthy? What does it mean to be a sage? These self-evident norms back then have become vague and even unfathomable in today's world. If we regard the central issue of the Theory of Principle as "How is moral practice possible?" then heavenly principle will be the "*a priori* rationale for the possibility of moral practice" (Mou 1999: 7-8), while a sage can be no other than a "morally perfect man." Arguably, sagehood does include this meaning. In fact, a "morally perfect man," whether in terms of depth or breadth, is incomparable to sagehood. We can even argue that a morally perfect man has even failed to reveal the most essential meaning of sagehood in its fundamentals. For instance, a morally perfect man is only pure supreme goodness, while a sage is born to learn. A morally perfect man can only perfect himself, while a sage through his capability can even govern the state and bring peace to

the universe. Ancient morals are unlike moral principle in today's ethics, where the perfection of a morally perfect man is only finite in the confine of ethics. By comparison, the perfection of sagehood covers all intellectual and spiritual system in the ancient world, representing the innermost dimension of the spiritual life of mankind. Modern scholars are blinded by disciplinary compartmentalization, for which they have consciously or otherwise regarded the essential issue of the Theory of Principle as a moral one, confined the field of the Theory of Principle within ethics, and inescapably rendered invisible the most profound in the Theory of Principle.

The huge difference between a sage and a morally perfect man can be perceived from their different psychological impacts upon mankind. As Zhu Xi argued, "When I was ten or more years old and read the saying 'The sage and I are the same in kind' in *the book of Mencius*, I was happy beyond words, and thought it was easy to become a sage. Only now do I realize that it is difficult" (*Yu Lei*, vol.104; translation from Chan 1989: 13). What made a ten or more years old child "happy beyond words" was the "ease of becoming a sage" on the surface, while at a deeper level, it was the possibility of becoming a sage. Why could the possibility of becoming a sage have such a significant impact upon the little mind of young Zhu Xi? This can only be explained from the general historical context back then, which indicates that to become a sage and worthy occupied a special and important place in the mind of the ordinary people, especially of social elites. By comparison, in today's world, it is difficult to imagine that the possibility of becoming a morally perfect man will have a similar impact. Wang Shouren 王守仁 sensed the importance of becoming a sage and worthy since he was little. According to the record in Wang Shouren's *Genealogy*, around the age of eleven, "He asked the teacher, 'What is the best thing to do?' The teacher answered, 'Only to study and gain office.' He asked in doubt, 'I'm afraid to gain office is not the best thing to do. Maybe it is learning to become a sage and worthy.'" Although there is a difference between the theory by the two Chengs and Zhu Xi, and that by their opponents Lu and Wang, they agree with each other in regarding "to keep heavenly principle and to eliminate human desire" and "learning to be a sage" as the general objectives of the Theory of Principle. Why had learning to be a sage been regarded as the "best thing to do" in life by these theoreticians? Perhaps an earlier appreciation by Lu

Jiuyuan 陸九淵 can offer some clue. According to his Genealogy, at the age of thirteen, he “committed himself to learning to be a sage when inspired by word of ‘cosmos.’” “At the age of three or four years old, he deliberated on the infinity of heaven and earth, with no answer, so much so that he would not even eat. His teacher scolded him and he temporarily left it aside, while in his breast this doubt remained. Afterwards when he was ten or more years old, he was reading in ancient books the two characters of *yu-zhou* 宇宙 (‘cosmos’), the explication says, ‘The four directions, plus up and down, constitute *yu*, while the past, present and future constitute *zhou*.’ This suddenly dawned on him and he exclaimed, ‘This is primarily a matter of infinity. Man, heaven and earth, and all things, are included in the infinity!’ He then grabbed a pen to write down these words, ‘What is within cosmos belongs to my share, while what is in my share belongs to within cosmos.’ He also wrote that ‘cosmos is my mind and my mind is cosmos. Out of the East Sea comes a sage, with the same mind and principle. Out of the West Sea comes a sage, with the same mind and principle. Out of the South and North Seas come the sages, with the same mind and principle. For those sages of thousands of generations both before me and after me, their mind and principle are all the same.’ That “How infinite heaven and earth are!” as in the thought of young Lu Jiuyuan might not come from a curiosity towards cosmology. Judged from the content of his appreciation, the answer of the “primordially infinite” (元來無窮) offered him great satisfaction. The infinite universe illuminates a way out for finite life: although man is finite, his mind can be infinite! The universe is an infinite extension of time and space, while my mind is the infinite universe, which is also the infinite heavenly principle. This is exactly “The sage and I are the same in kind.” My mind is the universe, infinite and boundless. The sages throughout history had invariably such an infinite mind and principle, which is the “best thing” in learning to be a sage. All the finite shall perish, with nothingness as its end. Under the long-term influence of Buddhism and Daoism, there was a greater sense of the threat of nothingness, and an increasingly urgent pursuit of transcending the finite and integrating with the infinite. The theoreticians advocated heavenly principle, and set the sagehood as the benchmark, for the very purpose of rebuilding the Confucian faith. In its core, this was to explore a Confucian path of conquering the threat of nothingness.

To connect Confucian value with the source of heavenly mandate is the key to rebuilding the Confucian faith. The sage is the symbol of the Confucian faith, exemplar of "heaven-and-human-in-one," as well as the incarnation of the Way (道成肉身). As Zhu Xi argued, "The sage is Heaven beyond the reach of a common man" (*Yu Lei*, vol.34). "The Sage is a heavenly principle standing straight up." "Although he has the corporeality of man, in fact the sage is a heavenly principle" (*Yu Lei*, vol.31). "The Way is the sage without corporeal form, while the sage is the Way with corporeality. To learn the Way is to learn to be a sage, while to learn to be a sage is to learn the Way" (*Yu Lei*, vol.130). The position of the sage between heaven and human is similar to that of Jesus between God and human. The difference in feature is due to the difference in faith. In essence, heaven and human are the same, which is testified by the sage. The sage is the same with heaven, while ordinary people can become sages through personal efforts. The body of a sage, like that of the ordinary people, is finite and cannot escape the force of life and death. In spite of this, the sage's mind is pure heavenly principle, infinity. This is not to suggest that the sage has a unique soul living permanently in the Heavenly Kingdom. For one thing, if the soul is unique, then it will surely be finite to a certain extent. The mind and principle of the sage have no features of the finite, as they are completely integrated with heaven. This way of eliminating the threat of nothingness was unprecedented in the history of human civilization, which determined that the essence of rebuilding the Confucian faith lies in faith in value.

We can see that the sages and worthies in ancient times attended to nothing else but these two critical things. To illuminate virtue is to have not even the slightest partial desire. There is also a desire that everyone will behave properly on all things. As the Buddha says, 'I appear in the world because of a great event,' which is also a great event for the sage. Innumerable words speak of this moral principle only. If we do not support it for even a single day, it will then fall. The sage only wants to support this moral principle, which enables him to uphold heaven and stand firmly on earth (*Yu Lei*, vol.17).

The day before yesterday Zhu was conversing with scholars. The scripture says, 'The Buddha appears in the world because of a great event.' The sage also appears in the world because of a great event. Up to the heaven and down to the earth, man is in the middle. What fills the space in the between is no other than this principle. Of necessity the sage appears, to lift with his left hand and to uphold with his right one, to reason with the source and to illuminate the end, which serves no other purpose than to

illuminate the people to understand this principle completely without losing their own primordial nature. 'The Heaven blesses the people, for which they are given monarchs and teachers,' which is exactly the moral principle. For this reason, monarchs and teachers are produced to help the people, in order that they can become good without losing their natural goodness. For this reason, the sage shares with the people what he receives *a priori*, which is for this moral principle only. The Buddha perceived this moral principle. As was said by *Zhuangzi*, 'Divine ghosts and divine emperors gave birth to heaven and earth.' The Buddha said, it can 'become the lord of everything and will not wither with the four seasons.' He had also seen this moral principle. It is just that he said it with exaggeration. The learning of the sage has a totally different function. The learning of the sage is concrete with utmost vacuity, substantial with utmost nothingness. It has this thing and this principle. The Buddha saw this and went no further, which is why there is the difference (*Yu Lei*, vol.13).

The "great event" for the Buddha to appear in the world is to lead the multitude to appreciate Buddhism and free themselves of life and death. The Buddhist faith is an ultimate concern, where the truthful Buddhist essence is an ultimate power, by which to completely free oneself from the threat of nothingness (cf. Zhao 2009). The Confucian faith is equally an ultimate concern, for which Zhu Xi argues that "likewise the Sage appears in the world for a great event." Nevertheless, the ultimate power for Confucianism is heavenly principle, the ultimate power to elucidate value. All ultimate power is the ultimate source of changes and vicissitudes in things, and capable of illuminating the being and meaning of the multitude, for which "Divine ghosts and divine emperors gave birth to heaven and earth." All ultimate power is infinite, transcending and dominating the finite, thus capable of enabling the finite to free itself from the threat of nothingness. For this very reason, it can "become the lord of everything and will not wither with the four seasons." Zhu Xi suggests that the Sage "is only for this moral principle," while the Buddha "also saw this moral principle," which is to refer to the ultimate concern or power. The Buddha, in arousing the multitude's interest in the ultimate question, has deliberately emphasized the seriousness and urgency of the threat of nothingness. Against this background, the ultimate concern and power become all the more prominent and impressive. For this Zhu Xi feels that "he said with exaggeration." The Confucian faith, upon being rebuilt, deliberately avoided the personal impact of the threat of nothingness, leading impartiality to shift their focus of attention to the social whole, for which "the learning of the sage has a totally different function."

Heavenly principle as the ultimate power is infinite and it is thus formless and invisible, for which he remarks that it is the "ultimate vacuity" and the "ultimate nothingness." Nevertheless, within it the value is elucidated, for which it has "concrete reality" and "concrete properties." The Buddha did indeed take a "glimpse" of the ultimate power, but lost Confucian value, for which "he can do nothing more but retire." The sage is different. He is not only illuminated in virtues, but also "has a desire to achieve appropriateness in all things and matters," for which "he constantly wants to support this moral principle, which teaches him to uphold the heaven and stand firmly on the earth." What worries Zhu Xi most is not the nothingness of individual life, but the nothingness of value for the social whole. "If no one maintains it for even a single day, it will collapse. If we inversely use foot to uphold heaven and head to uphold earth even for a shortest while, then everything will be broken" (Vol.13). The ultimate power is heavenly principle. Only apparent value can uphold heaven and earth and support the social existence of humans. Heavenly principle is the very ultimate power, responsible for upholding heaven and earth. If we can open up our mind, transcend human body, become a sage and worthy, integrate with heaven, then the threat of nothingness confronting individual will likewise disappear.

During the discussion of Chapter IX of the *Analects*, it was asked, 'People today do not know whether one's mind and the cultivation of heaven and earth are two things, or the same thing? I ask you to deliberate on it.' After a long while, Zhu replied, 'People today, when they study, only mean to understand text at its face value, not to appreciate its real meaning. The words by the sage are just to discover this moral principle, which includes my body, all things, and heaven and earth. In the final analysis there is only one thing, without cover or obstacle. One's mind is the mind of heaven and earth. What the sage sees upon noticing the flow of time on the top of a mountain is no other than this principle. Where heavenly mandate is the ultimate propriety, then human mind is impropriety; where heavenly mandate is the ultimate impartiality, then human mind partiality; where heavenly mandate the greatest, then human mind the insignificant, for which reason we are different from heaven and earth. The teaching today is to get rid of the dissimilarity with heaven and earth and reach similarity with the latter. It was also said, 'In vacuity there is nothing but this moral principle. It is just that the sage does it on things at hand.' It was also said, 'As long as we discern the outline of the source, then we will be able to see that all things grow out of this root. It is like a big tree having a root and with many branches and leaves. Once you shake the root, then all will move (Yu Lei, vol.36).

"There is only one moral principle in the universe," for which "the words by the sage is to discover this moral principle." This moral principle is heavenly principle, the ultimate power of elucidating value. It is neither some logical abstraction; nor can it be grasped through a logical analysis of category. For one thing, heavenly principle is the infinite, while all logical analyses are certain kind of definition, thus being finite. The logical analyses of heavenly principle by modern scholars, in Zhu Xi's words, are "only an appreciation of words at their face value without a real understanding of their meanings." All the finite are in the infinite, manifesting this infinity directly or otherwise. This infinity is the source of life and root of meaning. For this, in terms of source, "there is only one thing in the final analysis, without cover, without obstacle." Human desire creates obstacles to cover it, and so does logic. For this reason, there is a difference between heaven and human. When such obstacle is removed, "my mind" is the "mind of heaven and earth," namely heavenly mandate and heavenly principle. The value of heavenly principle is pure goodness, for which it is the "most proper." It is not bound by human body, for which it is the "most just." It is infinite, for which it is the "greatest." There will be no logical abstraction in nothingness, but some ultimate power. The words and conduct by the sage can help us to derive certain logical abstractions. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, they have to be traced back to the source of heavenly mandate. To recognize this source of heavenly mandate is to see the "reason of 'why'" for things. This knowledge cannot be achieved by logical reasoning, but ultimately through life experiences. What life experiences point towards is not what can be defined by modern academic disciplines, but some ultimate concern over the whole of life. There can be infinite primary concerns, which are invariably related to the ultimate issue of life. There exists only one ultimate concern, which is precisely the only important thing for mankind. This is perhaps the profound message that Zhu Xi wants to convey to us through his distinction between heavenly principle and human desire.

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論朱熹的理欲之辨

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中文提要：朱熹的理欲之辨，多為現代人所詬病，輕者視之為禁欲主義，重者斥之為“以理殺人”。應該說，以現代語言重新解讀古代思想，難免會出現一些偏差，因為古今不同的話語系統預設了不同的自明前提，如果不對雙方的話語系統及其自明前提保持足夠的清醒和自覺，誤讀和曲解將是必然的。事實上，這種誤讀和曲解充斥在朱熹理欲之辨的各個層次。如果說對人欲、人心、私利的誤解已經開始引起了人們的初步關注，盡管這種關注依然沒能擺脫現代語境的束縛，那麼，對天理和聖人的誤解則至今還未受到應有的反思，如馮友蘭、牟宗三等人的有關解釋一直在廣泛流傳，它們集中體現了現代語境對古代理念的粗暴扭曲。這些誤解不但遮蔽了理欲之辨的深層用意，同時也遮蔽了整個朱熹理學的深刻內涵。本文試圖從古今不同語境及其自明前提的考察入手，對朱熹的理欲之辨進行一番清理，為重新揭示朱熹理學的深層秘密探索一種可能的途徑。

關鍵詞：朱熹，人心，道心

The Concept of Social Responsibility as It Appears in Vietnamese Confucianism

Nguyen Tai Dong

While Confucius does not use the term “responsibility” in his writings, he and his followers have a clear opinion about responsibility. Some scholars believe that Confucianism is one of the two significant traditions to emphasize human responsibility¹, and thus there is no reason to deny the role of Confucianism in the future of Capitalism.²

The first manifestation of the concept of responsibility in Confucianism is in its definition of human beings in terms of relationships, emphasizing the community but not the individual. As a representative of East Asian philosophy, Confucianism pays particular attention to two ways: the way of Heaven and the way of Man, which itself comprises the “Inner Sage” and “Outer King.”³ While the Inner Sage refers to an internal method of cultivating the self and so establishing the virtue of the sage, the Outer King refers to the external method of using one’s virtue to rule the country and so practicing the way of the King in society. This view was clearly expressed in *the Great Learning*, one of the foundational ‘Four Books’ of Confucianism. The first chapter of *the Great Learning* sets out three great guidelines for human conduct, which include the Inner Sage and Outer King: *firstly*, manifesting virtue, *Secondly*, loving the people⁴ and finally, resting in the highest good, or excellence. These three purposes

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1 “The contemporary promotion of the Confucian virtue of humaneness is especially important now because Confucianism is one of the two influential traditions to emphasize human responsibility for social structures as well as personal action. The other tradition is the Western Enlightenment thought that has become attached to the rationalism of the capitalist market economy, which is inhumane.” Robert Cummings Neville, *Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in a Comparative Context*, State University of New York Press, 2008, p.102.

2 “In fact, if Capitalism were to be guided, not by an “invisible hand” as Adam Smith would wish, but by a Confucian ethic of social responsibility, the world would be on a more harmonious path.” Justin Philcox, *Confucian Capitalism?* August 15, 2011.

3 “Inner Sage and Outer King” appeared for the first time in *Chuang-tzu* and since then has been popularly used in Confucian literature.

4 Or “Renovating the People,” as translated in some other versions.

having been established, they are developed into eight more specific goals or courses of action, which progressively expand the field of one's influence: investigating the things, extending one's knowledge to the utmost, being sincere in one's thought, rectifying one's heart, cultivating one's self, regulating one's family, ordering well the state and pacifying the world. In other words, in order to achieve the state of Inner Sage man must cultivate his personal morality, in accordance with the ethical criteria set up by Confucius and his disciples. These ethical standards are given in the form of the Five Constants (Wu-ch'ang, or the Five Virtues of human behavior: benevolence, righteousness, proprieties, wisdom and fidelity) and other virtues such as courage, truthfulness, and humbleness. The practice of the King's way (the Outer King) consists in ruling the country in accordance with the fundamental principles and methods of Confucianism, in order to achieve good relationships among the people. What, then, are the conditions for good relationships among the people, and how can they be achieved?

According to Confucianism, the best conditions for people and their relationships are when harmonious society is maintained in three dimensions: in the relationship of man to nature, man to man and man to himself. On the relationship of man with nature, Confucianism claims that man originates from nature and therefore man and all social relationships are part of nature, and ought to follow the laws of nature. The concept of 'trinity' (Heaven-Earth-Man) pays attention to the reciprocity between man and his outer objects, as well as affirming the importance and agency of man in his relation to nature. Within social (man to man) relations, apart from addressing the solutions to economic issues and the basic needs of people's livelihoods such as 'making the people wealthy first and then educating them,' 'allowing the people to have property first and cultivate their minds later,' Confucianism focuses on the moral relations between man and man; or more specifically, on relations within the state, and family relationships. Such relationships manifest in three main bonds: those between ruler and minister, father and son, and husband and wife, in which the authority of the ruler over the minister, the authority of the father over the son, and the authority of the husband over the wife are affirmed in the Five Constant Virtues (righteousness on the part of the father, love on the part of the wife, brotherhood on the part of elder brother, respect on the part of younger brother, and filial piety

on the part of son).⁵ Confucius always seeks to harmonize with other people: "When the Master was in company with a person who was singing, if he sang well, he would make him repeat the song, while he accompanied it with his own voice."⁶ "The Master said, 'Those who are without virtue cannot abide long either in a condition of poverty and hardship, or in a condition of enjoyment. The virtuous rest in virtue; the wise desire virtue.'"⁷

In the Confucian world-view, cultivating oneself is a precondition to harmonizing one's own family, which is, in turn, a precondition to well governing one's own State, which is, in turn, a precondition to bringing peace to the entire world.⁸ It means that one needs first to cultivate oneself so as to bring peace and security to his or her extended family, fellow citizens, and eventually to the people of the entire world.⁹

5 In the *Analects*, these relations are mentioned implicitly, but later, *Mengzi* generalizes these five relationships in *Mengzi* Book 3A4: "There is a *Dao* that common people follow: if they have food enough to eat and clothes enough to wear, they sit in idleness and pursue no learning, little different from birds and beasts. Yao brooded over this as well, and he appointed Xie to be Minister of the People and teach them about proper human relationships – about affection between father and son, righteousness between ruler and minister, the proper divisions between husband and wife, the precedence of elder and younger, and the faithfulness of friends." *Mencius. Indiana University, Early Chinese Thought [B/E/P374] – Fall 2010 (R. Eno)*, p.36.

6 *The Analects of Confucius*, 7.31.

7 *The Analects of Confucius*, 4.2.

8 "Only after affairs have been straightened out
may one's understanding be fully extended.
Only after one's understanding is fully extended
may one's intentions be perfectly genuine.
Only after one's intentions are perfectly genuine
may one's mind be balanced.
Only after one's mind is balanced
may one's person be refined.
Only after one's person is refined
may one's household be aligned.
Only after one's household is aligned
may one's state be ordered.
Only after one's state is ordered
may the world be set at peace."

(*the Great Learning: The Eight Stages*, translated by R. Eno, Indiana University, Early Chinese Thought [B/E/P374] – Fall 2010)

9 "Tsze-lu asked what constituted the superior man. The Master said, 'The cultivation of himself in reverential carefulness.' 'And is this all?' said Tsze-lu. 'He cultivates himself so as to give rest to others,' was the reply. 'And is this all?' again asked Tsze-lu. The Master said, 'He cultivates himself so as to give

In the relations between man and his self, Confucianism focuses on the cultivation of the inner self and perfection of the self. Everyone must learn, not only theoretically but also practically, to cultivate the basic virtues of benevolence, righteousness, proprieties, wisdom and fidelity, among which benevolence (*ren*) is both a virtue in its own right, and also the foundation for all other virtues. We can see the spirit of Confucianism in this Golden Rule: "Never do to others what you would not like them to do to you."¹⁰ Confucius also says: "A man of humanity is one who, wishing to establish himself, helps others to establish themselves; and who, wishing to gain perception, helps others to gain perception."¹¹ According to Confucianism, through the cultivation of moral seeds endowed by Heaven, and especially the cultivation of benevolence, man can overcome himself and become perfect. This is why Confucius teaches consistently the Way of Virtue as he says, "Virtue is never solitary; it always has neighbors."¹² Confucius' personal conviction of his life, "at fifteen, I set mind upon learning; (...) and at seventy, I could follow my heart's desires without overstepping the bounds of propriety,"¹³ is not a simple personal confession of his life; rather, it demonstrates his comprehension of humanity.

According to Confucianism, *Li* (propriety) and *Zhengming* (rectification of names) are needed in order to build an ideal society as mentioned above, or to practice the King's way.

As one of the cardinal virtues in Confucianism, *li* (propriety) is usually understood as the principle of social order and hierarchy. Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, paid particular attention to *li* and considered it both the criterion and measure to construct a harmonious and good society. As Confucius stated, *Li* has the following contents: first, *Li* is used to regulate human relations in society. You Ruo, a Confucian disciple, said that "Among the functions

rest to all the people. He cultivates himself so as to give rest to all the people: even Yao and Shun were still solicitous about this.'" (*The Analects of Confucius*, 14.45.)

10 *The Analects of Confucius*, 15.23. Or: "What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others"(kỷ sở bất dục vật thi ư nhân)

11 *The Analects of Confucius*, 6.28. Or: "Now the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others."

12 *The Analects of Confucius*, 4.25.

13 *The Analects of Confucius*, 2.4.

of propriety (*Li*) the most valuable is that it establishes harmony. The excellence of the ways of ancient kings consists of this. It is the guiding principle of all things great and small. If things go amiss, and you, understanding harmony, try to achieve it without regulating it by the rules of propriety, they will still go amiss"¹⁴. Second, *Li* is the expression of ethical norms, and the scale of values in society. Confucius used to equate Ren and *Li* when he said "If a man is not humane, what has he to do with ceremonies? If he is not humane, what has he to do with music?"¹⁵ Third, *Li* comprises the norms, rules and rituals which urge man to follow the right way. Confucius said "The superior man extensively studies literature (wen) and restrains himself with the rules of propriety. Thus he will not violate the Way"¹⁶.

Confucianism insists that the practice of Zhengming (rectification of names) is necessary in order to bring order, morality and harmony to society. Confucius stressed the importance of social roles and stated that one's name (in the sense of one's position, role, or privilege) must go together with one's performance (competence, duty and responsibility) and everyone should strive to play his proper role in the social hierarchy: "Let the ruler be the ruler, the minister be the minister, the father be the father, and the son be the son"¹⁷. Therefore, the rectification of names is the foundation for social management. "Tzu-lu said, "The ruler of Wei is waiting for you to serve in his administration. What will be your first measure?" Confucius said, "It will certainly concern the rectification of names." Tzu-lu said, "Is that so? You are wide of the mark. Why should there be such a rectification?" Confucius said, "Yu! How uncultivated you are! With regard to what he does not know, the superior man should maintain an attitude of reserve. If names are not rectified, then language will not be in accord with truth. If language is not in accord with truth, then things cannot be accomplished. If things cannot be accomplished, then ceremonies and music will not flourish. If ceremonies and music do not flourish, then punishment will not be just. If punishments are not just, then the people will not know how to move hand or foot. Therefore the superior man will give only names that can be described

14 *The Analects of Confucius*, 1.12.

15 *The Analects of Confucius*, 3.3.

16 *The Analects of Confucius*, 6.25.

17 *The Analects of Confucius*, 12.11.

in speech and say only what can be carried out in practice. With regard to his speech, the superior man does not take it lightly"¹⁸. According to Confucianism, it is necessary to have men who are highly virtuous and maintain harmonious relationships with other men and nature, as well as paying proper attention to both *Li* (propriety) and Zhengming (rectification of names), in order to build an ideal society.

Shi Xie (137~226), a Chinese official in Jiaozhi, was one of the first propagators of Chinese Confucianism to Vietnam. However, it took a long time for Confucianism to penetrate into the life of Vietnam's society, undergoing the process of indigenization to become Vietnamese Confucianism. Vietnamese Confucianism absorbed, shared and implemented the basic concepts of Chinese Confucianism. However, the basic concepts of Chinese Confucianism received new meanings or were restructured into a new system. What is more important to Vietnamese Confucianism is the contribution of Vietnamese Confucian scholars, especially those great scholars who took up the practical circumstances of Vietnam to evaluate and propose solutions to the major problems and challenges faced by the country, and the people, at that time. Vietnamese Confucianism paid particular attention to the issues of the Way related to the human condition, including the issue that we now call social responsibility. Vietnamese Confucian scholars evaluated humans mainly from the ethical angle rather than the angle of power or interest: i.e., a man is respected not because of his wealthy status but rather due to his attitude towards others and towards society; whether or not he can sacrifice his private interests for the interests of society and the nation. This is the very spirit that President Ho Chi Minh received from Confucianism: "total dedication to the public interest, and complete selflessness."

After more than a thousand years, Vietnam regained its independence in the beginning of the 10th Century. This important event shows that Vietnam has, not only a vehement will towards freedom and an indomitable spirit, but also a solid system of philosophical thought, serving as the foundation for its enduring and heroic struggle against foreign invaders. The Vietnamese have struggled from generation to generation for their national independence

18 *The Analects of Confucius*, 13.3.

and the reconstruction of their traditional culture, handed down by their ancestors from the time of Hung's Kings. As Vietnamese Confucians in the 12th Century remarked on the rebel of Trung's Sisters in "Thien Nam ngu luc": "The first thing is to take the national revenge and the second is to restore the Cause of Hung's Kings"¹⁹. The Cause of Hung's Kings is the cultural foundation of the Vietnamese people and the inner vitality of the nation.

The Vietnamese system of thoughts at that time manifested in the reflections of the Vietnamese on themselves, and their responsibility toward the nation and country. The sense of community, the awareness of a common origin of the Viet and their national sovereignty are expressed clearly in the tale of "One Hundred Eggs" associated with the King Lac Long Quan, a descendant of dragons, who married the fairy Au Co. Apart from the affirmation of the national spirit, the tale also expresses the humane nature of the Viet society, which is not a kind of simple aggregate of separate individuals but an organic community bound by blood ties and holy relationships. Here in this tale 'compatriot' means the descendants from the same original womb.

After regaining their independence, and especially after the 'upheaval of twelve,' the need for a unified society became more pressing for the Vietnamese. The influence of Chinese culture was not quite symmetrical with a period of more than 1,000 years of Chinese domination. However, when the Viet regained their sovereignty, they actively acquired some outstanding achievements of Han's culture in order to safeguard their national independence and construct their social life. The Viet not only actively acquired Chinese political institutions, social structures and education systems, but they also approached, developed and transformed some fundamental concepts of Chinese philosophy to make them more appropriate to the conditions of Vietnam. Chinese philosophy was known by the Viet mainly through the teachings of Chinese Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. Based on the foundation of the traditional thoughts and culture of Vietnam, outstanding Vietnamese Confucian scholars, including Chu Van An, Nguyen Trai, Le Thanh Tong, Nguyen Binh Khiem, Nguyen Du, Phung Khắc Khoan, Le Quy Don, Le Huu Trac, and Ngo Thi Nham, acculturated Chinese Confucianism in order to address and find

19 *The History of Vietnam* The Tertiary Education Publishing House, Hanoi, 1993.

solutions to the problems raised by the reality of Vietnam. As well, the Viet were able to establish their own form of Buddhism by the end of the 13th Century, through their acculturation of Indian and Chinese Buddhism. In following the teaching of the Buddha, this Vietnamese sect of Buddhism, known as Truc Lam's Zen Buddhism, has actively engaged with the problems and issues of the real life-world of the Viet.

The intellectuals of Vietnam in the past, regardless of their ideological stances and differences in interpretation of the world and human values, were united on the issue of the importance and necessity of national independence, which serves as the most important premise for construction of a good and happy society. The nation as a whole recognized clearly that only by being independent, sovereign, free, and united, could Vietnam gain stability, development and felicity. The yearning for freedom, peace and self-reliance has been constantly manifested in the traditional thoughts of Vietnam. In his reply to the question raised by the King about the affairs of the nation, Phap Thuan, a Vietnamese Zen Master, said:

Like woven canes the nation's destiny stands
Peace now adorns the Southern sky
If mindful wisdom tends the Palace
All warring stops, all strife withers²⁰.

Or in a famous poem, "Nam Quoc Son Ha," which is considered to be the first Vietnamese Declaration of Independence, Ly Thuong Kiet affirmed the truth that:

Over Mountains and Rivers of the South, reigns the Emperor of the South
As it stands written forever in the Book of Heaven
How dare those barbarians invade our land?
Your armies, without pity, will be annihilated²¹.

Many other basic concepts relating to the theme of national independence, freedom and peace were also addressed in the works of famous Vietnamese Buddhist monks and Confucian scholars during that period of national construction.

20 *Thien Uyen Tap Anh* (A Collection of Outstanding Figures of the Zen Community).

21 *Ly-Tran literature and poetry*. Vol. 1 The Social Sciences Publishing House, Hanoi, 1977, p.321.

Apart from thoughts on national independence, the issues of benevolence and righteousness are among the most important ideas of the traditional Vietnamese school of thought relating to the concept of good relationships in society. An ideal society is one which is not only independent, unified, and socially ordered, but also one which is righteous and benevolent. The thought of benevolence and righteousness has been a guideline for Vietnamese Confucianism throughout history. As Nguyen Trai affirmed, "the benevolent uses weakness to control the powerful, and the just uses the few to fight against the many,"²² and "uphold great justice to overcome barbarity, and uphold perfect humanity to challenge brute force."²³ The thought of benevolence and righteousness acts not only as a policy guideline, as do the 'rule of virtue' or 'rule of *Li*' in Chinese Confucianism, but also as the goal for the cause of national independence, and more than that, as the foundation for ethics and moral criteria in human life. Thanks to the thought of benevolence and righteousness, Nguyen Trai, in particular, and other Confucians and leaders of Vietnam in general, were able to eradicate hatred and intolerance and practice the Way of Heaven. In the case of Nguyen Trai the thought of benevolence and righteousness was also demonstrated in the amnesty given to surrendering troops, in order to eradicate the source of future wars, and to leave an eternally kind image in their mind. Concretize

The thought of benevolence and righteousness was concretized in social relationships as the authentic way of being human. According to Nguyen Trai, to be human means to have the virtues of benevolence, wisdom and courage. However, unlike traditional Confucians, Nguyen Trai insisted that those virtues are not theoretical but should be implemented in human life and embodied in human actions to help man to renounce all kind of evil. Nguyen Trai's thoughts on benevolence and righteousness became the life orientation and basic code of conduct for Vietnamese Confucians in later periods. King Le Thanh Tong, who was fond of Confucianism, said that "eradication of brutality is King's benevolence." Ngo Sy Lien, a famous historian, claimed that benevolence is the most revered virtue: "to renounce the life in order to follow righteousness is better than to live. To live in indignity is not what a great man wants"²⁴. *Mencius* affirmed that

22 Nguyen Trai. *Letter in reply to General Phuong Chinh*.

23 Nguyen Trai. *Binh Ngo Dai Cao* (Great Declaration).

24 *Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu* (Complete history record of Great Viet) vol. 1 p.123.

human life is worth living, but if he had to choose between life and righteousness he would sacrifice his life to choose righteousness.²⁵ So did Ngo Sy Lien, who regarded righteousness as being more important than life. Life without righteousness is a mere physiological existence. It is righteousness that makes human life meaningful and authentic.

Social responsibility is a concept from the West, but the thought of social responsibility is prevalent in Confucianism. Even some scholars claim that Confucianism is one of two ideologies that emphasize human social responsibility (the other ideology is Enlightenment)²⁶. Both the East and the West emphasize social responsibility; however, there exist differences between the two traditions. The West locates social responsibility in groups rather in individuals, while Confucianism locates social responsibility in individuals. Gu Yanwu (1613~1682), a Confucian scholar in the beginning of the Qing Dynasty, famously declared in his work "*Ri Zhi Lu*" his social thought that "Everybody is responsible for the fate of his country" (which has been repeated many times by Liang Qi Shao). This is also the spirit of the tradition of Confucianism: Everyone bears responsibility for the prosperity of his or her country.

Social responsibility can exist only within the relationships between man and man. Man is human only in the arms of others; ethics cannot be separated from sociality. Therefore, responsibility can serve as the basis for all relationships, the foundation of ethics. Humanity is the foundation of human relatedness. As such, the relationship between man and man is steadfastly bound by responsibility. In the thought of Confucius, in particular, and Chinese Confucianism in general, the virtue of benevolence or "humaneness" and the very concept of benevolence, which means human being, are often regarded as identical. According to the *Theory of Chinese Character Study*, the word *ren* (benevolence) means two persons and has the meaning of intimacy and close relatedness. Thus, to be benevolent means to live with others and to interact with the Other in good will and with good intentions; benevolence is not only the outcome of the interactions between two men or among many men, one to another, but also the very crux of the right Way to be human. That idea is

25 Mencius Gaozi. "I like life, and I also like righteousness. If I cannot keep the two together, I will let life go, and choose righteousness."

26 Robert Cummings Neville. *Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in a Comparative Context*, State University of New York Press, 2008, p.102.

reaffirmed in the *Doctrine of the Mean*. To do humanly is to be human" (仁者人也). "*Ren*" (humaneness) means human being, and a human being is the expression of humaneness. Confucianism confirms the view that being a human means being benevolent, and regards it as the basis of life's value. Benevolence serves, not only as the criterion for an ethical basis of the right way of being human, but also as the practical criterion for real behavior by individuals living in society.

Confucianism pays particular attention to social relations, and regards them as the starting points to focus on the morality of individuals, families and societies. Confucianism regards man as a social being, and proposes concrete ethical principles for every type of human relation, of which the two main concepts are the state and the family. Within a family the key relations include the relationship between parents and their children, that between husbands and wives, and that among siblings. Social relations include the relationship between a king and his subjects, and that among friends.

Following *Mencius's* categorization of the five relationships, "When being a child, yearn for and love your parents; when growing mature, yearn for and love your lassie; when having wife and child(ren), yearn for and love your wife and child(ren); when being an official (or a staffer), yearn for and love your sovereign," Dong Zhongshu institutionalized the Three Cardinal Guides, stating that "a ruler is a cardinal guide to a minister, a father a cardinal guide to a son, and a husband a cardinal guide to a wife." Later the Three Cardinal Guides became the cultural and ethical framework of Confucianism. Thus, the Guides request that the subjects, children and wives obey absolutely the king, fathers and husbands, as well as that the king, fathers and husbands serve as examples for the subjects, children and wives to follow.

So how does traditional Confucianism understand social responsibility? First of all, social responsibility is understood in the context of norms and ethical virtues. From an ethical angle, the core of Confucian thought contains five cardinal virtues of "benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness," five cardinal relationships, and ten ethical norms of human relationships: "between father and sons, between the king and subjects, between husbands and wives, between siblings, between friends." Second, social responsibility is also understood to be the duty towards one's country: the ultimate aim of Confucian self-cultivation is the practical social life. The human

attitude of Mencius towards life, on the one hand focuses on inner cultivation, self-perfection and the improvement of inner virtues, and on the other hand, pays attention to the "external realm": those activities which serve the aim of helping others and stabilizing the country. The Way of "Inner Sage, Outer King" is the very model of traditional Confucianism, oriented towards the activities of social responsibility. Third, social responsibility is also seen from the angle of natural laws: Confucian scholars attach social responsibility to the belief of man's heaven-related destiny in order to find rational solutions to social changes (as we can see in the *I Ching*). Thus, the Confucian notion of heaven's destiny contains an awareness of social responsibility: "to practice the Way on behalf of Heaven."

As stated above, the core of Confucianism is benevolence. The founder of Confucianism related benevolence to the spirit of social responsibility. While talking about the relationship of benevolence with human values and social responsibility, Confucius mentioned two kinds of comparative explanations. One was from the angle of pursuing the inner nature of man: "Wealth and high position are what men desire but unless I got them in the right way I would not remain in them. Poverty and low position are what men dislike, but even if I did not get them in the right way I would not try to escape from them. 'If the gentleman forsakes benevolence, in what way can he make a name for himself? The gentleman never deserts benevolence, not even for as long as it takes to eat a meal. If he hurries and stumbles one may be sure that it is in benevolence that he does so'" (*Lun Yu IV. 5*). The gentleman is defined by benevolence, and therefore he is also called the man of benevolence. And from the angle of the human being, he must do his best to practice his social responsibility: "If a man has no *benevolence* what can his propriety be like? If a man has no benevolence what can his music be like?" (*Lun Yu III. 3*). The first view affirms that benevolence is the Confucian ideal of human life, the second explains that benevolence is the principle of social responsibility. The core value of benevolence is that man expresses *spontaneously* his ethical consciousness and social responsibility in his relationships within his family, society, and country: "Now the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others" "To be able to judge of others by what is nigh in ourselves;— this may be called the art of virtue" (*Lun*

Yu, VI. 28.3).

Vietnamese Confucians also pay particular attention to social responsibility. In the thought of Nguyen Trai, social responsibility is manifested through patriotism. The category of patriotism, from a philosophical perspective, implies a human community; a nation, a country. Therefore, philosophically speaking, patriotism means the awareness of one's social responsibility towards one's compatriots, the national community, which is manifested as a system of thought. The particularity of Vietnam's patriotism is expressed in the spirit of solidarity, the spirit of protection of national sovereignty and national cultural identity. Patriotism does not remain limited to a psychological level or a sentimental respect but becomes a theory, a point of view: the view on national independence and national sovereignty. Nguyen Trai mentioned the cultural, territorial, customary, historical, and human factors of patriotism. The driving force for the construction and safeguarding of the country is the consensus. Humanism, in Nguyen Trai's thought, is manifested in the view that regards man as the starting point and respects human dignity. Towards others, human-heartedness is the foundation of relationships. The sociality of benevolence in Nguyen Trai's thought can be considered from the following angles: first, good will towards others; second, understanding others; third, caring for the common good; and fourth, acting in accordance with the community's customs. The ultimate aim is to develop all aspects of a man, especially the ethical aspect, so as to develop the perfect personality, as well as to make human life better and happier. The humanism and tolerance of Nguyen Trai's thought are expressed in his spirit of deep humanism.

Nguyen Binh Khiem, from some angles, seems to be a world-renouncing Confucian; however, he remained devoted to social affairs. The spirit of care for one's nation and country, loving the country and the people, and keeping in touch with the world are the ideal of Vietnamese Confucianism, the very spirit of "Worry should be before, and *joy* must be after those of the people,"²⁷ as well as the character and inspiration of Vietnamese Confucian scholars throughout history. This kind of ideal has served as one of paradigms for the process of the formation and development of the Vietnamese in the past, as well as still being a bright example for the formation of the

27 範仲淹《嶽陽樓記》：“先天下之憂而憂，後天下之樂而樂”。

personality of the Viet in the present.

The Confucian scholars of later generations still preserve the tradition of Le Quy Don, to Ngo Thi Nham, Nguyen Cong Tru, Cao Ba Quat, and so on. The spirit of active participation in the affairs of the world, with the purpose of helping the people. The spirit of “regarding the rise and fall of the nation concerns everyone”²⁸ (or, “everyone bears responsibility for the prosperity of society”) is one of the principles expressing the humane spirit and humane attitude of Vietnamese Confucianism. The ideal of “to establish a mind for heaven-and-earth; to establish the way for the people of today; to carry on the lost learning of the sages of yesterday; and to find the “Great Peace for ten thousand generations”²⁹ has encouraged and supported Confucian scholars’ awareness of responsibility towards society, and the spirit of responsibility towards history, from generation to generation.

