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# A Reconsideration of Yi Hwang's Four-Seven Theory

Yoo Weon-ki

## Abstract

The Four-Seven Debate between Toegye Yi Hwang (退溪 李滉) and Gobong Gieseung (高峯 奇大升) in 16th century Korea concerned the problem of explaining the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings (四端七情) in terms of the two ontological concepts of *ri* (理) and *gi* (氣). In this paper, I will focus on the questions raised in this debate about the following issues: (a) the origin or ontological basis of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings; (b) the exact meaning of *bal* (發), which is used in the description of the origin of the Four and the Seven; (c) the possibility of ascribing activity or movability to *ri*; (d) the relation between the Four and the Seven; and (e) the possibility of nonequilibrium in the case of the Four. In explaining why each issue was raised, I will focus on the position of Yi Hwang rather than that of Gi Daeseung, and will show how far and in what way Yi Hwang revised his position in response to Gi Daeseung's criticisms.

**Keywords:** Toegye Yi Hwang, Gobong Gi Daeseung, the Four Beginnings, the Seven Feelings, the Four-Seven theory, *ri* (理), *gi* (氣), *bal* (發)

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## 1. Introduction

Neo-Confucians try to explain human beings in terms of the three psychological concepts of mind (心), human nature (性), and emotion (情). They in turn try to understand those concepts in terms of the ontological concepts of *ri* (理) and *gi* (氣), which are the components of the universe and all the myriad things in it. To understand human beings in terms of *ri* and *gi* is therefore to understand them in the context of the universe as a whole, which entails the belief that the universe and human beings are closely related. The so-called Four-Seven Debate between Toegye Yi Hwang (退溪 李滉, 1501-1570) and Gobong Gi Daeseung (高峯 奇大升, 1527-1572) which began in 1559 and lasted for about eight years, is a good illustration of the belief. In this debate, they attempt to use *ri* and *gi* in order to explain the psychological concept of feeling (情), which includes the Four Beginnings (commiseration, shame-dislike, deference-compliance, and right-wrong) and the Seven Feelings (joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire). Indeed, this debate bears a characteristic mark of Korean scholarly Neo-Confucianism: whereas Chinese Neo-Confucian scholars such as Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200) and Lu Xiangshan (陸象山, 1139-1192) were deeply concerned with human nature and mind respectively, Korean Neo-Confucian scholars focused on emotion.<sup>1)</sup>

The Four-Seven Debate turns on questions concerning five main issues: (a) the origin or the ontological basis of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings; (b) the exact meaning of *bal* (發), which is used in the description of the origin of the Four and the Seven; (c) the possibility of ascribing activity or movability to *ri*; (d) the relation between the Four and the Seven; (e) the possibility of nonequilibrium in the case of the Four.<sup>2)</sup> Though many scholars have examined these issues closely over the past thirty years, they have not clearly

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1) Choi (2007), p.49.

2) (a) Most scholarship on the Four-Seven discusses the Four and the Seven in terms of *ri* and *gi*, see Fu (1985), Jin (1987), Lee (1988), Kim (1996), and Kim (2008); (b) on the various meanings of *bal* (發), see Jeong (2003), Nam (2007), Yoo (2011a, pp. 37-45), and Yoo (2012); (c) on the relation between the Four and the Seven sometimes discussed in terms of *daeseol* (對說) and *inseol* (因說), or "The Seven including the Four" and "The Seven versus the Four", see Lee (1973), Han (2005), and Choi and Ahn (2008); (d) on "the movability of *ri*" or "the arousal of *ri*", see Choi (1981), Kim (1996), and Lee (1993), Kim (1999), and Moon (2001); and on the possibility of nonequilibrium in the case of the Four, see Yoon (1980, pp. 88-111), Moon (2001, pp. 168-171), Yoo (2011b).

explained the reasons why they arise as questions in the first place. In what follows, I will divide the questions into two groups: (a)-(c), concerning *ri* and *gi*, and (d)-(e), concerning the Four and the Seven, and I will try to show the reason for raising each of them. In doing this, I will examine Yi Hwang's positions on these five issues.

## 2. The Debate in terms of *Ri* and *Gi*

### (1) *Ri* and *Gi* as the Origin

Let us begin with a brief account of the Four-Seven Debate. Chuman Jeong Jiun (秋巒 鄭之雲, 1509-1561) drew a diagram entitled *Diagram of the Heavenly Mandate* with a brief account of Confucian teachings on the relation between the universe and human beings and consulted Yi Hwang about the accuracy of his account. Yi Hwang noted that Jeong Jiun's account of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings in terms of *ri* and *gi* respectively would be controversial, since it seems to sever the connection between the Four and the Seven and, as a result, that between *ri* and *gi*. Jeong Jiun corrected his own position in accordance with Yi Hwang's advice. Later on, Gi Daeseung heard about this incident and raised a doubt about Yi Hwang's advice. This is the beginning of the debate between Yi Hwang and Gi Daeseung. In the course of their debate, the original proposition of Jeong Jiun was modified four times by Yi Hwang and once more by Gi Daeseung. Their debate thus involves six different propositions.<sup>3)</sup> Let us examine the implications of each of the propositions and the differences among them.

(P1) Chuman's original Proposition (1537): The Four Beginnings originate from *ri*, and the Seven feelings originate from *gi*.<sup>4)</sup>

Since the preposition 'from (於)' in the above proposition implies

3) I have discussed these propositions in greater detail in Yoo (2011a, 24-37) and Yoo (2012, 102-107).

4) The page numbers concerning the Four-Seven Debate refer to those in *sachon chiljeong* Nonjaeng Yeongutim (2008). For (P1) "四端發於理, 七情發於氣," see the "Second Letter of Yi Hwang" (SCNY 2008, 161-162: Hereafter referred to as "Second Letter of Yi Hwang") and the "Second Letter of Gi Daeseung" (SCNY 2008, 234).

the origin, it means that the Four originate from *ri* and the Seven from *gi*. Yi Hwang suggested replacing originate from *ri* (發於理) and originate from *gi* (發於氣) with the arousal of *ri* (理之發) and the arousal of *gi* (氣之發).<sup>5)</sup> Thus, the first emended version of Jeong Jiu's proposition is as follows:

(P2) Toegye's First Emendation (1553): The Four Beginnings are the arousal of *ri*, and the Seven Feelings are the arousal of *gi*.<sup>6)</sup>

In (P1), *ri* and *gi* are said to be the origin of the Four and the Seven, respectively. However, (P2) now means that the Four are the *ri*'s arousal and the Seven the *gi*'s arousal. The reason for Yi Hwang's suggestion that (P1) should be emended to (P2) is that the former appears to sever the connection between the Four and the Seven and consequently the connection between *ri* and *gi*.<sup>7)</sup> The two propositions differ, in that (P1) refers to the point of origin whereas (P2) refers to the subject of the arousal; but they seem to share the same idea of separating the Four from the Seven and *ri* from *gi*. But, as Gi Daeseung pointed out, there is a problem with this separation. Yi Hwang therefore presents the following alternative formulation:

(P3) Toegye's Second Emendation (1559): The **origin** of the Four Beginnings is *ri* only and [they are] nothing but good, and the **origin** of the Seven feelings is [not only *ri* but is] combined with *gi* and [they are] good or evil.<sup>8)</sup>

(P3) makes more or less the same claim as (P1) and (P2), but characterizes the Seven as the arousal of something combined with *gi* (兼氣). But in the course of presenting (P3) in order to defend himself, Yi Hwang stated another new proposition:

(P4) Toegye's Third Emendation (1559): In the arousal of the Four Beginnings, [...] *ri* predominates, and in the arousal of the Seven Feelings,

5) As noted, the term *bal* is used as a noun as well as a verb. In this article, I translate it without any discussion as 'origin/originate' or 'arousal/arouse' or the like according to the context in which it is used. For a detailed discussion of its meanings, see Yoo (2012, 98-107).

6) (P2) “四端理之發, 七情氣之發” (“Second Letter of Yi Hwang,” 169).

7) “往年鄭生之作圖也, 有四端發於理, 七情發於氣之說. 愚意亦恐其分別太甚, 或致爭端” (“Second Letter of Yi Hwang,” 161-162).

8) (P3) “四端之發純理 故無不善, 七情之發兼氣 故有善惡.” (“First Letter of Yi Hwang,” 140).

[...] *gi* predominates.<sup>9)</sup>

Unlike the previous propositions, which mention *ri* or *gi* as the sole origin of the Four or the Seven, (P4) claims that both the Four and the Seven are the arousal of the combination of *ri* and *gi*. This is inferred from the term predominate (主), which implies that there are both *ri* and *gi*, but one of them predominates. However, since Gi Daeseung does not acknowledge this implication,<sup>10)</sup> Yi Hwang once again emended his own proposition as follows:

(P5) Toegy's Fourth Emendation (1560): The Four are the arousal of *ri*, and *gi* follows it, and the Seven are the arousal of *gi*, and *ri* rides on it.<sup>11)</sup>

Yi Hwang says that his description of the Four as the arousal of *ri* is not meant to refer to *ri* without *gi*, but to emphasize the characteristic property of *ri*.<sup>12)</sup> In other words, he seems to suggest that even when he explains the Four and the Seven in terms of *ri* or *gi* alone, he still thinks of both of them as the arousal of the combination of *ri* and *gi*. That is, his remarks about *ri* and *gi* in (P5) do not imply that he has changed his mind in reaction to Gi Daeseung's objection; rather, he is now stating explicitly what was only implicit in the previous propositions. Nevertheless, Gi Daeseung remained dissatisfied with Yi Hwang's responses, and finally presented his own proposition:

(P6) Gobong's Final Proposition (1561): In the arousal of emotions, at times *ri* moves and *gi* is together with it, or at times *gi* is stimulated and *ri* rides on it. <sup>13)</sup>

Gi Daeseung's claim that the claim in (P5) that the Four are the arousal of *ri* and *gi* follows it (四則理發而氣隨之) implies *gi* without *ri* is problematic,<sup>14)</sup> since it clearly mentions both *ri* and *gi*. On the other

9) This proposition, (P4) “四端之發主於理，七情之發主於氣” has been inferred from “四端之發 [...] 主於理，七情之發 [...] 在乎氣.” (“Second Letter of Yi Hwang,” 164-165) by Fu (1985). For this, see Yoo (2011b, 138-139 and n. 15).

10) Yoo (2011b, 139-142).

11) (P5) “四則理發而氣隨之，七則氣發而理乘之” (“Third Letter of Yi Hwang,” 257).

12) “四端之發，固曰非無氣。然孟子之所指，實不在發於氣處，若曰兼指氣，則已非復四端之謂矣” (“Third Letter of Yi Hwang,” 257).

13) (P6) “情之發也，或理動而氣俱，或氣感而理乘” (“Third Letter of Gi Daeseung,” 303).

14) “四則理發而氣隨之，七則氣發而理乘之，兩句亦甚精密，然鄙意以爲此二箇意思，七情

hand, (P6) is different from propositions (P1)-(P5) in that it does not distinguish the Four from the Seven, but refers to them collectively as *jeong* (情, emotion or feeling). However, although Gi Daeseung does not explicitly make any distinction between them, he introduces two ways to describe it; there is thus no doubt that one description refers to the Four and the other to the Seven. Moreover, although there is still a question of which description refers to the Four and which to the Seven, it is clear that both the Four and the Seven are explained in terms of both *ri* and *gi*.

Let us summarize our discussion so far. (P1) and (P2) explain the Four and the Seven in terms of *ri* and *gi* respectively. (P3) still explains the Four in terms of *ri* alone, but explains the Seven in terms of something combined with *gi*, which means the combination of *ri* and *gi*. (P4), on the other hand, uses the term predominate to imply that both the Four and the Seven must be explained in terms of both *ri* and *gi*, whereas (P5) explicitly refers to both *ri* and *gi* to explain both the Four and the Seven. Although (P6) uses a collective term to refer to the Four and the Seven, it introduces two different descriptions and so appears still to distinguish two kinds of emotions.

The basis for Gi Daeseung's claim throughout the debate that the Four and the Seven should be explained in terms of the combination of *ri* and *gi*, and the principle of Zhu Xi is that *ri* and *gi* cannot be separated from each other in reality. He therefore cannot accept Yi Hwang's propositions because they seem treat *ri* and *gi* as really separated. But Yi Hwang agrees that they cannot be separated and emphasizes that he never intended to admit the existence of *ri* without *gi* or of *gi* without *ri* in any of (P2)-(P5). That is, (P2), which appears to distinguish *ri* from *gi*, originally implies (P4), which refers to a single predominant element in the combination of *ri* and *gi*, and (P4) in turn implies more or less the what is claimed in (P5).

Once again, the point Yi Hwang tries to make here is that he has never thought that *ri* and *gi* can be separated from each other in reality, but that it is nevertheless sometimes necessary to speak of them separately. He cannot but help it in order to describe clearly the properties of the Four and the Seven. In other words, he separates *ri* from *gi* in order to explain the good of the Four that originate from *ri* and the good and evil of the Seven that originate from *gi*. In fact, the

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則兼有，而四端則只有理發一邊爾” (“Third Letter of Gi Daeseung,” 303).

main question concerning the propositions is whether we can accept Yi Hwang's explanation as it stands. Considering Yi Hwang's repeated emendations of his own proposition, Gi Daeseung remained dissatisfied with it. However, Yi Hwang is not simply making excuses in order to avoid criticism, but is telling the truth. In particular, (P4) and (P5) clearly show that he takes seriously Gi Daeseung's objection that the Four and the Seven should not be ascribed to *ri* or *gi* alone.<sup>15)</sup>

## (2) *The Activity of Ri and the Meaning of Bal (發)*

There are two points to be noted in relation to Yi Hwang's proposition (P5) and Gi Daeseung's proposition (P6). First, Gi Daeseung has no basis to raise any doubt concerning the arousal of *ri* (理發) in (P5). In fact, since he uses the expression the movement of *ri* (理動) in (P6), there is no doubt that he acknowledges the activity of *ri*.<sup>16)</sup> Secondly, he is not concerned with any difference in time in the descriptions of *ri* and *gi*. In (P5), there are four activities: the arousal of *ri*, *gi*'s following *ri*, the arousal of *gi*, and *ri*'s riding on *gi*. In (P6), there are also four activities: *ri*'s moving, *gi*'s being with it, *gi*'s being stimulated, and *ri*'s riding on *gi*. However, Gi Daeseung has no interest in the difference in time between the activities in each case, i.e. between the arousal of *ri* and *gi*'s following *ri*, and between the arousal of *gi* and *ri*'s riding on *gi*. This is to neglect the aspect of their causal relationship.<sup>17)</sup>

Many scholars have discussed the possibility that *ri* is active. within the system of Zhu Xi Studies, *ri* is by definition not any actual or physical entity that acts or moves, or any substance that can exist independently without *gi*. However, a number of scholars think that Yi Hwang really accepts the activity of *ri* separated from *gi*.<sup>18)</sup> They claim that he deliberately employs the concept of the activity of *ri* in order to explain the relation between the Four and the Seven. Those

15) As noted, Gi Daeseung did not at first raise any question about the arousal of *ri*, but did later (see III.1 below).

16) Song (1995a, 155) points out that Gi Daeseung maintained his position to the end that he could not accept the activity of *ri*. In fact, Gi Daeseung criticized Yi Hwang for allowing for the emotion, calculation, and manipulation of *ri* ("Third Letter of Gi Daeseung," 328).

17) For a discussion of the Humean conception of causation, see Yoo (2005b, 318 f).

18) K. Kim (1999) refers to S. Lee (1973, 8), Yoon (1985a, 10), etc. Cf. Choi (1981, 87-108).

who favor this view try to make his overall theories consistent.<sup>19)</sup> Other scholars claim that Yi Hwang's term *bal* does not imply the activity of *ri*.<sup>20)</sup>

In fact, the understanding of Yi Hwang's view depends on the interpretation of the meaning of *bal*. A number of questions concerning this concept might arise, such as whether it has a single meaning or various meanings, how many meanings it has and what they are, whether it has one and the same meaning in all the propositions of the Four-Seven Debate or different meanings, and, if it has different meanings, what meaning it has in each of the propositions. Scholars have different opinions as to how to interpret the term in each proposition.<sup>21)</sup> For example, Fu Wei-hsun suggests that the term must be interpreted in all the propositions as issue, whereas Jeong Sang-bong thinks that it has two meanings, namely, manifestation and arousal. Nam Ji-man, on the other hand says that it can be interpreted as issuance, manifestation, and arousal.<sup>22)</sup> Issuance here means the origin of generation, manifestation means that its subject cannot move itself and so reveal itself in other media, and arousal means actual activity.<sup>23)</sup>

As stated earlier, the possibility of the activity of *ri* can be answered from the analysis of the meaning of *bal*. If *bal* in such expressions as *ri*'s *bal* or *bal* of *ri* is interpreted as manifestation, the activity of *ri* will no longer be a problem, and also the question about the origin will be disposed. For, if *bal* means manifestation, the *bal* of *ri* no longer refers to the activity of *ri*, but to the activity of the subject in which *ri* resides. If this is what Yi Hwang has in mind when he claims that he does not mean the existence or the activity of *gi* without *ri* or *ri* without *gi*, we can be sure that his claim was not an excuse made simply to avoid Gi Daeseung's criticism.

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19) Cf. K. Kim (1999, 20-21).

20) For example, Moon (2001, 176).

21) Nam (2007, 8-15); Jeong (2003, 207-223); Yoo (2011a, 37-45); Yoo (2012, 92-115).

22) Fu (1985, 16-24); Jeong (2003, 207-223); Nam (2007, 8-15). Elsewhere, I have claimed that there is no single translation for *bal* 發 mentioned in (P1)-(P6), and that it must be interpreted according to its context (see Yoo 2011a, 37-45; Yoo 2012, 92-115).

23) Nam (2007, 7) distinguishes three meanings of *bal* as the origin, affection, and effect of the emotion, but there is no reason to restrict it to emotion only.



### 3. The Debate in terms of Mind and Nature

#### (1) *The Relation Between the Four and the Seven*

As noted, Gi Daeseung criticizes Yi Hwang's first proposition (P2) for separating the Four from the Seven, and also *ri* from *gi*.<sup>24)</sup> Against Yi Hwang, Gi Daeseung emphasizes that there cannot be any *ri* without *gi* or *gi* without *ri*, and that the Four are included in the Seven.<sup>25)</sup> Yi Hwang responds to Gi Daeseung's criticism in two steps. First, he defends his own position in (P2), where he appears to separate *ri* from *gi*; then he responds to the objection by emending (P2) into (P4) and (P5), in which he mentions both *ri* and *gi*.<sup>26)</sup>

Yi Hwang's reasoning might have been roughly as follows: he accepts that nature (性) refers to the nature of the composite of *ri* and *gi*, but not to the nature of *ri* alone or *gi* alone. However, since by definition *gi* can have the property of being evil, we refer only to *ri* without *gi* when we indicate only original nature (本然之性), which is always good. All the same, there is no problem with referring only to *ri* without *gi* in order to indicate the Four, which are purely good.

In general, the original nature refers to the property of *ri*, whereas psychophysical nature (氣質之性) refers to the property of *gi*. All human beings have the same *ri*, but they can be different because of differences in their psychophysical nature. In other words, since *ri* is good and is actualized as it is without any interference or obstruction, all human beings must be good; however, they can be either good or evil according to their *gi* or psychophysical nature. It is not the case that *gi* itself is evil; rather, the manifestation of *ri* in clear *gi* is good, and its manifestation in turbid *gi* is evil. Gi Daeseung

24) "Now if one accepts that 'the Four originate from *ri* and so there cannot be anything that is not good, whereas the Seven originate from *gi* and so there is good and evil,' they become two things by dividing *ri* and *gi* and, moreover, the Seven do not originate from nature, whereas the Four do not ride on *gi*' (今若以謂四端發於理而無不善, 七情發於氣而有善惡, 是理與氣判而爲兩物也, 是七情不出於性, 而四端不乘於氣也) ("First Letter of Gi Daeseung," 146).

25) "非七情之外復有四端也" ("First Letter of Gi Daeseung," 145-146; "Second Letter of Gi Daeseung," 186-187). Gi Daeseung explains this in terms of *chaesol* and *inseol*. For this, "*chaesol* is to say by means of comparison, e.g., comparison between left and right, whereas *inseol* is to say by means of connection, e.g., connection between top and bottom" (蓋對說者, 如說左右, 便是對待底, 因說者, 如說上下, 便是因仍底) ("Third Letter of Gi Daeseung," 299-300). Cf. Yoo (2011a, 48).

26) "Second Letter of Yi Hwang," 164-165.

agrees with Yi Hwang's reasoning; indeed, there is nothing new here, and it fits well with Zhu Xi's system.

However, Gi Daeseung takes note of the fact that when Zhu Xi speaks of the original nature, he refers only to *ri*, whereas when he speaks of the psychophysical nature, he refers to the mixture of *ri* and *gi*.<sup>27)</sup> On the basis of this, he therefore points out that Yi Hwang was wrong in (P2) to say that the Seven are the arousal of *gi*, for he should have referred to the combination of *ri* and *gi* in the case of the Seven.<sup>28)</sup> Gi Daeseung emphasizes the combination of *ri* and *gi* in order to maintain the close relationship between the Four and the Seven. That is, if the Four are the arousal of *ri*, whereas the Seven are the arousal of *gi*, then they might be viewed as separated feelings which have no connection between them.

According to Gi Daeseung, however, there is only one kind of emotion. The Seven include good emotions as well as evil emotions since they originate from the combination of *ri* and *gi*, and the good emotions among them are called the Four.<sup>29)</sup> This means that the Four are included in the Seven. Gi Daeseung criticizes Yi Hwang in (P3) for holding that the Four and the Seven are mutually exclusive. If his interpretation is correct, Yi Hwang has to accept either that they are different emotions or that they have different kinds of goodness; that is, Yi Hwang cannot but accept two kinds of emotions as well as two kinds of goodness. and since it is hardly reasonable to say that two different kinds of goodness come from one and the same origin, one of them must originate from *ri* and the other from *gi*.<sup>30)</sup>

27) *Zhuzi quanshu* 朱子全書, 4:46. "論天地之性, 則專指理言, 論氣質之性, 則以理與氣雜而言之."

28) "According to this, to say that the Four are the *bal* of this *ri* refers only to *ri*, and to say that the Seven are the *bal* of this *gi* refers to the mixture of *ri* and *gi*. The expression of the *bal* of this *ri* cannot be changed, but the expression of the *bal* of this *gi* does not refer only to *gi*" (以是觀之, 所謂四端, 是理之發者, 專指理言, 所謂七情, 是氣之發者, 以理與氣雜而言之者也. 而是理之發云者, 固不可易, 是氣之發云者, 非專指氣也.) ("Second Letter of Gi Daeseung," 184-185).

29) "蓋人之情一也, 而其所以爲情者, 固兼理氣有善惡也. 但孟子就理氣妙合之中, 專指其發於理, 而無不善者言之, 四端是也" ("Second Letter of Gi Daeseung," 186-187); "Only is there a distinction between the Four and the Seven, and it is not the case that the Four exist apart from the Seven" (有四端七情之別耳, 非七情之外復有四端也) ("First Letter of Gi Daeseung," 145-146; "Second Letter of Gi Daeseung," 186-187).

30) "蓋以四端七情, 對舉互言, 而揭之於圖, 或謂之無不善, 或謂之有善惡, 則人之見之也, 疑若有兩情, 且雖不疑於兩情, 而亦疑其情中有二善, 一發於理, 一發於氣者, 爲未當也" ("Second Letter of Gi Daeseung," 189).

Gi Daeseung's criticism is logically valid in the sense that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. However, as is well known, the logical truth is one thing, and the truth of a premise is another. We should therefore now ask whether his premises are true. What is Yi Hwang's response to this criticism? In fact, he explicitly admits that the Four are included in the Seven by saying that the Four are not the emotions apart from the Seven.<sup>31)</sup> Thus, Gi Daeseung's criticism that Yi Hwang cannot but accept two kinds of emotions and two kinds of goodness does not apply. However, Yi Hwang continues to explain the Four and the Seven in terms of *ri* and *gi* respectively without saying anything to defend himself from Gi Daeseung's criticism.<sup>32)</sup> He thinks (a) that *ri* and *gi* cannot exist or move apart from each other and that the Four and the Seven are not separated from each other, but also (b) that it is acceptable to explain the Four and the Seven in terms of *ri* and *gi* respectively insofar as this helps to reveal their characteristics. However, Gi Daeseung does not consider Yi Hwang's position in (a), but he focuses on criticizing (b) for the reason that the separation of *ri* from *gi* implies the separation of the Four from the Seven. He thus claims that both *ri* and *gi* must be referred to in the explanation of the Four and the Seven. This view is reflected in his own proposition (P6).

## (2) *Equilibrium (中節) or Nonequilibrium (不中節) of the Four*

Let us now examine the moral characteristic of the Four. According to Zhu Xi, nature (性) is something that should be naturally done.<sup>33)</sup> Nature is manifested as an emotion (情). When it is excessive or defective, it becomes evil, and when it is appropriate, it becomes good. Emotion here refers to the Four as well as to the Seven; therefore, they can both be in a state of equilibrium as well as nonequilibrium. However, according to Mencius's theory that human nature is fundamentally good, the Four must be only good, that is, they can be in a state of equilibrium only. In other words,

31) "故雖不可謂七情之外復有四端." ("Third Letter of Yi Hwang," 262).

32) Cf. "Third Letter of Yi Hwang," 263-264. Yi Hwang claims only that (P3) is true, but does not explain anything about the controversial discussion of two kinds of feelings or two kinds of goodness.

33) *Zhuzi quanshu*, 4:40. "Nature is something that should be done" (性便是合當?底); *Zhuzi quanshu*, 5:3. "Nature is like a given job to do" (性猶職事); *Zhuzi quanshu*, 5:9. "Nature is something that should be done" (性是合當底).

nonequilibrium implies evil, but the Four by definition cannot be in a state of nonequilibrium, since to say that the Four are evil is to reject Mencius's theory of nature.

Nonetheless, Gi Daeseung explicitly states in his second letter to Yi Hwang that since there can be nonequilibrium even in the arousal of the Four, they cannot be said to be all good.<sup>34)</sup> He acknowledges that his statement that there can be nonequilibrium even in the arousal of the Four contradicts his earlier statement that the Four are *ri* and good.<sup>35)</sup> He says, "since such a theory is possible, think about it." Yet he goes on to the next discussion without any detailed explanation to work out the contradiction.<sup>36)</sup> However, in his third letter to Yi Hwang, he retreats from his claim in the second letter by saying that he did not really mean that the Four originate from the combination of *ri* and *gi* and also are both good and evil.<sup>37)</sup>

As Gi Daeseung repeatedly claims, if the Four and the Seven originate from the combination of *ri* and *gi*, the distinction or division between them seems unnecessary.<sup>38)</sup> Among the aroused feelings, those in the state of equilibrium are good, whereas those in the state of nonequilibrium are evil, but they will no longer be named the Four or the Seven, but merely feelings. Perhaps it is for this reason that Gi Daeseung in his own proposition (P6) does not distinguish the Four from the Seven, but calls them by the collective name feelings. Viewed from this perspective, his claim that the Four, like the Seven, can be good as well as evil seems consistent with the claim that the Four can be either in the state of equilibrium or in the state of nonequilibrium.

As Gi Daeseung says, if we have to refer to the combination of *ri* and *gi* in the explanation of both the Four and the Seven, we also have to admit that the Four and the Seven share the properties of *ri* and *gi*. Once again, from the premise that the properties of *ri* and *gi* or the characteristic of good and evil, it is reasonable to conclude that the Four also have such a property and characteristic, for the Four are

34) "四端之發，亦有不中節者，固不可皆謂之善也" ("Second Letter of Gi Daeseung," 228).

35) "然大升從來所陳，改以四端爲理爲善，而今又以爲四端之發，亦有不中節者，其語自相矛盾，想先生更以爲怪也。然若究而言之，則亦不妨有是理，而自爲一說也。伏幸將入思議何如" ("Second Letter of Gi Daeseung," 228-229).

36) Cf. the underlined phrase in the previous footnote.

37) "又有四端不中節之說者，蓋常人之情，不無氣稟物欲之累，或天理?發，而旋爲氣稟物欲之所拘蔽，則亦有不中節者爾，非固以四端，亦兼理氣有善惡也" ("Third Letter of Gi Daeseung," 293-294).

38) Song (1995b, 147).

included in the Seven. Nonetheless, Gi Daeseung merely accepts Mencius's theory of human nature rather than such a conclusion. Yi Hwang did not respond to Gi Daeseung's third letter about the conclusion, and so we cannot be certain what he thought about Gi Daeseung's change of attitude. He might have thought that, even though all the feelings originate from the combination of *ri* and *gi* and cannot be separated in reality, we can still divide them in thought.<sup>39)</sup> In particular, (P2) and (P3) clearly show Yi Hwang's view that since the Four originate from *ri*, they are good, which means that they are in a state of equilibrium.

#### 4. Concluding Remarks

By viewing the Four as the arousal of *ri* and the Seven as the arousal of *gi*, Yi Hwang separates *ri* from *gi* (even if only conceptually), and so he is unable to include the Four in the Seven. Consequently, as Gi Daeseung points out, he took the burden to explain away that the Four and the Seven, or the good of the Four and the good of the Seven are two different kinds of emotion or good. However, although Yi Hwang speaks of the arousal of *ri* or the arousal of *gi*, he does not mean that there can be *ri* without *gi* or *gi* without *ri*. He does not claim that *ri* can be separated from *gi* in reality, but has in mind only their conceptual separation.

Indeed, the treatment of *ri* and *gi* as really separate entities not only conflicts with the fundamental principles of Zhu Xi Studies, but also raises the problem of rejecting or reconstructing all the theories and convictions based on them. The Four and the Seven should therefore not be explained separately in terms of *ri* and *gi* respectively. According to Gi Daeseung, this is the very mistake that Yi Hwang made in his letters; he therefore argues that Yi Hwang has to emend his own positions.

However, Yi Hwang thinks that he himself never deviated from Zhu Xi's teachings on *ri* and *gi*, and so believes that there is little in

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39) "Since the Four are feelings and also the Seven are feelings, all are feelings. If so, why are there such different names as the Four and the Seven? However, since they indicate differently, it is not the case that there is no distinction" (夫四端情也, 七情亦情也, 均是情也, 何以有四七之異名耶. [...] 然而所就而言之不同, 則亦不容無別) ("Third Letter of Yi Hwang," 237).

Gi Daeseung's criticism for him to reply to. He also thinks that in order to clarify the characteristics of *ri* and *gi*, it is not wrong to separate them in thought or conceptually. Indeed, he emends his own proposition several times in response to Gi Daeseung's criticism. Nonetheless, Gi Daeseung seems not to be satisfied with such responses, but goes on to claim that even a conceptual separation is not acceptable. In fact, this is the Maginot Line for Yi Hwang, and unless Gi Daeseung takes a step back and accepts the possibility, and indeed necessity, of a conceptual separation between *ri* and *gi* in specifying the characteristics of the Four and the Seven, their debate will remain unresolved.

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## 對李滉四端七情論爭的再考察

俞 原 基

**中文摘要：**16世紀韓國的代表論爭之一，即退溪李滉與高峰奇大升之間發生的四端七情論爭，是在存在論的概念層面上對理和氣進行了說明。本論文所關心的是在此次論爭中提出和涉及的問題中，特別是a) 四端與七情的根源，或者說其存在論的依據是什麼。b)在表述四端七情的根源時所使用的“發”字，其真正的意義是什麼？c)能否賦予理活動性或是說運動性。d)四端七情真正的關係是什麼？e)四端不中節是否可能等問題的答辯。文中首先會說明各問題提出的理由，然後更多的是站在李滉的立場，直接面對奇大升的批判，考察李滉對自己的立場做了多少改變，又是以何種方式在改變。

**關鍵詞：**退溪 李滉、高峯 奇大升、四端、七情、理、氣、發。



# Yulgok's Moral Emotion Theory: A Reflection on the Foundation of Normativity

KIM Kyung-ho

## Abstract

In this paper I will attempt to reinterpret in a modern context the theory of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings advanced by Yulgok (栗谷) especially by focusing on two aspects. First, I will investigate an aspect of the Confucian philosophical theory of moral emotion through Yulgok's discussion of the Four-Seven. Specifically, I will try to identify the basis of morality and the foundation of normativity proposed by Yulgok. Secondly, I will explore the possibility of a new interpretation of his much discussed view on the Four-Seven. In order to foster a better understanding of morality in general, I will reformulate the problem of emotions and morality in the Four-Seven debate within the contemporary theoretical framework of moral emotion.

**Keywords:** the Four Beginnings (四端), the Seven Feelings (七情), moral emotion, morality, the theory of *ri* and *gi* (理氣論), Yulgok (栗谷)

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## 1. Introduction: The Four-Seven Theory and Moral Emotion Theory

In this paper I will attempt to reinterpret in a modern context the theory of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings advanced by Yulgok Yi I (栗谷 李珥, 1536-1584), focusing on the following two aspects. First, I will investigate an aspect of the Confucian philosophical theory of moral emotion through Yulgok's discussion of the Four-Seven. Specifically, I will try to identify the basis of morality and the foundation of normativity proposed by Yulgok. Secondly, I will explore the possibility of a new interpretation of his much discussed view on the Four-Seven. In order to foster a better understanding of morality in general, I will reformulate the problem of emotions and morality in the Four-Seven debate within the contemporary theoretical framework of moral emotion.

Yulgok both accepts and is skeptical of the traditional way of dividing human feelings into the Four Beginnings (moral emotions) and the Seven Feelings (general feelings). What is the origin of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings? How are emotions in general and moral emotions distinguished? How are emotions related to moral practice? Yulgok tries to answer these questions by linking these issues concerning moral emotions with the Neo-Confucian concepts of *ri* (理) and *gi* (氣). His account is what is generally referred to as his Four-Seven theory.

Any attempt to make a philosophical investigation of emotion with the abstract concepts of *ri-gi* raises a fundamental question. The Four-Seven theory addresses the question of how human nature and essence can be understood in terms of feelings and emotions in the Confucian *lebenswelt*, in which the value and norms of relationships are emphasized. In Confucian philosophy, the human essence is understood to be constituted by characteristics which make humans as such. Confucian concept of benevolence, which shows an intuitive insight into the human being despite being rather loose in conception, illustrates what human nature or humanity is. Thus, human nature is not so different from the human essence.

In Confucian philosophy, human nature is defined by basic qualities that constitute human beings. On the basis of those qualities, the general way of life or morality is formulated, and norms and institutions are established. The Four-Seven theory provides clues to

understanding the human essence and the normative traits of the world as the ground for human beings to stand on. In this regard, the Four-Seven theory of the Joseon (朝鮮) period, which discusses ethical behavior and the foundation of morals and norms, is linked to contemporary theories of moral emotion, which are concerned with the relationships between cognition and feeling and between morality and emotion.

The Four-Seven theory is an important philosophical subject for Joseon Confucian scholars, including Yulgok. I think that the ultimate aim of Yulgok's philosophical study of the Four-Seven is to investigate the foundation of body-based emotion-morality and the human essence. With this view on the issue of concern, in this paper therefore, I will examine Yulgok's philosophical thought on the Four-Seven with special attention to his methodology of accentuation and suppression. In a fundamental sense, descriptions usually involve highlighting and concealing; selecting a specific aspect has the natural effect of stressing it and hiding the rest. This strategy is particularly associated with Yulgok's use of metaphors. He employs an accentuating technique to play up his theory and turns to a concealing one when he downplays it. Metaphorical understanding inevitably results in the suppression of other aspects.<sup>1)</sup> That is why I examine Yulgok's discussion of the Four-Seven through his methodology of accentuation and suppression.

I propose to approach the Four-Seven theory from a new perspective. Many scholars have studied it and produced high-quality works.<sup>2)</sup> The existing secondary literature on the Four-Seven theory examines it mainly in relation with human nature, and research on Yulgok's theory is no exception. But recently, new perspectives on the study of the Four-Seven have been raised. Rather than dwelling on its theoretical consistency within its own context, recent work has examined it from the viewpoints of moral emotion theory, ethics, and comparative philosophy. Yun Sa-sun, for example, approaches the Four-Seven theory from the viewpoint of ethics, analyzing it in terms of virtue ethics and deontological ethics.<sup>3)</sup> Yi Chan studies Toegye Yi Hwang's (退溪 李滉) conception of the Four Beginnings and the

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1) Lacoff and Johnson (2003, 30).

2) For extensive bibliography on the Four-Seven theory in the history of Korean Confucianism, refer to the Institute for the Study of People and Thought (1992) and Hwang et al. (2009).

3) Yoon (2013).

issuance of *ri* (理發, *ribal*) in the context of moral psychology and acknowledges the importance of motivation for the realization of moral norms.<sup>4)</sup> Kim Kyung-ho adopts the perspective of Humberto Maturana's cognitive biology, examining the Four-Seven theory in the framework of moral emotion theory.<sup>5)</sup> Jeong Won-jae conducts a conceptual investigation of the Four-Seven, providing insights into how to reinterpret the Four-Seven debate in Joseon Confucianism.<sup>6)</sup> This new approach is expanding the horizon of research on the Four-Seven, although there is still work to be done in examining exactly how this approach can be applied to the Four-Seven theory.

A modern reinterpretation of the Four-Seven theory demands an approach that is different from the various interpretations in the secondary literature. We no longer live in a world where Confucian moral norms and values regulate us. If the Four-Seven theory is to be redefined as a moral emotion theory that suits the contemporary epoch, we should carefully examine which aspects of it will be conducive to developing moral thinking and ethical practice among modern-day people. The Four-Seven theory of this era needs to make a switch to addressing how to foster virtuous emotions and control excessive ones. We should consider how to cultivate vital moral emotions to uphold human values. We must understand how emotions arise through intimate interactions of the whole body, including sensory organs, neural networks, and brains, and how emotions are manifested in bodily expressions. Furthermore, we must keenly observe and reflect on the mechanism of emotions in connection with various issues concerning the mind.

I propose therefore to shift the focus of discussion on the Four-Seven from human nature (性) to mind (心). By examining Yulgok's discussion of the Four-Seven, we can see that he distinguishes mind and human nature and takes note of the domain of mind apart from human nature, and he shows how to become a mature person. From this perspective, I do not take issue with the differentiation of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings, about which there has been ample discussion. Instead, what I take issue with is the validity of the way in which the discussion of the ontological foundation of the Four-Seven is conducted.

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4) C. Yi (2013).

5) K. Kim (2011).

6) Jeong (2012).

In traditional Confucianism, human nature is the origin of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings. It is presupposed that humans are endowed with their nature from heaven *a priori*; indeed, the conventional belief that humans are granted good nature by heaven (天命之謂性) is a core assumption of the Four-Seven theory. But do we still need in the present day to accept this Confucian assumption about human nature? Should we continue to believe in the metaphor of the heavenly mandate (天命) of humanity? The belief in the mandate of heaven might have been needed in an earlier era, but accepting a hypothetical presupposition as a belief is nothing but wishful thinking.

## 2. The Four-Seven as Embodied Emotions

Are emotions moral? How are emotions or feelings related to morality, and how do they influence it? While there has been much discussion of how our moral capacity derives from a realm that is separate from that of the emotions, some recent studies addressing the problem of morality and emotion show that the emotions play a certain role in the origin and grounding of morality. But not all emotions are moral. Some sort of planning [design] is required in order for emotion to become moral. Emotion can be moral if it is understood in a moral context; in other words, signification of emotions at a specific point is needed. This is not very different from providing a narrative context to emotion. Emotion can be moral when it is situated in the context of agreements or codification that precedes it. In this sense, not all emotions can be moral.

Early Confucians attended to the problem of the emotions that arise from the human body. Humans biologically have feelings such as pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy, but at the same time they have a power for self-regulation. Confucius drew attention to human feelings, as did Mencius and Xunzi. They understood that feelings, which are inseparable from the human body, are activated sensitively at a certain place and time and affect our intentions, behavior, and judgment. In order to ensure that life activities become natural, the Confucians attempted to determine whether feelings should be expressed, controlled, or regulated. For this reason, they reduce various feelings to an orderly classification.

The systematic research of the early Confucians on emotions and feelings in the doctrine of the Seven Feelings (七情), which are proposed in the "Yeun" (禮運, Liyun) Section of *Yegi* (禮記, *Liji*). *Jwajeon* (左傳, *Zuo zhuan*), which precedes *Yegi*, proposes six feelings: liking (好), hatred (惡), pleasure (喜), anger (怒), sorrow (哀), and pleasure (樂).<sup>7)</sup> In *Yegi*, liking and pleasure are merged into their representative feeling, joy, and three more emotions, fear (懼), love (愛), and desire (欲), are added. The emotions mentioned in *Jwajeon* are broken down, and one more is added to make up seven feelings: joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire.<sup>8)</sup>

The Four Beginnings refer to the four emotions presented by Mencius. Confucius believes that the virtue of humanity, namely *in* (仁), is revealed in natural feelings, and he places it at the center of his philosophy. Mencius, inheriting Confucius' thought, finds it instead in the tendency of mind. The tendency of mind has an orientation to choose what is good. He divides this orientation into four and names them *cheugeun ji sim* (惻隱之心, the feeling of commiseration), *suo ji sim* (羞惡之心, the feeling of shame and dislike), *sayang ji sim* (辭讓之心, the feeling of reverence and respect), and *sibi ji sim* (是非之心, the feeling of approval and disapproval).<sup>9)</sup>

The classifications of the Four-Seven emotions are not fixed, as they are reflective of the philosophical views and cultural consciousness of the Confucian scholars who proposed them. Indeed, Confucians never ceased developing new theories of the emotional states of the Four-Seven; the Four-Seven theory proposed by the Joseon Confucian scholars is a concrete case of this continuous theoretical development. The Seven Feelings are the kind of emotions that humans, as situational beings, express immediately in response to external stimuli, while the Four Beginnings are the kind of emotions expressed through reflection and are thus complex. In this respect, the latter are regarded as the emotions that are reflective of morality.

Although the conception of the Four-Seven was produced by the Confucians as they needed the conception, it should be noted that the

7) *Zuo zhuan*, 25th year of the reign of Duke Zhao. "民有好惡喜怒哀樂, 生于六氣. 審則宜類, 以制六志."

8) "Liyun 禮運," in *Liji*. "何謂人情? 喜怒哀懼愛惡欲, 七者弗學而能."

9) "Gongsunchousang 公孫丑上," in *Mengzi*. "今人乍見孺子將入於井, 皆有怵惕惻隱之心. 非所以內交於孺子之父母也, 非所以要譽於鄉黨朋友也, 非惡其聲而然也. 由是觀之, 無惻隱之心, 非人也. 無羞惡之心, 非人也. 無辭讓之心, 非人也. 無是非之心, 非人也. 惻隱之心, 仁之端也. 羞惡之心, 義之端也. 辭讓之心, 禮之端也. 是非之心, 智之端也."



bi-dimensional conception dictates human emotions. Although the seven feelings and the four moral emotions mean different things depending on the interpreter, they are identical in signification. Despite the fact that cultural differences exist in the way that emotions are aroused and expressed, they are accumulated empirically through the process of understanding and learning based on the body. Here, empirical accumulation of emotions means their embodiment. I therefore call such emotions embodied emotions.

In a previous study of the dialogue on King Xuan of Qi in *Mencius*, I have examined how sorrow could be a moral feeling in the respect of its spontaneity.<sup>10)</sup> The so-called Tremor for Fear (戰慄) section is an example.<sup>11)</sup> In this study, I investigate how sorrow, a natural feeling of humans, could be moral and coined the term moralization of sorrow. By achieving an affective empathy through compassionate involvement in pity and employing moral imagination,<sup>12)</sup> one feels not just simple sadness but moral sorrow of another sort. The issuance of sorrow goes through a complex mechanism of embodiment. Undergoing the process, a simple sad feeling is, with the addition of narratives, turned into a moral feeling. I refer to this as the moralization of emotion.

The concept of the moralization of emotion provides a clue to why the Four-Seven operate at different levels in terms of content, although they are both body-based emotions. Mencius' Four Beginnings clearly illustrate how a simple emotion becomes a moral one. The distinction of the Four-Seven and the philosophical context of the distinction is a sort of design, which is open to different formulations from different perspectives. The long-standing controversy over the Four-Seven is thus far from simple.

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10) K. Kim (2012b, 141).

11) Mencius talks about a particular case of an ox headed for imminent death, which is a specific event. Would it be the same, if one sees people in suffering? On this issue, we can refer to David S. Nivison's analysis. The main issue is whether practical reasoning is involved. Nivison argues for the necessity of a cognitive process. On this point, see D. Kim (2004, 15-16).

12) with his concept of moral imagination, Johnson attempts to expand the main axis of moral investigation from reason to imagination. He asserts that our moral thinking does not go beyond the cognitive process of embodied imaginary structure and that the nature of morality is also imaginary. On this point, see No (2006, 6).

### 3. Yulgok's Understanding of the Four-Seven

Yulgok rejects Toegye's proposition about the Four-Seven. Toegye takes a scholarly stance in making a clear distinction between the Four and the Seven.<sup>13)</sup> Although Yulgok agrees with Toegye's notion of the Four-Seven, he is critical of Toegye's biased view. Working with a dichotomous scheme, Toegye correlates the Four Beginnings to the issuance of *ri* and the Seven Feelings to the issuance of *gi* (氣發, *gibal*) in a one-to-one relationship and determines that human nature is the origin of the four moral emotions.<sup>14)</sup> Yulgok is strongly against this view.