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28 《南史·孔休源傳》：“休源風範強正，明練政體，常以天下為己任。”

29 Famous saying of a famous North Sung Dynasty philosopher, Zhang Zai (1020~1077)

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儒家社會責任觀及其在越南當代的意義

阮才東

中文摘要：傳統儒教是如何理解社會義務的？首先，社會義務既是規範，又是倫理德目。從倫理的觀點上看，儒教思想的核心包含五德(仁義禮智信)和五倫(父子、君臣、夫婦、兄弟、朋友)。第二，社會義務被理解為指向國家的責任意識。儒教修養的最終目的是社會生活的實踐。透過孟子的生涯我們所看到的人生態度，一方面是內面的修養和自我的完成以及內面德性的提高，另一方面是外面的領域，即幫助他人，安定國家的行為。“內勝外王”之道正是傳統儒教中履行社會義務的模型。第三，還可以從自然法的層面觀察社會義務。為了尋找合理解決社會變化的方法，儒學家認為社會義務是賦予給人的天命。(見於《易經》)因此，對於天命的儒教概念就是認識到“替天行道”的社會義務。

越南的儒學家們也對儒教的社會義務表現出特殊的關心。在阮廌(Nguyen Trai)的思想中，社會義務首先表現為愛國心。守護國家的精神，熱愛國家和人民之心，與世界的連續性是越南儒學的理想，“先人之憂，後人之樂”的精神可以說是越南歷代儒學家們所體現的特性和靈感。這種理想在歷史上，以至於今天，都是構成和發展越南人的一個典型。“國家的興亡取決於大家”(所有人對社會的繁榮負責)一句正是體現越南儒學的人類愛的精神和態度的原則中之一。“立天地之心，為今天的人類開拓道路，尋求萬世之‘大和平’”的理想是，為鼓舞社會責任而子子孫孫相傳下來的儒學精神。

關鍵詞： 越南儒學

《尚書緯》新論*

任 蜜 林

中文提要：本文從西漢尚書學的傳承探討了《尚書緯》的形成。西漢的尚書學主要有三個系統，即歐陽氏學、大小夏侯氏學。從《尚書緯》中講災異的內容，可以推斷其可能出於歐陽氏、大夏侯氏或李尋之手。又根據“百二《尚書》”及其它證據，認為《尚書緯》形成當在劉歆之後。其下限則在東漢光武帝中元元年(56年)之前。然後在此基礎上，對《尚書緯》中的尚書學思想以及《尚書中候》作了深入的探討。

關鍵詞：《尚書緯》，百二《尚書》，尚書學，《尚書中候》

一、西漢尚書學傳承與《尚書緯》形成

《尚書緯》是相對《尚書》而言的，其形成必然與西漢尚書學的流傳有關。因此，欲明《尚書緯》的形成，必須先瞭解西漢尚書學的傳承情況。

對於西漢尚書學的傳承，《漢書·儒林傳》說：

伏生，濟南人也，故為秦博士。孝文時，求能治《尚書》者，天下亡有，聞伏生治之，欲召。時伏生年九十餘，老不能行，於是詔太常使掌故朝錯往受之。秦時禁《書》，伏生壁藏之，其後大兵起，流亡。漢定，伏生求其《書》，亡數十篇，獨得二十九篇，即以教於齊、魯之間。齊學者由此頗能言《尚書》，山東大師亡不涉《尚書》以教。伏生教濟南張生及歐陽生。……歐陽生，字和伯，千乘人也。事伏生，授兒寬。寬又授業孔安國，至御史大夫。……歐陽、大小夏侯氏學皆出於寬。寬授歐陽生子，世世相傳，至曾孫高子陽，為博士。……由是《尚書》世有歐陽氏學。

此與《史記·儒林列傳》記載大略相同，顯系班固據史遷之文而成。據上面記載，可以知道西漢尚書學傳承始於伏生。伏生是秦朝的博士，其在秦焚書坑儒的情況下，把《尚書》藏在牆壁裏。後來遇到大亂，伏生流落他鄉。等到漢建國後，伏生求其所藏《尚書》，丟失了數十篇，僅存二十九篇。他即以此教於齊、魯之間，由是齊國學者頗能言《尚書》之學。到了漢文帝的時候，求能治《尚書》者，天下無有。聽說伏生能言《尚書》，欲召其至朝廷，但由於伏生年老，不能應召。於是文帝派晁錯到伏生那裏受《尚書》。

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伏生授張生、歐陽生。歐陽生授兒寬,寬又授歐陽生子,於是《尚書》有歐陽氏學。

從上面記載來看,我們還知道兒寬不但受業於歐陽生,而且還向孔安國問學。孔安國以傳古文《尚書》知名。而歐陽生等人所傳皆為今文《尚書》。這樣就出現一個問題,即尚書學傳至兒寬的時候,就已出現今古文融合的情況。而西漢中後期的尚書學傳承皆出自兒寬,這說明《尚書》傳至兒寬的時候就已經發生了變化。歐陽高授林尊,林尊授平當、陳翁生,由是歐陽有平、陳之學。翁生授殷崇、龔勝,平當授朱普公文、鮑宣。這是歐陽氏學後期的傳承情況。

大、小夏侯氏學則始於夏侯都尉。夏侯都尉學於張生,其又授夏侯始昌,始昌授夏侯勝。勝又學於蔣卿。蔣卿者,兒寬弟子也。此為大夏侯氏學。勝又授夏侯建,建又學於歐陽高,此為小夏侯氏學。夏侯勝又授周堪、孔霸,堪授牟卿、許商長伯,霸授孔光,由是大夏侯有許、孔之學。夏侯建授張山拊,山拊授李尋、鄭寬中、張無故、秦恭、假倉,由是小夏侯有鄭、張、秦、假、李氏之學。這是大小夏侯氏學在西漢中後期的傳承情況。

可見,大小夏侯氏之學都不純粹,皆非學於一師。大夏侯之學源於張生,其又學於兒寬弟子,而兒寬之學源於歐陽生。這說明大夏侯之學同時融入張生、歐陽生兩種學說。但對於大夏侯影響最大的還不是這兩種思想,而是夏侯始昌的陰陽災異思想。《漢書·夏侯始昌傳》說:

夏侯始昌,魯人也。通五經,以《齊詩》、《尚書》教授。自董仲舒、韓嬰死後,武帝得始昌,甚重之。始昌明於陰陽。先言柏梁台災日,至期日果災。

可以看出,夏侯始昌在董仲舒、韓嬰之後,得到漢武帝的重任。之所以如此,與其精通陰陽災異有關。董仲舒借助《春秋》而明災異,而始昌則以《齊詩》、《尚書》言之。夏侯勝繼承了他的陰陽災異思想。《漢書·夏侯勝傳》說:

夏侯勝,字長公。……勝少孤,好學,從始昌受《尚書》及《洪範五行傳》,說災異。後事蔣卿,又從歐陽氏問。為學精孰,所問非一師也。善說禮服。徵為博士、光祿大夫。會昭帝崩,昌邑王嗣立,數出。勝當乘輿前諫曰:“天久陰而不雨,臣下有謀上者,陛下出欲何之?”王怒,謂勝為祲言,縛以屬吏。吏白大將軍霍光,光不舉法。是時,光與車騎將軍張安世謀欲廢昌邑王。光讓安世以為泄語,安世實不言。乃召問勝,勝對言:“在《洪範傳》曰‘皇之不極,厥罰常陰,時則下人有伐上者’,惡察察言,故雲臣下有謀。”光、安世大驚,以此益重經術士。

夏侯勝從夏侯始昌學《尚書》和《洪範五行傳》,其學亦以說災異為主。從其根據《洪範》推斷天久陰不雨是臣下謀上的徵兆來看,其說災異是從《尚書》而來。《洪範五行傳》是《尚書大傳》的一篇。《尚書大傳》據說乃是伏生弟子張生、歐陽生根據伏生口說而成。《洪範五行傳》主要

講君主的貌、言、視、聽、思五事要符合它們自己的性質,如貌要恭、言要從、視要明、聽要聰、思要容。如果君主貌不恭、言不從、視不明、聽不聰、思不容,就會出現災異。如其說:“一曰貌。貌之不恭,是為不肅,厥咎狂,厥罰常雨,厥極惡。時則有服妖,時則有龜孽,時則有雞禍,時則有下體生於上之病,時則有青眚青祥,維金沴木;次二曰言。言之不從,是謂不艾,厥咎僭,厥罰常陽,厥極憂。時則有介蟲之孽,時則有犬禍,時則有白眚白祥,維木沴金。……”¹⁾這是說,如果君主貌不恭敬,則會有雨災,還會有服妖、龜孽等怪異現象;如果君主言語不順,則會有暘災,還會有蟲孽、犬禍等怪異現象。其它視不明,則有糞災;聽不聰,則有寒災;思不容,則有風災。“五事”出於《尚書·洪範》,不過《尚書大傳》把其同災異聯繫起來。夏侯勝所說“皇之不極”顯然是根據《洪範》“皇極”來闡發災異思想的。此說不見陳壽祺所輯《尚書大傳》,應為《洪範五行傳》佚文。不過我們可以通過《漢書·五行傳》來瞭解此思想。其說:“《傳》曰:皇之不極,是謂不建。厥咎眊,厥罰恒陰。……時則有下人伐上之禍。”此《傳》可能即為《洪範五行傳》。此說與夏侯勝相同,可能即是夏侯勝所言之本。

這裏的《洪範五行傳》到底是伏生本來所傳,還是夏侯始昌自己改師法而作。徐復觀認為此為夏侯始昌自造。其說:“《洪範五行傳》乃出於夏侯始昌,為他這一系統的《尚書》家所傳承。夏侯始昌為張生的再傳弟子,為伏生的三傳弟子。他的《洪範五行傳》,為張生及夏侯都尉所未聞,為歐陽生系統的《尚書》家所不習,更何能推及伏生?”²⁾徐氏所說似乎有理,然史籍未有夏侯始昌改師法的記載。如果始昌自立門戶,史書必有記載,如《易》之孟喜。何況《漢書·五行傳》亦說“孝武時,夏侯始昌通五經,善推《五行傳》”。從“善推《五行傳》”來看,《五行傳》在始昌之前就已存在。從尚書學傳承的記載來看,伏生當時傳授的弟子有張生和歐陽生二人。夏侯始昌之學源於張生,或者可以認為講災異的尚書學出於張生一系。但歐陽生一系的尚書學也是講災異的,如平當說:“今聖漢受命而王,繼體承業二百餘年,孜孜不怠,政令清矣。然風俗未和,陰陽未調,災害數見,意者大本有不立與?何德化休徵不應之久也?”(《漢書·平當傳》)平當之學出於兒寬,屬於歐陽生一系。這說明歐陽生一系的尚書學也是講災異的,不過沒有夏侯始昌那麼明顯而已。而且劉向也曾撰《洪範五行傳論》。《漢書·楚元王傳》說:“向見《尚書·洪範》箕子為武王陳五行陰陽休咎之應。向乃集合上古以來歷春秋、六國至秦、漢符瑞災異之記,推跡行事,連傳禍福,著其占驗,比類相從,各有條目,凡十一篇,號曰《洪範五行傳論》,奏之。”班固贊曰:“劉氏《洪範論》,發明《大傳》,著天人之應。”《洪範論》即《洪範五行傳論》,《藝文志》錄有《劉向五行傳記》十一卷,即是此書。可見班固之時,

1) 陳壽祺,《尚書大傳》,北京:中華書局,1985,63-65頁 [Chen Shouqi, *Shangshu Dazhuan*, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1985, pp.63-65].

2) 徐復觀,《徐復觀論經學史二種》,上海:上海書店出版社,2006,97頁 [Xu Fuguan, *Xu Fuguan on History of Classics*, Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, 2006, p.97].

《傳論》尚存。因此,班氏的說法是可信的。這說明《尚書大傳》本來就有講陰陽災異的內容。

從上面分析來看,伏生所傳尚書學本來就有講災異的傳統,夏侯始昌不過發揚光大而已。到了夏侯勝則以陰陽災異作為自己學派的特點。除了夏侯勝外,其後學皆講災異學說。如許商撰《五行論》,其性質當與劉向《洪範論》相似。孔光亦大談災異。《漢書·孔光傳》說:

臣聞日者,眾陽之宗,人君之表,至尊之象。君德衰微,陰道盛強,侵蔽陽明,則日蝕應之。《書》曰“羞用五事”,“建用皇極”,如貌、言、視、聽、思失,大中之道不立,則咎徵薦臻,六極屢降。皇之不極,是為大中不立,其傳曰“時則有日月亂行”,謂眊、側匿,甚則薄蝕是也。……

可見孔光之談災異,完全以《尚書》為基礎。其說“大中之道不立,則咎徵薦臻,六極屢降。皇之不極,是為大中不立”等亦本於《洪範五行傳》。可以看出,大夏侯一系的尚書學以陰陽災異思想為主。

小夏侯一系的尚書學則為章句之學。《漢書·夏侯建傳》說:“勝從父子建字長卿,自師事勝及歐陽高,左右采獲,又從《五經》諸儒問與《尚書》相出入者,牽引以次章句,具文飾說。勝非之曰:‘建所謂章句小儒,破碎大道。’建亦非勝為學疏略,難以應敵。建卒自顓門名經。”小夏侯之學以章句為主。其弟子張無故善修章句,守小夏侯說。另一弟子秦恭則增師法至百萬言。小夏侯之學可能源於歐陽氏。《後漢書·牟長傳》說:“牟長……著《尚書章句》,皆本之歐陽氏,俗號牟氏章句。”《桓鬱傳》也說,歐陽氏有朱普學章句四十萬言,桓榮減為二十三萬言,桓鬱又刪省定成十二萬言,由是有桓君大小太常章句。這說明歐陽氏本來就有以章句解《尚書》的傾向。小夏侯的另外一個弟子李尋則講災異。《漢書·李尋傳》說:“李尋,字子長,平陵人也。治《尚書》,與張孺、鄭寬中同師。寬中等守師法教授,尋獨好《洪範》災異,又學天文、月令、陰陽。”李尋的同門皆遵守師法,唯其喜言《洪範》災異。由此可以看出,小夏侯一系是不講災異的。

從上面的分析來看,西漢的尚書學主要有三個系統,即歐陽氏學、大小夏侯氏學。其中大夏侯氏學以言災異為主。小夏侯氏學則為純粹章句之學,不言災異。歐陽氏之學的內容不易斷定,但從上面分析來看,其包含章句和災異兩方面的內容。《尚書緯》中有很多講災異的內容,因此,可以推斷其可能出於歐陽氏、大夏侯氏或李尋之手。其中平當之徒鮑宣,許商之徒吳章、炁欽在當時徒弟甚多,影響甚大,因此,《尚書緯》可能出於它們之手。

二、從“百二《尚書》”看《尚書緯》的形成

在上一節我們主要從西漢尚書學的傳承情況考察了《尚書緯》的行成,在這一節中,我們將通過“百二《尚書》”來考察《尚書緯》的形成。《尚書緯》說:

孔子求書，得黃帝玄孫帝魁之書，迄於秦穆公，凡三千二百四十篇。斷遠取近，定可以為世法者百二十篇，以百二篇為《尚書》，十八篇為《中候》。

據《古微書》、《緯攬》、《七緯》等書，此為《璿璣鈴》中的文字。這是說孔子從三千多篇的古書中，選取一百二十篇作為後世之法。其中一百零二篇為《尚書》，十八篇為《中候》。

據史書記載，“百二《尚書》”乃張霸所作。《漢書·儒林傳》說：

世所傳百兩篇者，出東萊張霸，分析合二十九篇以為數十，又采《左氏傳》、《書敘》為作首尾，凡百二篇。篇或數簡，文意淺陋。成帝時求其古文者，霸以能為百兩徵，以中書校之，非是。霸辭受父，父有弟子尉氏樊並。時太中大夫平當、侍御史周敞勸上存之。後樊並謀反，乃黜其書。

這裏明確指出百二篇乃張霸根據《尚書》二十九篇、《左傳》、《書序》等而作。他把《尚書》二十九篇分成數十，然後又採取《左傳》、《書序》作為首尾，這樣就湊成百二之數。漢成帝時，求知古文《尚書》之人，張霸以“百二”應徵。成帝以所藏中祕本校之，二書完全不同。因此此事敗露。

王充對於此事也有論述。《論衡·佚文篇》說：

孝成皇帝讀百篇《尚書》，博士郎吏莫能曉知，徵天下能為《尚書》者。東海張霸通《左氏春秋》，案百篇序，以《左氏》訓詁，造作百二篇，具成奏上。成帝出祕《尚書》以考校之，無一字相應者。成帝下霸於吏，吏當器辜大不謹敬。成帝奇霸之才，赦其辜，亦不減(減)其經，故百二《尚書》傳在民間。

《正說篇》亦說：

至孝成皇帝時，徵為古文《尚書》學。東海張霸案百篇之序，空造百兩之篇，獻之成帝。帝出祕百篇以校之，皆不相應，於是下霸於吏。吏白霸罪當至死。成帝高其才而不誅，亦惜其文而不減。故百兩之篇傳在世間者，傳見之人則謂《尚書》本有百兩篇矣。

王充的記載較《儒林傳》詳細。按照《儒林傳》的看法，張霸似乎在漢成帝求徵能通古文《尚書》之前就已經造好了“百二《尚書》”。按照《論衡》的說法，張霸造“百二《尚書》”的動因是因為成帝徵求天下通古文《尚書》之人。這種說法比較合理，因為張霸編造“百二《尚書》”顯然出於利益的驅使。張霸自己通曉《左氏春秋》，因此其在根據百篇《書序》偽造“百二《尚書》”的時候，融入了《左傳》的思想。可以看出，百篇《書序》在當時已經流行，但古文《尚書》尚未流行，不然張霸不會冒險去造“百二《尚書》”。

在上一節中，我們曾說過西漢尚書學出於伏生。伏生當時在牆壁中藏

了《尚書》，但後來丟了數十篇，僅存二十九篇。後來孔安國根據今文來識讀其家所藏古文《尚書》，多出十餘篇。這些都說明《尚書》的篇數原本不只二十九篇。按照《書序》的看法，《尚書》有百篇。《書序》前人多認為是孔子所作。如班固說：“故《書》之所起遠矣，至孔子纂焉。上斷於堯，下迄於秦，凡百篇而為之序。”（《漢書·藝文志》）此是根據《史記》而來。

《孔子世家》說：“孔子之時，周室微而禮樂廢，《詩》、《書》缺。追跡三代之禮，序書傳，上紀唐虞之際，下至秦繆，編次其事。……故《書傳》、《禮記》自孔氏。”然此處“序書傳”的“序”是排列之意，並非“書序”之“序”。因此，孔子作《書序》之事尚乏證據。不過《尚書》百篇的說法在漢成帝之前就已有之。如《藝文志》在《尚書》類中錄有“《周書》七十一篇”顏師古注曰：“劉向雲，周時誥誓號令也。蓋孔子論百篇之餘也。”此七十一篇與伏生二十九篇相合，恰好百篇。據此，劉向之時已有百篇之說。這說明在張霸之前《書序》百篇的說法就已經流行了。但據孔安國所傳古文《尚書》，僅比二十九篇多出十餘篇，離百篇之數相差甚遠。不過按照《漢書·儒林傳》和《論衡》的說法，古文《尚書》與百篇《尚書》所指的是同一部書。

在西漢歷史上，對於古文《尚書》出現的記載曾有數次：一次是孔安國的家藏本，一次是魯恭王壞孔子屋所得，一次是河間獻王通過民間獻書所得。不過這幾次所得古文《尚書》皆未言百篇。史書所記，孔安國、魯恭王所得皆比今文二十九篇多出十餘篇。唯獨王充《論衡·佚文篇》所記魯恭王所得逸《尚書》為百篇，未知何據？蓋受到《書序》百篇的影響。這樣看來，祕府所藏的《尚書》百篇應該是今文二十九篇和《周書》七十一篇的合稱。如果祕府所藏不是百篇，而是今文二十九篇加上十六篇的四十五篇，則張霸一開始造偽就露出破綻了。因為篇數的差別是很明顯的。

從上面的分析來看，張霸之前只有《尚書》百篇，而未有“百二《尚書》”。因此，“百二《尚書》”出於張霸偽造是確信無疑的。

因為張霸和《尚書緯》都言“百二《尚書》”，那麼二者關係到底如何？孔穎達認為緯書的“百二《尚書》”的看法受到張霸的影響。其說：“或雲百二篇者，誤有所由。以前漢之時，有東萊張霸偽造《尚書》百兩篇，而為緯者附之。”（《尚書序疏》）皮錫瑞不同意孔氏的說法，認為張霸偽造“百兩篇”受到緯書的影響。其說：

緯書所出甚古，並非始於哀、平。張霸造百兩篇，必因緯書。本有百二篇之說，故分析篇數以當之。孔疏拘於緯始於哀、平，故反以為霸偽造百兩篇而為緯者附之，然則從古並無此說，霸何敢憑空撰造乎？《春秋說題辭》曰：“《尚書》凡百二篇，第次委曲而不紊。”是《春秋緯》與《書緯》合百二篇，除《書序》百篇之外，不知增益何篇？（《六藝論疏證》）

張西堂也說：

孔《疏》假定緯書是：“通人考正，偽起哀、平。”緯書後起，所以

說：“而為緯者附之。”但依清儒的考訂，緯說非起於哀、平，而在哀、平以前，既已有緯說，則正恐張霸之偽百兩篇，是依附緯說而來，緯說以百二篇為《尚書》，十八篇為《中候》，《中候》後來流行於世，其篇數既實在，而與百二篇配合，較有理由。張霸之偽百兩篇依附緯說，也是較有理由的。張霸之偽百兩，在當時即已發覺，造緯說者，又何必依此偽說呢？孔《疏》所雲，實臆斷不足信。³⁾

皮、張二人所說似乎有理，然仔細分析則是站不住腳的。其一，從前面分析來看，《漢書》明確指出張霸分析今文二十九篇以為數十，又采《書序》、《左傳》等書以作首尾湊成“百兩篇”。皮氏還疑百篇外，不知增益何篇？可知其未細讀《漢書》。其二，清儒考訂緯書非起哀、平，是否正確，尚需論證。因此，不能據此斷定張霸“百二”《尚書》與《尚書緯》形成之先後。其三，以十八篇與百二篇相配合合理作為理由顯然牽強。其四，張霸偽書雖然在當時就被發現了，但並未遭到禁絕，其在民間尚有流行。因此，《尚書緯》成書於張霸偽造“百兩篇”之後。既然《尚書緯》已經提到《尚書中候》，則可以推斷《尚書中候》形成於《尚書緯》之前。

此外，我們還有一條證據證明《尚書緯》出於張霸之後。《尚書中候·雜篇》說：

星孛房，四邦災。

鄭玄注曰：“按《春秋》魯昭公十七年冬，有星孛於大辰，魯大夫申須曰：諸侯其有火災乎？明年五月，鄭四國同日火。”鄭玄以《左傳》解釋《中候》，顯然符合《中候》本意。因為《公羊傳》和《穀梁傳》對此的解釋，皆未涉及四國火災。如《公羊傳》說：“冬，有星孛於大辰。孛者何？彗星也。其言於大辰何？在大辰也。大辰者何？大火也。大火為大辰，伐為大辰，北柰亦為大辰。何以書？記異也。”《穀梁傳》則說：“冬，有星孛於大辰。一有一亡曰有。於大辰者，濫於大辰也。”這種在《尚書》中融入《左傳》思想，應該受到張霸的影響。考慮張霸上書事敗，平當等人曾勸說成帝保存“百兩篇”，由此可以推斷《尚書緯》最有可能出於平當後學之手。

最後我們再來看一下《尚書緯》對於河圖、洛書的論述：

伏羲氏有天下，龍馬負圖出於河，遂法之畫八卦。又龜書，洛出之也。（《尚書中候》）

神龍負圖出河，虬犧受之，以其文畫八卦。（《尚書中候·握河紀》）

乃受舜禪，即天子之位。天乃悉禹洪範九疇，洛出龜書五十六字（按：當為六十五字），此謂洛出書也。（《尚書中候·考河命》）

3) 張西堂，《尚書引論》，西安：陝西人民出版社，1958，68—69頁[Zhang Xitang, *Shangshu Yinlun*, Xian: Shanxi People's Publishing House, 1958, pp.68-69].

以八卦為河圖、九疇為洛書的說法出於劉歆。《漢書·五行志》說：“《易》曰：‘天垂象，見吉凶，聖人象之；河出圖，洛出書，聖人則之。’劉歆以為虞氏繼天而王，受河圖則而畫之，八卦是也；禹治洪水，賜洛書法而陳之，洪範是也。”《尚書緯》的說法顯然受到劉歆的影響，因此，《尚書緯》必定形成於劉歆之後。其下限則當在光武帝在中元元年(56年)“宣布圖讖於天下”之前。

三、《尚書緯》中的尚書學思想

《尚書緯》是相對《尚書》而言的，因此，《尚書緯》中有很多解釋和闡發《尚書》思想的內容。就現有材料來看，其關於尚書學方面的內容主要有七政、六宗等思想，以及對《尚書》經文的零散解釋。

“七政”最早見於《尚書》，《堯典》說：“在璿璣玉衡以齊七政。”對此解釋歷來眾說紛紜、莫衷一是。對於“璿璣玉衡”的解釋，主要有兩種：一是認為其為北鬥七星，一是認為其為玉制的渾天儀。前者以司馬遷、班固等人為代表，如《史記·天官書》說：“北鬥七星，所謂璿璣玉衡以齊七政”；後者以馬融、鄭玄為代表，如馬融說：“璿，美玉也。璣，渾天儀，可轉旋，故曰璿璣。衡，其中橫筭。以璿為璣，以玉為衡，蓋貴天象也。”鄭玄亦說：“渾儀，其中筭為璿璣，外規為玉衡者是也。”(以上見《天官書索隱》)實際上，渾天儀等天文儀器直到漢代的落下閎時才開始出現的。⁴⁾揚雄說：“或問渾天，曰：落下閎營之，鮮於妄人度之，耿中丞象之，幾乎幾乎，莫之能違也。”(《法言·重黎》)皮錫瑞說：“古無測天儀器，故《大傳》、《史記》不以機衡為渾儀；古無測五星法，故《大傳》、《史記》不以七政為七緯。考兩漢人所引經義皆以機衡為星。”⁵⁾這樣看來，“璿璣玉衡”在《堯典》中本意應為北鬥七星。對於“七政”，歷來也有不同的解釋。據劉起鈞的統計，至少有以下四種說法：一是指四季、天文、地理和人道。如《尚書大傳》說：“七政者，謂春、秋、冬、夏、天文、地理、人道，所以為政也。”二是指北鬥七星，如《天官書》中所說。三是指天、地、二十八宿、十母、十二子。《史記·律書》贊曰：“在璿璣玉衡以齊七政，即天、地、二十八宿、十母、十二子。”按未知此說與七政如何相應。四是指日、月、五星。馬融《尚書》注雲：“七政者，北鬥七星各有所主。……日月五星各異，故名曰七政也。”由於對“璿璣玉衡”和“七政”的看法不同，對於“在璿璣玉衡以齊七政”的作用也有不同說法。劉起鈞認為今文說是就星鬥以觀天道，來察人間政事，如《天官書》說：“鬥為帝車，運於中央，臨制四鄉，分陰陽，建四時，均五行，移節度，定諸紀，皆系於鬥。”古文說則著重就星象吉凶，審思自己政事之是否，如馬融說：

4) 顧頡剛、劉起鈞，《尚書校釋譯論》，中華書局，2005，115頁[Gu Jiegang and Liu Qiyu, *Shangshu Jiaoshiyilun*, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2005, p.115].

5) 皮錫瑞，《今文尚書考證》，中華書局，1989，47頁[Pi Xirui, *Jinwen Shangshu Kaozheng*, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1989, p.47].

“日月星皆以璿璣玉衡度知其盈縮進退失政所在，聖人謙讓猶不自安，視璿璣玉衡以驗齊日月五星行度，知其政是與否，重審己之事也。”（《孔疏》引）⁶⁾既然《堯典》的“璿璣”是指北鬥七星，那麼“在璿璣玉衡以齊七政”的意思就應是根據北鬥七星的運行規律來安排一年四季的政事活動。

在《尚書緯》中，對於“璿璣玉衡以齊七政”也有兩種解釋解釋：一種認為是指北鬥七星。《尚書緯》說：

璿璣門魁四星，玉衡拘橫三星，合七，齊四時五威。五威者，五行也。五威在人為五命，七星在人為七瑞。北鬥居天之中，當昆侖之上，運轉所指，隨二十四氣，正十二辰，建十二月。又州國分野年命，莫不政之，故為七政。

這裏“璿璣玉衡”顯然指北鬥七星。這與《春秋緯》的說法相同，《春秋運鬥樞》說：“北鬥七星，所謂璿璣玉衡以齊七政”，“北鬥七星，第一天樞，第二璿，第三機，第四權，第五玉衡，第六闔陽，第七瑤光。第一至第四為魁，第五至第七為杓，合為鬥。居陰布陽，故稱北。”《文耀鉤》說：“鬥者，天之喉舌。玉衡屬杓，魁為璿璣。”可以看出，北鬥七星有著規範四時、五行和十二辰的作用。其不但主管著天下州國的治亂，而且也掌控著每個個體的命運。

另外一種解釋則認為是渾天儀。《尚書考靈曜》說：

在璿璣玉衡，以齊七政。璿璣未中而星中，是急。急則日過其度，月不及其宿；璿璣玉衡中而星未中，是舒。舒則日不及其度，月過其宿；璿璣中而星中，是周。周則風雨時，風雨時則草木蕃盛而百穀熟。

這裏的“璿璣玉衡”應是觀測天象的儀器，“七政”是指日月五星。緯書把“璿璣玉衡以齊七政”分為三種情況，即“急”、“舒”、“周”。“急”和“舒”都是不好的情況，它們或“過”或“不及”，都將有災害發生。只有“周”才是好的情況，“周”又作“調”（按：疑“周”為“調”之壞寫），“璿璣中而星中，為調，調則風雨時，庶草蕃蕪，而五穀登，萬事康也。”（同上）這是說“璿璣”和“星”的運行很協調，所以會出現風調雨順的結果。

可見，在《尚書緯》中，“七政”是指日、月、五星。《考靈曜》說：“七政曰：日月者，時之主也，五星者，時之紀也。”《尚書緯》認為，日月五星的變化對於人間的政治有著重大的影響。《考靈曜》說：“歲星得度，五穀孳。熒惑順行，甘雨時。鎮星得度，地無災。太白出入當，五穀成熟，人民昌。”五星順行，則風調雨順，五穀豐登。否則，則會出現災異。反之，人間政治的好壞也會影響日月五星的變化。《考靈曜》說：

歲星為規，熒惑為矩，鎮星為繩，太白為衡，辰星為權。權、衡、規、矩、繩，並皆有所起，周而復始，故政失於春，歲星滿偃，不居其常。政失於夏，熒惑逆行。政失於季夏，鎮星失度。政失於秋，太白失行，出入不當。政失

6) 顧頡剛、劉起鈞：《尚書校釋譯論》，118—119頁[Gu Jiegang and Liu Qiyu, *Shangshu Jiaoshiyulun*, p.118-119].

於冬,辰星不效其鄉。五政俱失,五星不明。春政不失,五穀孳。夏政不失,甘雨時。季夏政不失,時無災。秋政不失,人民昌。冬政不失,少疾喪。五政不失,日月光明。此則日月五星共為七政之道,亦名七曜,以其是光曜運行也。

五星分別與春、夏、秋、冬及季夏五政相對,具體來說,歲星與春政相對,熒惑與夏政相對,鎮星與季夏政相對,太白與秋政相對,辰星與冬政相對。在緯書看來,帝王一年四季安排政事都有相應的要求,“春發令於外,行仁政,從天常,其時衣青。夏可以毀清銷銅,使備火,敬天之明,其時衣赤。中央土,舉有道之人,與之慮國,可以殺罪,不可起土功,犯地之常,其時衣黃。秋無毀金銅,犯陰之剛,用其時持兵,宜殺猛獸,其時衣白。冬無使物不藏,毋害水道,與氣相保,其時衣黑。”(同上)如果不按照季節的要求行使政令,則會引起五星失行,出現災異。反之,則日月五星合度,天下太平。

從上面的分析來看,對於“璿璣玉衡以齊七政”的解釋雖然有不同看法,但其目的實際上都是相同的。即通過觀察天象的變化來安排人間的各種活動,從而達到治理國家的目的。

“六宗”之說出於《堯典》的“禋於六宗”。對於“六宗”歷來也有很多解釋。據劉起鈞統計,至少有二十多種看法。現擇其要者,略述如下:1、天、地、四時(伏生、馬融、高誘等);2、乾坤六子(劉歆、王莽等);3、天宗:日、月、星辰(或為北辰);地宗:岱、河、海(賈逵、馬融等);4、太一與五帝六神(劉向等);5、星、辰、司中、司命、風師、雨師(鄭玄、範寧等);6、四時、寒暑、日、月、星、水旱(王肅、朱熹等);7、四方、上、下的“方明”之祀(姚鼐、汪中等);8、三昭三穆(張髦、王安石等);9、五行及社稷之神(陳世鐸);10、六代帝王:黃帝、少昊、顓頊、帝嚳、伏羲、神農(王庭植)。可以看出,由於對於“六宗”理解和利用目的的不同,從而產生不同的看法。劉起鈞說:“古代把祭祀看成頭等大事,只有戰爭同樣重要,但還列在它的後面。所以無怪乎歷代統治者都極端重視而經師們都要絞盡腦汁為尋解釋了。而且對六宗的解釋,古代往往成為政爭的工具,或者為經師們爭學術地位的資本,就是由於它與古代政治密切相關之故。”⁷⁾這樣看來,“六宗”的本義如何似乎已經顯得不重要了。

我們現在來看一下《尚書緯》對於“六宗”的解釋:

六宗,天地神之尊者。天宗三,地宗三。天宗:日、月、北辰;地宗:河、岱、海。日、月為陰陽宗,北辰為星宗,河為水宗,海為澤宗,岱為山宗。祀天則天文從祀,祀地則地理從祀。

這裏的六宗分為天宗和地宗,天宗包括日、月、北辰,地宗包括河、岱、海。而且六宗各有自己的名字,如日、月為陰陽宗、北辰為星宗、河為

7) 顧頡剛、劉起鈞,《尚書校釋譯論》,124頁[Gu Jiegang and Liu Qiyu, *Shangshu Jiaoshiyilun*, p.124].

水宗、海為澤宗、泰山為山宗等。在祭祀的時候,天宗要從屬於天,地宗要從屬於地。不難看出,這種解釋與上面的第三種看法相同,賈逵、馬融的說法可能受到緯書的影響。

我們在前面曾指出,《尚書緯》形成於劉歆之後,大概與王莽同時。從上面可以看出,王莽認為“六宗”指乾坤六子。《漢書·郊祀志》說:

《書》曰“類於上帝,禋於六宗”。歐陽、大小夏侯三家說六宗,皆曰上不及天,下不及墜,旁不及四方,在六者之間,助陰陽變化,實一而名六,名實不相應。《禮記》祀典,功施於民則祀之。天文,日、月、星、辰所昭仰也;地理,山、川、海、澤所生殖也。《易》有八卦,乾坤六子,水火不相逮,雷風不相諍,山澤通氣,然後能變化,既成萬物也。……又日、月、雷、風、山、澤,《易》卦六子之尊氣,所謂六宗也。星、辰、水、火、溝、瀆,皆六宗之屬也。

在歐陽、大小夏侯那裏,六宗實際上指一個東西。王莽認為,根據今文三家的說法,六宗不應包括天、地、四方。又因為日、月、山、川等對人民生活皆有功勞,因此這些都應是祭祀的物件。在八卦中,乾坤代表天地,因此,它們不在六宗之內。但乾坤六子對於萬物生長皆有作用,因此,它們也應為祭祀的物件。日、月、雷、風、山、澤是六子的基本卦象,因此,他把這些稱為“六宗”,其餘星、辰、水、火、溝、瀆則為六宗的從屬。可見,在當時尚無天宗、地宗的說法。因此,《尚書緯》的說法應該是在此基礎上形成的。上面已有天文、地理的看法,《尚書緯》作者把星、辰合二為一,與日、月構成天宗。大概因為泰山為五嶽之尊,因此,其以此代表山、川。然後又以河代替澤。這樣河、岱、海就代替山、川、海、澤成為地宗了。

我們現在來看一下《尚書緯》對《尚書》篇題的解釋。《尚書璿璣鈴》說:

《尚書》,篇題號。尚者,上也。上天垂文象,布節度。書者,如天行也。

書者,如也。書務以天言之,因而謂之書,加“尚”以尊之。

這認為“尚”指上天,“書”則是對上天文象的摹寫。“尚書”的意思就是模仿上天之文而成的書。對於《尚書》篇名,歷來有很多解釋。如馬融說:“上古有虞氏之書,故曰《尚書》。”王肅說:“上所言,史所書,故曰《尚書》。”鄭玄說:“尚者,上也,尊而重之,若天書然,故曰《尚書》。”(以上見孔穎達《尚書序疏》)王充說:“《尚書》者,以為古帝王之書。”(《論衡·正說篇》)又說:“或說《尚書》曰:‘尚者,上也。上所為,下所書。’”(《須頌篇》)劉熙《釋名》說:“《尚書》,尚,上也。以堯為上始而書其事也。”孔安國《尚書序》說:“濟南伏生,年過九十,失其本經,口以傳授。裁二十餘篇。以其上古之書,謂之《尚書》。”可以看出,上面的解釋大致可以分為三種:一種把“尚”解釋為上古。“尚書”的意思就是上古之書,如孔安國、馬融、劉熙、王充等;一種把“尚”解釋為帝王。“尚書”的意思就是記載帝王

之言的史書,如王肅、《須頌》等。另外一種就是鄭玄的解釋,其也認為“尚”指上天,這顯然受到《尚書緯》的影響。這三種解釋以第一種最為恰當。“書”的本義就是寫的意思,如《說文·自序》說:“著於竹帛謂之書,書者,如也。”《釋名·釋書契》說:“書,庶也,紀庶物也,亦言著也。”後來史官把帝王的言語行為記錄下來,編在一起,也稱為“書”。這時書就由動詞變成名詞了。“尚”字應是後來才加上去的。

在《春秋緯》中,我們還能看到對《尚書》篇題的另外一種解釋。《說題辭》說:

《尚書》者,二帝之跡,三王之義,所推期運,明受命之際。

《尚書》者,二帝之跡,三王之義,明天下情,帝王之功。尚,上也,上帝之書。

《書》之言信,而明天地之情,帝王之功,凡百二篇,第次委曲。尚者,上也,上帝之書。

這裏一方面認為《尚書》是古代帝王的史書,記載著“二帝之跡,三王之義”。二帝指堯、舜,三王指夏、商、周。另一方面則認為《尚書》是“明受命之際”的書。這種解釋顯然與《尚書緯》有關,如《帝命驗》、《運期授》以及《尚書中候》都記載了帝王受命的內容。這裏還提到“百二篇”,說明《尚書緯》此時已經形成。《說題辭》最後把《尚書》解釋成“上帝之書”。然據《初學記》所引,此語作“上世帝王之遺書”。這兩種解釋完全不同,那麼二者哪個正確呢?從緯書內容來看,“上世帝王之遺書”的說法更為合適。《尚書璿璣鈴》說:“帝者天號,王者人稱。天有五帝以立名,人有三王以正度。”《春秋說題辭》說:“合天者稱帝,河洛受瑞,可放仁義。合□者稱王,符瑞應,天下歸往。”帝、王雖有天號、人稱之別,但二者都是指人間的帝王,而非天上的上帝。因此,這裏不應解釋為“上帝之書”。而且從《說題辭》本身來看,“尚”也不應指“上帝之書”。其前面說到“二帝之跡,三王之義”、“帝王之功”,又說到“受命之際”,這些都是相對人間帝王而言的。《孝經援神契》也說:“書考命行授河。”宋均注曰:“授河者,授河洛以考命行也。”這與《說題辭》的說法相同。既然帝為天號,那麼也可以說“書者如天行”了。

除了上面所說之外,《尚書緯》中還有一些對《尚書》經文零散解釋的內容。如《尚書緯》說:“若稽古帝堯。稽,同也;古,天也。”這是對《堯典》“曰若稽古帝堯”的解釋。《考靈曜》說:“放勳,欽命文思晏晏。”此亦抄於《堯典》,“晏晏”古文作“安安”,這說明《尚書緯》同於今文說。《考靈曜》說:“七戎、六蠻、九夷、八狄,行類不同,而總謂之四海,言皆近海。海之言晦,昏無所見也。”這是對《皋陶謨》“外薄四海,鹹建五長”中“四海”的解釋。《考靈曜》說:“春、夏民欲早作,故令民先日出而作,是謂‘寅賓出日’。秋、冬民欲早息,故令民候日入而息,是謂‘寅饒納日’。春迎其來,秋送其去,無不順矣。”這是對《堯典》“寅賓出日”、“寅饒納日”的解釋。《尚

《尚書緯》說：“時雨、時暘、時燠、時寒、時風，此休徵也。人主五事修明，則雜星之吉者出而應之；恒雨、恒暘、（恒燠）、恒寒、恒風，此咎徵也。人主五事失道，則雜星之凶者出而應之。”這是對《洪範》“休徵”、“咎徵”思想的進一步解釋和發揮。從現存材料來看，《尚書緯》對《尚書》的解釋基本上符合經文的思想，其並沒有借此而作過多的引申和發揮。

四、《尚書中候》研究

我們在前面曾說過，在《尚書緯》外，與《尚書》有關的還有一部稱作《尚書中候》的書。《隋書·經籍志》認為，《尚書中候》與《洛罪級》、《五行傳》、《詩推度災》、《汜曆樞》、《含神務》、《孝經勾命訣》、《援神契》、《雜識》等一樣，皆在七經緯之外。這種看法顯然是有問題的，因為這樣《詩緯》、《孝經緯》等皆被排除在七緯之外。從篇名上看，《尚書中候》顯然與《尚書》有關。那麼它究竟是緯書中的一種，還是另外一種解釋《尚書》的書。從內容上看，《尚書中候》應該是緯書中的一種，因為其有很多與《尚書緯》相似甚至重複的內容。如《尚書中候·雜篇》說：“初堯在位七十載矣，見丹朱之不肖，不足以嗣天下，乃求賢以異於位，至夢長人見而論治。舜之潛德，堯實知之，於是疇咨於眾，詢四嶽，明明揚側陋，得諸服澤之陽。”《尚書緯》說：“初堯在位七十載矣，見丹朱之不肖，不足以嗣天下，乃求賢以異於位，至夢長人見而論治。”《尚書緯》與《中候》的前半部分完全相同。《尚書緯》的後半部分可能佚失。此語亦見於《尚書帝命驗》，不過僅存“堯夢長人見而論治”。通過比較，我們知道二者內容完全相同。又如《尚書中候·我應》說：“季秋之月甲子，赤雀銜丹書，入豐，止於昌戶。再拜稽首受，最曰：姬昌蒼帝子。”《尚書帝命驗》說：“季秋之月甲子，有赤雀銜丹書入豐，止昌戶，拜稽首，至於磻西谿之水。呂尚釣涯，王下趣拜曰：公望七年，乃今見光景於斯。答曰：望釣得玉璜，刻曰：‘姬受命，呂佐旌。’遂置車左，王躬執軀，號曰師尚父。”二者雖然敘述詳略不同，但意思並無大異。可以看出，《尚書中候》與《尚書緯》性質相同，從廣義上講，二者都應歸入解釋《尚書》的緯書。

既然《尚書緯》與《尚書中候》都是解釋《尚書》的緯書，那麼二者何以不像其它緯書一樣直接稱作《尚書緯》？其何以又單單列出一部《尚書中候》出來？《尚書緯》說：

孔子求書，得黃帝玄孫帝魁之書，迄於秦穆公，凡三千二百四十篇。斷遠取近，定可以為世法者百二十篇，以百二篇為《尚書》，十八篇為《中候》。

據《古微書》、《緯攬》、《七緯》等書，此為《璿璣鈴》中的文字。

按照這種說法,《中候》和《尚書》一樣,都是孔子從古代帝王書中選出來的為後世立法的書。

從上面論述來看,《中候》與《尚書》似乎沒有什麼區別。那麼“中候”在這裏是什麼意思呢?陳槃認為,“候”可兼有“緯”或“圖讖”之稱,不必專指《中候》。在讖緯中,言望候之術者很多,皆可以稱“候”。⁸⁾據此,“候”為類名,不是特稱,因此,與“讖”、“緯”等名稱異名同實。陳槃以應劭所說為據。

《續漢書·百官志》注曰:

應劭曰:自上安下曰尉,武官悉以為稱。《前書》曰秦官,鄭玄注《月令》,亦曰秦官。《尚書中候》雲:舜為太尉。束皙據非秦官,以此追難玄焉。臣劭曰:緯候眾書,宗貴神詭。圖讖紛偽,其俗多矣。

從前後文可知,應劭所說“緯候”即指《尚書中候》。因此,陳槃以此推斷“候”與“讖”、“緯”等互文,並不確切。查《漢書·藝文志》、《隋書·經籍志》等書,以“候”為名的書還有很多,如《藝文志》雜占中的《泰壹雜子候歲》、《子贛雜子候歲》,《經籍志》中的《五行候氣占災》、《候雲氣》、《風角要候》、《周易飛候》等書。這些書多與占候、天文、五行等術數類的書放在一起,可見它們性質相同。從名稱上看,“候”與“占”、“望”等詞相近,有觀察、推算等意。《藝文志》說:“雜占者,紀百事之象,候善惡之徵。《易》曰:占事知來。”但《尚書中候》在《經籍志》中並非在這些術數類書中,而是與《尚書緯》、《易緯》等書列在一起。從《藝文志》、《經籍志》等記載的以“候”為名的書來看,其大多與“雲氣”、“五行”、“風角”、“日食”等連在一起,而這些都是可以通過觀察或推算來進行預測的。與經書相連的只有《周易》,而《周易》本就是筮之書,其與“候”放在一起,不足為異。但《尚書》並非筮之書,如何能作為占候的依據。可見,《尚書中候》與術數之書並不相同,而應是緯書中的一種。

除上面的說法外,對“中候”還有一種解釋,即認為其指官名。《漢書·張蒼傳》說:“蒼任人為中候”張晏注曰:“所選舉保任也。按中候,官名。”《續漢書·百官志四》說:“右屬執金吾。本注曰:本有式道、左右中候三人,六百石。”又說:“北軍中候一人,六百石。本注曰:掌監五營。”據此,有人推斷“尚書”與“中候”相對,亦是官名。章太炎說:“哀、平以後,緯書漸出,有所謂《中候》者。‘中候’,官名。以中候對尚書,則以尚書為官名矣。”⁹⁾“中候”雖然是官職名稱,但在《尚書中候》中絕非此意。如果“尚書”、“中候”皆指官名,則二者連在一起如何解釋?此與《尚書》又有何種關係?可

8) 陳槃:《讖緯命名及其相關之諸問題》,《中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊》1948年第21本[Chen Pan, *Naming of Chenwei and Its Related Problems, Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology (BIHP)*, Volume 21, 1948].

9) 章炳麟,《國學講演錄》,南京:江蘇文藝出版社,2007,56頁[Zhang Binglin, *Lectures on Traditional Sinology*, Nanjing: Jiangsu Literature and Art Publishing House, 2007, p.56].

見把“尚書”、“中候”解釋成官名是望文生義。

從上面的分析來看,《尚書中候》既非術數之書,又非官職名稱。那麼“中候”的含義具體應該作何解釋,還需要我們進一步探討。從上面所引《尚書緯》的文字來看,其與《尚書》都是孔子從三千二百四十篇的古帝王書中刪減出來的。其為什麼刪減一百二十篇呢?可能與“百二十寶書”的說法有關。《春秋說題辭》說:

昔孔子受端門之命,制《春秋》之義,使子夏等十四人求周史記,得百二十寶書,九月經立。

這裏說的雖然是孔子根據“百二十國寶書”製作《春秋》。但子夏所求的“周史記”,應該包括周以前的書,如黃帝玄孫帝魁之書。《尚書緯》“百二十篇”的說法可能受到“百二十國寶書”的影響。其又受到“百二《尚書》”的影響,因此,把“百二十篇”分成兩部分,一部分為《尚書》,一部分為《中候》。至於二者區分的標準,則不得而知了。這樣看來,“中候”與“尚書”一樣,都是一種書名。至於其含義如何,由於文獻無徵,就不必強解了。

按照上面的說法,《尚書中候》有十八篇。安居香山等所輯《緯書集成》列有二十一篇,除《尚書中候》泛稱外,尚有二十篇。其具體篇目為:《握河紀》、《我應》、《考河命》、《離予命》、《離師謀》、《摘離戒》、《義明》、《勅省圖》、《稷起》、《準纖哲》、《合符後》、《運衡》、《契握》、《苗興》、《赤雀命》、《日角》、《霸免》、《覬期》、《亶甫》、《離篇》。孔廣森在《尚書中候鄭注序錄》中去掉《赤雀命》、《日角》、《亶甫》、《離篇》四篇,添加《題期》、《立象》二篇,認為這是《尚書中候》的“十八篇”。皮錫瑞的《尚書中候疏證》亦以此為準。按《尚書中候》原來的十八篇具體為何,由於現存材料太少,我們無從斷定。不過《題期》、《立象》見於《尚書緯》,《帝命驗》說:“順堯考德,題期立象。”宋均注曰:“舜受禪後,習堯禮得之,演以為《考河命》,題五德之期,立將起之象,凡三篇,在《中候》也。”宋均之時,《中候》尚存,因此,可以證明《題期》、《立象》是《中候》本有的篇目。安居香山認為,以《赤雀命》、《日角》、《亶甫》等作為《中候》篇名缺乏根據。¹⁰⁾而《離篇》與其它篇名不類,斷非原名。這樣看來,孔廣森所說的十八篇還是可信的。

從內容來看,《尚書中候》是一部符命之書,其主要以五行相生說為基礎,模仿《尚書》的《堯典》、《舜典》等篇,論述了堯、舜、禹、湯、文、武等各王朝帝王或其祖先的性格、行為及祥瑞,由此確立這些帝王興起的正統性,從而證明漢王朝出現的必然性和正當性。¹¹⁾《握河紀》說:

10) 安居香山、中村璋八,《緯書集成》,石家莊:河北人民出版社,1994,37頁[Anju Xiangshan and Zhongcun Zhangba, *Complete Works of Weishu*, Shijiazhuang: Hebei People's Publishing House, 1994, p.37].

11) 安居香山、中村璋八,《緯書集成》,41頁[Anju Xiangshan and Zhongcun Zhangba, *Complete Works of Weishu*, p.41].

堯即政十七年,仲月甲日,至於稷,沈璧於河。青雲起,回風搖落,龍馬銜甲,赤文綠色,自河而出,臨壇而止,吐甲迴遶。甲似龜,廣九尺,有文言虞、夏、商、周、秦、漢之事。帝乃寫其文,藏之東序。

《春秋命曆序》說:“河圖,帝王之階,圖載江河山川州界之分野。後堯壇於河,受龍圖,作《握河紀》。逮虞舜、夏、商,鹹亦受焉。”這裏雖然僅僅提到《握河紀》,但這卻說出了《尚書中候》的總體內容。從此我們還可以推斷,《命曆序》形成於《尚書中候》之後。“藏之東序”出於《尚書·顧命》,其說:“大玉、夷玉、天球、河圖在東序”。《顧命》中的河圖與大玉等放在一起,可能也是玉石一類的東西。但緯書作者卻借此把它演繹為受命之書,這或許是《中候》與《尚書》結合的原因。

根據上面所說,我們可以推斷《中候》十八篇的篇次應以時代為序。孔廣森說:

以《宋書·符瑞志》參校,略為比次其文。蓋《宋志》所說堯、舜、禹、湯、文、武符命,皆取諸《中候》也。其篇次則以時代序焉。《敕省圖》總敘帝皇,其最先者,故以為首。承帝之德,應王之運者,堯、舜、禹也。……然則未禪作《握河紀》,既禪作《運衡》,故先《握河紀》,而次《運衡》。《帝命驗》雲:“《考德》、《題期》、《立象》。”……凡三篇是舜事也,故繼之。紹帝者王,故繼之以《義明》。……三王之祖,並立堯庭,並有異徵,故繼之以《苗興》。……繼禹者湯,湯之先契,故繼之以《契握》,而《洛予命》次之。商廢周興,肇基後稷,故繼之以《稷起》。受命者文,助化者尚,故繼之以《我應》、《洛師謀》。本文業者武,故繼之以《合符後》。成文、武之德者周公,故繼之以《摘雒戒》。……五霸興焉,故繼之以《霸免》。五霸桓公為盛,故繼之以《準纖哲》。繼周而王者秦,故終之以《覬期》。(《尚書中候鄭注序錄》)

孔氏所說是有道理的,這可能即是《中候》本來的篇次。

《尚書中候》歷來受到學者重視。東漢經學大師鄭玄曾為其作注。清代學者皮錫瑞則對其作了詳細的疏證。他認為《中候》與《尚書》同出一源,因此其對《中候》評價頗高。“《中候》之文,與《書》同出。……例以《春秋》,宜存外傳。超諸緯而獨出,紀實為多;擬《逸周》之刪餘,徵文尤信。”(《尚書中候疏證自序》)皮氏所說顯然誇大了《中候》的作用。《中候》與《尚書》同出於“百二十篇”乃緯書作者杜撰,並不足信。而且從內容來看,《中候》並非“紀實為多”、“徵文尤信”,其虛構編造之處較諸緯有過之而無不及。

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A New Research on *Shangshuwei*

REN Milin

Abstract

The focus of this article lies on the formation of *Shangshuwei*, as evidenced by the learning tradition of *Shangshu* during Western Han dynasty. There are three systems of learning *Shangshu* during Western Han dynasty; namely, Ou Yang's learning of *Shangshu*, Da Xia Hou and Xiao Xia Hou's learning of *Shangshu*. As for the contents that deal with natural calamities in *Shangshu Wei*, I have deduced that it was probably written by Ou Yang Sheng, Xia Hou Sheng or Li Xun. I have also derived from other evidences that *Shangshu Wei* was written about between Liu Xin and 56 by *Baier-Shangshu*. Based on such findings, we may be able to discuss further on the thought and meaning of *Shangshu* in *Shangshuwei* and *Shangshu Zhonghou*.

Keywords: *Shangshuwei*, *Baier-Shangshu*, Learning of *Shangshu*, *Shangshu Zhonghou*

十七世紀來華耶穌會士對儒學概念的譯介 ——以“性”的翻譯為例


羅 瑩

中文摘要：明末清初來華耶穌會士因應傳教活動的需要，入華甫爾便投入大量時間精力學習漢文、閱讀中文典籍並西譯儒家經典將之刊行於歐洲，其中影響至深者莫若《中國哲學家孔子》(*Confucius Sinarum Philosophus*, 1687 Paris)一書。該書不僅囊括了《大學》、《中庸》、《論語》三書的拉丁文全譯本，書中序言(*Proëmialis Declaratio*)更是首次系統地向歐洲人介紹了中國文化“儒”“釋”“道”三統，將《易經》的六十四卦之卦名及卦象逐一翻譯描繪並為孔子立像作傳。此外，書中所附《中華君主統治歷史年表》(*Tabula Chronologica Monarchiae Sinicae*)、《中華帝國及其大事紀》(*Imperii Sinarum et Rerum In Eo Notabilium Synopsis*)並附柏應理所繪製的中國地圖，在將古老的中國歷史帶入歐洲的同時，由於中國編年與《聖經》紀年之間的顯著差異，直接誘發了歐洲啟蒙思想家對於《聖經》乃至教會絕對權威的質疑和反思，為歐洲的“啟蒙運動”帶去東方的思想火種。由此可見，明清之際來華耶穌會士堪稱“儒學西傳”最早的踐行者。本文嘗試借助概念史的方法，以《中國哲學家孔子》書中“性”這一儒學概念的西譯為例，對十七世紀來華耶穌會士所進行的“四書”西譯活動進行個案分析，總結譯介過程中滲透進去的東西方文化因素以及譯者在譯介過程中對儒學概念“名”與“實”的重新設定，切實體認當時來華耶穌會士對中國文化的理解和接受程度，繼而勾勒出耶穌會來華傳教士因應自身需要過濾、投射到西方受眾接受視域中的儒家思想。

關鍵詞：《中庸》、概念翻譯、耶穌會士

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利瑪竇(Matteo Ricci, 1552-1610)在將“孔子”一詞譯介到西方時，便把該詞拉丁化為Confutius。1696年殷鐸澤神父(Prospero Intorcetta, 1625-1696)又把Confutius改寫成Confucius。此後英文和法文都採用此名，義大利文用Confucio，德文用Konfuzius等等。¹⁾於是儒家思想以此為序曲、經過多代耶穌會士的努力正式傳入西方，其中儒家的許多重要核心概念也是在此過程中逐漸為西方人所“瞭解”以及“誤解”。下文擬將《中國哲學家孔子》(Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, 1687 Paris)一書第二冊的《中庸》拉丁語譯本為藍本，通過勾勒17世紀來華耶穌會士對“性”這一基本概念的翻譯，再現經由他們過濾並傳遞給當時歐洲知識界的儒學之“性”。



《中國哲學家孔子》一書扉頁

一、《中國哲學家孔子》一書簡介

1687年比利時來華耶穌會士柏應理(Philippe Couplet, 1623-1693)在法王路易十四的資助下，於巴黎出版了《中國哲學家孔子》²⁾一書。該書封面上標示了共同參與該書翻譯的四位耶穌會譯者姓名：殷鐸澤、恩理格(Christian

- 1) 吳文璋《論儒家與儒教——從儒家是否為宗教談起》一文，
<http://www.confucius2000.com/confucian/rujiao/lrjyrcrjsfwzjtq.htm>, 2007/03/13。
- 2) 此處筆者是以羅馬國家圖書館所藏印刷本為例(Collocazione: 13. 11.F.27)，該書使用米黃色軟皮革作封皮，書脊上有墨水書寫的標題Confucius Sinarum Philosophus(已褪色)，卷邊裝訂，紅色的噴色書邊；此對開本使用那個時代的上等牛皮紙印刷而成，書頁大小為341毫米 x 225 毫米，全書頁碼編排為：CXXIV, 108, 21, [3], 159, [1]; XX, 108 [即110], [10]。書中還附有孔子的銅板畫像一幅以及折疊起來的銅板印刷的中國地圖一張。此外筆者經比較發現，雖同為1687年在巴黎印刷出版的《中國哲學家孔子》，奧地利國家圖書館的藏本(BE.4.G.7)與羅馬的藏本內容一致，但內容上各部分的排列順序卻略有不同，而且奧地利的藏本為紅色軟皮封面並有卷邊裝訂，金色噴色書邊，在裝訂上更為精美。奧地利本中還出現多種類型的頁碼形式並存、部分頁碼排序重疊以及前後頁碼不相銜接的現象，筆者據此推測：書中各部分內容應該是各自獨立排版印刷，之後才又將各部分拼合成書出版的。另外，通過比較歐洲五家圖書館所藏《中國哲學家孔子》的版本，以及與比利時漢學家高華士的通信討論，筆者也發現在十七世紀的歐洲存在著這樣不成文的慣例：當時的“書籍”是以散頁的方式(即處於無裝訂的狀態)出售給買家，售出之後買家可以自己選擇封皮的樣式並按照自己喜好的順序安排書中各部分內容的順序，然後才進行裝訂。這也是現在歐洲多家圖書館所藏的《中國哲學家孔子》書中各部分內容在順序安排上各有不同的原因。

Wolfgang Henriques Herdtrich, 1625-1684)、魯日滿(François de Rougemont, 1624-1676)和柏應理。該書的主要內容有：柏應理所寫的《致偉大虔誠的基督教君主路易十四函》(*Ludvico Magno Regi Christianissimo Epistola*)、殷鐸澤與柏應理合著的《初序》(*Proëmialis Declaratio*)、殷鐸澤所作《孔子傳》(*Confucii Vita*)並附孔子像、《大學》(*Liber Primus*)《中庸》(*Liber Secundus*)《論語》(*Liber Tertius*)“三書”的拉丁文全譯本、柏應理所作的《中華君主統治歷史年表》(*Tabula Chronologica Monarchiae Sinicae*)和《中華帝國及其大事紀》(*Imperii Sinarum et Rerum In Eo Notabilium Synopsis*)，並附柏應理繪製的中國地圖。

《中國哲學家孔子》出版的第二年，該書的英、法節譯本便紛紛出現，此外還湧現出關於該書的眾多書評，分別刊登於《哲學會刊》(*Philosophical Transactions*, 1687年第189期)、《學者雜誌》(*Le Journal des Sçavans*, 1687年)、《世界和歷史文庫》(*Bibliothèque universelle et historique*, 1688年第七期)、萊比錫的《博學通報》(*Acta Eruditorum*, 1688年5月)、《文壇新志》(*Nouvelles de la république des lettres*, 1687年8月)、《月談》(*Monatsgespräche*, 1689年8月)等多本學術刊物上。伏爾泰(Voltaire, 原名François-Marie Arouet, 1694-1778)、萊布尼茨(Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 1646-1716)、孟德斯鳩(Charles Secondat de Montesquieu, 1689-1755)、威廉·鐘斯(William Jones, 1746-1794)、培爾(Pierre Bayle, 1647-1706)等歐洲啟蒙思想家都借由該書得以親炙孔子的思想，繼而將之吸納入自己思想批判體系，或褒或貶地將其轉化為自身啟蒙思想中的東方參照物。

二、“性”的西譯：以《中國哲學家孔子》中的翻譯為鑒

據筆者判斷：《中國哲學家孔子》第二冊的《中庸》譯文應是出自殷鐸澤筆下。該書第二冊並無譯者署名，筆者作此推斷的依據有二：一是從手稿字跡判斷。現藏於巴黎國家圖書館的《中國哲學家孔子》原始手稿分上下兩部³⁾，第一部(其中包括了《中庸》一書的原始譯文手稿)字跡通過與藏於羅馬耶穌會檔案館殷鐸澤的親筆信比照，不管是在字母書寫形態還是縮寫習慣上都保持高度一致，基本可以確定是殷鐸澤本人的字跡；二是從譯文內容的一致性進行判斷。通過與殷鐸澤1667、1669年所出版的《中國政治道德學說》(*Sinarum Scientia Politico-Moralis*, 1667/1669 Quamcheu / Goa)一書進行比照——該書是殷鐸澤在廣州及果阿翻譯出版的早期《中庸》拉丁文譯本，以直譯為主——殷鐸澤的早期譯文在《中國哲學家孔子》一書中得到充分保留，尤其是從譯詞的選擇以及句式安排上都與他之前的譯文保持一致。而在直譯的基礎上，殷鐸澤又增添了许多個人的補充以及

3) 現藏於法國巴黎國家圖書館西文手稿部，藏書號：Ms. Lat., 6277/1 et 2.

八篇關於中國文化的專題小論文⁴⁾(在手稿中, 凡是由個人所增添的議論部分他都用括弧標出; 凡是個人所作的專題小論文部分也都會在頁邊作注明確標明, 並在正文中另起標題行文並獨立成篇, 以此與《中庸》一書的直譯部分相區分)。正式出版之前, 柏應理對殷鐸澤的譯文又進行了大量的刪減和修改——因此該書手稿的上部有兩種不同的字跡。其中殷鐸澤對於原文的直譯部分得到充分保留, 被刪減的多是殷鐸澤個人的注釋和專題論文。

書中有關“性”一詞的翻譯情況如下:

《中庸》: 天命之謂性, 率性之謂道, 修道之謂教。

CSP: *Id quod à caelo est homini inditum dicitur natura rationalis: quod huic conformatur natura & eam consequitur, dicitur regula, seu consentaneum rationi, restaurare quoad exercitium hanc regulam se suaque per eam moderando, dicitur institution, seu disciplina virtutum.*

譯文: 這一來自上天、人身上所具有的事物, 被稱為理性的本性; 受到這一本性的塑造並追隨它, 被稱為準則, 或者說是符合這一理性; 修正直至自身行為能遵循這一準則, 這被稱為教育或者說是德行的修煉。

《中庸》: 自誠明謂之性。

CSP: *Concludit çù sù verba & doctrinam avi sui dicens: Se ipso, id est, sine operosa contentione vel conatu, verè solidéque perfectum esse, simulque rerum omnium intelligentem; dicitur natura, seu connaturalis virtus à coelo infusa.*

譯文: 子思總結他祖父的話語和教導, 說道: 自己無需通過費力追尋或努力嘗試, 便能真實、穩固地成為完善(的人), 認識所有的事物, 這被稱為本性, 或者說是, 上天賦予的天生的美德。

《中庸》: 唯天下至誠, 為能盡其性。

CSP: *Itaque ait çù-su, quamvis quae à Coelo homini indita est natura, rationalis quidem sit spectata radice sua, & solidum quid, verum, & sine fictione, tamen quia per vitiosos affectionam suarum motus homo jam deflexit ab illa nativae puritatis innocentia ac veritate, non clarè eam cognoscit, nec in operando assequi potest, quantum naturae conditio &*

4) 殷鐸澤所寫的這八篇專題論文(Digressio)分別涉及: 1.中國對鬼神的理解及祭祀(*An Sinae cognoverint et coluerint spiritus*)、2.關於“上帝”之名, 古代人是否將“上天”理解為物質性的; 關於最高的天帝(*An nomine 上xám帝tí Prisci intellexerint coelum hoc material, an potius supremum coeli Imperatorem*)、3.古代中國人已知道最高神的存在並用“天”來稱謂它(*Tum ratione, tum Veterum autoritate plurimisque testimoniis probatur, Priscos Sinas non fuisse ignaros Supremi Numinis: creberrime item voce Coelum ad Numen hoc significandum fuisse usos*)、4.中國人的命運觀、占筮及預測(*De Sinensium sortibus, auguriis, atque prognosticis*)、5.中國的文字(*De Sinarum literis*)、6.中國人的音樂(*De sinensium Musica*)、7.古代中國人關於精神不滅的看法(*Quid senserint prisci Sinae de Animorum immortalitate*)、8.中文書籍中提到的: 誠實的人在其死後將會發生的以及墮落的人在其死後會受到的懲罰(*An in Sinarum libris mentio quoque fiat Prooemii, Poenaeve, quae post hanc vitam proborum, vel improborum meritis respondeant*)。

status exigit; ideò solùm is qui in universo hoc summè perfectus & sanctus est potest in cognoscendo penitus exhaustire suam ipsius naturam:

譯文：因此子思說：上天所賦予人的任何品質都是本性。事實上，理性被視為它[指人的本性]的根本，它是穩固的、真實的，而非虛假的。因為邪惡情緒[的影響]，人們的行為與天生的那種天真無邪和真實的純潔之間出現偏差，沒有清楚地認識到它，也不能在行動中去遵循它，無法按照原初的條件和狀態[所要求的]去行事。所以，在宇宙中只有最完美和神聖的人，他能在深入的認識之中充分發揮自己的本性。

由此可見，殷鐸澤在翻譯“性”時，統一使用了“natura”以及“natura rationalis”這樣的翻譯。在拉丁語中，natura的意思有自然、本性、性質、事物的決定性特徵等。⁵⁾ 應該說殷鐸澤正確理解了《中庸》中“性”的部分意義，但其所選譯詞與原詞在概念內涵上無法相互對應的部分卻更多。這種在概念翻譯中，對其內涵進行貌似可信實則“不忠實”的人為重新設定，恰恰凸顯了中西文化差異之下，以概念為載體所承載的中西思想碰撞的一幕。

1. 儒學系統中“性”的內涵演變

孔子罕言“性”與“天道”⁶⁾，此後不管是固守於“仁”並以四端之心為道而主張性善的孟子，還是執著於“禮”針對人性之欲望而剖析性惡的荀子，都是面對孔子對於“性”的罕言，試圖對此懸置之“性”做出進一步的解析。只是孟荀割裂式的性善性惡之爭並沒有最終解決性之善、惡的來源問題，因而後來才又出現了：董仲舒的教化說(他認為“性”需教化才能成善，只憑藉性的本質是不可能達到“善”的)；揚雄調和式的“性善惡混”說、告子的“性不善不惡”說、王充的氣稟差異說(他以宇宙本體為氣，認為氣生陰陽而又孕生萬物，人與人、人與物之間的差異都是由於氣稟的差異而生)⁷⁾以及荀悅、韓愈的人性分善、中、惡三品說。東漢許慎在《說文解字》中，釋“性”為“人之陽氣性善者”，也成為後世“思孟派”漸占上風的一個例證。

到了宋代，儒家知識份子一方面為進一步分疏前代在論證“性”在本源論述上的不足以及有關“性”之善惡是如何產生等問題，另一方面也是為了扭轉“儒門淡薄，收拾不住，皆歸釋氏去”⁸⁾、與當時繁盛一時的佛教爭奪治世資源，他們批判性地汲取佛、道文化的成果，在“理一”“明體”上進行了

5) 拉丁語詞匯的解釋參見：John C. Traupman ed.: *The New College Latin & English Dictionary*, USA: Bantam Books, 1995, p.270 以及雷立柏：《漢語神學術語辭典》，北京：宗教文化出版社，2007年，第101頁。

6) 在《論語》中孔子唯一一次談到“性”是在《論語·陽貨》：“性相近也，習相遠也”，在其他處“夫子之言性與天道，不可得而聞也”。

7) 學者王儒松據此認為王充實開“後儒氣質說之先河也”。但在朱熹著作中卻從未曾見他論及王充的“氣質之說”，王儒松先生猜測是因為當時印刷術技術不夠發達以致阻礙了書籍的廣泛流通造成的。詳見王儒松：《朱子學（上冊）》，臺北：教育文物出版印行社，1995年，第159—160頁。

8) 此言出自南宋禪僧宗杲《大慧語錄》，轉引自王健：《在現實真實與價值真實之間——朱熹思想研究》，上海：華東師範大學出版社，2007年，第37頁。

積極的思考和努力。孟荀之後的儒家知識份子論“性”多就人而論，但從張載和二程開始，論“性”則兼論人與物，尤其張載言“性”眼光往往大及宇宙整體，這正是得益於他對周敦頤太極圖說的借鑒。但張載最為後世稱道之處還是他為建構自己的理論體系而締造了“天命之性”和“氣質之性”這對基本概念，其中尤以後者“有功於名教者……以氣質論，則凡言性不同者，皆冰釋矣”。⁹⁾ 二程兄弟基於張載思想體系中“天命之性”與“氣質之性”，進一步提出了“性即理也”，用具有普遍性的至善之“理”代替張載“天命之性”的概念（“性即是理；理則自堯舜至於塗人一也”）。二程中尤其程伊川將具體人性中善與惡的來源解釋為人各自“氣稟”的不同（“人生氣稟，理有善惡，然不是性中元有此兩物相對而生也；有自幼而善，有自幼而惡，是氣稟有然也”）。¹⁰⁾ 朱子曾盛讚到“如性即理也一語，直自孔子後惟是伊川說得盡。這一句，更是千萬世說性之根基。”（《朱子語類》九三），可見程伊川對於“性”的闡釋，在中國思想史的演進過程中所占的重要地位。

因為以殷鐸澤為首的耶穌會士翻譯團體在其譯文中明確指出，他們參考過的“四書”注釋本包括了朱熹的《四書集注》，此外還借鑒了張閤老（即張居正）、張侗初等人的注釋。¹¹⁾ 儘管後來在禮儀之爭的壓力之下，他們轉而指責以朱熹為首的“新闡釋者”（*Neoterici Interpretes*）是無神論者，但實際上他們對於儒學概念的基本理解，很大程度上都是源於以朱熹為代表的宋儒觀點。朱熹本人繼承了二程、尤其是程伊川的思想，若縱觀其著作中有關“性”的言談，卻可以清楚地看到他對“理”“性”的分疏有其自身不斷修繕不斷豐富的演變過程，直到六十九歲之後，朱熹才正式給“理”“性”問題給出定論：主張“理”“性”兩分，談論“性”時需分清“天命之性”與“氣質之性”之間的差別。在程明道性本無異而異在氣質的基礎上，朱熹指出不僅人物之氣質有異，就連人物身上之“理”也是不同的，從而才有人獸草木之別。如果說早年朱熹認同程伊川“性即理也”，主要是肯定“性”“理”之同，那麼到他晚年則更重“性”“理”之異。¹²⁾

9) 王儒松：《朱子學（上冊）》，第160頁。

10) 程明道並不區分“稟氣”之清濁，而“性”（“理”）在他那裡也並不是至善的，正所謂“人生氣稟，理有善惡”。他更傾向於：人性之善惡都是由“理”生衍出來的。由於“性”（“理”）繼承自原初的“道”，自然有善。但往往因為“相交而生物”的陰陽失調，導致“理”在現實中無法實現不偏不倚的狀態，從而出現“循理不足”或者“循理過度”，“惡”便會從“理”中產生。詳見葛瑞漢：《中國的兩位哲學家：二程兄弟的新儒學》，河南：大象出版社，2000年，第203—210頁。

11) 殷鐸澤在《中國政治道德學說》（*Sinarum Scientia Politico-Moralis*, 1667/1669, Guamcheu / Goa）的譯者手記中明確指出他翻譯時使用的中文底本是《中庸》的南京版本，作者是朱熹，這本書一般被稱為《四書集注》（“iuxta ordinem impressionis Nan-ki editae, Autore Chu-Hi, qui liber uulgo dicitur Su-Xu çie chu.”）；《中國哲學家孔子》譯文中多次出現張閤老的名字（“Nos hic eam verbis Cham-colai, sed in compendium redactis explicabimus”），耶穌會譯者多次引用了張居正在其《四書直解》中的解釋。此外，他們也表明自己參考了張侗初的注釋（“Mirificè favet huic Interpreti Interpres alter, paris cum Colao autoritatis; et ipse Cham dictus, cognomento tum-ço: hic autem in vigesima circiter editione Commentariorum suorum in modo explanatam Confucii sententiam sic scribit”）。

在《四書章句集注·中庸章句》中，朱熹明確地注“性”為“理”，並將“理”視為太極映照在萬物包括人身上的一種完美至善的存在。當他說到“理”或“本然之性”時，此“理”還未墮入氣質之中，亦即人物未生之時。當人成形之後，由於“理”與“氣”相雜，這就產生了人性中善與惡的共存。朱熹強調“天命之性”決無不善沒有偏差（“萬殊而一本”），但是“氣質之性”卻是人、物稟之於天的“理”墮於形氣之中交混形成的“性”，也正是由於“氣”混入了“理”才產生萬物的性之異和性之惡（“一本而萬殊”）。簡而言之，天地間“理”只唯一，而“性”卻可散為萬萬千千。同時，朱熹的“理”與“氣”也處於一種相互依存的關係之中，正如他所說“天命之性，若無氣質，卻無安頓處。”此外，朱熹還進一步細劃了具體個人的“性”，指出“性之本體便只是仁義禮智之實”（朱子文集卷六十一），發於外便表現為：惻隱（因其有“仁”）、羞惡（因其有“義”）、恭敬（因其有“禮”）和是非（因其有“智”）（朱子文集卷五十八）。既然人性中均有本性之善，如果能通過後天的修身，譬如《中庸》中提到的擇善固執、博學、審問、慎思、明辨、篤行以及“慎其獨”來矯正氣質之偏，以德勝氣，則人就可以恢復本性之善，此即朱熹強調的為學以及個人修身中必須重“工夫”。

2. 西方哲學系統中“性”的概念內涵

拉丁譯文中，殷鐸澤開篇就將“天命之謂性”中的“性”譯為*natura rationalis*，即理性之自然、理性本性。根據教會神學辭典的解釋，西方哲學中“*natura*”是指：“和人為製造出的物體不同，在各種天然（自然使之然）存在物的身上總是存有著自然賦予之的固定不變、持續不斷的內在原理，因應這些原理，存在物進行一系列的基本活動以實現、表現自身的存在。”¹³⁾ 在阿奎那《神學大全》（*Summa Theologiae*）“論自然的原理”（*Thoma v. Aquin: S.th.III, 2,*

12) 有關朱熹學術思想中有關“性”“理”分疏的發展過程：①四十六歲之時他還認為不必專門提出“氣質之性”之名，只說是本善之性墮入氣質受薰染致使人性中出現不善即可；②到他五十八、五十九歲之時，凡言性即是指氣質之性，他開始堅定地確立“氣質之性”並將其與極本窮源的至善之性對舉；③六十七歲以後，他開始對程伊川的“性即理也”進行完善，細劃出“性”的本體是理，但決不可據此統而言之“性即理也”，人物未生之時至純未染的是“理”，即那“在天曰命也”；而當人物生時，此理便在形氣中具現，雜氣稟而為“性”，因此他指出“才說性時便已不是性者”（此處，前一“性”指已雜氣稟之性，具體的人性物性，後一“性”指性之本體，原初的天命之性）（《朱子語類》九五），並特別強調了氣質在言“性”時的重要性：他既繼承了前人“故凡言性者，皆因氣質而言”（《朱子文集》卷六十一），又直言離開氣質則無性可言，個人觀點開始凸現；直至晚年才為“性理”給出了明確的定論。錢穆先生和王儒松先生對此都有精心的梳理，詳見錢穆：《朱子新學案（上）》，成都：巴蜀書社，1986年，第307—329頁；王儒松：《朱子學（上冊）》，第169—173頁。

13) Im Unterschied zu dem v. anderem als Natur her Seienden ist Natur als das ständig gegenwärtige innere Prinzip des aus ihr Hervorgehenden zugleich der Grundakt der Verwirklichung des Seienden, wie es sich v.a. beim Lebendigen zeigt.“ W.Kasper (Hg.), *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder: 1993-2001, pp.662-667.

1c.; De principiis naturae cap.2)一章中,他指出所謂的自然原理包括了:質料(matter)、形式(form)、缺乏(privation)和目的(end),也詳盡地舉例解釋這些內在原理如何成為促成事物基本活動的原因(cause)¹⁴⁾。

而且,殷鐸澤的譯文明顯強調了人性中的理性色彩。西方有關理性最著名的論述可以追溯到亞裡斯多德處。早期來華傳教士大多接受了亞裡斯多德“人性論”中的三魂說:①存在於植物以及所有具有生命的東西身上的“生魂”,它負責維持每一種存在物的整體性,負責使“每一種存在的整體先於部分,並且全體大於各部分的總和”(15);②在動物的身上除了“生魂”還有位居其上的“覺魂”,它使動物具有感覺,可以根據外界環境的變化來發展自己的能力以繼續生存下去;③除了“生魂”和“覺魂”,人還具有位於“覺魂”之上的“靈魂”,正是靈魂使人成為了有理智的政治動物,使人不僅能生存、能感覺,還學會了思考。¹⁶⁾ 亞裡斯多德在《靈魂論》(On the Soul)一文中指出:“靈魂”(rational soul)正是通過理智或者說理性得以進行認識和思考,只有理性是永恆不朽的。亞裡斯多德曾將“理性”劃分為能夠產生物件的“主動理性”和能夠成為對象的“被動理性”。人的理性有能力識別是非和善惡,如果人們能借助理性的這種能力知善並去實行、知惡並加以回避的話,他認為這樣的人就會幸福。此後,“理性”成為了西方神學中的一個重要術語,尤其在湯瑪斯·阿奎那的思想體系中,“理性”扮演了一個重要的角色。阿奎那不僅認定人類所具有的理性能力本身已經足夠讓人類去認識外在的事物,還格外強調人類身上這種唯一先天性的東西,即理性,這種積極地去認識瞭解事物的先天性能力。在亞裡斯多德的基礎上,他也提出了理性具有雙重性:猶如白板一般映照客體的被動性以及具有創造能力的積極性。但是比起亞裡斯多德,阿奎那更為強調理性對於人所具有的絕對自由的盲目意志的指導作用,而理性引導意志更是湯瑪斯倫理學的前提。¹⁷⁾

14) 此處有關聖托馬斯“論自然的原理”一章的內容,筆者閱讀的是St. Jerome's University的Gerard Campbell教授的英語譯文,參見:<http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/aquinas/Nature.html>(2008/04/20)以及Robert Pasnau: Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.1-10. 在阿奎那那裡,所謂的“人性”(human nature)即是關於靈魂及其所擁有的不同能力的討論。阿奎那視“天然(natura)”為人類一切行動的內在原理,並且他認為在決定事物本質方面,“形式因”比“質料因”更為重要:任何受造物的本質都是由其形式所決定的(“the essence of any given thing is completed through its form”),而且在自然物身上,其“目的因”與“形式因”是一致的。事物產生的最終目的,這也是存在物首要的內在原理便是其形式。就人類而言,人類內在的“形式”便是其靈魂(Thomas v. Aquin: In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum exposition VIII.4.1737)。

15) 鄔昆如:《西洋哲學史話》,臺北:三民書局,2004年,第169頁。

16) 鐘鳴旦所編的Handbook of Christianity in China, Volume One: 635-1800一書的第653頁也指出了早期來華傳教士與中國文人在對人“性”看法上的差異。除了基督教原罪說與中國性善論之間的差異以外,西方傳教士所主張的亞裡斯多德的“三魂說”也和中國文人所理解的“性”說、尤其是和以朱熹為代表的“理—氣”說有很大的不同。

17) 鄔昆如:《西洋哲學史話》,第315、329頁。

3. 耶穌會士所譯介的孔子之“性”

在17世紀的歐洲，阿奎那神學思想的影響既大且深，並成為當時耶穌會教育方案中(“Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum Societatis Jesu”)的重要內容。殷鐸澤作為接受過耶穌會系統神學訓練的神父，對此自然也有深入的瞭解。而當殷鐸澤在翻譯《中庸》的“性”時，他選擇了在湯瑪斯哲學尤其是倫理學中具有積極意義的“理性”一詞，這在一方面可能就如孟德衛在分析柏應理《中國哲學家孔夫子》一書的《中庸》譯文時指出的：由於17世紀湯瑪斯神學的影響，耶穌會士在理解儒家經典時有某些明顯的過度詮釋的印記，尤其是對中國經典中“理性”的過度挖掘。但孟德衛認為這阻礙了當時的耶穌會士們對儒家在道德和精神教化上的關注¹⁸⁾，筆者對此並不認同。倘若說與其同時代的許多耶穌會士一樣，殷神父對於湯瑪斯哲學思想尤其是其倫理學思想非常熟悉¹⁹⁾，那麼他對“理性”一詞的選擇，則恰恰說明他認識到：如果將儒家的“性”與湯瑪斯倫理學中的“理性”進行比較，會發現儒家之“性”既有值得強調的、與基督宗教的共通之處，更有需要基督宗教加以啟示、引導的地方。湯瑪斯跟亞裡斯多德一樣，重視理性和政治體系，認為人不僅要在自身積極求善，還應致力於在社會生活當中“兼善天下”。²⁰⁾他總在思考如何才能夠給人帶來此世的幸福，“使得這種幸福成為來世幸福的影像，認為將來的幸福是此世幸福的延長”。²¹⁾因而，國家有責任將有關宗教、藝術、倫理等方面的知識帶給國家的民眾，幫助每一個人借此達到自己的人生目標，而教會則負責從“‘彼岸來的資訊’引導人走向來世。”²²⁾後者正是耶穌會在華活動的意義所在。

另一方面，考慮到這是一部向總會長乃至羅馬的教皇反映耶穌會在華活動的成果以及宣傳自身對於中國文化瞭解程度的著作，它主要是以歐洲讀者為受眾，所以殷鐸澤在選詞上不大可能有利瑪竇、衛方濟(François

18) D.E.Mungello: *Curious land Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins of Sinology*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989, p.284.

19) 《聖經·舊約》中的《智慧篇》一開始是用希臘文寫成，並主張採用希臘文化的形式來表達以色列的信仰和智慧，從而強調一個民族不能只封閉於自身的文化模式之中，而要勇於面對並接納其他民族新的思維方式，因為“天主對猶太人的啟示並未受到限定，也不會一直封閉於希伯來文化的模式當中，必將以新的方式呈現給思想言行都和猶太人不同的其他民族”，因而，猶太文化也對希臘文化進行了吸收。因而，耶穌會早期由利瑪竇所制定的“和儒補儒”的上層傳教方針以及吸收儒家的語言、思想所進行的傳教實踐，其實是有前例可依、是符合教會傳統和教會正經中的規定的。而通過翻譯中國經書，來華耶穌會士也看到其中“耶儒”的某些共融性。以“中國政治道德學說”來翻譯《中庸》，恰恰說明殷鐸澤認為中國人獨特的哲學智慧乃是源於世俗生活中的政治經驗及倫理道德。其中，“道德”一詞所指的應該就是儒家的道德哲學和倫理觀，而“政治”一詞更凸顯了殷鐸澤對於儒家致力於在個人的道德修行上下功夫而最終旨在實現“平天下”的這種政治擔待的重視。這些與他對湯瑪斯哲學的理解應該不無聯繫。

20) 鄔昆如：《西洋哲學史話》，第329頁。

21) 同上。

22) 同上。

Noël, 1651-1729)在其中文著述中出現的那種動機，即選擇一個在當時中國文人的集體意識中有積極暗示作用的用語來迎合儒家正統。²³⁾ 從上文列舉的譯文可以看出，殷鐸澤在反映中國典籍原貌的基礎上，在譯文中滲透進自身的神學認識，並將之改寫為一個符合他所期望的、能傳達到西方基督徒接受視域中的拉丁文譯本。作為一名深受阿奎那思想影響的17世紀耶穌會士，殷鐸澤對於人“性”的基本看法應該可以從上文中對這兩位西方神學最重要之代表的思想梳理中略窺一斑。以“natura”與“性”的簡單對應背後卻隱含著傳教士和儒家對於人“性”以及“性”“理”之學，在異質文化背景之下巨大的認識差異。

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23) 有關來華傳教士在其中文著述中迎合儒家“性善論”的做法，可參見劉耘華：《詮釋的圓環——明末清初傳教士對儒家經典的解釋及其本土回應》，北京：北京大學出版社，2005年，第138—142頁。

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17th Century Chinese Jesuits' Interpretation of Confucian Concepts: Focusing on the Translation of 'Nature'

LUO Ying

Abstract

During the time of Late Ming and Early Qing dynasty, Chinese Jesuits, especially those who felt the urgent need of proselytization, began to learn and research the Chinese Confucian Classics and translate them into Latin. One of the books most influential in European academic community was Confucius *Sinarum Philosophus*, written in 1687. This book not only included the Latin version of the Great Learning, the Doctrine of Means, and the Analects, its Preface was the first systematic introduction of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. This article attempts to analyze the translated term "Nature (性)" in the Four books as appeared in *Confucius Sinarum Philosophus*, and tries to derive the cross-world context in which the pivotal term is being understood. Additionally, the changed notion of "name (名)" and "contents (實)" is discussed, in order to describe the vivid circumstances in which Chinese Jesuits understood and enable others to understand the Confucian tradition and thoughts.

Keywords: Jesuits, Translation of Concept, Introduction of Confucianism, Confucius Sinarum Philosophus

朝鮮儒者「小中華」意識中的自我情感因素*

張 崑 將

中文摘要：本文企圖指出，「小中華」意識在朝鮮518年(1392-1910)的漫長歷史過程中，至少可區分以下三種展現主體自我的認同情感：第一種主體自我的認同情感是在小中華意識的溯源過程中，在箕氏朝鮮之「上」，另立「檀君朝鮮」的自我認同之情感。這一類情感是來自於民族根源的情感。第二種主體自我的認同情感是小中華意識在華夷變態的政治巨變中，出現所謂的「唯我是華」的自我文化認同之情感。「唯我是華」又可區分兩階段，第一個階段是面對清人滅明後的華夷變態情勢，中華淪為夷狄，華已不華，天下僅存「唯我是華」的自我情感，這一類自我情感的特色，可說夾雜著政治與文化上的情感。政治上的情感來自於「尊周思明」的正統意識，不以清為正統；文化上的情感則哀嘆中華竟淪為夷狄，充滿「華」的自任自重感，甚至出現「小華」也可以成為「大華」的自負感。「唯我是華」的第二個階段是在西人勢力(「洋夷」)入侵以後的小中華意識，「洋夷」或「日帝」威脅著「清夷」，而「清夷」終被推翻，同時朝鮮也亡於日帝的兼併，這時出現期待「大華重現」的特殊情感。

關鍵詞：小中華、朝鮮、自我情感、箕氏朝鮮、檀君朝鮮

一、前言

「中華」一詞通常專用於文化上的意義，因為「華」有禮樂教化的文化之意。本文扣緊朝鮮文化認同中的「小中華」意識，探索朝鮮儒者對「小中華」意識的形塑與轉變過程中，分析「小中華」意識在本國情境下的自我文化認同的情感因素。本文認為「小中華」意識不只是表面上的「慕華意識」而已，尚帶有自我文化認同的「情感」因素，這種自我認同的情感，在文化交流中主導著對「他者」的「再現」，更是文化交流中「去脈絡化」與「再脈絡化」的決定性因素。¹⁾本文企圖指出，「小中華」意識在

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1) 有關文化交流中的「去脈絡化」與「再脈絡化」的觀念分析，詳參黃俊傑教授：〈東亞文化交流史中的「去脈絡化」與「再脈絡化」現象及其研究方法論問題〉，《東亞觀念史集刊》第2期，2012年6月，頁55-78[Huang Chun-chieh, "On 'Decontextualization' and 'Recontextualization' in East Asian Cultural Interactions: Some Methodological Reflection," in *Journal of the*

朝鮮518年(1392-1910)的漫長歷史過程中，至少可區分以下三種展現主體自我的認同情感：第一種主體自我的認同情感是在小中華意識的溯源過程中，在箕氏朝鮮之「上」，另立「檀君朝鮮」的自我認同之情感。這一類情感是來自於民族根源的情感。第二種主體自我的認同情感是小中華意識在華夷變態的政治巨變中，出現所謂的「唯我是華」的自我文化認同之情感。

「唯我是華」又可區分兩階段，第一個階段是面對清人滅明後的華夷變態情勢，中華淪為夷狄，華已不華，天下僅存「唯我是華」的自我情感，這一類自我情感的特色，可說夾雜著政治與文化上的情感。政治上的情感來自於「尊周思明」的正統意識，不以清為正統；文化上的情感則哀嘆中華竟淪為夷狄，充滿「華」的自任自重感，甚至出現「小華」也可以成為「大華」的自負感。「唯我是華」的第二個階段是在西人勢力(「洋夷」)入侵以後的小中華意識，「洋夷」或「日帝」威脅著「清夷」，而「清夷」終被推翻，同時朝鮮也亡於日帝的兼併，這時出現期待「大華重現」的特殊情感。

有關朝鮮「小中華」意識的研究，課題頗多，有專注在清興滅明後朝鮮知識份子的「尊周思明」之意識，²⁾有集中討論堅持北伐大義的宋時烈(1607-1688)之小中華思想及尊周思想等等，³⁾也有學者考察朝鮮以前的高麗王朝之小中華意識的形成及轉變，⁴⁾也有針對「士林派、性理學派系列」/「勳舊派、實學派系列」關於「事大」與「慕華」態度的不同做過詳細的區別。⁵⁾本論文則是在前人的研究基礎上，擬更細探「小中華」意識在朝鮮特殊情境下的「情感」因素，最後擬將此「中華」情感放在東亞交涉的脈絡中，窺其多元與辯證性的關係。

History of Ideas in East Asia, Vol.2, 2012. 6, pp.55-78].

- 2) 如孫衛國的專書《大明旗號與小中華意識：朝鮮王朝尊周思明問題研究(1637-1800)》(北京：商務印書館，2007) [Sun Wei-guo, *Da Ming Qi hao yu Xiao Zhong hua Yi shi : Chao Xian Wang Chao Zun Zhou Si Ming Wen ti Yan jiu*(A Study on Chosŏn Dynasty's Pro-Ming problem(1637-1800)), Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2007].
- 3) 這方面的研究論文集可參《韓國儒學思想論文集》第26冊(首爾：景仁文化，1994)[*Proceeding of Korean Confucianism*, Book26, Seoul: Kyŏng'in munhwasa, 1994]。另也可參禹景燮(禹景燮, Kyung Sup Woo), 〈송시열의 화이론과 조선중화주의의성립(宋時烈的華夷論與朝鮮中華主義的成立)〉, 震檀學會編《震檀學報》Vol.101, 2006, 頁257-289 [Woo Kyung-Sup, "Theory of The Civilized and the Barbarians & Chosŏn Chung-hwa Ideology of Song Si Yol, in *Chindan Hakhoe*, Vol.101, 2006, pp.257-289]。
- 4) 如鄭瑋謨：〈朝鮮漢學中的「小中華」意識：「小中華」意識的成立與轉變〉，此文發表於2010年宣讀於臺灣師範大學國際與僑教學院主辦「國際漢學與東亞文化」國際學術研討會(2010/06/25)，台北：國家圖書館國際會議廳 [Jung Sun-mo, "Establishment and Transformation for the Consciousness of 'small-China' in Chosŏn's Sinology", presented at the Conference for the International Sinology and East Asian Cultures, Taipei: National Central Library, 2010. 6. 25]。
- 5) 參이상익(李相益, Sang Ik Lee)：〈조선시대 중화주의의 두 흐름〉(朝鮮時代中華主義的兩條潮流)，收入韓國哲學史研究會《韓國哲學論集》Vol.24, 2008, 頁7~41。本文指出士林派、性理學派系列對於「事大」與「慕華」更徹底，但勳舊派、實學派系列雖然沒有否認「事大」與「慕華」，但也擁護「朝鮮的獨自性」 [Lee Sang-ik, "Two Streams of Sino-centrism in the Chosun Dynasty, into *Journal of Korean philosophical history* (The Society for Korean Philosophical History), Vol.24, 2008, pp.7-41.]。

二、「小中華」意識中的「檀君」與「箕子」情感

韓國歷史上的「小中華」之稱，最早可以追溯到高麗中期文宗30年(1076)的「小中華之館」，是一批出使宋朝使臣而由中國官員命名的處所，⁶⁾而高麗使臣樸寅亮(?~1096)也在著作中提到：「聲名煊赫，文物芬葩，比盛上國，稱小中華。」⁷⁾顯然，在北宋神宗一朝，「小中華」一詞在中國與韓國之間已經具備雛形，而且是以禮樂文物制度與中國無別而被冠上的稱呼。不過筆者以為，「小中華」之稱在高麗一朝確實存在過，但還不到形成一個通說乃至「意識」，僅偶爾出現在上述資料中，故只能說已有雛形，未能像朝鮮一朝已形成一股共識的普遍文化意識。此外，高麗一朝之所以未能成為「華」的主因，也與其「華」的程度還不夠「純」，因其國仍儒、佛雜染，如以下成均館儒生的上奏文的說法：⁸⁾

本朝，海外尚文之小中華也。三韓之際，羅、麗之間，猶未免夷俗之陋，逮夫我太祖、太宗，明倫於勝國崇佛之後，陳常於勝國蔑儒之餘。凡係名分二字處，其嚴有截，其等有隔，一洗舊染，如日中天。際於其時，大明高皇帝，頒我以禮法之書，賜我以冠裳之制，儀節之隆殺，名位之等級，井井有區域，分不得踰寸，寸不得踰尺，維持我四百年基業者，專由於此。

這裡透露出稱小中華的兩個要素，其一是明太祖朱元璋特頒禮法之書給朝鮮，其二是太宗以後，朝鮮崇儒斥佛，有別於前朝高麗及新羅的崇佛政策，這兩項是朝鮮特別「華」而有別於前朝「不純華」的因素。職是之故，「小中華」不只是典章文物制度都模仿中華而已，對朝鮮而言，「小中華」意識還更有上述與明帝國的深厚關係，其一是國號來源是明太祖所賜，⁹⁾

6) 安鼎福：《東史綱目》(漢城：景仁，1970)第二冊，卷七，文宗三十年記載：「秋八月，遣使入朝於宋。工部侍郎崔思諒，奉使入宋謝恩獻方物。宋以本國文物禮樂之邦，待之深厚，題使臣下馬所曰：『小中華之館』，所至太守郊迎，其餞亦如之。」頁168[An Jeong-bok, *Dongsagangmok*, Book2, Vol.2, Seoul: Kyŏng'in munhwasa, 1970, p.168].