According to Yulgok, Toegye's theory is open to the trouble of supposing two different origins in the mind, as the Four and the Seven are clearly separate. Yulgok believes that not only the four moral emotions but also the seven general feelings are revealed on the basis of human nature. Furthermore, he maintains that the four good emotions are implicated in the seven, which represent general feelings. In his view, the root of aroused feeling or its ontological foundation cannot be a subject of discussion.

What then is the issue of discussion for him? Unlike Toegye, he understands that the Four-Seven must be discerned in the concrete process of revealing emotions. In other words, the Four-Seven are not divided in their original state. Emotions are issued by an external stimulus in a particular situation, which may or may not suit the objective situation. Emotion is expressed depending on the situation. If it is unskewed without bias (中節, equilibrium), it belongs to the Four, and if it is skewed (不中節, nonequilibrium), it belongs to the Seven.

Yulgok emphasizes the importance of discerning the

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13) Believing that the root of the four moral emotions belong to human nature, Toegye concretizes it with the concept of the issuance of *ri* (理發). What he means by it is that human morality is good in itself and thus, morality, which is good in nature, can also be realized voluntarily and actively. He also proposes the concept, the issuance of *gi* (氣發) in parallel with the issuance of *ri*. The issuance of *gi* means that emotion is revealed by the material force integrated in the human body. He argues that innate virtues of humans can be distorted by their body-based feelings. Therefore, while Toegye admits of the issuance of *gi*, he prefers the issuance of *ri*, a state in which moral feelings are realized. That is the gist of his idea of the mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi* (理氣互發).

14) "Dap Gi Myeongeon 答奇明彦" (Reply to Gi Myeong-eon), in *Toegye jeonseu*, vol. 16. "四則理發而氣隨之, 七則氣發而理乘之."

nonequilibrium and wholeness of emotion immediately before it is expressed as an act through the body. The process by which emotion is aroused in response to a stimulus is quite complex, as the empirical evidence of neuroscience and brain science suggests. He puts special emphasis on the moment in the process at which a stimulus to sensory organs is expressed as a bodily reaction. This is the moment just before a tide of emotion is expressed as a behavior. Because emotion is a flow of consciousness, it involves both cognitive and affective elements. If we try a contemporary interpretation of this moment as explicated by Yulgok, we should pay attention to the issue of how the cognitive and emotional responses to a stimulus proceed. We must therefore take care, both cognitively and affectively, to capture the emotional flow and steer it in the right direction. He therefore urges us to observe our consciousness with sincerity in order not to distort its flow before emotion finds bodily expression. In my view, this notion in Yulgok's theory of the Four-Seven can be reinterpreted in such a way that it is consistent with modern theories of moral emotion.

Yulgok explains his understanding of the Four-Seven with the concept of *ri-gi*. His basic view is that "*ri* and *gi* are inseparable" (理氣不相離) and "*gi* is active on its own" (理無爲氣有爲). In this, he differs from Toegye, who believes that "*ri* is active voluntarily." As noted previously, Toegye correlates the Four-Seven to *ri-gi* and concludes that the four moral emotions are what the inherent good principle is manifested (四端理發), whereas the seven general feelings are unveiled by the activity of *gi* (七情氣發), which concerns the body. In contrast, Yulgok asserts that the Four-Seven are not distinct, but are revealed by the single path of the issuance of *gi* (氣發一途).<sup>15)</sup>

Yulgok argues for his position that "emotion is revealed by the single path of the issuance of *gi*" by appeal to the metaphor of mounting a horse. It is very interesting that he develops his theory with the methodology of metaphor.<sup>16)</sup> Metaphor is often used to

15) "Dap Seong Howon 答成浩原" (Reply to Seong Howon), in *Yulgok jeonseŏ*, vol. 10. "性情本無理氣互發之理, 凡性發爲情, 只是氣發而理乘等之言, 而非珥杜撰得出, 乃先儒之意也, 特未詳言之, 而珥但敷衍其旨耳."

16) Yulgok often uses the metaphor of a bowl and of the water contained in a bowl to explain why *ri* and *gi* are inseparable and why *ri* cannot act of its own volition. In our everyday experience, water is inseparable from the bowl; water moves when the bowl moves. He compares *gi* to the bowl and *ri* to water. He also discusses 'mind-nature' metaphorically with the empirical frame of the

explain, with the aid of empirical understanding, an abstract concept that is difficult to comprehend at a cognitive level. He explains the abstract notion of the single path of the issuance of *gi* with *ri* mounting it by using empirical metaphors such as horse-mounting and water contained in a bowl. An abstract concept can be understood through an analogy, for it is a product of our imagination that is mediated by the empirical world we live in, i.e. the body.

In fact, Zhu Xi used the horse-mounting metaphor for the first time to explain the movement and stillness of the Great Ultimate (太極動靜),<sup>17)</sup> and Toegye employs the same metaphor to buttress his conception of the issuance of *ri*.<sup>18)</sup> Yulgok attacks Toegye's position by altering the horse-mounting metaphor,<sup>19)</sup> which is an empirical illustration focused on the role of *ri* as nature. Playing up a situation in full-scale with an analogic transformation, however, debunks in reverse what is hidden beneath it. Yulgok uses this analogy moderately, compared to Toegye. This is a strategy to minimize or suppress the danger of undermining his own logic.

The horse riding metaphor refers to two cases: "the case in which the man follows the movement of the horse" and "the case in which the man leads the horse on her way." Here, the horse is compared to *gi* and the man to *ri*. The relation of top and bottom is implied in the metaphor. The vertical relation involved in the structure of the man sitting on the horse illustrates their power relation: empirically speaking, the upper part has greater authority or power than the lower. As Zhu Xi did in using the horse-mounting metaphor, Toegye formulates in this positional structure the direction of power, which is exercised from the top to the bottom. The man controls and holds the horse's reins. As horse-riding is a familiar experience, the metaphor

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'interior and exterior of a bowl.' Nature is contained in the bowl of mind. He tries to rationalize his understanding with the conceptual analogy of a bowl and water. of course, a hidden realm lies behind the accentuation intended with this metaphor.

17) *Zhuzi yulei*, vol. 94. "太極猶人，動靜猶馬。馬所以載人，人所以乘馬。馬之一出一入，人亦與之一出一入。"

18) "Dap Gi Myeongeon," in *Toegye jeonseu*, 16:419. Toegye remarks that it is very acceptable for earlier thinkers to make an analogy between the state in which a man comes and goes by riding a horse and the state in which *ri* moves by mounting on *gi*; without the horse, the man cannot come and go; without the man, the horse will miss the way; man and horse are interdependent and inseparable.

19) H. Yi (2004).

leads people to regard as a fact the abstract idea that *ri* controls and governs (主宰) *gi*.

Yulgok rejects Toegye's interpretation of the horse-riding metaphor.<sup>20)</sup> This is because the metaphor presupposes the separation of *ri* and *gi*, and the horse riding metaphor falsely implies that *ri* is the kind of quality that can exercise power over *gi*, just as a man can intentionally exercise power over a horse. He believes that Toegye's understanding of the metaphor violates the propositions that *ri* and *gi* are inseparable (理氣不相離) and that *ri* cannot act by itself (理無爲). To justify his argument, Yulgok modifies Toegye's interpretation of the metaphor. Both Zhu Xi and Toegye understand the starting point of the horse-riding metaphor as the state in which the man is already on the horse. Yulgok by contrast understands the starting point as the state in which the man is not yet on the horse. Through this alteration, he reveals two things that were concealed in Toegye's use of the metaphor. That is, Yulgok shows with his modification of the metaphor that Toegye violates the two propositions mentioned above. Hence, he rejects the idea of the issuance of *ri* and argues for the single path of the issuance of *gi*.

Yulgok classifies the Four and the Seven as emotion (情) and asserts that emotion is aroused when "nature contained in the bowl of mind is manifested" (性發爲情). According to this scheme, the Four-Seven are revealed in concrete emotions via the movement of *gi*.<sup>21)</sup> He summarizes his view in the following way: "If Master Zhu really holds that both *ri* and *gi* can be separately activated and manifested, he is wrong. Then how would he be Master Zhu? [...] All the trouble of Toegye comes from two characters, *hobal* (互發, the mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi*)."<sup>22)</sup> In Yulgok's view, Toegye's argument for *hobal* is mistaken because it presupposes two bases of mind. Against Toegye's idea that the Four and the Seven have separate

20) *Yulgok jeonseq*, vol. 10. Yulgok states that the notion of mutual issuance or activation (互發) can be likened to such a situation in which a man and a horse stay in different places before they walk out of a gate, and the man mounts the horse immediately after they step out of the gate. Sometimes the man guides, and the horse follows it; some other times, the horse may guide, and the man follows it.

21) "Dap Seong Howon," in *Yulgok jeonseq*, vol. 10. "性情本無理氣互發之理, 凡性發爲情, 只是氣發而理乘等之言."

22) "Dap Seong Howon," in *Yulgok jeonseq*, vol. 10. "若朱子真以爲理氣互有發用, 相對各出, 則是朱子亦誤也. 何以爲朱子乎? [...] 退溪之病, 專在於互發二字."

origins of issuance, he proposes nature (性) as the unitary origin of emotion. Thus, in Yulgok's moral emotion theory, nature no longer poses a problem. The problem is now how emotion, which is defined as an assembly of consciousness activated from the identical basis, is differentiated into the Four and Seven. Yulgok notes this problem and attributes it to mind as cognition; he thus draws attention to mind.

*Jigak* (知覺, cognition) is a concept which refers to the cognitive capacity of the empty clear mind to understand and to feel (虛靈知覺). It is different from Berkeley's concept of perception, which refers to the normal process of obtaining information by way of the sensory organs. The concept of *jigak* was introduced in Neo-Confucianism by Zhang Zai.<sup>23</sup> It means not only sensory knowledge, e.g., "sensing (知) the cold and feeling (覺) the heat," but also the flow of deep understanding or consciousness, which is usually called mind. Zhu Xi explains *jigak* in terms of *ri* and *gi*. He argues that what is known through *jigak* (所知覺) is the *ri* of mind (心之理),<sup>24</sup> and he concludes that *ji* (知) is to recognize what is necessarily realized or done in a given situation, and *gak* (覺) is to understand the underlying reason for the necessity.<sup>25</sup>

For Yulgok, *jigak* is the activity of mind and is entrusted with the important task of judging whether an emotion is appropriate or not. He regards *jigak* as a kind of a reliable judge that is responsible for assessing whether the Four-Seven operate appropriately. Since it would be improper for emotion to evaluate its own issuance by itself, he locates the role of making stable judgments without being affected by the situation in the cognitive capacity of mind. It is of special significance that he proposes the reference for cognitive judgment through knowledge. He accepts the concept of *jigak* proposed by Zhu Xi and pays attention to the operation of mind. He regards mind as being like something alive (活物)<sup>26</sup> and defines that "mind is *gi*" (心是氣).<sup>27</sup>

23) "Taihe 太和" (Great Harmony), in *Zhengmeng*: "由太虛, 有天地名; 由氣化, 有道之名. 合虛與氣, 有性之名. 合性與知覺, 有心之名."

24) "Xingli 性理" (Nature and Principle), in *Zhuji yulei*, vol. 5. "所覺者, 心之理也. 能覺者, 氣之靈也."

25) "Gaozi 告子" 1, in *Mengzi jizhu*. "知謂識其事之所當然, 覺謂悟其理之所以然."

26) "Jagyeongmun 自警文" (On Self-Admonition), in *Yulgok jeonse*, vol. 14. "心是活物."

27) "Dap Seong Howon," in *Yulgok jeonse*, vol. 10. "朱子曰 心之虛靈知覺, 一而已矣, 或原於性命之正, 或生於形氣之私, 先下一心字在前, 則心是氣也. 或原或生, 而無非心之發, 則豈非氣發耶."

#### 4. Implications and Reinterpretation of the Theory of Moral Emotion

What is the core of the issue raised by Yulgok's moral emotion theory, which is built on his notion of the Four-Seven? He is notable for rejecting Toegye's doctrine of the issuance of *ri*, for achieving an integrated understanding of emotion, and for claiming that emotion and feeling are revealed by the issuance of *gi*. His theory represents a turn in a completely different direction from Toegye's position.

First, in Yulgok's moral emotion theory, the Four and Seven are discriminated through the status of mind. Secondly, discriminative cognition halts and adjusts the manifestation of emotions and feelings; this is why he emphasizes *seongui* (誠意, sincerity of will). Thirdly, he shows how to ensure the universality of moral judgment and moral practice via the moralization of emotion.

Roughly speaking, Yulgok's moral emotion theory can be understood as a kind of mechanism of emotion that is activated in the following manner: The input of an external stimulus is received and transmitted to the network of cerebral nerve bundle through nerve cells; sensory information passes through the process of cognitive assessment in the cerebral nerve bundle and is transmitted to output organs of the body; finally, before emitting an output, the process of cognitive judgment evaluates, on the basis of the embodied map, whether it is a valid moral emotion and gives the order of expansion or control. Of course, Yulgok would not have known the sequential process presented by modern cognitive biology; nonetheless, he emphasizes the important role of cognition, which is an operation of mind and guides us to assess preliminary emotions, which are a flow of consciousness and to reveal rational emotion via volitional *seongui*. He thus implies that not all emotions are moral and that even moral emotions are linked with the sequence of cognitive process.

Although he rejects in principle the independent issuance of *ri*, he admits that it may happen. But the problem is that this possibility is very limited. This is because not many people are capable of maintaining the state of unity between mind and *ri*; it can only occur in special conditions. The problem is that voluntary moral action in accord with the good nature of mind is not something general. Moral knowledge and moral behavior are not always associated, and in many cases, moral knowledge is not connected to moral action. Conversely,

moral action does not necessarily follow from moral knowledge. The issue is how to put moral action into practice. I do not mean an exceptional 1 percent of probability, but how ordinary people can practice moral action based on moral judgment, which is what Yulgok has in mind too.

It is possible for everyone to make a moral judgment based on moral knowledge and to behave morally. Toegye asserts that everyone ought to act on this possibility and put it into action. The issuance of *ri* is, after all, a strong will or desire to turn the possibility of performing moral action into real practice. Yulgok is different from Toegye in this respect: He does not place moral action in the realm of possibility but locates the realization of the possibility in the realm of practice, rather than in the normative realm. In the same context, he emphasizes real efforts and real effects. He intends to resolve it with objective standards which people accumulate empirically. It is the role of the cognitive mind to secure objective criteria.

Yulgok holds that people should scrutinize themselves incessantly and practice cognition and reflection in order to prevent distortion. Cognition and reflection are based on the morality and norms embodied through the process of accumulated learning and repeated experiences and on institutions, laws, and values shared by one's contemporaries. The question is whether one can continue to remain in equilibrium (中節) in accordance with the principle of the mean (時中), based on the moral canon formed in this process.

Yulgok agrees that the essence of human nature is good. He also acknowledges that the human mind is not strong and changes all the time. Moreover, the principle is weak, and the changeable is strong in the real world (理弱氣強). He even considers that falsehood and absurdity are in reality prevalent over truth and rationality. Thus, he proposes the moral emotion theory as an instrument to broaden moral thought and understanding of the world. He observes reality keenly and responds to it delicately; he thus gets very agitated. In this respect, it does not seem that the origin of the norms on which he depends lies in innate (i.e. naturally given) human nature.

Mencius argues for the goodness of human nature, believing that the origin of norms is innate in human beings. If everyone steadfastly sticks to their good human nature, it may be said that the Four Beginnings, including commiseration, characterize human essence. Why then does Yulgok take a different position from Mencius? He supports



Mencius' view that humans are naturally good, and so he accepts the Confucian core proposition expounded by the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi that "nature is *ri*" (性即理).<sup>28)</sup> Yet he does not support it as strongly as Mencius does.

Neo-Confucians in the Song Dynasty, who endorsed the doctrine of the goodness of human nature and the unity between humanity and nature in the universe, strove to construct theoretical tools to link them. Cheng Mingdao rediscovered the heavenly *ri* (天理). Cheng Yichuan developed a theory to directly connect the principle of heaven and human nature. He devised the notion that human nature (i.e. character) was associated with the principle of nature in the universe, saying that "nature is *ri*". This idea, which was conceived within the Confucian philosophical tradition, does not simply mean that the heavenly principle is present in human nature. It strongly urges us to cultivate a sense of solemn moral responsibility for not harming human nature (character), which resembles the principle of heaven and for striving to restore it once harmed.

Yulgok readopts this context in Confucian thought by tailoring it to the milieu of his era. While recognizing that the human essence is good, he is concerned that human character may be obscured or distorted under the influence of disposition. He talks about two types of nature, namely original nature and dispositional nature, and therefore does not attribute the foundation of norm to the nature contained in the mind. He holds that although humans can be moral, since they have good nature, the likelihood of this is very low; it may be possible only for people like sages. Presence is perhaps the domain of myth. He holds that it is not the issue of presence that matters in the world of human existence, where a myriad of situations occur; what is more important is how to realize it through practice.

Even a theory based on a strong endorsement of the goodness of human nature cannot eliminate the mediation of mind. Good nature means that mind is nearly at the same level as *ri*. In this regard, a subjective stance based on the interiorist view regarding good nature may suppose that mind as the subject is identical to *ri* as nature. This is similar to the position of the Wang Yangming School. Yulgok limits the plausibility of the idea that "mind is *ri*", which a strong advocate of the view of good nature might hold, to the ideas that nature is *ri*

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28) "Dap An Eunghyu 答安應休," in *Yulgok jeonse*, vol. 12.

and mind is *gi*. This is the key of his theoretical modification and originality.

Toegye's conception of the issuance of *ri* traces the origin of norm to internalized conscience, in which "mind is identified with *ri*" (心與理一). He guides the revelation of good nature through the belief in human values. Meanwhile, Yulgok proposes the moral emotion theory regarding the Four-Seven with the idea of the single path of the issuance of *gi* with *ri* mounting it. He makes a clear distinction between *ri* as nature and *gi* as mind. That is, the absolute realm of nature-*ri* is distinguished from the changeable one of mind-*gi*.

For Yulgok, morality and norm are derived from the constant arena of nature-*ri*, which lies beyond human influence and control. Hence he sees that essence is reflected in phenomena. That is reflected in his notion that *ri* is general and *gi* is specific (理通氣局). On the basis of this idea, he lays the foundation of norm in the phenomenal world. Because it is the real life of people that matters, he explores the objective criteria of the interior and the exterior through cognition in the arena of mind-*gi*. Therefore, value, order, and real norm, which are realized by sages in the mind-*gi* arena, are established as the canon that everyone must follow. This stance gives more impetus to the exterior in comparison.<sup>29)</sup>

## 5. Conclusion: Suggestions for Reflection

Yulgok's discussion of the Four-Seven is more than a critique of Toegye and improves on the East Asian Confucian thought of his time. He deploys his own brand of philosophy by conducting new experiments with the notion of moral emotion. Some examples are his conceptions that "it is a unitary process that *gi* is activated and *ri* rides on it" and "mind is *gi*." In fact, a new stream of thought begins with new questions.<sup>30)</sup> New vocabulary is developed while answering the questions. One needs to invent new things in order to explain something that does not exist in the world. The development of terminology and the amalgamation of different thoughts are the driving forces in the creation of a new philosophy. Yulgok's idea that

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29) Yoon (2013, 6).

30) K. Kim (2012a, 34-37).

*ri* is general and *gi* is specific is an example. While new thought can be entirely newly conceived, it may also be discovered on an existing foundation. Creation and invention are based on the accumulated layers of foundation. Yulgok is a philosopher who reconstructs his own philosophy by thoroughly studying the history of Confucian thought rather than creating something out of nothing. It may be said that his creativity lies in reinventing.

Considered in the framework of moral emotion theory, Yulgok's notion of the Four-Seven puts emphasis on the process of moving from being to becoming, where 'becoming' means ethical practice, i.e. doing. To undergo this process is to enlarge moral understanding. from this point of view, being *per se* is not very important, whether it is nature or something else. For instance, sorrow itself is not important but becomes important as one devises morality on the basis of sorrow. A flower in itself is not important but becomes important as it enters into one's soul.

Feelings like joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure merely exist. As we name, label and distinguish them, we fit them into a pattern or assign them to categories, in the context of which they become meaningful. In this way, we can moralize a specific feeling such as sorrow. This refers to moral sorrow or the moralization of sorrow which is evoked by a moral emotion.

Sorrow is defined as moral or immoral through a concrete action. Here morality, which regulates behavior, arises. The existence of something is difficult to recognize or verify clearly; it is therefore important to pay attention to the process of action. Ethical practice and action must be emphasized. The course of practice means the transition from being to doing. Yulgok's moral emotion theory stresses the importance of doing in everyday life. The process of doing enables us to expand moral thought and moral insight and to form alliance with others.

Yet there are some elements that we should be careful of in Yulgok's theory of moral emotion. People like Yulgok who are anxious and worrisome tend to want visible orderliness rather than invisible vagueness. It is because the vague invisible world causes fear and anxiety, whereas a clear and orderly world gives a sense of stability. This standpoint can easily lead to an emphasis on moral force, once it acquires real power. The fact that Yulgok's disciples acted as self-proclaimed truth-bearers and became strict conservatives in the

historical progression of Joseon after the 18th century has many implications. George Lakoff categorizes people of this type into the strict fathers model.<sup>31)</sup>

My final point concerns how to view the problem of 'nature' raised in Yulgok's moral emotion theory from a contemporary perspective. I studied the horizon of Confucian sensibility in a paper published in 2009, in which I proposed a relaxed theory of nature.<sup>32)</sup> In my view, Mencius' statements on natural goodness show that the original tendency revealing human characteristics is very limited, whereas those of Xunzi on natural evil imply that emotion has a strong tendency to evil, which may be moderated with social modification. These two views are consolidated into the philosophy of Zhu Xi.

While accepting the theory on moral emotion in Confucian history, I believe that we should think about whether the view of strengthening original moral emotion is suitable for the present era. Scientific investigation of human nature leads to new reflections on human beings. The advancement of third-generation cognitive science and cognitive biology addresses the problems of brain, neuron, and nerve ethics, which used to lie beyond the horizon of conventional philosophical thought. Is it still meaningful in the present era to maintain an *a priori* argument about the natural goodness of humanity and to discuss the theory of moral emotion?

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31) Lakoff and Johnson (2002, 461-464).

32) K. Kim (2009, 107-111).

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## 栗谷李珥的四端七情論 —對規則性的根源進行的考察

金 璟 鎬

**中文摘要：**本文從兩個層面進行探究。第一個層面是對於栗谷李珥的四段七情的解釋。筆者在揭示對於栗谷李珥的四段七情的一般性解釋後，又提出了進行新解釋的可能性。這裏所謂的新解釋是指從身體上的感情層面來理解關於性理學的感情、本性以及心的討論，並運用暗喻理論，尤其是概念性暗喻理論來解釋這種討論。栗谷的四端七情論涉及了儒家哲學中被認為是根本性的學術主題的道德感情和一般感情問題，而這一主題在以儒學價值秩序為基礎的傳統社會中奠定了實踐論的基礎。通過這一討論，筆者揭示了栗谷所提出的規範的根據和規範性的源泉。

在文中筆者最終主張如下：首先，與當時對於人類的感性、道德性條件的認識不同，栗谷的四端七情論提出了新的觀點。其次，栗谷的這種規劃是試圖通過擴大‘道德性認識’來確保‘能夠普遍實現的人類的規範性條件’。

**關鍵詞：**四端、七情、理氣論、栗谷。





# Dialectical Development of the Theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings by the Toegye and Yulgok Schools during the 17th-18th Centuries

AN Yoo-kyoung

## Abstract

This study summarizes the theories of the Four beginnings and Seven Feelings developed by the Toegye (退溪) and Yulgok (栗谷) Schools. The Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings were interpreted differently by these two schools. Moreover, within each school, there existed different positions in terms of theoretical details. The Toegye School included some scholars who interpreted the theory of the mutual issuance of *ri* (理) and *gi* (氣) in terms of the distinction between the primacy of *ri* and the primacy of *gi*. This school also included other scholars who emphasized the clear distinction between the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings based on their origins by accepting the independent issuance of *ri*. On the other hand, the scholars from the Yulgok School attempted to explain the difference between the theories of Yulgok and Toegye in terms of the difference between the primacy of *ri* and the primacy of *gi*. In addition, this school also included other scholars who criticized Toegye's theory of the mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi*.

**Keywords:** the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, the Toegye school, the Yulgok school, the mutual requirement of *ri* and *gi*, the single path of the issuance of *gi* with *ri* mounting it, the primacy of *ri*, the primacy of *gi*.

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## 1. Introduction

The key idea in Toegye's (退溪) theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings (四端七情, *sadan chiljeong*) is the concept of mutual issuance (互發, *hobal*). However, Toegye himself did not frequently employ the concept; by contrast, Yulgok (栗谷) used the concept in criticizing Toegye's idea of the issuance of *gi* with *ri* mounting it (氣發而理乘). In fact, Yulgok saw the concept of mutual issuance as the decisive mistake in Toegye's Neo-Confucianism. The Yulgok School also went to great lengths to show that the theory of the mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi* (理氣互發說) constituted the greatest weakness in Toegye's position. The Toegye School responded to these criticisms by attempting to reestablish the theory of the mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi* and forged different methods to explain it.

The Toegye School's understanding was itself divided into two ways of interpreting the concept of mutual issuance. One was advanced by scholars such as Udam Jeong Sihan (愚潭 丁時翰, 1625-1707) and Daesan Yi Sangjeong (大山 李象靖, 1711-1781), who explained Toegye's theory of the mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi*, which had been so roundly criticized by Yulgok, in terms of the division between the primacy of *ri* (主理, *jur*) and the primacy of *gi* (主氣, *jugi*); they based their arguments on the idea of the mutual requirement of *ri* and *gi* (相須, *sangsū*). The other was promoted by scholars such as Galam Yi Hyeonil (葛庵 李玄逸, 1627-1704) and Cheongdae Gwon Sangil (淸臺 權相一, 1679-1760), who emphasized the clear distinction between the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings in accordance with their different origins (所從來) by accepting the idea of the independent issuance of *ri*.

Different opinions on the theory of Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings also emerged within the Yulgok School. Scholars such as Jolsuje Jo Seong-gi (拙修齋 趙聖期, 1638-1689) and Nongam Kim Changhyeop (農巖 金昌協, 1651-1708) attempted to compromise Yulgok's theory with the interpretation of Toegye's theory by understanding their difference in terms of the division between the primacy of *ri* and the primacy of *gi*. Other scholars, such as Uam Song Siyeol (尤庵 宋時烈, 1607-1689) and Namdang Han Wonjin (南塘 韓元震, 1682-1751), criticized Toegye's theory of mutual issuance by considering it as focusing on the different origins of *ri* and *gi*.

Based on these facts, this study will analyze the major trends in

the theories of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings developed by the Toegye and Yulgok Schools.

## 2. The Theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings developed by the Toegye School

### (1) Interpretation of *Juri* and *Jugi* based on *Sangsu*

#### 1) Udam Jeong Sihan

Yulgok's criticism of Toegye's *hobal*, the mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi*, can be summarized as follows. The theory that *ri* issues and *gi* follows it (理發氣隨) leads to the separation of *ri* and *gi*, because it establishes an order between them. The theory that *ri* issues (理發, *ribal*) is inconsistent with the principle of the inaction of *ri* by itself (理無爲). Instead, Udam understood Toegye's theory that *ri* issues first with *gi* following it (理發氣隨), and that *gi* issues with *ri* mounting it (氣發理乘), in connection with the division between *juri* (the primacy of *ri*) and *jugi* (the primacy of *gi*) based on the idea that *ri* and *gi* are mutually required.

The reason for saying that *gi* follows is that it cannot be argued that there is no *gi* when *ri* issues. How can it be argued that *ri* issues first and then *gi* follows it? It is also said that *ri* mounts (理乘) only because it cannot be that there is no *ri* when *gi* issues. How can it be argued that *gi* issues forth first and then *ri* follows? One also has to mention *gi* when talking about *ri* first when *ri* plays the core role. Conversely, one also has to mention *ri* when talking about *gi* first when *gi* plays the core role.<sup>1)</sup>

Udam explained that Toegye's theory of *hobal* was based not on the temporal order between *ri* and *gi*, but on the division between *juri* and *jugi*. He asserted that Toegye stated that *gi* follows (氣隨, *gisu*) because he could not claim that there was no *gi* when *ri* issues; moreover, Toegye stated that *ri* mounts (理乘, *riseung*) because he could not conclude that there was no *ri* when *gi* issues. In other words, the terms, *gisu* and *riseung*, were simply used to emphasize

1) "Sachil byeonjeung 四七辨證," in *Udanjip*, vol. 7. "理發之時不可謂無氣, 故謂之氣隨, 豈理先發而氣隨後之謂乎. 氣發之時不可謂無理, 故謂之理乘, 豈氣先發而理在後之謂乎. 一則主理而言, 故先言理而亦未嘗不言氣, 一則主氣而言故先言氣而亦未嘗不言理."

*sangsu* rather than the temporal order between *ri* and *gi*. Toegye's theory of *ribal gisu* (理發氣隨) is, despite the fact that both *ri* and *gi* require each other, based on an emphasis on *ri*, whereas his theory of *gibal riseung* (氣發理乘) is, despite the fact that *ri* and *gi* are once again mutually needed, based on an emphasis on *gi*. Therefore, in accordance with the separation of *juri* and *jugi*, Udam regarded the Four Beginnings as belonging to *ribal* and the Seven Feelings as being related to *gibal*.

Thus, if it must be the case that human emotions (情) are generated from human nature on the basis of the idea of *sangsu*, there is only one path of issuance, not two. In conclusion, contrary to Toegye's understanding of the different origins of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings on the basis of the division between original nature (本然之性) and psychophysical nature (氣質之性), Udam emphasized that there are not two origins in the human mind. As he put it, "there are not two roots in the human mind."<sup>2)</sup>

Udam strongly emphasizes *sangsu* in order to avoid Yulgok's criticism of the theory of *hobal* that is based on the idea of the temporal order between *ri* and *gi*. Udam's position amounts to the assertion that there is only one root of human emotions originating from human nature (性). This in turn renders the separation of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings ambiguous. That being the case, Toegye's original intention for separating the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings begins to fade. In this regard, Udam developed the idea of the distinction (分開) between the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings.

From the standpoint of primordial nebulousness (渾淪), it becomes clear that psychophysical nature includes original nature and that the Seven Feelings include the Four Beginnings. However, original nature is primarily based on *ri*, while psychophysical nature is primarily based on *gi*. Separating the Four Beginnings from the Seven Feelings, we must then conclude that the issuance of the Four Beginnings based on *ri* implies that original nature is primarily based on *ri*; conversely, the issuance of the Seven Feelings based on *gi* implies that psychophysical nature is primarily based on *gi*.<sup>3)</sup>

2) "Sachil byeonjeung," in *Udamjip* vol. 8. "人心雖無二源."

3) "Sachil byeonjeung," in *Udamjip* vol. 7. "夫渾淪言之則氣質之包本性七情之兼四端不待多言而明矣。而既已指出本然之性於氣質之中則本然之性主理而爲言者也氣質之性主氣而爲言者也。既已剔發四端於七情之中則四端之謂之理發猶本然之性之主理也。七情之謂之氣發猶氣質之性之主氣也。"

Udam asserted that while original nature is understood with an emphasis on *ri*, whereas psychophysical nature is understood with an emphasis on *gi*. Thus, the Four Beginnings are based on *ribal*, while the Seven Feelings are based on *gibal*, while original nature originates from *ri*, the Seven Feelings originate from *gi*. This understanding is different from Yulgok's theory, which regarded only psychophysical nature as human emotion (情) and conceived psychophysical nature and original nature as existing in an inclusive relationship. By breaking down original nature and psychophysical nature into *juri* and *jugi*, Udam conceived the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings as issuing from *ri* and *gi* respectively.

## 2) Daesan Yi Sangjeong

Rather than adhering to the rigid separation of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, Daesan maintained that there are two other viewpoints that can be adopted. First, there is the viewpoint from the primordial nebulous state of the universe (渾淪), in which the Four Beginnings could be included in the Seven Feelings; secondly, there is a viewpoint from the distinction (分開) that can be made conceptually between the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings. Daesan therefore stated, "Toegye's theory of *ribal gisu* and *gibal riseung* was presented solely from the viewpoint of distinction. Still, how would the division between the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings and *hobal* make sense from the viewpoint of nebulousness?"<sup>4)</sup> Daesan made clear that *hobal* can make sense only from the viewpoint of distinction rather than from the viewpoint of nebulousness. Furthermore, he explained *hobal* in connection with *juri* and *jugi*, saying, "*hobal* does not imply that there is no *gi* when *ri* issues forth, nor that there is no *ri* when *gi* issues forth. There is only the difference between two different points of view."<sup>5)</sup>

It is not that *gi* does not exist in the Four Beginnings; rather, they are understood with a focus on their *ri*. It is not that *ri* does not exist in the Seven Feelings; rather, they are understood with a focus on their *gi*. This is why one refers to *ribal* and *gibal*.<sup>6)</sup>

4) "Dap Yi Huido 答李希道," in *Daesanjip*, vol. 20. "理發氣隨氣發理乘, 正是分開說. 若渾淪時, 又安有四七之異名, 理氣之互發哉."

5) "Gimun 記聞," in *Daesan seonsaeng silgi*, vol. 8. "理氣互發之云, 理發時全無氣也, 氣發時全無理也, 特所主而言之者不同耳."

This means that the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings can be interpreted in terms of *ribal* and *gibal* respectively, on the basis of the division between *juri* and *jugi*. Here, *juri* means that *ri* properly controls *gi*, which in turn implies that *ri* actually controls *gi* without doing anything by itself (不宰之宰), and that everything is done by *ri*, even though *ri* does not do anything by itself (無爲之爲).<sup>7)</sup> Daesan shared Gwon Sangil's position that although the actual movement and stillness (動靜) of *ri* should be denied, the movement and stillness of *ri* in its capacity as the main supervision should be conceded. This can be compared to the state in which a person rides a horse: while it is the horse that actually moves, it is the person who controls the horse. Similarly, it is *juri* that continuously provides order and direction to *gi* in reality; this can be understood conceptually as the movement and stillness of *ri*. On the other hand, *jugi* can be regarded as the failure to maintain the state of the primacy of *ri*. Based on this logic, Daesan criticized Yulgok's theory of the inaction of *ri* as "ri being treated as if it were the *ri* of dead material." Daesan asserted that if *ri* were understood as merely inactive, then *ri* would not have any regulatory power, and *gi* would move arbitrarily, creating a chaotic situation.

Daesan also explained that the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings are based on *ribal*, which accords with the idea that emotions originate from the issuance of nature (性發爲情). He asked, "if everything originates from the issuance of nature (性發) from the viewpoint of nebulousness, then can one rightfully claim that the Seven Feelings have no connection with the issuance of nature, even though they may be mentioned from the viewpoint of distinction?"<sup>8)</sup> This can of course be regarded as a sign that Daesan partially accepted Yulgok's theory that the Four Beginnings are included in the Seven Feelings (七包四, *chilposa*). Since Daesan conceived both the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings as being intricately connected to *ribal*, this approach effectively weakened Toegye's original intention of separating the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings. Thus, we can surmise that Daesan's approach leads to problems of consistency. By adopting the viewpoint of distinction, he attempted to explain the Four

6) "Dap Yi Huido," in *Daesanjip* vol. 20. "四端非無氣, 而理爲主, 七情非無理, 而氣爲主, 其曰理之發氣之發."

7) "Dok seonghak jibyo 讀聖學輯要," in *Daesanjip* vol. 40. "如曰不宰之宰, 無爲之爲."

8) "Dap Yi Huido," in *Daesanjip* vol. 20. "今渾淪言, 而謂皆性之發, 則方其分開, 而謂七情之非性發, 可乎."

Beginnings and Seven Feelings in terms of both *ribal* and *gibal*; but by adopting the viewpoint of nebulousness, he explains both the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings in terms of *ribal*, on the basis of the idea that emotions originate from the issuance of nature (性發爲情).

## (2) Active Interpretations of the Theory of Hobal

### 1) Galam Yi Hyeonil

Galam Yi Hyeonil defended the distinction (分開) between *ri* and *gi* within a single entity. He stated that although *ri* and *gi* are subtly mixed, and therefore it is impossible to separate them and place them into their own spheres, they should nonetheless be distinguished.<sup>9)</sup> This distinction between *ri* and *gi* naturally develops into a logic that accepts the actual movement and stillness of *ri*.

Although *ri* does not move by itself, it is actually the basis of all phenomena and all beings. According to Yulgok, *ri* cannot be the foundation of all phenomena. [...] One *ri* is united together, penetrates through all movements and stoppages, and becomes the chief cause of all phenomena and beings.<sup>10)</sup>

Galam defined *ri* as an active entity, explaining that all things and beings do not lose their logic and order because of the penetration of *ri* through all their movements and stoppages. He argued that Yulgok's sole emphasis on the inaction of *ri* leads to the denial that *ri* is the foundation of all phenomena, since his position makes *ri* something completely empty and inactive (虛無空寂). Galam emphasized the need to distinguish the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings based on their origins. He conceived the existing structure of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings differently, saying, "the Four Beginnings are pure and good as they originate from *ri*, whereas the Seven Feelings can be appropriate or inappropriate because they originate from *gi*."<sup>11)</sup>

9) "Dap Jeong Gunik. Gapsin. Byeolji 答丁君翊. 甲申. 別紙," in *Garanjip*, vol. 8. "理與氣雖是妙合而凝, 不宜分開, 各在一處, 然亦不可認爲一物而無所分別."

10) "Yulgok Yissi ron *sadan chiljeong* seobyeon 栗谷李氏論四端七情書辨," in *Garanjip*, vol. 18. "夫理雖無爲, 而實爲造化之樞紐品彙之根柢. 若如李氏之說, 則此理只是虛無空寂底物, 不能爲萬化之原, 而獨陰陽氣化縱橫顛倒以行其造化也, 不亦謬乎. 夫一理渾然, 貫動靜而爲之主."

In addition, Galam opposed Yulgok's assertion that both the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings issue from *gi*. As he said, "*cheugeun ji sim* (惻隱之心) occurs when one sees a child falling into a well; one's feeling sympathy after having seen such a child is to be understood in terms of *gi* and *gibal*."<sup>12)</sup> Galam supported the theory of *hobal*, arguing that the Four Beginnings originate from *ri* and the Seven Feelings from *gi*.

Toegye asserted that the Four Beginnings consisting of benevolence (仁), righteousness (義), propriety (禮) and wisdom (智) originated from human nature. This means that when *ri* emerges in one's mind as a result of a contact to become the emotions of compassion and sympathy (惻隱), shame and dislike (羞惡), modesty and deference (辭讓), and approval and disapproval (是非), the emanations of these emotions have no interaction with psychophysical form-*gi* (形氣). This does not mean the self-issuance of these emotions without any contact. Toegye also asserted that the Seven Feelings moved from one's mind when an external entity came into contact with a being. This means that a material from the outside moves into one's mind to become the Seven Feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, joy, love, hate, and desire. These emotions are impacted by psychophysical form-*gi*. This does not mean however that *ri* does not originally exist in one's mind.<sup>13)</sup>

Galam concluded that *ribal* does not occur by itself without any contact with an external material, and that *gibal* does not imply the nonexistence of *ri*. He asserted that while the Four Beginnings indicate *ri*, which is not mixed with physical form and *gi*; the Seven Feelings belong to *gi* and interact with psychophysical form-*gi*. of course, both the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings issue forth as a result of contact with an external world, as Yulgok asserted; however, because the issuance of the Four Beginnings is primarily based on *ri*, it directly originates from the human nature of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, with which *gi* cannot interfere. Thus, it is said to be *ribal*, namely the issuance of *ri*. On the other

11) "Dok Kim Cheonhyu ron Yi Daehyu rigi seongjeong doseolbyeon 讀金天休論李大柔理氣性情圖說辨," in *Garanjip* vol. 8. "四端發於理，故粹然無不善，七情發於氣，故有中節不中節云爾."

12) "Dap Seong Howon 答成浩原," in *Yulgok jeonseol* vol. 10. "見孺子入井然後乃發惻隱之心，見之而惻隱者氣也，此所謂氣發也。"

13) "Dap Jeong Gunik. Byeolji," in *Garanjip* vol. 8. "退溪之以四端爲發於仁義禮智之性者，乃謂心中本有之理隨觸而發，爲惻隱羞惡辭讓是非之情，其發不雜形氣者而言，初不言無感而自發也。以七情爲外物觸其形而動於中者，乃謂物之自外至者，觸其耳目而動乎中，爲喜怒哀樂愛惡欲之情，其出涉於形氣者而言，亦非謂其中元無是理也。"



hand, the Seven Feelings are primarily based on *gi* and interfered with by physical form and *gi* (形氣). Galam criticized Yulgok's theory regarding the single path of the issuance of *gi* with *ri* mounting it (氣發理乘一途), through which only the issuance of *gi* occurs, by asserting that while the Four Beginnings originate from *ribal*, the Seven Feelings originate from *gibal*. Thus, by emphasizing the justification for the viewpoint of distinction and accepting the differences in terms of the movement and stillness of *ri* and its origins, Galam separated the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings into *ribal* and *gibal*.

## 2) Cheongdae Gwon Sangil

Cheongdae held that the distinction between *juri* and *jugi* made by Udam and Daesan on the basis of the theory of *sansu* in effect obscured the essence of Toegye's thought on the division between the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings. As Cheongdae puts it, "the malady of modern learning stems from the [excessive] emphasis on the non-separation (不相離) of *ri* and *gi* and the perception of the two from the viewpoint of nebulosity or oneness."<sup>14</sup> In other words, the problem was rooted in the inability to understand *ri* and *gi* in a conceptually distinct manner and the failure to accept the movement and stillness of *ri*. Cheongdae argued that the theory of *hobal*, which allows the actual movement and stillness of *ri*, should be adopted in order to distinguish the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings.

If movement and stillness are ascribed solely to *eum* (陰) and *yang* (陽) and the causes of movement and stillness to *ri*, then *ri* becomes the principle (體) and *gi* its applications (用), thus implying that *ri* is inactive while *gi* is active. As such, only *gi* is effective while *ri* is a dead thing.<sup>15</sup>

Cheongdae's point is that the movement and stillness of *ri* should be admitted, for otherwise, according to the theory of *ri*-principle and *gi*-application (理體氣用論), reality would be led solely by *gi*, while *ri* would become a dead principle that does not have any influence on reality. This implies the plausibility of the idea that *ri* gives birth to *gi* (理生氣) and that *ri* goes first and *gi* follows it (理先氣後). Thus, by

14) "Dap Yi Gyeongmun 答李景文," in *Cheongdaegip*, vol. 8. "近世學問之弊，專在於主張不相離處，或作渾淪看，或作一物看。"

15) "Dap Yi Gyeongmun," in *Cheongdaegip*, vol. 8. "若以動靜專歸於陰陽，而所以動靜者歸之理，則是理爲體而氣爲用，理無爲而氣有爲也，作用祇是氣，而理則爲一死物也。"

accepting the fundamental difference between the origins of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, Cheongdae asserted that the Four Beginnings stem from *ribal* and the Seven Feelings from *gibal*.

Although *gi* exists in the Four Beginnings and *ri* in the Seven Feelings, the sprouts of their origins differ. This is why Toegye advanced the notion of *ribal gisu* and *gibal riseung*. As such, it cannot be said that both the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings originate from the *gibal* nor that the both originate from *ribal*.<sup>16)</sup>

Cheongdae explained that although *gi* exists in the Four Beginnings and *ri* in the Seven Feelings, the seeds of their origins differ. If the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings have different origins, Yulgok's theory of the single path of the issuance of *gi* with *ri* mounting it collapses. That being the case, Yulgok, who regarded the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings as being rooted in the issuance of *gi*, as well as Udam and Daesan, who regarded the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings as stemming from the issuance of *ri*, become targets for criticism. In fact, when the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings based on *juri* and *jugi* are separated on the assumption of the theory of *sangsu*, the origins of the Four and Seven are not clearly distinguished from one another. This problem emerged in Udam's thought and more clearly in Daesan's thought. For this reason, in order to clearly distinguish the origins of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, Cheongdae asserted that the Four Beginnings originate from original nature or *ribal*, whereas the Seven Feelings originate from psychophysical nature or *gibal*.<sup>17)</sup> He thus introduced the fundamental deviation between the Four and the Seven by clarifying the different sources responsible for the emanation of each of them. He therefore rejected Yulgok's theory of the Four Beginnings as the good side of the Seven Feelings; he also rejected the "convergent" understanding that the Seven Feelings include the Four Beginnings (*chilposa*). As he stated, "when the Seven Feelings emanate in accordance with *ri*, they then become akin to the Four Beginnings. Even so, as these take the form of joy, anger, sorrow and pleasure (喜

16) "Dap Udaerae 答禹大來," in *Cheongdaejeip* vol. 9. "四端非無氣, 七情非無理, 而所從來苗脈不同. 故退翁於四端, 則先言理發, 而繼以氣隨二字, 於七情, 則先言氣發, 而繼以理乘二字, 不可謂四七皆是氣, 亦不可謂四七皆是理也."

17) "Gwanseorok 觀書錄," in *Cheongdaejeip* vol. 15. "然而四端是本然之性所發, 故曰理發, 七情是氣質之性所發, 故曰氣發."

怒哀樂), they cannot rightfully be viewed as the Four Beginnings.”<sup>18)</sup> Cheongdae thus affirmed *hobal*, namely the mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi* based on the actual movement and stillness of *ri*. Essentially, he claimed that inactive *ri* becomes active and creates a state of non-separation with *gi*. He therefore had to accept Yulgok’s criticisms that two different human emotions would be created if the sprouts of the origins of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings differed.

### 3. The Yulgok School’s Theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings

#### (1) *Interpretation of Gibal riseung ildo (氣發理乘一途, the single path of the issuance of gi with ri mounting it) in terms of Juri and Jugi*

##### 1) Jolsuje Jo Seong-gi

Jolsuje’s opinions on the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings are well expressed in his essay, “*Tae-Yul yangseonsaeng sadanchiljeong indo rigi hubyon* (退栗兩先生四端七情人道理氣說後辨),” which he wrote when he was twenty years old. Jolsuje concluded that regardless of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, the actual action of the mind is based on the single path of the issuance of *gi* with *ri* mounting it. However, as he also went on to explain, “analyzing it in a detailed manner, we find that the notion that *ri* moves by mounting *gi* (*riseunggi i dong* 理乘氣而動) and the notion that *gi* issues forth by being attached to *ri* (*giuri i bal*, 氣寓理而發).”<sup>19)</sup> Although he premised that the action of the mind is based on *gibal riseung* (氣發理乘), he divided the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings into *riseunggi i dong* and *giuri i bal*. The Four Beginnings, understood in terms of *riseunggi i dong*, issue from the human nature of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. Human nature cannot be damaged regardless of how much one is affected by inappropriate endowment of *gi* (氣稟) and blinded

18) “Gwanseorok,” in *Cheongdaejeip*, vol. 15. “七情順理而發，則似四端，而畢竟是喜怒哀樂所發，不可謂四端。”

19) “Gwanseorok,” in *Cheongdaejeip*, vol. 15. “然而就氣發理乘之中，細分而言之，則又有理乘氣而動者，與氣寓理而發者。”

by worldly desire (物欲). For this reason, the Four Beginnings are primarily based on *ri*. The Seven Feelings, understood in terms of *giuri i bal*, issue from the natural desire for food and sex (食色之性); at this moment, *ri* is trapped by *gi*, and therefore the Seven Feelings are to be understood with a focus on *gi*. Jolsuje explained that although the action of *gi* is needed for the Four Beginnings to emanate and be used, the issuance and effect of the Four Beginnings are realized when the actions of *gi* are completely controlled. At this moment, the actions of *gi* are nothing more than the implementation of the order stemming from *ri*, with *ri* becoming the core principle in this movement. As such, the Four Beginnings originate from *ri*, thus they are *ribal*.

Although the Four Beginnings are what *gi* issues, the content of the issuance is related to *ri*. It is expressed as *ribal*, which cannot be equated with *gi* as what issues, because *ri* controls *gi* and therefore *gi* cannot obscure *ri*.<sup>20)</sup>

This stands out from Yulgok's stance and can be regarded as a conception that is closer to Toegye's theory regarding *ribal*. 'Ri mounting *gi*' implies that *ri* depends on *gi*; the more this point is emphasized, the more the absolute status of *ri* is compromised. Thus, Jolsuje viewed the theory of *gibal riseung* as strengthening the status of *ri*.

If one imputes the good and evil of the mind only to *gi* while asserting the inaction of *ri*, *ri* no longer controls good and evil, becoming a useless entity whose existence has no importance. How then can *ri* become the pivot and applicable to all beings in the universe, and where can one find the reality of the ultimate and original nature?<sup>21)</sup>

Jolsuje asserted that if good and evil are determined by *gi*, as Yulgok proposed, then *ri* becomes a useless entity that does not have any influence over good and evil. Thus, as Yi Byeongdo has noted, "Jolsuje compromised Toegye's theory of *hobal* with Yulgok's theory of *gibal riseung*."<sup>22)</sup> In other words, Jolsuje attempted to resolve the

20) "Gwanseorok," in *Cheongdaejeip*, vol. 15. "四端雖發之者是氣，而所發處在理而不在氣，理宰乎氣而氣不能蔽乎理，故謂之理發而不得以發之之氣雜而混稱之也。"

21) "Toe-Yul yangseonsaeng sadan chiljeong indo rigiseol hubyeon 退栗兩先生四端七情人道理氣說後辨," *Jolsujaejip*, vol. 11. "若概以理無所作爲，而遂以心之善惡，只屬乎氣之清濁，則是理無所與於善惡，而所謂理者，直是一箇僮侗物事，有亦可，無亦可，烏足爲萬事之樞紐主宰，而無極之真，至虛而至實，本然之妙，無適而不然者，將於何處可見乎?"

22) Yi (1989, 276).

problems associated with *ri* by accepting Toegye's division between *juri* and *jugi* on the basis of Yulgok's theory of *gibal riseung*.

## 2) Nongam Kim Changhyeop

Nongam partially accepted Toegye's view in order to strengthen the status of *ri*, as long as it did not reject the notion of the inaction of *ri*, which stands as one of the basic principles of Neo-Confucianism. This tendency can be identified from his conception of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings in terms of *juri* and *jugi* and on the premise of Yulgok's theory of the single path of the issuance of *gi*.

The Four Beginnings are based on the primacy of *ri*, but *gi* is also contained within them. The Seven Feelings are issued based on the primacy of *gi*, but *ri* is also contained within them. The *gi* of the Four Beginnings is equated with the *gi* of the Seven Feelings, while the *ri* of the Seven Feelings is equated with the *ri* of the Four Beginnings. There are not two different kinds.<sup>23)</sup>

Nongam's opinions are consistent with Toegye's theory that although the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings are composed of *ri* and *gi*, the Four Beginnings are based on *juri* and the Seven Feelings are based on *jugi*. By contrast, Yulgok asserted that the Four Beginnings indicate only *ri* and therefore can be understood in terms of *juri*; however, the Seven Feelings cannot be conceived in terms of *jugi*, as they are based on both *ri* and *gi*.<sup>24)</sup> Nongam criticized Yulgok's assertions that the Seven Feelings are based on both *ri* and *gi* from the standpoint, according to which the Four Beginnings are understood in terms of *juri* and the Seven Feelings in terms of *jugi*.

Yulgok criticized Toegye's understanding of the Seven Feelings in terms of *jugi*. However, this does not mean that the Seven Feelings are not based on *ri*. Even though the Seven Feelings are rooted in *ri*, the focus of the expression "the Seven Feelings" is put on *gi*. [...] Yulgok's position is that while the Four Beginnings belong only to the good side, the Seven Feelings belong to both the realms of good and evil, and that while the Four Beginnings are mentioned with a focus on *ri* (專言理), the Seven Feelings are mentioned in relation to both *ri* and *gi* (兼言氣). I am

23) "Sadan chiljeongseol 四端七情說," in *Nongam jeonjip* "四端主理言而氣在其中, 七情主氣言而理在其中, 四端之氣, 卽七情之氣, 七情之理, 卽四端之理, 非有二也."

24) "Dap Seong Howon," in *Yulgok jeonseol*, vol. 9. "情一也, 而或曰四或曰七者, 專言理兼言氣之不同也."

however somewhat of a different opinion. This difference has to do with the view that the Seven Feelings are mentioned in relation to both *ri* and *gi*. Although the Seven Feelings are based on *ri* and *gi*, the focus of the expression is primarily on *gi*.<sup>25)</sup>

Nongam asserted that although the Seven Feelings are based on both *ri* and *gi*, their core consists in *jugi*. He emphasized that the Four Beginnings are expressed primarily with reference to their *ri*, whereas the Seven Feelings are mentioned primarily with reference to *gi*. This position has the same logical structure as Toegye's theory, which is the main reason why Nongam was classified as an eclectic from a theoretical perspective. of course, Nongam's claim that the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings should be separated based on *juri* and *jugi* still differs from Toegye's theory, which is rooted in the difference in the origins (所從來) of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings. Nevertheless, Nongam's reason for separating the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings into *juri* and *jugi* stemmed from the fact that scholars had long perceived the Seven Feelings as something to be wary of, while the Four Beginnings were seen as something to expand. This can be seen as the main reason why Nongam asserted that the Seven Feelings are primarily based on *gi*. In other words, because the Four Beginnings are something to expand, while the Seven Feelings are something to be wary of, the Four Beginnings were seen in terms of *juri* and the Seven Feelings in terms of *jugi*. Nongam emphasized the centrality of *ri* within a scope that did not deny the inaction of *ri*, leaving room for *ri* to intervene in the pure and good Four Beginnings.

If the good and evil of human emotion are regarded as originating solely from *gi*, then one cannot come to know the actuality of *ri* and the goodness of human nature.<sup>26)</sup>

As Yulgok asserted, if we conclude that good emotions are issued from clear *gi* and evil ones from murky *gi*, then we must also concede that the good and evil of human emotions are completely determined

25) "Sadan chiljeongseol," in *Nongam jeonjip* "以七情爲主氣，栗谷非之，然此非謂七情不本乎理也，雖本乎理，而所主而言者，則在乎氣耳。……四端善一邊，七情兼善惡，四端專言理，七情兼言氣，栗谷之說，非不明白，愚見不無少異者，所爭只在兼言氣一句耳。蓋七情，雖實兼理氣，而要以氣爲主。"

26) "Sadan chiljeongseol," in *Nongam jeonjip* "今若以善惡之情，一歸之於氣之清濁，則恐無以見理之實體而性之爲善也。"

by *gi*, while *ri* remains passive. In other words, *ri* becomes a useless entity that cannot exercise any influence when it comes to determining good and evil. Thus, Nongam emphasized the centrality of *ri* although *ri* mounts *gi* based on its characteristics of non-volitions and non-functionality (無情意/無造作), *gi* also receives the order of *ri*. Nongam intended to resolve Toegye's theory designed to make clear the purity and goodness of the Four Beginnings within Yulgok's singular structure called the theory of *ribal riseung ildo*.

## (2) Theoretical Enforcement of the Theory of *Gibal riseung ildo*

### 1) Uam Song Siyeol

As Uam pointed out, "Yulgok thought that Toegye's errant understanding lay mainly in his theory of *ribal gisu*"<sup>27)</sup> As a criticism of Toegye's theory of *hobal* and as an alternative to it, in particular to his idea of *ribal*, he developed the theory of *gibal riseung ildo*. He criticized Toegye's adoption of the theory of *hobal* on the basis of Zhu Xi's statement that "the Four Beginnings are the issuance of *ri*, and the Seven Feelings are the issuance of *gi* (四端是理之發, 七情是氣之發)." Uam regarded this statement as a faulty record of Zhu Xi's true position. Furthermore, based on Zhu Xi's statement that "the division between equilibrium (中節) and nonequilibrium (不中節) may exist in terms of compassion and sympathy (惻隱) and shame and dislike (羞惡)," Uam asserted that there is in fact nonequilibrium even within the Four Beginnings. Uam thus criticized not only Yulgok but also Toegye, Gobong and Ugye for having overlooked the point that there are cases of evil within the Four Beginnings, which they perceived solely as pure and good.

Toegye, Gobong, Yulgok, and Ugye regarded the Four Beginnings as pure and good. However, Zhu Xi stated that the Four Beginnings also include evil. It is unknown whether these four great scholars saw Zhu Xi's statement. How do the Four Beginnings contain evil? It is because even the Four Beginnings are issued from *gi* with *ri* mounting it. If *gi* is pure and good in its issuance, then *ri* also becomes pure and good; if *gi* is murky in its issuance, then *ri* becomes murky.<sup>28)</sup>

27) "Ganseo jamnok 看書雜錄," in *Songja daejeon*, vol. 131. "栗谷所以非退溪說者, 專在於理發氣隨一句."

28) "Juja eollon dongigo 朱子言論同異攷," in *Songja daejeon*, vol. 130. "退溪高峯栗谷

As the Four Beginnings are based on the structure of *gibal riseung* and good and evil can come about differently depending on the state of *gi*. When *gi* is clear, the purity and goodness of *ri* are guaranteed, and the Four Beginnings are therefore pure and good; however, when *gi* is murky and envelops *ri*, the human emotions associated with the Four Beginnings are evil. In this regard, Uam refuted Yulgok's theory that while the Four Beginnings are part of the Seven Feelings, they emerge as a result of being appropriately regulated (equilibrium). As long as Yulgok based his reasoning on the idea that the Four Beginnings are pure and good, then the good Seven Feelings have to be separated from the good Four Beginnings. Thus, if the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings are divided into equilibrium and nonequilibrium based on the clarity or murkiness of *gi* and on the structure of *gibal riseung* the theoretical basis for the distinction between the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings disappears. But can one conceive *cheuguen ji sim* and appropriately regulated joy and anger (喜怒) and the Seven Feelings as the same emotions? In this regard, Uam saw the appropriately regulated Seven Feelings as being just as pure and good as the Four Beginnings.

In terms of the Seven Feelings, how can the joy of Emperor Shun and the anger of King Wen not be regarded as examples of pure goodness? Generally speaking, when the 『Book of rites (禮記)』 and Zisi referred to the Seven Feelings in a collective manner, they were all seen as originating from human nature. Human nature is *ri*. The Seven Feelings originate from human nature and they are issued from *gi* with *ri* mounting it.<sup>29)</sup>

Uam asserted that not only the Four Beginnings but also the Seven Feelings are based on human nature, and that they both become pure and good when they are appropriately regulated. A situation in which a saint becomes naturally angry or naturally joyful belongs to the realm of the Seven Feelings, but the contents are also akin to the Four Beginnings, in that they are pure moral emotions. This is because the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings are emotions that stem from the issuance of human nature, and are based solely on the notion of

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牛溪, 皆以四端爲純善, 朱子以爲四端亦有不善者. 未知四先生未見此說乎. 夫四端何以亦有不善乎. 四端亦氣發而理乘之故也. 發之之時, 其氣清明, 則理亦純善, 其氣紛雜, 則理亦爲之所掩而然也.”

29) “Juja eollon dongigo,” in *Songja daejeon*, vol. 130. “然於七情中如舜之喜文王之怒, 豈非純善乎. 大抵禮記及子思統言七情, 是七情皆出於性者也, 性卽理也, 其出於性也, 皆氣發而理乘之.”



*gibal riseung*: Good and evil, or appropriateness and inappropriateness, coexist within the Four Beginnings. The only problem then is how to ensure equilibrium, thereby making the Four Beginnings in need of extension in fact become insignificant. Toegye's theory that the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings are separate, and Yulgok's idea that the Seven include the Four are also rejected. In conclusion, a diagram in which the Seven Feelings are equal to the Four Beginnings is established, and thus the relationship between the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings is no longer of any significance.

## 2) Namdang Han Wonjin

Namdang consistently took issue with Toegye's notion of *hobal*. He asserted that an inactive *ri* could never issue by itself. In addition, he claimed that the only theory that is valid is the one according to which active *gi* issues and inactive *ri* mounts it, under which all emotions, regardless of whether they belong to the Four Beginnings or Seven Feelings, are issued from *gi* with *ri* mounting it.

of course, Toegye never asserted that *ri* can emanate without *gi*. However, Namdang focused his criticism on the discussions related to original nature and psychophysical nature to prove that Toegye's assertions in effect set up the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings as two different kinds of human emotion, thus violating the principle of *gibal riseung*. Namdang asserted that Toegye used his theory of *hobal* to explain human nature as being based on original nature and psychophysical nature and implied that in the end human emotion is determined by the issuance of *ri* and the issuance of *gi*. In this regard, Namdang asserted that while it is correct to explain human nature as based on the division between original nature and psychophysical nature, this division should not be applied to human emotion.

As to human nature, the division between original nature and psychophysical nature is acceptable on the basis of two different standpoints, namely that of the non-separation of *ri* and *gi* (in all phenomena) (不相離) and that of the conceptual deviation between *ri* and *gi* (不相離). Human emotion belongs to the realm after emanation (已發) and belongs to *gi*, whereas the existence from which emotions emanate belongs to *ri*. Nothing can emanate without *gi* and there is no matter that emanates without *ri*. (Based on this principle,) there is no division that should be made between what is solely issued from *ri* and what is issued from both *ri* and *gi*. How then can one assert that the Four Beginnings and

Seven Feelings are distinguished in terms of the division between *ribal* and *gibal*?<sup>30)</sup>

Namdang believed that human emotions seen as emanating from *ri* in fact emanate from both *ri* and *gi*, regardless of whether they are associated with the Four Beginnings or Seven Feelings. The Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings therefore cannot be separated into what is mentioned solely in relation to *ri* (專言理) and what is mentioned in relation to both *ri* and *gi* (兼言氣); they also cannot be separated into *ribal* and *gibal*, since the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings contains both *ri* and *gi*. Psychophysical nature can thus be compared to the Seven Feelings because it emanates from both *ri* and *gi*. However, original nature, which refers solely to *ri*, cannot be compared to the Four Beginnings, because while original nature cannot have *gi*, the Four Beginnings are human emotions that contain both *ri* and *gi*.<sup>31)</sup> In this regard, Namdang pointed out that although other scholars believed that the Four Beginnings are equally original nature, they in fact belong to the realm of *ri*.<sup>32)</sup> Thus, Yulgok's assertion that "the Four Beginnings are mentioned solely in relation to *ri*, while the Seven Feelings are mentioned in relation to both *ri* and *gi*," was also rejected.<sup>33)</sup>

Namdang identified the relationship between the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings as follows: "The Four Beginnings are a summary of the Seven Feelings and the Seven Feelings are the amplification of the Four Beginnings. Since the Seven Feelings do not exist outside the Four Beginnings and the Four Beginnings do not exist outside the Seven Feelings, the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings are not two different kinds of human emotion."<sup>34)</sup> The relationship between the

30) "Dap Gi Myeongeon non sadan chiljeongseo 答奇明彥論四端七情書," in *Namdangjip seubyu* 南塘集拾遺, vol. 4. "性則未發也, 未發之時, 氣不用事而理自渾具, 雖不相離而亦不相雜, 故因其不雜而專指其理, 謂之本然之性, 因其不離而兼指理氣, 謂之氣質之性, 無不可矣。至於情則已發也, 已發之際, 發之者皆氣, 而所以發者皆理也。非氣則不能發, 非理則無所發, 固未有專以理而發兼理氣而發者不同, 則又安可以專言理兼言氣而言之耶。專言理兼言氣而言之, 尚不可, 況又可以理氣分言, 而謂某是理發乎, 某是氣發乎?"

31) "Dap Gi Myeongeon non sadan chiljeongseo," in *Namdangjip seubyu*, vol. 4. "若論理氣, 則本然不能兼氣, 而四端却兼理氣, 其義不同矣。"

32) "Japjeo 雜著," in *Namdangjip*, vol. 29. "一則專理, 一則兼氣, 氣質之性固與七情同, 而本然之性安得與四端爲比乎, 每以四端擬之於本然之性, 故靡靡然以四端屬之理一邊矣。"

33) "Dap Gi Myeongeon non sadan chiljeongseo," in *Namdangjip seubyu*, vol. 4. "專言理兼言氣而言之, 尚不可。"

34) "Sidongjiseol 示同志說," in *Namdangjip*, vol. 29. "故七情約之爲四端, 四端衍之爲七情, 四外無七, 七外無四, 則四七非二情也。"

Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings is akin to that between longitude (經) and latitude (緯): the Four Beginnings can be equated with longitude, and the Seven Feelings can be likened to latitude.<sup>35)</sup> The Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings can be said to contain both good and evil, because they contain both *ri* and *gi*; in other words, both equilibrium (中節) and nonequilibrium (不中節) are embedded in the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings. If the Four Beginnings have the potential for evil as well as for purity and goodness, then Yulgok's statement that "the Four Beginnings belong to the realm of good" is also refuted. Thus, the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings have no apparent differences in terms of their essence. As long as Yulgok based his argument on the fact that the Four Beginnings are pure and good, then the good Seven Feelings and Four Beginnings have to be separated from one another.

#### 4. Conclusion

Scholars from the Toegye and Yulgok Schools attempted to develop Toegye's theory of the mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi* and Yulgok's theory of the single path of the issuance of *gi*, while also attempting to resolve the problems inherent in both these theories.

In an attempt to address Yulgok's criticism, some scholars of the Toegye School advocated the separation of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings into *juri*, namely the primacy of *ri*, and *jugi*, namely the primacy of *gi*, based on *sangsu*, namely the idea that *ri* and *gi* are mutually needed. Others emphasized the distinction of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings based on their origins by accepting the independent issuance of *ri*. Such a separation into *juri* and *jugi* can help to overcome the criticism regarding the inaction of *ri*, but it also makes it difficult to guarantee the purity and goodness of the Four Beginnings based on the origins of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings. The mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi* creates difficulties that pale in comparison to the distinction of *ri* and *gi*, since the inaction of *ri* is explained based on artificial notions such as movement and stillness.

35) "Nongam sachil jigak byeonseol 農巖四七知覺辨說," in *Namxangjip* seubyu, vol.

6. "四端爲經, 七情爲緯, 而錯綜爲一, 則七情四端果是二物乎."

Some scholars of the Yulgok School attempted to reach a compromise between the views of Yulgok and Toegye via the notion of the single path of the issuance of *gi* with *ri* mounting it, while separating the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings into *juri* and *jugi*. Others attempted to downplay the separation of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings by emphasizing the nonequilibrium of the Four Beginnings and the equilibrium of the Seven Feelings, while rejecting Toegye's theory of the mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi*. The former tried to overcome the possibility of *ri*'s powerlessness against Yulgok's assertion of the inaction of *ri*, while the latter emphasized the logicity of Yulgok's theory of the single path of the issuance of *gi* with *ri* mounting it so as to assert the existence of equilibrium and nonequilibrium in the Four Beginnings, which in turn created problems for Yulgok's notion that the Seven include the Four.

The interpretations of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings advanced by the Yulgok and Toegye Schools can thus be regarded as a process of coming to grips with the fundamental problems embedded in the philosophies of Toegye and Yulgok and of suggesting new alternatives to resolve these problems. Rather than focusing on how successful their solutions were, more attention should be drawn to the ways in which they attempted to solve these problems.

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## 關於朝鮮後期退溪學派與栗谷學派對 四端七情論的辯證

安 琉 鏡

**中文摘要：**本論文的目的在於整理退溪學派與栗谷學派中展開的四端七情論的大體脈絡。詳細的說，在退溪學派和栗谷學派內部各分為如下兩種解釋：首先，退溪學派中有強調以相須說為根據，將栗谷批判的互發說解釋為主理、主氣的愚潭丁時翰(1625-1707)、大山李象靖(1711-1781)等學者，以及承認理的主體性發動，強調要明確由於四端與七情的來曆不同而產生的區別的葛庵李玄逸(1627-1704)、清台權相一等學者；栗谷學派中，有將退溪的學說解釋為主理、主氣的差異，試圖在栗谷的理無為的主張中尋找理無力理論的可能性的拙修齋 趙聖期(1638-1689)、農巖金昌協(1651-1708)等學者，以及將退溪的主張理解為強調來曆不同的互發說，積極否定退溪互發說的尤庵宋時烈(1607-1689)、南塘韓元震等學者。

**關鍵詞：**四端七情、退溪學派、栗谷學派、主理、主氣。





# Jeong Jedu's Theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings

KIM Yun-kyeong

## Abstract

Hagok Jeong Jedu (霞谷 鄭齊斗) developed his thought in line with that of Wang Yangming and on the basis of the philosophical achievements of Neo-Confucianism in Joseon. His critical thought is well demonstrated in his theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, which is one of the most controversial themes for the Joseon Neo-Confucians. An important issue for them was the basis of moral goodness especially in relation to the operation of the mind. A key concept for this issue was *ribal* (理發), namely the issuance of *ri*. Hagok understood the Four-Seven in terms of the concept of *saengri* (生理), and he interpreted *ribal* in a way that is different from Toegye's interpretation, which initiated much debates among the Joseon Neo-Confucians. According to Hagok, the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings are all emotions (情), *saengri*, and pure *gi* (純氣). This paper will investigate this characteristic understanding of *ribal* in Hagok's thought.

**Keywords:** Korean Confucianism, Hagok, Neo-Confucianism, the Four-Seven debate, the issuance of *ri* (理), *ribal* (理發), *saengri* (生理)

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## 1. Introduction

Hagok Jeong Jedu (霞谷 鄭齊斗) is widely known as the foremost Yangming scholar of Joseon.<sup>1)</sup> Not only did he deeply understand and support the theory of Wang Yangming, but he also fully embraced the philosophical contributions of Joseon Seongnihak (朝鮮 性理學). While accepting Yangming's view of truth, Jeong did not ignore the philosophical issues that had been debated within Joseon Seongnihak, but incorporated them into the foundation of his own philosophy. His concept of *ri* (理, the principle), more particularly, *saengri* (生理, living *ri*), which is a key concept in understanding the whole of his philosophy, embodies not only the theory of *sim jeuk ri* (心即理) in Yangming's thought but also the ontological thought of Hwadam (花潭 徐敬德) and the value theory of Ugye (牛溪 成渾).<sup>2)</sup> His theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings (四端七情論, *sadanchiljeongron*) is also based on important themes of Joseon Seongnihak, and it can be understood in relation to his unique conception of *ri*. An important point, however, is that the theory of Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings for Jeong was a means of expressing his own thought as a philosopher, and not an important issue in itself. Therefore, his theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings has implications that are different from those in the thought of preceding scholars. The debate in the Joseon dynasty was mainly focused on the investigation of the ground of *seon* (善, good) in relation to the operation of the mind.<sup>3)</sup> Since Jeong began by acknowledging the activity (發用) of *ri* by itself, he had no issues with identifying the grounds for *seon*, and he did not feel the need to investigate what the condition of the mind is like before it is aroused. Rather than with a fundamental investigation of the human psychology, Jeong's critical questions are more concerned with immediate discernments of whether one's mind and actions are

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1) There have been only two previous articles about this subject matter in the secondary literature. Previous research on Hagok focused mainly on his idea of *yangji cheyong* (良知體用). This can be understood in relation to Hagok's own tendency to give less attention to the debate of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings. The two previous articles on Hagok's theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings focused on the characteristic aspect of his theory but did not attempt to understand his theory comprehensively. See Kim Gyobin (1998) and Kim Gyobin and Kim Gillak (2005).

2) Kim (2011, 233).

3) Choi (2008).

good (*seon*) or bad (不善) and whether one's mind and actions accord with the heavenly principle (天理) or with human artificiality (人偽); based on such discernments, he raises the question of how to subdue human desires. This paper proposes to reveal the critical thought of Jeong regarding human nature through a close examination of his theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings. In this process, we can also see how Jeong reinterprets the philosophical legacy of Joseon Seongnihak.

## 2. Jeong Jedu's Criticism of the Theory of the Mutual Issuance of *Ri* and *Gi* (理氣互發論) and His Theory of the Operation of *Saengri* (生理發用論)

In the debates on the Four Beginnings (四端, *sadan*) and Seven Feelings (七情, *chiljaeng*) in Early Joseon, one of the most controversial problems in explaining the basis of the Four Beginnings revolved around *ribal*, namely the issuance of *ri* (理發). Toegye Yi Hwang (退溪 李滉), who was the first to bring up the issue, emphasized that the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings differ in their bases by stating that the Four Beginnings are issued from *ri* (*ribal*), whereas the Seven Feelings are issued either from *gi* (氣發, *gibal*) or from both *ri* and *gi* (互發, *hobal*). Gobong Gi Daeseung (高峯 奇大升) and Yulgok Yi I (栗谷 李珥) responded by arguing that the theory of *ribal* violates the Neo-Confucian principle that *ri* in itself is not active, and it theoretically would lead to a problematic dichotomy of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings. Gobong and Yulgok claimed that only *gi* issues in itself (*gibal*). In contrast, Ugye modified a problematic idea in the theory of the mutual issuance of *ri* and *gi* (*hobal*), namely the idea that the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings become fundamentally distinguished, stating that they do not have fundamentally different bases. Jeong, whose academical lineage lies with Yulgok and Ugye, criticized Toegye from the standpoint based on the non-separation of *ri* and *gi* (理氣不離), but he did not offer any specific critique of Toegye's theory of *ribal*.<sup>4)</sup> Let us first examine

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4) Since the focus of this paper is on the Four-Seven debate, Hagok's understanding of the Ultimate Reality (本體論) will not be discussed at length. For detailed discussion, see Kim (2013).

## Hagok's comment on Toegye's view.

How is it that there is such a view that among the emotions (情), the Four Beginnings derive from nature (性), while the Seven Feelings derive from *gi*, that the Four Beginnings are of *ri*, and the Seven Feelings are of *qi*; so the Four and the Seven issue from different sources? When discussed in terms of purity, *ri* is mingled with *gi* in the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, thus it is not possible to separate them into *ri* and *gi*. In relation to both *ri* and *gi*, that which is pure in nature becomes the Four; however, the nature is still located in *gi*. The Seven are considered to be that which is mingled with *gi*; however, the *gi* still accords with *ri*. If the Seven Feelings are pure in terms of *ri*, they may also be considered to be the Four Beginnings; if they follow *qi*, they would do, just as the Seven Feelings follow *qi*. Thus, *gi* exists within the Four Beginnings, and the Seven Feelings also contain *ri*. To claim that the Four Beginnings are solely of *ri*, and therefore the Seven Feelings are considered to be equivalent to *gi*, is to say that the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings issue through two different paths – Are they then to be considered two kinds of emotions?<sup>5)</sup>

In the above passage, Hagok criticizes Toegye's division of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings into *ribal* (the issuance of *ri*) and *gibal* (the issuance of *gi*), by stating that Toegye falls into the error of creating a dichotomy of emotions. In addition, he states that in terms of purity, both the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings are a mixture of *ri* and *gi* and therefore cannot be separated, while nature lies within *gi*, and the Seven Feelings, which are mingled with *gi*, can also become of *ri*. It can be seen that Hagok's criticisms of Toegye lie not in the issue of the nature of *ri* that arises from the theory of *ribal* – is *ri* an active entity? – but in the issue of setting up *ribal* and *gibal* as separate events in relation to the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings. When setting forth his theory of *ri* and *gi* (理氣論) and his theory of mind and nature (心性論), Hagok occasionally criticized Toegye's theory together with that of Zhu Xi. His main argument is that Toegye's thought is based on dichotomies of *ri* and *gi*, *ri* and nature, and methods of self cultivation, etc. According to Hagok, *ri* is the coherent principle of *gi*, and *gi* is that which is created as the movement of *ri*.<sup>6)</sup> As the two are not distinct from each other, there

5) "Joneon (ha) 存言(下)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 9. "有以爲情之四端 出於性也 七情出於氣也 四端爲理 七情爲氣 四端七情之其發各異也 何也 曰 夫四端七情者以純言 理雜於氣而謂也 非理氣之別也 若以理氣 以純於性者 爲四端而性亦在氣 以雜於氣者 爲七情 而氣亦是理也 七情而純於理 則是亦可以爲四端 而徇於氣則是亦所謂七情之從氣而已 四端亦有氣 七情亦有理也 謂四端專是理也 遂以七情直爲氣也 是兩道各出四七 其二情乎."

6) "Joneon (jung) 存言(中)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 9. "氣者理之運用 無運用 無以見條理. [...]"

can be no instance in which *ri* exists without the activity of *gi*, and the primary condition of one's mind becomes of importance.

Hagok considers *ri* to be the ultimate substance (本體) underlying *gi*,<sup>7)</sup> the place throughout which the whole *gi* (一氣) can penetrate and, therefore, the mysterious and divine (神).<sup>8)</sup> In this context, he considered *gi* also to be *ri* and *ri* also to be *gi*.<sup>9)</sup> To Hagok, *ri* and *gi* are the two sides of the Ultimate Reality (本體) and never two independent entities. His view takes a step further than the fundamental rule that states that the real entities, *ri* and *gi*, can never actually be separated. Wang Yangming had also brought up such an argument. Wang understood the phrases from *Taegeukbosal* (太極圖說), “太極動而生陽” and “靜而生陰,”<sup>10)</sup> by interpreting *dong* (動) and *saengyang* (生陽) in terms such that the Supreme Ultimate (太極) begets and begets, and its mysterious process never ceases (妙用不息), and by interpreting *jeong* (靜) and *saengyeum* (生陰) in terms such that the Supreme Ultimate is eternally changeless (常體不易).<sup>11)</sup> Yangming stated that if the claim is made that the Supreme Ultimate begets *yang* (陽) after it moves (動) and begets *yeum* (陰) after it rests (靜), *yeum* and *yang* activity (動) and stillness (靜) become distinct and independent of each other. In this regard, he said, “the generating force of the Supreme Ultimate is the generating force of *yeum* and *yang*.”<sup>12)</sup> Hagok also makes the following comment in the same vein:

The furling and unfurling of the whole *gi* become *yeum* and *yang* (this is the operation of the *Do* (道)), while the concealment and exposure of the

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理者氣之條理 無條理不能運用."

- 7) "Joneon (jung) 存言(中)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 9. "氣之本體爲理 心之本體爲性."
- 8) "Joneon (sang) 存言(上)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 8. "理者氣之靈通處 神是也 氣者氣之充實處 質是也 一個氣而其能靈通者爲理."
- 9) "Joneon (ha)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 9. "是故 性爲形本 理爲氣原 既是天理則無原末而皆理也 其理一也 其不得爲天理者 其原末皆氣 而不得爲理 可知也 (氣亦理 理亦氣 非可以人心道心 作理氣也)."
- 10) *Taiji tushuo* "太極動而生陽 動極而靜 靜而生陰 靜極復動 一動一靜 互爲其根 分陰分陽 兩儀立焉."
- 11) As to Zhu Xi's understanding, see the following: *Zhuzi yulei*, Vol. 94, No. 33. "纔動便生陽, 不是動了而後生. 這箇只得且從動上說起, 其實此之所以動, 又生於靜, 上面之靜, 又生於動, 此理只循環生去."
- 12) "Daluyuanjingshu 答陸原靜書, 157," in *Chuanxilu (zhong)* 傳習錄(中), *Wang Yangming quanji*, vol. 2. "太極生生之理, 妙用無息, 而常體不易. 太極之生生, 卽陰陽之生生. 就其生生之中, 指其妙用無息者, 而謂之動, 謂之陽之生. 非謂動而後生陽也. 就其生生之中, 指其常體不易者, 而謂之靜, 謂之陰之生. 非謂靜而後生陰也. 果靜而後生陰, 動而後生陽, 則是陰陽動靜, 截然各自爲一物矣."

whole *ri* (一理) become stillness and activity (this is coherence (條理)). The ceaselessness of the mysterious process (this is the movement of *yang*) and the changelessness of the Ultimate Reality (this is the quietness of *yeum*) accord with the heavenly mandate; it speaks of the flow (流行) of *gi*.<sup>13)</sup>

The above passage is Hagok's paraphrase of Wang Yangming's statement, "*yeum* and *yang* are the whole *gi*; the whole *gi*, as it furls and unfurls, becomes *yeum* and *yang* activity and stillness are the whole *ri*; the whole *ri* (一理), as it is concealed and revealed becomes activity and stillness,"<sup>14)15)</sup> which summarizes the aforementioned phrases from *Taegeukdoseol*. Hagok did not differentiate between the activity and stillness of *ri* and between the furling and unfurling of *yeum* and *yang*; he wholeheartedly agreed with Yangming's understanding of the two as aspects of the single reality by using such expressions as "the ceaselessness of the mysterious processes" and "the changelessness of the eternal Ultimate Reality." Furthermore, Hagok explained the two aspects in terms of the flow of *gi*. This explains why Hagok did not reject Toegye's idea of *ribal*, but found fault only with Toegye's dichotomy of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings in the theory of *hobal*. For Hagok, Toegye's theory of *ribal* provoked the question, such as 'Is *ri* active by itself?' But Hagok did not consider this question to be problematic at all, for he basically considered *ri* to be the flow of *gi*. Thus, *ri* has to be understood as an active entity in his thought. Hagok called it *saengri* (生理, living *ri*).<sup>16)</sup>

Upon contemplation, the Great *gi* (大氣), the Fundamental Divinity (元神) is active, vital, and whole; its abundance knows no end; it is numinous and profound beyond understanding; its changeability, fluctuation, and endless vitality are the substance of heaven and the very source of life. [...] This is pure *gi* and simply *saengri*; this is the ultimate substance of *ri* and the subject of divinity. [...] The divinity in the human mind is an active

13) "Joneon (jung)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 9. "一氣屈伸而爲陰陽 (道運) 一理隱顯而爲動靜 (條理) 妙用無息 (陽動) 而常體不易 (陰靜) 皆命○氣流行言."

14) The whole *gi* (一氣) and the whole *ri* (一理) refer to the ultimate *gi* and the ultimate *ri*.

15) "Daluyuanjingshu 157 答陸原靜書 157條," in *Chuanxilu* (zhong) 傳習錄 (中), *Wang Yangming quanji*, vol. 2. "陰陽一氣也, 一氣屈伸而爲陰陽. 動靜一理也, 一理隱顯而爲動靜."

16) Wang also used the expression of *saengri*, though he did not discuss it in depth ("Xuekanlu 122 薛侃錄 122條," in *Chuanxilu* (zhong) 傳習錄 (中), *Wang Yangming quanji*, vol. 2. "所謂汝心卻是那能視聽言動的. 這箇便是性,便是天理. 有這箇性, 才能生這性之生理. 便謂之仁").

entitysubstance (活體), and the whole of *saengri* knows how to empathize and grieve. Here is without doubt an agent that knows how to be genuine, how to empathize and grieve, and that which is supremely pure and good, supremely subtle, supremely serene, supremely constant; this becomes the Ultimate Reality of human nature (性).<sup>17)</sup>

Hagok thought that when human beings did not yet have any defined shape before their genesis, only the Great *gi* (大氣) and Fundamental Divinity (元神) were active. The inscrutable spreading and changing of the Great *gi* and Fundamental Divinity is substantial *ri* (實理), namely *saengri*.<sup>18)</sup> In the passage quoted above, the terms, "the substance of heaven," "source of life," "spirit," "Great *gi*," and "Fundamental Divinity," all refer to *saengri*. According to Hagok, *saengri* is of pure *gi*,<sup>19)</sup> and as an active entity it is filled with sincerity and compassion. In other words, it is the moral capacity of sympathizing with others' pain upon having noticed it.

Hagok illustrated how *saengri* takes root within the body and becomes vigorously active in the following manner: "That which is *saengri* builds its house in the mind and curls up in *junggeuk* (中極).<sup>20)</sup> It strikes root in the kidneys and blossoms on the face. If one can expand it, it will fill one's whole body and spread throughout Heaven and Earth."<sup>21)</sup> Hagok explained *ri* in terms of *gi* in order to emphasize the point that *ri* is not an abstract metaphysical principle; rather it is the kind of entity that operates actively within the body. Hagok thus rejected the widely accepted view that it is only *gi* that operates and said, "how can only *gi* be ceaselessly active? The divinity is also active and ceaseless;" "how can only one's psychophysical *gi* be vigorous and

17) "Joneon (jung)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 9. "竊謂 大氣元神 活潑生全 充滿無窮 神妙不測 而其流動變化 生生不已者 是天之體也 爲命之源 (主) 者 …… 是一點純氣 只是生理 (是其爲精神真氣) 是理之體神之主也 …… 人心之神 一箇活體 生理全體 惻怛者 是必有其真誠惻怛 純粹至善 而至微至靜至一之體焉者 是乃其爲性之本體也."

18) "Joneon (sang)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 8. "其生理之純氣 萬物亦與人一原 此卽人生以上未形之時 陰陽之理如是也."; "Joneon (sang)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 8. "是活潑潑者 蓋形象雖未形 元氣則常混混 元神則常生生(是實理也 常於穆至純至誠 無爲冲漠微妙而其流行變化神妙不測)"

19) Because it is pure *gi*, the terms, true *gi* (真氣) and great *gi* (大氣) are used. Therefore, selfish desire (私欲), which arouses evil, is differentiated from *gaekgi* (客氣). See part 4 of this paper.

20) In Korean traditional medicine, "中極" is an acupuncture point located under the navel, also called "氣員" or "玉泉."

21) "Joneon (sang)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 8. "一團生氣之元 一點靈昭之精 其一箇生理 卽精神生氣爲一身之生理 者 宅竅於方寸 團圓於中極 其植根在腎 開華在面而其充卽滿於一身 彌乎天地."

restless? Innate knowing (良知) is also vigorous and restless. This is the substance underlying nature (性體)."<sup>22)</sup> As to the view that the substance underlying nature cannot operate by itself, he objected: "This serene and tranquil substance is the foundation of all beings and things and is capable of taking action by itself (發用)"<sup>23)</sup>

### 3. The Meanings of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings

Toegye's notion of *ribal* in his theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings aims not to highlight that *ri* is an active entity but to differentiate between the bases of the Four and the Seven. However, Hagok, who considered *ri* to be an active entity, did not comment specifically on the view that the Four Beginnings are *ribal*. This may imply that Hagok acknowledged the plausibility of *ribal*.<sup>24)</sup> He stated, "*Cheugeun* (惻隱), *suo* (羞惡), *sayang* (辭讓), and *sibi* (是非) are all emotions (情); they stem from the issuance of nature."<sup>25)</sup> By this he meant that the Four Beginnings are classified as emotions and stem from the issuance of *saengri*. The Four Beginnings understood as the issuance of *saengri*, however, differ from those in Zhu Xi's thought. Hagok explained the difference as follows:

In his *Collected Commentaries on Mencius*, Zhu Xi claims, "*in* (仁) resides within, and it is expressed through its Beginning, from which it expands and grows." This is far from what Mencius himself meant. *In ui ye ji* (仁義禮智, humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom) refer to the virtues, and these are not names given to certain things. How then would it be

22) "Joneon (jung)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 9. "周程曰太極陰陽動靜相生 陰陽無始動靜無端 此天道之生生不息也 豈獨其氣生生不息而其神生生不息也 …… 豈獨其血氣生生不息 而其良知生生不息也 此乃性體也."

23) "Joneon (jung)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 9. "蓋是中寂之體, 至微而難見, 雖然惟是靜寂(無極)之體者, 實爲之根本, 而能爲發用."

24) This does not mean that Toegye's *ribal* and the issuance and operation of *saengri* in Hagok's thought are identified with each other. For Toegye, *ribal* does not mean that *ri* itself can operate and move, rather that *ri* governs and is manifested (發現) through *gi*. See "Jeongjaegi 靜齋記," in *Toegye jeonse*, vol. 42. "靜時氣未用, 故理得自在." See also Jung (2010, 248). By contrast, Hagok's *saengri* means that the whole *gi*, which can coherently and mysteriously penetrate though all things and beings, can issue and operate by itself.

25) "Maengjaseol (ha) 孟子說(下)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 15. "<四端章解>惻隱羞惡辭讓是非之心, 情也, 性之發也."



plausible to talk about their beginnings? and if the Four Beginnings are considered merely as sprouts and not as whole entities (體), this understanding would be incompatible with a passage in Mencius, "one without *cheugeun* would not be a human. [...] Arms, legs, head, and torso constitute the whole entity of a human." Zhu Xi's understanding of *in* as the underlying substance of nature and *cheugeun* as a sprout or beginning might explain the different states of mind, namely its "having yet to respond (未應)" to external things and its "having already responded (已應)" to external things. But this understanding would not be what Mencius actually meant by *in ui*.<sup>26)</sup>

According to Hagok, *in ui ye ji* in Mencian Thought should not be understood as things that exist in the physical realm, for they may exist inside another thing and have small parts revealed through exposure. *In ui ye ji* are not fixed qualities that emerge inherently from one's birth, but are rather the virtues that need to be developed throughout one's lifetime. Hagok also rejected the view that the Four Beginnings reveal the whole and entire reality. According to him, the view in which the Four Beginnings are regarded as a tiny tip of the whole reality, which is not the whole reality itself, differs from Mencius's understanding of the lack of any of the Four simply as the loss of the whole. Therefore, Zhu Xi's theory that *in* is the source of nature and the Four Beginnings are its sprouts can be considered his original interpretation, but it is not compatible with Mencius's thought. How then did Hagok himself define the Four Beginnings?