7) 樸寅亮：《文王哀冊》，收入《影印標點東文選》(首爾：韓國民族文化推進會，1999)第1冊，卷28，頁73-74[Park In-ryang, *Munwangaechaek*, in *Dongmunseon*, Book1, Vol.28, Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1999, pp.73-74].

8) 《朝鮮王朝實錄》(漢城：國史編纂委員會，1958年太白山四庫本)，純祖26卷，純祖23年(1823)8月2日[*Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, Seoul: National Institute of Korean History, Vol.26, August of the 2nd year of King Sunjo(1823)].

9) 關於明太祖賜給「朝鮮」的國號，《明史》及明太祖實錄均簡單記載如下：「乙酉，高麗權知國事李成桂，欲更其國號，遣使來請命，上曰：『東夷之號，惟朝鮮之稱最美，且其來遠矣，宜更其國號曰朝鮮。』」參(明)姚廣孝鈔本：《明太祖高皇帝實錄》卷之223。但在《禦批歷代通鑑輯覽》卷101有比較詳細的記載：「秋七月，高麗李成桂逐其君瑤而自立，成桂在國，威權日盛，瑤雖為所立，慮禍必將及亡，與近臣圖之，事泄，成桂遂逐瑤而自立，尋以國人表請命，帝以高麗而僻在海隅，非中國所治詔，聽之。既而成桂又請更國號，帝命仍古號曰朝鮮。」由上述簡繁的朝鮮國號由來的敘述，可知整個命名朝鮮，實與「小中華」無關，「朝鮮」只是被當作「東夷之號」中名稱「最美」，顯然仍視朝鮮為「東夷」。至於朝鮮君臣如何誇大解讀對朝鮮有「小中華」的特殊待遇，應是朝鮮一廂情願的看法。[*Ming Taizu Gao huang di shilu*, Vol.223]

其二是朝鮮一如明帝國尊崇儒學正統。具有以上內容，才是朝鮮儒者對「小中華」的同意識。

值得注意的是，「小中華」意識在朝鮮一朝的發展過程中，不是只有一開始「慕華」或以中華文化為尊而已，特別是朝鮮歷經明亡清興的「華夷變態」之巨變，朝鮮在此脈絡的轉換下，將「小中華」意識注入「在其自己」的主體自我情感，我以下擬凸顯某些儒者如何在小中華意識下注入「檀君朝鮮」與「唯己是華」兩項的自我情感，前一項是基於民族自尊的自我情感，後一項則是處於華夷變態的政治巨變下所體現的自任情感。本節先扣緊小中華意識中的檀君朝鮮之自我情感。

朝鮮儒者在追溯文化的自我認同上，常溯源自「箕氏朝鮮」，「小中華」意識便在這樣的依戀情結中出現，亦即箕氏帶來教化，使朝鮮從「夷」變「華」，如以下所引：¹⁰⁾

禮曹啓：今承傳教，陳言者有雲：「吾東方，自箕子以來，教化大行，男有烈士之風，女有貞正之俗，史稱小中華。」

箕子為朝鮮帶來文物教化，這是稱為「小中華」的主因，即連朝鮮國王也是如此認為，如肅宗即提到：¹¹⁾

王曰：「予今講洪範書，箕子傳道於武王，以敘彝倫，及其受封於東，大明教化，禮樂文物，燦然可述，使我東國，至今冠帶，克明五常，以得小中華之稱者，箕子之力也。」其令主文之臣，別構祭文，遣都承旨致祭於箕子廟。

王室如此熱衷帶頭推崇，並為箕氏立廟祭祀，¹²⁾以紀念「小中華」的源頭，追溯其源，當從其開國君主李成桂(在位1392-1398)，把國號的命名權給了明朝開國皇帝朱元璋，朱元璋刻意選「朝鮮」，當然清楚箕氏曾在朝鮮立國，令李成桂深為感激，使本是「東夷」的朝鮮可轉「夷」為「華」，這也是韓國歷史王朝史上由中國皇帝賜封國名的唯一一次。由此窺知，朝鮮與明帝國的藩屬關係，迥異於其他國家與明帝國的朝貢關係。不僅國名來自於明帝國，連文化上也都以明帝國推崇的朱子學為宗。朝鮮開國不久，為接待天朝來的使臣，太宗時代特設有「慕華館」，經世宗擴建而完備，取「小華慕大華」之意。¹³⁾筆者檢索「小中華」一詞，有關儒林的《韓國文

10) 《朝鮮王朝實錄》，成宗3年(1472年)，7月10日[*Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, July of the 10th year of King Seongjong(1472)]。

11) 李觀命：《屏山集》卷之九，〈肅宗大王行狀〉，第177冊，頁171[Li Guan-ming, *The Works of Byŏng San*, Vol.9, *Xiaozong Dawang xingzhuang*, Book177, p.171]。

12) 為箕子立祠祭祀，不始於朝鮮，可見於高麗時代的肅宗7年(1102年)的記載：「肅宗七年，十月壬子朔禮部奏：『我國教化禮儀，自箕子始而不載祀典，乞求其墳塋，立祠以祭。』從之。」參《高麗史》卷63，〈禮志·吉禮小祀·雜祀〉。[*Koryŏsa*, Vol.63]

13) 崔溥〈慕華館記〉載曰：「我國朝，彝倫秩然，禮教赫然，華人亦以為小中華。則小華慕大華，宜也，館之得名，亦宜也。臣聞：上有好者，下必有甚焉者。國家慕華之制如此，主

集叢刊》出現有236筆，記載王室的君臣對話的《朝鮮王朝實錄》也有19筆，可見「小中華」一詞已是朝鮮儒者常用語詞。

值得注意的是，「小中華」在中國明清重要的史籍典冊上均未見，諸如《二十五史》中的明清史、《四庫全書》、《明清實錄》等皆未見「小中華」一詞，可見中國官方乃至士大夫社群中並未將朝鮮當成「小中華」。但是，「小中華」一詞常出現在中國官員出使朝鮮過程中的讚詞，只是這些記載都出自朝鮮的儒臣之說，如以下兩筆記載：

義州宣慰使李克墩啓曰：「去年天使祁順初到，我國禮遇甚倨。其還也，言曰：『朝鮮實是知禮之國，其稱小中華，非虛語也。』稱嘆不已。¹⁴⁾

我國雖在海外，中朝以文士之多爲美，先是天使倪謙出來，見成三問、樸彭年之才，稱爲小中華。今弘文館官員有將來者，使久居其任，以成華國之才。¹⁵⁾

由此可知，「小中華」一詞除用於「知禮」的教化涵養以外，朝鮮人要被中國官員稱爲「華」，起碼也要具備相當的詩文文采，所以朝鮮派遣的「朝天使」或「燕行使」都必具有這樣的才能。能夠在與中國人的交流過程中被稱呼爲「華」，才是「小中華」的品質保證，例如1574年作為朝天使之趙憲(1544-1592)，宿於接待者袁鐸之家，袁鐸來見，有一段記載：

餘勸以勤勤讀書，以孝慈親，而且與之筆以獎之。鐸曰：『大人所為，皆禮義之風，而吾中國還有夷狄之風，何以報德？』即取西瓜以侑之。¹⁶⁾

這雖是一段很普通的記載，但透露出中國居民也總有「華彼夷我」的心態，何以言之？看過趙憲一行使節團的《朝天日記》，都會對中國接待官員如何對之索賄，以及一路所見，盜賊屠村資料，時有所聞，面對一個來自外邦的朝鮮，竟會贈筆勸其讀書，兩相對照，當然會有「華彼夷我」的感覺。

即便朝鮮人自稱「小中華」，遠溯到「箕氏朝鮮」，但這個箕氏畢竟還是外來的中國人，並不是朝鮮人，就民族情感而言，在自我認同上不免有主體性失落之感，於是一些儒者將「教化」的源頭，再遠推至「檀君朝鮮」（「檀君」亦書為「壇君」），即可解決自我民族情感失落的問題，展現

上慕華之心如此。爲臣者，體上而勉於忠；爲子者，體上而勉於孝，則是館也，豈徒爲慕華設，抑亦爲忠孝者勸，抑亦爲國家之休矣。」收入氏著《錦南先生集》卷之一，第16冊，頁370。[Choi Bu, *Mohwa gwanji*, in *The Works of Geumnam*, Vol.1, Book16, p.370]

14) 《朝鮮王朝實錄》，成宗208卷，18年(1487)10月12日。[*Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, Vol.208, October of the 12th year of King Seong jong(1487)]

15) 《朝鮮王朝實錄》，中宗7卷，3年(1508)10月22日。[*Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, Vol.7, October of the 22th year of King Jung jong(1508)]

16) 趙憲：《朝天日記》(《重峰集》)，收入《燕行錄》第五冊，頁187-188。[Cho Heon, *Jochean ilgi*(*The Works of Jung bong*), in *yŏnhaengnok*, Vol.5, pp.187-188]

自我文化認同的主體性。眾所周知，檀君朝鮮神話的色彩相當濃厚，¹⁷⁾ 但一些儒臣要將「華」再往上溯到這個階段，如《成宗實錄》載有一條：¹⁸⁾

自檀君與堯竝立，歷箕子、新羅，皆享千年，前朝王氏亦享五百。庶民則男女勤耕桑之務，士夫則文武供內外之事，家家有封君之樂，世世存事大之體，作別乾坤，稱小中華，凡三千九百年於茲矣。

但我們看到以下李廷龜(1564-1635)解釋的箕子，將檀君視為「人文未彰」：¹⁹⁾

我東雖僻，亦天民也，而曰自檀君，人文未彰，泯泯棼棼，倘微箕子八條之教，則終未免為左衽之歸。箕子之教東方，是猶羲軒堯舜之教中土，蓋有不可得而已者，此又非天意而誰歟？天之不死箕子，為傳道也，為化民也。

由以上的對照可知，有以箕氏為朝鮮的「華之始」，但也有遠推自檀君，其目的在於認為「小中華」的「華」之歷史不只稱朝鮮一朝，尚包括古檀君朝鮮也包括在內，再將之與儒家推尊的第一個聖王「堯」並立，而且還標記大致的年代「三千九百年」之實證，以與「大中華」等齊而「華」。這種將「小中華」溯源到「本土的」檀君朝鮮，便可解除民族根源上是「夷」而受到「華」的教化才成為「華」。此條遠溯檀君朝鮮，並非特例，如以下儒臣洪良浩(1724-1802)在1799年的上筭書：²⁰⁾

洪惟我東方有國，粵自邃古，檀君首出，箕子東來。自茲以降，分為三韓，散為九夷。及至羅、麗，始得混一，而其教則儒釋相半，其俗則華戎交雜。然而地近燕、齊，星應箕門，故檀氏之起，竝於陶唐，箕聖之封，

17) 高麗忠烈王(在位1275-1308)一然和尚所著《三國遺事》(台北：東方文化，1971)第一卷〈紀異〉即載：「古記云：昔有桓國，謂帝釋也。庶子桓雄數意天下貪求人世，父知子意，下視三危太伯，可以弘益人間，乃授天符印三箇，遣往理之雄，率徒三千降於太伯山頂即太伯今妙香山神壇樹下謂之神市，是謂桓雄天王也。將風伯、雨師、雲師而主穀、主命、主病、主刑、主善惡，凡主人間三百六十餘。事在世理化時，有一熊一虎，同穴而居，常祈於神，雄願化為人，時神遺靈艾一炷，蒜二十枚，曰：「爾輩食之，不見日光百日，便得人身。」熊虎得而食之，忌三七日，熊得女身，虎不能忌，而不得人身。熊女者無與為婚故，每於壇樹下，呪願有孕，雄乃假化而婚之，孕生子號曰壇君王儉。以唐高即位五十年，庚寅唐堯即位元年，戊辰則五十年，丁巳非庚寅也，疑其未實都平壤城，今西京始稱朝鮮，又移都於白嶽山阿斯達，又名弓(一作方)忽山，又今彌達禦國一千五百年，周虎王即位，己卯封箕子於朝鮮，壇君乃移於藏唐京，後還隱於阿斯達，為山神壽一千九百八歲。」[*King Chungryeol and Il yŏn, Sanguo yishi(Legend of the Three Kingdoms, Taipei: Far Eastern Cultures Books, 1971)*]

18) 《朝鮮王朝實錄》134卷，成宗12年(1481)，10月17日。[*Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty, Vol.134, October of the 17th year of King Seong jong(1481)*]

19) 李廷龜：〈箕子廟碑銘〉，《月沙先生集》卷之45，收入《韓國文集叢刊》(漢城：民族文化推進會，1990)第70冊，頁231。[Lee Jeong-gu, "*Kija myo bi myŏng, Works of ŏl Sa, Vol.45, in Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea, Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1990, Book70, p.231*]

20) 《朝鮮王朝實錄》52卷，正祖23年(1799)，12月21日。[*Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty, Vol.52, December of the 21th year of King Jeong jo(1799)*]

肇自周武。蓋其風氣相近，聲教攸漸，衣冠悉遵華制，文字不用番梵，或稱小中華，或稱君子之國，與夫侏㒹離左衽之俗，迥然不同。

此又將檀君亦包括在「小中華」之列，而且都出現在君臣的討論上。揆諸儒者遠溯檀君朝鮮，在於將檀君比附唐堯的聖君形象，其「華」乃「自出」，非箕氏朝鮮的「外來」，故這種遠溯目的，無非來自於自我民族自尊的情感。

以上所引兩條遠溯「檀君朝鮮」的小中華意識資料中，前一條發生在成宗在位的1481年，後一條則在正祖在位的1799年，前者在明帝國時期，後者在清帝國時期，所以基於自我民族情感的「檀君朝鮮」的小中華意識，並不是因明帝國衰亡才產生的主體性情感，而是自15世紀以來儒臣即有的自覺意識。

值得注意的是，朝鮮儒臣在遠溯檀君朝鮮之際，並非否定箕氏朝鮮，反而是強化箕氏朝鮮與檀君朝鮮之關係，如實學派李瀲(1681-1763)以下的立場：21)

檀君與堯並立至十二州時已百年矣。雖未知疆土遠近，而箕子繼立其後，孫朝鮮侯時，與燕爭強，燕攻其西，取地二千餘裏。……檀君亦必在虞廷風化之內，而東邦之變夷為夏久矣。舜本東夷之人，則諸馮(舜生之地)、負夏(舜遷居之地)亦必九夷之中也。箕子雖都平壤，而與燕接界，而孤竹之墟又在其中，自堯舜之世視作內服，閱檀箕、夷齊之風化聲教所迄，莫有此若也。

李瀲清楚地表達檀君與箕子的繼承關係，且說「檀箕、夷齊之風化聲教所迄」，指的是從檀君到箕子、孤竹君二子的伯夷、叔齊都是屬於東夷之人，自堯以來早皆已內服於中國，且確定檀君在虞舜時代已屬「風化之內」。李瀲這種在同屬「殷民」之下的東夷之人，旨在強化「檀君」與「箕子」、「夷齊」的連續性關係，而非斷裂性關係，筆者稱之為「檀箕情感」，但這種「檀箕情感」仍然擺脫不了以大中華為中心，只是遠溯朝鮮之華可以上推至檀君而屬堯「內服」之疆域，可以洗刷民族源流的「不華」之憾。

三、華夷變態中的「唯我是華」之自任情感

朝鮮「小中華」的另一種主體情感的因素，則是處於華夷變態巨變下的小中華意識，從而出現所謂的「唯我是華」的自我責任之情感。「唯我是華」可區分兩階段，其一面對清人滅明後的華夷變態情勢，中華淪為夷狄，華已不華，故存在筆者所謂的「唯我是華」的自我情感，這一類情感的特色，

21) 李瀲：《星湖僊說》(漢城：民族文化推進委員會，1966)，卷一「天地門」之〈檀箕疆域〉，頁36。[Lee Ik, *Sŏngho sasŏl*, Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1996, Vol.1, "*Tanki Gangyŏk* p.36]

可說夾雜著政治與文化上的雙重認同情感。政治上的情感來自於「尊周思明」的正統意識，不以清為正統，文化上的情感則哀嘆中華竟淪為夷狄，充滿「華」的自任自重感，出現「小華」可躋身「大華」以及期待「真華」再現兩種情感。

由於小中華涉及到「華夷秩序」的課題，一旦華夷秩序有變，「小中華」的內涵也將隨之轉變，從而在情感上也與第二節基於民族情感的性質有所不同。

「小中華」既然是相對於「大中華」而言，而且這個「大中華」確實在一開始即與朝鮮命運齊帶相連，如前所言朝鮮「國號」是明朝皇帝賜給，朝鮮思想界亦學習著明帝國以朱子學為官方的學問，朝鮮的北方外患也有著與明帝國一樣的「夷狄」，而這個明帝國是以驅除韃虜建國，所以論「正統」、論「中華」，明帝國比其他諸朝代可說是更為「正統」、更為「中華」，更不用說在日本豐臣秀吉發動侵韓之役(1592-97)，明帝國也確實盡到其宗主國的責任，保護了朝鮮，使之免於亡國。上述因素使得朝鮮上下對明帝國的「事大慕華」政策不動如山，而且「事大」與「慕華」可說是一體不可分割。不過，滿州人在北方興起，終究滅了明帝國，使朝鮮只能「事大」，卻無法「慕華」，因「大華」已淪為「夷狄」，也只有讓「小華」撐起文化的責任，或以「大華」自任，或期待「大華」的重光，許多朝鮮儒者是抱持這樣的心態面對華夷變態的巨變。華夷變態扭轉了朝鮮人的「華夷秩序」觀，而且處處都涉及文化與政治的認同情感，此首先由其始終不承認清帝國的正統窺知。

朝鮮儒臣面對清帝國滅明之後的地位，多仍以「夷狄」視之，私底下的君臣對話或儒者文集之中，拒絕承認清帝國的正統地位。我們且看1636年的丙子事變過程中所引起的抗爭。丙子年春天二月，金人將建帝號，請朝鮮共尊之，由於涉及國書是否稱「清」帝號的爭議，群臣激烈抗爭，仁祖(在位1621-1649)亦拒絕承認，然亦遣二使臣答禮，不意三月皇太極改國號為「清」，二使臣被迫參賀，引起不少爭議，但仁祖在清軍大舉入侵以前，仍未承認其帝號。丙子歲末之際，清軍大舉兵渡鴨綠江，仁祖棄京逃至南漢山城。翌年正月，清帝促降稱臣，群臣洶洶，仁祖舉棋不定，及至清軍攻下江華，屠城，俘虜二王子，仁祖始決定出降，力主抗清大臣如金尚憲(1570-1652)自縊、鄭蘊(1569-1641)自刺，皆獲救未死。二月，仁祖交出斥和儒臣吳達濟(1609-1637)、尹集(1606-1637)等，出城受降，向清帝皇太極三拜叩頭而返城，清軍乃罷兵。在此受降期間，有義不帝清之儒臣罷官，有士人廢科隱居不用清曆。1639年秋，朝鮮正式向清朝貢。在丙子事件短短幾個月的時間中，朝鮮君臣始終討論與清和議或堅持「大義」的爭議，我們先看朝鮮儒臣所謂的「大義」是何指？以下是諫院向仁祖進諫的內容：22)

諫院啓曰：「謀國之道，必先明大義，不可回譎，而知經筵崔鳴吉，

22) 《朝鮮王朝實錄》，仁祖33卷，14年(1636丙子)9月27日。[*Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, Vol.33, September of the 27th year of King In jo(1636)]

曾於筵席之上，謂：『金汗爲清國汗，以爲定式』雲，謬哉！鳴吉之言也！何其不思之甚耶？彼以清國爲號者，實非偶然之稱也。彼僭偽號，我因以稱之，則是與其僭也，浸浸之弊，何所不至？鳴吉當公論方張之日，不顧大義，敢以不忍聞之說，仰溷於冕旒之下，其縱恣無忌，固已極矣。

這裡的「明大義」不只涉及到對明帝國的忠誠心而已，還涉及到金人並沒有資格稱帝號，故說其為「僭」，若一旦承認「僭」者，則自己也同為「僭」，不僅自己有失「大義」，同時拋棄了對大明的「大義」。引文中的崔鳴吉(1586-1647)，是主張和議而承認大清以免亡國的大臣，可以想見他被群臣攻擊的體無完膚，其中以尹集表達最為露骨：23)

尹集上疏曰：和議之亡人國家，匪今斯今，振古如斯，而未有如今日之甚者也。天朝之於我國，乃父母也；奴賊之於我國，即父母之仇讐也。爲人臣子者，其可與父母之仇讐，約爲兄弟，而置父母於相忘之域乎？而況壬辰之事，秋毫皆帝力也。其在我國，食息難忘，而頃者虜勢張甚，逼近京師，震汚皇陵。雖不得明知，殿下於斯時也，當作何如懷耶？寧以國斃，義不可苟全，而顧兵弱力微，未能悉賦從征，亦何忍更以和議，倡於此時乎？往日聖明，赫然奮發，據義斥絕，布告中外，轉奏天朝，環東土數千裏，舉欣欣然相告曰：「吾其免被髮左衽矣。」不圖茲者，獎勅纔降，邪議旋發，忍以清國汗三字，舉之於其口，又有承旨、侍臣屏去之說，噫嘻亦太甚矣。

這段上奏文，先以「父母國」稱「明」，以「父母之仇讐」稱「金」，辭氣甚厲，接著歷數過去明朝在壬辰倭亂對朝鮮的再造之恩，同時也描述當下金人對朝鮮的蹂躪，若承認了清帝號，則如何面對未來「被髮左衽」之譏。總之，尹集訴說著過去明廷的「恩」到當下金人的「仇」乃至未來遭「入夷」之譏，念及此，「寧以國斃，義不苟全」，實無和議之理。尹集這裡的「大義」，不只是對明朝再造之恩的「大義」，也是堅持華夷秩序有關朝鮮本身國格尊嚴的「大義」，亦即若「大義」有虧，則朝鮮也「華」不起來了，將與清人共「夷」。洪翼漢(1586-1637)的上疏文更指出清人稱帝何以需要朝鮮承認，似乎透露一些訊息：24)

然則虜之稱帝，非虜之自帝，廟堂使之帝，而虜不得不以爲帝也。苟欲稱天子、蒞大位，唯當自帝其國，號令其俗，誰復禁之，而必欲稟問於我而後，行帝事哉？其所以渝盟、開釁，嚇我、藉我者明矣，而亦見其要我立信，將以稱於天下曰：「朝鮮尊我爲天子。」殿下何面目，立天下乎？

洪翼漢上述的疏文實點出了皇太極即位之初，定下「將圖中國，欲先服朝鮮」的兩層用意，其一是軍事上「斷其援助」的因素，此可明說；其二是文化上讓「小中華」的朝鮮承認了清人的帝號，有威服其他藩屬國向清

23) 《朝鮮王朝實錄》，仁祖33卷，14年(1636丙子)11月8日。[*Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, Vol.33, November of the 8th year of King In jo(1636)]

24) 《朝鮮王朝實錄》，仁祖33卷，14年(1636丙子)2月21日。[*Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, Vol.33, February of the 21th year of King In jo(1636)]

交心的作用。值得注意的是，在這裡朝鮮扮演了「華」承認「夷」的角色，如果「華」的朝鮮都承認了身為「夷」的清帝為天下主，表示清人已是「不夷」，那清人入主「大華」有何「失義」？

不過，清雖滅「大華」仍存「小華」，「小華」的朝鮮雖必須「事大清」，但卻高度掌有歷史的解釋權，未如清帝國在境內實施文字獄(如呂留良、曾靜案)。朝鮮有不少儒者並不忌諱地討論「正統」，而且一開始仍私自堅持春秋大義，以明為正統者居多，甚至出現北學派宋時烈(1607-1689)向孝宗陳北伐之策，欲恢復明朝之言論。但隨著清帝國統治中國上百年之久，朝鮮也出現實學派人物，修正宋時烈的尊周大義論。²⁵⁾ 本節集中處理堅持春秋大義一派的儒臣之華夷論，以窺其在華夷變態過程中的「唯華意識」之自任情感。

朝鮮堅持春秋大義的儒臣，以「華」自居，以「夷」稱清，以朱子《春秋》「攘夷」筆法的褒貶方式論正統為宗，不取歐陽修的《春秋》「尊王」之大一統正統論。²⁶⁾ 因此，即使明帝國已亡，多數儒者仍高度推崇明朝的正統，卻不承認清朝的正統。揆諸朝鮮以「正統論」為文者，李瀾(1579-1624)有〈三韓正統論〉、張瑱(約1670年代為官)有〈溫公不以蜀漢為正統論〉，崔錫鼎(1646-1715)、成海應(1760-1839)、柳重教(1832-1893)亦均有〈正統論〉專文。²⁷⁾ 以下我們舉後三人的正統論說明之。崔錫鼎的〈正統論〉，基於朱子

25) 如安錫倬(1718-1774)在〈擬大庭對策〉反對宋時烈的華夷觀，採取比較實務的看法，如是批評宋時烈：「我孝宗與先正臣文正公宋時烈議大舉北伐，灑濯天下，復立大明，此皆殿下之所欽誦也，其奮義甚明，不俟後人之申說，雖有一種邪論，行於世間，有不可不辨者。蓋其論雲：『苟能全有天下者，皆天子也。天下之主也，或起華夏，或起夷狄，皆天之所與也。人之臣附者，亦何擇之有哉？大明固天之所與也，今清獨非天之所與乎？若非天與，則能百年完全，尚無敗缺也哉？且朝鮮雖稱小中華，而尚有夷音則是亦夷也。以夷臣於夷皇，抑何害乎？朝鮮之於大明，固臣事之矣，今於清獨不臣事之乎？三百年之舊君固君也，百年之新君獨非君乎？欲以朝鮮為明伐清，於義何所據也？且怨德之報，不宜在後世，方明之亡清之初興也，復讎雪恥之舉可為也。今幾年耳，德已無可報，而怨亦已可忘矣。且大明之於朝鮮，苛刻多責而貢獻繁重，國為之懸竭而幾於亡矣。賴清帝之寬大簡易，廉於納貢，而朝鮮少完，百年底賴，實有長育之恩。若丁卯之寇，丁醜之難，則以此而為可忘也。且大明萬曆東救之舉，則所謂為楚非為趙者也，若使倭寇仍據朝鮮，則陸行二千裏，燕京危矣。為大明計者，欲無救朝鮮得乎？存亡生死之恩固大矣。顧以其恩之所由，則我雖不能報，亦無憾焉。』」參安錫倬：《雪橋遺集》，〈擬大庭對策〉，《韓國文集叢刊》第233冊，頁570-571。[An seok-kyeong, *The Works of Sap Kyo, "Öidaegong daechak, Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book233, pp.570-571]

26) 誠如饒宗頤的正統論研究採取歐陽修的說法：「正統之論始於《春秋》之作」，而宋代爭議尤烈，且北宋、南宋有別，饒宗頤說：「宋代《春秋》之學，北宋重尊王(如孫復著《春秋尊王發微》十二篇可見之)；南宋重攘夷(胡安國著《春秋傳》可見之)。……其純以《春秋》書法為褒貶者，則朱子一人而已。」參氏著：《中國史學上之正統論》(上海：遠東出版社，1996)，頁75-76。[Rao Zong-yi, *Theory of orthodoxy in Chinese history*, Shanghai: Fareast press, 1996, pp.75-76.]

27) 有關朝鮮儒林的正統論分析，孫衛國曾針對朝鮮儒臣成海應、金平默(1819-1888)、柳重教等人的正統觀做過描述與分析，並綜合以下四項特質：其一是來源於朱熹的正統觀；其二是他們關心中國歷代王朝正統性問題，而沒有討論朝鮮歷史上王朝的正統問題；其三是上述諸人都已是十八世紀末、十九世紀初人，與前兩個世紀的宋時烈之思想極其相似，都強調華夷有別、倡導尊王攘夷理念；其四，他們都貶斥事元的許衡(1209-1281)。氏著：《大明旗號與小中華意識：朝鮮王朝尊周思明問題研究(1637-1800)》(北京：商務印書館，2007)，頁

《資治通鑑綱目》的正統論原則，先批評歐陽修不以蜀漢為正統，且斥其以秦之得國無異於湯武之論，從而以明為正統，清為閏統，他說：28)

明太祖掃清腥穢，應天順人，得國之正，遠過漢唐，聲教訖於滇黔，日本西洋，皆奉正朔，正統絕而復續。元氏雖號統合，不能革夷狄之風。清亦與元相類，而甚至舉天下之人薙髮胡服，合在閏統之例也。

崔錫鼎的論點指出，清朝之所以不能成為正統，主因在於「變華為夷」，舉天下人成為「薙髮胡服」，勉強只能是「閏統」。其次，成海應的〈正統論〉中，歷屬中國王朝的正統、非統，其中被其承認正統王朝者，僅有漢朝與明朝，而明朝又甚於漢朝，可謂「正統之最純者」。29) 即連南明政權苟延殘喘於中國南方，成海應更謂：

夫皇明雖殘破，然弘光皇帝在南都則正統在南都。隆武皇帝在福州則正統在福州，永曆皇帝在桂林在緬甸則正統在桂林在緬甸者，天下之正義也。永曆皇帝崩，正統於是乎絕矣。30)

至於清人入主中華，成海應更謂之為「主人遠出，盜賊闖而據其室」，直接否定了其正統性與得權力的正當性。成海應上述的〈正統論〉可說是措辭最直接、對清人最嚴厲的論點。我們再看柳重教的〈正統論〉，他直斥清以夷入中華的非統，而曰：

是則外夷之於中華，固自有君臣之體，方命不庭，尚為逆德，況乘時猾夏，盜據天位，以臨堯舜文武之故疆，其為名義之大變，豈在中國亂賊之下乎？若其暫息世亂，功則功矣，而曾不足以贖翻天倒地之罪。苟活民命，惠則惠矣，而曾不足以償毀形亂族之禍，惡得以是而謂賢於正統之末主乎。31)

27-33. [Sun Wei-guo, *Da Ming Qi hao yu Xiao Zhong hua Yi shi : Chao Xian Wang Chao Zun Zhou Si Ming Wen ti Yan jiu* (A Study on Chosŏn Dynasty's Pro-Ming problem (1637-1800)), Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2007, pp.27-33]

28) 崔錫鼎：〈正統論〉，《明毅集》，卷之十一，〈雜著〉，《韓國文集叢刊》第154冊，頁61-62。[Choi Seok-chŏng, "Theory of orthodoxy", *Works of Myŏng Gok*, Vol.11, *Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book154, pp.61-62]

29) 成海應〈正統論〉中說：「如三代之盛。唯漢與皇明也。皇明之世。閨門正於上。權柄不移於下。將帥不敢恣。直士奮舌強諫。朝廷清明純粹。比漢又過之。自三代以來。居天下之正者皇明也。合天下之統者亦皇明也。夫正統者。有名有實者也。」收入氏著《研經齋全集》，卷之三十二，〈風泉錄二〉，《韓國文集叢刊》第274冊，頁223。[Sŏng Hae-eung, "Theory of orthodoxy", *Complete Works of Yŏn'gyŏngjae*, Vol.32, *Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book274, p.223]

30) 成海應，〈正統論〉，頁223。[Sŏng Hae-eung, "Theory of orthodoxy", *Complete Works of Yŏn'gyŏngjae*, Vol.32, *Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book274, p.223.]

31) 柳重教：《省齋先生文集》，卷之三十二，〈講說雜稿·正統論〉，《韓國文集叢刊》第324冊，頁146。[Yu Jung-kyo, *The Works of Seong jae*, Vol.32, *Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book324, p.146]

以上「逆德」、「盜據天位」、「毀形亂族」等用語，都是在華夷秩序的原則上之用語。

由以上的分析可知，朝鮮上下從1636年清稱帝所討論的「大義」開始，到清已入主中華超過百年之久，儒臣還積極地討論「正統論」，甚至不承認清國為「上國」，主因是清乃「非中華」，³²⁾ 這些討論背後，都涉及到「小中華」意識的轉變。質言之，丙子事變前，朝鮮處處以「大華」的明帝國為依歸，且對於明朝給予朝鮮「小華」的特殊地位感到有「恩」，特別是在壬辰倭亂以後，明帝國以實際的「大華」保衛了「小華」，對朝鮮有所謂「再造之恩」，可與開國之初受到明帝國承認的「恩」相比擬。不過，丙子事變後，清滅了對朝鮮有「再造之恩」的明帝國，「中國淪於夷狄，人類入於禽獸」(宋時烈語)³³⁾，以後朝鮮「小中華」意識便多了懷念明朝之「恩」，而轉為「存大義」、「明正統」、「華夷之辨」的深層意義，而不再只是禮儀教化的淺意義而已。

在前述加添了深層的「存大義」、「明正統」的「小中華」意識下，朝鮮儒者發酵出「唯我是華」的自我責任情感。在韓國歷史發展進程中，這種「唯華意識」曾在高麗末期的一些知識份子出現過，乃因蒙古崛起，女真族及南宋正處於危急之秋，高麗文人處於華夷變態中，以下陳渾(1180-1220)的詩句正體現這種唯華意識：

西華已蕭索，北塞尚昏蒙。坐待文明朝，天東日欲紅。³⁴⁾

朝鮮也正面臨這種情境而產生唯華意識，即使清帝國建國已屆兩百年，儒臣宋秉璿(1836-1905)仍稱：「孔孟講道之所，淪入於腥羶之中，而惟我東土獨能為衣冠之國，可謂周禮在魯」，³⁵⁾ 「唯我是華」的自我意識，不言可喻。這種「唯華意識」的自我責任情感又可區分為兩種：其一是「小中華」有成為「大中華」的氣魄之自任情感，其二是期待「真華再現」的依戀情感，以下分述之。

「唯我是華」的自我情感意識乃因「大華」淪為「夷狄」統治，世界

32) 如樸趾源在《熱河日記》對清國給予朝鮮諸多禮遇，甚於明朝，但他仍說：「然而不謂之上國者，何也？非中華也。我力屈而服彼，則大國也。大國能以力而屈之，非吾所初受命之天子也。」收入氏著：《燕巖集》卷之十三，第252冊，頁242。[Park Ji-won, *The Works of Yŏn Am*, Vol.13, Book252, p.242]

33) 宋時烈：《宋子大全》卷十三，〈請神德王後祔廟筭〉，《韓國文集叢刊》第108冊，頁344。[Song Si-yŏl, *Song ja dae jŏn*(*Complete works of Song ja*, Vol.13, *Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book108, p.344)]

34) 陳渾：《梅湖遺稿》之〈奉使入金〉，收入《韓國文集叢刊》第108冊，頁344。[Chin Hua, *Bongsayipkeum of Maehoyugo*(*Works of Maehŏ in Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book108, p.344)]

35) 宋秉璿：《淵齋先生文集》卷之二十三，〈衛正新書序〉，《韓國文集叢刊》第329冊，頁396。[Song Byŏng sŏn, *The Works of Yŏn Jae*, Vol.23, *WijŏngSinsŏsŏ*, *Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book329, p.396]

僅存「小華」，因而「小華」如無「大華」作為相對照，「小華」不就等於「大華」，如以下尹愔(1741-1826)的論述具有相當的代表性：³⁶⁾

且夫大而有不大者焉，小而有不小者焉。故古人或有小朝廷之語，或有崖州大之說，此皆不以地界之大小而言之者也。然則昔日東方之稱以小中華者，以其有大中華也。而今其大者，非復舊時疆域矣。地維淪陷，山川變易，曾無一片讀春秋之地。而吾東方三百六十州之疆域，蓋無非中華之衣冠謠俗，則優優乎大哉，奚可以小雲乎哉！苟使東方疆域，不有鴨綠一帶之限，而參錯於青徐荊楊之間，則不過為腥羶中一州郡而已，又安能為天下之別乾坤大疆域耶？由此言之，東方疆域之僻小隘陋，與中國隔遠者，昔人所謂不幸，而以今觀之則未必非幸也。吾夫子之所嘗欲居者，安知非審視無涯，固已知中國之禮樂文物，畢竟不在於中國而在於東方之疆域中耶。

以上尹愔的論點，旨在打破地理大小所區分的「大中華」、「小中華」，而代之存中華衣冠之俗、講求春秋之義的「中華」性質，證之以孔子欲居「東夷」，無非說明「華」已轉移到東方疆域，「原大中華」既已成變易為「不華」之地，「小華」由於獨存中華衣冠謠俗，則已與「大華」無異，故雲「無非中華之衣冠謠俗，則優優乎大哉，奚可以小雲乎哉！」

上述的「小華」成為「大華」的「唯我是華」的自我情感展現，企圖扭轉小大之差別，展現自我有大華的氣魄。但是「唯我是華」也有另一種「期待真華再現」的自我責任情感，可從一些儒者仍持續沿用「皇明年號」窺知，以下我舉一位在日本併吞朝鮮後，流亡到俄羅斯帝國的柳麟錫(1843-1915)的設問：³⁷⁾

或曰：「子於太皇國尊皇帝之後，不用所行年號，新皇年號亦不用，依舊用皇明年號何也？見倭合邦之後，始用新皇隆熙年號，何歟？」
曰：「皇明屋社，已三百年，士子知大義者，尚帝之而用其年號，吾師省齋先生說其義曰：『人不可一日無帝，又不可以剃頭僭皇為帝，姑帝先王先祖之所帝，以待天下真主之出。』其義甚正也，吾故守之。皇明屋社之後，天下無華而我國有華，特其以有華而尊之。地雖非中華，道其為中華，尚可說，為臣子者固不得有異議，不然而班之今倭洋所稱之帝，豈可以吾君為倭洋同等也。吾故不敢稱皇用年號而獨異於世，所以尊吾君也。」今倭勒合邦，貶皇位廢年號而臣之也，舉世不復稱皇用年號，以吾君臣於倭也。吾今不稱皇不用年號，有似臣君於倭，且吾方有事復國，期於為自專獨主，顯示義於國中天下，亦其為有妨於事也，吾故異於世而有是，是則不得已也。吾尊吾君之意中未變也。」

引文中提到皇帝年號問題，涉及到朝貢體系的皇帝制度之背景，即朝

36) 尹愔：《無名子集文稿》冊八，〈策·東方疆域〉，《韓國文集叢刊》第256冊，頁334。[Yun Ki, *The Works of Mu'nyongja*, Vol.8, *Chae Dongtang Gang'yok, Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book256, p.334]

37) 柳麟錫：《穀菴先生文集》卷之三十二，〈雜著·散言〉，《韓國文集叢刊》第338冊，頁353。[Yu In-sök, *The Works of Ŭi'Am*, Vol.32, *Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book338, p.353]

鮮向來以中國為宗主國，故例稱「國王」而非「皇帝」，故不能有「年號」。柳麟錫所處的時代，已是甲午戰後，日帝將併吞朝鮮的時代了。文中的「倭」是日本，「洋」是西洋，朝鮮在1895年甲午戰爭之後，處於被日本兼併之勢，朝鮮國王高宗乃於1896年稱帝獨立，改國號為「大韓帝國」，開始用「皇帝年號」。由引文中的問答可知柳麟錫在朝鮮國王於1896年稱帝以後，仍不用其年號「隆溪」，用的仍是「皇明年號」，其理由是「皇明屋社之後，天下無華而我國有華，特其以有華而尊之。地雖非中華，道其為中華，尚可為說，為臣子者固不得有異議」，這一段實點出明帝國滅亡以後，「道」僅存於朝鮮，自己堅持用皇明年號，目的在存「道」以待華，這是典型的「唯我是華」的自我情感之責任展現。因而又有以下「復華」的問答：

曰：「子若復國，將復如何？」

曰：「以吾為復國，亦復復華，是將特以有華而尊之，非復如班之倭洋之為也。若中國有真主出，當勸吾君帝之。蓋天無二日，地無二王，是大義也。」

柳麟錫上述期待中國「真華再現」的濃厚情感，為的還是堅持「大義」，質言之，「大義」是決定「華」或「道」的根本核心。柳麟錫上述期待「真華」的願望，也反應在他對孫中山革命推翻滿清的興奮感，如以下的問答：38)

餘病臥雲岵深山中，不聞外事，最晚許昇炫來傳中國革命退清之說，且問曰此事有好否。

曰：「此在處事善不善如何。善處則奚翅有好，中國萬萬世，無限大慶幸也。」

曰：「清入主中國三百年，以臣民退其主，無乃不可乎。」

曰：「尊中華攘夷狄，春秋大義，天地常經，清夷狄也，入主中國大變也，非所謂主也，退之有何不可。昔明太祖掃元，得大義常經，天下後世誦其功，無所評議也。」

柳麟錫搬出「尊中華攘夷狄」的春秋大義，還將中國的革命之舉與明太祖掃元相比擬，對於「大義」終得以申明，相當肯定了中國革命之舉，但不意味他贊成孫中山革命後用美國的共和政治，畢竟共和體制是「洋制」，就他而言仍是「夷狄之制」，並言：「大地有中國，中國有帝王，帝王繼天以立極，極是一而無二，尊而無對，極之理至矣。……以中華而不有帝王，不有倫常禮樂，不有衣冠文物，不有所以為中華，有滅其本。」³⁹⁾可見他

38) 柳麟錫：《穀菴先生文集》卷之三十三，〈雜著·散言〉，第338冊，頁368。[Yu In-sök, *The Works of Ŭi'Am*, Vol.33, *Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book338, p.368]

39) 柳麟錫如是主張中國革命後必須維持帝制，理由是帝制是維持大一統的核心，他說：「大地有中國，中國有帝王，帝王繼天以立極，極是一而無二，尊而無對，極之理至矣。天敘洪範九疇，五皇極居中，是其理也。中國帝王，蓋自伏羲至於文武致其隆，自漢至於大明

所期待的「真華」是以再現「大中華」的「尊攘大義」的帝王體制，質言之，也就是如明帝國掃蕩蒙元堅持中華正統的大義。因此，當他聽到袁世凱(1859-1916)有欲帝制，興奮異常，特上有〈與中華國袁總統〉之書信，字字充滿對革命後採洋制共和而不採中華帝制的憤懣之情：40)

國名中華而去其實，中華雲乎哉？可尊雲乎哉？攘清而崇洋，漸入幽穀，合於天理物情乎？……蓋尊攘大義，窮天地之常經，不可以不深念也。麟錫林下書生也，安敢有與於中國大事，安敢有煩於閣下崇威。惟中國敝邦，素稱大小中華而有同休戚也。敝邦為日壓迫，終至見吞，賤身與日從事，見事不成，而因以出疆。感昔閣下保護敝邦之恩德，切欲往依，而難以危蹤，仰貽憂念，不得已來留俄境，日望中國變更興立，適幸有事，而閣下主張事機。蓋中國之立不立，即關敝邦之興廢，且賤誠粗聞尊攘義理，傾向中國，不自悠泛，所以冒幹尊嚴，有此忤怛，伏望閣下深恕而開納焉，不勝激切悚惶之至。柳麟錫謹啓。

上述期待「大中華」再現的情感，表達出「大小中華」唇齒相依的命運共同體之心境，希望袁世凱堅持「尊攘義理」的「中華」精神，掃除夷狄(當然也包括日本)對「華」的侵犯，重現大小中華的榮光。41)顯然柳麟錫的希望落空，「大中華」帝制僅存在八十幾天。

四、結語：中華情感在近代東亞脈絡性的多元辯證

本文分析了朝鮮「小中華」意識中的文化與政治認同的複雜情感因素，「小中華」概念在朝鮮被注入了諸如「檀君朝鮮」、「唯我是華」等意識，前者是基於民族情感，後者是處於華夷變態下所激發的自任情感。我們若從地緣政治來看，朝鮮緊鄰中國邊疆，只要中原一有動亂，最先波及的周邊國家便是朝鮮，一方面較沒有天險，敵人容易渡江長驅直入，高句麗王朝在

承其正，是所謂大一統也。中國而無是可乎？以中國而無帝王之大一統，為夷狄之甚失理，萬古天下，寧有此事，義理已矣，利害可不念乎？」同上註，頁369。

40) 柳麟錫：《穀菴先生文集》卷之十二，〈書·與中華國袁總統〉，第337冊，頁326-328。[Yu In-sök, *The Works of Ŭi'Am*, Vol.12, *Complete Series of Literary Anthologies of Korea*, Book337, pp.326-328]

41) 本文並未企圖以柳麟錫的「小中華」認識即可代表當時朝鮮人的中國觀，柳氏之論只是當代朝鮮人中國觀的認識類型之一。有關甲午戰後，大韓帝國時期朝鮮人的中國觀，白永瑞所著〈韓國人的中國認識之軌跡〉一文透過當時的主流報紙(如《獨立新聞》、《皇城新聞》、《大韓每日申報》)之社論分析，有如下三種認識類型：其一是「賤之清」的認識類型，即是蔑視中國觀，特別以《獨立新聞》的社論為主；其二是「作為東洋和平一員的中國」的認識類型，認為即使清朝已衰，日本崛起，但仍承認中國為東亞三國之間均衡勢力不可或缺的一方；其三是「作為改革典範的中國」之認識類型，關注中國維新變法前後的改革(以《皇城新聞》為主)，以及同情中國革命派的認識，《大韓每日申報》即一方面關注改良派，一方面同時關心革命派。收入氏著：《思想東亞：韓半島視角的歷史與實踐》(台北：臺灣社會研究雜誌社，2009)，頁177-190。顯然，本文分析柳麟錫在大韓帝國成立後的小中華意識，是以第三類《皇城新聞》支持改良派卻不贊成革命派的社論為代表類型。[Baek Yöng-sö, *East Asia as Intellectual Thought: History and Practices from the Perspective of Korean Peninsular*, Taipei: Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, 2009, pp.177-190]

強大時也可直入東北，故朝鮮與中國東北在邊境上常處於折衝狀態，此不同於一海之隔的日本，也不同於有高山叢林天險且較遠的南方越南。所以，「小中華」意識僅會出現朝鮮這個國度，從地緣理政治學來看的話，有其必然結果。本文對朝鮮「小中華」情感的分析，也讓我們看到弱國在強權之間夾縫中求生存的複雜情感，這種複雜情感若放到今日弱國的處境之中，依然相當適用。例如美國作為強權國家，許多弱國在政治(含軍事)上必須有被強迫或自願的情感上的依附，在文化上也有自願歸附或排斥美國的文化價值觀的情感，今日亞洲大多數弱國可說都籠罩在這樣一個複雜的脈絡情節之中。至於在東亞國家本身的脈絡中，近十年來的中國崛起，已成為世界第二大經濟體(僅次於美國)，使得東亞國家有可能再度捲入鴉片戰爭以前，以中國為中心所形成的自成一格之東亞交流社會，而「中華」情感是其中觸動東亞的一項共同因素。我想在文章最後探索這個作為東亞共同質素的「中華情感」出現在韓國、日本以及臺灣之間的辯證關係。

儘管學者的研究指出，「中國」概念在先秦統一以前，「中國」一詞即具有鮮明的政治與文化的共喻的定義，即指稱諸夏之列邦，並包括其所活動之全部領域，已帶有民族文化的一統觀念。⁴²⁾但當我們細查「中華」一詞時，先秦典籍並沒有，可見此詞語係晚出，《史記·天官書》雖出現「中華門」，較不具分析的意義，到《魏書》、《晉書》才頻繁出現，而且多是與夷狄相對列而言，如《晉書》卷101〈載記第一〉：「孔子曰：『微管仲，吾其被髮左衽矣。』」此言能教訓卒伍，整齊車甲，邊場既伏，境內以安。然則燕築造陽之郊，秦塹臨洮之險，登天山，絕地脈，苞玄菟，款黃河，所以防夷狄之亂中華，其備豫如此。」雖然「中華」一詞在先秦典籍未出現，但與「中華」相關的詞語的「華夏」則《春秋左傳》已偶出現，載有「楚失華夏」，⁴³⁾東漢荀悅(148-209)的《前漢紀》之序也提到「有華夏之事焉，有四夷之事焉。」⁴⁴⁾指涉的雖都以地理空間意義為主，但從「華夷」秩序分別來看，「華夏」一語即帶有「中心」對「邊緣」、「文明」對「野蠻」的政治與文化的雙重意涵。我們若再從「華」的字書定義來看，所謂「華」者，《說文解字》釋「華」為「榮」，用之於「華夏」應具有「繁榮茂盛之區域」的意義。但《爾雅·釋言》稱「華」為「皇」，又釋「皇」為「匡，正也」，則「華」又具有「匡正」錯亂的秩序而言。不過，《說文解字》則如是稱「皇」：「王部，大也。從自，自，始也。」

42) 王爾敏：〈「中國」名稱溯源及其近代詮釋〉，收入：氏著：《中國近代思想史論》(台北：作者自印，1977)，頁441-480，引文觀點見頁443。[Wang Erh-min, *Zhongguo Mingcheng Suyuan ji qi Jindai Quanshi*(The Origin of the Name of 'China' and the Contemporary Interpretations, in *Zhongguo Jindai Sixiang shilun*(History of Modern Chinese thought, Taipei: Printed for the Author, 1977, pp.441-480)]

43) 《春秋左傳》「襄公二十六年」載曰：「析公曰：楚師輕窳，易震蕩也，若多鼓鈞聲以夜軍之，楚師必遁晉人從之，楚師宵潰，晉遂侵蔡襲沈，獲其君，敗申息之師於桑隧，獲申麗而還，鄭於是不敢南面，楚失華夏，則析公之為也。」[*Commentary of Zu*]

44) 《前漢紀》序雲：「凡漢紀有法式焉。有監戒焉。有廢亂焉。有持平焉。有兵略焉。有政化焉。有休祥焉。有災異焉。有華夏之事焉。有四夷之事焉。有常道焉。有權變焉。」[*Annals of the Former Han dynasty*]

如是，則「華」又具有大中心的「開始」之意。綜合上述字書的「繁榮茂盛」、「匡正」與「開始」三項對「華」的解釋，「華」字既具有事實又兼具價值的意涵，「繁榮茂盛」相對於「未開化的」、「野蠻的」，擴大解釋的話，帶有「禮儀制度」的文化榮光之意涵；「匡正」則相對於錯亂的、非禮的秩序行為，以「自我」為正者，以「他者」為待正者；「開始」則一切以「自我」為開始，「他者」皆由此始而出，有「中心」對「邊陲」的宰制意涵，且有所謂的「空間」的遞嬗關係。上述三項意涵可說是「三合一」，存在著不可分割，但同時又具緊張性，如「匡正」、「開始」之意，是由「誰」來匡正「誰」？由「誰」開始成為「中心」？誰又是「邊陲」呢？特別是在「夷狄入中國」的征服王朝時代以及常被中國稱為「夷狄」的周邊國家，上述「中華」的意涵，在脫離了母國脈絡後，由於其帶有強烈「文化中心」及「華夷之別」的意涵，常引起周邊國家對此一詞語的敏感甚至緊張性，加上東亞區域國家特殊的風土與歷史經驗，使得「中華」一詞因脈絡性的情感作用，發酵出更多元且具辯證性的意涵。⁴⁵⁾

因此，我們看到朝鮮儒者為「小中華」注入民族情感的「檀君朝鮮」，使其具備主體性意義的「小中華」，而不只是被動接受他者之「華」才使自己成「華」。同理，我們也看到在德川日本的儒者，稱自己國家為「神國」、「神州」、「中朝」（如山鹿素行）、「豐葦原中國」（山崎闇齋），他們的對治對象其實也是「中華」，在此我們看到了德川日本學者已經努力地「轉華成己」。例如以下德川兵學者松宮觀山(1688-1780)的論點，即以日本為「華夏」，他說：⁴⁶⁾

儒之華彼夷我者，本是出於賤惡我國之心，則不敬甚於浮屠者。非耶！竊稽上世稱蘆原中州，《古事記》、《日本紀》、《令》等，皆指我京畿為華夏，指彼雲唐國、高倉之朝。《大外記》清原賴業識之，近日水府儒臣願介栗山子(名誠信)再論之，願言曰：「自稱曰中國，蓋對外國之通稱，而固非言此土在堪輿之正中。」至其或為神州，或為神國，且海內為天下，而外為夷為藩，則雖俱非九九總域之通言，亦各國自稱，彼此無相害。……源親房亦曰：「彼以我為東夷，猶我以彼為西蕃也。」近學墮乎市井，文不振乎搢紳，憚乎舊典而不之顧，或呼元明為中華，自稱為東夷，殆幾乎外視萬世父母之邦，而無蔑百王憲令之著矣。確論可據，而儒者尚仍舊不改者多矣。

45) 如同黃俊傑教授對「中國」概念的研究指出：從「中國」概念的內在結構的角度來看，「中國」這個概念至少包括「文化中國」、「地理中國」與「政治中國」諸概念，而以「文化中國」居於最重要之地位，並且顯示「中國」或「中國性」的概念是一種「作為精神移住的中國」與「作為想像的共同體的中國」之「移動的」概念，並不是地理的疆域所能律定。參氏著：〈論中國經典中「中國」概念的涵義及其在近世日本與現代臺灣的轉化〉，《臺灣東亞文明研究學刊》，第3卷第2期(總第6期)，2006年12月，頁91-100。[Huang Chun-chieh, "The Idea of 'Zhongguo' and Its Transformation in Early Modern Japan and Contemporary Taiwan", *Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol.3, No. 2, 2006. 12, pp.91-100.]

46) 松宮觀山：《學論》，收入《日本儒林叢書》第五卷(東京：鳳出版株式會社，1978)，卷上，頁3-4。[Matsumiya Kanzan, *Gakuron*, in *Series on Japanese Confucianism*, Vol.5, Tokyo: Hô Shuppan, 1978, pp.3-4]

一位幕末有名的水戶藩學者會澤正志齋(1782-1863)說：47)

地之在天中，渾然無端，宜如無方隅也。然凡物莫不有自然之形體而存焉，而神州居其首，故幅員不甚廣大，而其所以君臨萬方者，未嘗一易姓革位也。

松宮觀山上述之論，不外訴求日本古代諸多史書即已稱自己是「華夏」，各國也都有自稱「中國」、「神州」，實無足為怪，也無足自「夷」而「華彼夷我」。會澤正志齋則用「神州」稱日本，且神州「居其首」，以凸顯其中心地位，而且能稱的上這個「中心」的，其特色便是「未嘗一易姓革位」的天皇體制。我們在這裡看到了日本的「唯華意識」的主體情感之展現，總是與萬世一系的天皇體制無法分開。

在這裡我們看到無論是朝鮮將「檀君」注入「小中華」之列，或是日本的爭「華夏」並稱自己為「神國」，是採取對「華」的「開始」(或源流)意涵做出解構的企圖，唯有爭取「華」的源流或開始，始能免於被「匡正」的後果，目的也在樹立「自己是中心」的「唯華意識」，反而可以成為「匡正」別人的根據。這方面我們看到日本武士學者運用的最為徹底，如下所舉吉田松陰(1830-1859)的中華論：48)

支那人常自尊為中華，賤外國為犬羊，而一變為蒙古，再變為滿洲，所謂中華之人，蓋不能平矣。然其俗以統一為大，丕災以下，大義所不容，明教所不恕者。至於其統一寰區，則舉以為天子不疑，況乃疑於蒙古滿洲乎。父之所以為賊者，子可以為君；子之所以為君者，孫可以為賊。忠孝之訓，雖載諸空言，不能施於實事。凡如此者，彼皆習以為常。

吉田松陰的「中華」觀點有兩大重點，其一是「支那人」不配自稱為「中華」，因其不斷異姓革命且為蠻族所征服，故其忠孝的父子君臣觀只是空言，來對比於日本對天皇的絕對君臣觀。49) 上述吉田之論，我們看到日本在幕末已出現了「唯我是華」的中心論，將「華」注入「神國中心」，藉此匡正「中華」，「取華代之」的意圖呼之欲出。

相較日本而言，韓國與臺灣在近現代的命運有其相似之處，均有日本帝國主義的殖民經驗，故對「中華」存有「再現」的期待，此即前節提到的「期待真華重現」的中華情感。不過臺灣的「期待真華」並未如前述韓國

47) 會澤正志齋：《新論》，收入《水戶學》(東京：岩波書店，1982日本思想大系版)，頁381。
[Aizawa Seishisai, *The New Thesis, in Mitogaku(Mito School)*, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982, p.381]

48) 吉田松陰：〈與赤川淡水書〉，收入《吉田松陰全集》(東京：岩波書店，1986年)第二卷，頁10。
[Shoin Yoshida, *Letter to Akagawa Oumi*, *The Complete Works of Shoin Yoshida*, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1986, Vol.2, p.10]

49) 有關吉田松陰的尊皇攘夷的君臣觀，可參拙著：〈吉田松陰《講孟餘話》的詮釋特質與其批判〉，《漢學研究》，第27卷第1期，2009年3月，頁207-233。[Chang Kun-chiang, *Interpretative Characteristics of Yoshida Shoin's Jiang Meng yu hua and Criticisms of It in the Late Tokugawa Period*, *Chinese Studies*, Vol.27 No. 1, 2009]

柳麟錫的期待「以帝制為中心的中華」，反而支持孫中山革命的共和中華。我們舉杜聰明(1893-1986)為例，他在日本殖民時代的總督府醫學校時代，於1916年以蔣渭水為首，一些醫學校學生一起加入中華革命黨，根據杜聰明的《回憶錄》說：「翁俊明、蘇樵山、黃調清、林錦生、曾慶福、杜聰明等熱心募集基金，託漳州之留學生王兆培君，寄附中國革命黨，喚起啟蒙運動。」又說：「每朝起床就閱讀報紙，看中國革命如何進展，歡喜革命成功。」⁵⁰⁾ 更在袁世凱稱帝時，由蔣渭水、翁俊明、杜聰明等擬議以霍亂菌暗殺之，並著手實行，最後計畫未成，無功而返。⁵¹⁾ 在此，我們看到了在韓國柳麟錫身上「期待真華再現」的內涵，與在台灣一批總督府醫學校的青年學生期待真華再現的內涵也存在不同的辯證與緊張關係。另外，眾所周知，當1966年開始中國進行中華文化大革命之際，臺灣當局特別推動了「中華文化復興運動」，這個「復華運動」是基於民族情感乃至有「真華在己」的自任情感，如今中國大陸有一股國學熱，似乎有要將「華」找回來的趨勢，引起東亞國家也有一股搶「華」風潮。中華意識似乎再度成為東亞文化交流共同的新課題，與一百多年以來許多知識份子要將「華」去之而後快的情形，實不可同日而語。

附表：〈「中華」情感在近代東亞脈絡性的多元辯證表〉

國別 情感類別	朝鮮	日本	臺灣
民族情感作用的 「中華」概念	「小中華」 被注入了「檀君 朝鮮」因素	「神州」、「中 朝」 被注入了萬世一 系的天皇體制因 素 (自江戶初期即出 現)	復華運動 (文化大革命時 期)
在華夷變態下的 自我責任情感作 用的「唯我是 華」概念	「小中華」成為 「大中華」 (自朝鮮中期即出 現)	取華代之 (自江戶時代即出 現)	復華運動 (文化大革命時 期)
在華夷變態下的 自我責任情感作 用的「期待真華 再現」	期待帝制中華重 光 (日本殖民時期)	取華代之 (真華不是中國， 而是日本)	期待共和體制的 中華出現 (日本殖民時期)

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50) 杜聰明：《回憶錄》(台北：龍文出版社，1989)，頁174。[Du Cong-ming, *Memoirs*, Taipei: Longwen, 1989, p.174]

51) 杜聰明：《回憶錄》，頁63-65。[Du Cong-ming, *Memoirs*, Taipei: Longwen, 1989, p.63-65]

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The Self-Identification Factors inside Chosŏn Confucians' "Small-China" Consciousness

CHANG Kun-chiang

Abstract

The paper intends to indicate that the "small-China" consciousness in Chosŏn, throughout 518 years (1392-1910) of its history, can be divided into three different kinds of self-identification. The first one is the establishment of "Tankun Chosŏn" on Ki Chosŏn through the process of tracing the origin of the small-China consciousness. It was originated from an ethnical sentiment. The second type of self-identification is a cultural identification that "we are the only Chinese," which was derived from its small-China consciousness under the political upheaval in the metamorphosis between the Chinese and the barbarians. The "we are the only Chinese" sentiment can be divided into two different stages. The first stage occurred when the Manchurians overthrew the Ming Dynasty. China became the realm of the barbarians, so China was no longer an authentic China. The Chosŏn Confucians began to believe that "we are the only Chinese" left in the world, and such a sentiment came from a mixture of political and cultural factors. The political factor was derived from the orthodox thinking of "revering the Zhou and admiring the Ming," so the Qing Dynasty was not considered an orthodox regime. Culturally speaking, Chosŏn Confucians mourned for the loss of China because China had unfortunately fallen into the hands of the barbarians. They felt the need to carry the responsibility of being "Chinese." There was even a sense of self-importance that the "small China" could become the "big China." The second stage of "we are the only Chinese" occurred after the Western invasion. "Western barbarians" and the "Japanese Empire" threatened the "Qing barbarians." When the "Qing barbarians" were finally overthrown and Chosŏn was also subjugated by the Japanese Empire, a special sentiment about "the re-appearance of a great China" emerged.

Keywords: Small-China, Chosŏn, Ethnical sentiment, Ki Chosŏn, Tankun Chosŏn

由「完善」與「正當」論茶山學與朱子學的關聯

蔡 振 豐

中文提要：丁若鏞(號茶山Tasan)對四書的注解，在說法上與朱子學頗有出入，因而有學者認為他是反朱子學的學者。類似的討論，放在「實學」的脈絡中，也有學者認為實學接近於氣學，因而將丁若鏞的說法歸入氣學一派。本文由當代政治哲學中「完善」與「正當」的概念重新檢討上述的說法，其目的有二：(一)釐清茶山學與朱子學清代氣學的理論差異及其關聯性。(二)探尋茶山學的理論是否有延伸至現代學術(特別是當代政治哲學)的可能性。本文的結論有二：(一)丁若鏞的論說與朱子學具有互補的意義，而與清代的氣學不屬同一路向。(二)茶山學的理論比朱子學更具有現代學術的意義，除了有融通倫理學中「義務論」(deontology)與「目的論」(teleology)的可能性外，也有由「德行原理」(principle of virtue)延伸為「法權原理」(principle of right)的可能性。

關鍵詞：丁若鏞(Chŏng Yagyong)、正當(the right)、完善(the good)、氣學、朱子學

一、前言

丁若鏞(茶山；1762-1836)對四書的注解，在說法上與朱熹(1130-1200)頗有出入，因而有學者認為他是反朱子學的學者。類似的討論，放在「實學」的脈絡中，也有學者認為實學接近於反理學或朱子學的氣學，因而將丁若鏞的說法歸入氣學一派，認為他的理論與清代戴震(1723-1777)與阮元(1764-1849)相近。從丁若鏞對《論語》「仁」的解釋中，的確可以看到他與戴震、阮元在論述文字上的相近之處，如戴震論「心」、「性」的關係，有「心之於理義，一同於血氣之於嗜欲，皆性然耳」，¹⁾而丁若鏞也有「性為心所嗜好」之說，²⁾又如阮元〈《論語》論仁論〉有「必有二人而仁乃見」的說法，³⁾而丁若鏞亦有「仁者，兩人相與也」的說法。⁴⁾然而，語詞上的

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1) 見《孟子字義疏證》(冒懷辛譯注，四川：巴蜀書社，1992年)，頁178(Dai Zhen, *Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius*, p.178)。

2) 見《孟子要義》，《與猶堂全書》，第4冊，總頁576(Cheong Yagyong, *A Summary Opinion On Mencius, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong* vol.4, p.576)。

相近並不足以說明丁若鏞與戴震、阮元在理論上的相近，為了釐清丁若鏞與朱熹及戴震、阮元在思想理論上的異同，以下本文擬借當代政治哲學中「完善」(the good)⁵⁾與「正當」(the right)⁶⁾的概念，分析丁若鏞與朱熹在理論模式上的相近處，並指出他們的說法與戴震、阮元的根本差異。

二、朱子學中的「完善」觀

在當代英美政治哲學的議題中，什麼是「完善」和「正當」曾引起諸多的討論，如羅爾斯(John Rawls)在其《正義論》(*A Theory of Justice*)中明確的指出「作為公平的正義，正當概念優先於完善的觀念」，自由主義的沈岱爾(Michael J. Sandel)也指出由羅爾斯《正義論》引起與社群主義者的論戰，其核心的問題在於雙方對「完善」和「正當」之關係有不同看法。⁸⁾「完善」和「正當」指涉了什麼意義？簡而言之，「正當」表達了一種人際的或社會學上的關係，著重於人與人之間行動的結果；「完善」則具有理想主義或存有論的意義，關係到個人的價值信念及善的意欲。以道德行為而言，若說此一道德判斷不符合「正當」的概念時，首先要問的是：這個行為是否侵害了他人的權利而對他人有害。若問這個道德判斷是否「完善」時，則首

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- 3) 阮元《論語論仁論》言：「元竊謂詮解仁字，不必煩稱遠引，但舉曾子《制言篇》人之相與也，譬如舟車然，相濟達也。人非人不濟，馬非馬不走，水非水不流，及《中庸篇》仁者人也，鄭康成注：讀如相人偶之人。數語足以明之矣。〔……〕。相人偶者，謂人之偶之也，凡仁必於身所行者驗之而始見，亦必有二人而仁乃見矣」。見《學經室集》一集卷8(四部叢刊初編·集部，上海商務印書館縮印原刊本)，頁95(Ruan Yuan, *Yanjingshi ji*, Shanghai: Shanghai Commercial Press, P.95)。
 - 4) 見《論語古今注》，《與猶堂全書》，第5冊，總頁20(Cheong Yagyong, *Old and New Commentaries of Analects, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong* vol.5, p.20)。
 - 5) the good 在中文的譯名有「好／壞」之「好」、「善」或「價值」等。黃勇：〈超越自由主義與社群主義之爭：新儒家朱熹仁愛觀的啟示〉一文將之翻譯為「完善」，本文以為「完善」較可對應儒學的理論，故延用之。黃勇之文見於《全球化時代的政治》第六章(臺北：臺大出版中心，2011年)(Huang Yong, *Politics in a Global Age*, Chapter 6)。
 - 6) the right 有譯為「對／錯」之「對」、「正當」、「公正」、「公平」等。
 - 7) John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp.31-32. 中譯本可參見李少軍等譯《正義論》(臺北：桂冠圖書公司，2003年)(Li Shao-jun(trans.): *A Theory of Justice*)。
 - 8) 沈岱爾認為自由主義與社群主義的問題「不在於個人要求和社群要求的孰輕孰重，而在於正當和完善之間的關係」，此可參見Michael J. Sandel, "Review of *Political Liberalism*", *Harvard Law Review* 107, p.1767.又，論及自由主義與社群主義的爭論，並由此論爭脈絡討論儒家政治哲學之特色者，有何信全：〈儒家政治哲學的前景：從當代自由主義與社群主義論爭脈絡的考察〉一文，該文收入黃俊傑主編：《傳統中華文化與現代價值的激盪與調融》(臺北：喜瑪拉雅研究發展基金會，2002年)，頁208-228(Ho Hsin-chuan, "The Prospect of Confucian Political Philosophy", in Huang Chun-Chien(ed.) *The conflict and integration between Chinese traditional Culture and modern value*, pp.208-228)。

要考慮的是：人是否依據他對人性、世界或宇宙實在的根本理解安排自己的人生。9)「正當」與「完善」除了可作上述的區分外，實也與羅爾斯《正義論》中所論的兩種道德的能力(moral powers)相關聯，「正當」所對應的是「追求正義感的能力」(capacity for a sense of justice)，而「完善」所對應的則是「追求、修正理性人生計劃的能力」(capacity for a conception of good)。10)

「完善」之概念關注於縱向的與世界實在的形上關係，而「正當」的概念則關注於橫向的人與人之間的關係。當論及先秦儒家有無「完善」與「正當」的概念時，「仁」、「義」的概念應會最先被提及。11)《論語》所說的「仁」意謂著理想的人格型態或者人性的完美實現，與「完善」的概念相近；而「義者宜也」是就處事或人際是否得宜而說，故與「正當」的概念相近。然而，在朱熹的解釋下，「仁」、「義」二字，都偏重於縱向存有論的意義。依朱熹理氣論的架構，「仁」、「義」與「禮」、「智」同為「性」之一名，屬之形上之「理」，故朱熹言「仁者，愛之理，心之德也」。12)若以《中庸》的「已發／未發」論之，則「仁義禮智」是「未發」之「性」，而「惻隱、羞惡、辭遜、是非」是「已發」之「情」。13)依此「理／氣」、「性／情」之分，可知朱熹之論「義」，其重點仍在於縱向的「存天理」，而不在於橫向地調整人際之間的各種關係。由此，亦可見朱熹的「仁義」觀缺乏「正當」的概念而只有「完善」的概念。14)雖有學者指出：朱熹雖有以「愛」推究「形上之理」的用意，但他所論的「愛」仍是表現在「人與人之間」，因而具有「正當」的意涵。15)然而，朱熹所言的「愛」並不考慮在合作社會中的利害或效益問題，因此他所論的「愛」似乎很難直接與「正當」畫上等號。

9) R. M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.152.

10) John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p.19.

11) Heiner Roetz, *Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age: A Reconstruction under the Aspect of the Breakthrough toward Postconventional Thinking* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp.111-118.

12) 《四書章句集注》卷1〈學而·第二章〉(臺北：大安出版社，1996年)，頁62(Zhu Xi, *Collected commentaries on the Four Books*, p.62)

13) 朱熹言：「性是理之總名，仁義禮智皆性中一理之名。惻隱、羞惡、辭遜、是非是情之所發之名，此情之出於性而善者也」。見《朱子語類》卷5〈性理二：性情心意等名義〉(王星賢點校本，北京：中華書局，2007年)，頁92(LI Jingde(ed.), *Quotations from Zhu Xi*, p.92)。

14) 朱熹的意見也可能反映了宋明理學家的一般看法，因而郝大維(David L. Hall)、安樂哲(Roger T. Ames)、成中英(Chung-Ying Cheng)在分析儒家整體的思想時，也有類似的意見，認為儒家所指的「義」是對自己而言，而不是指對他人是否適宜。此可參見David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking Through Confucius* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), p.96. 及Chung-Ying Cheng, *New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), p.242.

15) 如上引黃勇：〈超越自由主義與社群主義之爭：新儒家朱熹仁愛觀的啟示〉一文以為朱熹的「仁／愛」與「完善／公正」(此文將the right譯為「公正」)有可比性。

基於朱熹對「仁」、「義」所作形而上的解釋，使得朱熹對是否達成「仁」的看法也有極高的標準，認為「仁」必須是「純然天理」，不能夾雜一絲一毫的功利之心。以《論語·憲問》孔子對管仲「如其仁」的評價為例，朱熹認為管仲「功利駁雜其心」、「一生只是私意小智」，¹⁶⁾因而在輔佐齊桓公稱霸後，也帶來「齊法壞盡，功利自此盛」的壞處。¹⁷⁾基於此種觀點，朱熹不認為管仲是個仁人，而只稱許他具有仁功。由此，可見朱熹論「仁」，並不把「仁」的目的或效益列為考慮，而將重點放在行為動機是否符合「完善」的價值上。¹⁸⁾

三、丁若鏞對朱熹「完善」觀的進一步論述

(一) 基本差異

丁若鏞同意朱熹論「仁不應雜有功利之心」的論點，但他也認為「有仁功卻不得為仁人」的論法並不合理。¹⁹⁾仁功雖然不能避免目的與效益的用意，但眾人所期望的效益，絕非存有一己私欲的人所能成就，故就事件而言，不能以行動者在此事件上有「功利駁雜之心」，而否定其作為。丁若鏞對朱熹說法的質疑，顯示他是就事上來評斷仁的意義，²⁰⁾而非如朱熹是就人在精神上的全幅表現來判斷人的價值。因而，依丁若鏞的說法，仁可

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- 16) 朱熹認為管仲「一生全無本領，只用私意小智做出來，僅能以功利自強其國」見《朱子語類》，第2冊，第25卷〈論語七·八佾篇·管仲之器小哉章〉(王星賢點校本)，頁630(LI Jingde(ed.), *Quotations from Zhu Xi*, p.630)。
- 17) 《朱子語類》載，朱熹言：「『齊一變至於魯』，是他功利俗深。管仲稱霸，齊法壞盡，功利自此盛。然太公治齊尚功時，便有些小氣象，尚未見得，只被管仲大段壞了。」又云：「管仲非不尊周攘夷，如何不是王道？只是功利駁雜其心耳。」見第3冊，第33卷〈論語十五·雍也篇四·齊一變至於魯章〉，(王星賢點校本)，頁829(LI Jingde(ed.), *Quotations from Zhu Xi*, p.829)。
- 18) 《朱子語類》載有如下的問答：「問『仁以理言，通乎上下。』曰：『一事之仁也是仁，全體之仁也是仁，仁及一家也是仁，仁及一國也是仁，仁及天下也是仁。只是仁及一家者是仁之小者，仁及天下者是仁之大者。如孔子稱管仲之仁，亦是仁，只是仁之功。』復問：『上是上，下是小？』曰：『只是高低。』又曰：『這箇是兼愛而言，如博施濟眾，及後面說手足貫通處。』復問貫通處。曰：『才被私意截了，仁之理便不行。』」見(王星賢點校本)第3冊，第33卷〈論語十五·雍也篇四·子貢曰如有博施於民章〉，頁847-848(LI Jingde(ed.), *Quotations from Zhu Xi*, pp.847-848)。
- 19) 丁若鏞《論語古今注》言：「〔質疑〕朱熹曰：『管仲雖不得為仁人，而其利澤及人，則有仁之功矣。』案：仁者非本心之全德，亦事功之所成耳。然則既有仁功而不得為仁人，恐不合理。」見《與猶堂全書》，第5冊，總頁582-583(Cheong Yagyong, *Old and New Commentaries of Analects, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong* vol.5, pp.582-583)。
- 20) 丁若鏞《孟子要義》(Cheong Yagyong, *A Summary Opinion On Mencius, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong*)注解〈告子上〉第7章「心之所同然者何也 謂理也義也」言：「悅我心者，悅衆人之心非悅聖人之心也。作一善事，盜賊亦且愉快；修一善行，淫婦莫不忻樂，理義之悅我心，非是之謂乎？」於此可見，他認為即使是盜賊、淫婦亦有合於理義、行善修仁的可能。

表現在「達成自我之完善」的「盡己之道」上，也可以表現為「達成眾人之所期望之目的與效益」的「盡(眾)人之道」兩方面。達成自我完善之仁，如召忽之死於義、顏淵之「三月不違仁」；達成眾人效益之仁，如管仲之「一匡天下」、「免於被髮左衽」。丁若鏞認為「管仲之仁功」與「召忽之仁心」二者具有同等的價值，故他以「管仲之仁功如召忽之仁心」解釋孔子「如其仁」的評論。²¹⁾

朱熹與丁若鏞所以對管仲有不同評價，其根本的因素在於二者對「性」與「天理」有不同的看法。在理論模式上，朱熹有「道心 / 人心」的區分，也有「心統性情」之說，他認為「心」能得「理」而復「性」是為「道心」，心不得「理」而為形氣私欲所拘蔽是「人心」。²²⁾在此說法中，朱熹所重視的是能「格物窮理」的「心」所具虛靈知覺的機能，而其所謂的「性」與「理」既是「心」格物窮理下的結果，也就帶有著知識性及規範性的意義。基於這種知識性及規範性的內容，朱熹才會引用程子「奢而犯禮，其器之小可知，蓋器大則自知禮而無此失」的說法，以「奢而犯禮」批評管仲之心不得天理而有人欲之私。

丁若鏞不反對朱熹的「道心 / 人心」說，但他認為「道心」非「心之得理復性」，而是「心之合於性之好惡判斷」。丁若鏞認為「性」與「心」皆有活動的機能，「性」有「好善恥惡」的機能，²³⁾而「心」有「嗜好於性」的機能。在此說法下，可以形成二個與朱熹論點上的差異。首先，道德判斷是來自於「性」的好惡，而非「心」能「具理」與「知理」，因此不會得出類似朱熹「心具有仁義禮智的本然之理」的結論；²⁴⁾其次，由於道德的行動

21) 《論語古今注》言：「孔(安國)曰：『誰如管仲之仁』。駁曰：非也。添入誰字，猶不白矣。凡此物之數與彼物相當者曰如其數。子路獨以召忽為殺身成仁，而不知管仲之功將仁覆天下，故孔子盛稱其功曰：管仲雖不死，亦可以當召忽之死也。秤其輕重，細心商量而終不見其不相當，故再言之曰：如其仁」。見《與猶堂全書》第5冊，總頁582[Cheong Yagyong, *Old and New Commentaries of Analects, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong* vo5, 4p.582]。

22) 朱熹《中庸章句·序》(Zhu Xi, *Zhongyong Zhangju, Collected commentaries on the Four Books*)言：「心之虛靈知覺一而已矣，而以為有人心、道心之異者，則以其或生於形氣之私，或原於性命之正。而所以為知覺者不同，是以或危殆而不安，或微妙而難見耳」。又《大學章句》注「大學之道在明明德」(Zhu Xi, *Da xue zhang ju, Collected commentaries on the Four Books*)言：「明德者，人之所得乎天而虛靈不昧以具眾理而應萬事者也。但為氣稟所拘、人欲所蔽則有時而昏，然其本體之明，則有未嘗息者。故學者當因其所發而遂以明之，以復其初也」。

23) 丁若鏞言：「天命之性，亦可以嗜好言。蓋人之胚胎既成，天則賦予靈明無形之體，而為其物也。樂善而惡惡，好德而恥污，斯之謂性善也」。見《中庸自箴》，《與猶堂全書》，第4冊，總頁178[Cheong Yagyong, *Self-chosen Aphorism on the Means, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong* vol.4, p.178]。

24) 《孟子要義》(Cheong Yagyong, *A Summary Opinion On Mencius, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong*)注《公孫醜上6章》「人皆有不忍人之心」言：「仁義禮智之名，成於行事之後，故愛人而後謂之仁。愛人之先，仁之名未立也。善我而後謂之義，善我之

在於「心能否合於性的判斷」，因此「行仁」的關鍵不在於朱熹所說的「天理」，而在於能否使此兩種機能處於充分狀態，能揀別取捨、付之實踐的「人德」。²⁵⁾丁若鏞所謂的「天理」既不是朱熹「理／氣」二分下的「所以然之理」，而是「性之好惡判斷下的理義」，²⁶⁾且道德行動的關鍵不在「存天理」而在於心抉擇下的人德，因此其對「仁」的判定，就可在「事」上講究。由此，管仲在輔佐齊桓公「一匡天下」、「免於披髮左衽」的「事」上，可因其合於理義之事，因其具有「人德」而配稱為「仁人」。

(二) 延伸理論

經由上節的分析，可知丁若鏞所謂「仁義禮智之名，成於行事之後」可以有二層意義。第一層意義是指：「性」之好惡機能非無端發作，必待行事之時，才有具體的內容可以作為「性」的判斷與料。第二層意義是指：「性」之好惡判斷所形成的理義，必待行為者的實踐，才具有道德上的意義，而有「仁義禮智之名」。基於這二層意義，可知「性」的好惡對「心」有強責性，是一種「形式原則」，此種「形式原則」是道德行動者無法迴避的律令，它不受任何意義內容所規約，卻能依事物的脈絡，產生具有規範性的意義內容。

基於「性」所具有的「形式原則」，以及心在行動上有揀擇取捨的作用，丁若鏞因而有「以人事人，而後有忠之名。獨我無忠，雖欲先自盡己，無以著手」²⁷⁾、「行恕以忠，故孔子單言恕」²⁸⁾等等的主張。所謂的「獨

先，義之名未立也。賓主拜揖而後禮之名立焉，事物辨明而後智之名立焉。豈有仁義禮智四顆，磊磊落落如桃仁、杏仁伏於人心之中者乎？顏淵問仁，子曰克己復禮為仁。明仁之為物，成於人功，非賦生之初，天造一顆仁塊插於人心也。克己復禮之時，豈不費許多人力乎？孟子曰舍魚而取熊、舍生而取義，明一生一義皆在彼處，我得就彼揀擇，舍其短而取其長也。若於賦生之初原有一顆義塊插在心內，則又安得舍之、取之乎？」

- 25) 《孟子要義》(Cheong Yagyong, *A Summary Opinion On Mencius, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong*)注解〈告子上〉18章「仁之勝不仁也，猶水勝火」，他批評朱熹「天理勝人欲」之說而言：「仁非天理，乃是人德」。
- 26) 丁若鏞對「理」的解釋雖有「條理」、「治理」之說，然而他也承認《孟子》所言的「理義」具有「天理」的意思，如他注解《孟子要義》(Cheong Yagyong, *A Summary Opinion On Mencius, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong*)〈告子上〉第7章「心之所同然者何也？謂理也義也」言：「此雲理義者天理也，道義也。合於天理者，無非善事；成於道義者，無非善行。善事、善行，人心之所悅也。悅我心者，悅衆人之心非悅聖人之心也。作一善事，盜賊亦且愉快；修一善行，淫婦莫不忻樂，理義之悅我心，非是之謂乎？」。
- 27) 《論語古今注》言：「盡己之謂忠，推己之謂恕也。然忠恕非對待之物，恕為之本，而所以行之者忠也。以人事人，而後有忠之名。獨我無忠，雖欲先自盡己，無以著手。今人皆認吾道為先忠而後恕，失之遠矣。方其忠時，恕已久矣。」見《與猶堂全書》第5冊，總頁150 (Cheong Yagyong, *Old and New Commentaries of Analects, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong* vol.5, p.150)。
- 28) 《論語古今注》言：「補曰：道，人道也。謂之吾道者，身任之也。一者，恕也。貫，穿也。行恕以忠，故孔子單言恕，而曾子連言忠恕也。」見《與猶堂全書》第5冊，總頁148 (Cheong Yagyong, *Old and New Commentaries of Analects, The Complete Works of*

我無忠，雖欲先自盡己，無以著手」，可理解為：「獨自一人而無他者或行事的脈絡存在，則無具體內容可令性行其好、惡，因而心也無法進行揀擇取舍的行動」。不論是「獨我無忠」或「行恕以忠」，其目的皆在於說明「理義」的具體內容，不是來自於存有學下的「完善」觀，而是來自於事物發展脈絡下，自我與他人之間遂行其「嗜好之性」所形成的種種主張。

因為丁若鏞不由存有學上的理氣觀討論道德的活動，因而他認為在「忠恕」二字上，應以《論語》中「己所不欲，勿施於人」之「恕」作為「成仁之法」²⁹⁾。相對而言，朱熹則強調「忠恕」之「忠」的重要性。朱熹認為「忠」是「一箇實心，萬法萬事皆自此出」，無「忠」則不能「恕」。³⁰⁾在朱熹的看法下，「忠」之「盡己」是指己心能掌握愛人之理，而「恕」則是將愛人之理推擴於他人。這種忠恕觀，可說是將自我的「完善」觀推展於他人、群體。而丁若鏞則認為：愛人之理除了來自於自我的完善觀外，也有其現實脈絡，非獨我之「窮格」、「盡己」所能得，必待於具體人事間的交涉而後能得。故其說法是以現實上的「愛人之理」，應當通過溝通、協商的「正當」程序，在「正當」的形式運作下，才可以獲得眾人所認同的「完善」。

(三) 與朱子學的互補

儘管丁若鏞與朱熹對如何獲致「完善」的概念有不同的看法，但他們的理論之間仍然有共享與互補的意義。首先，在朱子的理氣觀中，「天理」與「性」是先驗而普遍的存在，也不依循於氣質世界或物理世界的因果法則。丁若鏞所論的「性嗜好」，雖有「嗜好」、「嗜欲」的文字之異，但「嗜欲」只是比喻其機能，而不是指「性」、「心」依循著欲望的法則，因而也所論的「性」與朱熹之論，同屬於先驗性的普遍人性。換言之，二者對「性」的看法雖有不同，但卻同樣認為「性」中具有先驗性的道德法則，可作為道德活動的根據。

其次，朱熹由存有論的立場揭示「天理」與「人性」具有下貫的關係，

Cheong Yagyong, vol.5, p.148).