*Dan* (端, Beginning) refers to the starting point of a thing and the place of its genesis. [...] An important point here consists in the idea that it is called *dan* because it has to be developed and realized in actual actions. When a flame begins to burn and water begins to flow, they are not yet at a full blaze, or at a roaring flood.<sup>27)</sup>

In the Four Beginnings, *dan* is the same as that in the expressions, "*yuem* and *yang* have no beginning" and "activity and stillness have no beginning." It is the *dan* of *sudan* (首端, opening).<sup>28)</sup>

26) "Maengjaseol (ha)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 15. "<四端章雜解>集注其以爲仁在內。端緒發見。卽此處而推廣云者。可知其非孟子本意。仁義禮知者。謂其德也。非有物之定名。何由乎端緒之可言哉。且以四端爲端緒。不以爲正體者。是其於無惻隱之心非人也之旨。可以謂合乎。是心皆人所全得者。是其於猶其有四體之喻。可得以近之耶。四體卽人身之全體所存也。其以仁爲性本。惻隱爲萌端者。又別是論未應已應之一說。非此孟子言仁義之旨也。"

27) "Maengjaseol (ha)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 15. "<四端章解>端者指物初頭。謂其發生處也。[...] 今以其主。在擴充而行之。故謂之端焉。始火之始。泉之初。而未及乎焰流者耳。"

28) "Maengjaseol (ha)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 15. "<四端章雜解>仁義禮知四端端字。如陰陽無始。動靜無端之端。端始之意也。是首端之端。性在內。情爲端。(爲本) 仁爲充體。"

First of all, Hagok pointed out that the term *dan* in Zhu Xi's thought differs in its meaning from the meaning it has in Mencius's thought. According to Hagok, it refers in its original meaning to the starting point of the genesis of something. It is likened to the spark that becomes the starting point of a flame and the spring that becomes the starting point of great waters,<sup>29)</sup> so that the flame begins to burn and the waters commence to flow; the flame is not yet an intense blaze, and the waters are not flowing as a flood, but they already have the whole characteristics of the later stages of burning and flowing. Similarly, one can attain the virtues of *in ui ye ji* by developing the Four Beginnings. In this regard, Hagok says, "though *in ui ye ji* may be developed enough for one to be able to help the people widely, the starting points of the development still are the emotions of *cheugun*, *suq*, *sayang*, and *sibi*."<sup>30)</sup>

Hagok criticized Zhu Xi for having interpreted the Four Beginnings differently from Mencius. He argued that Zhu Xi mistakenly understood *dan* as referring to the tip of something that is already predetermined, and that this understanding is contrary to the Mencian view that the Four Beginnings are merely starting points of development. According to Hagok, Mencius's idea is that nature understood as *saengri* resides in the mind, and that emotions are the starting points of the development of nature. However, according to Hagok, Zhu Xi considered the Four Beginnings as the exposed tips of nature that is predetermined as the forms of *in ui ye ji* and resides in the mind. To Hagok, Mencius's Four Beginnings are the beginnings of the whole reality, and the expansion of these beginnings result in the virtues of *in ui ye ji*.

Hagok's interpretation of the Four Beginnings and his criticism of Zhu Xi's view are based on Wang Yangming's thought, and reflect Hagok's own views on the moral Ultimate Reality (性). To conclude, the Four Beginnings in Hagok's thought are *yangji* (良知, the original innate knowledge). Hagok stated, "the Four Beginnings, *cheugun*, *suq*, *sayang*, and *sibi*, refer to that which has its beginnings within oneself,"

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(爲末) 朱子以爲端緒之見。是末端之端。正相反倒。仁在內。(爲本) 情爲端。(爲末)。

29) "Maengjaseol (ha)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 15. "<四端章雜解>卽惻隱羞惡辭讓是非之心是也。如燧爲火之端。泉爲水之端是已。"

30) "Maengjaseol (ha)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 15. "<四端章雜解>仁義禮智其體甚廣。雖至於博施濟衆。如其初所發端處。卽惻隱羞惡辭讓是非之心是也。如燧爲火之端。泉爲水之端是已。"

while "*in ui ye ji* refer to the entirety."<sup>31)</sup> Further, he says, "the Four Beginnings within myself are my *yangji*," and "the expansion of the Four Beginnings" is "the recovery of *yangji* (致知)."<sup>32)</sup>

How then did Hagok define the Seven Feelings? He considered both the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings to fall within the category of emotions (情): "In terms of those that are issued as the emotions, the Seven Feelings are the emotions of nature, while the Four Beginnings are the nature of the emotions."<sup>33)</sup> Hagok did not offer an extensive explanation of the emotions and understood the emotions in line with nature. His expressions, "the emotions of nature" and "the nature of the emotions," are based on his idea of *saengri*. with these expressions, he meant to emphasize that the Four Beginnings are still emotions, because their core is nature and *ri*; yet, they are not unconnected to *gi*; the Seven Feelings are not merely *gi*, but are also issued from nature and *ri*.

Now a question to be raised is this: If all emotions are issued from nature and *ri*, from whence does evil (不善) originate? We have to pay attention to Hagok's understanding that both the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings, understood as the issuance of *saengri* and also as the emotions, carry the potential for good and evil. This understanding differs from the traditional view in which the Four Beginnings are considered pure good. This will be examined further in the following section.

#### 4. Good (善) and Evil (不善) of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings

When Hagok referred to the nature that is manifested as emotions, he referred to the kind of nature with which humans are endowed after their birth. According to him, once one has been given a certain

31) "Maengjaseol (ha)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 15. "<四端章雜解>四端惻隱羞惡辭讓是非者。指其本源之在我而言。仁義禮智者。舉其全體而言也。端者物初生之頭。謂其初所發之處也。仁義禮智其體甚廣。雖至於博施濟衆。如其初所發端處。卽惻隱羞惡辭讓是非之心是也。如燧爲火之端。泉爲水之端是已。"

32) "Joneon (ha)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 9. "凡有四端於我者良知也。凡有四端於我者良知也。人皆有之。多不能察。及其知之也。則悉皆張大而充之。是致知也。"

33) "Joneon (sang)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 8. "以發乎情者言 喜怒哀樂 愛惡懼欲 性之情也 惻隱羞惡 辭讓是非 情之性也。"

psychophysical component (氣質), the *ri* with which one has been endowed from *ri* as the Ultimate reality cannot be the same as the *ri* as the Ultimate Reality.<sup>34)</sup> This is because after one has been given a certain psychophysical component, the differences in the body, such as strong and soft, or clear and unclear, will be generated. The kind of nature that Hagok understood to be manifested as emotions refers to psychophysical nature (氣質之性). However, Hagok did not conceptualize original nature (本然之性) independently of the conception of psychophysical nature, in that he thought that they have the same essence. Unlike the traditional Neo-Confucians, Hagok did not explain the differences in human minds in terms of the differences in their psychophysical nature. He claimed that evil may occur in a person's mind because the *ri* with which the person has been endowed cannot realize its essence; this is in turn because there exists an excess or lack of the *ri*, and the excess or lack is caused by the movement of *gi*, which causes the foolish and false division of the mind. But as Hagok also said, "while the *ri* has lost its essence, it is not that it is not *ri*."<sup>35)</sup> In other words, if nature-*ri* (性理) controls *gi* improperly, therefore creating excess or lack, the essence would be lost, and evil created. Even so, the essential nature is not completely lost. Hagok considered this principle as applying in the same manner to both the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings.

As for the Four Beginnings, if they achieve their true nature, they cannot be evil, and if they lose their true nature, there will be excess or lack. [...] Mencius was discussing that which derives from the true nature, and not the loss of the true nature. How then do the Four Beginnings realize their true nature? If the essence of the mind (心體) realizes its essential nature, the Four Beginnings become the true nature. [...] When one's mind is darkened and clouded by one's psychophysical component, then the mind may lose its true nature, and consequently its manifestation cannot be appropriate. This may be described as the case in which the essential nature is clouded by the person's psychophysical component, but it should not be considered to be caused by the person's psychophysical nature.<sup>36)</sup>

34) "Joneon (sang)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 8. "凡人說性皆以形而後言 以生稟全粹之體 仁義粹善之情言之 則其本之本然冲漠之體 生理純氣之初 有不能及者矣 明道亦曰 凡人說性 是說繼之者善 卽又以其惻隱四端情動處也."

35) "Joneon (ha)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 9. "然其實只一理也 只一氣也 不可以分貳 其性之惡 心之邪者 皆其理也之不得其體者也. [...] 其失其理焉者 何也 卽以理之過不及也 其過不及者 爲以其謬迷動氣 而分貳妄僞故耳 爲失其體已也 非非理也."

36) "Maengjaseol (ha)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 15. "<四端章雜解>按四端得其本體則無不善。失其本體則有過不及矣。蓋此則雖食色好惡。亦無不皆然。但孟子所言。本主其出於本體者言之。初未嘗論其失體者也。言性善也 曰四端何如斯爲得其本體也。曰心體得乎

Discussions by Neo-Confucians of the basis of evil focus mainly on the difference in psychophysical nature in individuals, but this does not mean that evil arises from psychophysical nature. Zhu Xi stated that the differences in psychophysical nature bring about differences in the ability to discern and to carry out moral principles,<sup>37)</sup> which in turn lead to the occurrence of evil.<sup>38)</sup> But on this matter Hagok argued that one's psychophysical component is not the cause of evil; rather, "the inappropriate control of *gi*" is the cause of evil. This can be defined in two different ways: the improper control of *gi* may be understood in terms of the constraints that are generated because of one's psychophysical component with which one is endowed at one's birth. Secondly, it may be understood in terms of one's selfish inclinations (自私).

Although beauty and evil exist in one's psychophysical component, it is not always necessary to strike and discipline all beauty and evil, for nature is entirely good. It is only necessary to remove what is clouded, and not necessary to work on the psychophysical component. One merely removes what has been clouded and can then restore good. When what has been clouded is removed, and nature is restored, all the beauty and evil of the psychophysical component return to their rightful places. The strong, the soft, the clear, and the unclear all serve only to restore good.<sup>39)</sup>

Hagok interpreted nature in terms of *saengri* and pure *gi* and did not consider *gi* itself to be evil. He does not also regard psychophysical nature, which defines the strong and weak and the clear and unclear of the body, as having no crucial impact on the fact that nature is good. In the passage quoted above, Hagok considered psychophysical nature to be a kind of inclination and one's being constrained by one's psychophysical component to be the only basis

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其本體則四端即其本體也。按惻隱羞惡之有善有不善者。是天理人偽之辨耳。非所謂氣質之性也。但有氣質昏蔽而心失其體。則所發亦有不得其正者有之。謂之由蔽於氣質亦可也。但以此遂謂之氣質之性而謂有發則不可。"

37) Yeon (2007, 178).

38) In general, *sayok* (私欲) or *mulyok* (物欲) are brought up most often as the rationale when arguing for evil. Zhu Xi saw this *mulyok* as also being innate from birth, and related to the psychophysical component bestowed on one at birth. See *Zhuzi yulei*, 18:411 ("氣稟物欲亦自相連著 …… 氣稟物欲生來便有, 要無不得, 只遂旋自去理會消磨").

39) "Maengjaseol (ha)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 15. "<生之謂性章解>氣雖有美惡。而其美惡之爲稟則不必攻治。以其性之皆善也。故只去其蔽。不事其氣。故只宜去其蔽復其善而已。如其蔽去則其性復矣。如去其蔽而復其性則氣之美惡。皆歸于正矣。其剛柔清濁。皆爲復其善而已。"

for evil. The constraint of the psychophysical component is not regarded as a structural problem, but as a transient problem that repeatedly arises in changing circumstances. Nature always issues forth, so a person who is supremely foolish, dark, stubborn, and unreasonable will effortlessly feel the emotions of the Four Beginnings, if she does not obstruct the issuance of nature. However, "a person whose foolishness and evil is excessive and therefore behaves atrociously is simply constrained by her psychophysical component and wallows in evil habits; because such a person prioritizes her personal gain, her inherent nature cannot find that by which to operate."<sup>40</sup> If a person removes her psychophysical component or selfish motives, instead of being constrained by them, her psychophysical component, on the contrary, can serve for her restoration of good.

To Hagok, the psychophysical component and selfish inclination stem from the form-and-body (形氣). the form-and-body is created as one's physical shape has been formed. It is thus different from the pure *gi* and from the whole *gi*, which are *saengri*. However, it cannot exist completely apart from the pure *gi* and the whole *gi*. "the form-and-body has its own desire; therefore, once one's form and body exists, one will have selfish inclinations."<sup>41</sup> The form-and-body is always accompanied by desires, and if the mind is moved by one's selfish inclination to pursue only the satisfaction of desires, one's inherent purity is clouded and consequently flows towards evil. Hagok explained this in terms of the *gi*-membrane (氣膜) in the human body, the heart-sac, or pericardium (心包). Evil becomes a bodily phenomenon, when the *gi*-membrane around the heart (also the mind) becomes dirty; reciprocal fires (相火) will arise in order to remove desire, and the mind-heart loses its true nature.<sup>42</sup> Here the reciprocal fires are just a transient or habitual problem, and not a permanent one. Also, even though the selfish inclinations derive from the form-and-body, the presence of the form-and-body alone is not

40) "Joneon (ha)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 9. "惻隱羞惡辭讓是非 喜怒哀懼愛惡欲 憂思慮驚 人心有此 皆不學而自有者 雖至痴至暗極頑冥之人 有時乎發出 不勉而油然 則此凡有是心者 所同然 蓋其痴頑之極 極爲頑惡之行 但以或拘於氣質 亦習於惡習 而加以自己利害之私爲主 故其本有之元體 無所發容 有同全亡者 反至利害不甚關處 則有不知不覺發出時耳 若古之羊舌石生而惡者 是其所稟氣惡耳 其氣雖極惡 苟人也 則惟其油然發之一段 亦與聖同也."

41) "Joneon (sang)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 8. "身之形氣各有其欲 既有是形各有自私之理也."

42) "Joneon (sang)," in *Hagokjip*, vol. 8. "氣者心包氣膜 心包者命門相火 爲氣欲者 屬於包絡相火 凡氣之用皆是相火 故如凡動氣者慾 皆是相火也 少有所動即神撓志亂矣."

sufficient to create selfish inclinations and therefore not in itself evil, just as the psychophysical component itself is not evil. The problem is that when the form-and-body operates in accordance with desire, selfish inclinations arise, but this does not mean that all that derive from the form-and-body is evil. Consider the following:

If the form-and-body has not been moved by desire, it is simply the whole *ri*, and it cannot be called human desire.<sup>43)</sup>

Hagok proposed two reasons for the existence of evil in the emotions, which are an operation of the Ultimate Reality: 1) the constraints of one's psychophysical component and 2) one's selfish inclination. Neither of these is inherent from birth, or essential and unchanging. According to Hagok, one's being constrained by the psychophysical component and having selfish inclinations are both momentary or habitual, matters of selfish desires. In contrast, the emotions that are not clouded by selfish desires are the true mind (本心) and the heavenly principle (天理). "The Seven Feelings become *ri* because their heavenly principle is not different from that of the Four Beginnings. The Four Beginnings are moved in accordance with *gi*, then their *gi* is also not different from the Seven Feelings. Selfish desires make us follow our desires in matters of eating, of love, and of personal gain; the true mind and the heavenly principle come about, when the virtues of *in hyo chung sin* (仁孝忠信) accord with *ri*. But that which follows the principle in matters of eating, love and personal gain also becomes the correct *ri* (正理) and is not different from the virtues of *in hyo* (仁孝)." <sup>44)</sup>

Therefore, Hagok's main concern in matters of morality is not with the definition and correction of structural limitations in which evil can occur, but with the careful examination of whether one's emotions and actions in certain situations are derived from the movement of *gi* - in other words, whether they accord with the heavenly principle or are artifice (人偽) - followed by the removal of artifice.

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43) "Joneon (sang)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 8. "形氣與性理之別 可以名之者 其目只可曰志也 氣也是已 不可曰人心道心 是相對爲兩心者也 何者 形氣之未變於欲也 卽一理而已 不可謂之人欲."

44) "Joneon (sang)," in *Hagokjip* vol. 8. "喜怒哀樂之從氣者易暴 是卽私欲客氣也 惻隱羞惡之爲理者易微 皆爲本心天理也 然喜怒哀樂之爲理者 其天理亦與惻隱無異 惻隱羞惡之動氣者 其客氣亦與喜怒無異 食色利害之從欲者多切 是卽私欲客氣也 仁孝忠信之循理者多微 此爲本心天理也 然食色利害之循理者其爲正理與仁孝無異."

## 5. Conclusion

The problem of the basis of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, which was the subject of active debate within Joseon Seongnihak, was not of great importance to Hagok. He already had his own solution, which is that the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings are the active operation of *saengri* and the Ultimate Essence of nature (性體), and this is identical to the active operation of original innate moral knowledge (良知). Because Hagok made use of important ideas that had been discussed in Joseon Seongnihak to develop and apply his own philosophy, we could examine his concepts of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings and the issue of good and evil from his angle.

Hagok understood *ri* and *gi* as the two sides of the single universal/moral Ultimate Reality and explained the operation of *saengri* and pure *gi* on the basis of the movement of *gi*. According to Hagok, the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings are all emotions that are issued from *saengri* and pure *gi*, and the Four Beginnings in one's mind constitute original innate knowledge. The term *dan* refers not to the tips of something predetermined, but to the starting-point of development. *In ui ye ji* are not the contents of nature but the virtues of nature, and are that which must be realized through the expansion of the Four Beginnings. The Four Beginnings are the bases, and *in ui ye ji* are the endpoint of their developments. In addition, the good or evil of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings is not predetermined; even the Four Beginnings, which are manifestations of good, can become evil if their true nature is obscured, while the Seven Feelings should be considered good if they do not lose their true nature. To Hagok, the cause of evil is not one's psychophysical nature, but 1) the constraints of one's psychophysical component and 2) selfish inclinations. These are both momentary happenings, or repetitive habits, not the result of any limitations inherent from the birth. By examining Hagok's theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, we can see that Hagok's critical thought focuses on the removal of falsity and artifice from the operations of the mind and the recovery of the truth and the heavenly principle. Hagok's views can be considered the root of the later theory of truth-falsity (眞假) set forth by the Ganghwa school of thought. Further research on the specifics of this influence would contribute greatly to scholarly understanding by



placing the Kanghwa school's ideology in its historical context.

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## 鄭齊斗的四端七情論

金潤璟

**中文摘要：**霞谷鄭齊斗是一位在朝鮮性理學哲學成果的基礎上，對陽明學的性質展開自己獨特思考的學者。他對於歷代學者所討論的哲學主題時而批判時而擁護，同時又對陽明學說進行說明並提出了更具發展性的見解。四端七情論是他對歷代哲學論爭進行批判性解釋的典型。歷代四端七情論中提出的問題的核心是：當心發生作用時，善的根據在哪裏？這表現為對於“理發”問題的爭論。霞谷把四端七情理解為‘生理的直接發用’，所以批判提出‘理發’論的退溪的意圖，但並不否認‘理發’這一表達自身。霞谷認為‘四端’和‘七情’都是情，是‘生理純氣’的發用，我心中的本源--四端就是良知。另外，‘端’不是內部的某種已經規定好了的完結體向外表現出來的端緒，其自身就是本源的發用和出發點。霞谷認為，如果本體被埋沒，四端和七情都會變的不善。祛除四端七情中的不善，對四端的擴充以及致中和的學習都被歸結為在四端七情中為善去惡的問題。通過霞谷的四端七情論我們可以知道：他對於‘心性’的問題意識在於去除心的作用中的虛假和人為，遵循真實與天理。

**關鍵詞：**韓國儒學、霞谷、性理學、四端七情論、理發、生理。

# The Four-Seven Debate in Silhak: On the *Gong Hino Ribal* Theory of the Seongho School

AHN Young-sang

## Abstract

This paper examines the *gong hino ribal* (公喜怒理發) theory in Silhak (實學), which was the center of debate in the Seongho (星湖) school of thought. There were two main debates. The first was the distinction between cosmology and morality. Yulgok (栗谷) claimed *gibal* iseung ji (氣發理乘之), stating the necessity to understand *sadan chiljeong* (四端七情, the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings) theory in the extension of the universe's process of change. However, Seongho claimed that the dimension of *sadan chiljeong*, namely the mind of humans in which good and evil generated, was different from the mindless natural world. Furthermore, those members of the Seongho school asserting the *gong hino ribal* theory adopted that idea and claimed that Yulgok was right in cosmology, in which there was no distinction between good and evil, while Toegye (退溪), who explained good and evil based on the distinction between *ribal* (理發, the issuance of *ri*) and *gibal* (氣發, the issuance of *gi*), was right in morality. This was an attempt to understand the Four-Seven theory by differentiating the moral world from the natural world.

Secondly, those who asserted the *gong hino ribal* theory rejected the Toegye school's common theory that *ribal* explained *sadan* (四端, the Four Beginnings) and *gibal* explained *chiljeong* (七情, the Seven Feelings) and created a new scheme that *ribal* was considered to be *gong* (公) and *gibal* was considered to be *sa* (私). A sage's *gong chiljeong* (公七情), which is appropriately moderated, namely *gong hino* (公喜怒), is still categorized as *ribal* because, despite being *chiljeong* it is still *gong*. This is the *gong hino ribal* theory, which invalidated the received distinction between the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings while searching for a new distinction. As a result, scholars who upheld the existing distinction came into conflict with those who

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supported the new distinction, which led to a division within the Seongho school of thought.

**Keywords:** the Four Beginnings, the Seven Feelings, the Seongho school (星湖), *gong* (公), *sa* (私), *Gong hino* (公喜怒), *ribal* (理發)

## 1. Introduction

As the Western concept of modernity fades, so too does the concept of Silhak (實學), the school of Practical Learning in Korean Confucianism, built upon that idea of modernity. Nevertheless, the reason for considering the *sadan chiljeong* (四端七情, the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings) theory under the pretense of Silhak is that an adequate concept to replace Silhak has not yet been found in the process of understanding the development of Joseon thought.

The development of the *sadan chiljeong* or Four-Seven theory from Seongho to Dasan (茶山) is different from the existing discussions in Seongnihak (性理學, Neo-Confucianism). Notably, this philosophical transformation was combined with Western ideals, influenced by the presence of missionaries in China. Nevertheless, it is difficult to say that the discussion was focused on modernity, for the content they adopted was centered on Aquinian medieval thought, which Western modernity sought to overcome.

There were two threads of discussion. The first was the distinction between cosmology and normativity. The Seongho school criticized Yulgok's idea that the universal process of development and change was equal to the operation of human minds, and claimed that though there existed the human mind that operated as a part of the process of universe, this operation should be differentiated from another operation of the mind that has to do with the moral values of good and evil and, therefore, with the Four-Seven theory. The Seongho school thus attempted to distinguish the natural world from the moral world.

Secondly, the Seongho school newly created the scheme of *ribal-gong-seon* (理發-公-善) and *gibal-sa-ak* (氣發-私-惡), clarifying that good (*seon*, 善) originated from *ri* (理) and evil (*ak*, 惡) originated from *gi* (氣). In this process, it claimed that a sage's appropriately moderated *gong-chiljeong* should be classified as *ribal* (理發, the issuance of *ri*) because it is related to *seon* and *gong* even though it belongs to *chiljeong*. This is the *gong hino ribal* theory; many discussions attempting to prove this took place, and eventually the Seongho school divided. This process stimulated further development of the Four-Seven theory from existing discussions of it.

The significance of the development of the *gong hino ribal* theory is the application of newly brought Western ideas to the existing

Four-Seven theory, which furthered existing understanding of it. It is difficult to call this application modern, but it is also difficult to deny that it stimulated a new academic tradition. I will proceed this paper with a provisional understanding that Silhak was the rise of such a new academic tradition.

## 2. The distinction between Cosmology and Morality

### (1) *Seongho Yi Ik's (星湖 李瀾) New Sim (心, mind) Theory and Theory of Sogi daegi (小氣大氣)*

Yulgok criticized Toegye, claiming that the universal process of change (天地之化) and the process of the manifestation of the human mind were the same.<sup>1)</sup> He sought to explain the manifestation of the human mind through *ribal* and *gibal* because humans were ultimately a part of the universal process of change. This emphasizes the equal structure of the natural world of the universal process of change and the moral world that manifest from the human mind.

To this point, Seongho said that because heaven does not have a physical heart, the process of universal change cannot be equal to the process of humans perceiving or emanating emotions and volition.<sup>2)</sup> Heaven cannot have *sachn*, which is wholly good, nor can it have *chiljeong* which combines good and evil; only humans, who have a physical heart and therefore an active mind, can have *sachn* and *chiljeong*. Seongho first began this discussion at age thirty-five when he wrote *Sachil sinpyeon* (四七新編) and continued to explore it until age sixty. In this process, he drew upon Xunzi (荀子) and said the following:

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1) "Dap Seong Howon 答成浩原," in *Yulgok jeonse*, vol. 10. "天地之化, 無非氣化而理乘之也, 是故, 陰陽動靜, 而太極乘之, 此則非有先後之可言也. 若理發氣隨之說, 則分明有先後矣, 此豈非害理乎. 天地之化, 即吾心之發也. 天地之化, 若有理化者氣化者, 則吾心亦當有理發者氣發者矣, 天地既無理化氣化之殊, 則吾心安得有理發氣發之異乎. 若曰吾心異於天地之化, 則非愚之所知也."

2) "Dok Yi Yulgok dapseogiui 讀李栗谷答書記疑," in *Seongho jeonse: Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. "蓋天地之常, 以其心普萬物, 而無心, 非有情意知覺之發, 如人心之爲矣. 如曰天與人, 無小異, 則未知天道亦有兼善惡, 善一邊之情乎. 豈可以混元默然之理, 與人心應物而生者, 強化而同之."

Xunzi said that while plants have life but not perception, and animals have perception but not righteousness, humans have life, perception, and righteousness. This idea appears in the *Seongri Dajeon* (性理大全), already discussed by previous Neo-Confucian scholars. Does this mean that the *sim* (心, mind) of people is threefold? That is not true. *Insim* (人心) and *dosim* (道心) inherently take two different forms, and there is no other *sim*. Only humans and animals have *sim*, which originates from the heart, one of the five viscera; from the beginning, plants do not have it. The mind is what carries *seong* (性). *Seong* is *ri*, and *sim* is *gi*. Therefore, when *ri* governs *gi*, perception follows *ri* to become the mind of *uiri* (義理). When *gi* overtakes *ri*, only a mind of perception resides, making humans equal to animals.<sup>3)</sup>

In this quote, the explanation is based on the writings of Xunzi, but there is also the influence of Catholicism. In Catholicism, plants are said to demonstrate the capacity for growth and development and thus have *saenghon* (生魂, vegetable soul); animals have the capacity for physical movement and sensory perception and thus have *gakhon* (覺魂, sensitive soul); humans, who have the capacity of rationality in addition to *seghon* and *gakhon*, have *yeanghon* (靈魂, intellectual soul). Matteo Ricci, who traveled to China, explained this theory of three souls based on Xunzi's teachings.<sup>4)</sup> As such, Confucian scholars actively discussed Xunzi's teachings, and Seongho himself cited this theory of three souls, claiming that it was logically sound in some ways though different from Neo-Confucian ideas.<sup>5)6)</sup>

3) "Simseol 心說," in *Seongho jeonseol Munjip*, bk. 1, vol. 22. "荀子曰, 草木有生而無知, 禽獸有知而無義, 人有生有知亦有義, 此已經先儒勘定之論, 見性理大全. 然則人有三心也, 曰非也, 人心道心固有此兩樣, 外此無心也. 心本五臟之一, 人與禽獸有之, 草木未始有也, 心者載性者也, 性理而心氣, 故理御于氣, 則知覺循乎理而為義理之心, 氣偏理昧, 則只有知覺之心而同乎禽獸."

4) *Tianzhu shiyi*, ch. 4. "分類之物, 貴邦士者曰, 或得其形, 如金石是也, 或另得生氣而長大, 如草木是也. 或更得知覺, 如禽獸是也, 或益精而得靈才, 如人類是也." "貴邦士者" here refers to Xunzi.

5) When asked about the Catholic theory of three souls, An Jeongbok replied: "吾中國亦之, 荀子曰, 水火有氣而無生, 草木有生而無知, 禽獸有知而無義, 人有氣有生有知有義, 高最為天下貴. 此語真西山, 表出於性理大全中, 西士之言 與此大同, 而但靈魂不死之言, 與釋氏無異, 吾儒之所不道也" ("Cheonhak mundap 天學問答," *Sunam jeonjip* vol. 17). It is evident that this is logic in response to the influence of Matteo Ricci's ideas on Xunzi.

6) Seongho saseol yuseon rearranges the content and order of Xunzi as it appears in Seongho saseol and is divided into Xunzi seongak (荀子性惡) and Xunzi. However, in the last part of the section Xunzi in Seongho saseol yuseon, there is a passage that does not appear in Xunzi in Seongho saseol. "近觀西洋人畢方濟所著靈言蠡酌, 其說恰符, 如出一口, 豈可以遠人而忽之也." This self-proclaims is the influence of Catholicism. It does not appear in Seongho saseol; there is the possibility that it was omitted with later revisions. Additionally, Sin Hudam

As Catholicism differentiates plants, animals, and humans based on their souls, Seongho used *sim* to differentiate them.<sup>7)</sup> Humans have moral minds in addition to the growth capacity of plants and the sensory capacity of animals. As such, only humans can act morally.<sup>8)</sup> Since heaven has no *sim*, it cannot possess moral emotions such as *sadan*, much less generic emotions such as *chiljeong*.<sup>9)</sup> Seongho claimed therefore that theories about universal mechanics and the Four-Seven theory must be differentiated.

Seongho closely considered *Jujejunjing* (主制群徵), in which Johann Adam Schall von Bell introduced the Galenos's system of medicine. According to Galenos, the process of the liver turning nutrients into blood to enable bodily growth was the natural spirit (自然精氣); the process by which some blood coursed through the hepatic veins to the heart and gained heat was the vital spirit (生命精氣); and the process of that blood reaching the brain to enable rational thought was the animal spirit (靈魂精氣). Schall von Bell translated these ideas as the *gi* of *cheseong* (體性之氣), *gi* of *saengyang* (生養之氣), and *gi* of *donggak* (動覺之氣), respectively. This implies that the types of *gi* flowing within the human body each have distinct functions when differentiated. While Schall von Bell's *gi* of movement and perception (*donggak*) places the movement of nerves and the process of thought within the brain, Seongho maintained his idea that humans' thought process occurred in the heart.<sup>10)</sup> Despite this difference, Seongho based his idea that there are two types of *gi* in the human body on Schall von Bell's logic. According to Seongho, the heart is responsible for perceptive capacity, and the kidneys are responsible for bodily growth.<sup>11)</sup> For example, the growth of hair, fingernails, or toenails cannot be

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introduces ideas he heard from Seongho as the following: “其言云，頭者受生之本也，頭有腦囊爲記含之主。又云草木有生魂，禽獸有覺魂，人有靈魂，此其論學之大要也，此雖與吾儒心性之說不同，而亦安知其必不然也” (“Gapjin chun-gyeon Yi Seongho gimun 甲辰春見李星湖紀聞,” in *Dunwa seohak byeon 遯窩西學辨*, vol. 7 of *Habin seonsaeng jeonjip*).

7) “Simseol,” in *Seongho jeonseol Munjip*, bk. 1, vol. 22. “故人者，較之於草木，而均有生長之心，較之於禽獸，而亦均有知覺之心，其義理之心，則彼草木禽獸所未有也。”

8) “Simseol,” in *Seongho jeonseol Munjip*, bk. 1, vol. 22. “其曰天地之心何也。此與草木之心一般，亦無所謂知覺也，天何嘗有五臟之心也。”

9) “Simseol,” in *Seongho jeonseol Munjip*, bk. 1, vol. 22. “心之名，初從人之心臟上說去，而若草木天心者，特以類推言，非歪曲皆同者也。”

10) For a more detailed discussion, see Ahn (2004a).

11) “Simseol,” in *Seongho jeonseol Munjip*, bk. 1, vol. 22. “人與禽獸既自有心，雖有生長之理，未嘗謂心，是以生長責之根，根主於水，知覺責之心臟，心臟主於火。責知覺於根，



regulated by the mind; when one has injured one's finger, it will not heal on account of one's mind wishing for it to heal. Thus the role of perceptive capacity cannot bolster or replace the role of bodily growth.<sup>12)</sup> To reiterate, though the *gi* of perception, which is centered on and acts from the heart, and the *gi* of bodily growth, centered on the kidneys, coexist in the human body, they each have distinct roles.

Seongho built the theory of *sogi daegi* (小氣大氣) based on the above idea and applied it to the Four-Seven theory. He developed the concepts of the *gi* of bodily growth centered on the kidneys and the *gi* of perception centered on and acting from the heart to the *gi* that spreads through one's body and the *gi* managed by the heart, respectively. He called the *gi* that makes human bodily growth possible *daegi* (大氣) because it is spread through the entire body; he called the *gi* centered on the heart *sogi* (小氣) because it stays within that organ. Because *daegi* is the basis of human desire to sustain life, it is also called *hyeonggi* (形氣), and because *sogi* is the basis of perceptive activity, it is also called *singi* (心氣) or *jigak ji gi* (知覺之氣, the *gi* of perception). This *sogi* is also called the *gi* of the *gisuji* in *ribal gisu ji* (理發氣隨之); this means that the *gi* of perception must exist, whether in *sachin* or in *chiljeong*. As such, *sachin* and *chiljeong* all accord with the framework of *ribal gisu ji*.<sup>13)</sup> Seongho developed this logic at age sixty, but he applied this idea specifically to the Four-Seven theory after having been criticized by his disciple Sin Hudam (慎後聘). I will discuss this in the following section.

## (2) The Acknowledgement of Yulgok in Cosmology and Toegye in the Four-Seven Theory

Sin Hudam, upon closely studying Seongho's *Sachil sinpyeon*, adopted Seongho's criticism of Yulgok and developed it further.<sup>14)</sup> Nevertheless,

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則咳矣。責生長於心臟，則謬矣。水者在人爲腎，腎爲生長之根。故飲食以滋腎，如草木之澆根也。”

12) “Simseol,” in *Seongho jeonseol Munjip*, bk. 1, vol. 22. “其知覺之心，無補生長也。”

13) “Dap Yi Yeogyeon (gyeongsin) 答李汝謙 (庚申),” in *Seongho seonsaeng jeonjip*, vol. 17. “氣者，有混沌之氣，有心臟運用之氣。雖同一氣也，而有大小之別。不但心也，凡頭目之類皆然也。其陽舒陰翕也，自是頭歛於腦，目歛於睛，不成說與渾淪者舒翕同歸也。形氣之氣屬之大，理發氣隨之氣屬之小，大以一身，小以心。言心之感應，只有理發氣隨之一路而已。四七何嘗有異哉。”

14) “Sachil donggibyeon 四七同異辨,” in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. “蓋天人固無二致，而至於天之嘿運，如人心之應物而生者，豈可強化而同之乎。[...] 如曰天與人，無小異，則未知天道

like Yulgok, Sin Hudam claimed that the universal process of change should not just be seen as *gibal riseung ji* (氣發理乘之). He claimed that changes arising from inevitable universal changes, such as night and day or the seasons, are an aspect of *ri*, while changes that happen within those phenomena, such as weather phenomena including rain or wind, are aspects of *gi*. The constant change of higher order is inevitable, but the lesser internal changes are variable and capricious; according to him, positive changes occur when *gi* follows *ri*, and negative changes occur when *gi* does not follow *ri*.<sup>15)</sup> This logic, which differentiates between constant change and the variable changes within, can be summarized as such:

In my opinion, when discussing the general aspects of *ri* and *gi*, all universal beings are from *ilri* (一理) and thus do not have two origins; however, when discussing diverse manifestations of *ri* (其分之殊), even though it is contained in one body, it can be divided into *seongmyeong ji ri* (性命之理) and *hyeonggi ji ri* (形氣之理).<sup>16)</sup>

Sin Hudam's point is that the system of *ri il* (理一), the aspect of being, and *bunsu* (分殊), the aspect of value, are distinct. He further explained that as generally known (凡論), *ri* needs *gi* to actually manifest itself; *gi* also needs *ri* to be manifested.<sup>17)</sup> The existence of all beings is composed of *ri* as a cause and *gi* as substance. Because *sadan* and *chiljeong* generate as a temporary state of the body, *cheugeun* (惻隱, pity) as one of *sadan* is to be understood in terms of *gi*, but the cause of that pity is *ri*; and *hino* (喜怒, happiness and anger) as one of *chiljeong* is to be understood in terms of *gi*, but the cause of that *hino* is *ri*. On the other hand, in the structure of the general *ri-gi* theory that explains existence, there is no differentiation between *sadan* and *chiljeong*.<sup>18)</sup> In this case, acknowledging the preexisting logic of *ri*, he explained *sadan* and *chiljeong* equally in relation to *ribal gisu ji* (理

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亦有兼善惡，善一邊之情乎。亦有外物觸其形而動於中者乎。”

- 15) “Sachil dongibyeeon,” in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. “且必欲如栗谷說，以天地之化，分理氣言之，則天地一陰一陽，日往月來，寒來暑往，非理之使然者耶。洪範所謂雨暘燠寒風，非氣之使然者乎。雨暘燠寒風之時若，非氣之順其理者乎。雨暘燠寒風之恒若，非氣之不順於理者乎。由此言之，則天地之化，亦以理氣分言可也。”
- 16) “Sachil dongibyeeon,” in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. “按論理氣之大致，則雖天地萬物，同出一理，固無二原，而論其分之殊，則雖一身之內，有性命之理，有形氣之理。”
- 17) “Sachil dongibyeeon,” in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. “若凡論理氣，則理豈有無氣，而獨發者乎。氣豈有無理，而獨發者乎。”
- 18) “Sachil dongibyeeon,” in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. “是皆兼理與氣，未見四端七情之有以異也。”

發氣隨之).<sup>19)</sup>

The system of *bunsu* is a way of explaining a given situation in terms of the values of good and evil.<sup>20)</sup> The virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom (仁義禮智) are said to be the roots of *sadan*; this is *seongmyeong ji ri* in the above quotation.<sup>21)</sup> On the contrary, *chiljeong* generates in connection with *hyeonggi* (形氣), and thus the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom cannot be at its root; this is *hyeonggi ji ri* (形氣之理) in the above.<sup>22)</sup>

Not only *ri* but *gi* is also classified into the *gi* of *sadan* and the *gi* of *chiljeong*. *Hyeonggi* composes the human body and is also the root of individual desires that sustain the body, such as the desire for warmth when one feels cold and the desire for food when one feels hunger. However, while perception is a type of *gi*, the *gi* of perception is not limited only to the private domain (私) of *hyeonggi*, the origin of desire. As such, the *gi* of *sadan* is the *gi* of enacted perception, and only the *gi* of *chiljeong* is *hyeonggi*.<sup>23)</sup> Based on this, Sin Hudam said the following:

Then the *gi* that rides *sadan* where *sadan* emanates is the *gi* of perception, and that *chiljeong* is *gi ji bal* (氣之發) is the *gi* of *hyeonggi*. These two types of *gi* are different with different focuses. However, at this point, the *sangsus* theory (相須說) originating from Toegye becomes a convoluted discussion, as does Seongho's mistake.<sup>24)</sup>

In the *Sachil sinpyeon*, Seongho understood *sadan* in relation to "*ribal* unmediated by *hyeonggi*" and *chiljeong* in relation to "*ribal* mediated by *hyeonggi*." However, contradictory to this understanding, he also said that *jeong* (情) is what is mediated by *gi* when *seong* (性) emanates forth; there is only one type of *gi* that mediates, but there are two kinds of *jeong*.<sup>25)</sup> He analogized the reason for there being

19) "Sachil dongibyeyon," in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. "且理氣字若是凡論，則四七皆具理氣，其發也皆理動而氣隨，雖七情，亦豈氣先發而理去乘之乎。"

20) "Sachil dongibyeyon," in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. "然而四端，則非特舒慘之質性，而實有仁義禮智之德，爲之根。"

21) "Sachil dongibyeyon," in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. "七情，則但因形氣上利害，而初無仁義禮智之德爲之根。"

22) "Sachil dongibyeyon," in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. "此非理之分則殊者乎。"

23) "Sachil dongibyeyon," in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. "此見知覺之氣，非偏屬於形氣之私也。"

24) "Sachil dongibyeyon," in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. "然則四端發處，所乘之氣，是知覺之氣，七情氣之發，是形氣之氣。兩氣字所主本異，而自退溪理氣相須之說，於此未免渾淪，星湖誤亦然。"

25) "Seungjuyu 乘舟喻," in *Seongho jeonse: Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. "情者性之動，而氣

two kinds of *jeong* to horses and humans as well as the helm of a ship and ocean waves. Traveling to fulfill the purpose of men is *sadan*, while traveling for the purpose of the horse is *chiljeong*. This is a Toegye school explanation of *sadan* and *chiljeong* either with a focus on the primacy of *ri* (主理, *juri*) or with a focus on the primacy of *gi* (主氣, *jugi*). Sin Hudam thought that this logic differentiated *sadan* as originating from *ri* (men or the helm of a ship) and *chiljeong* (horses or ocean waves) as originating from *gi*, even though *sadan* and *chiljeong* all originate from the same *ri* and *gi*. Logically, this distinction can be made, but an instance of a man riding on a horse can only exist as one instance. If *jeong* comes equally from the interaction between *ri* and *gi*, *sadan* and *chiljeong* are not actually different, even though those can be categorized either in terms of *juri* or in terms of *jugi*.

In criticizing Seongho based solely on his reading of the *Sachil sinpyeon*, Sin Hudam did not know that Seongho labeled *hyeonggi* and *singi* (心氣) as *sogi* and *daegi* at the age of sixty. Seongho, who had already differentiated *hyeonggi* and *singi*, wholeheartedly accepted Sin Hudam's criticism. Thus, Seongho finally labeled *sadan* as "*ribal gisu ji* unmediated by *hyeonggi*" and *chiljeong* as "*ribal gisu ji* mediated by *hyeonggi*." In the phrase of *sadan ribal gisu ji* (四端理發氣隨之), the *gi* of *gisu ji* is the *gi* of perception; because this is not *hyeonggi*, it is unrelated to desire. *Chiljeong* which can be understood as *hyeonggi* plus *ri* plus *gi* (of *gisu ji*), has a structure with two *gi*; even so, *hyeonggi* is *daegi*, whereas the *gi* of *gisu ji* is *sogi* (the *gi* of perception, *singi*). For this reason, the two types of *gi* can be differentiated from each other. As such, Seongho believed that he could evade any contradiction. This idea only differentiates types of *gi*, not *ri*.<sup>26)</sup> On the contrary, because Sin Hudam differentiates *seongmyeong ji ri* and *hyeonggi ji ri*, *sadan* becomes (*seongmyeong ji*) *ribal (jigak ji) gisu ji* ([性命之]理發[知覺之]氣隨之), whereas *chiljeong* becomes (*hyeonggi ji*) *gibal (hyeonggi ji) riseung ji* ([形氣之]氣發[形氣之]理乘之).

Yi Byeonghyu (李秉休) adopted Sin Hudam's logic and called the monistic explanation of the existence of objects or humans *ridong gisu* (理動氣隨). He explained the actual existence of *sadan* and *chiljeong* with such monistic logic. On the other hand, he explained the moral

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則載之者也。載之一也，所以爲情，則有二，何也。”

26) See Ahn (2004b).

values of good and evil dualistically as *ri ji bal* (the issuance of *ri*) and *gi ji bal* (the issuance of *gi*).<sup>27)</sup> He did not invoke complex structures of *sadan* and *chiljeong* as did Seongho and Sin Hudam. I will explore the significance of this in later paragraphs.

Yi Byeonghyu also referred to ridong *gi su* as *gidong ri gu* (氣動理俱).<sup>28)</sup> *Gidong rigu* implies that Yulgok was correct in regard to the explanation of universal change. However, since discussions of *sadan chiljeong* are about moral values, Yulgok's theories cannot be applied.<sup>29)</sup> This discussion was passed down to Yi Samhwan (李森煥), Yi Byeonghyu's foster son. Yi Samhwan led the *Seoam* society (西巖講學會), in which Dasan Jeong Yak-yong (茶山 丁若鏞) participated, and here Dasan said the following:

The *ri* of which Toegye spoke is a theory built wholly on the seongjeong (性情) of one's mind. *Ri* is *dosim* (道心), and it factions from the law of nature and appears from *seongryeong* (性靈). *Gi* is *insim* (人心), and it factions from human desire (人欲) and appears from vitality. [...] The *ri* and *gi* of which Yulgok spoke is a theory that includes all of creation. [...] Therefore, from *sadan chiljeong* to all things and begins in the universe (天地萬物), there is nothing that is not *gibal riseung ji*. [...] The characters *ri* and *gi* clearly have different meanings, so it seems impossible to weigh the rights and wrongs, gains and losses of this theory and that theory to unify them. I am not sure, but how does that sound?<sup>30)</sup>

Yi Samhwan generally agreed with Dasan's words. However, he disagreed with the statement that "from *sadan chiljeong* to all things and beings in the universe (天地萬物), there is nothing that is not *gibal riseung ji*."<sup>31)</sup> Yi Samhwan was against connecting *sadan chiljeong*

27) "Sangpyeongho dapseo 上平湖答書," in *Jeongsan japjeo*, vol. 7. "四七均是情也，其發時，理動氣隨，光景一般，而朱子必以四爲理之發，七爲氣之發，何也。四原於性命之理，故曰理發，七生於形氣之私，故曰氣發。然則理發之理字，即指性命之理，而與汎稱理動者不同。氣發之氣者，即指形氣之氣，而與汎稱氣隨者又不同。"

28) "Sachil rigibyeon 四七理氣辨," in *Jeongsan japjeo*, vol. 7. "愚意人與馬，猶爲二物，而情之發出，氣動理俱，四七無別。"

29) *Jeongsan japjeo*, vol. 10. "有曰，發之者氣也，所以發者理也，此義孰有不知者，而何干四七理氣辨也。"

30) "Seoam ganghakgi 西巖講學記," in *Jeungbo yeoyudang jeonseok*, bk. 1, vol. 21. "蓋退溪所論理氣，專就吾心性上立說。理者道心也，天理分上也，性靈邊的也。氣者人心也，人慾分上也，血氣邊的也。故曰四端理發而氣隨，七情氣發而理乘。蓋心之所發，有從天理性靈邊來者，此本然之性有感也，有從人慾血氣邊來者，此氣質之性有觸也。栗谷所論理氣，括天地萬物而立說。[...] 故曰四端七情，以至天下萬物，無非氣發而理乘之。[...] 理氣字義既別，則彼自一部說，此一部說，恐無是非得失之，可以歸一者，未知如何。"

31) "Seoam ganghakgi," in *Jeungbo yeoyudang jeonseok*, bk. 1, vol. 21. "木齋曰，此說似好。然原因論四七說，許多理氣字來，恐天地萬物之理氣，却著不得。"

to all things and beings in the universe. This is in accordance with the basic principles of Yi Byeonghyu, who adopted an aspect of Seongho's ideas. Focusing on the statement that "from *sadan chiljeong* to all things and beings in the universe, there is nothing that cannot be understood in terms of *gibal riseung ji*," it seems as though Dasan agreed more with Yulgok than he did with Toegye. However, Jeong Dasan later labeled himself as a loyal follower of Toegye's ideas, expressing more support for moral values over the law of all things and beings in the universe.<sup>32)</sup>

In summary, the debate on the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, progressing from Seongho to Dasan, came to an important conclusion. In regard to explaining the process of universal change, Yulgok's *gibal riseung ji* was correct. However, in the aspect of moral values, Toegye's logic was correct. This is under the premise that explaining facts and explaining value are different.

### 3. The Theory of *Gong hino ribal* (公喜怒 理發說) and its Significance in the History of Thought

#### (1) *Seongho's Views on Gong hino gibal ribal* (公喜怒 氣發 理發說)

Toegye's *gi ji bal-chiljeong* (氣之發-七情) is not just evil but combines both good and evil. *Chiljeong*, when appropriately moderated, is good. As such, *ri ji bal-sadan* (理之發-四端) is purely and absolutely good, appropriately moderated *gi ji bal-chiljeong* is relatively good, and only unmoderated *gi ji bal-chiljeong* is evil. Gobong Gi Daeseung (高峯 奇大升) criticized this, claiming that the goodness of *ri ji bal-sadan* and that of appropriately moderated *gi ji bal-chiljeong* are not different but the same goodness. Toegye once professed his agreement to this idea; this is called the Treatise on the Last Theory of Toegye.<sup>33)</sup>

When he wrote the *Sachil sinpyeon*, Seongho defined *sadan*, public emotions, as *gong* (公) and *chiljeong*, private emotions, as *sa* (私).<sup>34)</sup> If

32) "Ribal gibal byeon i 理發氣發辨二," in *Jeungbo yeoyudang jeonseok* bk. 1, vol. 12. "退溪一生用力, 於治心養性之功. 故分言其理發氣發, 而唯恐其不明, 學者察此意而深體之, 則斯退溪之忠徒也."

33) Ahn (2009).

34) "Sadan jaui 四端字義," in *Seongho jeonseok Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. "四之隱, 非七之哀也. 隱者, 隱於物公也. 哀者, 哀在己私也. 四之惡, 非七之惡也. 四之惡, 惡不善 公

he used only this to explain *sadan chiljeong*; he would run into contradictions with his other ideas.

Mencius's happiness (喜) and King Shun's anger (怒) can be explained as *dongin ji sa* (同仁之私) of a holy man and wise sage. It has been said that the king likens his preference for colors to that of his people, and likens his preference for riches to that of his people. This extends his personal likes and dislikes to an emotion shared by the public.<sup>35)</sup>

When King Shun was angered at Sahyung (四凶) and subjugated him, thereby restoring peace throughout the country, that anger (怒) began as a personal emotion, but the result was *dongin* (同仁), in which all people shared *in* (仁). Another similar example is when Mencius learned that Lu (魯) was to award his disciple Yakjeongja (樂正子) with a government post, and he was so happy (喜) about the ideal of a royal government that would realize *dongin* that he could hardly sleep. The end result can achieve *gong* through *dongin*, but the emotion began from *chiljeong* which is *sa*; therefore, this emotion is called *dongin ji sa* (同仁之私), and the happiness and anger (喜怒) of sages (聖人) is called *gong hino* (公喜怒). In addition to the king sharing his happiness/enjoyment with the people (與民同樂), the sentiment of viewing the whole nation as one family can also be interpreted this way. Considering the nation as one family and China as one body allows one to take ownership of all objects, *gi* to spread effortlessly, and others' happiness and sorrows to become one's own happiness and sorrow.<sup>36)</sup>

Why is this community based on Confucian ideals not labeled immediately as *dongin* but infused with *sa* to be called *dongin ji sa*? This is to vindicate Toegye and criticize Gobong. Gobong, claiming that the *chiljeong* of sages was equal to *sadan-ri ji bal*, criticized Toegye's distinction of *sadan-ri ji bal* and *chiljeong-gi ji bal*. As such, likening the *chiljeong* of sages to *ri ji bal-sadan* brings about the result of vindicating Gobong.<sup>37)</sup> For this reason, Seongho, after much

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也 七之惡, 惡害己私也。”

35) “Seonghyeonji chiljeong 聖賢之七情,” in *Seongho jeonse: Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. “若向所謂孟之喜舜之怒之類, 亦是聖賢同仁之私也。傳曰, 好色, 則與百姓同之, 好貨, 則與百姓同之者, 方是自吾身欲惡之私, 而推向公去也。”

36) “Seonghyeonji chiljeong,” in *Seongho jeonse: Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. “聖人偏愛人類, 是以天下一家, 中國爲一人也, 既是一人, 則物皆屬己, 而氣自貫通, 天下之喜怒, 卽吾之喜怒也。如四肢百體痛痒, 必覺外物之感, 莫不切己, 固曰非意之也。”

37) “Seonghyeonji chiljeong,” in *Seongho jeonse: Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. “蓋高峯, 只偏

thought, defined the *chiljeong* of sages as *gi ji bal*.<sup>38)</sup>

Sin Hudam consistently applied Seongho's claim that *sadan* is *gong* and *chiljeong* is *sa*.<sup>39)</sup> In this regard, whether labeling *sadan* or *chiljeong* *gong* is *ribal* and *sa* is *gibal*. Using the structures of *ribal-gong* and *gibal-sa* as the utmost principles, Sin Hudam reevaluated the theories of Toegye, Gobong, and Yulgok.

Generally, while it is indisputable that *chiljeong* emanates from *gi*, it also emanates following the law of nature and thus does not interfere with *hyeonggi*. For example, there are emotions such as happiness (喜) that comes from witnessing an act of goodness, anger (怒) that comes from witnessing an act of evil, love (愛) towards someone who is good, dislike (惡) towards someone who is evil, sadness (哀) felt for someone in a predicament, fear (懼), desire (欲) to follow the example of a good person performing a good act, and desire (欲) to aid someone in a predicament. In such cases, there is no difference from *sadan*. Therefore, I believe that some aspects of Gobong's and Yulgok's ideas can, in and of themselves, be one theory.<sup>40)</sup>

This made clear that *gong chiljeong* should be understood in terms of *ribal*. Based on this, Gobong, in criticizing Toegye, agreed that *gong chiljeong* and *sadan* were actually equal to each other just with different names;<sup>41)</sup> therefore, Toegye, who believed that *gong chiljeong* should be understood in terms of *gibal*, was wrong.<sup>42)</sup> Because there is *sadan*-like goodness in *chiljeong* Gobong's and Yulgok's theories were partially correct. However, Gobong and Yulgok, rather than judging good or evil based on dualistic differentiation of *ribal* from *gibal*, differentiated *sadan* from *chiljeong* based on appropriate moderation, or lack thereof.

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舉孟子之喜舜之怒公低一邊，有此云爾。才如此說，便闕却欲當欲惡當惡正低一邊，而又況孟子之喜舜之怒，原其自，則只是氣發耶。”

38) “Seonghyeonji chiljeong,” in *Seongho jeonseu Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. “愚故曰，聖賢中節之七情，終是氣之發。”

39) “Sachil dongibyeon,” in *Habinjip*, vol. 9. “按此論四七分界甚明，只就公私二字上，可驗理發氣發。” This is in regard to Seongho's claim in *Sachil sinpyeon* that what is affixed to objective situations is *gong* and what is affixed to oneself is *sa* (“四之隱，非七之哀，隱者隱於物，公也。哀者哀在己，私也”).

40) “Sachil dongibyeon,” in *Habinjip*, vol. 9, 215. “蓋七情之發於氣，固也。亦有從天理發，而不干於形氣者。如見善事則喜，見惡事則怒，見善人則愛，見惡人則惡，見人險於患害則哀懼，見善人善事而欲從之，見人險患害而欲救之，若是者，未見於其異於四端。愚所謂奇李二氏之或，可自爲一說者。”

41) “Sachil dongibyeon,” in *Habinjip*, 9:215. “此正高峰所謂七情中理發一邊，與四端同實異名者也。”

42) “Sachil dongibyeon,” in *Habinjip*, 9:215. “雖非禮記論七情之本意，然不害其自爲一說，退溪之必以爲氣發，終有所不可曉者也。”



Sin Hudam did not condone this. According to Sin Hudam, *bal*, of *ribal* and *gibal*, is different from appropriate moderation, so *ribal* is *ribal* regardless of appropriate moderation and *gibal* is *gibal* regardless of appropriate moderation.<sup>43)</sup>

Sin Hudam emphasized dualistic differentiation. Therefore, after Toegye responded to Gobong's *Huseol* and *Chongran* with a letter and seemed to support Gobong, Sin Hudam was discontented.<sup>44)45)</sup> According to this letter, Toegye chose to give up the purpose for dualistic differentiation. From the perspective of Sin Hudam, who emphasized dualistic differentiation through the parallel between *ribal-gong* and *chiljeong-sa*, albeit not the parallel between *ribal-sadan* and *gibal-chiljeong*, the fact that Toegye supported Gobong was seen as discarding the dualistic differentiation.

Sin Hudam's discovery that Toegye agreed with Gobong later served as a big shock to Seongho.<sup>46)</sup> Initially, Seongho did not accept Sin Hudam's argument on this matter. However, after some thought, he felt gratitude towards Sin Hudam for pointing out that Toegye agreed with Gobong.<sup>47)</sup> This is because Seongho had been concerned about his labeling of *gong chiljeong* as *gibal* in order to support Toegye, and now he could understand it in connection with *ribal* without denouncing Toegye. He therefore wrote new logic deeming that *gong chiljeong* was *ribal* in *Jung bal* (重跋).<sup>48)</sup>

In *Jung bal*, he primarily sought to differentiate the *ribal* of *yeokgyeong* (逆境) from the *ribal* of *sungyeong* (順境). Compassion (惻隱之心) is the rejection of situations such as a small child about to fall into a well or the sight of a cow on its way to death and the inability to avoid them; this rejection (逆) of *gyeong* (境), an externally occurring situation, rather than acceptance and the conscience arising from this rejection is the *ribal* of *yeokgyeong*.<sup>49)</sup> On the contrary, all

43) "Sachil dongibyeyon," in *Habinjip* 9:215. "發與中節，自是兩件事，烏可以中節謂之發乎，若以七情之中節者，謂發於理，而與四端無異，則四端之不中節者，亦可謂發於氣，而與七情不異乎。如是則，四七理氣特無所分別也。"

44) Ahn (2009).

45) "Sachil dongibyeyon," in *Habinjip* 9:215. "後說總論二篇，即高峰之改其初見而從退溪，而退溪稱為通透灑落也。然今改其說於理氣之分，終未明瑩，老先生稱許之意，未可曉也。"

46) "Dap Sin Iro 答慎耳老 (辛酉)," in *Seongho seonsaeng jeonjip* vol. 23. "耳老又因此，疑四端在七情中，而謂其為一說，模糊兩可，終無究竟之時。"

47) "Jungbal 重跋," in *Seongho jeonse: Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. "以孟喜舜怒之類，歸之理發，與高峰合。余因此重思覺，前說之猶有未詳者，麗澤之益有如是。"

48) "Dap Sin Iro," in *Seongho seonsaeng jeonjip* vol. 23. "四七說三回重思，益覺吾舊見之不免紕繆，今有一篇跋語別紙錄去。"

humans experience pleasure and joy from finding their due places and from seeing examples of occurrences in accordance with the Way (道); Seongho defined this as the *ribal* of *sungyeong*<sup>50)</sup> Seongho claimed to be the first to discover this, and called this happiness of sages the *ribal* of *sungyeong*<sup>51)</sup> There are similarities to be found between this idea and Sin Hudam's claim that *chiljeong* as emanates from the principle of heaven, appears as it follows objective situations. That the anger of sages is *ribal* proves that the anger of sages and the *o* (惡, dislike) of their *suo* (羞惡, shame and dislike) are semantically related.<sup>52)</sup>

Seongho also discussed that the *gong hino* of sages is *ribal* from the perspective of *manmulilche* (萬物一體, the unity of all things and beings in the universe).<sup>53)</sup> In Sachil sin pyeon, he explained one extending his emotions of *ho o* (好惡, like and dislike) to all of the people in one nation as *dongin ji sa*, or *gibal* originating from *hyeonggi*. However, *manmulilche* has the same significance as the removal of *sa* from *dongin ji sa* with the removal of the significance of *sa*, Toegy's traditional logic becomes unstable; if *sa* remains, the logic that sustains the definition of the Confucian community is weakened. This was Seongho's point of concern. Viewing this *gong hino* as the same *ribal* as *sadan* is the main theorem of *Jung bal*. However, when Yun Donggyu (尹東奎), another disciple of Seongho, criticized this theorem because it is comparable to the logic of Gobong or Yulgok, in which there is no distinction between *sadan* and *chiljeong* Seongho abandoned *Jung bal*.<sup>54)</sup>

49) "Jungbal," in *Seongho jeonse Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. "此逆境也，非君子之所願，而緣境便發者也。"

50) "Jungbal," in *Seongho jeonse Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. "彼藹然隨感者，亦無順境理發乎。"

51) "Jungbal," in *Seongho jeonse Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. "古人時不言耳，始知聖賢之喜，固亦順境之仁發。"

52) "Jungbal," in *Seongho jeonse Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. "其爲人怒，卽逆境之羞惡，怒與惡，字雖別，義實相近，屬之理發，亦宜也。"

53) "Jungbal," in *Seongho jeonse Sachil sinpyeon*, bk. 7. "義仁之心，度外無物。惻隱羞惡，亦從萬物一體中流出。所以然者理爲主，而不爲形氣所屬。然則凡喜怒之不干己私者，莫非理發，不可與形氣生者混稱也。"

54) "Yeo Iro 與耳老 (乙丑)," in *Seongho seonsaeng jeonjip* vol. 23. "四七說論中，舜怒孟喜一條，高峯終守理發前見，而退溪許之，新編中雖不從此意，胸裏畜疑久矣。頃得耳老書，更繹退溪說，既改輟從新，尹幼章諸友，疑限界之不明。"

## (2) The Course of Succession of *Gong hino ribal* Theory (公喜怒理發說) and its Significance

After Seongho's death, there was a fervent debate between Yun Donggyu, who asserted the *gong hino gibal* theory, and Yi Byeonghyu, who asserted the *gong hino ribal* theory. This resulted in the eventual split of the Seongho school of thought.<sup>55)</sup> Yun Donggyu's ideas, adopted by Sunam An Jeongbok then the brothers Hwang Deokgil and Hwang Jeokil, then by Heo Jeon became rooted in southern Yeongnam. On the other hand, Yi Byeonghyu's claims were adopted by Yi Giyang and Gwon Cheolsin to be adopted by Dasan Jeong Yak-yong.

Yi Byeonghyu's main idea was that *sadan* and *chiljeong* alone could not be differentiated solely in terms of *ribal* or *gibal*; rather, the *gong* (公) or *sa* (私) of which they originated should be the deciding factor.<sup>56)</sup> That originating from a mind of *gong* was *ribal* while that originating from a mind of *sa* was *gibal*. According to him, what differentiates *ribal* and *gibal* is the origins of *gong* or *sa*, not in the semantic differences between the items of *sadan* such as *cheugeun* (惻隱), *suo* (羞惡), *sayang* (辭讓), and *sibi* (是非), or the items of *chiljeong* *hi*, *no*, *ae*, *gu*, *ae*, *o* and *yok*.<sup>57)</sup> Based on this understanding, the structure that since *cheugeun*, *suo*, *sayang* and *sibi* are *sadan*, they are *ribal*, and that *hi*, *no*, *ae*, *gu*, *ae*, *o* and *yok* since they are *chiljeong* are *gibal*, is no longer valid. This provides a new structure that an emotion, regardless of the type of emotion, is *ribal* if it is *gong* and *gibal* if it is *sa*, invalidating existing distinctions between *sadan* and *chiljeong*. Then, a new scheme arises: '*ribal-dosim* (道心)-usual *sadan-gong chiljeong*' '*gibal-insim* (人心)-unmoderated *sadan*-usual *chiljeong*'

This logic is adopted by Dasan Jeong Yak-yong, who made clear that "*sadan* is generally *ribal*."<sup>58)</sup> The keyword is "generally," which signifies that not all *sadan* becomes *ribal*. The following are examples

55) Sunam seonsaeng munjip, vo. 5. "四七之辨, 自師門新編之出, 而無餘蘊矣。頃日既明自星中還言, 景協以聖人之公喜怒, 爲不涉於氣而出於理發, 元陽亦爲先生晚年定論云。故尹丈移書亦辨其非云。雖不見其往復之書, 先生易費未幾, 同門之議論携貳 有此一番辭說, 亦爲之興歎不已也。"

56) "Sonam yunjang seo 召南尹丈書," in *Jeongsan japjeo*, vol. 4. "四七不須說此理彼氣, 只察其發之公私而斷之。其以公心發者, 則曰理發, 其以私心發者, 則曰氣發。"

57) "Sonam yunjang seo," in *Jeongsan japjeo*, vol. 4. "嘗思之四七之分, 只繫性命形氣, 而不繫於惻隱羞惡等字也。"

58) "Ribal gibal byeon i," in *Jeungto yeoyudang jeonse*, bk. 1, vol. 12. "四端大體是理發。"

using pseudo-*sadan* in place of appropriately unmoderated *sadan*. Though such pseudo-*sadan* is linguistically categorized as *sadan*, in actuality "these things cannot be said to emanate from the *gong* of the law of nature."<sup>59)</sup> It can be said that this exemplifies many instances added to the logic of Yi Byeonghyu, which asserted that it is more important to pinpoint whether the origin of an emotion is *gong* or not than it is to linguistically analyze the characters of *sadan*.

Additionally, he also said that "*chiljeong* is generally *gibal*."<sup>60)</sup> Similarly, this means that not all *chiljeong* is *gibal*. This is because *gong hino* is *ribal* that originates from *gong*. Dasan mentioned a few such examples and claimed that such *gong chiljeong* when literally classified, can be categorized as *chiljeong* but in actuality "it cannot be said that it emanates from the *sa* of *hyeonggi*."<sup>61)</sup> This signifies that, likewise, whether an emotion originates from *hyeonggijisa* is more important than the linguistic analysis of the characters of *chiljeong*.

As such, Dasan said that to cultivate oneself was to closely question, "Is this thought originating from the *gong* of the law of nature? or from the *sa* of human desire? Is it *dosin*? or *insin*?"<sup>62)</sup> If the thought is deemed to be of the *gong* of the law of nature, then it should be expanded; if it originates from human desire, then it needs to be broken and overcome. According to Dasan, if this method was used to distinguish between *sadan* and *chiljeong* then there would be no difficulties.<sup>63)</sup> In this way, Dasan positioned himself as a loyal disciple of Toegye.<sup>64)</sup>

Such *gong hino ribal* theory strongly emphasized the distinction between *ribal* and *gibal*. But rather than using *sadan* and *chiljeong* to do so, it used *gong* and *sa*. Dasan therefore applied the dualistic

59) "Ribal gibal byeon i," in *Jeungbo yeoyudang jeonse*, bk. 1, vol. 12. "雖然明皇於馬嵬，引貴妃而發惻隱之心，--此先儒之言--漢高祖自白登還而發羞愧之心，曹操讓帝號而不為，荀卿非十二子，若此類謂其發於天理之公。不可得也。"

60) "Ribal gibal byeon i," in *Jeungbo yeoyudang jeonse*, bk. 1, vol. 12. "七情大體是氣發。"

61) "Ribal gibal byeon i," in *Jeungbo yeoyudang jeonse*, bk. 1, vol. 12. "雖然子路喜聞過，文王一怒而安天下之民，關雎之哀，中庸之恐懼，孩提之愛其親，禹之惡旨酒，大學之欲誠其意欲正其心，若此類，謂其發於形氣之私，不可得也。"

62) "Ribal gibal byeon i," in *Jeungbo yeoyudang jeonse*, bk. 1, vol. 12. "凡一念之發，即已惕然孟省，曰是念發於天理之公乎，人欲之私乎，是道心乎，是人心乎，密切推究，是果天理之公，則培之養之，擴而充之，而或出於人欲之私，則遏之析之，克而復之。"

63) "Ribal gibal byeon i," in *Jeungbo yeoyudang jeonse*, bk. 1, vol. 12. "理發氣隨之辨者，正為是也，苟知其所由發而已，則辨之何為哉。"

64) "Ribal gibal byeon i," in *Jeungbo yeoyudang jeonse*, bk. 1, vol. 12. "此意深體之，則斯退溪之忠徒也。"

distinction between good and evil more strictly than did Toegye.

If a thought was already originated by way of *hyeonggi*, it easily relates to evil because personal emotions flare easily. Therefore, *Seogyeong* says that *insim* is precarious and *Yegi* says that it governs *chiljeong*. What could we speak of that is good or evil, and what could there be that relates to the character *ri*? The reason that many theories nevertheless speak of *chiljeong* in relation to *ri* and *gi* and claim the existence of good and evil is likely because scholars did not adequately explore the meaning of *ribal* and *giba* [.<sup>65</sup>]

As seen above, Yi Byeonghyu agreed with *sangsu* (相須), or that *ri* and *gi* must coexist in *gidong rigu* (氣動理俱), which explains the universal process of change. However, in the realm of morality, the origin of evil must only be written as *gi ji bal* so that it does not interfere with *ri*, the origin of goodness. Similarly, the origin of happiness should be spoken of just as *rijibal* without *gi*. Most scholars, including Gobong and Yulgok, explained *sadan* and *chiljeong* as having *ri* and *gi*; as *ri*, the origin of goodness, and the origin of evil come to coexist, then clear dualistic differentiation of good and evil became impossible. In the case of Toegye, *rijibal-sadan* is purely good, but *gijibal-chiljeong* is *gyeom hino* (兼善惡), where good and evil coexist. Yi Byeonghyu viewed *chiljeong* not solely as evil but, when appropriately moderated, also as good. Then *ri* becomes the origin of pure goodness but *gi* cannot be the origin of evil. Yi Byeonghyu criticized Toegye's logic because the origin of good and evil could not be reverted to *ri* and *gi*, respectively.

*Gijil ji seong* (氣質之性, psychophysical nature) also leads to this problem. Since *gijil ji seong* already includes *bonyeon ji seong* (本然之性, original nature), *gijil ji seong* cannot wholly be the origin of evil. Because of such problems, Yi Byeonghyu distinguished between *gangchung ji seong* (降衷之性), *hyeonggi ji seong* (形氣之性), and *gijil ji seong* and claimed that *hyeonggi ji seong* was the true origin of evil.<sup>66</sup> Since *insim* can sometimes not be the direct origin of evil, Yi Byeonghyu called the *in* (人) of *insim* (人心) as *insin ji sim* (人身之心), which implies the human body (身體), the origin of desire, and

65) "Sachil rigi byeon," *Jeongsan japjeo*, vol. 7. "旣因形氣而發矣, 私勝情熾, 易係於惡, 故書稱人心而已, 禮稱治七情而已. 有何善惡之可言, 又何理字之交涉, 而諸說中必稱七情, 兼理氣有善惡者, 蓋由於不詳理發氣發之義."

66) *Jeongsan japjeo*, vol. 10. "統而言之, 則四端卽道心也, 七情便是人心也. 道心原於降衷之性者也, 人心生於形氣之性者也. 所謂氣質之性, 則兼降衷形氣而言者也."

labeled *dosim* as *solseong ji sim* (率性之心), clarifying the dualistic nature.<sup>67)</sup> This signifies the clear-cut categorization of the structure '*ri ji bal-gangchung ji seong-dosim-sadan-gong chiljeong gi ji bal-hyeonggi ji seong-insim-chiljeong*'-unmoderated *sach'i* and his rejection of any confusion between them.<sup>68)</sup> Yi Byeonghyu constructed these ideas amidst deep communication with Yi Giyang and Gwon Cheolsin; this can be defined as *yiseong yisim yiyeong* (二性二心二情).<sup>69)</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

I have examined the Four-Seven debate as carried from Seongho to Dasan using two main features. The first is the distinction between cosmology and morality and the second is the rejection of the structure '*ribal-sadan, gibal-chiljeong*' and process of constructing the structure of '*ribal-gong chiljeong-sa*'

The distinction between cosmology and morality signifies a revision of the Four-Seven theory, a major topic of debate in Joseon Neo-Confucianism. Many of the scholars who took part in the Four-Seven debate neglected to objectively explore and evaluate the Four-Seven theory, entrenched instead in the debate over whether Yulgok or Toegye was right. Based on their logic, however, Yulgok's ideas take on their own significance as a method of understanding humans within the process of natural change. On the other hand, they supported Toegye in regard to discussing moral values. Motivation for radical conflict between the two camps disappears upon distinguishing these two areas and agreeing that each scholar was correct in his own realm.

From a different perspective, there is also the problem of considering Western thought. The Catholicism brought to East Asia was an Aquinian combination of logically incomprehensible religious

67) "Insim dosim sadan chiljeongdo 人心道心四端七情圖," in *Jeongsan japjeo*, vol. 11. "心之爲物, 虛靈知覺, 而內具性, 外包於身, 故其所知覺, 若因此身而發, 則曰人心謂人身之心. 或由性命而發, 則曰道心謂率性之心."

68) *Jeongsan japjeo*, vol. 10. "蓋上世之人, 知有一箇心, 而不知其發又有二者之殊, 故多迷於公私義理之際, 舜之告禹始判而分之, 曰人心危道心微, 如一刀兩段不相混淆, 使人得而審擇而行之, 何其明也."

69) "Insim dosim sadan chiljeongdo," in *Jeongsan japjeo*, vol. 11. "余友士興嘗云, 若身者作圖, 明七情之出於此, 則人必易曉兼無辨爭, 其言甚善, 余於閑中, 重加深繹, 揭圖如右, 覽者察焉."

aspects, such as creationism, heaven and hell, and the Virgin Mary's conception of Jesus, with rational logic such as Aristotelian philosophy. In addition, contemporaneous discoveries in Western science were also influencing religion. At that time in the Western world, Catholic religious logic was losing ground due to scientific developments, and science and religion were beginning to separate. Nevertheless, missionaries who came to China hid these trends and, for the sake of spreading their Catholic mission, integrated Western science into theology when introducing Catholicism to East Asia. In such an environment, many Eastern intellectuals, though they criticized the superstition-like aspects of Catholicism based on Neo-Confucian logic, could not denounce rational philosophical logic when it was separated from Western science and theology. Seongho was one such intellectual. Considering this, Seongho was in a position where he had to find a way to separate the logical elements from theology and science and use them to criticize the former and accept the latter. Such a distinction served to allow human understanding, based on science and rational logic, to accept the West while maintaining Neo-Confucian ideals such as the Four-Seven theory in the moral realm, which regulated norms.

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## 實學的四端七情論 ——以星湖學派的公喜怒理發說為中心

安 泳 翔

**中文摘要：**本文考察了星湖學派論爭的重心——公喜怒理發說。內容大體分為兩個：第一，宇宙論和道德價值論的區分。栗谷認為必須在天地變化過程的延長中掌握四端七情論，並提出‘氣發理乘之’。但是星湖認為沒有心的自然界與人心造成的有善惡的四端七情論不同。星湖學派中主張公喜怒理發說的人們繼承這一主張，認為在不區分善惡的宇宙論中栗谷是正確的，而在道德價值論中區分理發和氣發來說明善與惡的退溪是正確的。這是試圖將自然現實世界與道德價值世界的四端七情區分開理解所進行的嘗試。

第二，主張公喜怒的理發說的人丟棄退溪學派的理發為四端，氣發為七情的一般理論，提出了理發為公，氣發為私的新主張。在這一過程中，公喜怒認為七情也是公，所以必須將其歸屬到理發之中去，這即是公喜怒的理發說。這是在無視既存的四端與七情的標準的同時尋找新的標準。因此，主張必須維持既存學說的學者與支持新學說的學者展開論戰，分裂出星湖學派。

**關鍵詞：**四端、七情、星湖學派、公、私、公喜怒理發。



# Topical Review of Confucian Philosophy Research in Korea, 2009–2012: Embracing the Ambiguity of Confucianism

CHANG Won-suk

## Abstract

In this paper, I review recent Korean research on early Confucian philosophy from 2009 to 2012, focusing especially on philosophical topics. My review shall be neither a statistical nor an exhaustive survey of publications during this period. Rather, it takes the form of a review of selective publications about early Confucian philosophy appearing in Korea during the period 2009–2012 categorized by salient topic. Philosophical topics are as follows: 1) the nature of *qing* (情), 2) defining Confucian Ethics, and 3) the rehabilitation of Confucianism as a social vision. Regarding the first topic, surveying variety of hermeneutical efforts in interpreting the notion of *qing* I try to look at how two meanings of *qing* in early Chinese philosophy could be reconciled in a single frame of interpretation. Regarding the second topic, I, examining approaches to the Confucian ethics in terms of virtue ethics, scientific evolution, and naturalism, argue interpretation should be coincided with intrinsic philosophical sensibility of early Chinese philosophy rather than imposition from the western categories. Regarding the third issue, I reflect and criticize underlying assumptions of the method in reconstructing Confucian social vision for the future.

**Keywords:** early Confucian philosophy, *qing* (情), Confucian ethics, Confucianism as social vision

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## 1. Introduction

In this paper, I review recent Korean research on early Confucian philosophy from 2009 to 2012, focusing especially on philosophical topics. Considering Oh Seokwon's previous review on a similar topic,<sup>1)</sup> wherein he surveyed the literature on Confucian research up to 2008, this review will commence with 2009 and cover up through 2012. I shall also approach this topic differently than Oh did in his analysis. My review shall be neither a statistical nor an exhaustive survey of publications during this period. Rather, it takes the form of a review of selective publications about early Confucian philosophy appearing in Korea during the period 2009–2012 categorized by salient topic. Though I can find notable textual, historical and individual studies being written about Confucianism of the Han period to the Tang period in Korea,<sup>2)</sup> my review will hinge around three themes grounded mainly in pre-Han Confucianism: the nature of *qing* defining Confucian ethics, and the rehabilitation of Confucianism as a social vision. Lastly, I will examine the place of Confucian philosophy in the wider context of the changing intellectual horizons of this era. My hope for this review is that this examination of those topics recently studied and discussed among Korean scholars might inform international readers and inspire them to engage themselves in the discussions at hand. As a result, we can form a wider group of international scholars sharing similar topical concerns and help lead the way to a more mature study of Confucian philosophy.

## 2. The Nature of *Qing* (情)

Many researchers in Korea have begun to inquire into the nature of the Confucian notion of *qing* (*jeong* in Korean) in early Confucian writing. Indeed, it has become a pervasive topic in recent publications, especially as a preparatory discussion of a wider topic: Confucian ethics.

Many scholars have focused upon the nature and role of emotion in early Confucian ethics. Kim Myung Seok has analyzed the notion of

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1) Oh (2009).

2) For examples, Jeong (2009); Jo (2012); Pak (2010); B. Kim (2011).

*qing* in *Analects*, arguing that the exemplary person is properly emotional, which leads to his/her own appropriate ethical judgments. In this regard, an exemplary person's emotional-ethical judgment is of a quite different quality from that of the petty person.<sup>3)</sup> Confucian moral sentiment is also the central topic of Jeong Byeongseok and Eom Junseong's paper.<sup>4)</sup> They define *ren* as moral sentiment in which emotion is not something that interferes with the development of morality. Rather, they see the emotions as playing a positive role in the consummation of morality in early Confucian philosophy.

Jeong Ujin provides us with a more apt approach to the notion of emotion in terms of feeling-arousal (感應) that is more relevant to an understanding of Confucian philosophical notions congruent with basic assumptions and relational and correlative sensibility. Arguing that *qing* is not mere emotion but 'shared perception,' Jeong attempts to understand *qing* without the dichotomous notion of subject and object. When continuing to argue that the notion of *qing* can be viewed properly from an alternative perspective to the discontinuous understanding of subject and object, organisms and environment, he places the notion of *qing* in the sensibility of correlative thinking that defines ancient Chinese philosophy more broadly.<sup>5)</sup> The notion of *qing* often prevents contemporary interpreters from understanding this term in their own language, with the result that it is defined by many and various translated terms of Western origin. *Qing* has turned out to be one of the most important ideas of early Confucianism, as revealed in recently discovered Confucian texts in Mawangdui and Guodian, including the Zisizi (子思子). In the early Chinese corpus, to include the aforementioned texts, *qing* denotes not only feeling or emotion but also 'state of affairs' or 'what something really is' in its objective implication. According to Angus Graham, *qing* began to imply 'emotions' from the writings of Xunzi and prior to him *qing* had been used as objective implication. Do we have to accept Graham's historical shift in the meaning of the term? Yet if there is an advantage in adopting Jeong's transactional approach, which is non-dichotomous between the objective and the subjective, to the issue discussed, in understanding the notion of *qing* we do not have to be selective—choosing either human feeling within or the state of an

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3) M. Kim (2009).

4) Jeong and Eom (2011).

5) Jeong (2011).

event without. At the same time, it is not necessary to follow Graham's shift of ideas from the objective to the subjective implication. from the transactional perspective, *qing* is an experience of the inner as much as a configurative energy in the outer. It seems to be more congruent with the early corpus of Confucian philosophy, as notion of *qing* which enable to achieve continuity between the inner and the outer in *Zhongyong*

Lee Hyangjun's argument collaborates Jeong's, positing that substantial approaches to our understanding of emotion are invalid.<sup>6)</sup> Lee does not admit any ontological argument of moral sentiment in early Confucianism. According to him, many interpreters, if not all, tend to interpret Mencian notion of *xing* (性) as *a priori* regardless it is good or bad, by which he meant ontological argument. He proposes a naturalistic approach than an ontological justification of human nature leading to *a priori* and metaphysical abstraction. According to him, the model of causality, which is an important part of the ontological arguments, does not account for morality as a complex process of human cognition in early Confucianism. As moral sentiment is closely interwoven with diverse cognitive functions like moral imagination and cognitive construction of context in the situation, it is not possible to derive moral sentiment from related wholeness and make it an abstract idea where the goodness is inherent. Thus, he aligns Mencius' idea of commiseration in the context of the idea of correlative understanding (恕) in *Analects*.

### 3. Defining Confucian Ethics

In recent decades, divergent academic discussions concerning the nature of Confucian ethics have flourished. Herbert Fingarette initiated the movement toward developing an updated interpretation of Confucian ethics—with the concepts of humanity (仁) and ritual propriety (禮) as its basis—that could be compared to Western ethics of moral law, agency and choice. Hoyt Tillman, in his textual accounts of the intellectual history of the Song Confucians, subsequently examined elements of utilitarianism within the Confucian tradition that had formerly been ignored by scholars; and not long ago Stephen

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6) Lee (2012a).

Angel and Michael Slote proposed an understanding of Confucian ethics from the standpoint of virtue ethics. Roger Ames, using more indigenous vocabulary from the Confucian tradition where role and relationship are constituents of ethical sensibility, brought forward role ethics. In this day and age, scholarly literature *inquiring* into the nature of Confucian ethics is readily available in China, Japan and Korea as well as throughout the Western world.

Hwang Sunu argues there is much in common between Confucian ethics in *Analects* and Kantian ethics of *Critique of Practical Reason*. He understands there to be a parallel between the Confucian notion of ren and *jing* (敬) and the Kantian idea of exclusive respect for the moral law (moralisches gesetz). According to him, we can interpret Confucius from the standpoint of a Kantian deontological position.<sup>7)</sup>

However, Chung Yonghwan argues that Mencian ethics, or more broadly early Confucian ethics, is not properly understood either in terms of deontological ethics or consequentialism. He thinks virtue ethics to be the closest to Confucianism.<sup>8)</sup> Relying upon the Mencian idea of 'weighing the circumstances' (權道), Chung argues that Mencius is a virtue ethicist, positing that Mencius sees that moral motivation is central, and effective consequences do not count; he considers the positive consequences and necessary negative consequences of the action when the most important motivation is enacted. At the same time, Mencius is not a deontologist because he is not blind to imperative duty but considers variances of moral motivations for moral action according to the circumstances.

In his analysis of 'the village honest man' in *Mencius* from the standpoint of virtue ethics, Rhee Janghee also seems to be supportive of virtue ethics as a viable vehicle for interpreting Confucian ethics.<sup>9)</sup> Rhee sees virtue ethics as capable of integrating the ethics of mind (deontology) as much as the ethics of action (consequentialism), which fits with the Mencius' understanding of morality.

Attempts to define Confucian ethics in other ways are not rare. Rhyu Keunsung probes into Mencius' ethics in terms of natural evolution using the ethical idea of 'intuition.'<sup>10)</sup> Resisting the metaphysical approach to Mencius' ethics, Rhyu approaches it from the

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7) Hwang (2010).

8) Chung (2012).

9) J. Rhee (2012).

10) Rhyu (2010).

principles of evolution, natural selection and the survival of the fittest. According to him, moral sentiment is an *a priori* and intuitive instinct acquired in the evolutionary process of the human community. His interpretation of Mencius' vocabulary constitutes moral feelings that became instinctive following their acquisition.

Lee Hyangjun attempts to reconstruct Confucian ethics using Richard Rorty and the idea of sympathetic correlation (恕).<sup>11)</sup> Rorty borrows Judith Shklar's definition of liberals as people who view cruelty as "the worst thing we do," seeing in this parallel attitudes to the Confucian emphasis on *ren* (仁). According to this argument, Rorty as an ironic liberalist may share with Confucianism the sentiment of abhorrence to cruelty as well as a shared sensibility with the basics of Confucian ethics as defined by the term 'sympathetic correlations.'

If an unsatisfactory approach to the topic of Confucian ethics could be identified, it would be the tendency of many, if not all, modern-day interpretations of Confucianism to appeal to theories and terms belonging to external traditions. The result is the reduction of Confucianism's rich ethical tradition to little more than a subcategory of Western ethical theories, whether that be utilitarianism or virtue ethics. Consideration of the Confucian ethical tradition via the use of its own intrinsic vocabulary gives rise to an entirely different understanding of the topic, one that refrains from superimposing Western categories.

I believe we need sound skepticism about the way we understand Confucian ethics employing Western ethical terms. The interpreter needs to be sensitive to differences between modern Korean language and early Confucian ethics effected by the lapse of time, different language lineages, modern translations and the accompanying variant philosophical assumptions from which two cultures have grown. W.K.C. Guthrie, the contemporary scholar of Greek philosophy, made similar cautions regarding the understanding Greek philosophy using modern English terms.

Many key words, such as "music," "gymnastic," "virtue," and "philosophy," have shifted their meanings or acquired false associations in English ears. One who reads the statement that the best guardian for a man's "virtue" is "philosophy tempered with music" might go away with the idea that, in order to avoid irregular relations with women, he had better play the violin in between sessions of studying metaphysics. Only after reading widely in

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11) Lee (2012b).



other parts of the book would the reader discover what Plato meant exactly by *logos* accompanied with *musike* as the only sure safeguard against *arête*.<sup>12)</sup>

Guthrie continued to disclose vital differences between the Greek and modern English, as in “dike” and “justice,” “theos” and “God,” and “virtue” and “*arête*.” He advised English readers not to rely upon single-word English equivalents such as “justice” or “virtue” to stand for the various usages according to the connotation of their Greek counterparts. We should exercise proper care in our interpretation of different philosophical vocabularies of culture that belong to different epochs and places. Such an approach seems to work when dealing with the notion of *qing* in order to secure the whole range of implied meanings in that term.

Yet, for our understanding of Confucian ethics we may need more than just the use of its intrinsic terms. Neither Confucius nor his pupils ever tried to create theories, rules or stipulated norms of human ethics. Early Confucian sensibility toward ethics is productive ambitious, contextually defying any *telos* or principle and oriented rather toward solving specific problems or issues. For instance, Mencius, considering incorruptibility (清), responsibility (任), and tolerance (和) as important standards to assess the personalities and moral situations, preferred being consummately skillful in moral excellences at variances of circumstances (時聖) to adherence to the abstract law.<sup>13)</sup> Sometimes, theorizing on Confucian ethics and debating for its own sake can miss the whole Confucian point of view on ethics. Morality in the Confucian tradition, rather than a set of stipulated ideas, is a process of negotiation in making the most of any given situation. It echoes Hillary Putnam’s comment on John Dewey’s reluctant attitude to reduce his “instrumental” ethical edifices into any single formation of theory:

I believe that Dewey’s perceptive and realistic refusal to reduce ethics to a single biological traits (such as sympathy) or to any single concern or to any one rule or system of rules, coupled, as it was, with his insistence that nonetheless intelligence-situated intelligence-is both possible and necessary in the resolution of political and ethical problems, make him particularly relevant to our time Ethics without ontology.<sup>14)</sup>

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12) Guthrie (2012, 5).

13) *Mencius*, bk. 5, B/1.

14) Putnam (2005, 10).

It is useful to bear in mind when discussing the ethics of Confucianism that we should resist the temptation to reduce Confucianism to a seemingly charming extant category of western ethics. By doing so, we may better understand the intrinsic and creative language of Confucian ethics.

#### 4. The Rehabilitation of Confucianism as Social Vision

In his book, *Maengja ui ttam, seongwang ui pi* (Sweat of Mencius, blood of sacred kings),<sup>15)</sup> we find Kim Sangjun's complicated attempt to rehabilitate Confucianism as a viable socio-political model, one of the most often discussed topics regarding Confucianism today. Kim critiques the idea of 'modernity' as implying a discriminative view of the "barbarian" vis à vis the civilized, or the obsolete past and modern present (or future), and as a source of misguidance and distortion. Instead, he puts forth his own theory of modernity entitled 'multifold modernity,' in which the rise of ancient ethical systems of thought from 800 to 200 BCE and the emergence of Neo-Confucianism in China and of early modernity in Europe from the 11th to 13th centuries, are marked as proto and early modernity, respectively. For him, Confucianism is not a dead relic but a living exemplar of (multifold) modernity for the "universal values of mankind," such as the liberal tradition, democracy, popular sovereignty, the state, beyond the state and so forth. In his discussion, Kim tends to identify the "deterrence of abuse of political power in favor of impartiality, empowerment of the people, guarantee of constant source of people's livelihood, foreign policy for peace and coexistence" as traits of Confucianism. His formulation of Confucianism is captured well in the title of his book in which sweat breaks out on son's brow in *Mencius*,<sup>16)</sup> expressing the human's concern for others, and the bloodshed of the Confucian scholar implying the duty to remonstrate and risk one's life to oppose a ruler's violence.

Yet Kim's theory of multifold modernity seems to be an ethnocentric one quite similar to the idea of 'modernity' he dismisses. When he argues that modernity has its origin and prototype in the

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15) S. Kim (2011).

16) *Mencius*, bk 3, A/5.

religions and philosophies of an “Axial era” defined by the philosopher Karl Jaspers, and its generic features are transcendence and universality, differences and uniqueness of early Chinese philosophy are not properly appreciated. When it comes to transcendence and universality, they may be unique in the Pythagorean philosophical idea, but the ideas of transcendence and universality were never entertained by Laozi and Confucius, or even the Buddha. Their philosophical sensibilities were to inquire how one was to achieve harmony within this immanent, continuous world of experiences rather than the search for an objective, transcendent truth.

His failure to appreciate the proper gap between the West and the East may have led to his delicate twist on Confucianism. His definition of the “sweat of the son” in *Mencius* as not the son’s spontaneous action from his innermost heart but the universal concern for others may reflect Kim’s own reconstruction of Confucianism as public philosophy without a familial relationship, which is very controversial. When he supports Kang Youwei’s idea of “great conformity” (大同), his refusal of the importance of family relationships in Confucianism becomes clear. Yet, does Confucian tradition abandon the importance of family? There is common agreement among experts that unlike other schools of early China, early Confucians gave the family relationship (親) the highest importance and regarded it as the starting point for the extrapolation of similar relations to the wider community, and part of the self-making process of humans. In this tradition, even interrelated changes of the natural forces are understood in terms of family. For example, family terms like father (strong, the Creative), mother (devoted, the Receptive), the first son (inciting movement, Arousing), the second son (dangerous, the Abysmal) the third son (resting, Keeping still) the first daughter (penetrating, the Gentle) the second daughter (light-giving, the Clinging), the third daughter (joyful, the Joyous) are used for interrelated forces of the eight trigrams in *Yijing*. His inaccurate reading of the son’s sweat for Mencius’ sweat indicates his peculiar interpretation of Confucianism that is incompatible with the Confucian tradition.

When Kim describes the early modern era that emerged during the Song in China and in Europe as encompassing the holy and the secular, I am apprehensive that the terms ‘holy and secular’ that he employs were actually inherent in the western intellectual tradition,

where the dichotomous notion of worlds has been traditionally pervasive. Actually, this is exactly the reason why he dismisses modernity as having its origin in the West. As far as I know, his is a quite unusual way of understanding the emergence of Neo-Confucianism in the Song period using such irrelevant terms as “encompassing the holy and the secular.”

It is interesting to compare the work of Bae Byongsam with that of Kim as it was designed for the same purpose, namely the reconstruction of Confucianism as a viable social ideal.<sup>17)</sup> Discontent with current Western-oriented research, especially in the social sciences where imported terms and ideas have taken priority over indigenous ideas, Bae recommends we re-read the Confucian classics in the contexts of both the past and the present. His reinterpretations of Confucianism include the following ideas: the notion of *zhongxiao* (忠孝) has its origin in Legalist thought, not Confucianism; *sangang* (三綱) is entirely different from the idea of *yulun* (五倫); Confucian politics should be understood as a horizontal relationship between the ruler and the people as captured in the idea of “accompanying people” (與民), rather than a hierarchical one as in the ‘bestowing of privilege to the people’ (爲民). As a conclusion, he sets Confucianism as a feasible philosophy for the ‘ecological, democratic politics’ of the future.