29) 《論語古今注》言：「仁者，人倫之成德；恕者，所以成仁之方法」。見《與猶堂全書》第5冊，總頁171(*Cheong Yagyong, Old and New Commentaries of Analects, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong*, vol.5, p.171)。

30) 朱熹言：「有諸己而後求諸人，無諸己而後非諸人，是責人之恕。絜矩與己所不欲勿施於人，是愛人之恕」、「推己及物之謂恕，聖人則不待推而發用於外者皆恕也。己所不欲勿施於，則就愛人上說，聖人之恕則不專在愛人上見，如絜矩之類是也。」、「忠只是實心，直是真實不偽，到應接事物也只是推這箇心去。直是忠，方能恕，若不忠，便無本領了，更把甚麼去及物？」見於《朱子語類》卷16《大學》三·傳九章釋家齊國治(王星賢點校本)，頁358(LI Jingde(ed.), *Quotations from Zhu Xi*, p.358)。又言：「一是忠，所貫者恕。忠是一箇實心，萬法萬事皆自此出。聖人只有這兩端，外此更無餘事。」見《朱子語類》卷27《論語》九·〈裏仁篇〉下·子曰參乎章(王星賢點校本)，頁687(LI Jingde(ed.), *Quotations from Zhu Xi*, p.687)。

這種立場應該也可以被丁若鏞所接受。丁若鏞的不滿應在於：朱熹對「性」、「理」的揭示，只能說明人具有一種能意識道德價值的能力，卻無法具體的說明這種能力如何成為一種討論道德的能力，而被適當的運用。特別是在不同的立場與欲望需求之下，由於不雜人欲之私的自我無法被眾人檢定，因而也無法找到一個對待雙方，彼、此皆可接受的「純然天理」。因此，丁若鏞的說法，可以視為是站在朱熹所談論「道德主體」(moral subject)的基礎上，再進一步的討論作為「動德行動者」(moral agent)應該如何掌握「理義」的問題。

三、丁若鏞說法與朱熹及戴震、阮元間的距離

(一) 戴震之學在完善觀上的缺乏

掌握了上述朱熹與丁若鏞在四書詮釋上的差異與發展，則可以對照出，在理論型態上，丁若鏞實近於朱熹而遠於震戴與阮元。以戴震對「恕」的看法而言，戴震曾舉《大學》「所惡於上，毋以使下，所惡於下，毋以事上；所惡於前，毋以先後；所惡於後，毋以從前；所惡於右，毋以交於左；所惡於左，毋以交於右」來解釋「己所不欲，勿施於人」。³¹⁾他的解釋重點有二：(一)「己所不欲，勿施於人」即是「以情絜情」之意；(二)「理在情中」不能「捨情求理」。這二個意見看似與朱子「絜矩」、丁若鏞「以人事人」之說不異，然而戴震所謂的「情」與「理」與朱熹、丁若鏞之說仍然有很大的區別。主要的差異在於朱熹或丁若鏞所論的「性」、「理義」皆不由「欲望」上立言，³²⁾而戴震所論之「性」、「理」與「欲」、「情」、「知」則是一組整體不分的概念。³³⁾

31) 戴震《孟子字義疏證》卷上〈理〉第4條(Dai Zhen, "li" no.4, *Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius*, vol.1)言：「曰所不欲、曰所惡，不過人之常情，不言理而理盡於此。惟以情絜情，故其於事也，非心出一意見以處之，苟舍情求理，其所謂理，無非意見也。未有任其意見而不禍斯民者」。

32) 以丁若鏞為例，他說：「餘嘗以性為心之所嗜好，人皆疑之，今其證在此矣。欲、樂、性三字，分作三層，最淺者欲也，其次樂也，其最深而遂為本人之癖好者性也。君子所性，猶言君子所嗜好也。但嗜好猶淺，而性則自然之名也，若雲性非嗜好之類，則所性二字不能成文。欲、樂、性三字既為同類，則性者，嗜好也」。由此段話可知，丁若鏞認為若言嗜好可以有「欲、樂、性」三層意思，故「性嗜好」不能說是「欲嗜之好」，而所以用「嗜好」說之，是為要生動的解釋「所性」的意思。引文見於《孟子要義》，《與猶堂全書》，第4冊，總頁576(Cheong Yagyong, *A Summary Opinion On Mencius, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong*, vol.4, p.576)。

33) 《孟子字義疏證》卷下〈才〉第1條(Dai Zhen, "cai" no.1, *Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius*, vol.2)言：「人生而後有欲，有情，有知，三者，血氣心知之自然也。給於欲者，聲色臭味也，而因有愛畏。發乎情者，喜怒哀樂也，而因有慘舒。辨於知者，美醜是非也，而因有好惡」、「惟有欲有情而又有知，然後欲得遂也，情得達也。天下之事，使欲之得遂，情之得達，斯已矣。惟人之知，小之能盡美醜之極致，大

戴震認為「性」表現為「聲色臭味之欲望」、「喜怒哀樂之情」、「美醜是非之知」三者。「聲色臭味之欲望」、「喜怒哀樂之情」有關於「血氣」，「美醜是非之知」有關於「心知」，故也可直接以「血氣心知」論「性」。³⁴⁾戴震認為道德之盛無過於「使人欲無不遂，人情無不達」，而達到此種目的的關鍵在於「心知」能否具有「無蔽隔，無弗通」的「神明」而能「不失理」。³⁵⁾由於戴震所謂的「理」是「血氣中人欲與人情所呈現的條理」，³⁶⁾所以他所說「有條不紊」的道德觀，比較接近於調解社會紛亂與欲望衝突的「秩序」概念，而其道德修養論則傾向於「智識」的培養，³⁷⁾其目的在於解決社會的「失序」狀況。

(二) 阮元「二人為仁」說的理論型態不同於茶山學

震戴的說法明顯具有「正當」的理念，卻缺乏「完善」的觀點。而這種對儒學的解釋方式，同樣的也表現在阮元的說法中。阮元除了以「血氣心知」說「性」之外，³⁸⁾特別強調「仁」在實踐上的意義，因而有「二人而仁乃見」及「相人偶」的說法。阮元「二人乃見仁」的說法與丁若鏞「二人相與」的說法看似相近，其實二者的論述有很大的距離。阮元「二人乃見仁」所強調的是「己立立人」、「己達達人」之意，³⁹⁾這種說法不如丁若

之能盡是非之極致，然後遂己之欲者，廣之能遂人之欲；達己之情者，廣之能達人之情。道德之盛，使人之欲無不遂，人之情無不達，斯已矣。」

- 34) 《孟子字義疏證》卷下〈誠〉(Dai Zhen, "cheng", *Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius*, vol.2)言：「血氣心知者，分於陰陽五行而成性者也，故曰天命之謂性」。
- 35) 《孟子字義疏證》卷上〈理〉第5條(Dai Zhen, "li" no.5, *Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius*, vol.1)言：「孟子曰：耳目之官不思，心之官則思。是思者，心之能也。精爽有蔽隔而不能通之時，及其無蔽隔，無弗通，乃以神明稱之。凡血氣之屬，皆有精爽。其心之精爽，鉅細不同，如火光之照物，光小者，其照也近，所照者不謬也，所不照斯疑謬承之，不謬之謂得理；其光大者，其照也遠，得理多而失理少。且不特遠近也，光之及又有明闇，故於物有察有不察；察者盡其實，不察斯疑謬承之，疑謬之謂失理」。
- 36) 《孟子字義疏證》卷上〈理〉(Dai Zhen, "li" no.1, *Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius*, vol.1)言：「理者，察之而幾微，必區以別之名也，是故謂之分理。在物之質，曰肌理、曰腠理、曰文理，亦曰文縷、理縷，語之轉耳。得其分，則有條而不紊，謂之條理。孟子稱『孔子之謂集大成』曰：『始條理者，智之事也；終條理者，聖之事也。』聖智至孔子而極其盛，不過舉條理以言之而已矣」。
- 37) 《孟子字義疏證》卷上〈理〉第5條(Dai Zhen, "li" no.5, *Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius*, vol.1)言「失理者，限於質之昧，所謂愚也。惟學可以增益其不足而進於智，益之不已，至乎其極，如日月有明，容光必照，則聖人矣」。
- 38) 阮元《學經室集》一集卷10〈性命古訓〉「春秋成公十三年」條(Ruan Yuan, "Xing ming gu xun, Yanjingshi ji")言：「性字從心，即血氣心知也。有血氣無心知，非性也；有心知無血氣，非性也。血氣心知皆天所命，人所受也。人既有血氣心知之性，即有九德、五典、五禮、七情、十義，故聖人作禮樂以節之，修道以教之，因其動作，以禮義為威儀」。
- 39) 《學經室集》一集卷8〈論語論仁論〉(Ruan Yuan, "Lunyu lun ren lun, Yanjingshi ji")言：「所謂仁者，己之身欲立則亦立人，己之身欲達則亦達人，所以必兩人相人偶而仁始見也。即如己欲立孝道，亦必使人立孝道，所謂不置錫類也。己欲達德行，亦必使人達德行，所謂愛人以德也。曾子所謂人非人不濟，正是立人達人之道也，亦即近取譬之道也」。

鏞之說具有社會互動的意義。如以孝道言之，阮元所謂的「二人乃見仁」是指「己欲立孝道，亦必使人立孝道」，這種解釋近於傳統的說法，只在強調「盡己」(忠)且能「推己」(恕)的意思。丁若鏞的「二人之間盡其道」所強調的不在於「推己」，而在於「二人之間」的「間」。⁴⁰⁾「間」猶如《論語·八佾》所提示「君使臣以禮，臣事君以忠」之意，指在君臣關係中，君有君當盡之道，臣有臣當盡之道，而仁即在此「二人之間盡其道」而完成。

(三) 茶山學中「嚮人之愛」與「二人之間盡其道」的理論關係

由於丁若鏞對「二人之間盡其道」的強調，因而他所說的「二人相與」就具有社會互動的意義，而不只是指「盡己」且能「推己」之意。再進一步言，丁若鏞以「二人」解釋「仁」，除了有「間」的意義，也有「嚮」的意義，⁴¹⁾因而可以再有「嚮人之愛」與「二人之間，盡其道」的二層意義。「嚮人之愛」是由性之好、惡所形成對他人「無條件的義務」，如「孝弟忠信」或「孝弟慈」等，皆當責於己而不責於人，故丁若鏞於此強調「為仁由己」之意，這是第一個層次的「二人」為「仁」。第二層次的「二人」為「仁」則涉及了具體的社會條件與個人條件，所以這個層次的「二人」為「仁」所強調的是社會互動中「相與」的意義。

就仁的行動而言，第一層次的「嚮人之愛」應當優先於第二層次的「二人之間盡其道」，故丁若鏞言：「凡二人之間盡其道者，皆仁也，然孝弟為之根」。以孝而言之，「子事親」是單方面的「嚮人之愛」，這是子獨盡其在倫理中的「分」，可以有「孝」之名，而「二人之間，盡其道者」則是雙方面的「嚮人之愛」則有「孝慈」之名。「嚮人之孝」，顯然不涉及利益及所嚮對象的想法及作為，如舜之怨慕父母。⁴²⁾然而「二人相與的慈愛」則必須考慮所嚮之人的想法，以達成對待雙方在精神與物質上相互扶助的效益。

上述的說明除了對照出丁若鏞與阮元在「二人為仁」說的理論差異外，

40) 丁若鏞言：「道者，人之所由行也；仁者，二人相與也。事親孝為仁，父與子二人也；事兄悌為仁，兄與弟二人也；事君忠為仁，君與臣二人也；牧民慈為仁，牧與民二人也；以至夫婦、朋友。凡二人之間盡其道者，皆仁也，然孝弟為之根」。見《論語古今注》，《與猶堂全書》，第5冊，總頁20(Cheong Yagyong, *Old and New Commentaries of Analects, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong* vol.5, p.20)。

41) 丁若鏞言：「仁者，嚮人之愛也。處人倫，盡其分謂之仁。為仁由己，故曰：不遠」。見《論語古今注》，《與猶堂全書》，第5冊，總頁280(Cheong Yagyong, *Old and New Commentaries of Analects, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong* vol.5, p.280)。

42) 《孟子·萬章上》(Mencius, "Wan Chang" part1, Mencius)載：萬章問曰：「舜往於田，號泣於旻天。何為其號泣也？」孟子曰：「怨慕也。」萬章曰：「父母愛之，喜而不忘；父母惡之，勞而不怨。然則舜怨乎？」曰：「長息問於公明高曰：『舜往於田，則吾既得聞命矣；號泣於旻天、於父母，則吾不知也。』公明高曰：『是非爾所知也。』夫公明高以孝子之心為不若是怨。『我竭力耕田，共為子職而已矣；父母之不我愛，於我何哉？』〔……〕。大孝終身慕父母，五十而慕者，予於大舜見之矣。」

亦可見丁若鏞之說有超出傳統之處。如以「完善」與「正當」的概念論之，丁若鏞的「嚮人之愛」說，以「孝弟忠信」為根本，顯然是出於心所嗜好的天性，超越因果及利害的法則，具有「完善」的意義。而「二人相與」說則著重於平等的倫理分位與現實的條件，因而除了「忠信」的「完善」概念外，亦涉及所嚮對象間溝通與協商的「相與」過程，因而又具有「正當」的意義。相對之下，戴震與阮元由於在論說上不能觸及道德根據的問題，因而在「完善」的論點上有所不足；而且在「二人」為「仁」的論點上，阮元的說法也不像丁若鏞之說具有「正當」的概念。

四、結論

在倫理學的討論中，有「義務論」與「目的論」的兩種區分，「義務論」與「目的論」雖有不同的定義，但如果取最普遍的說法，將兩論的區別放在道德行動是依照「義務原則」或「幸福原則」上，則「目的論」在於主張道德行為的價值決定於該行為所實現的目的(*telos*)或結果(*consequences*)，而義務論則主張道德行為的價值不完全由結果所決定。⁴³⁾如以倫理學上「義務論」(*deontology*)與「目的論」(*teleology*)的區分來討論朱熹與戴震、阮元對「仁」的解釋，朱熹著重於「完善」的理念，明顯是偏於「義務論」而離於「目的論」，而戴震、阮元重視「正當」的意義，傾向於具有「秩序」效益的「目的論」。相對而言，丁若鏞論「可仁之理在於本心」、「行仁之根在於本心」，⁴⁴⁾都意指著普遍而內在的「性」對人具有強責性，心是依性而有仁，而非依外在的目的而成仁，因而他的說法也有「義務論」的特色，而與朱熹相近。

丁若鏞的理論雖然有「義務論」的特色，但由於他比朱熹更加強調「二人相與」的意義。這使得他的義務倫理學比朱熹更進一步，而能觸及橫向關係的溝通與效益問題，因而具有目的論的性質。以上節所論丁若鏞的「嚮人之愛」與「二人之間盡其道」而言，「嚮人之愛」合於朱熹對「完善」的論說，而「二人之間盡其道」，則比朱熹更進一步，涉及了對待雙方如何能平等而有效的進行溝通與協商的「正當」觀。丁若鏞在平衡「義務論」與「目的論」或「完善觀」與「正當觀」上有其獨特的意見，但他的說法並沒有超出先秦儒學(特別是孔孟儒學)的論說，不論是在論及

43) 林火旺：《倫理學》，(台北：五南圖書公司，1999年)，頁20(Lin Huo-Wang, *Ethics*, p.20)。

44) 《論語古今注》言：「仁之不明久矣！可仁之理在於本心，詩雲：『民之秉彝，好是懿德』是也。行仁之根在於本心，孟子雲：『惻隱之心，仁之端也』」。見《與猶堂全書》第6冊，總頁48(Cheong Yagyong, *Old and New Commentaries of Analects, The Complete Works of Cheong Yagyong* vol.6, p.48)。

內在自由的完善觀，或者是論及外在自由的正當觀上，他都一概的以「嗜好之性」中所呈現好善恥惡的形式原則作為判準。在「嚮人之愛」時，性所呈現的是對「孝弟忠信」的嗜好；而在「二人相與」時，由於普遍人性的好、惡機能，使得對待雙方可以用「己所不欲，勿施於人」做為溝通與協商的基礎。由於丁若鏞的論述中，「性」所形成的道德性的形式原則，可以通貫於「自我完善」與「他我正當」的二個領域，因而可說丁若鏞的論說，除了具有由「義務論」延伸至「目的論」的意義外，也有引伸為「德行原理」與「法權原理」的可能性。

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The Good and the Right: Connections between the Thought of Tasan and Zhu Xi

TSAI Chen-feng

Abstract

The fact that the commentaries on the *Four Books* written by Chǒng Yagyong (style name: Tasan) deviate widely from those of Zhu Xi has led many scholars to believe that he opposed the thought of Zhu Xi. As similar positions have been thought to be related to *qi* studies, Chǒng Yagyong has been considered to be a proponent of such movement. This paper reviews this argument from the modern philosophical perspectives of the “good” and the “right” to clarify the theoretical differences and connections between Tasan and Zhu Xi, as well as to consider whether it is possible to place Tasan’s theory within the context of modern scholarship, especially that of political philosophy. We conclude that Chǒng Yagyong’s thought is complementary to that of Zhu Xi, and that as such it is distinct from the *qi* studies of the Qing dynasty. Furthermore, Tasan’s thought is shown to be more relevant to modern scholarship than that of Zhu Xi in that, in addition to introducing the possibility of merging deontology and teleology in the field of ethics, he also opens up the possibility of shifting from the principle of virtue to the principle of right.

Keywords: Chǒng Yagyong, the right, the good, *qi* thought, Zhu Xi thought

黃宗羲與明清之際經濟倫理的轉向

黃 敦 兵

中文摘要：黃宗羲從“人各自私自利”的新人性論出發，視萬民之利為“公利”，為萬民自有權利和權益辯護；從是否“切於民用”的角度，重新判分“本末之辨”，主張“工商皆本”，重整了四民價值秩序。黃宗羲的經濟倫理思想是“新民本”型的經濟倫理思想，它包涵的“以民生起見”的民生觀，是“崇公”的價值理想在新的經濟形態下的運用，涵藏著近代性的根芽，代表著中國哲學從古典形態向近代形態的轉向，對於我們今天的稅費制改革、減輕農民負擔、構建和諧社會等諸多方面和多個領域，都有著重要的啟示意義。

關鍵詞：黃宗羲；經濟倫理；轉向；明清之際

引言

黃宗羲是明清之際“三大思想家”之一，因其對君主專制政治的激烈批判、喊出“為天下之大害者，君而已矣”的口號而卓著於後世。他主張在“天崩地解”的明清之際，有能“扶危定傾”的豪傑之士起而拯救天下萬民，他親自“條具為治大法”以救時難而扶人心。黃宗羲對豪傑型君子人格理想的設想，落實到現實經濟活動中，表現為他對“人各自私自利”需求的價值認同，也表現在他願“天下安富”、“遂民之生”的民生觀上。黃宗羲歎惜於“喪亂以來，民生日蹙，其細已甚”¹⁾的情景，主張“志仁者從民生起見”，因為“從民生起見，即蒞中國朝秦楚，而無不可從一己起見，即固有之地，亦在所當損”²⁾。他還說：“夫古今之變，至秦而一盡，至元而又一盡，經此二盡之後，古聖王之所惻隱愛人而經營者蕩然無具，苟非為之遠思深覽，一一通變，以複井田、封建、學校、卒乘之舊，雖小小更革，生民之戚戚終無已時也。”³⁾他提倡“有治法而後有治人”⁴⁾，主張恢復“先王之法”，以存“法外之意”，

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1) 《黃宗羲全集》第10冊，浙江古籍出版社2005年增訂版，第270頁。以下引述黃宗羲原文，皆出自該版本。

2) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第146頁。

3) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第7頁。Huang, Zongxi, The Complete Works of Huang

使“不至深刻羅綱，反害天下”⁵⁾。對於“複井田”、“遂民之生”這些經濟活動，黃宗羲提出了自己的倫理考量與制度設計。

因為本文主要涉及的將是黃宗羲與明清之際經濟倫理的轉向，定位於“轉向”這一層面上，所以就只能從幾黃宗羲經濟倫理思想的幾個重要部分入手來分析，著重論述黃宗羲基於自然人性論上的合眾私而成公利的新型功利主義，以及黃宗羲“工商皆本”論所反映的新型價值次序重建近代性意義。

一、“人各自私自利”——黃宗羲經濟倫理的新人性論基礎

義利關係是中國倫理思想史上被熱烈討論的大問題。⁶⁾《周易·文言傳》雲：“利者，義之和也。”講義利統一前提下“義”的價值優先地位，這是中國倫理學思潮的主流。義為利本思想是儒家義利觀的重要源頭之一。早在春秋時期，孔子就主張“見利思義”、“義然後取”。⁷⁾荀子則主張“先義後利”⁸⁾，“以義制利”⁹⁾。在以“義”為前提的義利觀中，儒家也承認“利”的合理性，並強調獲“利”途徑的正當性。孔子說：“富而可求，雖執鞭之士，吾亦為之。”¹⁰⁾雖然孟子對梁惠王說“王何必曰利，亦有仁義而已矣”¹¹⁾，但他只是批評當時諸侯奪民自肥而“利吾國”，不知恤民、利民，並非只講仁義不講利。¹²⁾他主張王須能與民同樂、同“好貨”，能“制民之產”，士也要有“恒

Zongxi, Zhejiang Ancient Book Press, 2005. Same bibliographical information applies hereafter.

4) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第7頁。

5) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第7頁。

6) 對義利觀研究的論文，可參：(1)朱家楨：《義利思想辯證》，載《中國經濟史研究》1987年第2期；(2)葉坦：《論“利”》，《中國經濟史研究》1998年第2期。專書可參：呂世榮、劉象彬、肖永成：《義利觀研究》，河南大學出版社2000年版。

7) 《論語·憲問》。The Analects.

8) 《荀子·王霸》。The Book of Xunzi.

9) 《荀子·正論》。

10) 《論語·述而》。

11) 《孟子·梁惠王上》。The Book of Mencius.

12) 楊澤波先生認為，孟子此處講的“亦有仁義而已”，是在談政治問題，不是談倫理問題，必須落到仁政上來理解，“並不是說只要有仁義就可以了，而是說，君主應該施行仁政，用仁政治民”。孟子此處的義利之辨，其實是在(1)“治國方略意義上”講的，也就是王霸之辨。孟子還從(2)人禽之分意義上談義利之辨。這時的“利”指“利益”，“義”指“德義”，這個意義上的義利之辨，“強調人的道德性，強調人與禽獸之間的差異性”，“義和利是價值選擇關係，成為什麼樣的人，關鍵就看你有怎樣的價值選擇。價值選擇是人禽之分意義的義利之辨的核心”。(3)“道德目的意義的義利之辨”，純然為善，是“由仁義行”的。其中，(1)與(3)在本質上彼此對立，孟子正是在這兩層關係上談“只准言義，不准言利”；而(2)本質上是價值選擇的問題，義與利只有層次之分，沒有絕對的排他性，選擇義不一定必須排斥利，選擇利也不一定違背義，二者可以兼得。見氏著《孟子評傳》，南京大學出版社1998年，第233-260頁。

產”以護持其“恒心”。北宋理學家張載說：“義，公天下之利。”¹³⁾他以“公利”釋“義”的思想，多被後來的學者引釋。程顥說：“大凡出義則入利，出利則入義。天下之事，惟義利而已。”¹⁴⁾朱熹說：“義利之說，乃儒者第一義。”¹⁵⁾一語道出義利之辨的重要的思想史意義。程頤說君子未嘗不欲利，“人無利，直是生不得，安得無利”¹⁶⁾，若“只以利爲心則有害”¹⁷⁾。其實，“天下只是一個利”，“只爲後人趨著利便有弊，故孟子拔本塞源，不肯言利”¹⁸⁾，故在義利關係上，他認爲“聖人於利不能完全不較論，但不至妨義耳”¹⁹⁾，利害是人之常情，聖人“則更不論利害，惟看義當爲不當爲”²⁰⁾，而且“聖人以義爲利，義安處便爲利”²¹⁾，高揚義的價值優先性。朱熹繼此說：“只循這道理做去，利自在其中矣。……聖人豈不言利？”²²⁾應“必以仁義爲先，而不以功利爲急”²³⁾，“只認義和處便是利，不去利上求利”²⁴⁾。他又從天理人欲之辨上對義利關係進行了解讀，認爲“循天理，則不求利而自無不利；殉人欲，則求利未得而害己隨之”²⁵⁾，在一定程度上肯定了“利”的合理性。永嘉學派代表人物葉適則批評董仲舒說：“既無功利，則道義乃無用之虛語爾。”²⁶⁾明確倡言功利。葉適與陳亮的義利觀，突破了傳統儒家重義輕利的價值觀，反映了當時商品經濟的發展情況。

明清時期對功利的認識進一步深化，明代丘濬將利與義、害相聯系來認識，激烈反對“人君與商賈爭利”的思想。海瑞認爲，聖人實際上都是“樂就功利”²⁷⁾的，他主張“利國之道於利民得之”²⁸⁾，將“利國”與“利民”兩種價值取向歸而爲一。張居正認爲“義利之間在心不在跡”²⁹⁾，強調以心理動機而不是實際行爲及效果來判斷義利。他要求“厚商而利農”，“厚農而資商”，而“農商之勢常若權衡然”，各行業間應相互爲用。³⁰⁾

13) 張載：《正蒙·大易篇第十四》，《張載集》第50頁。

14) 《二程集》第124頁。The Book of Two Brothers.

15) 朱熹：《與延平李先生書》，《朱子文集》卷十二四。

16) 《二程集》第215頁。

17) 《二程集》第249頁。

18) 《二程集》第215頁。

19) 《二程集》第396頁。

20) 《二程集》第176頁。

21) 《二程集》第173頁。

22) 《朱子語類》第849頁。

23) 《朱文公文集》卷七十五。

24) 《朱子語類》第849頁。

25) 《四書集注·孟子》。

26) 《習學記言序目》卷二十三。

27) 《海瑞集·複歐陽柏庵掌科》。

28) 《海瑞集》，中華書局1962年，第493頁。

29) 張居正：《答福建巡撫耿楚侗談王霸之辨》，《張太嶽集》卷八，上海古籍出版社1984年影印本，第383頁。

30) 張居正：《贈水部周漢浦樞竣還朝序》，《張太嶽集》卷八，上海古籍出版社1984年影印本，第99頁。

黃宗羲正是從這樣的理論背景出發，從普通人的情感、利益出發立論，提出了他對人性的設定，即提出以“有生之初，人各自私也，人各自利”³¹⁾的自然人性論為新人性論基礎的新經濟倫理理想，反對君主專利。他憂思“生民之戚戚”而努力欲使“天下安富”，使民獲“久遠之利”，極力主張以經世致用為特色的義利統一觀。

當然，這個“有生之初”“人各自私自利”是一個“無君”的時代。在“無君”的時代，雖然人人出於與生俱來的本性，能追求個人的一己私利，但“公利”卻並不是不為個人所需要的，“公害”也需要有人出來掃除。在黃宗羲看來，“無君”的社會並不是一個理想的社會。所以如果一個人出來為天下“興公利”而“除公害”，為公利不惜一切代價，那麼這個能做出並非常人所能為之行爲的，就是“君”。天下需要“君”，需要興利除害的“君”。從這種人性自私自利論出發，黃宗羲認為在古代，一個人去擔當人君，是不得已而為之的，因為那時的人君要“以千萬倍之勤勞而已又不享其利”，為天下“除公害”、“興公利”，這“必非天下之人情所欲居”。一般來講，“好逸惡勞，亦猶夫人之情也”，一個若是千萬倍地辛勞於普通人，“不以一己之利為利，而使天下受其利，不以一己之害為害，而使天下釋其害”，為他人的利益鞠躬盡瘁，這必非出自普通人的自願。所以，對於“君”之一位，一般的人是“不欲入”的。黃宗羲看到“作君之意”之“當然”情景，在公利與私利中有著“崇公抑利”的選擇。作為一個大思想家，黃宗羲更看到現實中的君主廢“公”為“私”、化“國”為“家”的不正當現象，認為這既引致君民關係的惡化、君臣關係的異化、世道人心的機械變詐，還最終背離了“作君之意”。

黃宗羲在建構他的倫理學說體系時，多從三代之治、原始儒家那裏尋繹理論資源，披上了復古的外衣³²⁾。黃宗羲對民生問題的倫理關切，以同情惻隱和悲憫之心看待萬民所受的苦難而思以救之。他提出一系列的制度設計，將傳統民本思想推進到一個新的階段。³³⁾而黃宗羲“新民本”式的倫理思想，正是以自然人性論作為其基礎之一。馮天瑜、謝貴安先生說，所謂“自然人性論”，指“以人的自然本能的合理性為立論基礎的一種人道主義哲學觀”³⁴⁾，肯定人們情感、欲望的存在與滿足，以及追求各自私利的合理性。

31) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第2頁。

32) 侯外廬先生指出，黃宗羲“對於封建的現狀，批判很尖銳，同時他披著三代外衣的理想，又表示出極其篤信的樣子”。見氏著《中國思想通史》第五卷，人民出版社1956年，第159頁。

33) 對黃宗羲政治倫理思想的定位，大致說來有如下幾種：(1)侯外廬、蕭蓬父等先生“早期啟蒙說”中的樸素民主性界定；(2)張岱年先生的“民主說”；(3)馮天瑜、謝貴安、吳光先生等的“新民本”說；(4)劉澤華、張師偉等先生的“傳統民本說”或“民本極限說”；(5)李存山、韋政通等先生的“從民本到民主的過渡說”。諸先生觀點相關論著，請參附錄“主要參考文獻”。黃宗羲是“通儒”，他的思想不能僅限於從某一領域的界定來概括。因諸家是從不同角度作的界說，故本文不持某一說為定論。就君民(包括官民)倫理層面面議，我們大致認同我們所重釋的“過渡說”，即帶有樸素民主性的“新民本說”。

34) 馮天瑜、謝貴安先生認為，自然人性論牽涉到理欲觀、義利觀、平等思想和人道主義等命題，“實際上是對理學所確立的‘存天理滅人欲’觀念的解縛”。參氏著《解構專制》，湖北人民出版社2003年，第260頁。

從中國倫理思想史上看，持好“利”的自然人性論較著者，如荀子認為“若夫目好色，耳好聲，口好味，心好利，骨體膚理好愉佚，是皆生於人之性情者也；感而自然，不待事而後生之者也。”³⁵⁾人們聲色美味之求與好利之心，都是人之性情的自然流露，是人們天生就有的。法家也認為趨樂避苦、趨利避害是人之常情。如說“凡人之情，得所欲則樂，逢所惡則憂，此貴賤之所同也”，“凡人之情，見利莫能勿就，見害莫能勿避”。³⁶⁾《商君書·算地》篇認為“民生則計利，死則慮名”，名利之心是人天生就有的，“民之性，度而取長，稱而取重，權而索利”，故“羞辱勞苦者，民之所惡也；顯榮佚樂者，民之所務也”。《賞刑》篇則說：“民之欲富貴，共闔棺而後止。”人們趨利之心，“民之於利也，若水之於下也，四旁無擇也”³⁷⁾，而且一生不變。韓非子認為，“夫民之性，惡勞而樂佚”³⁸⁾，“喜利畏罪，人莫不然”³⁹⁾，人情本來就是“皆挾自爲心”⁴⁰⁾，而“好利惡害，夫人之所有也”⁴¹⁾，“安利者就之，危害者去之”⁴²⁾。而對於如何滿足萬民自私自利需求的問題，黃宗羲給出了他那個時代的新詮。

二、“自有”與“自養”：黃宗羲自私自利人性論的社會基礎

黃宗羲對人性的設定，是出於對一般人性情偏好的考慮，他認為“有生之初，人各自私也，人各自利也”⁴³⁾，這是一個“無君”時代人性的實然狀況。在“無君”的時代，雖然人人出於與生俱來的本性，能追求個人的一己私利，但“天下有公利而莫或興之，有公害而莫或除之”，可見“無君”的社會並不是一個理想的社會。所以，需要“非天下之人情所欲居”的“君”之職位，需要一個為天下盡“興公利”而“除公害”之責的人君。黃宗羲依“古之人君”擬比的理想君主，某些方面類似於現代人們所講的“公仆”。君主之所以必要，是因為社會上存在著“公利”需要有人去“興之”，存在著“公害”需要有人去“除之”。人君的職責就是為社會興公利而除公害，從而滿足天下萬民的“自利”欲求。視萬民之利為“公利”，這是黃宗羲功利主義價值觀的特征。⁴⁴⁾但是，黃宗羲的“人各自利”的人性論必然會推致君主的“專利”，即人君利用手中的權力牟取一家一姓之大私，

35) 《荀子·性惡》。

36) 《管子·禁藏》。

37) 《商君書·算地》。

38) 《韓非子·心度》。

39) 《韓非子·難二》。

40) 《韓非子·奸劫弑臣》。

41) 《韓非子·難二》。

42) 《韓非子·外儲說左上》。

43) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第2頁。

44) 唐凱麟，陳科華：《中國古代經濟倫理思想史》，人民出版社2004年，第391頁。

進而以此大私視爲大公，並且以此訓化乃至強制臣民接受。

黃宗羲本人並未從這種邏輯上只作理性思辨的圓融工作，他看到的是現實中即“後之人君”的極端專橫、無限詐取的罪惡行爲，他看到的是君爲“天下之大害”，甚至認爲這種“人君”還不如“無君”。黃宗羲由此出發，批判他所認爲的三代之後的君主視天下爲一家之私產，將君位視爲能帶來超經濟利益的權力，完全丟棄了滿足人各自私、人各自利的義務，並利用手中的與萬民爭利。所以，黃宗羲喊出時代的最強音：“爲天下之害者，君而已矣！”黃宗羲化用孟子政治哲學關於臣以道事君等高揚臣道的精神，主張暴君即爲“獨夫”，人人可得而誅之。

綜觀現在可稽的黃宗羲的所有著述，他對於“人各自私自利”的自然人性論並沒有作過多的理論論證，正如前文所言，他提出這一人性論假設，是爲引出“作君之意”，以糾正“君害論”，從而重新厘正君民關係。但結合他所“條具”的“爲治大法”，我們卻可以從他諸多的制度設計中讀出不少信息，以此證成黃宗羲對萬民追求自身合理利益的價值肯定。

黃宗羲說：

嗟乎！天之生斯民也，以教養托之於君。授田之法廢，民買田而自養，猶賦稅以擾之；學校之法廢，民蚩蚩而失教，猶勢利以誘之；是亦不仁之甚。而以其空名躋之曰“君父，君父”，則吾誰欺！⁴⁵⁾

這是從國君治國方略上批評君權極端化、私有化以後，君主與民爭利的醜惡現實。有學者認爲，他的基本租稅思想是從維護私有財產權利的市民觀點出發的，黃宗羲一再區分“民自有之田”與“上之田”，他批評那些向私人田產征收賦稅的君主即不成其爲“君父”，他“用這樣激昂的情調來爲私有財產辯護，連南宋葉適和明中葉的李贄也不及他鮮明而堅決”，“他的這一租稅觀點是當時信奉私有財產權利神聖的福音的市民意識的反映”。⁴⁶⁾

這種承認民眾“自有”私利權的合法性的觀點，確實帶有所謂市民意識覺醒的近代性特征。但黃宗羲是在爲民眾的正當私利呼籲，人人各得自私自利，則天下人皆得其利，這其實帶有所謂天下公利正當性進行辯護的性質，這與顧炎武“合私成公”的思想是相近的。顧炎武(字寧人，1613-1682)也堅持人性自私的觀點，他說：“不在此列之人各懷其家，各私其子，其常情也。爲天子爲百姓之心，必不如其自爲，此在三代以上已然矣。聖人者因而用之，用天下之私以成一人之公，而天下治。”⁴⁷⁾自私是人之“常情”，聖人是“因而用之”，不壓制人之私利而“天下治”。他主張“寓封建之意於郡縣之中”，如此可“厚民生，強國用”而“天下治”。⁴⁸⁾就一縣而言，令縣令“私其

45) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第11頁。

46) 胡寄窗，談敏：《中國財政思想史》，中國財政經濟出版社1989年，第554頁。

47) 顧炎武：《郡縣論》五，《顧亭林詩文集》，中華書局1983年，第14頁。

48) 《顧亭林詩文集》第12頁。

百裏之地”⁴⁹⁾，民是縣令的“子民”，則縣令治縣必然盡力，當變亂時也會效死勿去，這樣“爲其私，所以爲天子也”⁵⁰⁾，縣縣如此，則“天下之私，天子之公也”⁵¹⁾。

在《破邪論》之《賦稅》篇中，黃宗羲說：“先王之時，民養於上。其後，民自爲養。又其後，橫征暴斂，使民無以自養。《詩》雲：‘普天之下，莫非王土；率土之濱，莫非王臣。’田出於王以授民，故謂之‘王土’。後世之田爲民所買，是民土而非王土也。民待養於上，故謂之‘王臣’。民不爲上所養，則不得系之以王。孟子以二十取一爲貉道，以授田時言之也。若其所自買之田，即如漢之三十而取一，亦未見其爲恩也，而況於後世之賦輕者十取其三，重者十取其五六，民何以爲生乎？民既無以爲生，則隱避催科，詭計百端，並亦難乎其爲上矣。”⁵²⁾他還意圖恢復井田之制，減輕“小民”負擔，能使民“自養”。他說：“雖然，此不過催科便於有司，吾誠不敢以養民者望之後世，但使兩稅之法，複於前代，征其田土所自出，不以銀爲事，庶幾民得以自養耳。”⁵³⁾在複井田的同時，征稅不再經過納銀的中間環節，政府“征其田土所自出”，由此可以保障農民解其倒懸。這是從總體構想而言的，在具體制度上，黃宗羲也有相應的倫理創構。如他說：

今之兩稅，皆貢法也。其病民不待言，然民亦無暇以此爲病矣。苟還什一之稅，民亦解倒懸也。我東浙之田，斥鹵下下，一畝所收，上者不過米八鬥，米價八錢，其征銀米火耗二錢有奇，則十而取三矣。三吳之田稍優，其漕糧銀米，大略十取五六，而力役不與焉。古之田自上授之，而稅止什一，今之田民所自有，而稅且至半，何不幸而爲今之民也。⁵⁴⁾

這是黃宗羲從土地所有制及稅負數量上而指斥當日賦稅的不合理狀況。他還從賦稅征收的方式上提示了當時經濟制度的不合理性。他還指出：

以二十而取一爲不可者，亦是封建之制，非什一不足以備用。然當時田授於上，故稅其十一而無愧。今以民所自買之田，必欲仿古之什一，已爲不倫。且封建變爲郡縣，苟處置得宜，以天下而養一人，所入不貲，則二十取一，何爲不可！漢氏三十而稅一，未見其不足也。⁵⁵⁾

他指出中國古代社會制度最大的變化是“封建變爲郡縣”，社會的土地所有制關係也隨之發生了變化，由土地國有制過渡到土地私有制。因此，三代封建制下施行的十稅一，即使能在郡縣制下比例不變地施行，也“已爲

49) 《顧亭林詩文集》第14頁。

50) 《顧亭林詩文集》第15頁。

51) 《顧亭林詩文集》第15頁。

52) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第203頁。

53) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第203-204頁。

54) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第80頁。

55) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第146-147頁。

不倫”。國爲田是“民所自買之田”，並非“授於上”之田。黃宗羲認爲，土地既爲“民所自有”，人民就應該有基於土地所有制上的正當權利。若政府不能保障人民對自己權利的有效行使，就不具有合法性。正是出於維護人民的“自有”、“自養”權利，黃宗羲才主張“授田以養民”，並提出恢復井田制的倫理構想。

三、“工商皆本”：黃宗羲對傳統本末觀的價值重整

中國經濟倫理思想上，在四業的地位評價上，主流思想是重農桑而輕工商，以農桑爲本、以工商爲末而崇本抑末。一般而論，有利於王朝的經濟發展與政局穩定的即爲“本”，反之爲“末”。事實上，在對何爲“本”、何爲“末”的界說上，諸家所說的側重點並不完全一致。

司馬遷(前145－前86)在《貨殖列傳》中認爲，農、工、商、虞“此四者，民所衣食之原也”。求富是“人之情性”，但“富無經業”，不過，“本富爲上，末富次之，奸富爲下”。從致富之速度而言，“農不如工，工不如商，刺繡文不如依市門”，務農爲“拙業”而易守，從商而“富者必用奇勝”而其業風險大。理想的方式是“以末致財，用本守之”。中國早期資本主義萌芽興起時，商人富後多投資於買田置地，也說明司馬遷這一經濟倫理思想的實用性。可見，司馬遷並不否定人們求富的合理性。賈誼引楚靈王時範無宇的話，反對“充之以資財”、“實之以重祿之臣”的“輕本而重末”的做法，因爲“本細末大，弛必至心”。⁵⁶⁾他是以爵賞爲“末”，加強中央統治力量爲“本”。北齊思想家顏之推說：“農商工賈，廝役奴隸，釣魚屠肉，飯牛牧羊，皆有先達，可爲師表，博學求之，無不利於事也。”⁵⁷⁾認爲農商工賈各有其值得學習的地方，“人生在世，會當有業：農民則計量耕稼，商賈則討論貨賄，工巧則致精器用，伎藝則沈思法術，武夫則慣習弓馬，文士則講議經書”⁵⁸⁾，但農業爲“務本之道”，不能“輕農事而貴末業”⁵⁹⁾。他是從職業分工上談“本末論”的。

陳亮主張“上下相恤”，農商互補，他在《四弊》中指出，“古者官民一家，農商一事也。上下相恤，有無相通，民病則求之官，國病則資諸民”，“商藉農而立，農賴商而行”，農與商應“相資以爲用”，從而“官民農商，各安其所而樂其生”，這才是“至治之極”。張居正(字叔大，號太嶽，1525－1582)在《贈水部周漢浦榷竣還朝序》中說：“商、農之勢，常若權衡然。”也認爲農商應相互爲用，“欲物力不屈，則莫若省征發以厚農而資商；欲民用不困，則莫若輕關市以厚商而利農”，農業發展的出路不在抑商，而在“力本節

56) 《賈誼集》第23頁。

57) 顏子推：《顏氏家訓·勉學》，見張靄堂譯注《顏之推全集譯注》，齊魯書社2004年，第82頁。

58) 《顏之推全集譯注》第76頁。

59) 顏子推：《顏氏家訓·涉務》，《顏之推全集譯注》第165頁。

儉”，同時開利源“以植國本”。

葉適說：“夫四民交致其用，而後治化興。抑末厚本，非正論也。果出於厚本，而抑末雖偏，尚有義，若奪之以自利，何名為抑？”⁶⁰這段話中，葉適主張“扶持商賈”反對抑末，因為抑末論(1)缺乏理論依據，沒有元典的支持，不具有倫理上的正當性。(2)抑末論沒有實際政治經濟效果的支撐，因為“四民交致其用”，社會分工是必要的，抑末不能獲致社會的協調發展。(3)實際操作上，抑末並沒有起到厚本的作用，往往成為“奪之以自利”的旗號。丘濬甚至反對政府與商賈爭利，他指出“食貨者，生民之本也”，應該“農商並重”，若“人君而爭商賈之利，可醜之甚也”⁶¹。

伴隨著資本主義萌芽的成長，明清之際出現了城市的繁榮與商人階層的增多。明中葉的漢口，是個“五方雜處，商賈輻輳”的商業都市，城中居民“俱與貿易為業，不事耕種”。而安徽的歙縣則“農之三，賈之七焉”，山東黃縣“農之三，士與工十之二，商十之五”，經商之家幾占多半。社會上出現了士商間的新的互動。何良俊在《四友齋叢說》中說：“由是觀之，吳松士大夫工商，不可不謂眾矣。”他還指出，“四五十年來，賦稅日增，徭役日重，民命不堪，遂皆遷業”而不“樂於為農”，“大抵以十分百姓言之，已六七分去農”⁶²。於慎行在《穀山筆塵》第四卷中也指出：“吳人以織作為業，即士大夫家多以紡織求利，其俗勤嗇好殖，以故富庶。”世人的“本末論”開始出現異動，接續了東漢以來的本末論並有了較大的創新。

東漢思想家王符著《潜夫論》，他在《務本》篇中說：“凡為治之大體，莫善於抑末而務本，莫不善於離本而飾末。”表面上看來，好象與一般的“重本抑末”論者沒有什麼區別，但王符對“本”、“末”進行了新詮，他視正當的生財之道為“本”，認為社會分工是必要而合理的，四業各有本末，他說：“夫富民者，以農桑為本，以遊業為末；百工者，以致用為本，以巧飾為末；商賈者，以通貨為本，以鬻奇為末。三者守本離末則民富，離本守末則民貧。”這說明王符的“本末之辨”已由不同行業來辨本末，轉向了對經濟行為本身的倫理正當性的考量上，是對秦漢以來關於“輕重、本末之辨”的一種新的創造性詮釋。⁶³他其實是在主張以農業為本的前提下，又認為工商本身也有“本”、“末”，而“末”即指當時的奢侈品的生產，“他的本末觀的新貢獻一是對‘末’的含義作了明確的說明，二是將‘本’的範圍擴大到農桑以外”⁶⁴。與王符思想遙相呼應的是黃宗羲，二人是直到鴉片戰爭前不僅是反對抑商的少數人，而且是對以工商為“末”提出了異議的僅有的兩個人⁶⁵。

黃宗羲繼承了王符關於“本末之辨”的思想，批駁了封建正統的“重本抑

60) 《宋元學案》卷五四《水心學案》。

61) 《大學衍義補》卷二五《市糴之令》。

62) 何良俊：《四友齋叢說》，第112頁。

63) 唐凱麟，陳科華：《中國古代經濟倫理思想史》，人民出版社2004年，第277頁。

64) 葉世昌：《關於黃宗羲的工商皆本論》，《復旦學報》1983年，第110頁。

65) 葉世昌：《關於黃宗羲的工商皆本論》，《復旦學報》1983年，第110頁。

末”論。與王符相同，他認為“本”、“末”的區分不應是行業的區分。黃宗羲以“古聖王崇本抑末”思想為據，認為首先要看一種經濟行為是否“切於民用”，凡“不切於民用”則“一概痛絕之”⁶⁶⁾。他批評陋儒不察聖王的“崇本抑末”的真實涵義，“以工商為末，妄議抑之”，根本沒有看到工商業可以足財用、“通有無”的作用。黃宗羲說：“夫工故聖王之所欲來，商又使其願出於途者，蓋皆本也。”⁶⁷⁾這句話可分為兩層：(1)工、商皆為聖王治天下所需；(2)工、商皆本。由上文可知，在黃宗羲看來，因為工商都是“切於民用”的，故為聖王治天下所必重視的行業。而從其“切於民用”這個角度看來，工商與農業沒有什麼區別，工商與農業都是社會的“本業”而非“末作”。

黃宗羲從是否“切於民用”的角度，重新判分了“本末之辨”，這是對王陽明以“有益於生人之道”為判分四業的標準之做法的繼承。因為王陽明肯定“四民異業而同道”，分工上有異，“士以修治，農以具養，工以利器，商以通貨”，但均“有益於生人之道”。⁶⁸⁾與王符相同，黃宗羲對工商業本身進行了本末的界定。一般而言，工商業活動有利於社會生產的發展，有利於民生的改善，可以認為是“切於民用”的，從而具有與農業一樣的地位。黃宗羲也將“崇本”與“抑末”結合起來，但他所謂的“崇本”是崇其“切於民用”；他所謂的“抑末”，是貶抑那些不直接關切民用的商業活動內容。他說：

今夫通都之市肆，十室而九，有為佛而貨者，有為巫而貨者，有為倡優而貨者，有為奇技淫巧而貨者，皆不切於民用；一概痛絕之，亦庶乎救弊之一端也。此古聖王崇本抑末之道。⁶⁹⁾

李觀針對“貧民無立錫之地，而富者田連阡陌”⁷⁰⁾的高度的土地兼並情況，提出“平土之法”，即“莫若先行抑末之術，以驅遊民”⁷¹⁾。“夫農人，國之本也”，“若夫工商之類，棄本逐末，但以世資其用，不可無之，安足比於農人哉”。⁷²⁾視工商為“不可無之”，工商階層亦是靠“能其事”而後“食”，非“冗食之民”。他說：“天生民而胙之畎畝，其庠則手於工，足於商，為有益於人而後食其報。”⁷³⁾他將工商業者分為三類，上者交通王侯，以利相傾，“專行而制民命”，應予以抑制；對於中者應“平其徭役不專取”而使之“安富”⁷⁴⁾，使“商人自市”⁷⁵⁾，“商人眾則入稅多”⁷⁶⁾，“商通則公利不減”⁷⁷⁾，則有利於社

66) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第41頁。

67) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第41頁。

68) 王陽明：《節庵方公墓表》，《王陽明全集》第頁。

69) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第41頁。

70) 李觀：《李觀集》，第135頁。

71) 李觀：《富國策》第二，《李觀集》第136頁。

72) 李觀：《平土書》，《李觀集》第202頁。

73) 李觀：《廣潛書》，《李觀集》第222-223頁。

74) 李觀：《周禮致太平論·國用第十六》，《李觀集》第89頁。

75) 《李觀集》第149頁。

76) 李觀：《富國策》第十，《李觀集》第149頁。

會上的“刑罰以清”⁷⁸⁾；下者則驅之歸農。李觀區分工商的層次，對黃宗羲有一定的影響。

綜上可知，黃宗羲的“本末之辨”並非是工商業者與農民、士人之間的區分。黃宗羲的區分是社會分工方面的區分，是行業社會職能方面的區別，而非社會地位的區分，它不包涵有對社會各階層倫理地位的劃分與評定。凡是能使民富、“天下安富”的，能“切於民用”的，均可視為社會經濟活動之“本”，可視為國家之“本”；否則，耗費民資、民財，蠱惑人心，不利於滿足民眾基本生存需要的，不利於淳化社會風俗的，都是“末”。因此，黃宗羲的“工商皆本論”蘊含有值得重視的道義成份，對於那些有利於“民用”的社會職業分工，他都給予了倫理合理性說明，給予了國民經濟之“本”的地位。

結語

黃宗羲主張紓解“民之困瘁”，一切“以民生起見”，力主“重定天下之賦”；他追求“久遠之利”，主張“工商皆本”，從大局出發考慮全國經濟的發展，欲使“封域之內千萬財用流轉無窮”，讓財富用到重建社會倫理及政治倫理最需要的地方。這是黃宗羲經濟倫理思想的重要內容。這也是黃宗羲新五倫觀、義利統一觀、社會功利主義思想、經世致用的理想人格在經濟倫理層面的反映，進一步反映了黃宗羲倫理構想的嚴整性。

黃宗羲的民生觀帶有較濃厚的三代意味，他力主實行王道政治。他的經濟倫理思想，也是對孟子“明君制民之產”思想的發揮。黃宗羲主張恢復井田之制，稅負是“以下下為則”，實行三十稅一；廢除“以銀為賦”，為了解除民生困厄，他甚至情溢於外地要取消金銀！正如黃宗羲所言，“不忍人之心人皆有之，但不能擴充耳。‘行先王之道’，正教以擴充之法”⁷⁹⁾，即用王道精神改革現實民生問題。他還說：“天地之生萬物，仁也。帝王之養萬民，仁也。宇宙一團生氣，聚於一人，故天下歸之，此是常理。自三代以後，往往有以不仁得天下者，乃是氣化運行，當其過不及處。”⁸⁰⁾帝王政權的合法性，取決於它能否“養萬民”、實行“仁”政。從這個意義上，我們可以說黃宗羲的經濟倫理思想是“新民本”型的經濟倫理思想。這種“以民生起見”的民生觀，是“崇公”的價值理想在新的經濟形態下的運用。⁸¹⁾

77) 《李觀集》第148頁。

78) 李觀：《富國策》第九，《李觀集》第148頁。

79) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第89頁。

80) 《黃宗羲全集》第1冊，第90頁。

81) 吳根友認為，顧、黃、王對“公”、“私”的明確界說中有雙重性特點，即“一方面，他們要肯定‘人欲之各得’、‘人各自私’的個體價值欲求的合理性；另一方面，他們又要求‘遂公欲’、‘合私以成公’、實行‘公天下’的原則”，而“帝王本人亦可以有自己的私人利益，然而以不損害‘天下之私利’為前提，帝王一人之私必須服從‘天下人之私’的公共利益”，因此，與其說這種“崇公”的價值理想類似於集體主義中的“公共利益”之“公”，不如說更類似於

當然，黃宗羲的經濟倫理思想中也有不少值得商榷的地方。首先，他主張以穀帛與銅幣並用交納賦稅，沒有看到市場經濟發展的必然趨勢是允許“以銀爲稅”或以鈔爲稅，說明他其實是把“以銀爲稅”和“以白銀爲貨幣”這兩種情況混同起來。

其次，黃宗羲主張“重定天下之賦”，他甚至認爲“三十稅一”才是他所謂的“以下下爲賦”，這是對傳統理想稅額“什一稅”的突破。他據以立論的理由，不是現實王朝政治運轉的實際情況，主要不是民眾的負擔能力，而是土地私有權，而是他所理解的三代聖王之治、井田之制，所以就帶有更多的“烏托邦”色彩。這是他倫理批評的局限所在。

其三，黃宗羲繼承了東漢思想家王符的“本末之辨”思想，重構了經濟倫理中的本末論，部分地恢復興“古聖王崇本抑”的真正意涵，以“切於民用”爲判定本、末的標準，反對根據行業界線來劃分。這種意義確實比較重大，但卻缺乏充分的論述，也給予後來學者進行多面向解釋留下較多空間，甚至致使有些學者在界說上存在著猶疑。如唐凱麟等指出，黃宗羲主張工商皆本，即農工商的政治地位、經濟地位和道德地位都是平等的，“這是黃宗羲對中國傳統經濟思想的重大突破，也是黃宗羲倫理思想功利主義重實用的顯現”⁸²⁾，“黃宗羲是中國古代經濟倫理思想史上第一個明確否定傳統的‘重本抑末’論的思想家”⁸³⁾。不過唐先生也曾說過：“葉適是中國古代經濟思想史上第一個明確而徹底地否定傳統的‘重本抑末’觀念的思想家。”⁸⁴⁾這種界定並不固定。

葉世昌認爲，黃宗羲的工商皆本論的提出，“抽象地說，是符合商品經濟發展的要求的；但不能因此就認爲他是市民階級的代表”，同時此論與他“除布帛外皆有禁”的觀點相矛盾，因爲“這樣的禁末範圍，會對工商業的發展起阻礙作用”，因所謂“奇技淫巧”，“卻可能包含有技術創新的成分”⁸⁵⁾、“必然也包含有生產技術上的進步”⁸⁶⁾。這也是應該注意的一種觀點，我們應該對黃宗羲工商皆本論的意義作出合乎實際的評價，不能提得過高。但葉先生又說“黃宗羲的工商皆本論和王符的工商也有本有末的論點並無實質性的區別。黃宗羲的新貢獻只是在於從文字上作出了工商皆本的結論。”⁸⁷⁾這種評價又太低了。吳根友認爲，黃宗羲的工商皆本思想具有解構與重構四民“價值序列”的意義。⁸⁸⁾如果從這個角度來重新解讀黃宗羲的

現代西方自由資本主義時期“合理的利己主義”的主張。參吳根友著《中國現代價值觀的初生歷程——從李贄到戴震》，武漢大學出版社2004年版，第373頁。

82) 唐凱麟，鄧名瑛：《中國倫理學名著提要》，湖南師範大學出版社2001年，第393頁。

83) 唐凱麟，陳科華：《中國古代經濟倫理思想史》，第394-395頁。

84) 唐凱麟，陳科華：《中國古代經濟倫理思想史》，人民出版社2004年，第355頁。

85) 葉世昌：《古代中國經濟思想史》，復旦大學出版社2003年，第384頁。

86) 葉世昌：《關於黃宗羲的工商皆本論》，《復旦學報》1983年，第109頁。

87) 葉世昌：《關於黃宗羲的工商皆本論》，《復旦學報》1983年，第110頁。

88) 吳根友：《“工商皆本”與晚明儒家經濟哲學的突破》，《杭州師範學院學報》2006年第1期，第18-24頁。

“工商皆本論”，那就能得出相對公允的結論。也就是說，黃宗羲此論的意義不是單向度的解構或重構，而是兼而有之。

黃宗羲將田價和物價的急劇下跌的原因歸結為流通中的白銀嚴重不足。對此，葉世昌認為，明末土地跌價是事實，不過是“明末的特殊社會條件所造成的，和白銀的作為貨幣無關。至於物價，整個明代呈上漲趨勢”⁸⁹⁾。但是，黃宗羲主要是從他的切身感受來談的，他的倫理關切的興趣只在於限制政府與民爭利，只在於解民困瘁，又不去困苦富民，尊重富民已有的土地私有權。不管他是站在地主級立場上，還是站在富民立場上，是否為維護紳權、士權而呼喊，黃宗羲都無愧於一個為萬民利益挺身而出的志士仁人。

總之，在為民自有權利、權益辯護上，在重整四民價值秩序上，黃宗羲提出的經濟倫理思想，確實帶有較為濃烈的近代性。這也說明，在經濟倫理層面與政治哲學的制度設計層面，黃宗羲的思想學說有著內在的一致性，即均涵藏著近代性的根芽，代表著中國哲學從古典形態向近代形態的轉向。黃宗羲這些卓見，對於我們今天的稅費制改革、減輕農民負擔、構建和諧社會等諸多方面和多個領域，都有著重要的啟示意義。

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89) 葉世昌：《關於黃宗羲的工商皆本論》，《復旦學報》1983年，第109頁。葉先生還引用清人錢泳《履園叢話》的《田價》篇為例，錢氏文指出：“前明中葉，田價甚昂，每畝值五十餘兩至百兩……崇禎末年，盜賊四起，年穀屢荒，鹹以無田為幸，每畝只值一二兩，或田之稍下，送人亦無有受諾者。”說明田價下跌與白銀作為貨幣無關。而近人彭信威也指出：“從整個明代來看，白銀的購買力，仍有輕微的下跌。以十五世紀後半和十七世紀前半下跌得比較多。”見氏著《中國貨幣史》，上海人民出版社1965年，第707頁。說明物價也是上漲的。

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Huang Zongxi and Transformation of the Ethics of Economics during the Ming and Qing Dynasties

HUANG Dun-bing

Abstract

Based on the new premise of human nature that “every person is self-interested,” Huang Zongxi viewed “profit of ten thousand men” as the “common good” or “public interest.” Moreover, by adopting a utilitarian perspective, he renewed the “means and ends,” thereby re-arranging the traditional social stratum that engineers and merchants go on top of officials and farmers. Huang’s ethical theories on economics can be regarded as the “new citizen-centered type” advocating “arising from the grassroots” doctrine. Emphasis on the public interest contains in itself the seed of modernization, propelling the transition from the ancient to modern political and economic frameworks. Huang’s economic ethics may throw some light on today’s urgent issues, such as tax reform, relieving farmer’s economic burdens, and social polarization.

Keywords: Huang Zongxi, Self-interest, Ethics of Economics, Transformation, Ming and Qing Dynasty Economics

當代世界環境危機與困境的儒家關懷

潘 朝 陽

中文摘要： 本文的目的在於簡要陳明現代世界的環境危機和困境，在於現代化的兩大巨輪的推動，此即工業化和都市化。在兩大現代化作用下，世人的身心都有所變異，因而更加使環境危機深度化和廣度化，世人的在世生存益加困頓。

古代儒家聖賢雖然生存於有機農業文明之中，沒有現代化的生命經歷，但正由於如此，所以他們與天地以及其他生機很自然地融合為一體，在儒學儒教的經典中因此存在著天人和諧合一的觀念，這個古代儒家的智慧，實可作為對治當代日益嚴重的環境生態汙染破毀的危機而期望能夠改變世人的生活心態，返回與天地和神明同洽共融的境地。

我們認為啟動儒家的天人哲學的啟蒙教育是很要緊的事情。讓世人脫離理性主義啟蒙運動之典範而轉移到天人和諧合一的儒家典範，是很有意思的環境倫理教育。

關鍵詞： 現代化、工業化、都市化、儒家、儒教、易、禮記、環境、生態、空間。

一、環境的危機與困境

當代世界環境的危機和困境，已然是事實，自「現代化」(modernization)起始，逐年益增。然而世人並未有所警覺而有所更張。西元1972年，「羅馬俱樂部」(the Club of Rome)作出了一份生態環境的報告書，名為“*The Limits to Growth*”(中譯《成長的極限》)，提出五種重大的全球性環境趨向：(1)工業化加速進行，(2)人口劇烈增加，(3)營養不良普遍發生，(4)非更生資源日趨枯竭，(5)環境持續惡化。¹⁾它宣稱五大趨向並非以獨立形態而是以互動交纏的方式影響地球。若到二十一世紀中葉沒有改進，則環境危機和困境，勢難挽轉。²⁾

四十年倏忽逝矣，情形持續惡化。

最近，環境史家隆納萊特(Ronald Wright)指出戰後宰制各國的共產主

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1) 唐妮菈·米道，斯喬詹·蘭德斯，丹尼斯·米道斯，《成長的極限》(朱岑樓、胡薇麗 中譯)，臺北：巨流圖書公司，1973，頁6。[D. H. Meadows, D. L. Meadows, J. Randers, W. W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth*, New York: Univers Books, 1972]

2) 同上注。

義和資本主義都是物質主義的烏托邦，前者對自然環境的開發和剝削，一點都不手軟，但它至少提出全體人民平等分享物質的觀念；後者卻像引誘賽狗向前跑的機械兔般，誘惑著人類向前狂奔，並且蠱惑說經濟資源沒有極限，人們不需平等分享。全球人類無論那一種主義，都陷溺在物質和欲望中奔逐至死，使生態環境成為澈底的輸家。³⁾從蘇聯崩潰以及中國改政以來，共產主義式微，資本主義成為全球壟斷式的文明體制，其製造出來的環境危機和困境更加深刻化、全面化。

隆納·萊特講出一段發人深省的警語，他說：

那些曾在年輕時遠行，在二、三十年後又回到老地方的人，一定能察覺到「進步」的猛烈攻擊：農田變郊區、叢林變牧場、河川蓋水壩、紅樹林成了養蝦場、山區變成水泥開採場或是珊瑚礁搖身變公寓。

至今人類仍然擁有各種不同的文化與政治體系，但在經濟層面上，我們只能算是一個龐大的文明體系，以整個地球的自然資本為生。我們四處伐木、四處捕魚、四處灌溉、四處建設，生物圈中沒有一個角落能躲過我們這種大量出血性的耗損。自七十年代以來，全球經濟成長了二十倍，這意味著幾乎沒有一個地方能夠自給自足。[……]當崩壞再度發生時，這次將會是全球性的，[……]世界各地的文明將整體崩解。⁴⁾

隆納·萊特的警語告訴世人，運行數百年之久的現代化，特別在最後這一個世代，已經讓「進步」侵吞質變了自然的地球；地球已經不再自然，同時，人類對於自然地球的盜取豪奪，已非在有限的區域中發生，而是交互作用下的全球化現象(globalization)，換言之，人的現代化文明對於自然地球的生態環境之破毀與斲喪，乃是全球性的。

隆納·萊特說地球生態環境的大崩解之來到，可能只剩大約十年時間，如果在這十年內，人類的生活方式以及文明方向，若不扭轉，未來的「一個世代」，全球的饑荒、無政府狀態以及戰亂，恐將無法避免。⁵⁾

或許評者又會質疑說這樣的悲觀論點只是一種灰色偏見。實則不然，因為當代不少有識之士幾乎都持有共同的結論。賈德·戴蒙(Jared Diamond)在其著作《大崩壞－人類社會的明天》(COLLAPSE-How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed)中，提到當代世界最嚴重的十二種危機或困境，它們是：

- (1) 加速破壞自然棲地如森林、濕地、珊瑚礁、海底等。或將自然棲地改變成人造棲地，如城市、鄉村、農田、牧場、道路等。
- (2) 野生魚類資源形將枯竭。
- (3) 很多野生物種和基因多樣性，已經消失。再過50年，將大多數消失。

3) 隆納·萊特，《失控的進步》(達娃 中譯)，臺北：野人文化股份有限公司，2007.02，頁184.[Ronald Wright, *A Short History of Progress*, Toronto: House of Annasi press, 2007]

4) 同上注，頁184-185。

5) 同上注。

- (4) 農田土壤急速流失，流失速率約是生成速率的10倍到40倍；侵蝕速率更是森林土壤的500倍到10000倍。除此之外，還有土壤鹽化、肥力喪失、酸化等污染和破壞現象。世界農地約有20%－80%已經嚴重破毀。
- (5) 石油、天然氣的目前儲藏，將於半個世紀內用罄。
- (6) 全球淡水資源明顯趨向枯竭，地下水層消失甚速。
- (7) 光合作用甚有限，1986年，學者算出全人類已耗費地球光合作用能力的一半。由於人口不斷攀升，21世紀中葉，陽光帶來的能量幾乎被人類用盡，剩餘一點，才留給自然界植物。
- (8) 工業產生的有毒物質大多數是科技合成物，持續地排放在大氣、海洋、河湖、地下水、土壤中，也被動植物吸收入體內。污染和毒化，是全面性的，包括自然生態、社會層面以及人的生理、心理狀態。
- (9) 外來物種的入侵，造成本地生態環境的無可轉移的變化和破壞。
- (10) 人類科技和工業活動，破壞臭氧層，導至溫室效應而使地球逐漸暖化。
- (11) 世界人口不斷增加，全世界人口已達六十億。
- (12) 世界六十億人口形成地球生態環境很大很高的壓力。⁶⁾

上述的環境危機和困境已經非常繁複、全面。更令人擔心的卻是此十二種危機環環相扣、層層互動，而使情勢愈加嚴重複雜且難以解決。賈德·戴蒙說：

上述十二種資源短缺的問題勢必在接下來的幾十年間影響我們的生
活。〔……〕在二十五年內，也許只有亞馬遜盆地和剛果盆地部分雨林逃
過一劫。在未來的幾十年內，〔……〕世界剩下的海洋魚類也將被捕撈一
空或者滅絕；可供使用的石油和天然氣儲量也將用盡；光合作用的能力也
將到達上限。在半個世紀內，全球暖化也會愈來愈嚴重，預計氣溫將再升
高攝氏一度或好幾度，許多野生動植物物種也將瀕臨絕種，〔……〕。⁷⁾

這絕非危言聳聽，因為全球生態環境已經發生了明顯的異變情形，且
頻率和規模均有上升的趨勢。而賈德·戴蒙再三呼籲：「不管用什麼方式，
在今日的孩子和年輕人有生之年，世界的環境問題都必須解決。」⁸⁾否則
生態和文明必定崩壞。

以上所述，主要指出自從人類啟動現代化，亦即啟動工業化(industrialization)
的巨輪往前衝以後，全球環境情況就每下愈況，其速度愈快、規模愈大，且狀況愈

6) 賈德戴蒙，《大崩壞－人類社會明天》(廖月娟 中譯，臺北：時報文化出版公司，2006，頁557-566。[Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*, New York: Viking Press, 2005])

7) 同上注，頁567。

8) 同上注，頁568。

來愈嚴重。從生存空間或棲息場所之觀點言，就是包括人類在內的一切生命的安居之空間(space)或場所(place)已經漸次傾頹敗壞而恐怕將失去基盤以致無法生存發展。

二、現代化都市空間的物化

上述的環境危機和困境，主要是現代化的工業文明引發的情勢。而現代化還有另外一個巨輪，就是都市化(urbanization)。工業生產必須具有空間聚集性，亦即工業區位(location of industry)，而這也是人類大量移入聚集的空間，此即都市(urban)或城市(city)(本文以下概以都市稱之)。工廠是以都市為其中心區位的，換言之，現代化都市是工業的生產基地，同時也是消費市場。工業化以後，工業與都市的空間景觀往往疊置錯間而為一體。換言之，二、三級產業創造並運作在都市之內(intra-city)以及都市之際(inter-cities)；在大小都市之內和大小都市之際，是各式各樣的陸上、空中、水上的如蛛網狀的交通系統盤結糾纏，在其中，人們、資源、能量以及物品不止息地流通，還有一種網狀系統也在其中繁複流動不住，那就是現代化下才有的電子資訊的流動體系。人類與他們的祖先已有所不同，他們因經濟集聚和交通集聚的效應而大量大批地往都市區進住。這樣的都市化現象和歷程自工業革命開展就已同步發生。工業化和都市化的帶動下，地球在結構上區分為兩種空間，一是還保有自然生態的荒野(wilderness)；一則是都市以及其周遭的鄉郊，而前者愈減後者愈增。

美國是資本主義國家典型，現代化大都市非常發達，這些大都市甚或大都市集團，是工業化的產物，也為工業而服務。它們不斷地膨脹擴充而擁擠不堪，形成都市肥大症，其建築形式枯燥，結構外形沈重，人們依靠汽車移動，而肺部則不斷吸入汽車燃燒的有毒廢氣，而在城中充斥工業產品，且透過量販而讓消費者深層地物化於其中。

到了二十世紀末期，美國大都市開始發生從中心開始退化或崩潰的重症，專業作家康斯勒(James Howard Kunstler)指出底特律在1975年時，從空中俯看，它的空間形態像個「中間燒了個大洞的甜甜圈」，環外是一個超大型的郊區環環圍住，中產階級紛紛遷至郊區定居，市中心由外來的貧窮移民入佔，到了2000年，底特律的市中心人行道已野花雜草叢生，都市榮景不再。聖路易市的衰頹也一樣，它像是一個鬼城。類似的都市敗壞，也發生在水牛城、費城、克裏夫蘭、巴爾的摩、紐華克、匹茲堡、堪薩斯、印第安那波裏、辛辛那提、密爾瓦基等都市。其他次級的美國都市，其衰退情形也是一樣。⁹⁾

9) 康斯勒，《沒有石油的明天：能源枯竭的全球化衝擊》，郭恆祺譯，臺北：商周出版社，2007.04，頁312-314。[J. H. Kunstler, *The Long Emergency: Surviving the Converging*

康斯勒討論美國大小都市在二十世紀末的持續的中心性衰敗崩頹，有其深層之結構，他特別指出此種現代化大都市和大都市集團，是以石油工業為基礎，利用廉價的石油為動力，美國建設了現代化都市與郊區的文明空間。各個大小都市區的繁榮和熱鬧，其實是建立在廉價石油之相關二、三級產業。康氏說：

各大工業城市再也無法維持二十世紀的榮景，因為工業化需要有太多能源為後盾，況且這些城市所設計的各種工業活動早就壽終正寢了。就像任何大企業一樣，在後廉價石油(昂貴石油)的未來，任何大型農場、大型政府、或大型城市，都不適用於日益縮小的生活。而在「油荒時代」，這些大型機構也會加速緊縮。更有甚者，過去五十年來那些欣欣向榮的新郊區型都會，如鳳凰城、拉斯維加斯、休士頓、亞特蘭大及奧蘭多等，在「油荒時代」一步步進逼前，衰退速度將比那些老工業城更快，更具災難性，只因這些城市中的種種事物，都被設計成與汽車代步和運送有關。如紐約、芝加哥與洛杉磯等頂級大城，將會步上底特律的後塵，其人口也會大量流失，可預見的是，這些大城市的衛生和治安將面臨空前挑戰。¹⁰⁾

從康斯勒對於美國都市之現況以及未來的批判，我們可以看到人類現代化之下的全球都市文明之空間與生態，將會是非常嚴重的生存困境。因為人之身心與空間、環境息息關聯。世人在汙染擁擠破毀的都市中生活，其身心必受到本質和結構性的衝擊。

世人愈來愈居住在都市中。聯合國統計，2008年全世界人口超過總人口數的一半，也就是34億人口，居住在都市。同一年，中國人口的42%居住在都市；印度則其總人口的29%住在都市。¹¹⁾中國國家統計局於今年(2012年)1月17日公布，中國大陸目前有69079萬城鎮人口，佔13億總人口的51.27%，農村人口則是65656萬。¹²⁾參考這些人口統計數字，世人隨著工業化和都市化，愈來愈多人從鄉村或山野湧入擠進大小都市中居住生活。那麼多人在一個高度工業性人工化以及汙染化的都市空間裏面「在世存有」(being-in-the-world)，他們絕大部份時間都是被環圍套牢於工業性人工化的空間架構中，都市人已經不再與天和地(heaven and earth)直接相臨在、相密契，他們的世界是機械性無機性的空間。

都市生活的幽暗面與現代性(modernity)密不可分。都市是現代性的生活世界的空間場所，現代性的生活一定是在都市中才得以表達、展開，而

Catastrophes of the Twenty-First Century, New York: Grove/ Atlantic, 2005]

10) 同上注，頁314-315。

11) 向天星：〈聯合國：全球半數人口將住城市〉，《看雜誌》(電子雜誌)，第七期，2008.3.13.[Xiang tian xing, "United Nations: Half of global population will live in cities", in *Kan za zhi*(Vol.7, digital ver.), 2008.]

12) BBC中文網：〈中國城市人口首次超過農村人口〉，2012.01.17.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/chinese_news/2012/01/120117_china_urban.shtml

且現代都市也一定是現代性的標誌和產物。那麼，都市生活的現代性，或者現代性的都市生活是什麼性格？其性格是碎片性、感官性、物質性、多樣性、瞬間性、易逝性。¹³⁾何以現代性的都市生活是這樣的性格？文化評論人汪明安如此詮釋：「由於都市人來源廣泛，背景複雜，興趣殊異，流動頻繁，因此，主宰著民俗社會的血緣紐帶、鄰裏關係和世襲生活等傳統情感不復存在。都市人需要同大量的他人打交道，但是這種接觸是功能主義的，表面性的，淺嚐輒止的，非個性化的。」¹⁴⁾又說：「共同情感的匱乏，急劇的競爭，居無定所，階層和地位的差異，職業分工引起的個體的單子化，使人和人之間的溝壑加深，在密密麻麻的人群中，個體並沒有被溫暖所包圍，而是備感孤獨。〔……〕個體沒有歸屬感，他在這個物質化的城市中發現不了自己的根據，也在各種繁瑣的體制中培植不了自己的個性，個性被吞噬了。」¹⁵⁾汪氏所言甚為深刻真切，現代化都市的現代性之性格，恰好與前現代的農業文明的鄉村空間和生態相反，他將都市和鄉村加以對比說道：

現代都市生活同傳統的鄉村民俗生活斷裂；現代生活固有的碎片化同前現代生活的總體化斷裂。正是現代生活碎片化的斷裂特徵，使得它同傳統的整體性的有機生活發生了斷裂。〔……〕鄉村生活屬於「共同體」，而都市生活屬於「社會」；前者是「自然意志」主導的「禮俗社會」，而後者則是「理性意志」主導的「法理社會」。〔……〕鄉村生活被安靜地束縛在一片固定的土地上，人們根據這片土地確定自己的認同，確定自己的語言、風俗和起源。〔……〕鄉村緩慢、寂靜的整體性生活，同都市生活的碎片一樣的瞬息萬變恰成對照。在鄉村，絕對不會出現「人群中的人」，人面對的是鄰人和家族權威。正是現代性的都市動蕩，使得鄉村那些固定的東西——固定的價值觀，固定的生活方式，固定的時空安排，固定的心理和經驗，固定的社會關係——都煙消雲散了。¹⁶⁾

依上所述，全球世人將愈來愈多自願或被迫而不停息地湧擠塞到大小都市中，此現象就意味著起碼一大半甚或更多的人們，他們或者茫然漫走於縱橫交錯的市街上；或陷進密密麻麻的陌生人群中而使自己也成為陌生人；又困居於鴿子籠一般的公寓裏而左右上下的居住人都是無關的「他者」(the Others)；或許沈溺在形形色色的消費品中讓自己迷途於拜物教的癖性裏，於是，原本在天高地厚且時光悠長的鄉村本質中蘊藉涵養而有的人之敦篤恆常的生命和心靈，一旦被拋擲在大小都市的牢籠空間中，都一切被撕裂切割成碎片。

汪氏對於都市空間和文明的批判，是以現代化的中國都市化現象為對象

13) 汪明安：《身體、空間與後現代性》，南京：江蘇人民出版社，2006.01，頁118。[Wang min an, *Shen ti, Kong jian yu Hou xian dai xing*(Body, Space and Post-Modernity, Nan jing: Jiang su renmin press, 2006.)]

14) 同上注。

15) 同上注，頁118-119。

16) 同上注，頁123-124。

的。自鄧小平推展新政後，中國很快邁入現代化，因此，中國的都市化非常迅速，從廣大鄉村不斷地湧進大量人口，大都市急遽地膨脹，中國的現代化造出很多新都市的光怪陸離，生態美學家魯樞元描述他在某個華南濱海的大都市的經驗，他說此城是「人們砍去林莽、挖掉崗巒、填平海灣、修建馬路、蓋上高樓」而在原本「一片靜寂的荒原」上建造起來的現代化都市。¹⁷⁾如此現代化式地建造新城，絕對破壞生態環境，當地的原初自然性，必然一去不復返。魯氏說到這個新都市的空間內容是這樣的：「星河般燦爛輝煌的霓虹燈、高射燈，密集的飛馳而過的轎車、摩托車，琳琅滿目堆積如山的各類商品貨物，撲面而來的濃烈的汽油味、燒烤味、脂粉味、汗漬味，使我真切感覺到『高物質』、『巨能量』在這個都市中的飛速流動。這一巨大的物質能量晝夜不息地在兩極間湧流：一級是公司、銀行、股票、期貨、談判、合同等所謂『生意場』，一級是餐廳、酒吧、桑拿、夜總會、遊樂中心、三陪小姐等所謂『娛樂場』；一端是慘淡經營，一端是恣意享樂。」¹⁸⁾

鄧小平始施新政以來，現代化都市化運動如狂飆一般地襲捲全中國，由上引魯氏對這個華南濱海新興大都市的形容和描述，我們看到了高度資本主義消費享樂主義的人之物化現象，這就是現代大都市文明的人與環境的關係，即：世人大量集聚在一個很有限的空間點內，卻以大規模的動態形式而耗費著地球的資源，同時，依據「熵」的定律，也就大規模地破毀、污染了生態環境。

此種形態的都市生活是怎樣的內容？魯樞元說：

高科技、高效益、高消費使現代都市人能夠挾帶著巨大的物質能量高速運轉，貨幣的溝通取代了心靈的溝通，電磁波的聯繫取代了骨肉親情的聯繫，操作的成敗掩遮了人格的優劣，性的商品化取代了愛在情感渠道中的昇華，電子遊戲機與卡拉OK廳的普及取代了圖書館與博物館，純淨的宗教信仰已蕩然無存，僅存的是店堂後壁趙公元帥神龕前的炎炎香火，那信條也只剩下了「快快發財、多多發財」。¹⁹⁾

魯氏的描述，固然偏向一邊而作較嚴厲的批評，現代化都市中，當然亦有心靈、親情、圖書館、博物館以及純淨的寺廟教堂，可是，他提到的那種種都市人之物化、異化而心靈虛無、精神枯竭的文明生態病症，卻在全球各大都市中比比皆是，且其趨勢愈來愈盛，是世人除了已然面臨本文前述的十二大項生態環境的危機之外，還必須設想如何加以解除的現代化都市文明生態之深切困境。

17) 魯樞元：《生態批評的空間》，上海：華東師大出版社，2006.09，頁18。[Lu shi yuan, *Sheng tai pi ping de kong jian*(The Space of Eco-criticism), Shang hai: East china normal university press, 2006.]

18) 同上注，頁18-19。

19) 同上注，頁19。

三、中國人的傳統「風水」棲居形式

現代人類臨在的困境實有雙重，一是全球環境生態由於工業化而發生的污染與破毀，另一則是人口大量趨向大小都市而帶來的人之疏離與異化。此兩種危機和困境其實就是人之安適之棲居的失落。

當代新儒家劉述先論及幾個重要的全球倫理，包括基督宗教、伊斯蘭教、佛教都已經從各自的教義和倫理智慧中提汲生態和環境的倫常關懷。儒家作為重要的全球倫理，亦有其天人之際的智慧，值得從中提鍊出對治當代生態環境危機和困境之方策，而這個方策落實了就是營造一種人與地和諧安適的居住和活動的空間。

人在環境中的諧和性的適應棲居，在上古儒家經典中已多有記錄，古人謹慎抉擇大地上適宜的區位(location)進行居住和活動的空間築造。在中國發展出中國人的占地學(geomancy)，有一個專有名辭，稱之為「風水」。此套人地關係的倫理實踐術，很早就有。《尚書·召誥》載曰：

唯太保先周公相宅，越若來三月，唯丙午肅，越三日戊申，太保朝至於洛，蔔宅。厥既得蔔，則終經營。[……] 周公朝至於洛，則達觀於新邑營。越三日丁巳，用牲於郊，牛二。越翼日戊午，乃社於新邑，牛一、羊一、豕一。[……] 旦曰：「其作大邑，其自時配皇天，瑟祀於上下，其自時中乂。王厥有成命，治民今休。」²⁰⁾

在《洛誥》中又有一段記載曰：

周公拜手稽首曰：「朕復子明辟。王如弗敢及天基命定命，予乃胤保，大相東土，其基作民明辟。予唯乙卯，朝至於洛師。我蔔河朔黎水。我乃蔔澗水東、澧水西，唯洛食。我又蔔澧水東，亦唯洛食。[……]」²¹⁾

上引兩段文字是說明周公為了將周的勢力能向東發展，所以必須營建一個新的都邑，他先派召公先去今河南洛陽一帶觀察占蔔並且擇取吉利的地區，有了初步的抉擇，將一個區位看好了，周公再來到該地，先舉行隆重莊嚴的祭典，將此政策敬告皇天，再到該地區的河流邊的各方位進行相地之占蔔儀式，結論是只有洛地是吉利的區位，因此，洛邑也就是洛陽最後確定築造新都城。

這段歷史記載反映了中國上古就已有慎重選擇地點築建居住和活動之空間的一套知識系統，後人稱此為「堪輿術」或「風水術」。

《召誥》所言「相宅」，就是後世的風水堪輿術的關鍵性運作，而風水是一門獨特的中國文化景觀，數千年來，風水一直是中國人追求理想環境的代名詞。其基本的理論取向，特別關注於人與環境的關係，這與傳統

20) 《尚書·召誥》。[Shao gao/Announcement of the Duke of Shao]

21) 《尚書·洛誥》。[Luo gao/Announcement concerning Luoyang]

的「天人合一」宇宙觀是基本一致的。風水強調以自然為本，人類只有選擇合適的自然環境，才有利於自身的生存與發展。²²⁾

學者劉沛林說：

風水一向注重人類居住之「宅」的選擇，「夫宅者，乃是陰陽之樞紐，人倫之軌模。[……] 凡人所居，無不在宅」。「宅者，人之本」。「宅」的本意也反映了人們對環境的選擇。漢代成書的《釋名》中說：「宅，擇也，擇吉處而營之也。」²³⁾

周公的相宅而營建東都，乃「擇吉處而營之」是也。古人居住和活動，就已明白必須經過一套方式來選擇「吉處」來營建屋宇和聚落，此所謂「吉處」即是安全適宜的區域，包括了它的地點、位置以及周遭可以提供生存的多元性條件的環境生態。由於十分重要而不能兒戲粗心，因此很自然會有敬謹恭慎的言行，在古代，是以宗教祭祀的儀式表現出來，連帶著，此種古人擇吉處營之的「相宅」之所謂「風水」或「堪輿」之術，也就附著以神祕神聖以及禁忌的種種規定，因此，周人為求東進中原而籌劃營建能夠有效統治中原大陸之理想之都邑，乃由召公、周公如此敬慎神聖地進行細緻的「相宅」，而最終確定了洛邑的城市營建。

《尚書》是上古中國史之記載，上言之周人新建東都，其實反映了古代中國人的擇地居住和活動的人地倫理(ethos of man-land relationship)。演衍到後世，融入了陰陽五行說以及方士和道教之術，變成了帶有濃厚神密色彩的「風水」。

學者俞孔堅指出在原始人類出現在大地之上過其原始生活時，就已本能地尋求並築造他們自己覺得滿意的棲息地，俞氏特別列出幾個主要的中國原始人類的「滿意棲息地」之景觀結構，這些原始人類是：元謀猿人(早期直立人，距今約170萬年)、藍田猿人(早期直立人，距今約100萬年)、北京猿人(直立人，距今約20-70萬年)、馬壩人(早期智人，距今約10萬年)、小南海文化(距今約1.3-2.5萬年)、山頂洞人(晚期智人，距今約1萬年)，²⁴⁾他們以幾點要項而形成理想的棲息地模式，此幾點要項是「圍護與屏蔽」、「界緣與依靠」、「隔離與胎息」、「豁口與走廊」等合成一個整體景觀結構，²⁵⁾俞氏得出結論說：

22) 劉沛林：《古村落：和諧的人聚空間》，上海：上海三聯書店，1997.12，頁123。[Liu pei lin, *Gu cun lu xie de ren ju kong jian*(Old villages: Harmonious Residential Spaces, Shang hai: Shanghai Joint Publishing Company, 1997.]

23) 同上注，頁123-124。

24) 俞孔堅：《理想景觀探源－風水的文化意義》，北京：商務印書館，2002.05，頁79。[Yu kong jian, *Li xiang jing guan tan yuan - feng shui de wen hua yi yi*(Exploration of the Deep Meaning for Ideal Landscape- Cultural significance of FENG-SHUI), Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2002.]

25) 同上注，頁79-88。

中國原始人類滿意的棲息地具有多種生態效應，其景觀結構使原始人處在庇護、獵採、空間的辨識、探索和開拓新空間以及擇域的戰略優勢。能否成功地選擇具有這些生態效應的棲息地，成為人類進化和發展的一種選擇壓力。自然選擇和經驗遺傳，使原始人類的這種能力永恆地保存在生物基因之上。當中華民族進入農耕社會以後，這種在獵採生活中進化發展而來的心理能力，[……]在人們的景觀認知過程中不自覺地表現出來，這就是對景觀結構特徵的吉凶感應，[……]正是它，構成了中國人景觀吉凶意識(風水意識)的最基本的深層結構。²⁶⁾

綜上所述，我們可以大體明白古代中國人已知道一種合乎自然與人文和諧法則的相宅擇地來築造聚落而經營與生態相協調之生活方式。

此種擇地築造的原理發散擴大，從屋宇到村落乃至於到城鎮的選擇適宜的地點位置來安頓其空間，使人之世界和自然地理相融合和諧，此種風水式的擇吉地而居的棲居模式乃是中國之農業文明中的人地倫理，唐君毅闡釋中國人數千年生活在中土大地上，發展出農耕文明，使中國人定著而安居，一方面盡人事以俟天，一方面灌注其感情於具體的稻粱等糧食作物，因此，常易有天人相應而和諧之想像和追求。在實實在在且勤勞投入的農耕生活中，中國農人對於世界養成了一種敦厚真實感，並且時有一種從無生命界而上升於生命界的創生不息之意識。中國人在農耕中，其穀物並非人造物而是源於天地之自然，農人取穀種加以種植，穀種成長為稻田，順四季之循環之理而有春耕夏耘秋收冬藏，此即顯大自然的生生永續的規律與人之生活、生存和合而為一體。²⁷⁾所以，傳統的中國人從上古源生的擇吉地而築造安居空間到天地人和諧共生的穀物農耕文明，體證的是天人和諧的生活方式及文明形態。

四、易傳中的天人和諧合一

儒家思想是上述的文明基礎的心靈產物，儒學儒教非常重視人地之際的倫常，甚至達至關乎生命實踐的信仰。其睿智實非憑空天降，換言之，儒學儒教的常道慧命，乃古代儒家聖賢在中國人的生活世界之環境和空間中培養成就的。筆者曾經為文闡釋中國古代的環境思想與古代中國人的大地倫理乃是一本同體的，其蘊育與發展有一基盤，即中國的有機生態農業文明，以此文明為維生之根基，而創造出整全生機的環境本體宇宙論。²⁸⁾從

26) 同上注，頁86-87。

27) 唐君毅：《中國文化之精神價值》，臺北：正中書局，1979.05，頁248-253。[Tang Jun yi, *Zhong guo wen hua zhi jing shen jia zhi (Spiritual values of Chinese culture)*, Taipei: Cheng Chung Book, 1979.]

28) 潘朝陽：〈周易的環境倫理及其大地關係〉，收入氏著《心靈·空間·環境－人文主義的地理思想》，臺北：五南圖書出版公司，2005.12，頁415-455。[Pan Chao yang, *Xin ling Kong jian, Huan jing - Ren wen zhu yi de di li si xiang (Spirit, Space, Environment-Humanistic geographical thought)*, Taipei: Wu nan book Inc., 2005.]

此種哲理出發而構成的環境和空間倫理之根本立場是：天地、神明與人以及一切生命一體共生。

且讓我們從儒家古典有以陳明，茲以《易經傳》論之。

《易·乾象》曰：

大哉乾元，萬物資始，乃統天。雲行雨施，品物流形。大明終始，六位時成，時乘六龍以禦天。乾道變化，各正性命，保合太和，乃利貞。首出庶物，萬國鹹寧。

我們謹依據船山的詮釋加以分判：

(1) 大哉乾元，萬物資始，乃統天。

《易》之言元者多矣，唯純乾之為元，以太和清剛之氣，動而不息，無大不屆，無小不察，入乎地中，出乎地上，發起生化之理，肇乎形，成乎性，以興起有為而見乎德；則凡物之本、事之始，皆此以倡先而起用，故其大莫與倫也。木、火、水、金、川融、山結，靈、蠢、動、植，皆天至健之氣以為資而肇始。乃至人所成能，信、義、智、勇、禮、樂、刑、政，以成典物者，皆純乾之德；命人為性，自然不睹不聞之中，發為惻悱不容已之幾，以造群動而見德，亦莫非此元為之資。在天謂之元，在人謂之仁。[……] 其實一也。故曰元即仁也，天人之謂也。[……]

[……] 謂人之仁即元者，謂乾之元也。自然之動，不雜乎物欲，至剛也；足以興四端萬善而不傷於物者，至和也；此乃體乾以為初心者也。²⁹⁾

這一段關於「大哉乾元，萬物資始，乃統天」的船山詮釋，看出《易·乾象》的「乾元」，一方面是指大自然的生態環境之總體要素皆乾元的創發展顯，船山以「太和清剛之氣」之「氣」來狀此乾元乃是上天下地、由大至小、從外到內，興發湧現了無有止息的生生大化。此生生大化的乾元之發用，乃是包含著宇宙天地世界一切無機之存在以及有機之生命而成為一個整全之體的，且永續生發而無停止。另一方面則提示人文世界的一切禮樂道德刑政之施作，乃源創自人之仁心仁德，而此仁心仁德實際上也就是這個乾元，在天地曰乾元，在人心曰仁德，其實一也。人心以及人文之中的「四端萬善而不傷於物者之『至和』」，就是點明人與自然生態系所有生命和物種，本即和平和諧而相融洽。

船山進一步就《乾·彖辭》而發揮之。

(2) 大明終始，六位時成，時乘六龍以禦天。乾道變化，各正性命，保合太和，乃利貞。

29) [明]王夫之：《周易內傳》，卷一上，收於《王船山全集》，第二冊，長沙：嶽麓書社，1996.02,頁50-51.[(Ming)Wang fu zhi, *Zhou Yi Nei Zhuan*(Vol.1), in *The Complete Works of Wang Chuan Shan* (Vol.2), Chang sha:Yue lu press, 1996.]

乾以純健不息之德，禦氣化而行乎四時百物，各循其軌道，則雖變化無方，皆以乾道為大正，而品物之性命，各成其物則，不相悖害，而強弱相保，求與相合，以協於太和，是乃貞之所以利，利之無非貞也。以聖人之德擬之，自誠而明者，察事物之所宜，一幾甫動，終始不爽，自稚迄老，隨時各當，變而不失其正，益萬物而物不知，與天之並育並行，成兩間之大用，而無非太和之天鈞所運者，同一利貞也。³⁰⁾

於此，船山詮顯並表達了《易·乾·彖辭》以及他自己的生態多樣性及其永續性，在此儒家的古典環境生態觀中，古儒著重萬物的同生共榮的精神和表現，古儒和船山都強調在乾元也就是天道的一氣創發之體中，各類物種生命均「成其物則，不相悖害，而強弱相保，求與相合，以協於太和」。這是一種追索並闡發環境生態系的和諧和平的多樣性和永續性的環境倫理。再者，個人以及群體的人文世界之最高理想境界之實現，在船山的用語，就是聖人之德化之境界，於《易·乾·彖》的信念中，也必須是且亦必然是相融合協同於這個太和之境的環境生態體系之中而為天地人之三而一，最終極或最原初，天地以及天地中的生物和人類，在儒家觀點，本即大化生機的一體。

五、從禮記的天圓地方思想體證儒家的天人和諧合一觀

《易經傳》及後世晚明大儒王船山的天地人整全一體的環境生態觀，在其他儒家經典中亦有相同的文本載記。一般而言，大小戴的《禮記》，是晚周以迄漢初中國貴族以至平民的禮之文明體制的整理和記錄。它的內容亦具足儒家的敬重親近天地的環境倫理。我們謹就《大戴禮記》的〈曾子天圓〉而稍予明之。

參嘗聞之夫子曰：「天道曰圓，地道曰方；方曰幽而圓曰明。明者吐氣者也，是故外景；幽者含氣者也，是故內景。故火曰外景，而金水內景。吐氣者施而含氣者化，是以陽施而陰化也。陽之精氣曰神，陰之精氣曰靈；神靈者，品物之本也，而禮樂仁義之祖也，而善否治亂所由興作也。」³¹⁾

上述所引乃曾子(曾參)所言昔時親聞孔子詮釋天地之道的一段話。這一段話雖然甚短，卻含義豐富深厚，代表中國古代儒家的基本之自然生態環境之倫理觀念。

30) 同上注，頁52-53.