I am sympathetic with Bae’s intention to reshape Confucianism into a form compatible with ecological and democratic norms and practices. His way of approaching the theme is simpler and more direct than Kim Sangjun’s heavy dependence upon a variety of modernity theories and historical investigations. and I should add that I agree with Bae when he reveals that the historic-legendary deeds of Boyi and Shuqi were never like Confucian intelligent devotion, while at the same time noting that he ignored the fact that Confucius himself paid a certain degree of respect to these figures. Though his book seems designed for a general audience, at times his assertions seem to lack sufficient textual proof. For example, when he argues that the ruler-minister relationship in Confucianism is characterized by a contract rather than obedience, he seems to lack any evidence from the early Confucian corpus. In this sense, I doubt that his suggestion we understand Confucian tradition as conflicting traditions between liberal, horizontal versus conservative, hierarchical camps is applicable, or even

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17) Bae (2012).

desirable.

While he tries to discern similarities between Confucianism and the best practices of democracy, in so doing he tends to neglect the differences between current democratic ideals and practices and Confucianism. When 'initiative of the people' and 'autonomy of the politics' constitute the core of political philosophy in *Mencius*, his delineation of *Mencius* sounds more like the optimistic, mass democratic political philosophers of the nineteenth century, without considering the other side of Confucian understanding people as blind, unordered, those to be educated.<sup>18)</sup>

In this regard, in their article, Rhee and Lee attempt to reinterpret Confucian philosophy based on the dichotomous identities of Confucianism as an authentic learning and a political doctrine.<sup>19)</sup> According to them, while the former denotes Confucianisms in the history that includes the Confucianism of Confucius and Mencius, the Han and Tang period, the Neo-Confucianism in Song period, and the Evidential Studies of the Ming and Qing period, the latter is political Confucianism for building certain identity and value system. In fact, the two identities of Confucianism have been blended. They accused the ideology of Zhu Xi in particular as a case of the latter because it includes elements of absolutism and conformism. They argue further that this kind of Confucianism was adopted by of the autocratic Park Junghee regime and used as a tool for modernization, the consolidation of central power and totalitarianism. The modernization process of South Korea has involved the emergence of political authority exercising absolute and centralized control over all aspects of life. The individual and peripheral regions were subordinated to the central state. In the Confucianism as political ideology, *zhong* (忠) implies not to do one's best, but loyalty and obedience to the state; the aim of *xiao* (孝) is not intelligent responsibility for the one's parents but unconditional servitude to the state.

Yet, according to them, Confucianism as a political ideology for modernization from above and totalitarianism is not the entire picture because Confucianism as an authentic learning system is also able to provide us with a democratic and pluralistic interpretation of it. They

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18) For example, in *Analects* (16/9) Confucius says, "Those among common people who do not learn even when vexed with difficulties—they are at the bottom of the heap" (困而不學, 民斯爲下矣).

19) Rhee and Lee (2012).

argue that Confucianism as authentic learning emphasizes a reciprocal consideration among members of society resisting authoritarianism, hierarchy, and sino-centrism. What they meant by reciprocal consideration is the way of understanding two polarities such as *yin* and *yang* as interdependent and complementary. The idea of reciprocal consideration leads us to the correlated empathy (忠恕), which seeks the optimal equilibrium between two positions and the appreciation of differences. Finally, they conclude that Confucianism as authentic learning can be a moral curative for the dark aspects of South Korea's modernization.

Rhee and Lee are not the first to make a dichotomous interpretation of the Confucian tradition. Tu Weiming distinguishes Confucianism as a politicized ideology from Confucianism as popular tradition. According to Tu, the former supports the power of state over society, politics over economy, bureaucratization over individual initiative, while the latter provides the essential constitutive elements of China's national culture and the norms of everyday human interaction. The latter has been shaped by eminent Confucians from Confucius, Mencius to Wang Fuzhi and Dai Zhen. In addition to Tu, many contemporary scholars in Taiwan, Mainland China, and Korea, such as Jin Yaoji, Huang Junjie, Jiang Guobao, Song Zhiming, Liu Shuxian,<sup>20)</sup> Kim Chungyeol, Han Sangjin, Kim Sangjun and Bae Byeongsam have employed dichotomous or trichotomous evaluative demarcations of Confucian identity, one of which is inheritable and valuable and the other detestable and threatening to democratic ideals.

I have some reasons for viewing the dichotomy of a 'good' Confucian and a 'bad' Confucian tradition to be inappropriate. First, these categories do not serve to interpret the Confucian tradition properly, as I have already noted some failing aspects of Kim and Bae's reinterpretation of Confucianism. They ignore crucial features of the Confucian tradition, like the importance of family and the proper relationship between ruler and minister in viewing to making Confucianism pure and good. When Rhee and Lee accused the philosophy of Zhu Xi of serving to consolidate central power and the sin of supporting authoritarianism, they made the similar but opposite fallacy. While they blamed Zhu Xi for the problem of autocracy, their assertions would be challenged by many historians and philosophers

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20) Makeham (2008, 99-103).

today. Many prominent interpreters argue that many Neo-Confucians from peripheral regions in China and Korea attempted to restrict the amalgamation of centralized autocratic power. Neo-Confucians during the Southern Song envisioned a government that would do less in local society and local literati who would voluntarily take it upon themselves to do more. Neo-Confucianism was a philosophy of a locally-rooted elite called *shi* (scholar-official) whose principal aim was the consolidation of their own power, wealth and influence as opposed to the national and dynastic authority.<sup>21)</sup>

Philosophically, Rhee and Lee seem to misinterpret Zhu Xi's idea of pattern as continuity as the centripetal idea and philosophical ground for Neo-Confucian conformism. The interpret Zhu Xi in a simplistic way for the purpose of making it "bad" Confucianism.

Second, the interpretation discovering the purity of Confucian identity may have the consequence of creating an exclusive and essential Confucianism that is incongruent with the history and philosophy of Confucianism itself. Confucianism as a tradition is porous, provisional, and ambiguous. Elsewhere, I have attempted to understand Confucianism not as a theoretical entity but a set of evolving narratives, which can adapt themselves to address any number of circumstances. Confucianism is productively vague, allowing interpreters from various philosophical eras and cultures to elaborate upon Confucianism differently in their own different contexts. Confucianism does not start from axiomatic certainties, but rather is elliptical, often *requiring* a leap of the imagination to understand how the meanings are relevant to the specific conditions.<sup>22)</sup> Thus, there is an ambiguous boundary between Confucian territory and neighboring Daoism, Buddhism and legalism. The *Book of Changes* is shared by Confucians, Daoists, Buddhists, and even Jungian analysts. The history of Confucianism is, in fact, a history of syncretism in which constituents are ever re-arranged to respond the most meaningfully (義) to the changing circumstances. Terms and ideas are also borrowed from other traditions and adapted to Confucianism's own context. We can find an emerging interpretive horizon containing many Confucianisms, as interactive forces of the time undergo changes and reformulation. The emergent interpretations often add to the

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21) The classical study on this issue is that of Hymes (1986). Refer also to Fairbank and Goldman (1998, 101-107); Bol (2010, 246-269).

22) Chang et al. (2011, 2).

unprecedented dimensions of the Confucian tradition.

It does not afford us to be so bird-eye view as to set our present values up to judge the merits and demerits of the Confucian tradition. Just as we do not base our microbiology upon a division into harmful and beneficial microorganisms, so the study of Confucianism in different situations and cultures can be appreciated without any preoccupation with values for some immediate purpose. In the final analysis, for a more balanced study, I believe we may carefully discuss the consequences of certain aspects of Confucian philosophy brought to humans and society.

## 5. Some Prospects

In the early twenty-first century, a fundamental shift in intellectual trends marked a new phase of philosophic awareness. Wang Zihé has used the term “the Second Enlightenment” to designate the recent changes in the intellectual climate from a substance-oriented view to a variety of process philosophies.<sup>23)</sup> George Lakoff, a linguist and cognitive scientist, has expressed similar views using the term ‘New Enlightenment’ in support of his claim that Western philosophical traditions still hold tight to the Enlightenment view of human rationality and reason, arguing that we need a new vocabulary pertaining to the concepts of body, metaphor and the relational nature of humanity, which constitute the ‘new enlightenment’ identified above.<sup>24)</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein argues we live in an age of crisis of knowledge, which implies a paradigm shift from Newtonian sciences of certainty to the historic, process-oriented sciences of uncertainty.<sup>25)</sup>

Our age is also marked with the increasing presence of the Asian economy, Asian politics and Asian culture within the global cultural order. The renewal of Asian philosophy and cultures, to include the renewal of Confucianism as a repository of values and conceptual resources for contemporary dynamics, is more critical than ever. In the research trends discussed above, I can discern sufficient signs that Confucianism has stirred the imaginations of many Korean interpreters of today who are addressing pressing personal, social, environmental issues.

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23) Wang and Fan (2011).

24) Lakoff (2008).

25) Wallerstein (2004).



Yet, do interpreters of Confucian philosophy in East Asian countries and the world inform each other and collaborate enough to create a viable paradigm? Answers can vary. Insofar as the Korean interpreters discussed above, though they discuss subjects that can be shared with international scholars, the philosophical topics I have dealt with in this article—the notion of feeling, nature of Confucian ethics, and the vision of Confucianism as a social philosophy—are hot-button issues not only among Confucian scholars but also among western philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, political philosophers, statesmen and the general public. Yet actually discussion could not go beyond boundary of Korea. There are certainly factors working to inhibit widening process, such as nationalism, the language barrier, and the insularity of the scholarly community. As such, unfortunately their reference to the international scholars is quite limited and their works are not known enough in the international circle of Confucianism, philosophers, and professionals.

Though international journals have been emerging that contribute much to forming an international Confucian philosophical community, an open-access standard, accessible platform, along with high publication standards are still needed to elicit the participation of western philosophers, Asian philosophers, and other professionals. I believe we can create such a platform for facilitating our Confucian philosophical activities and breaking our insular intellectual habits. This would involve creating an international journal for highlighting, disseminating, and informing recent trends in Confucian scholarship in each country, gathering relevant scholars for short periods to discuss particular topics, holding colloquiums with experts in the social sciences and natural sciences to search out new paradigms of knowledge, and undertaking a concerted campaign to institutionalize Asian philosophy in western philosophical academia. This era of the “second enlightenment” may require that we return to the basic fact of Confucian philosophy: associating with one another and creating friendships and cultural understanding through real communication. It is my sincere hope this paper has helped you to better understand the recent research on early Confucian philosophy in Korea as well as to facilitate real communication among one another for the sake of future international collaboration in Confucian studies in the near future.

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## 2009年-2012年韓國儒學哲學研究中 對主題的分類研究：對儒學模糊性的認同

張元碩

**中文摘要：** 本論文試圖以2009年到2012年之間韓國國內出版的古代儒學哲學研究學術報以及單行本中值得矚目的業績 1)情的問題, 2)儒家倫理, 3)通過儒家構建未來社會這三個哲學主題為中心進行再探討, 品味其論旨。與其說本論文是對以上時期出版的有關古代儒家哲學的統計性的、整體性的調查, 不如說是以重要的哲學主題為中心, 了解這一時期所討論的大多數著作的論旨, 並由此引出生產性的哲學討論。首先, 將焦點放在觀察解釋學試圖理解‘情’的各種努力, 特別是古代中國哲學中以怎麼樣的觀點理解‘情’這一概念所具有的多樣性。而儒家倫理的本質則強調道德倫理、進化論、自然主義, 使儒家倫理更貼近於其自身的語言, 並進行內在觀點的解釋。最後, 分析了作者的各種與通過儒家構建未來社會相對應的論點, 同時試圖對其分析的方法論進行哲學性反省。

**關鍵詞：** 韓國儒學、情、儒家倫理。

# 儒家孝文化的兩種價值取向

## ——以申生之“孝”及其品格的文化內蘊為中心

尚永亮·葛剛岩

**中文摘要：**申生“敬順事上”卻屢被讒毀，“將以悅親”反受辱身亡，這一事實本身即說明了“家天下”政治之複雜和殘酷，說明了“愚孝”、“愚忠”之不可為；後人所謂“申生孝而不能安晉”，實在是對申生之“孝”所起作用的一種高估，缺乏對中國儒家“孝”文化的深層透視。就本質言，申生之死乃是其對儒家孝文化理解的偏執，是其“小心精潔”的性格特點所使然；他的悲劇，與其說是家庭層面的倫理悲劇、國家層面的政治悲劇，毋寧說是一種緣於人性深處的性格悲劇，以及緣於中國早期孝道深厚浸染的文化悲劇。

**關鍵詞：**申生、儒家、孝文化、品格。

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## 一、緒論

中國孝文化淵遠流長，早在孔子、孟子為代表的儒學思想家之前，就出現了一批恪守孝道的躬親實踐者，只是到了孔、孟之後，才形成了更為系統的理論體系。作為儒家文化的核心思想之一，“孝”成為歷代文人反復闡釋的倫理話題，也由此引發了關於“孝”這一倫理觀念認識上的分歧與辯論。

對於“孝”的本義，《說文解字》解釋為“善事父母者”。這裏所謂的“善事”，既包括針對父母的敬心奉養，也包括對父母的敬畏與順從，儒學思想家們對於後者尤其看重。孔子在《論語·為政》中強調說：“今之孝者，是謂能養。至於犬馬，皆能有養；不敬，何以別乎？”孟子《萬章上》中也堅守這一理念，“孝之至，莫大於尊親”。戰國時期經過法家的理論提升，“敬順”的孝道觀念得到強化，由家族尊卑的維繫者上升為國體秩序的規範者，“臣事君，子事父，妻事夫，三者順則天下治，三者逆則天下亂。此天下之常道也。”（《韓非子·忠孝篇》）兩漢時期，隨著董仲舒“三綱”、“五常”的思想的確立，孝道演變成為對父、君意志的絕對服從，“君為臣綱，父為子綱，夫為妻綱”（《白虎通義》卷下）。而至宋明之後，迂腐之儒將此發揮至極致，“君要臣死，不敢不死；父要子亡，不得不亡”（吳獬《一法通》卷一）。

那麼，“敬順”是否為傳統孝道至尊的核心價值？一味“敬順”會出現什麼樣的實際後果？下面，我們以申生之孝為例來詳細闡釋儒家孝文化的兩種不同的價值取向。

## 二、本論

西元前七世紀，地處黃河流域的晉國發生了一起因寵妾進讒、以庶代嫡而導致的太子自殺、餘子出亡的事件。此一事件中屢遭讒毀終至被殺的太子申生，既是一個悲劇人物，也是被後世反復提及並予以高度推獎的孝子典型。考察申生的心性品格，有助於剖析“申生之孝”的儒家文化內涵，也有助於瞭解此類因孝而被棄者在中國前孔子儒學思想史上的典範意義。

孝，是申生事父事君的一個重要準則。由於恪守孝道，所以面對來自庶母驪姬一次次的挑撥誹謗和各種讒言，他逆來順受，不做辯解；由於恪守孝道，他多次拒絕了勸他求取自安或出奔躲避的善意忠告，執意留在晉國，勤於王事。試看史書對其數次遭讒、面臨危機時所作回答的如下記載：

蒸於武公，公（按：即晉獻公）稱疾不與，使奚齊（按：即驪姬之子，申生之庶母弟）蒞事。猛足乃言於太子（按：即申生）曰：“伯氏不出，奚齊在廟，子盍圖乎！”太子曰：“吾聞之羊舌大夫曰：‘事君以敬，事父以孝。’受命不遷為敬，敬順所安為孝。棄命不敬，作令不孝，又何圖焉？且夫聞父之愛而嘉其貺，有不忠焉；廢人以自成，有不貞焉。孝、敬、忠、貞，君父之所安也。棄安而圖，遠於孝矣，吾其止也。”

公作二軍，公將上軍，太子申生將下軍。……士薦出語人曰：“太子不得立矣。……與其勤而不入，不如逃之。君得其欲，太子遠死，且有令名，為吳大伯，不亦可乎？”太子聞之曰：“子與之為我謀，忠矣。然吾聞之：為人子者，患不從，不患無名；為人臣者，患不勤，不患無祿。今我不才，而得勤與從，又何求焉？焉能及吳大伯乎？”太子遂行。

至於稷桑，狄人出逆，申生欲戰。狐突諫曰：“不可。突聞之：國君好艾，大夫殆；好內，適子殆，社稷危。若惠於父而遠於死，惠於眾而利社稷，其可以圖之乎？況其危身於狄，以起讒於內也！”申生曰：“不可。君之使我，非歡也，抑欲測吾心也。是故賜我奇服，而告我權。又有甘言焉。言之大甘，其中必苦，譖在中矣，君故生心。雖蠮譖，焉避之？不若戰也。不戰而反，我罪滋厚；我戰死，猶有令名焉。”果戰，敗狄於稷桑而反。<sup>1)</sup>

這裏，“孝”成為申生處理親子關係的惟一準則，也構成他文化品格的重要支撐。他並非不知道有人在背後屢進讒言，也探聽到君父已聽信了讒言並生出異心，他也深知出奔別國既可以免除君父的猜疑，又可以使自己避難，但他仍然要堅於職守，希冀以自己的行動換得君父的回心轉意。“雖蠮譖，焉避之”、“我戰死，猶有令名焉”，在這頗具淒涼悲壯意味的話語中，我們似乎可以體察到申生緣於道德理想的一種真誠。

秉持此種真誠，申生在困境中苦苦地堅守著對“孝”的執著，即使在驪姬以置毒案嫁禍於他的生死關頭，他仍然不願出逃他國，而是選擇了以死明志。《國語》這樣記載道：

人謂申生曰：“非子之罪，何不去乎？”申生曰：“不可。去而罪釋，必歸於君，是怨君也。章父之惡，取笑諸侯，吾誰鄉而入？內困於父母，外困於諸侯，是重困也。棄君去罪，是逃死也。吾聞之：‘仁不怨君，智不重困，勇不逃死。’若罪不釋，去而必重；去而罪重，不智；逃死而怨君，不仁；有罪不死，無勇。去而厚怨，惡不可重，死不可避，吾將伏以俟命。”

將死，乃使猛足言於狐突曰：“申生有罪，不聽伯氏，以至於死。申生不敢愛其死，雖然，吾君老矣，國家多難，伯氏不出，奈吾君何？伯氏苟出而圖吾君，申生受賜以至於死，雖死何悔！”是以諡為共君。<sup>2)</sup>

申生死前這兩段話，最能展示他的心志。一方面，不願出逃以彰顯父之過惡；另一方面，仍以“吾君老矣，國家多難”為憂，希望狐突出面輔佐王室。綜而觀之，申生對其父可謂忠孝兩全、仁至義盡了，故其死後被諡為“共君”。共者，恭也。《禮記·檀弓》正義引《諡法》曰：“敬順事上曰恭。”<sup>3)</sup>這

1) 徐元誥《國語集解》，中華書局2002年版，第258-269頁[Xu Yuanhao, *Guoyu jijie*, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 2002, p.258-269].

2) 徐元誥《國語集解》，中華書局2002年版，第280、281頁[Xu Yuanhao, *Guoyu jijie*, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 2002, p.280-281].

3) 《禮記正義》，中華書局1980年版，第1277頁[Liji zhengyi, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1980, p.1277].

就是說，申生之孝以恭順為核心，面對來自驪姬和君父的各種壓力，他不申辯，忍辱負重，努力追求著一種人格上的自我完善，為自己追求一個可以傳之久遠的孝名。

那麼，申生這種無條件的“敬順事上”的態度和做法，果真可以稱之為“孝”嗎？答案又是否定的。原始儒家提倡忠孝之道，但其所謂忠孝，與申生所一味堅守的“敬順”之孝，以及後世流傳的“君要臣死，臣不得不死；父要子亡，子不得不亡”之愚忠愚孝，有著明顯的差異。據《孔子家語》，孔子論子之事親有言：“小極則待過，大杖則逃走。”否則，“身死而陷父於不義，其不孝孰大焉？”<sup>4)</sup>這就是說，當父、君欲致孝子、忠臣於死地時，子、臣為了不陷父、君於不義，是可以逃避的，而這種逃避，正是孝的一種表現。進一步說，子、臣之事父、君，不僅在父、君施虐時可以逃避，而且為了匡救父、君之過，還應勇敢地站出來，陳說事理，予以諫諍和申辯。正如宋人陳祥道所論：

君子之於親，有言以明己，有諫以明事，諫則以幾為順，以孰為敬。幾而不入，則至於孰；孰而不入，則至於號；號而將至於見殺，則亦有義以逃之。是雖於親有所不從，而於義無所不順；於親或不我愛，而於鄉閭無所得罪，此古之所謂孝子也。彼不善事親者，以小愛賊恩，姑息賊德，於己可以言而不言，於事可以諫而不諫，依違隱忍，惟意是從。以至隕身於其親之命，而陷親於不義之名，是將以安親，而反危之；將以悅親，而反辱之。此君子之所不取也。晉獻公將殺其世子申生，申生於親可言而不言，而且懼傷公之心；於義可逃而不逃，而且謂天下豈有無父之國；以至忘其躬之不聞，而且恤國家之多難；不顧死生之大節，而且謹再拜之末儀。是恭而已，非孝也。<sup>5)</sup>

這段話說的明白透徹：子、臣對待父、君之過，本可以言說而不言，應當諫諍卻不諫，當危及生命時，能夠逃避竟不逃，只是一味地隱忍退讓，惟其意是從，其結果必然助長父、君之過，陷其於不義，造成對家、國更大的傷害。就此而言，申生之行為算不得真正的孝。然而，申生畢竟是一個堅持信念、有道德操守者，較之禮崩樂壞之春秋時代屢見不鮮的父子反目、君臣相殘，他的“敬順事上”已然是一特例；至於他守死善道的悲劇結局，更令無數人為之感歎唏噓，因而，禮法不以不孝責之，而謂其為“恭”，也算是一種寬恕的筆法吧。<sup>6)</sup>

4) 《孔子家語》，上海商務印書館1922年影印本，第5-6頁[Kangzi jia yu, Shanghai: The Commercial Press Shanghai, 1977, p.5-6].

5) 衛湜《禮記集說》，文淵閣《四庫全書》本，第117冊，324頁[Wei Shi, *Liji jishuo*, Taipei: Wen yu an ge Siku quanshu, second 117 volume, p.324].

6) 也有人認為，申生的行為在嚴格意義上是算不得“恭”的。如唐人白居易《晉諡恭世子議》即謂：“晉侯以驪姬之惑，殺太子申生。或謂申生得殺身成仁之道，是以晉人諡為恭世子，載在方冊，古今以為然。居易獨以為不然也。大凡恭之義有三，以孝保身，子之恭；以正承命，臣之恭；以道守嗣，君之恭。若棄嗣以非禮，不可謂道；受命於非義，不可謂正；殺身以非罪，不可謂孝。三者率非恭也，申生有焉。而諡曰恭，不知其可。若垂末代，以為訓戒，居易懼後之臣子有失大義守小節者，將奔走之。”見《白居易集》，中華書局1979年



與申生的“恭”而非“孝”相比，同遭驪姬之讒的重耳出亡異國十九年，歷經磨難，最後重返晉國，成就了一代霸業，倒是更近於孔子所謂“小極則待過，大杖則逃走”之事父事君的忠孝之道。

重耳為獻公之妾大戎狐姬所生，庶出的身份，使其不具備成為太子的條件，同時，也使他不必像申生那樣，承擔來自驪姬的正面攻擊，從而一定程度地躲避了風頭浪尖的危險。然而，驪姬並沒有完全放過他。獻公十二年，驪姬生奚齊後即向獻公進讒，遂導致申生、重耳、夷吾諸公子分赴曲沃、蒲、屈三地，以此降低獻公對他們的信賴和倚重。獻公二十一年毒酒案發，申生死，驪姬遂將攻擊的矛頭指向重耳。史載：“驪姬既殺太子申生，又譖二公子曰：‘重耳、夷吾與知共君之事。’”對驪姬來說，申生是其廢嫡立庶、以幼代長的最大障礙。申生一死，重耳、夷吾兩兄弟的重要性便凸顯出來。因為重耳、夷吾雖為庶出之子，但年長於奚齊，對立奚齊為太子仍構成不小的威脅，故繼續向獻公進讒，構陷重耳、夷吾參與了申生之謀，將他們拖下渾水，一齊殺掉，以解除最後的隱憂，便是驪姬的當務之急了。

在驪姬的進逼下，重耳表現出與申生截然不同的心性。早在申生蒙冤未死之際，重耳即曾向他進言：“子盍言子之志於公乎？”當申生以不可傷君父之心為由拒絕後，重耳又勸道：“然則盍行乎！”<sup>7)</sup>這則見載於《禮記·檀弓篇》的史料，為我們展示了重耳有別於申生的思考方式：面對讒言和陷害，申生是依違隱忍，重耳則欲辯白申說；申生是以死明志，決不逃避，重耳則主張出亡他國，暫避風頭。這樣兩種思維方式，反映了二人不同的性格特點，展示了二人對待君父的不同態度，從而也就決定了二人不同的行為取向。所以，當獻公在驪姬蠱惑下派人伐蒲、伐屈，再下殺手時，重耳逾牆而逃，出奔狄，夷吾出奔梁，兩位庶出之子以逃亡的方式回答了來自庶母昏君的迫害。而這樣一種選擇，也就與申生分疆劃界，構成子、臣遭父、君迫害時兩類迥然相異的行為標準。故唐人李翱對其有著截然不同的評價：“晉獻公信驪姬之讒，將立奚齊，太子申生不去，終被惡名，雉經而死，且陷其父於惡。公子重耳奔翟逃禍，卒有晉國，霸天下。故重耳為孝，而申生為恭。”<sup>8)</sup>

考察申生之所以一味地“敬順事上”而不逃避，實與他所受教育及其“小心精潔”的內在心性直接相關。從所受教育看，其傅杜原款對他的影響無疑最值得注意。史載：

杜原款將死，使小臣圉告於申生，曰：“……吾聞君子不去情，不反讒，讒行身死可也，猶有令名焉。死不遷情，強也；守情說父，孝也；殺身以成志，仁也；死不忘君，敬也。孺子勉之！死必遺愛，死民之思，不亦可乎？”申生許諾。<sup>9)</sup>

版，第978-979頁[Baijuyiji, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 2002, p.978-979].

7) 《禮記正義》，中華書局1980年版，第1276頁[Liji zhengyi, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co.1980, p1276].

8) 李翱《數奇篇》，文淵閣《四庫全書》本，第1078冊，第188-189頁[Li ao, Shuqipian, Taipei: Wenyuange Siku quanshu, second 1078 volume, p188-189].

杜原款對申生的詳細教誨史已無載，但僅憑死前遺言已可概見其平日教習之一斑：“不去情，不反讒”，強調的是要謹守親子之情，聽到讒言不去辯駁；“死不遷情”、“守情說父”、“殺身成志”、“死不忘君”，強調的也都是子、臣對父、君的單方面情感和義務，也就是說，父和君可以不仁不義，但子和臣卻要恭順事上，以求取強、孝、仁、敬的“令名”。杜原款這樣一種思想，通過長期的教化薰染，而內化為青年申生的自我情志，本不難理解；而當申生以此情志接人待物，也就必然地形成一種定向思維和排他性的取捨傾向，即凡與之相異者即拒斥之，凡與之相合者即汲收之。試看前引他的幾次自我表白：“吾聞之羊舌大夫曰：‘事君以敬，事父以孝。’受命不遷為敬，敬順所安為孝。”“吾聞之：‘仁不怨君，智不重困，勇不逃死。’”均與其得之於杜原款的教誨相一致，均展示出極為濃鬱的“敬順事上”特徵。

既然“敬順事上”是其行事的基本準則，那麼，申生具有的“小心精潔”的內在心性，以及對完善的道德化人格的追求，便有其邏輯的合理性了。對於申生這種心性，還是那位善於察言觀色、心計多端的優施看得清楚：“其為人也，小心精潔，而大志重，又不忍人。精潔易辱，重債可疾，不忍人，必自忍也。”這裏的“小心”，謂其謹慎而多畏忌；“精潔”，謂其精粹純潔而無雜質；“大志重”，謂其抱負遠大；“不忍人”，謂其宅心仁厚。這是一種謹小慎微的內向性格，也是一種追求完美、輕易不會改變志向而又受不得汙辱的正直性格。由於受不得汙辱，所以易於被辱；由於謹慎內向，宅心仁厚，所以受辱後多默默承受，不願聲張，也不願躲避。大概正是看到了申生這種與“不知固秉常”之“不知辱”者迥異的性格特點，優施才建議驪姬首先拿申生開刀，謂其“知辱可辱，可辱遷重”、“甚精必愚”、“愚不知避難”。<sup>10)</sup>

值得注意的是，優施這段話雖是針對申生說的，卻一定程度地概括了中國歷史上兩種截然不同的人格類型，即正人君子與邪佞小人的區別，而其分界即在於“知辱”與“不知辱”。邪佞小人因不知辱，故“頑鈍無恥”、“沉鷙有謀”，“雖辱之而不動”，最能得昏君寵信；正人君子因知辱，故“惜名顧行，惟恐點汙”、“以節自勵，不以智自全”，屢屢敗於旁行邪出、無所不用其極的小人手下，猶如申生惟“精潔”是好，“一辱以弑君之名，則必以死自明而後已”。<sup>11)</sup>如果說，就具體情境言，申生之死緣於驪姬等群小進讒、獻公信讒的外在動因，那麼，就事件本質言，申生之死卻是其“小心精潔”、“敬順事上”的性格特點所使然。也就是說，申生這種性格本身，導致他惟上是從，遇讒不辯，拚得一死，決不逃避。就此而論，他的悲劇，與其說是家庭層面的倫理悲劇、國家層面的政治悲劇，毋寧說是一種緣於人性深處

9) 徐元浩《國語集解》，中華書局2002年版，第280頁[Xu Yuanhao, *Guoyu jijie* Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 2002, p280].

10) 徐元浩《國語集解》，中華書局2002年版，第261頁[Xu Yuanhao, *Guoyu jijie* Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 2002, p261].

11) 真德秀《論申生》，文淵閣《四庫全書》本，第955冊，第83頁[Zhen Dexiu, *Lunshensheng* Taipei: Wenyuange Siku quanshu, second 955 volume, p83].

的性格悲劇，以及緣於傳統孝道深厚浸染的文化悲劇。這種悲劇，在中國歷史上一再上演，而申生可以算是其早期的代表人物。

換一個角度看，申生“敬順事上”卻屢被讒毀，“將以悅親”反受辱身亡，這一事實本身即說明了“家天下”政治之複雜和殘酷，說明了“愚孝”、“愚忠”之不可取、不可為。慎子有言：“君明臣直，國之福也；父慈子孝，夫信妻貞，家之福也。”這裏展示的，是一幅完滿幸福、頗具吸引力的家國關係圖卷。然而，在現實生活中，明君、慈父、信夫並不多見，更多出現的，倒是君不明、父不慈、夫不信。在這種情況下，單方面地要求臣忠、子孝、妻貞，則無異於對不明之君、不慈之父、不信之夫等權力持有者的一種放縱，無異於對臣、子、妻等弱勢群體的一種愚弄。倘若為臣為子者看不到這一點，仍然無原則、無申辯、無抗爭地盡忠盡孝，則其忠孝豈不正是一種愚忠愚孝？慎子正是有見於此，故一針見血地指出：“故比幹忠而不能存殷，申生孝而不能安晉，是皆有忠臣孝子而國家滅亂者。何也？無明君賢父以聽之。故孝子不生慈父之家，忠臣不生聖君之下。”<sup>12)</sup>引而申之，孝子、忠臣是因父不慈、君不聖才得名的，既然世無明君賢父，則臣、子雖有忠、孝之行，仍然挽救不了國家的敗亂，更何況這些孝子忠臣之言行，在嚴格意義上說，本來就算不得真正的孝和忠！

### 三、餘論

忠孝之道，貴在敬而重於義，若僅敬順而失義，只能歸於愚忠愚孝之列，故晏嬰有云：“君為社稷死，則死之；為社稷亡，則亡之。若為己死而為己亡，非其私昵，誰敢任之？”（《左傳·襄公二十五年》）以此看來，世人所謂“申生孝而不能安晉”，實在是對申生之“孝”所起作用的一種高估；而後人一再吟唱的“晉申生之孝子兮，父信讒而不好”<sup>13)</sup>、“晉獻惑於驪姬兮，申生孝而被殃”<sup>14)</sup>，也只是流於一種事件的表層陳述，而缺乏對申生之孝的深層透視，也忽略了儒家孝文化發展過程中兩種不同價值取向的存在與甄別。

需要提及的是，那位在中國歷史上出現更早的重量級人物虞舜，也是一個孝親典範。從各種早期記載看，虞舜生活在“父頑、母嚚、象傲”（《尚書正義》卷二）的家庭環境中，面對來自父母的種種迫害，他並非一味順從，而是多次設法逃避，躲過災難，表現出敬順而不乏權變、戀慕而又敢於哀怨的特點。儘管虞舜之孝屢經後人加工整合，已很難見出其原始面目，但作為

12) 《慎子》，上海商務印書館1922年影印本，第5頁[Shenzi, Shanghai: The Commercial Press Shanghai, 1922, p5].

13) 屈原《惜誦》，《四部叢刊》初編本，第3冊，第6頁[Qu Yuan, *Xisong the first edition Sibucongkan*, third 3 volume, p6].

14) 東方朔《七諫》，《四部叢刊》初編本，第4冊，第4頁[Dong Fangshuo, *Qijian the first edition Sibucongkan*, third 4 volume, p4].

被孔、孟等儒家先賢高度認肯和讚揚的早期孝子，其行為恰與申生之孝形成鮮明的對照，並為我們解讀儒家孝文化的早期形態和原初內涵，提供了可資借鑒的另一個範例。限於篇幅，對此一問題的詳細考察容於另文展開。

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## Two Kinds of Value Orientations in the Confucian Culture of Filial Piety

SHANG Yong-liang / GE Gang-yan

### Abstract

Shen Sheng (申生) was respectful to his elders, though he repeatedly received death threats from them; he cheerfully gave affection for his father, though he was inhumanly killed by him. His story actually explains the complexity and hidden cruelty of the family-state politics, and it also explains what may be called “foolish filial piety” and “foolish loyalty.” Shen Sheng’s filial piety and loyalty have often evaluated highly; however, such an evaluation does not offer deep understanding of the Confucian culture of filial piety. As for the essence of the culture, Shen Sheng’s death shows an obsession with the culture of filial piety. His story is neither simply a tragedy at the level of the family nor a tragedy at the level of state politics; rather, it should be understood as the kind of tragedy that stems from human nature itself and the inbuilt structure of the Chinese traditional culture of filial piety.

**Keywords** : Shen Sheng; Confucian ; filial piety culture; character

# 朱子思想中的‘心’與‘知’

## —朱子性心論再探

藤井倫明

**中文摘要：**‘理’、‘心’、‘知’等概念乃是朱子思想中的核心概念。學界已經有相當多相關研究。看似已經沒有進一步討論的空間。但其實針對朱子所謂‘理’、‘心’、‘知’等概念，目前學界仍然存在各種詮釋，看來似乎尚無共識。關於‘知’，學界一般從‘認識’外在的事物、‘認知’形而上的‘理’這種角度來詮釋，但筆者認為現代認識論脈絡上的‘認知、認識’義並不是朱子所謂‘知’的核心意義。因此，管見所及，歷來學者對朱子‘格物致知’論的理解看似脫離朱子本人的脈絡，找不到充分合理的、有說服力的解釋。關於為什麼‘誠意’以致知’為前提這一問題，也無法提供合理的說明。

本文的主要關心以及目的在針對朱子思想中的‘知’，根據朱子本人的脈絡，提出較合理的說明這一點。為了處理‘知’的問題，必須確認朱子思想中的‘心’以及‘理’的意義、特色。因此，本文先探討‘心’與‘理’。其實這些問題，筆者曾經分析、討論過。從問題意識的角度來說，並不是新的，詮釋的方向也大致沒有改變，但筆者後來發覺，之前對‘理’、‘心’、‘知’等概念的理解、說明，確實有不貼切或需要修正的地方。故此，雖然發現不大，但仍有新的體會，因此這次重新整理、檢討如上所說的‘理’、‘心’、‘知’等問題，將自己目前的看法、詮釋提供給學界，懇請各位專家的指正。

**關鍵詞：**理、心、性、情、知、知覺、明德。

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## 一、前言

‘理’、‘心’、‘知’等概念乃是朱子思想中的核心概念。學界已經有相當多相關研究。看似已經沒有進一步討論的空間。但其實針對朱子所謂‘理’、‘心’、‘知’等概念，目前學界仍然存在各種詮釋，看來似乎尚無共識。例如，關於‘理’，學界有承認其活動性的詮釋與不承認其活動性的詮釋。關於‘心’，有將它認定為‘氣’的詮釋與認定為跨越‘理’（形而上）、‘氣’（形而下）的功能，或者性、情的統一概念的詮釋。關於‘知’，學界一般從‘認識’外在的事物、‘認知’形而上的‘理’這種角度來詮釋，但筆者認為現代認識論脈絡上的‘認知’、‘認識’義並不是朱子所謂‘知’的核心意義。因此，管見所及，歷來學者對朱子‘格物致知’論的理解看似脫離朱子本人的脈絡，找不到充分合理的、有說服力的解釋。關於為什麼‘誠意’以‘致知’為前提這一問題，也無法提供合理的說明。

總之，筆者認為關於朱子思想中的‘理’‘心’‘知’等概念，仍然具有重新檢討的空間，特別是‘知’的問題，包含‘格物致知’論的結構，需要進一步深入分析，闡明其真相。本文主要關心以及目的在針對朱子思想中的‘知’，根據朱子本人的脈絡，提出較合理的解釋來說明這一點。但若要解決‘知’的問題，必須分析‘理’與‘心’的問題，因為據筆者的理解，在朱子的思想中‘知’與‘理’、‘心’二者有密切關係，談到‘知’，必然涉及到‘理’或‘心’的問題。因此，本文首先確認朱子思想中的‘理’的性質以及‘心’的意義、內容，進一步檢討‘知’的問題。

## 二、朱子思想中的‘心’義

如上所述，朱子思想中的‘心’義，歷來有各種詮釋。關於歷來學者的看法，吳震、吳略餘兩位先生有整理、介紹，<sup>1)</sup>筆者也曾經發表過自己的看法。筆者的看法、立場與之前相同，沒有改變，筆者認為心是性與情的統一概念。性、情才是心的具體內容，除了性、情之外，沒有獨立的心。換言之，性、情是同一心的兩種面向。朱子將心分為本體層次的性與作用層次的情。管見所及，這一觀點基本上與蒙培元、<sup>2)</sup>陳來、<sup>3)</sup>陳佳銘、<sup>4)</sup>吳略餘

1) 吳震：〈心是做工夫處——關於朱子心論的幾個問題：以朱子學為中心〉，收入氏編：《宋代新儒學的精神世界》（上海：華東師範大學出版社，2009年）（Wu Zhen, "Xin is the key point of Gongfu—about several issues at Zhu zi's Xin theory: to Zhuism as the center", *The Spirit World of Neo-Confucianism in the Song Dynasty*, Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2009）、吳略餘：〈論朱子哲學的理之活動義與心之道德義〉，《漢學研究》29：1（2011年3月），頁85-118。（Wu Lueyu, "On the Activity of Li and Morality of Xin in Zhu Xi's Philosophy", *Research in Chinese Studies*, vol.29: 1, 2011, pp.85-118）

2) 蒙培元：《中國心性論》（臺北：臺灣學生書局，1990年），頁361-366。（Meng Peiyuan,



等先生相同。例如最近的吳略餘先生的研究說：

朱子的心是包含性與情在內的整體，性是心的本體，情是心的作用，而心則是貫通形上之理與形下之氣的存在。<sup>5)</sup>

朱子以‘心統性情’為基本命題，進一步如下說明：

蓋心便是包得那性情。性是體，情是用。<sup>6)</sup>

心統性情，只就渾淪一物之中，指其已發、未發而為言爾。非是性是一箇地頭，心是一個地頭，情又是一箇地頭，如此懸隔也。<sup>7)</sup>

心兼體用而言。性是心之理，情是心之用。<sup>8)</sup>

如此朱子明確說明，心、性、情並不是各個獨立的存在，而是將同一個心分為未發(本體)的層次與已發(作用)的層次分析掌握而已。根據這些說明，除了如上述的理解之外，很難提出不同的詮釋。歷來學界很多學者認為心是氣，<sup>9)</sup>尤其是李明輝先生特別主張‘朱子將心歸於氣’這點，批判不承認氣心的陳來先生。<sup>10)</sup>但根據上面所舉的朱子的說明，無法使心歸屬於氣的層次。因此，筆者支持蒙培元、陳來、陳佳銘、吳略餘等先生的立場。

現在關注心的內容‘性’與‘情’的部分，朱子思想中的性、情兩者是體、

*Mind-nature theory in China*, Taipei: Student Book Co., Ltd., 1990, pp.361-366]

- 3) 陳來：〈朱子哲學中‘心’概念〉，收入氏著：《中國近世思想史研究》(北京：商務印書館，2003年)，頁184-195。[Chen Lai, “The Concept of Xin in Zhu Zi Philosophy”, *Research on History of Modern Chinese Thought*, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2003, pp.184-195]
- 4) 陳佳銘：〈朱子論‘明明德’之研究〉，《當代儒學研究》6(2009年7月)，頁61-89。[Chen Jiaming, “Research on Zhu zi’s concept of Ming ming de”, *Contemporary Confucian studies*, vol.6, 2009, pp.61-89]
- 5) 吳略餘：〈論朱子哲學的理之活動義與心之道德義〉，頁85。[Wu Lueyu, “On the Activity of Li and Morality of Xin in Zhu Xi’s Philosophy”, pp.85]
- 6) 黎靖德編，王星賢點校：《朱子語類》一(北京：中華書局，1986年)，卷5，頁91。(以下再引皆簡稱為《朱子語類》)[Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, in Li jing de ed. and Wang xing xian collation, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1986, vol.1: 5, pp.91]
- 7) 《朱子語類》一，卷5，頁94。[Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, vol.1: 5, pp.94]
- 8) 《朱子語類》一，卷5，頁96。[Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, vol.1: 5, pp.96]
- 9) 根據李明輝先生，錢穆、牟宗三、蔡仁厚、劉述先、傅武光先生等都以心為氣。
- 10) 李明輝：〈朱子論惡之根源〉，收入鍾彩鈞編：《國際朱子學會議論文集》上冊(臺北：中央研究院中國文哲研究所，1993年)，頁17-18。[Lee Ming huei, “Discussion on the roots of evil in Zhu zi’s thoughts”, in Chung Tsai chun ed., *Proceedings of the International Conference in Zhuism*, vol.1, Taipei: The Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy in the Academia Sinica, 1993, pp. 17-18]李先生如此主張的理論依據是第一：“在朱子理、氣二分的問架中，並不存在一個居間的領域。故心若不歸於理，則必然歸於氣”，第二：“朱子歸諸心的兩項重要特徵——有善惡、能活動——亦是氣之特徵。”(頁567-569)但這些理據是從‘理氣二分’以及‘理無活動義’等理論前提演繹出來的結果，並不是直接根據朱子的有關係的各種言論分析、歸納的結果。筆者認為根據朱子的相關言論，無法導出‘心歸屬於氣’這一結論。

用或者未發、已發的關係，這一點如上引用的朱子的言論可以確定。性情關係既然如此，邏輯上情必須以性的存在為前提條件，若沒有性就沒有發生情。這一點朱子用‘見影知形’的比喻來說明：

性不可言。所以言性善者，只看他惻隱、辭遜四端之善則可以見其性之善。如見水流之清，則知源頭必清矣。四端，情也，性則理也。發者，情也。其本則性也。如見影知形之意。<sup>11)</sup>

能實際看到的是情，但情的背後肯定有性。性雖然看不到，但性才是情的源頭(‘本’)。由此可以確認，朱子確實有以‘性’為主、以‘性’為起點的思維。總之，關於性情，朱子認為性(本體)發為情(作用)，這一點是無可置疑的，在朱子的言論中，確實屢次出現性(理)‘發’為情這種論述。<sup>12)</sup>但在此產生問題，根據學界一般的認識，性是‘理’，情是‘氣’，氣有動能、活動義，但理沒有動能、活動義。理既然沒有活動義，邏輯上不能說‘發’，因此，朱子的性‘發’為情這種論述，不能照字面解釋。關於如何理解‘性發’，將在後面仔細檢討，筆者擬首先質疑‘情是氣’這種一般理解。如上面所確認，情的形成以性為前提，不管性(理)有沒有活動義，在朱子的思維邏輯，若沒有性(理)就沒有情這一點無法否定。既然如此，我們不得不承認情上包含性(理)。

其實不僅情而已，嚴格而言，這世界的所有現象也不能看成單純的氣。推測朱子的思維模式，筆者認為應該如下理解：首先我們看到的現象都是理、氣合作的結果。<sup>13)</sup>在實際的狀況之下，理、氣兩者‘不離不雜’，互相交錯，並沒有各自獨立存在。<sup>14)</sup>換言之，實際上沒有單獨由‘氣’構成的世界，也沒有單獨由‘理’構成的世界。因此，我們看到某種現象是已經由‘理’被規定的‘氣’，並不是天然純樸的氣。若從體用關係這一觀點來說，所有的情、所有的現象都本體之‘理’展現的結果。雖然體現理的程度或體現理的方式上有所異同，但可以說都體現理。因此朱子如下說：

心思之正，便是天理，流行運用，無非天理之發見，豈待心思路絕而後天理乃見耶？且所謂天理，復是何物？仁義禮智，豈不是天理？君臣、父子、兄弟、夫婦、朋友，豈不是天理？<sup>15)</sup>

11) 《朱子語類》一，卷5，頁89。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, vol.1: 5, pp.89〕

12) 例如“性纔發，便情。情有善惡，性則全善。”(《朱子語類》一，卷5，頁90)(Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, vol.5, pp.90)

13) 朱子說：“天地之間，有理有氣。理也者，形而上之道也，生物之本也。氣也者，形而下之氣也，生物之具也。是以人物之生，必稟此理然後有性，必稟此氣然後有形，雖不外乎一身，然其道器之間，分際甚明，不可亂也。”見朱熹撰，陳俊民校：《朱子文集》陸(臺北：德富文教基金會，2000年)，卷58，〈答黃道夫一〉，頁2798。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi wenji*, in *Chen jun min collation*, Taipei: De Fu Cultural and Educational Foundation, 2000, vol.6: 58, “Da Huang DaoFu Yi”, pp. 2798)(以下再引皆簡稱為《朱子文集》)

14) 朱子說：“所謂理與氣，此決是二物。但在物上看，則二物渾淪，不可分開各在一處。”(見《朱子文集》伍，卷46，〈答劉叔文一〉，頁2095)。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi wenji*, vol.5: 46, “Da Liu Shuwen Yi”, pp. 2095〕

天理人欲分數有多少。天理本多，人欲便也是天理裏面做出來。雖是人欲，人欲中自有天理。問：“莫是本來全是天理否。”曰：“人都是天理，人欲卻是後來沒巴鼻生底。”<sup>16)</sup>

萬物、萬象都體現天理，所以才能說‘萬物有理’，‘格物窮理’這一工夫能夠成立的理由也在這裡。

筆者認為從朱子的思維脈絡而言，不是先有理與氣的概念，然後理、氣加起來形成萬物、現象，而是對現象加以分析，將現象分析為形而上的‘理’與形而下的‘氣’兩種要素。在此需要注意的是，理與氣雖然如此從現象中抽取來的概念，但朱子認為它並不是理論上的抽象概念，而是實際存在的實體概念。對朱子而言，理是‘實理’，實際存在的東西，不是理論層次的抽象觀念。<sup>17)</sup>因此，理論上理與氣各自獨立存在，假如沒有形下之氣，形上之理仍然可以存在。<sup>18)</sup>另外要注意的是，在朱子的思路，在理氣之間，以理為優先，以理為主這一點，並不是先有氣，然後有理。有些學者將理認定為氣之運動、作用的法則、秩序，但如此理解，若沒有氣就沒有理之可說，理便失去其超越性及獨立性，<sup>19)</sup>這可能不符合朱子的理氣觀。根據朱子的思維脈絡，不是先有氣的運動、作用(現象)，然後有理，而是因為有理，所以才產生具有特殊意義的氣之運動、作用(現象)。因此，價值結構上，理優先氣。但另外需要注意的是，理氣關係並不是體用關係這一點。學界有將朱子的理氣從體用關係的角度來掌握的立場，但筆者認為理與氣是不同層次的概念，兩者同時存在而共同協助產生世界的，無法將氣視為理之用。<sup>20)</sup>朱子思想確實將理認定為這世界的本體，但此本體之理的作用面向，不是

15) 《朱子文集》陸，卷59，頁2892。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi wenji*, vol. 6: 59, pp. 2892〕

16) 《朱子語類》一，卷13，頁224。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, vol.1: 13, pp.224〕

17) 李明輝先生認為朱子的理‘只是抽象的存有者，不是現實的具體物’，‘只是『存有』(being)，而不是“存在”(existence)’(〈朱子論惡之根源〉，頁560)，〔Lee Ming hui, “Discussion on the roots of evil in Zhu zi’s thoughts”, pp.560〕但筆者認為朱子的理並不是理論層次的抽象存有。關於這一點，筆者比較贊成吳略餘先生的以下見解：‘在朱子而言，太極之理並不是一個只存在於人類思維中的抽象觀念，它是真實存在的，而之所以能知道它的存在，則是透過形下之氣。’(見氏著：〈論朱子哲學的理之活動義與心之道德義〉，頁91)〔Wu Lueyu, “On the Activity of Li and Morality of Xin in Zhu Xi’s Philosophy”, pp.91〕

18) 朱子說：‘若在理上看，則雖未有物，而已有物之理，然亦但有其理而已。’(《朱子文集》伍，卷46，〈答劉叔文一〉，頁2095)〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi wenji*, vol.5: 46, “Da Liu Shuwen Yi”, pp. 2095〕

19) 當然實際看到的是現象，也就是說‘氣’之運動、作用的面向，‘理’只是從它推測、抽取來的概念，但朱子認為理並不是附屬氣的抽象概念，而是超越氣的實體概念。朱子的理，雖然若沒有氣，就無法展現、證明自己，但即使沒有氣，可以獨立存在。因此，朱子的存在論肯定是理氣二元論。

20) 關於理氣關係，李明輝先生的以下說明非常清楚且恰當。‘在既存的現實物當中，理與氣是同時存在的，無時間上的先後可言。但從存有論的結構來說，理對氣具有優先性，而其超越根據。’(見氏著：〈朱子論惡之根源〉，頁11)〔Lee Ming hui, “Discussion on the roots of evil in Zhu zi’s thoughts”, pp. 11〕

單純的氣，而是具體特殊的現象、情感。氣應該視為構成世界萬物的單位概念。本體之理以氣為材料、素材構成這世界的萬物、萬象、萬情(=作用)，如此理解可能比較符合朱子的脈絡。

那麼回到性體情用的問題，進行思考如何合理地詮釋性‘發’為情這一問題。

如上所述，根據學界一般的認識，性是‘理’，理沒有動能、活動義。因此，朱子的性‘發’為情這種論述，不能照字面解釋。但學界也有承認‘理’的活動義的立場，<sup>21)</sup>若如此理解，性發也不會造成問題。筆者也曾經將‘性發’、‘理發’、‘理之流行’等用詞照字面意義來理解，單純地承認理之活動義。但現在筆者認為對理賦予活動義，還是困難的。理雖然不是理論層次的抽象概念，而是實體概念，但既然它是形而上的存在，無法持有一般意義上的動能。關於‘性發為情’的問題，李明輝先生如此分析、說明：

朱子之‘理’是只存有而不活動，而性即理，故‘性發為情’並非意謂‘性自身發而為情’，而是意謂‘情依理而發’。<sup>22)</sup>

朱子所謂‘心統性情’，其實只是意謂心依性理引發情，也就是說，心認知地以異層之性理為依據，而引發同層之情。<sup>23)</sup>

性是理，理無所謂動。故‘性之動’非性本身之動，而是情依性而動。能動者是氣，故情屬於氣。心則居於性、情之間而統攝之。<sup>24)</sup>

心之所以為‘虛靈’、為‘精爽’、為‘神明’，乃是由於它能憑其知覺涵攝理。心之主宰能力即在於依理而禦情，以應萬事；在此意義之下，即可說‘心宰萬物’。<sup>25)</sup>

但若‘心依性理引發情’、‘心則居於性情之間而統攝之’、‘心’主宰式地‘依理而禦情’如此理解，需要承認性情之外的獨立之心的存在，而心、性、情之間產生‘懸隔’，違背朱子所謂‘心統性情’，只就渾淪一物之中，指其已發、未發而為言爾。非是性是一箇地頭，心是一個地頭，情又是一箇地頭，如此懸隔也。’這一說明，也無法合理地說明性情之間的體用關係。李先

21) 例如吳略餘先生強調理的活動義。詳參吳略餘的〈論朱子哲學的理之活動義與心之道德義〉一文。〔Wu Lueyu, “On the Activity of Li and Morality of Xin in Zhu Xi’s Philosophy”〕

22) 李明輝：《四端與七情——關於道德情感的比較哲學探討》(臺北：臺灣大學出版中心，2005年)，頁357。〔Lee Ming huei, *The Four Virtues and Seven Feelings: Comparative Studies on Moral Feeling*, Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2005, pp. 357〕

23) 李明輝：〈朱子論惡之根源〉，頁571。〔Lee Ming huei, “Discussion on the roots of evil in Zhu zi’s thoughts”, pp. 571〕

24) 李明輝：〈朱子論惡之根源〉，頁566。〔Lee Ming huei, “Discussion on the roots of evil in Zhu zi’s thoughts”, pp. 566〕

25) 李明輝：〈朱子論惡之根源〉，頁573。〔Lee Ming huei, “Discussion on the roots of evil in Zhu zi’s thoughts”, pp. 573〕

生如此詮釋的理論依據，除了前面所說的理(性)沒有活動義之外，還有朱子所謂的心其實沒有含具理這一點。李先生繼承牟宗三、蔡仁厚先生等人的看法，<sup>26)</sup>採取‘朱子所謂的心具(包)萬理，是認知地具，並非實際地含具萬理’這一詮釋。根據牟、蔡、李先生的理解，心真正具有的而不是理本身，而是‘知(知覺)’，也就是說‘認識(認知)理’的功能。若如牟、蔡、李先生所理解，心不具理，當然本來沒有的東西無法成為情的本體，性體情用的關係也無法成立。但筆者從朱子相關言論中無法導出這樣的詮釋。筆者認為朱子所謂的‘心具萬理’可以照字理解，心確實內具萬理，這就是性。性、情是體用關係，若包括心而言，性是心之體，情是心之用。

那麼沒有活動義的性(理)如何發為情呢？筆者認為‘性發情’的問題也許可以如此詮釋。實際‘發’的確實是氣，但一樣發也有各種發的模式、方向，而確定此發的模式、方向的原因就在‘性’(理)。性是一種資訊，<sup>27)</sup>性中規定氣之運動的所有訊息在內，氣收到此資訊決定其運動的方向，因此朱子說：

天地之間，有理有氣。理也者，形而上之道也，生物之本也。氣也者，形而下之氣也，生物之具也。是以人物之生，必稟此理然後有性，必稟此氣然後有形，雖不外乎一身，然其道器之間，分際甚明，不可亂也。……所謂人受以生，所謂動作威儀之則者，性也，非形也。<sup>28)</sup>

但氣有清濁、正偏等質上的差異。若太濁、太偏，氣無法順利接收性的訊息，無法按照性的訊息、內容規定運動。但若是清、正的氣，性的資訊順利圓滿傳達到氣，氣的運動完全按照性的資訊開展。在這種情況，氣的運動完全反映著性的內容，筆者認為‘理通’、‘理之流行’應該指這種狀態。在這裡需要注意的是，接收性的訊息是氣先天具有的本質，氣的運動自然地、必然地受到性的規定，並不需要借第三者的力量，從外面主宰式的依理控制情的運動。<sup>29)</sup>總之，在心性論的脈絡上，氣收到性的資訊規定

26) 牟宗三先生說：“朱子所謂‘具’或‘包’是心知之明之認知地具，涵攝地具，‘包’亦如之。……在此心知之明之認知作用中把理帶進來，而云‘即在吾心’，‘心具萬理’，‘心包衆理’。”(見氏著：《心體與性體》第三冊，臺北：正中書局，1968，頁357)(Mou Zong san, *Xinti and Xingtí*, vol.3, Taipei: Chen Chung Book Co., 1968, pp.357)蔡先生也明確說：“‘心具萬理’，乃是‘心知之明’之認知地具，涵攝地具。……心有‘知覺’，所以能‘具’此理。……這樣講的‘心具理’，實只是後天(工夫)的‘當具’，而不是先天的‘本具’。”(蔡仁厚：《朱子的工夫論》，收入鍾彩鈞編：《國際朱子學會議論文集》上冊，頁15)(Cai Renhou, “Zhu zi’s Gongfu Theory”, in Chung Tsai chun ed., *Proceedings of the International Conference in Zhuism*, vol.1, Taipei: The Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy in the Academia Sinica, 1993, pp.15)


27) 朱子說“性非有物，只是一箇道理之在我者耳”(《朱子文集》，卷74，〈玉山講義〉，頁3733)(Zhu Xi, *Zhuji wenji*, vol.74, “Yushan jiangyi”, pp.3733)朱子所謂的‘道理’，現代式的說，可以視為‘道德資訊’。朱子認為人先天內具完整的道德資訊，因此理論上可以實踐道德行為。

28) 《朱子文集》陸，卷58，〈答黃道夫一〉，頁2798。(Zhu Xi, *Zhuji wenji*, vol. 6: 58, “Da Huang Daofu Yi”, pp. 2798)


其運動而形成的結果就是情。實際運動的確實是氣而已(圖A)，但若沒有性的資訊，無法形成情。情的內容由性決定。換個角度來說，情可以視為性(理)的資訊、內容以氣為媒介、載體(材料)具體化、現象化，展現自己的結果。因此，朱子如下說：

凡人之能言語動作，思慮營為，皆氣也，而理存焉。故發而為孝弟忠信仁義禮智，皆理也。<sup>30)</sup>

在這個意義上，確實可以成立性(理)是體，情是用，性發的結果就是情這種觀點。(圖B)



<圖A>



<圖B>

29) 歷來一般認為朱子學的工夫要點就在控制情的發動，也就是說使情(氣的運動)符合理這一點，但筆者認為嚴格而言，這種理解不恰當。因為根據如上所說明的朱子性情結構脈絡，問題不是在‘情’符合不符合‘理’這一點，而在作為作用的‘情’的形成能不能圓滿體現作為本體的‘性’這一點。換句話說，問題在‘情’上反映或傳達‘性’之訊息的程度。若‘性’的訊息順利圓滿傳達就會形成沒有過不及的理想道德情感。因此，從朱子的脈絡而言，工夫修養不是由外在的理來調整情的發動或使情刻意符合規範之‘理’，而是使作為作用的‘情’圓滿體現、反映作為本體的‘性’這樣的內在性行為。

30) 《朱子語類》一，卷4，頁65。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, vol.1: 4, pp.65〕

### 三、朱子思想中的‘知’義

以上確認了在朱子思想脈絡下的‘情’基本上是人類內在的‘性’，亦即‘理’（道理、資訊）本身的展現、現象化、具體化。朱子所謂‘心’乃是將‘性’、‘情’兩者統一掌握的概念，心的具體內容就是‘性’與‘情’。筆者認為若如此理解朱子的心性論，朱子的‘格物致知’這一工夫論的結構、目的也比較通順的了解。

誠如眾所皆知的，朱子根據《大學》，提倡‘格物’→‘致知’→‘誠意’→‘正心’這一工夫的步驟。但為什麼為了達到‘誠意、正心’需要‘格物致知’呢？‘格物致知’如何連接到‘誠意、正心’呢？據一般的邏輯、思維，‘知’的層次與‘意’的層次很難連結。但朱子明確強調說：“欲誠意者，必先有以致其知。”<sup>31)</sup>筆者認為關於這些問題，歷來學界並沒有提出有說服力的解釋。一般認為‘格物致知’是屬於認識論範疇的工夫，<sup>32)</sup>但若單純地從認識論的角度來解釋‘格物致知’，可能無法正確了解朱子‘格物致知’論裡原來的脈絡。據筆者的理解，朱子所謂‘格物致知’的‘知’並不是像現代人所理解的認知義的‘知’，這一點由以下的朱子的說明很清楚：

若夫知則心之神明，妙衆理而宰萬物者也，人莫不有，而或不能使其表裏洞然，無所不盡，則隱微之間，真妄錯雜，雖欲勉強以誠之，亦不可得而誠矣。故欲誠意者，必先有以致其知。<sup>33)</sup>

如此，朱子將‘知’定義為‘心之神明，妙衆理而宰萬物者’。這一定義雖然不是容易理解的，但可以確認朱子所謂的‘知’不是單純的向外認知、判別事物(理)的作用。在思考朱子‘知’義時，我們應該注意朱子針對‘知’常使用‘盡’這個動詞這一點：

物致者，物理之極處無不到也。知至者，吾心之所知無不盡也。知既盡，則意可得而實矣。意既實，則心可得而正矣。<sup>34)</sup>

31) 朱熹：《大學或問》，收入氏著，黃坤校點：《四書或問》（上海：上海古籍出版社·安徽教育出版社，2001年），頁7-8。（以下再引皆簡稱為《大學或問》）[Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, in Huang Shen collation, *Sishu huowen*, Shanghai: Shanghai Classic Publishing House and Anhui Education Publishing House, 2001, pp. 7-8]

32) 如上所述，牟宗三、蔡厚仁、李明輝先生等都朱子的‘知’解釋為‘認知’理的能力，日本著名的宋明理學研究者島田虔次先生也將‘知’理解為‘認識作用’（見氏著：《朱子學と陽明學》，東京：岩波書店，1967年，頁103）[Kenji Shimada, *Zhuism and Yang-ming study*, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, Publishers., 1967, pp. 103]，將‘所知’解釋為‘自己的知識內容’（見氏著：《大學·中庸》上，東京：朝日新聞社出版局，1978年，頁67）。[Kenji Shimada, *Daxue and Zhongyong*, Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Publications Inc., 1978, pp. 67]

33) 《大學或問》，頁7-8。[Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, pp. 7-8]

34) 朱熹：《大學章句》，收入氏著：《四書章句集注》（北京：中華書局，1983年），頁4。（以下再引皆簡稱為《大學章句》）[Zhu Xi, *Daxue zhangju*, in *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1983, pp. 4]

如此朱子將通過‘格物’達到的‘知至’這一境界解釋為‘吾心之所知無不盡’的狀態，強調‘知’能夠‘盡’，‘意’才能獲得‘實’(誠)，而‘心’成為‘正’。這一過程可以如下圖式化：

物致 = 知盡 → 意實(誠) → 心正

‘盡’義類似於發揮，其對象應該是原先具有的某種力量或能力、功能。既然朱子對‘知’使用‘盡’這一動詞，可以判斷朱子所理解的‘知’應該是人心本來具有的某種能力或功能。果然朱子有說‘若夫知則心之神明……人莫不有’、‘吾心之所知’。因此，我們可以確認朱子所理解的‘知’並不是從零開始透過‘格物’漸漸累積或擴大的，而是先天圓滿地內在具備的，但每個人不一定完全發揮用盡它，所以需要透過‘格物’使它好好發揮這種性質的。

那麼為什麼‘知盡’，也就是說‘知’這一功能完全發揮，能夠使‘意’成為‘實’(誠)呢？到底‘知’的具體內容是什麼呢？為了解決這個問題，我們需要回過頭看朱子對‘知’賦予的定義：“心之神明，妙衆理而宰萬物者”。由此一定義可以確認，朱子所理解的‘知’是‘心’所具有的關涉到‘理’，亦即形而上的層次，以及‘物’，亦即形而下的層次兩方面的神妙功能。其具體的內容可以參考《朱子語類》中的以下說明：

大凡道理皆是我自有之物，非從外得。所謂知者，便只是知得我底道理，非是以我之知去知彼道理也。道理固本有，用知，方發得出來。若無知，道理何從而見。<sup>35)</sup>

從這一段可以確認以下的觀點：

- 1、我們先天內在具備‘道理’
- 2、‘知’的對象並不是外在的‘道理’，而是自己內具的‘道理’
- 3、內具的‘道理’用‘知’才能展現出來

朱子認為人類作為‘性’內具萬理，亦即世界的一切道理，這一點大家熟悉的朱子學的常識，而現在要注意的是朱子認為這些道理‘用知’才能‘發得出來’，也就是說內具的道理變成看得見的狀態這一觀點、邏輯。在朱子思想的脈絡，人類內具的道理就是‘性’(萬理)，因此，這一段的觀點可以解釋為‘性’用‘知’才能‘發’。如上所述，朱子的心性論的基本觀點是‘性’發為‘情’，性情關係是體用關係。關於性發為情的實際結構已經如上面加以分析過。若是如此，

<sup>35)</sup> 《朱子語類》二，卷17，頁382。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, vol.2: 17, pp.382〕由這一句可確認，如上所介紹的朱子所謂‘心具理’，不是‘先天的本具’，而‘認知地具’、‘當具’、‘涵攝地具’這種詮釋可能無法成立。



‘道理固本有，用知，方發得出來’這一觀點，從心性論的角度來看，可以理解為‘性’透過‘知’才能發為‘情’。於是，筆者認為朱子所理解的‘知’是將內在的形上之‘理’（道理）現象化、具體化的功能，換言之，使‘性’發為‘情’的功能。若沒有‘知’這一功能，人心內具的性（理）永遠停留在形而上的世界，無法展現於形而下的世界，無法確認、證實其實際的存在。所以朱子才說‘若無知，道理何從而見’。‘到此，我們可以了解，為什麼朱子將‘知’定義為‘妙衆理而宰萬物者’。‘知’就是對內在的形而上層次的‘衆理’加以現象化、具體化的神妙功能，所以說‘妙衆理’，如此被現象化、具體化的‘衆理’作為‘情’或‘意’必然接觸外在世界，進而宰制‘萬物’，所以說‘宰萬物’。

若將‘知’理解為把‘理’（性）現象化、具體化的功能，‘格物致知’論中的從‘致知’到‘誠意’的結構也可以通順地理解。首先確認‘誠意’的意思：

心者，身之所主也。誠，實也。意者，心之所發也。實其心之發，欲其一於善而無自欺也。<sup>36)</sup>

物格者，事物之理，各有以詣其極而無餘之謂也。理之在物者，既詣其極而無餘，則知之在我者，亦隨所詣而無不盡矣。知無不盡，則心之所發能一於理而無自欺矣。<sup>37)</sup>

理有未窮，故其知有不盡，知有不盡，則其心之所發，必不能純於義理而無雜乎物欲之私。此其所以意有不誠，心有不正，身有不修，而天下國家不可得而治也。<sup>38)</sup>

由此可以確認朱子所謂的‘意’乃是‘心之所發’。但需要注意的是‘心之所發’並不是‘心’發的結果成為‘意’的意思，而是‘意’就是已發層次的‘心’這樣的意思。因此朱子也如下說：

心，言其統體。意是就其中發處。<sup>39)</sup>

如前述所檢討、確認的，朱子的‘心’乃是性情的統體，由未發層次的‘性’與已發層次的‘情’構成的。因此，作為‘心之所發’的‘意’可以理解為相當於‘情’。筆者認為‘意’、‘情’是同樣指出‘心’的已發層次的概念，將‘心’之已發層次從不同的角度來說明而已。另外，‘誠’義是‘實’，因此‘誠意’是使‘心之所發’成為‘實’。而關於‘實’義，根據朱子的說明，它是‘其一於善而無自欺’、‘一於理而無自欺’、‘純於義理而無雜乎物欲之私’這樣的狀態。‘意’（已發層次的‘心’）成為純一於‘理’（義理、善）是何種狀態呢？如上所述，‘意’相當於朱子心性論上的‘情’，因此‘意’是性（理）發的結果、性（理）的具體作用。而性（理）發為‘意’（情），其實如上所述，氣收到性的訊息，規定運動的方向而形成‘意’（情）

36) 《大學章句》，頁4。〔Zhu Xi, *Daxue zhangju*, pp.4〕

37) 《大學或問》，頁8。〔Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, pp. 8〕

38) 《大學或問》，頁23。〔Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, pp. 23〕

39) 《朱子語類》一，卷15，頁304。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, vol.1: 15, pp.304〕

這樣的意思。所以意的形成必然以‘氣’為材料、媒介。但‘氣’的品質上有清濁正偏的差異，若是濁偏的氣，無法完整地、正確地傳達‘性’(理)的所有訊息，結果性的資訊、內容不一定完全反映在‘意’(情)上。若‘意’的形成上混雜來自‘性’(理)之外的訊息，其‘意’不能純一於‘理’，結果無法達到‘誠意’。

因此，實現‘誠意’的關鍵就在‘性’(理)的訊息能不能傳達到‘意’(情)上，換句話說，‘性’(理)的訊息、內容能不能完全具體化、現象化這一點。於是，‘誠意’確實關連到‘致知’。如上所確認，朱子所謂的‘知’是將理具體化、現象化的功能。朱子認為人類先天具有這一‘知’的功能，而這一功能本來是圓滿的，因此道理上人類可以完全實現內具的‘性’亦即萬理。但實際上受到氣質的影響，有時無法發揮本來具有的‘知’的功能，無法完全實現‘性’(理)，也就是說，‘性’的訊息無法完全傳達到‘意’(情)。這一狀態就是‘意’不‘誠’的狀態。因此，要達到‘誠意’必須完全發揮‘知’這一功能。在上面的引文中，朱子再三強調‘知無不盡’，亦即完全發揮‘知’，才能使‘心之所發(意)’一於理而無自欺’的理由也在這裡。

朱子認為萬物都具有‘理’，從‘理’的角度來說，萬物之間並沒有異同。<sup>40)</sup>但關於這種‘知’(‘知覺’)，除了一部分的動物之外，基本上人類才有的。僅人類具有完整的‘知’，也就是說，能夠圓滿實現萬理(性)。朱子說：

天之生物，有有血氣知覺者，人獸是也。有無血氣知覺而但有生氣者，草木是也。有生氣已絕，但有形質臭味者，枯槁是也。是雖其分之殊，而其理則未嘗不同。但以其分之殊，則其理之在是者，不能不異。故人為最靈，而備有五常之性。禽獸則昏，而不能備。草木枯槁，則又並與其知覺者而亡焉，但其所以為是物之理，則未嘗不具焉。<sup>41)</sup>

‘知’(‘知覺’)的有無與‘氣’有關係的。<sup>42)</sup>關於這一點，《朱子語類》中的以下這段話有相當仔細的說明：

人之所以生，理與氣合而已。天理固浩浩不窮，然非是氣，則雖有是理而無所湊泊。故必二氣交感，凝結生聚，然後是理有所附著。凡人之能言語動作，思慮營為，皆氣也，而理存焉。故發而為孝弟忠信仁義禮智，皆理也。然而二氣五行，交感萬變，故人物之生，有精粗之不同。自一氣而言之，則人物皆受是氣而生；自精粗而言，則人得其氣之正且通者，物得其氣之偏且塞者。惟人得其正，故是理通而無所塞；物得其偏，故是理塞而無所知。且如人，頭圓象天，足方象地，平正端直，以其受天地之正氣，所以識道理，有知識。物受天地之偏氣，所以禽獸橫生，草木頭生向

40) 例如朱子說：“然以其理而言之，則萬物一原，固無人物貴賤之殊。”(《大學或問》上，頁3)〔Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, pp. 3〕

41) 《朱子文集》陸，卷59，〈答餘方叔〉，頁2912-2913。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuji wenji*, vol.6: 59, “Da Yu Fangshu”, pp. 2912-2913〕

42) 在朱子思想，區別人、物的關鍵在‘知覺’，而決定‘知覺’之有無及昏明’的因素在‘氣’這一點，李明輝先生也已經仔細討論、闡明。但關於‘知’、‘知覺’的理解，筆者與李先生有差異。詳參李明輝：〈朱子論惡之根源〉，頁25-26。〔Lee Ming hui, “Discussion on the roots of evil in Zhu zi’s thoughts”, pp. 25-26〕

下，尾反在上。物之間有知者，不過只通得一路，如鳥之知孝，獺之知祭，犬但能守禦，牛但能耕而已。人則無不知，無不能。人所以與物異者，所爭者此耳。然就人之所稟而言，又有昏明清濁之異。故上知生知之資，是氣清明純粹，而無一毫昏濁，所以生知安行，不待學而能，如堯舜是也。其次則亞於生知，必學而後知，必行而後至。又其次者，資稟既偏，又有所蔽，須是痛加工夫，‘人一己百，人十己千’，然後方能及亞於生知者。及進而不已，則成功一也。孟子曰：‘人之所以異於禽獸者幾希。’人物之所以異，只是爭這些子。若更不能存得，則與禽獸無以異矣！<sup>43)</sup>

若整理以上朱子的觀點，大概如下：‘人’所稟受的‘氣’是‘正且通’的，因此‘理通而無所塞’，人能夠‘識道理，有知識’，‘無不知，無不能’的原因在這裡。相對於此，‘物’所稟受的‘氣’是‘偏且塞’的，因此‘理塞而無所知’。‘物’中也有‘有知者’，但他們‘只通得一路’，受到限制的‘知’，不像人那樣的全面性的‘知’。由這一段的內容可以確認，朱子認為人、物之間的差異就在有沒有‘知’這一點，而有沒有‘知’，與‘理’通不通、塞不塞有關係，且‘理’通不通、塞不塞與‘氣’的品質又有關係。從這個脈絡可以較清楚地了解，朱子所謂的‘知’是內在之‘理’的訊息順利傳達(=‘通’)到‘氣’，‘理’的內容能夠完全現象化、具體化的意思。人與物同樣內具‘太極’(萬理)。人所稟受的‘氣’是‘正且通’的，所以‘人’道理上將內在的萬理(性)完全圓滿地現象化、具體化，也就是說實現萬理，向外界發動。‘物’雖然與人同樣內具理，但稟受‘偏且塞’的‘氣’，所以無法實現理。根據朱子的理解，區別人與物的關鍵就在能不能實現萬理，也就是說有沒有‘知’這一點。總之，我們可以確認朱子所謂的‘知’就是實現萬理的這一功能，於是很明白朱子將‘知’定義為‘妙衆理而宰萬物者’的用意。

關於理、氣與‘知覺’的關係，也可以參考《語類》中的以下記載：

問：知覺是氣之靈固如此，抑氣爲之邪？曰：不專是氣，是先有知覺之理，理未知覺，氣聚成形，理與氣合，便能知覺。……問：心之發處是氣否？曰：也只是知覺。<sup>44)</sup>

所覺者，心之理也。能覺者，氣之靈也。<sup>45)</sup>

由此可以確認，朱子所謂的‘知覺’只有‘氣’無法成立，必須以‘理’(‘心之理’)的存在爲前提。‘理’才是‘知覺’的種子、根源，但‘理’自己無法展示實際反應(‘知覺’)，必須依據‘氣’的質量以及動能。因此，‘知覺’是理氣合作的結果。若是如此，‘心之發’，亦即‘情’或‘意’，如上所檢討，不應該單純地認定爲‘氣’，應該從理氣合作的‘知覺’的角度來掌握。

43) 《朱子語類》一，卷4，頁65-66。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, vol.1: 4, pp.65-66〕

44) 《朱子語類》一，卷5，頁85。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, vol.1: 5, pp.85〕

45) 《朱子語類》一，卷5，頁85。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, vol.1: 5, pp.85〕

#### 四、朱子思想中的‘心’、‘知’、‘明德’

若朱子的‘知’義如上所檢討、所確認的，朱子思想中的‘心’、‘知’、‘明德’之間的關係也變比較清楚。日本德川時代的代表性朱子學者山崎闇齋分析朱子的言論，提出‘明德＝心＝知’這一觀點。<sup>46)</sup>一般認為《大學》所謂的‘明德’相當於朱子思想中的‘性’(理)。但在朱子思想中，‘明德’只有針對人類可說的，若‘明德’單純地意味著作為‘天理’的‘性’，不只人類而已，萬物都有內具‘天理’。<sup>47)</sup>而且朱子對‘明德’賦予的定義明確是：‘虛靈不昧，以具衆理而應萬事者’，這一定義完全相對應朱子的‘知’義：‘妙衆理而宰萬物者’。如上所說明，人類不僅內具天理，也具有將天理現象化、具體化，也就是說實現天理的功能，這就是‘知’，也就是‘明德’。在朱子思想的脈絡下，‘明明德’應該解釋為恢復本來具有的實現‘理’的工夫，也就是說試圖完全發揮原來具有的‘知’的工夫。

關於‘心’與‘知’、‘明德’之間的關係，如山崎闇齋加以分析，不得不承認朱子對‘心’賦予的定義與‘知’‘明德’的定義幾乎相同。

心者人之神明，所以具衆理而應萬事者也。<sup>48)</sup>

若夫知則心之神明，妙衆理而宰萬物者也。<sup>49)</sup>

心之知覺，即所以具此理而行此情者也。<sup>50)</sup>

- 46) 詳參《文會筆錄》卷3,《山崎闇齋全集》(東京：ぺりかん社, 1978年)第一冊, 頁170〔Complete Works of Yamazaki Ansai, in Japanese Classic Association ed., Tokyo: Perikansha Publishing Inc., 1978, vol. 1, pp. 170〕、《大學垂加先生講義》以及《日本思想大系31 山崎闇齋學派》(東京：岩波書店, 1980年), 頁24、44、47。〔Yamazaki Ansai, *Daxue chuijia xiansheng jiangyi*, in Nishi Junzo, Ryuichi Abe, Masao Maruyama ed, *The survey of Japanese ideas* 31: Yamazaki Ansai School, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, Publishers., 1980, pp. 24, pp. 44, pp. 47〕高島元洋先生認為這一闇齋的理解是錯誤的，闇齋完全誤解朱子思想。據高島先生的分析，朱子思想中的‘明德’是性(理)，‘明德’與‘心’並不相同。‘知’雖然是‘心’的重要作用，但不能將‘知’直接認定為‘心’本身。高島先生的見解可能符合學界一般的理解，但如下檢討、確認，筆者認為山崎闇齋的‘明德＝心＝知’這一觀點才符合朱子的思維。見高島元洋：《山崎闇齋—日本朱子學と垂加神道》(東京：ぺりかん社, 1992年)。(Motohiro Takashima, Yamazaki Ansai: *Japanese Zhuism and Suika Shinto*, Tokyo: Perikansha Publishing Inc., 1992)
- 47) 山崎闇齋敏銳地發覺這一點如下指出：“人、物同ク天理ヲ受クトイヘドモ，人ニ限リテ明德ト心ヲ云也。明德ト云名ハ，物ニ通ジテハ云ハレヌゾ。サルホドニ今，人之ト，人バカリヲ以云，是也。”(見氏著：《大學垂加先生講義》，《日本思想大系31 山崎闇齋學派》，頁24)。(Yamazaki Ansai, *Daxue chuijia xiansheng jiangyi*, in Nishi Junzo, Ryuichi Abe, Masao Maruyama ed, *The survey of Japanese ideas* 31: Yamazaki Ansai School, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, Publishers., 1980, pp. 24)
- 48) 朱熹：《孟子集注·盡心章句上》，《四書章句集注》，頁349。〔Zhu Xi, *Mengzi jizhu-jinxin zhangju shang*, in *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, pp. 349〕
- 49) 《大學或問》，頁7-8。〔Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, pp. 7-8〕
- 50) 《朱子文集》陸，卷55，〈答潘謙之一〉，頁2607。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi wenji*, vol.6: 55, “Da Pan Qianzhi Yi”, pp. 2607〕

其實朱子的‘心’義以‘知覺’為核心，這一點可以說學界的共識。朱子明確說：‘心者人之知覺，主於身而應事物者也。’<sup>51)</sup>、‘心則知覺之在人而具此理者也。’<sup>52)</sup>筆者認為朱子所謂作為‘心’義的‘知覺’是與‘格物致知’論上的‘知’等同的。因此，在朱子思想的脈絡，《孟子》所謂的‘盡心’相當於《大學》所謂的‘知至’：

《孟子》之所謂知性者，物格也。盡心者，知至也。<sup>53)</sup>

人先天具有‘具衆理而應萬事’的神妙功能(‘神明’)，這就是‘知’(‘知覺’)，也就是‘心’。朱子將‘具衆理而應萬事’這一‘知覺’功能，從不同的角度來說明為‘具此理而行此情’。從此可以證明朱子所理解的‘心’是跨越形而上的‘理’與形而下的‘情’的概念，更具體的說，‘心’是一方面內具‘理’(本體)，一方面將其‘理’轉換為‘情’(作用)，向外發動這樣的功能。這種理解完全符合‘心統性情’這一朱子的另外‘心’的定義。由以上的論證，筆者認為在朱子思想中確實可以成立‘心’=‘知’=‘明德’這一模式。總之，筆者認為朱子的思維脈絡應該可以如此整理。

人看到父母自然溢出親愛的情感，而展現對父母孝順的反應，看到嬰兒快掉進水井，自然溢出惻隱之情，而展現試圖搶救的反應，這就是朱子所理解的‘知’(‘知覺’)，朱子思想中的‘知’並不是單純的認知或判別外在對象的意思。人類本來具有按照外界的各種狀況，適當反應的功能，也就是圓滿的‘知’(知覺)。那麼為什麼在某種狀況(例如：嬰兒快掉進水井)，人類會產生特定的情感(例如：惻隱之情)呢？朱子認為人先天具有，所以產生那個情感的‘理’(性)(例如：仁)。依朱子的思維而言，各個情感、反應背後都有產生其情感、反應的原因，亦即‘理’(性)，這反過來說，因為有特定的‘理’(性)，所以才有特定的情。因此，‘理’(性)是本體，情是其作用。但形而上本體的‘理’轉換為形而下作用的情展現出來，需要以‘氣’為媒介，所以若氣質是偏、塞，‘理’無法轉換為情展現。雖然萬物都具有‘萬理’，但除了人類以及部分動物之外，無法產生情感、反應的理由就在這裡。人類稟受的氣質是正、通的，所以理論上先天內在的‘萬理’都可以作為具體的情展現出來，圓滿反應外界。朱子將人類才內具的將形上之‘理’轉換為形下之‘情’這種神妙的功能，亦即‘知’認定為‘心’。因為有‘心’，所以可以成立‘性’(體)→‘情’(用)這一現象，內在的性才能展現出來。人類與其他禽獸不同，能夠實現‘萬理’的原因，是因為有‘心’。關於朱子的這一邏輯，由以下的論述也可以證明：

51) 《朱子文集》柒，卷65，〈大禹謨解〉，頁3284。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi wenji*, vol.7: 65, “Dayumo jie”, pp. 3284〕

52) 《朱子文集》陸，卷58，〈答徐子融三〉，頁2812。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi wenji*, vol.6: 58, “Da Xu Zirong san”, pp. 2812〕

53) 《大學或問》，頁10。〔Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, pp. 10〕

蓋天之生物，其理固無差別，但人物所稟形氣不同，故其心有明暗之殊，而性有全不全之異耳。若所謂仁，則是性中四德之首，非在性外別為一物，而與性並行也。然惟人心至靈，故能全此四德，而發為四端，物則氣偏駁而心昏蔽，固有所不能全。然其父子之相親，君臣之相統，間亦有僅存而不昧者，然欲其克己復禮以為仁，善善惡惡以為義，則有所不能矣，然不可謂無是性也。若生物之無知覺者，則又其形氣偏中之偏者，故理之在是物者，亦隨其形氣而自為一物之理，雖若不復可論仁義禮智之彷彿，然亦不可謂無是性也。此理甚明，無難曉者。<sup>54)</sup>

朱子的意思非常清楚。從性(理)的角度來說，人與物之間沒有差異，同樣內具性。產生人物異同的關鍵在能不能實現內在的性這一點，而實現理的功能就是‘心’。人所稟受的氣是清、正、通的，因此其功能(心)比較‘明’且‘靈’，所以內在的性的內容可以完整地圓滿地展現為情(‘能全此四德，而發為四端’)。這種性(理)所具體展現出來的情當中，最主要的就是道德情感、道德反應，對朱子而言，這世界的道德如此根據內在的性成立的，<sup>55)</sup>因此本體之‘性’轉換成作用之‘情’的功能‘知’或‘心’，可以視為實現道德的功能，從這個角度來說，‘知’可以稱為‘明德’。

## 五、結語

就以上所檢討、闡明的內容加以簡單整理，大致如下。

在朱子思想，‘知’的基本意義是使本體之‘性’展現為作用之‘情’的功能，換言之，將‘理’具體化、現象化的功能，也可以說實現‘理’的能力。人因為有‘知’這一功能，所以按照外界的情況，將先天內具的‘性’(理)具體化而形成圓滿的情(意)，展現適當的行為。在這個意義上，‘知’是跨越內在的本體之‘性’與向外推動的‘情’(《大學》脈絡的‘意’)兩者，被定義為‘妙眾理而宰萬物’的理由也在這裡。若沒有‘知’，內在的性(理)無法展現為情(意)。

朱子認為人不僅先天內具作為天理的性，另外具有實際實現其天理的能力、功能，亦即‘知’。因為有‘知’，所以人可以發揮內在的天理(‘四德’等德性)，圓滿實現道德。朱子所理解的《大學》所謂‘明德’不外乎是這種‘知’的另外一種表現。‘明德’是當然以性(理)為核心、前提的概念，但其主要意義並不在性本身，而將性的內容作為情(意)具體化、現象化，適當地反應外界的狀況這一點。朱子將‘明德’定義為‘具眾理而應萬事者’的原因在這裡。因此，‘明明德’不僅單純地了解‘性’的內容，覺醒自己內具圓滿實現天理的功能、能力這一點，進一步發揮其功能這樣的工夫。

54) 《朱子文集》陸，卷58，頁2813。〔Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi wenji*, vol.6: 58, pp. 2813〕

55) 關於《中庸》的‘率性之謂道’，朱子如下解釋：“人物各循其性之自然，則其日用事物之間，莫不各有當行之路，是則所謂道也。”(見氏著：《中庸章句》，《四書章句集注》，頁17)〔Zhu Xi, *Zhongyong zhangju*, in *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, pp. 17〕

而若心由本體之性與作用之情構成的，性發為情這一性體情用關係由‘知’這一功能才能成立，理論上可以說‘心’由‘知’成立，換個角度來看，也許可以說人所具有的‘知’這一功能就是‘心’本身。朱子將‘知’解釋為‘心之神明’，將‘心’認定為‘人之神明’，所以‘具衆理而應萬事者’的理由在這裡。在朱子思想中，‘盡知’涉及到闡明‘吾心之全體大用’的理由也在這裡。

朱子認為人先天內具實現天理的靈妙功能，‘知’、‘明德’、‘心’三者其實從不同的角度表現這一功能的概念。而若將這一功能實體化並加以掌握，就可以稱其為‘心’，又若要形容其功能的正面價值，就可以稱其為‘明德’，進而若欲強調其功能、作用本身這一面向的話，就可稱其為‘知’（知覺）。筆者認為‘格物致知’等工夫的主要目的就在恢復、發揮人原本具有的這一功能。

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## ***Xin* and *Zhi* in the Thought of Zhu Xi: a Review of the Theory of *Xing-Xin* in the Thought of Zhu Xi**

FUJII Michiaki

### **Abstract**

There are core concepts such as *li*, *xin*, and *zhi* in the thought of Zhu Xi, which received considerable attention in the secondary literature. But, it seems that these concepts have not any longer been much discussed in recent years. In fact, there are no scholarly agreements about the interpretations of *li*, *xin*, and *zhi*. As for the meaning of *zhi*, it is often understood in relation to the perception of external things or beings or in relation to the recognition of metaphysical *li*. However, this understanding does not capture the original meaning of *zhi* in the thought of Zhu Xi. To my best knowledge, the theory of *ge wu zhi zhi* has not been reasonably interpreted and convincingly explained in accordance with the original context of Zhu Xi's philosophy. It is mainly because the reason why *cheng yi* is based on *zhi zhi* has not been fully explained. This paper aims to explore the meaning of *zhi* in the thought of Zhu Xi in its own context. To do this properly, this paper first examines the meanings of *xin* and *li* in his thought. Even though I already discussed the same topic in one of my previous papers, I attempt to offer my own explanations of the concepts of *zhi*, *xin*, and *li* in the thought of Zhu Xi in a better organized way.

**Keywords :** *li*, *xin*, *xing*, *qing*, *xin*, *zhi jue*, *ming de*

# 王船山對宋儒朱子主張‘告子認氣爲性’之反省 ——孟告之辯的詮釋

蔡 家 和

**中文摘要：**告子與孟子對於人性的論辯一直是哲學史上的重要議題，朱子對於孟告之辯的評論是，孟子知性之爲理，故爲正說；評論告子認氣爲性，故不知性。然船山在哲學史上亦屬氣學之說。故船山對於氣說護航，然船山學還是以孟子爲正，故重新以氣學的方式，對朱子的詮釋提出質疑；一方面認爲朱子視告子的認氣爲性之說是有誤的。因爲若真能懂氣，則能懂性。然也並不因此即視告子爲正統，一方面他亦指出告子之失，失於只識氣之用，而不識氣之體；另一方面，認爲告子以具象物喻性，則爲不知性。然孟子亦以物喻性，而船山於此間，如何折合孟子之喻爲正、而告子之喻不正，乃本文所要處理的問題。最後船山視告子以情才爲性，都是不知性，而不能談到性之至善；因爲情、才可善可惡，而不到性善之層次。吾人認爲船山與朱子對於氣的定義實有不同，故於文中申論之。

**關鍵詞：**性、氣、告子、犬牛之性、知覺運動。

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## 一、前言

朱子以自己的《大學》的架構詮釋《四書》，於是《四書》的思想都要以格物窮理為本，此乃朱子的背後架構使然，其背後架構的真正起作用者是理氣論。朱子正是以理氣論詮釋《四書》，包括《孟子》。《孟子》的〈告子上篇〉前幾章記載著孟子與告子的論辯。朱子於其中第三章‘生之謂性章’的注釋結尾處，做了一個總結的說明，以說明告子之失，所失何在，朱子言：

告子不知性之為理，而以所謂氣者當之，是以杞柳湍水之喻，食色無善無不善之說，縱橫繆戾，紛紜舛錯，而此章之誤乃其本根。所以然者，蓋徒知知覺運動之蠢然者，人與物同；而不知仁義禮智之粹然者，人與物異也。孟子以是折之，其義精矣。<sup>1)</sup>

孟告之辯，於《孟子·告子上》記載，前四章是孟子本人親自與告子論辯，朱子亦是孟子性善論的忠實者，故站在孟子這一邊，而視告子有誤，然其錯誤之源，於〈告子上〉的第三章，朱子認為最為明顯，也是根源所在，即是告子誤在認氣為性，‘性’在朱子學中，就本然之性而言，只是理，性是天理，是形而上者，若認錯，視之為形下則有誤。然孟子之辯的本旨原意為何，不是吾人此文所要討論的重點，原意也不易求得，另一方面孟告之辯亦可謂是孟子學中最難解的一段。<sup>2)</sup>而當朱子說告子認氣為性，則是以他自己的架構來詮釋孟告之辯、詮釋告子，因為在朱子的理氣二分之架構下，性或是認之為理，或是氣，而孟子認對了，以性即理；告子錯了，認性為氣。在此公平一點的說法是，告子之認性為氣，是在朱子的系統裡，才視告子論性為氣。<sup>3)</sup>然船山學，一般視之為重氣之學<sup>4)</sup>，若船山承認朱子的講法，

1) 朱熹：《四書章句集注》(台北：鵝湖出版社，1984年)，頁326。[Zhu, X.: *Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu (Collected Commentaries in Chapters and Sentences of the Four Books)*, Taipei: E Hu Publishing, 1984, p.326].