31) 〔西漢〕戴德：《大戴禮記·曾子天圓》，高明：《大戴禮記今註今譯》，臺北：臺灣商務印書館，1975.09，頁216. [(Xihan) Dai De, "Zengzi Tianyuan", *Da dai li ji (The Book of Rites in Gao Ming(ed.), Da dai li ji Jin Zhu Jin Yi*, Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1975.]

現在，「天圓地方」早已成為一般皆知的成語，大致上都認為是說天空如鍋蓋呈圓穹狀而地平線使人感覺大地似乎是四方形的結構。此種解釋可謂初步的認識，的確人在天地之中仰觀俯察，天圓地方的空間性，確是如此，除非古人能飛出地球之外，才能知天者為太空而地者實是一顆橢圓形行星是也。

因此，我們宜就此段經文之上下文脈來進行第二步的探究，經文接著有一較長的句子，正是系統地說出天地之道的意義。若將經文加以剖析，可發現撰述《曾子天圓》的這位儒者，是依天、地以及天地之道的功能而撰文。所以，其結構如此：

- (1) 天道曰圓→圓曰明→明者吐氣者也→外景→火日外景→吐氣者施→陽施→陽之精氣曰神。
- (2) 地道曰方→方曰幽→幽者含氣者也→內景→金水內景→含氣者化→陰施→陰之精氣曰靈。
- (3) 神靈者：
 - ① 品物之本也。
 - ② 禮樂仁義之祖也。
 - ③ 善否治亂所由興作也。

從上面的整理類析，我們得以明白《大戴禮記》裏面的古儒如何以易簡之道來看待人與天地之間的關聯和倫常。

原來，天道所言的「圓」，它不僅僅是空間之指示詞而已，它亦是生態的作用力，此即所謂「明」，明之狀態或動能是「吐氣」，由於其氣之韻律和功用是「吐」，因而呈現的景觀和結構則為「外景」，在大自然的天地空間之中，最顯著的「外景」，就是「火」與「日」，此乃指古人仰觀看到的太空中的太陽和火星。而此「氣之吐」稱為「施」，施的表顯就是「陽」，所以稱為「陽施」；換言之，就是陰陽大化中的陽，而陽氣中之最精華就稱之為「神」。

同樣的邏輯，地道之所言的「方」，亦非只是空間之指示詞而已，其可以是生態的作用力，此即所謂「幽」，幽的狀態或動能是「含氣」，由於其氣之韻律和功用是「含」，因而呈現出來的景觀和結構則為「內景」，在大自然的天地空間中，最顯著的「內景」，就是「金」與「水」，此乃指古人俯察看到的地形中的礦石和水體。而此「氣之含」稱為「化」，化的表顯就是「陰」，所以稱為「陰施」；換言之，就是陰陽大化中的陰，而陰氣中之最精華就稱之為「靈」。

基於上面的整理和說明，我們發現古儒觀察天地，明顯地以雙元性思維來理解、詮釋天地，而且以演衍之方式，建構了多重的雙元性，加以聚合而觀之，就是天與地→圓與方→明與幽→外與內→火日與金水→吐氣與含氣→施與化→陽與陰→神與靈。

如果僅僅止於此，則中國古代儒家的雙元性思維，乃是對蹠分裂的兩

兩相對的天地空間和生態觀，順此發展，或許會推衍出自然氣化主義的環境論。

然而，儒家的雙元性思維卻是一種由對裂格局而趨向統一格局的辯證性思維。此即上述的第(3)項。古代儒家認為「神靈」(也就是天地、陰陽)乃是兩大存有體的根本者、創發者，其中一個大存有體是總體萬物，也就是天地間一切生命物種的總體，天地陰陽神靈，是一切生命的根本者、創發者；其中另一個大存有體是禮樂仁義所表顯的人文世界，天地陰陽神靈乃是這個人之禮樂仁義所在以及運作的文明世界的根本者、創發者。

儒家在這個地方很清楚地以自然與人文整全合一的觀點，看待天地人乃是同一本體，換言之，人在天地空間存有，他與自然生態本即和合而為同一個體系；人在自然生態的和諧韻律裏面，依據自然生態的法則創制施作人文的禮樂仁義。合乎此種軌轍，社會就是善治，反之，社會就會否亂。

在上引的文句之後，此位儒家作者就以陰陽二氣的觀點，先解釋了氣候，譬如風、雷、電、霧、雨、雪、雹、霰等現象，他認為這些氣候的重要現象，是陰陽之氣的互交相感而變化所生。³²⁾我們若依現代科學判斷之，當然很容易說古儒對於氣候之所解釋者，屬於前科學之臆想。但是古典對於自然氣候現象的說明解釋，顯示了古代儒家並非一往內向追索而只著意於心性論的學術派別，在此呈現了一個事實，即古代中國人非常重視氣候的風、雨、雷、電之現象，何以如此？乃因氣候是農業的最直接最重要的影響因素。換言之，《大戴禮記》的這一章表現了什麼環境倫理呢？它表現了古儒的環境和生態思想與最基本的維生基盤之農業文明密切相關。

復次，這位儒家作者敘述四種動物以及此四種動物之精者，依次是：「毛蟲」，其精者曰「麟」；「羽蟲」，其精者曰「鳳」；「介蟲」，其精者曰「龜」；「鱗蟲」，其精者曰「龍」。再則，毛羽兩種蟲，是陽氣所生；介鱗兩種蟲，則是陰氣所生。對於這四種動物的敘說，是古儒觀察研究生態系中的動物類之後的分類，算得上是古典素樸的動物分類學。然而，這段文句卻還不只於此段，因為，他在文句中還敘述了生態系中的一種物種——人。他說：「唯人為裸胸而後生也，陰陽之精也 [……] 裸蟲之精者曰聖人。 [……] 茲四者(指毛羽介鱗)，所以聖人役之也；是故，聖人為天地主，為山川主，為鬼神主，為宗廟主。」³³⁾聖人是裸蟲之精，也就是並非每一個人都能夠有權柄去役用另外的「四蟲」，也不是每一個人都可以「為天地、山川、鬼神、宗廟之主事者」。換言之，人在天地空間之中以及生態環境裏，並非

32) 該段文句如此說：「陰陽之氣，各從其所，則靜矣。偏則風，俱則雷，交則電，亂則霧，和則雨。陽氣勝，則散為雨露；陰氣勝，則凝為霜雪；陽之專氣為雹，陰之專氣為霰，霰雹者，一氣之化也。」見《曾子天圓》，引書同上注，頁217。[*The Book of Rites*]

33) 該段文句如此說：「毛蟲毛而後生，羽蟲羽而後生，毛羽之蟲，陽氣之所生也；介蟲介而後生，鱗蟲鱗而後生，介鱗之蟲，陰氣之所生也；唯人為裸胸而後生也，陰陽之精也。毛蟲之精者曰麟，羽蟲之精者曰鳳，介蟲之精者曰龜，鱗蟲之精者曰龍。裸蟲之精者曰聖人；[……]。茲四者，所以聖人役之也；是故，聖人為天地主，為山川主，為鬼神主，為宗廟主。」見《曾子天圓》，引書同上注，頁218。[*The Book of Rites*]

宰制者或發配者，而唯有「聖人」能之。在儒家，聖人之聖，是指人之道德的心性以及道德的施為已達到最上乘境界，在《易傳》稱呼此聖人為大人，他的德行是「與天地合其德，與日月合其明，與四時合其序，與鬼神合其吉凶；先天而天弗違，後天而奉天時，天且弗違，而況於人乎！況於鬼神乎！」³⁴聖人為人文界的最高道德，其心是仁心、其行是仁德。而天地、日月則是指自然界的最高存有，其源生是乾元。鬼神則屬超越界的陰陽變化，其本質是一而二又二而一的太和清剛之氣。在這裏，其實是說天地、鬼神與人文這三界，在中國古代儒家的觀點，應屬同一本體，也就是「仁」與「元」與「氣」，根本是同一，因為就是那個根源性的同一，所以，才有聖人與天地日月以及陰陽鬼神整合為一的思想，換言之，儒家主張整全生機主義的環境、空間、生態倫理。在《大戴禮記》以及《易經傳》的經文中，都可以獲得相同的印證。

結論

古代經典的智慧，是古人從他的生態和環境中有所回應的創造。如果一種古代智慧無法回應當代而有其作用，則這個古典對今人是無意義無價值的。當代人類遭遇的最大危機和困境是現代化下人與生態環境對裂之問題。古人建立的全球環境倫理之睿智，或表彰天人和諧合一；或強調人應敬畏神明與天地；或認為人與萬物為一體均屬天地之兒女，這種種信念，均與現代化觀念中的天人相離對裂之思想以及現代化中以理性主義否定超越性、神聖性的思想，屬於不一樣的本體宇宙論。在生態環境的全球危機困境之大趨勢下，傳統的全球性重大教派，已紛紛提出拯濟地球和眾生之道，儒家的古典智慧也沒有缺席，亦能提出對治之方，此即是儒學儒教的振復的正路。

然而，儒家是中國古代農業文明的產物，從原始儒家孔子孟子以迄朱子、船山等宋明大儒都沒有遭逢現代化文明的大工業和大都市的雙重之生態和空間之套牢及汙染，他們亦沒有談及任何生態和都市的病症之災害，今人必須依賴自己在古典中披尋含藏其中的永恆性的天人相處之睿智。儒家典籍實在富藏關於天地神人如何四重安居的文本，它在彰明人本來與天地萬物整全合一的有機觀，現代人在現代性中寢久而不歸，由於迷失已久，所以無法體悟。但儒家肯定人皆有天生之良知良能，是由上天所賜，故生來具有，而從本來的心靈中能夠直覺人與天地的安和之道，因此，我們可以透過經典教育來開啟之、喚醒之，這個經典教育不是理性主義的啟蒙運動，而是儒學儒教的人與天地和諧合一之教的啟蒙運動，是二十一世紀全球人類最需要的精神和心靈的資糧。

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34) 《易·乾·文言》。[The Classic of Changes]

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Confucians' Solicitude for Contemporary Environmental Crisis and Predicament

PAN Chao-yang

Abstract

Modernization pushes the world forward with its two giant wheels — industrialization and urbanization. The grand process radically alters the natural states of humans' body and mind; it also continuously worsens the environmental crisis nowadays. In this sense, the situation of mankind is getting difficult each day.

Being fostered mainly in pre-modern agriculture civilizations, ancient Confucianism was vividly featured by a form of organic holism advocating the ideal of the harmony between Heaven and human. This article aims at highlighting such an aspect of Confucianism in order to propose a possible therapy for our current predicament.

We regard an educational movement of environmental-ethical enlightenment both significant and urgent — the one that is able to bring about the paradigm shift from modern rationalism to Confucian naturalism for the contemporary world.

Keywords: Modernization; Industrialization; Urbanization; Confucians; Confucianism; *The Classic of Changes*; *The Book of Rites*; Environment; Ecology; Space.

<書評>

“以中釋中”的學術新作 ——《思想世界的概念系統》一書的書評 (曾振宇 著, 人民出版社, ISBN : 9787010108575)

范學輝

如果一個民族有自己的哲學與文化形態，那麼一定存在著自身獨特的概念系統。道、氣、心、性、理、陰陽、五行、太極、中庸、致良知、形上形下、已發未發、格物致知、知行合一、理一分殊等等概念，構成中國哲學史上獨具人文特色的概念系統（概念與觀念，Concept and Conception）。但是，自從西學舍筏登陸以來，學人紛紛用西方哲學原理與概念體系重新詮釋與裁評中國傳統文化中的概念，道、氣、心、性、理等中土概念逐漸被披上“洋裝”。西風熏得國人醉，“直把杭州作汴州”。中國本土文化中的概念、範疇是中國文化的“結晶體”，或者說是“細胞”，對“結晶體”與“細胞”的分析與“解剖”，實質上是對中國哲學與文化形態特點的把握與總結，是對中國哲學與文化獨創性人文品格的高度概括。如果中國文化形態中的“細胞”已經變異，概念已經西方化，那麼“中國哲學”合法性就值得懷疑。最近三十年學界熱火朝天討論的“中國是否有哲學”、“中國哲學合法性”諸熱點，就已經說明了這一問題的嚴重性。曾振宇教授新近出版的《思想世界的概念系統》（人民出版社2012年出版），是學界研究思想史概念與觀念的新作。掩卷而思，此書有兩大特點：

1，在理論和研究思路，《思想世界的概念系統》一書力求否定近代以來用西方話語系統詮釋中國哲學與文化概念的“以西釋中”文化立場和“反向格義”治學方法，立足中國文化本位，追求“有中國的中國學。”

在學術史上，對文化思想史上的概念進行研究屬於“語言學”研究領域。在傳統語言學領域，概念研究體現為辨形之學、審音之學與釋義之學。《說文解字》以及清四家、《廣韻》、《音學五書》、《爾雅》、《孟子字義疏證》、《經傳釋詞》等等，皆是“語言學”研究代表作品。西風東漸，學界進而以西方哲學原理與方法來規範與詮釋中國哲學與文化概念，以“學著講”的思路，建構了多部“中國思想史概念研究”、“中國哲學範疇研究”著作，顛覆了傳統學術史的思維模式與觀點，“哲學在中國”意義

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上的“中國的哲學概念”宣告誕生。但是，“以西釋中”、“反向格義”理論和治學方法也產生了諸多弊端：

其一，中國思想文化史主幹概念獨創性人文品格的喪失。近百年來，學人“自覺”地用西方哲學原理與方法來規範中國本土思想史概念，特別是用“本體論Ontology”、“唯心”、“唯物”等原理來規範中國哲學與文化中的諸多概念，結果導致了中國文化形態中的諸多概念的“西化”。有的學者幾十年來對老子“道”的認識就頗具代表意義，早年說“道”是唯物主義的，然後又說“道”是唯心主義的，晚年又認為“道”是唯物主義還是唯心主義，老子“自己沒有講清楚”。這些學者沒有意識到用唯心與唯物理論來詮釋中國哲學與文化概念在前提上就存在大問題。正所謂“開口即錯，用心即舛”！

其二，無論是海外的相關研究，還是國內的研究，有些學者對哲學與文化形態中的概念研究，側重於具體某一文本或某一人物；也有對某一概念作縱向的梳理，但尚停留在資料的收集上，每一哲學概念內在的邏輯性線索沒有梳理出來。譬如，“氣”在甲骨文已出現，氣何時由一普通字詞上升為哲學概念？氣學為何與陰陽五行學說“牽手”？氣範疇有那幾層內涵？張載氣學何以是中國氣學最高水平？王廷相氣學為何倒退了？程朱氣學如何與理學結合且下降為質料？理學為何又與氣學合二為一了？明清氣學為何又超越了理學？這些問題不深入探討，就無法梳理出“氣”這一哲學概念兩千多年的演變軌跡和內在邏輯發展線索，換言之，也就無法勾勒出哲學與文化形態中每一個概念的“一條龍”出來（馮友蘭語）。

日本著名學者溝口雄三曾經指出：目前對中國思想與曆史的研究，都是“沒有中國的中國學”。“這三百年來，不，這四千年來，世界上沒有產生真正研究中國的曆史。中國人自己也一樣。”美國柯文教授也一針見血地批評“凡是近代的就是西方的，而西方的就是重要的”西方文明中心論立場。日本與美國學者的這些觀點，對該書作者影響較大，他稱之為“猶如當頭棒喝！足以使中國學人既感到震驚又羞愧難當”。有鑒於此，在理論方法、思維方式和治學模式上，力求正本清源、返本開新，完全改變以往中國哲學與文化概念研究的理論方法與立場、觀點，讓中國古典學術回歸中國文化，以中釋中，成為此書一大特色。

2. 在諸多範疇的研究與梳理上，本書作者高屋建瓴，提出了自己一些獨到的見識。

譬如，老子之“道”蘊涵與性質應如何把握與評價，在學術史上始終見仁見智，莫衷一是。近幾年來，劉笑敢教授接連發表多篇文章，對近代以來以反向格義主流方法詮釋中國本土哲學概念所陷入的方枘圓鑿困境進行反思，在學界產生了廣泛影響。曾振宇深感其對《老子》道論尚有意猶未盡之處，所以在劉笑敢思考的基礎上進一步對當年處於風口浪尖的《老子》之“道”進行考辨與梳理，“其意義不僅僅在於對以往《老子》“道”論討論中凸顯的主流意識形態作別，更深刻的意義還在於努力回答一個似乎很

簡單的問題：以“道”為代表的中國傳統哲學概念的獨特性究竟何在？根據他的梳理，老子之“道”具有多位一體，多義合一的特點。道既是宇宙本根，又含有物質與精神屬性；道既是價值總根源，又是生命理想境界。貫通於形而上與形而下世界，兼涵萬有、賅總一切。曾振宇從中西文化比較視域分析出發，認為以“道”為代表的中國傳統哲學概念體系至少存在著三大特點：其一，“泛神論”、“泛心論”色彩濃鬱；其二，概念、範疇的邏輯進程十分緩慢；其三，詩性色彩濃鬱，語義含混、邊界模糊。“詩性色彩濃鬱”的中國本土哲學概念與西方哲學概念相比，不存在孰優孰劣之爭。存在的只是不同哲學與文化形態的特色與向度不一。“這些觀點是作者“自己講”得出的結論，給人的啟發意義頗大。又如，在孟子人性論研究上，學界普遍認為孟子的基本觀點為“人性善”或“性善”。曾振宇結合出土文獻，力辟陳識，對業已成為“國民常識”的觀點作進一步的質疑與考辨。他認為，“研究孟子人性學說，在方法論上應當遵循“以孟釋孟”原則，在文本釋讀與思想詮釋上，應當區別“君子所性”¹⁾與“人之性”兩個概念。在“君子所性”層面，孟子刻意強調君子與禽獸的“幾希”之別，論證人性有“善端”，仁義禮智四端“根於心”。“四端”是“在我者”，而非“在外者。”因此，君子在應然意義上當以此“四端”為性。但是，在“人之性”層面，孟子並沒有否定“性”或“人性”有惡端，“大體”與“小體”同在於人心。“味”、“色”、“聲”、“臭”也是“天性”，盡管君子不將“味”、“色”、“聲”、“臭”稱之為性，但芸芸眾生之“天性”還是蘊涵了“形色”基質。猶如《墨經》“殺盜非殺人”命題一樣，君子不從生物學意義上界定“人”，只從倫理學層面論證人之所以為人。在孟子看來，如果排除後天教化成份，人人近於“禽獸”。“惡”是與“善”相對之惡，“惡”並非僅具形式義，“惡”也具有實質義。善與惡皆有來源，善是人性中“固有者”，惡也是人性中“固有者”。秦漢以降，歷代學人之所以對孟子人性學說理解不一、莫衷一是，大多在於未厘清“君子所性”與“人之性”兩個概念的區別。全書的這些觀點，大大推進了學界對哲學概念與觀念的研究。

在學術理論、方法與觀點上，對“反向格義”進行反思，力求“以中釋中”，發掘出有別於西方哲學的中國思想文化史基本概念的特點與獨創性，這恰恰正是《思想世界的概念系統》一書最大的特點。

1) 《孟子·盡心章句上》，第355頁。

Regulations for Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

I. General Regulations

1. (Name) The official name for the institute is “Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture” (ICPC, hereafter), which an organization that belongs to Academy of East Asian Studies (AEAS, hereafter) at Sungkyunkwan University.
2. (Objective) ICPC researches mainly on Confucian thoughts. It also covers general Confucian culture, as well as its development and modernization, in an attempt to guide fundamental principles for the humanity in this fast developing society.

II. Organization

3. (Constitution) ICPC is constituted of 1) Director, 2) The management committee, and 3) editorial board.
4. (Director)
 - 1) Director must be a full-time professor of Sungkyunkwan University, with the specialty that meets the objective outlined in the article I. The director must be nominated by the university president and appointed by the chairman of the board.
 - 2) The director, representing ICPC, controls the general affairs of ICPC.
 - 3) The basic term for the director is 2 years, which is extendable.
5. (Assistant Director)
 - 1) The director may appoint (an) assistant director(s) to assist a part of director’s task.
 - 2) Assistant director must be a member of researchers, nominated by the director of ICPC and appointed by the director of AEAS.
 - 3) The basic term for the assistant director is 2 years, which is extendable.
6. (Office)
 - 1) ICPC may assign (an) office(s) according to different research area.
 - 2) The head of office must hold a position equivalent to

research professor or above. The head must be agreed by the management committee, again nominated by the director of ICPC and finally appointed by the director of AEAS.

III. Management Committee

7. (Constitution)
 - 1) ICPC may establish a management committee, in order to discuss and make important decisions regarding general management.
 - 2) Management committee is under 10 persons. The head of management committee is the director.
 - 3) Member of the management committee must be research member of the ICPC, nominated by the director and appointed by the director of AEAS.
8. (Agenda) The agenda for the management committee includes:
 - 1) Establishment of basic plans for management and research.
 - 2) Declaration and elimination of various rules and regulation.
 - 3) Settlement of budget and accounts.
 - 4) Other issues concerning the management.
9. (Call for Meeting)
 - 1) The director calls for meeting.
 - 2) The meeting is valid only when more than half of the members are present. More than half of the members present at the meeting must agree in order to settle an agenda.

IV. Editorial Board

10. (Constitution)
 - 1) ICPC holds editorial board, in order to discuss and make decisions regarding publications of ICPC.
 - 2) Editorial board includes the editor-in-chief and noted scholars of Korea and abroad. The editor-in-chief is the director of ICPC.
 - 3) The member of editorial board is appointed by the director. The basic term is 2 years.
 - 4) Each year, editorial board publishes Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture. Rules and dates for publication are established separately.
11. (Call for Meeting)

More than half of the editorial board members present at the

meeting must agree in order to settle an agenda.

* The above regulation begins at March 1st, 2000.

Code of Management for The Editorial Board of Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture.

I . General Regulations

1. (Objective)

This regulation is established according to the article IV-10-4) of the Regulations for Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (ICPC, hereafter). It is the regulative guideline for publishing Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture. (JCPC, hereafter).

2. (Mission)

- 1) To supervise publication of JCPC and the related affairs of acceptance, review, editing, and so on.
- 2) To set up rules and regulations for publishing JCPC.

II. Organization of Editorial Board

3. (Constitution)

Editorial board is constituted of editorial advisors, editorial councils, the chief manager (the director), the editor-in-chief, the head of editing team, and editing team members.

4. (Appointment of Editorial Advisors and Members)

The director of ICPC appoints editorial advisors and members among noted scholars of highest achievement, in Korean and abroad.

5. (Terms)

The basic term for the editorial members is 2 years, extendable when necessary. Editor-in-chief is tenured by principle, in order for the journal to maintain its congruity.

6. (Chief Manager)

The director of ICPC is also the chief manger, supervises the editorial board.

7. (Editor-in-chief)

The editor-in-chief is appointed by the director of ICPC, responsible for all the editorial issues.

8. (Head of Editing Team, Editing Team)

The head of editing team and editing team are appointed by the director of ICPC. The head of editing team is responsible for general issues concerning editing, and the assistant head is responsible for assisting related editorial matters.

III. Publication of JCPC

9. (Numbers and Dates of Publication)

JCPC is published twice in a year: August 31st, and February 28th.

10. (Circulation)

The size of circulation for JCPC is determined by the editorial board.

11. (Size)

The standard size for JCPC is 176mm x 248mm.

12. (Editorial System)

- 1) Academic article written in either Chinese or English.
- 2) Academic article includes: title, abstract, keywords, contents, bibliography, abstract written in Chinese or English, keywords written in Chinese or English.
- 3) The English title and name of the author must be specified.
- 4) The affiliation of the author must be specified.
- 5) Regulations, bulletins, articles other than academic articles may be included according to the decision of editorial board.

IV. Submission of Articles and Management

13. (Subject and Character of the Submitted Article)

The subject of article includes

- 1) Confucian thoughts and culture in Korea and abroad.
- 2) Reviews on books, translations, research articles of related subject, published in Korea or abroad. It may include dissertations.
- 3) Critical reviews on academic trends, mainly in arts and humanities, related to Confucianism and East Asian studies.

No certain qualification for submission is required.

14. (Number of Words)

- 1) The number of words for each article is limited to 10000 words for Chinese, 6000 words for English, including abstract, footnotes, bibliography, etc. Reviews are limited to 4000 words for Chinese, and 2500 words for English.
- 2) The number of words for articles other than academic articles and reviews will be determined by editorial board.

15. (Submission Guidelines)

- 1) Call for papers all time, but only the articles submitted 3 months before the publication date are subjected to reviewing process.
- 2) Digital texts must be submitted for articles written in Chinese or English.
- 3) Abstracts in Chinese or English must include 5 or more

keywords.

- 4) If written jointly, the first (main) author and the second (joint) author, as well as their respective name, affiliation, area of research, part of writing must be noted.
 - 5) E-mail address and phone number of the author must be provided.
16. (Control of Submitted Articles)
- 1) Submitted articles are, as they arrive, subject to a controlled process.
 - 2) Submitted articles are not returned, and copyright for the published articles belong to ICPC.

V. Reviewing Submitted Articles

17. (Obligation to Review)
All published articles must pass the reviewing process.
18. (Regulations for Reviewing Board)
- 1) For each submitted article, editorial board will select 3 reviewers and commission them evaluate the article. 2/3 of reviewers must agree in order for the article to be published.
 - 2) In principle, board of reviewers must maintain just and fair attitude, and do not review the articles written by scholars of their affiliation.
 - 3) For the sake of fairness, anonymity will be kept.
19. (Standard of Review)
- 1) Articles will be reviewed for basic format (20%), originality (20%), clarity of subject (20%), logic (20%), and congruity (20%)
 - 2) The result will divide the articles into two: publishable and not publishable.
 - 3) Articles evaluated as not publishable cannot be re-submitted with the same title.
20. (Feedback time)
Reviewers must feedback the article within two-week's time to the editorial board.
21. (Reporting Back the Result)
Editorial board must report back to the author as soon as the results come out.

VI. Revision of Regulations

22. (Principle)
This code of management is subject to change when 2/3 of editorial board agrees, given that more than half of the editorial board members are present.

*** Other Regulations**

23. (Others)

- 1) Other issues not written in this code will be treated following customary practices.
- 2) The above regulation begins at December 20th, 2006.
- 3) The editorial board will determine and deal with details concerning the above regulations.

Code of Ethics and Management For the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

I. General Regulations

1. (Objective) This regulation is established in order to define the ethical principles and standard of management of Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (ICPC, hereafter).
2. (Application) This regulation is applied to prevent any unjust act within academic agenda of ICPC, and to manage systematically if an unjust act arises. At the same time, it is geared toward protecting creativity of academic research and strengthening ethical spirits within academia.

II. Research Ethics

3. (Ethical Code for Authors)
 - 1) All the authors who submit their articles to the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (JCPC, hereafter) must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) All the research outcomes that are mainly based on a fake research or already published article without any new insight are regarded as forged.
 - 3) Any close imitation of another author's ideas and arguments without giving an objective credit or mention is regarded as plagiarism.
 - 4) Submission of one's own work that is already presented and published elsewhere as the first research outcome is regarded as duplication or self-plagiarism.
 - 5) Sponsored articles must follow the regulations of the sponsor before submission.
 - 6) An author must take a full responsibility of one's presented articles.
 - 7) Co-authors must mention the part to which each author has contributed, and take responsibility for the part.
4. (Ethical Code for the Editorial Board)
 - 1) Editorial board members of JCPC must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) Editorial board members must participate in editorial meetings and take responsibility of receiving articles, selection of reviewers, and selection of articles,
 - 3) Editorial board members must be silent about personal information of the authors submitting articles. Otherwise, it

will be regarded as abuse of right.

- 4) Editorial board members must strictly follow regulations in confirming submission, reviewers, etc., lest it should arouse any conflict between reviewers and general members.
- 5) Once any problem regarding ethical matters arises, the editorial board must immediately call for ethics committee.
5. (Ethical Code for the Reviewing Committee)
 - 1) Members of reviewing committee of JCPC must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) A reviewer must follow the established regulations as one proceeds an objective and fair review of the submitted article, and gives the feedback to the editorial board. If one cannot review the given article for an objective reason, one must notify the editorial board.
 - 3) A reviewer must rely on one's conscience and academic standard in reviewing the submitted article. A reviewer cannot reject an article based on personal standpoint without any sufficient basis, and cannot conclude the review without scrupulously reading the whole article.
 - 4) A reviewer must keep the author's personal information as well as the content of the article confidential throughout the process.

III. Establishment and Management of Ethics Committee

6. (Ethics Enforcement)

This regulation is established according to the general regulation, and it is already in effect. The director decides on establishing specific rules in applying the regulations.
7. (Constitution of Ethics Committee)

Ethics Committee is constituted of the director of Ethics Committee, the editor-in-chief, and members of editorial board (about five members). The director of ICPC is also the director of Ethics Committee
8. (Function of Ethics Committee)
 - 1) On violation of the ethical code, the ethics committee proceeds investigation and decision, and notifies the violator the opinion of the committee. Then it will report the issue to the editorial board.
 - 2) When investigating the violation, ethics committee must secure sufficient evidence and keep the whole process confidential.
9. (Accusation of Violation)
 - 1) An accuser must secure specific evidence when reporting an

act of violation. Even if the report turns out to be false, the ethics committee can keep the meeting.

- 2) The same process of accusation applies to editorial members and reviewers.
10. (Investigation and Decision)
 - 1) When accused for violating the ethical code, the accused must comply with the investigation by the ethics committee. Noncompliance is regarded as acknowledging the violation.
 - 2) The accused article will be postponed for publication until investigation clears its doubt. The investigation finishes before the next term for publication.
11. (Chance of Defense)

The accused has right to defend one's article. The method of defense can be open to general members, if accused pleases.
12. (Forms of Penalty)

The penalty from ethics committee includes warning, restriction of submission, and expulsion from the membership. An already published article can be deferred or pulled out completely. A sponsored article, when it is used unfairly or warned by the sponsor, is also subject to penalty.
13. (Revision of Regulations)

Revising this regulation must follow ICPC's principle of revision.
14. (Others)

Regulations not written in the above will follow customary practices.

*** Other Regulations**

This regulation is established according to the article 21 of ICPC. It is agreed by the editorial board (Oct. 20th, 2007), and is in act since Jan. 1st, 2008.

SUBMISSION REQUIREMENT FOR CONTRIBUTORS

1. Submit an academic c. v. within 250 words.
2. Type "Author's Contact Information" on top of the title of your article, which shows date, mailing address, affiliation, e-mail address, telephone and fax.
3. On the first page of the main text, make a 300 word abstract outline (including 5 key words or more)
4. On the first page of the main text, make a footnote (by marking a superscript* on the right top of the author's name) to provide your "Author's Academic Information": academic title, affiliation including the names of Department and University (omitting mailing address and e-mail address).
5. Each article should only use footnotes (at the bottom of the page) but not endnotes or parenthetical references (in the body of the article) for frequently cited source. Bibliography and other documentations are not preferable. Footnotes shall refer to the format of Chicago Manual Style.
6. Unless specially invited, the length of each article (including notes, references, and glossaries) should not exceed 20 pages (letter font of size 10.5 and American standard paper size of 8.5 × 11), namely, approximately 6,000 words. Regular book review is to be limited within 8 pages, approximately 2,500 words.
7. Each article, if needed, should supply its own Chinese or other linguistic glossary by either (1) itemizing each term with a superscript in the text and listing it according to alphabetical order of the superscripts in the glossary, or (2) listing all terms by their transliteration in alphabetical order and then adding the Chinese or other characters after these transliterations. The list of glossary is to be in two parallel columns and single spaces. When there is more than one linguistic glossary, please provide separate lists. Each glossary should be properly given a full name, i.e., "Chinese Glossary." Each glossary shall not exceed 80 items by selecting major terminologies.

For a more detailed submission guideline, please contact at jicpc@skku.edu.

儒教文化研究所章程

第一章 總則

第一條（名稱）本研究所的正式名稱爲“儒教文化研究所”（以下簡稱“研究所”），是成均館大學東亞學術院的下設機關。

第二條（目的）本研究所以研究儒學思想爲主，同時兼顧整個東亞的儒學文化研究，並對儒學的傳統進行現代化的解釋和發展，使之成爲指引人類發展的基本理念。

第二章 組織

第三條（機構）研究所的機構如下設置：1.所長，2.運營委員會，3.編輯委員會。

第四條（所長）

1. 所長必須由與第一章規定中的目的相符合的專業的本校教授擔任，由學校校長提請理事長任命。
2. 所長代表研究所，總體掌管研究所的事務。
3. 所長的任期爲2年，可以連任。

第五條（部長）

1. 爲了輔佐所長，並分擔所長的一部分業務，所長下面可以設置部長。
2. 部長由研究委員中產生，所長提請學術院院長任命。
3. 任期爲2年，可以連任。

第六條（研究室）

1. 研究所可以根據研究領域的不同而設置研究室。
2. 研究室長由研究教授以上的人擔任，須經運營委員會的審議通過，再由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第三章 運營委員會

第七條（構成）

1. 爲了便於審議和決定與研究所運營相關聯的重要事項，研究所可以設置運營委員會。
2. 運營委員會由所長和10人以內的委員構成，委員長是所長。
3. 委員由研究所的研究委員中產生，由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第八條（審議事項）運營委員會主要審議以下事項：

1. 基本運營計劃的確立以及與研究計劃相關的事項。
2. 研究所諸規定的制定與廢除問題。

3. 預算以及結算等諸問題。
4. 其他與研究所運營相關的事項。

第九條（會議）

1. 會議由委員長召集。
2. 會議要有在職委員過半數以上的出席才可以召開，出席委員過半數同意才可以決議。

第四章 編輯委員會

第十條（構成）

1. 爲了審議決定研究所刊行的出版物的編輯事宜，故設立編輯委員會。
2. 編輯委員會由委員長和國內外的知名學者構成，委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員由所長任命，任期2年。
4. 編輯委員會每年刊行《儒教文化研究》，論文的刊行原則以及刊行日期等規定另外制定。

第十一條（會議）編輯委員會會議要有出席編輯委員的過半數同意才可以決議。

附則（施行日）本規定自2000 年3 月1 日起施行。

《儒教文化研究》編輯委員會運營章程

第一章 總則

第一條（目的）本規定是根據儒教文化研究所文件中第4 節編輯委員會（以下簡稱委員會）第27 條第1 項研究所刊行物的出版條目中《儒教文化研究》的相關規定而制定的。

第二條（任務）

1. 主管《儒教文化研究》的發刊和相關論文的策劃、接收、評審、編輯等工作。
2. 制定與《儒教文化研究》的發刊相關聯的一系列規定。

第二章 編輯委員會構成

第三條（構成）委員會由編輯顧問、編輯委員、主任（委員長）、主編、編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯構成。

第四條（編輯顧問和委員的選任）編輯顧問和編輯委員由儒教文化研究所所長在世界各國中有卓越研究業績的權威學者中選擇並任命。

第五條（委員的任期）委員任期為2 年，必要時可以連任。但為了保證學術雜誌的長期穩定性，主編原則是連任的。

第六條（主任）主任（委員長）由儒教文化研究所所長兼任，主管編輯委員會。

第七條（主編）主編由研究所所長任命，總體負責所有的編輯事務。

第八條（編輯部主任、編輯）編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯由研究所所長任命。編輯部主任全面負責編輯事務，編輯輔助室長處理相關的編輯事務。

第三章 《儒教文化研究》的發刊

第七條（發行的次數和日期）《儒教文化研究》每年兩次刊行，出版日期為8月31日和2月28 日。

第八條（發行數量）《儒教文化研究》的發行數量由委員會決定。

第九條（開本）實行176mm×248mm 開本。

第十條（編輯體制）

1. 學術論文使用中文或英文制作。
2. 學術論文的編輯順序原則上分為論文題目、提要、關鍵詞、正文、參考文獻、中英文抄錄、中英文關鍵詞。
3. 必須注明學術論文的英文題目和作者姓名。
4. 必須注明作者的所屬單位、職務和具體的聯系方式。

5. 學術論文以外的各種文章以及會則、會報的刊載與否由委員會決定。

第四章 論文的投稿和管理

第十一條（投稿論文主題和資格）

1. 投稿範圍是以儒學思想為中心的世界各國的儒學文化。
2. 對國內外刊行的相關儒學著作、翻譯著作以及研究類刊物的書評。
3. 對國內外的儒學和東亞學等人文科學類相關論文（包括學位論文）的論評和研究動向。
4. 不限論文投稿資格。

第十二條（原稿字數）

1. 一般情況下按照中英文10000 字/6000 words 左右（包括腳注、參考文獻、抄錄等），書評4000 字/2500 words 左右的標準。
2. 論文和書評以外的原稿字數由委員會決定。

第十三條（論文投稿要領）

1. 隨時可以提交論文，但以本刊出版3 個月前到達的論文作為該版的審查對象。
2. 論文使用中文或英文格式，投稿時須提交電子版。
3. 中英文的抄錄需各附5 個以上的關鍵詞。
4. 如果是共同研究的論文，需要分別標出責任研究員和共同研究員，並且須分別注明姓名和所屬單位、研究領域、執筆範圍和分擔的領域。
5. 來稿須注明作者的電子郵件地址以及聯絡電話。

第十四條（投稿論文的管理）

1. 投稿論文按照來稿順序，建立文檔進行統一有序的管理。
2. 來稿論文概不退還，所刊載論文的著作權歸研究所。

第五章 投稿論文的審查

第十五條（審查義務）記載的論文必須經過審查。

第十六條（審查委員規定）

1. 對於投稿的每篇論文，編輯委員會將選定3 名評審委員，並委託給他們評審。論文必須經過審查委員2/3 以上的贊成才可刊登。
2. 原則上，審查委員應堅持公正、公平的作風。而且不得審查與自己同一單位的投稿者的文章。
3. 為了審查的公正性，審查全部採取匿名制。

第十七條（審查標準）

1. 審查按照基本格式（20%）、獨創性（20%）、主題明確性（20%）、

邏輯性 (20%)、完整性 (20%) 來進行綜合評定。

2. 審查結果分爲刊載可、否兩類。

3. 被評爲不可刊載的論文，不得再以同一題目向本會投稿。

第十八條（審查結果報告）審查委員從收到評審論文之日算起，應於2周內將審查結果報告給委員會。

第十九條（審查結果通告）委員會收到審查結果報告書後，立即告知投稿者。

第二十條（稿費支付）對於刊載文章，支付給作者一定的稿費。

第六章 章程的修訂

第二十一條（原則）本章程的修訂要有過半數編輯委員參加，並且經參加人員2/3 以上的同意方可實行。

附 則

第二十二條（其他）

1. 以上沒有列入章程的事宜按照慣例處理。
2. 本規定自2006 年12 月20 日起生效並施行。
3. 本規定在施行過程中發生的細部事項由委員會來決定並處理。

《儒教文化研究》研究倫理及運營規定

第一章 總則

第一條（目的）本規定的目的在於闡明儒教文化研究所（以下簡稱“本研究所”）學術研究活動的研究倫理和運營基準。

第二條（作用）本規定的作用在於抵制研究活動中的不正當行為，以及不正當行為發生後體系性的追查，並且保護有創意性的學術研究，提高學問的倫理性。

第二章 研究倫理

第三條（作者倫理）

1. 凡是向本研究所刊行的《儒教文化研究》投稿的作者都應該遵守運營規定。
2. 虛造研究成果或將以前的研究成果刪改變用的一律視為偽造、編造。
3. 對他人的觀點或主張缺乏客觀分析而直接拿來用作自己的觀點，此種行為視為剽竊。
4. 將自己已經發表的研究成果拿來用作首次發表，此種行為視為重複刊載或自我剽竊。
5. 受研究經費資助的論文只有遵守資助單位的管理規定才可投稿。
6. 對於自己公式發表的論文，作者要負全面責任。
7. 共同研究的情況要注明每個人分擔的部分，以此來各負責任。

第四條（編輯委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的編輯委員應該遵守運營規定。
2. 編輯委員要積極參與編輯會議，要對論文的接收、選定評委以及刊載與否負責任。
3. 編輯委員對於投稿者的個人信息要保密，不得利用私權。
4. 編輯委員要嚴格按照既定的標準來確認論文的投稿以及評審情況等，注意不要引發審評者以及一般會員間的是非。
5. 編輯委員會一旦發現研究倫理上的問題要立即通報倫理委員會。

第五條（審查委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的論文審查委員應該遵守審查規定。
2. 審查委員要根據所定的審查規定來對投稿論文進行客觀、公正的審查，並將審查結果通報給編輯委員會。若自己因客觀情況不能審查，則應及時通報編輯委員會。
3. 審查委員要根據學者的良心和學問的客觀基準來審查論文。在缺乏充分根據的情況下，不能一味的依據自己的學術觀點來判定“不可刊載”，也不能不仔細通讀全文就擅作審查。

4. 審查委員對於審查過程中所知道的作者的個人情況要進行保密，不能私自公開或利用審查論文的内容。

第三章 倫理委員會設置以及運營

第六條（倫理規定的遵守）本規定依據本會的會則制定，一經施行，立即生效。只是與此相適應的施行細則由委員長決定。

第七條（倫理委員會的構成）倫理委員會由所長、主編和編輯委員（5人左右）組成，所長兼任委員長。

第八條（倫理委員會的職能）

1. 對於違反本規定的行為，倫理委員會要進行調查和議決，並將相關意見通告給當事人，然後報告給編輯委員會。
2. 在審議違反規定的行為時，要確保能夠充分掌握證據並對事情的經過保密，不到最後時刻不能公開審議意見。

第九條（違反倫理規定行為的揭發）

1. 若有違反倫理規定的事實，揭發者可以持具體的事實證據向倫理委員會揭發。若揭發的事實是虛偽的，倫理委員會可以繼續維持決議。
2. 編輯委員或審查委員在評審過程中若發現有違反倫理規定的事實也依據如上方法揭發。

第十條（調查以及審議）

1. 會員若被揭發有違反本研究所倫理規定的行為，則應積極配合倫理委員會的調查，若不配合，其行為則視為違反倫理規定。
2. 對於被揭發的有違反倫理規定的論文，在事實查清以前應采取保留措施。調查審議應在下一期學術期刊發行前結束。

第十一條（解釋的機會）對於被揭發有違反倫理規定實施的會員，要給與其充分的解釋機會。解釋的方式可依據當事者的意願公開。

第十二條（處罰的類型）倫理委員會的處罰類型有警告、限制投稿、解除委任等。對於已經投稿或刊載的論文可以采取保留或撤銷的措施。對於接受研究經費資助的論文，若因不正當的使用而受到資助機關的警告，也屬於處罰對象之列。

第十三條（規定的修改）此規定的修改要遵守本研究所的修改原則。

第十四條（其他）以上規定中沒有涉及的事宜依據慣例處理。

附則

本規定依據本研究所會則第21條制定，並經過編輯委員會（2007年10月20日）的審議，於2008年1月1日起施行。

投稿須知

1. 本刊實行176mm×248mm 開本，來稿一律使用中文（或英文）制作，請提交電子版。中文一律使用簡體，英文按照一般慣例。
2. 論文的格式順序原則上依次分爲論文題目、中文提要（300-400 字）、中文關詞（5 個以上）、正文、參考文獻、英文題目、英文摘要（300 words）、英文關鍵詞（5 個以上）等。
3. 者簡介可置於文章的最後，須注明作者的性別、所屬單位、職務、E-MAIL、聯系地址以及具體的電話聯系方式，以便編輯部聯絡。必要時可附上自己的簡曆。
4. 正文內容請用10.5 號字，行間距爲1，文章字數以10000 字爲宜，可以適當的增減。但最好不要超過15000 字。
5. 文章的章節可以用“一、二、三……”來表示，若還要細分，則請用“（一）、（二）、（三）……”來表示。章節題目一律左側對齊，使用黑體加粗字體。
6. 文章引用古典文獻請採取隨文夾注的形式，須注明古典名、卷數，章節名等。有的古典須標明出版社，如：朱熹，《朱子全書》（第三冊），上海古籍出版社，2002，905 頁。
7. 引用書籍內容時，請依次注明：作者、書名、出版地、出版社、出版年度、引用文所在頁碼。如：楊伯峻，《春秋左傳注》，北京：中華書局，1981，56 頁。
8. 引用期刊內容時，請依次注明：作者，文章名，刊物名（包括期數），文章所在頁碼。如：張立文，《論羅從彥的內聖外王之道》，載《孔子研究》2006 年第5期，4 頁。
9. 外文參考文獻（包括出版社、出版地）一律使用原出版語種，西方作者名字全部用大寫，書名、雜誌名用黑體。
10. 若作者本人有對文章題目、文章內容的解釋性說明，請放在當頁用腳注表示。
11. 來稿一經采用，即付稿酬。不采用的稿件，一律不退，也不奉告評審意見。三個月內未接到采用通知的，作者可自行處理。
12. 本刊對采用的稿件有刪改權，不同意刪改者，請在來稿中申明。
13. 本刊刊發的文章，作者著作權使用費與稿費一次性付清。如作者不同意文章轉載，請在來稿時聲明。

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