2) 當代新儒家牟宗三先生以七十多歲的功力，詮釋孟告之辯，寫於《圓善論》一書，亦可知要進入孟告之辯的義理，要累積很久的功力始可。此可參見牟宗三：《圓善論》(臺北：台灣學生書局，1985年)，頁1-27。[Mou, Z.S.: *Yuan Shan Lun*, Taipei: Taiwan Hsueh Sheng Books, 1985, pp.1-27]. 又象山有言：“《告子》一篇，自『牛山之木嘗美矣』以下可常讀之，其浸灌、培植之益，當日深日固也。其卷首與告子論性處，卻不必深考，恐其力量未到，則反感亂精神，後日不患不通解也。”見陸九淵著，鐘哲點校：《陸九淵集》(北京：中華書局，1980年)，頁92。[Lu, J.Y., Zhong Z.D. ed.: *Lu Jiu Yuan Ji*, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1980, p.92]. 此看出，象山亦認為孟告論性處之難解。

3) “朱子釋孟子有曰：‘告子不知性之為理，而以所謂氣者當之，蓋徒知知覺運動之蠢然者，人與物同，而不知仁義禮智之粹然者，人與物異也。’如其說，孟子但舉人物詰之可矣，又何分牛之性、犬之性乎？犬與牛之異，非有仁義禮智之粹然者，不得謂孟子以仁義禮智詰告子明矣。”戴震：《戴震集》(上海：上海古籍出版社，1980年)，頁294。[Dai, Z.: *Dai Zhen Chi (Collection of Dai Zhen)*, Shanghai: Shanghai Gi Ji Publishing, 1980, p.294]. 此表示以戴震的義理，就不取朱子的認定，即認定告子認氣為性等見解。戴震的意思是若以仁義禮智以分人禽，則孟子何必多問了牛性是犬性嗎？

即告子認性爲氣的講法，而船山所視的性也是氣學，則船山等於是承認自己是告子之學。在宋明理學中，大致都以孟子爲正統，故視與孟子論辯者常是敗方，如告子，是邪說也，故船山與一般的宋明儒者一樣，亦不願意認爲自己是告子之學。<sup>5)</sup>

面對朱子認定的告子之失，失於認氣爲性，船山自己是氣學，不會做此承認，船山於此做了個巧妙的區別，其區分所謂的氣之體與氣之用，把氣區分爲體、用。船山認爲自己的氣學，是即體即用，故若真能識氣者，是識氣之體用，他自認這是正統的儒學思想，這是孟子之學，而不是告子之學；而告子之失，不是失之於認氣爲性，而是認‘氣之用’爲性，而不知性除了氣之用外還有氣之體。這是船山的巧妙區分，然也的確是其氣論的主張，其氣是即於體用的氣，是兩端一致的氣，是不離理的氣，氣本身既有形下義涵、亦有形上義涵<sup>6)</sup>，與朱子的氣只是形下者的見解不大相同。依此船山展開申辯，亦可謂對於孟告之辯所做成的自己之重新詮釋，重新以氣學方式詮釋孟子，而不取朱子的詮釋。而吾人本文可謂對於孟告之辯，朱子與船山的詮釋做一比較；船山不取朱子之學，而歸宗於橫渠的氣論來對孟告之辯做一重新詮釋。本文的主要參考資料，於朱子，以其《孟子章句集注》爲本；於船山選取其《讀四書大全說》，準確地說是其《讀孟子大全說》。船山作此書的用意，主要是對於《四書大全》中的程朱體系的詮釋方式之質疑，進而以自己的氣論，或說是同於橫渠的氣論方式，重新詮釋《孟子》。依此，進到第二節。

4) 唐君毅言：“當明清之際，能上承宋明儒學之問題，反對王學之流，亦不以朱子之論爲已足，而上承張橫渠之即氣言心性之思路，又對心性之廣大精微有所見，而能自樹新義，以補宋明儒之所不足者，則王船山是也。”唐君毅：《中國哲學原論·原性篇》（臺北：台灣學生書局，1990年），頁503。[Tang, J.Y.: *The Original Doctrine of Chinese Philosophy: Chapter of Natura Nature*, Taipei: Taiwan Hsueh Sheng Books, 1990, p.503]。又言：“宋明理學中，我們通常分爲程朱陸王二派，而實則張橫渠乃自成一派，程朱一派之中心概念是理，陸王一派之中心概念是心。張橫渠之概念中心是氣。……『理』之觀念在其系統中，乃第二義以下之概念。”唐君毅：《哲學論集》（臺北：台灣學生書局，1990年），頁219。[Tang, J.Y.: *Philosophy Essays*, Taipei: Taiwan Hsueh Sheng Books, 1990, p.219]。以唐先生的觀點，張子爲氣學，而船山又繼張子，故可視船山爲氣論。

5) 象山與朱子互批對方是告子之學，如象山批朱子格物於外是義外之學，是告子之學；而朱子批象山的不讀書是禪學，禪學作用見性，與告子的以知覺運動爲性一樣，故朱子亦視象山是告子之學。可見宋明儒者都不想自居告子之學。“象山死，先生率門人往寺中哭之。既罷，良久，曰：‘可惜死了告子！’”（此說得之文卿。泳）。黎靖德編：《朱子語類》第8冊（台北：文津出版社，1986年），第124卷，陸氏，頁2979。[Li, C.T. ed.: *Chu Tzu Yu Lei (Quotations From Zhu Zi)* (8), Taipei: Wen Chin Publishing, 1986, Vol. 124, Lushi, p.2979]。

6) 吾人所謂的形上形下性，是依於朱子的定義，形而上者爲道，爲理，形而下者爲器，爲氣。若依此，朱子的氣只有形下義，而船山定義的氣，氣中有理，故有形上與形下義涵，理中有氣。

## 二、船山認為告子之失於何？

船山對於孟告之辯，其中的問題意識是，朱子的詮釋在於告子之認性為氣，朱子以其理氣二元的解法，視孟子言性是理不是氣，而告子之失，就在於認氣為性。船山認為若真能懂氣者，則是正統，則可提升到孟子的地位了，豈還需批評之呢？因為船山心目中的氣，不同於朱子的形下義。船山不認同告子之失在認氣為性，而船山又要站在孟子一邊以反告子，那麼船山認為告子有何失可言呢？船山既然亦以孟子為宗，故要判定告子的缺失之處，不在認氣為性，又將缺失於何呢？以下分為三點以言之，首先船山認為告子之失在於只懂氣之用，而不知氣之體。

### (1) 告子失於只懂氣之用而不知氣之體

船山言：

朱子謂告子只是認氣為性，其實告子但知氣之用，未知氣之體，並不曾識得氣也。告子說‘勿求於氣’，使其能識氣之體，則豈可云‘勿求’哉！若以告子所認為性之氣乃氣質之氣，則荀悅、王充‘三品’之言是已。告子且以凡生皆同，猶凡白皆白者為性，中間並不分一人、禽等級，而又何有於氣質之差也！<sup>7)</sup>

船山認為若真能懂氣，則是正統，如船山所做成者；而真能懂氣者，是要體用兼備，告子只是知氣之用，而不知氣之體，故亦不懂氣。故以船山的判斷而言，朱子批評告子認氣為性亦有失誤，真能認氣之體用為性，則是正統。孟子於〈不動心章〉中提到告子的“不得於心，勿求於氣”，孟子評曰“可”。<sup>8)</sup>而朱子對於此‘可’的詮釋是：“然凡曰可者，亦僅可而有所未盡之辭耳。”<sup>9)</sup>船山在此的詮釋亦是認同朱子的意思，即告子的“不得於心，勿求於氣”，是有所未盡。何者未盡呢？依於船山，乃是告子的未盡之處在於，不得於心，還是要求於氣。故船山依著《孟子》記載告子之言，於是認定告子不知氣，若知氣者，必求氣，豈能勿求呢？既然告子不求於氣，則朱子的告子評定亦不中肯。此乃船山以自己氣論的推理及詮釋，以證成己說。

又船山認定告子之失，即是只懂氣之用，而不懂真正的氣，也不在於告子以氣質三品之說以明性、以明氣。在此應該是針對程朱見解所做的批評，因為程朱對於氣之說，有以氣質言之，例如公都子問性章中的或曰：‘有性

7) 王夫之：《船山全書》第6冊(湖南長沙：岳麓書社，1996年)，頁1052。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu (Collected Works of Chuan-shan)*, Vol.6, Changsha, Hunan: Yuelu Publishing House, 1996, p.1052].

8) 見朱熹：《四書章句集注》，頁230。[Zhu, X.: *Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu (Collected Commentaries in Chapters and Sentences of the Four Books)*, p.230].

9) 朱熹：《四書章句集注》，頁230。[Zhu, X.: *Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu (Collected Commentaries in Chapters and Sentences of the Four Books)*, p.230].

善有性不善’，朱子詮釋爲“韓子性有三品之說蓋如此。”<sup>10)</sup>而朱子又曰：“韓子三品之說只說得氣，不曾說得性。”<sup>11)</sup>亦是說朱子把韓子之說等同於‘或曰’之說，或曰者認爲有性善、有性不善。而韓子又等同於告子的認氣爲性，故韓子、告子、兩位或曰者，其實都一樣，都是認氣爲性，而告子的氣既同於韓子，則亦是三品之說，則有氣稟之分別。於此可見船山所批評者，正是程朱，批評他們二點，第一，其視告子認氣爲性，船山認爲告子不懂氣，豈有認氣爲性！第二，程朱視告子的氣論，屬氣質之氣，船山反對，其認爲告子之失只是認得氣之用，並不真懂氣，告子也無所謂的氣質三品之說的氣論，這些都是程朱學說妄加於告子之上，告子並無此。<sup>12)</sup>船山爲何主張告子無氣質之差呢？船山的理由在於告子的生之謂性，所謂性者，生也，此生也，共同者也，不是差別，故無等級。只要跟白有關者，白雪、白羽，都是白，都是性，都是生，人性同於物性，因爲都是生，故無等級之差，而朱子視告子有如此之氣質等級之差別，船山認爲誤矣。除此之外，船山認爲告子尚有缺失，如下一小節所述。

## (2)性不可喻而告子喻之

《孟子·告子上》的前幾章，告子喜歡舉具象之例以喻性，其所喻者計有，於第一章以杞柳喻性，以栝櫟喻義；第二章又以湍水喻性，第三章又以白、生等喻性，然依於船山的見解，此正是告子對於性的無知，理由在於，性不可爲喻。性是什麼，於人稱之爲人性，於物爲物性，孟子有山之性、水之性之說，性是物之爲物的特色本質，而不是一樣具體東西可以拿出來捉摸，人性乃就可以人可實踐仁義的本性善，牛性耕，馬性奔，故孟子言以故爲性，而不鑿。<sup>13)</sup>即回到以往的本性，牛依於上古百代之牛性，未嘗

10) 朱熹：《四書章句集注》，頁328。[Zhu, X.: *Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu*(*Collected Commentaries in Chapters and Sentences of the Four Books*), p.328].

11) 胡廣編：《四書大全》(台北：台灣商務印書館，1986年)收於文淵閣四庫全書，第205冊，頁765。[Hu, K. ed.: *Si Shu Da Quan* (*Collection of Commentaries on the Four Books*), Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1986. Photocopying of *Wen Yuan Ge Si Ku Quan Shu* (*The Complete Collection of the Four Treasures: Based on the Wenyuan Pavilion*), vol. 205, p.765].

12) 朱子於〈告子上〉第一章，認爲告子近於荀子，第二章，認爲告子似於楊雄，第三章認爲告子似於佛氏。見朱熹：《四書章句集注》，頁325-326。[Zhu, X.: *Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu*(*Collected Commentaries in Chapters and Sentences of the Four Books*), pp.325-326]. 由此可見，第一，視告子的氣如氣質三品之說的見解者是程朱，船山正是批評程朱。第二，朱子把告子等同於荀子、佛氏、胡宏、楊雄等人，都是認性爲氣者。又可參見丁爲祥之言，“從他對陸象山之‘從蕙嶺帶來’與‘可惜死了告子’這種雙重標準混雜的定位來看，也說明他確實劃不清二者的界線。”丁爲祥：《學術性格與思想譜系——朱子的哲學視野及其歷史影響的發生學考察》(北京：人民出版社，2012年)，頁357。[Ding, W. X., *Academic Characteristic and Thinking Pedigree: Ontology Study on Chu Tzu's Philosophical Vision and Historical Effect*, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2012, p.357]. 此處說明了朱子總是以理氣二元來做歸類，孟子的性歸於理，則其他人則歸於氣，故告子等同於象山，因都認氣(心)爲性。

有變，馬亦如此。當然到了朱子的體系，又有性即理之說，然是否是孟子的意思尚可商量，在此吾人跳過朱子的體系，只就船山認為告子的偏差處於何，船山認為：

告子說‘性猶杞柳’，‘猶湍水’，只說箇‘猶’字便差。人之有性，卻將一物比似不得，他生要捉摸推測，說教似此似彼，總緣他不曾見得性是箇甚麼；若能知性，則更無可比擬者。<sup>14)</sup>

船山認定性不可比喻，告子言語中，‘性猶杞柳’等，其中的猶字，以此例彼，用具體之物作喻，讓人對抽象者容易理解，然船山認為本意是要讓人理解，但是一旦例之，反而造成困惑，反而容易產生錯誤而不知性，如人性，乃人之為人的特色，只表現在具體人的行為動作中，如能實踐孝慈等，卻不可共相<sup>15)</sup>化，把它視為一物。<sup>16)</sup>既然船山視告子為不知性，因為以比喻言性是不知性，那麼怎樣才算是知性呢？船山言：

孟子斬截說箇‘善’，是推究根原語。善且是繼之者，若論性，只喚做性便足也。性裏面自有仁、義、禮、智、信之五常，與天之元、亨、利、貞同體，不與惡作對。故說善，且不如說誠。唯其誠，是以善；（誠於天，是以善於人。）惟其善，斯以有其誠。（天善之，故人能誠之。）所有者誠也，有所有者善也。則孟子言善，且以可見者言之。可見者，可以盡性之定體，而未能即以顯性之本體。夫然，其得以萬物之形器動作為變化所偶有者取喻之乎？先儒窮治告子之失，不曾至此，非所謂片言折獄也。<sup>17)</sup>

船山認為孟子說性是善，便已足矣，若足，則不用再以具體物喻之，如告子所做成者。善是繼天道而為善，而性只是成之者為性，性只是性，說其為必善則可，不用再譬。船山還認為性善的善是天道、是誠，不與惡對，世間的善與世間的惡相對，然此善是根源的善，善與誠可謂互換之語，所擁有的根源稱之為誠，而人能擁有以具成者，此為善，不只善，且是至善。依於此，船山甚至覺得孟子要治告子之失，其尚有不足處，要依於船山的對治告子之失才足；孟子何以不足，而船山何以足呢？船山認為批評告子，則要批評他以具體物形容性，然性不可喻，故船山認為這是自己的發明，古人未至此，甚至孟子治告子之失亦未至此，故性之隱晦，而人所不懂，若依於船

13) 《孟子·離婁下》：“天下之言性也，則故而已矣。故者，以利為本。所惡於智者，為其鑿也。”

14) 王船山：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1051。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1051].

15) 所謂共相者，如白筆、白馬，抽象出白的概念，而此白，為白筆、白馬所共。故西方中世紀有共相之爭，爭此共相為名還是實。

16) 若以柏拉圖的理型譬之，則白人、黑人等可理型出一個人的共相，此理型在彼岸，為世間人的所模倣，而船山言性，第一，不是在彼岸，乃落於人物者才是性。第二，也不是從一個現實此岸的理型而共享之，而可以物譬之（性不可為喻）；所謂的性，就在具體中，船山重氣，其對性的見解，是即於實體物之中，而不像柏拉圖的於世間之外。

17) 王夫之：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1051。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1051].



山的性不可喻之說，將能片言折獄，一言警醒所有未解之人。船山認爲孟子的不足處，一者，孟子未到船山的反喻之說，二者，乃在於孟子亦似於告子般，以可見者言性善，孟子言性之必善的舉例是：“水信無分於東西。無分於上下乎？人性之善也，猶水之就下也。”<sup>18)</sup>孟子還是以水之就下的具體實例以譬之，故船山覺得還不夠好。孟子以可見物喻性之不夠好，不足於何呢？船山認爲，此只可以盡性之定體，而不未能即以顯性之本體。即以可見喻之，最多充其量，只到了可以把性之表現而爲定體處指出，至於性以未現而爲體處，性是善、是誠，是天道，不可言，也不可以相對之善言處。用可見者喻性就有不盡處了，讓人以爲性窮於此喻。因爲這些具體可見之物之喻，都就其偶有而言，且一旦喻之則容易執定；而性是善、是誠，是天道，是必善，絕對善，是必然的，不是偶有的，偶有的只是一端，性善是源頭活水，有多端<sup>19)</sup>而爲絕對根源。

然船山如此說，似把孟子與告子等同，理由在於告子之不知性，理由之一，在於以物喻性，而孟子亦同，孟子以牛山、以水等喻性，如此則孟、告等同，而船山最高，然船山亦不敢如此狂言，故還是把孟、告之喻的不同處說明，以尊孟貶告子，船山言：

孟子此喻，與告子全別：告子專在俄頃變合上尋勢之所趨，孟子在亙古亙今、充滿有常上顯其一德。（如言‘潤下’，‘潤’一德，‘下’又一德。）此唯《中庸》鄭註說得好：‘木神仁，火神禮，金神義，水神信，土神知。’（康成必有所授。）火之炎上，水之潤下，木之曲直，金之從革，土之稼穡，（十德。）不待變合而固然，氣之誠然者也。天全以之生人，人全以之成性。故‘水之就下’，亦人五性中十德之一也，其實則亦氣之誠然者而已。故以水之下言性，猶以目之明言性，即一端以徵其大全，即所自善以顯所有之善，非別借水以作譬，如告子之推測比擬也。<sup>20)</sup>

船山的性不可爲喻之說成了兩面刃，一面傷了告子，另一面也傷了孟子，於是似有船山優於孟子的感覺，於是船山要爲孟子說明，故還是採尊孟的原則。船山開頭便認定孟子之喻不同於告子，雖然告子以‘湍水’喻性，孟子以‘水無不就下’喻性。湍水與就下之水有何不同呢？船山認爲告子只談到湍水，而孟子談到水時，有潤與下二德，潤是一德，下又是一德，故五行中共有十德，火之炎上，炎與上共有二德，配於五行，共有十德。此十德是固有之，因爲仁義禮智信比配金木水火土，都是固有的；而與告子的湍水而有變合之喻是不同的，此十德中的二德，水之潤德與下德是固有之，不是變合而成。既然爲五性十德之一，則爲性理，性中只有仁義禮智信，故孟子是以五行之一，其中的水，水有二德，一方面謙下、一方面潤澤以喻性，不

18) 《孟子·告子上第二章》。

19) 船山依著朱子的架構，視心性是具有衆理，故不該執定於一端。

20) 王夫之：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1056。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1056].

同於告子的水之在山的激變而成。然船山此說，似有強辯，亦是為自己的系統強辯、自己的‘性不可為喻’的講法強辯。吾人視之為強辯，理由在於孟子除了以水喻性，也以牛山為喻，山豈是十德呢？最多只能說土占十德之二。土與山又不能全等同之，一個是坤卦，一個是艮卦。船山最後說孟子之喻，乃是以一端徵其大全，即於惻隱之發而知其有性，就像眼之明而知其有目，即其五行之一端，而知其性之全體。可謂告子與孟子是不同的。告子不知性，孟子知性。告子之喻不恰，孟子恰當，孟子不是以具物喻性，而是在談性之德，故恰當。

### (3)告子認情、才為性

上文論及船山視告子只知氣之用，除此之外，又認為告子認情、才為性，此是相通的，故可見船山認定情才只是氣之用，而不及於氣之體，故其不識性。而情才在船山而言，常與性做為一比較對象，船山認定性必善，而情才無必善之勢。<sup>21)</sup>我們可以看船山如何把氣之用與情才關連在一起，船山言：

告子既全不知性，亦不知氣之實體，而但據氣之動者以為性。動之有同異者，則情是已；動之於攻取者，則才是已。若夫無有同異、未嘗攻取之時，而有氣之體焉，有氣之理焉，(即性。)則告子未嘗知也。<sup>22)</sup>

船山認為告子只懂氣之用，故不知性，若能懂氣之體用則可謂知性。既然只知氣之用，則不知氣之體，故其所認定之性，只是性之發用於外者認之為性，然性之發為情，故告子認定為性者，其實只是錯認情才為性，而不是真識性者。性之發用而於動上顯，發用而有同異者，如或喜或怒之不同，此為情；船山所認定的情就是喜怒哀樂，無必善之勢，故船山亦曾疑《中庸》之說，他認為該把‘喜怒哀樂未發’改為‘仁義禮智未發謂之中’<sup>23)</sup>，此看出船山的系統性，認為若要必善，則不可以情、而當以性當之。氣之動而同異為情，氣之動而有攻取者為才<sup>24)</sup>；而未同異、未攻取，則可視為太和絪縕本

21) “孟子不曾將情、才與性一例，竟直說箇‘善’字，本文自明。曰‘[情]可以為善’，即或人‘性可以為善’之說也；曰‘若夫為不善，非才之罪’，即告子‘性無不善’之說也。彼二說者只說得情、才，便將情、才作性，故孟子特地與他分明破出，言性以行於情、才之中，而非情、才之即性也。”王夫之：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1064。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1064]。此看出船山的系統中，性必善，情才無必善之勢。性是至善，情才若善也是相對之善。

22) 王夫之：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1053。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1053]。

23) “乃喜、怒、哀、樂，情也。延平曰：‘情可以為善。’可以為善，則抑可以為不善，是所謂惟危之人心也。而本文不言仁、義、禮、知之未發，而云喜、怒、哀、樂，此固不能無疑。”王夫之：《船山全書》第6冊，頁472。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.472]。在此可見船山以自己的系統而懷疑《中庸》說法有誤，不當為‘喜怒哀樂未發’，而當為‘仁義禮智之未發’，因為在他系統中，喜怒哀樂無必善之勢，則何以能未發即為中呢？

有之氣，此氣爲有體、有用，則爲性矣。告子之所缺失者，正在此，懂氣之用，而不知其體，懂得情才，而不知其背後之性。

然船山又如何證成告子論性其實只言及情才罷了呢？船山引《孟子》書中的告子之語，船山言：

故曰‘性猶杞柳也’，則但言才而已。又曰‘性猶湍水也’，則但言情而已。又曰‘生之謂性’，知覺者同異之情、運動者攻取之才而已矣。又曰‘食色性也’，甘食悅色亦情而已矣。其曰‘仁，內也’，則固以愛之情爲內也；愛者七情之一，與喜怒哀樂而同發者也。<sup>25)</sup>

船山認爲告子以杞柳喻性，則爲才而已，乃因杞柳者天生之物，天生之資具，故爲才。又認爲告子的湍水之喻是言情，乃因湍水是情變之激發而成，如同情感之激變爲七情般。而《告子上》的第三章，告子認爲‘生之謂性’，性者生也，生而有知覺運動之情，同者喜之，不同怒之，此爲情變<sup>26)</sup>；又生之謂性亦可視之爲才，即一旦生而有形，則有知覺運動，且有攻取的性之欲望，如食色等之攻取。而食色亦可視爲情，爲一種愛欲之情，如甘食悅色，則是一種貪愛的情感，若非自己喜好者，則爲惡的情感，皆爲七情之一；於《告子上》第四章告子又言：‘仁內也’，船山的詮釋認爲，其言仁不是就性理而視之爲仁，乃上文已說告子只知氣之用，不知氣之體，故其言仁，也是氣之用，是以愛之情爲內，如父愛子女，天性之情。<sup>27)</sup>而既然愛是七情，則同爲情，同爲喜怒哀樂。<sup>28)</sup>喜怒哀樂在船山而言亦是情，不是必正之情，情之能正與否端視性之加入與否，若無性，則情可善可惡，無必善之勢。

而上文談到船山認爲告子的杞柳爲才，湍水爲情，船山是如何把二者相接連在一起的呢？其實這是船山的系統如此視之，他人不如此，故尚待

24) 船山詮釋張子《正蒙》形而後有氣質之性’區分了氣質與性之不同，氣質則有攻取，有形後始有，非太和本有之性，其言：“氣質者，氣成質而質還生氣也。氣成質，則氣凝滯而局於形，取資於物以滋其質；質生氣，則同異攻取各從其類。故耳目口鼻之氣與聲色臭味相取，亦自然而不拂違，此有形而始然，非太和絪縕之氣、健順之常所固有也。舊說以氣質之性爲昏明強柔不齊之品，與程子之說合。今按張子以昏明強柔得氣之偏者，繫之才而不繫之性”王夫之：《船山全書》第12冊(湖南長沙：岳麓書社，1996年)，頁127。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu (Collected Works of Chuan-shan)*, Vol.12, Changsha, Hunan: Yuelu Publishing House, 1996, p.127]。此看出船山以有形後的攻取爲才。

25) 王夫之：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1053。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1053]。

26) 情變如同，愛之欲其生，惡之欲其死之情感，無常性。

27) 戴震認爲：“禽獸知母而不知父，限於知覺也，然愛其生之者及愛其所生，與雌雄牝牡之相愛，同類之不相噬，習處之不相齟，進乎懷生畏死矣，一私於身，一及於身之所親，皆仁之屬也，私於身者，仁其身也，及於身之所親者，仁其所親也，心知之發乎自然有如是，人之異於禽獸亦不在是，告子以自然爲性使之然，以義爲非自然，轉制其自然，使之強而相從，故言，仁內也，非外也。”清戴震：《戴震集》，頁293。[Dai, Z.: *Dai Zhen Chi (Collection of Dai Zhen)*, p.293]。戴震認爲告子的仁內，是就人與物都會仁於其所親，此是私人之情。就此而言，船山對告子的見解，與戴震相似。

28) 船山較無四端、七情之分別。

船山的說明，其言：

孟子曰：“乃若其情，則可以爲善矣。”可以爲善，則可以爲不善矣，‘猶湍水’者此也；“若夫爲不善，非才之罪也。”爲不善非才之罪，則爲善非才之功矣，‘猶杞柳’者此也。（杞柳之爲桮棬，人爲之，非才之功。即以爲不善之器，亦人爲之，非才之罪。）<sup>29)</sup>

船山以孟子回答公都子問性之言以證成己說，孟子言“乃若其情則可以爲善”，船山補了一句，可以爲善，不是必善，故可以爲善，則可以爲不善，但船山的增補不是孟子的本意，而是船山的體系，故視此爲情。然孟子的情，指的是實情<sup>30)</sup>，船山指的是喜怒哀樂之情感，故二人解法不相同。而情又何以比配於湍水呢？此湍水可以在山，可以過潁等等，都是情變所激，非水之就下之本性，如同情感可以善可以惡，可高興可哀傷，可在山，可過潁一般。

至於才，船山舉‘公都子問性章’爲例，孟子回答公都子言：“若夫爲不善，非才之罪也。”孟子的意思是爲惡者，不由‘才’負責，然其才字隱含著天降本有之善性。<sup>31)</sup>船山又以自己的體系詮釋之，其認爲‘不善非才之罪’，則可推出，‘爲善亦非才之功’，則才無所謂善惡，是公都子所引的告子之語，告子曰：“性無善無不善也。”‘才’因著無與於善惡，則才是告子所言的無善、無不善，而告子以之爲性，是錯認才而爲性；‘才’是如此，又與杞柳何幹呢？杞柳則爲天生自然物，不能爲桮棬，其能爲桮棬之善，是人爲之，不是杞柳之本性；同樣的，以杞柳爲不善之器亦是人爲之，無與於杞柳，故杞柳無善無惡，故船山認爲杞柳乃是才，杞柳無關善惡，才亦無關善惡。

故依著以上船山的認定，告子認‘氣之動、氣之用’爲性，而此氣之動、氣之用，指的是情與才，性之必善，而情才不必爲善，告子錯認，無法體認何者爲性，因爲若要論及性，則必能善；情者可以爲善，可以爲不善，不皆善，甚至其善亦只是相對之善；而才者，善、不善皆非才之功，故才亦非必善。此船山以自己的體系用以詮釋告子之學，而與朱子認定的‘告子認性爲氣’意思不同。

29) 王夫之：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1053。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1053].

30) 牟宗三言：“‘乃若其情’之情非性情對言之情。情實也，猶言實情(real case)。<sup>31)</sup>‘其’字指性言，或指人之本性言。……本當說‘非性之罪’，但孟子何以忽然想到一個‘才’字，而說‘非才之罪’？此並無何嚴重之理由，只變換詞語而說耳。‘才’是材質、質地之意，即指‘性’言。……故在孟子，心性情才是一事。心性是實字，情與才是虛位字。性是形式地說的實位字，心是具體地說的實位字。性之實即心。性是指道德的創生的實體言，心是指道德的具體的本心言。”見牟宗三：《心體與性體(三)》(台北：正中書局，1969年)，頁416-417。[Mou, Z.S.: *Xin Ti and Xing Ti* (3), Taipei: Cheng Chung Books, 1969, pp.416-417].

31) 孟子於此章後文言：“或相倍蓰而無算者，不能盡其才者。”又於下一章言：“非天之降才爾殊也，其所以陷溺其心者然也。”見朱熹：《四書章句集注》，頁328-329。[Zhu, X.: *Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu*(Collected Commentaries in Chapters and Sentences of the Four Books), pp. 328-329]. 這裡的才指的是本有之性善。

### 三、船山認爲朱子之失爲何？

依著上文的分析，船山對於告子的理解，認爲告子不是認氣爲性，若能認氣爲性，則爲正學，如同張載的氣學，是爲正統，甚至說即是孟子的正統接班人，此乃船山的見解。告子既然不是認氣爲性，而只是認氣之用爲性，則朱子的評斷則有問題，因爲朱子認爲告子之失，失於認氣爲性。朱子以其理氣論，用以詮釋孟告之辯，其認爲孟子講對了性，因爲孟子認爲性即理；而告子錯認，因爲告子認氣爲性，而不如孟子之認理爲性。<sup>32)</sup>

而朱子之所以有此缺失，在於其理氣論的架構，而理氣論的二元性又分裂太甚所造成。雖然船山學的架構也是從朱子學的架構做爲基礎以發展之，而不是從心學角度切入，然船山的基本架構雖與朱子相似，但還是有不同，其不同點在於，船山的義理是乾坤並建，兩端一致之說；乾坤並建在此孟子章中成爲理氣並建，故有氣必有理，有理必有氣，朱子與船山都有二元性，然船山一致之，朱子未能一致之，朱子最多只說到理氣不離；船山卻能一致之，則其二元性就不致於太割裂；我們說朱子學之割裂也不致視之爲理氣無相幹，只是相對而言，朱子學分析性還是太強，故有尊理賤氣之傾向，尊理，故尊孟子，以其知性即理；賤氣，故批告子錯認氣而爲性。此理氣二元，用以評價孟告論辯之勝負，這也是程朱的理氣論的系統使然。除此之外，船山亦批評朱子對於人性、物性之區分不清楚以致出錯。以下吾人以兩小節論之。

#### (1) 人性、物性區別之不明

船山認爲朱子之所以孟告論辯之詮釋有錯，其中的一個原因在於，對於人禽之辨的理解並不正確，他先從人受天地之氣與犬牛所受天地之氣之分別說下，其實是要說明朱子與告子都不識氣，也不識性，既不識性，則人性、物性之區別亦將有誤，船山言：

人有其氣，斯有其性；犬牛既有其氣，亦有其性。人之凝氣也善，故其成性也善；犬牛之凝氣也不善，故其成性也不善。氣充滿於天地之間，即仁義充滿於天地之間；充滿待用，而爲變爲合，因於造物之無心，故犬牛之性不善，無傷於天道之誠。（在犬牛則不善，在造化之有犬牛則非不善。）氣充滿於有生之後，則健順充滿於形色之中；而變合無恒，以流乎情而效乎才者亦無恒也，故情之可以爲不善，才之有善有不善，無傷於人道之善。<sup>33)</sup>

32) “告子不知性之爲理，而以所謂氣者當之，是以杞柳湍水之喻，食色無善無不善之說，縱橫繆戾，紛紜舛錯，而此章之誤乃其本根。所以然者，蓋徒知知覺運動之蠢然者，人與物同；而不知仁義禮智之粹然者，人與物異也。孟子以是折之，其義精矣。”朱熹：《四書章句集注》，頁326。[Zhu, X.: *Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu*(Collected Commentaries in Chapters and Sentences of the Four Books), p.329].

33) 王夫之：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1054。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6,

人的氣稟之不同於物，造就了人性必不同於犬、牛之性，而人性之不同於犬牛之性，也可以說人之氣與犬牛之氣不同所致。人的氣善，故性也善，而犬牛不可謂善，理由在於孟子言性善是就人性善<sup>34)</sup>；然到了朱子，視性善不只是人具有，而且是天地萬物都具有，只是人的氣質好，可以表現，而物的氣質不好，不易表現<sup>35)</sup>。然在船山，人性可謂善，犬牛之性不善，此不善亦非大惡，而是指無法如人的仁義禮智一般的表現。

又船山認為氣充滿天地間即是仁義充滿，因為船山的氣論，以立天之陰陽與立人之仁義比配，天人相配，氣與性相配，天地之本然則為氣，氣則為至善、為誠，‘氣’與‘氣化’不同，因著氣化之變合、氣之演化而有不善，如同人性善，因著情感之流而為不善。然犬牛之氣之不善，不代表天地不仁，因為天地無心成化，天地以誠、以氣為根源，本身是至善，不可疑天之無善，以至讓犬牛無法如人般皆善。以人們視犬牛之不能實踐仁義，則視其不足為善；但就物之源——天地而言，乾道變化，各正性命，上天都是至善。故若以天道與人道相比配，人之性必善，而流為情才則不必為善；至於天道之生人，則所生的人性必善，生犬牛之性則不必為善，也不稱性善。雖然有時如朱子舉羔羊跪乳等<sup>36)</sup>之例，表現出一點性善的樣子，如此似可駁船山，但船山認為縱動物有其善也不是自覺其性善而做成，說實了也是因為牛、犬之氣不同於人之氣所造成。故朱子說告子認氣為性，以船山認定而言，除了告子不知性、不知氣，其實朱子的人禽之辨的判斷亦不準。

## (2) 貴性賤氣

船山認為朱子之誤的另一理由在於尊性賤氣。<sup>37)</sup>也因為朱子的理氣二分，雖言理氣不離，卻也不雜，甚至把二者割裂太甚，在船山則為理氣合一、理欲合一、理勢合一，不同於朱子的見解。<sup>38)</sup>故船山認定朱子有尊性

p.1054]。

34) 孟子言：“人無有不善，水無有不就下。”《孟子·告子上》。孟子分明就人言善，不是就性言善，故孟子言的性善是就人性而善，犬性不有善。朱子卻以人性、物性皆善，因氣質而顯現的出或是不出來談性善。

35) 故朱子順著程子之說，認為人能推，物不能。而且物之氣稟不好，但有時亦能表現一點，如羔羊跪乳、蜂蟻之義之說等，認為動物亦可表現一些性善。但這不是孟子的本意。

36) 朱子便是以羔羊跪乳等說，認為動物亦可表現一點善。然吾人認為要認定動物是否有善，在此爭論的是，船山或朱子誰人合於孟子的動物觀察，而不是在爭誰人合於現實經驗的觀察。孟子並未有羔羊跪乳等之說。

37) 黃宗羲言：“蓋離氣無所為理，離心無所為性。佛者之言曰：‘有物先天地，無形本寂寥，能為萬象主，不逐四時凋。’此是其真贗實犯。奈何儒者亦曰‘理生氣’，所謂毫釐之辨，竟亦安在？”沈善洪主編：《黃宗羲全集》第8冊（杭州：浙江古籍出版社，2005年），頁891。  
[Shen, S.H. ed.: *Huang Zong Xi Chuan Chi (Collected Works of Huang Zong-xi)*, vol. 8, Hangzhou: Zhejiang Ancient Books Publishing House, 2005, p.891]。黃宗羲的義理從其師劉蕺山而來，再追溯的話，乃羅整菴已先言之，在此黃宗羲與船山有一個共同的義理，都視朱子的二元性割裂太甚，將有流弊。

38) “此世界乃是氣所充周的世界，不過依船山看來，此氣之世界即是理之世界，氣與理是不

賤氣之失，其言：

苟其識夫在天之氣，唯陰唯陽，而無潛無亢，則合二殊、五實而無非太極。(氣皆有理。) 苟其識夫在人之氣，唯陰陽爲仁義，而無同異無攻取，則以配義與道而塞乎兩間。(因氣爲理。) 故心、氣交養，斯孟子以體天地之誠而存太極之實。若貴性賤氣，以歸不善於氣，則亦樂用其虛而棄其實，其弊亦將與告子等。夫告子之不知性也，則亦不知氣而已矣。<sup>39)</sup>

船山認爲，若只就天之氣，尚未及於化時，則爲陰陽，而還不是一陰一陽之化時，則天只是氣，這時未及於氣化<sup>40)</sup>，這時爲至善、爲誠，這時亦不以潛、亢言之，因爲一旦以潛龍或是亢龍言之時，則爲已化。若未成其變化時，天只是氣，只是善，二殊五實都是善，陰陽之相加則爲太極，太極不在陰陽之外。<sup>41)</sup>故船山的氣學如有此的主張，即人之氣稟自天之氣，氣尚未屬之化時，則爲陰陽，天道之陰陽比配人道的仁義，這時用浩然之氣以形容之亦未嘗不可，故可塞乎兩間。其詮釋孟子也是氣學，也是以氣說性，故《孟子》的‘不動心章’中所言，以志帥氣，氣帥志，心與氣交相養；既然孟子談及氣，則孟子的性善之說，不是只有理，而是氣中有理，性是理氣合，<sup>42)</sup>氣中有理，故船山反對朱子之說，朱子視告子之認性爲氣，船山反對之。

分的，氣與理是合一的。”林安梧：《王船山人性史哲學之研究》(台北：東大圖書股份有限公司，1991年)，頁98。[Lin, A.W.: *Study on Human History Philosophy of Wang Chuan-shan*, Taipei: Tung Ta Books, 1991, p.98]。又可參見陳啟文：《王船山兩端而一致之思維的辯證性及其開展》(台北：師範大學國文所博士論文，2006年)，其第二章談理氣合一，第七章談理與欲，與其師林安梧教授相似，然這也的確是船山學的重點。[Chen, C.W.: “*Dialectical Logic and Development of Thoughts of Liang Duan Er Yi Zhi of Wang Chuan-shan*”, Taipei: Doctoral dissertation, Graduate Institute of Chinese, National Taiwan Normal University, 2006]。船山的原文：“其實，言氣即離理不得。所以君子順受其正，亦但據理，終不據氣。新安謂‘以理禦氣’，固已。乃令此氣直不繇理，一橫一直，一順一逆，如飄風暴雨相似，則理亦禦他不得。如馬則可禦，而駕豺虎獼猴則終不能，以其原無此理也。無理之氣，恣爲禍福，又何必巖牆之下而後可以殺人哉！”王船山：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1114-1115。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, pp.1114-1115]。

39) 王船山：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1054-1055。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1054-1055]。

40) “張子云：‘繇氣化，有道之名。’而朱子釋之曰：‘一陰一陽之謂道，氣之化也。’《周易》‘陰’‘陽’二字是說氣，著兩‘一’字，方是說化。故朱子曰：‘一陰而又一陽，一陽而又一陰者，氣之化也。’繇氣之化，則有道之名，然則其云‘繇太虛，有天之名’者，即以氣之不倚於化者言也。”王船山：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1109。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1109]。船山在此以天爲氣，爲太虛，爲誠；而氣化爲道，爲氣之已演化成其變化，稱爲一陰一陽。

41) 船山於《周易內傳》中，對於“‘一陰一陽之謂道’之詮釋爲‘合之則爲太極，分之則謂之陰陽。’”王船山：《船山全書》第1冊(長沙：岳麓書社，1996年)，頁525。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu (Collected Works of Chuan-shan)*, Vol.1, Changsha, Hunan: Yuelu Publishing House, 1996, p.525]。又唐君毅先生亦見及此，其言：“其言易道之別於先儒者，要在以太極只爲一陰陽之渾合，力主乾坤之並建。”唐君毅：《中國哲學原論·原性篇》，頁503。[Tang, J.Y.: *The Original Doctrine of Chinese Philosophy: Chapter of Natural Nature*, p.503]。

依於此，孟子學當該如何詮釋呢？船山認為孟子體天地之誠，此誠者氣也，氣中有理，陰氣、陽氣之並建則為太極，而太極不在陰陽之外。然朱子亦能說太極與陰陽不離，但朱子又視二者為不雜，即不同的意思。朱子與船山之不同在於，船山視陰陽之相加為太極，而朱子把陰陽相加還是形而下，不是形上的太極，這也是氣學與理學之不同，也因為對於氣的定義之不同所致。於是船山對於朱子之失，明白指出，亦是說朱子認為孟子認對性，以理視之，而告子認錯性，以氣視之，船山認為這種講法是錯的。朱子之所以會有缺失，其背後的原因在於，貴性賤氣。因著貴性賤氣之執著，則朱子判定孟子是尊貴的，因為性即理；告子是有失的、是低下的，因為視性為氣。然船山不贊成朱子的講法，因為氣若低賤之，則類於佛學的棄世間的意味，則氣化人倫被貶，此不是船山所樂意見的。故船山評朱子之失，認為其樂用其虛而棄其實；實者氣也，若無氣，理亦不得附焉；虛者，理也，理在船山反成了第二義<sup>43)</sup>，氣學才是第一義。船山認為朱子此失，將同於告子，告子棄氣之體，而朱子棄實氣，故二人有相似的毛病。其毛病為不知性，亦不知氣，若知氣，則知氣之體用，而孟子的性善之說若依於船山詮釋，正是以氣之體用詮釋之便能得其正解。

依著以上的說法，船山進一步再論，朱子貴性賤氣之說，其問題出於何呢？這也可以說是船山以其氣論以檢討朱子的理學之說，兩人對於氣的定義亦不完全相同，朱子的理氣之截裂，而船山的二端一致，可謂理氣一致，故雖割裂，但可一以貫之，船山續云朱子之失：

貴性賤氣之說，似將陰陽作理，變合作氣看，即此便不知氣。變合固是氣必然之用，其能謂陰陽之非氣乎！易曰：‘立天之道曰陰與陽，立人之道曰仁與義。’仁義，一陰陽也。陰陽顯是氣，變合卻亦是理。純然一氣，無有不善，則理亦一也，且不得謂之善，而但可謂之誠。有變合則有善，善者即理。有變合則有不善，不善者謂之非理。謂之非理者，亦是理上反照出底，則亦何莫非理哉！<sup>44)</sup>

船山認為朱子之所以貴性賤氣，乃因為把陰陽視為理所造成，然朱子的陰陽必是氣，不會是理，船山何以有此奇怪推論呢？乃因為朱子有‘理生氣’之說，此生的意思，雖不是時間上的母生子的意思，但以理為根源，而船山以陰陽未化之氣為根源，朱子以理為根源，故把二者(理與陰陽)相連在一

42) “性只是理。‘合理與氣，有性之名’，則不離於氣而為氣之理也。”王船山：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1108。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1108].

43) “故以氣之理即於化而為化之理者，正之以性之名，而不即以氣為性，此君子之所反求而自得者也。所以張子云‘合虛與氣，有性之名’。”王船山：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1111。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1111]. 在此看出氣化，氣之道、氣之理，則為第二義，第一義在於太虛之天的意思，而太虛之天，則為氣。故氣為第一義，理第二義。故船山於《讀孟子大全說》，解‘盡其心者章’處，反對程子的‘心性天一理也’的理學講法，而歸於張子的氣學。然此第二義的意思，並不是就時間上的落後之意。

44) 王船山：《船山全書》第6冊，頁1055。[Wang, F.Z.: *Chuan Shan Chuan Shu*, Vol. 6, p.1055].



起。船山認爲朱子把陰陽似作理，朱子的認定有誤，因爲陰陽是氣，也是誠，也是根源；朱子與船山之不同在於朱子以理爲根源，而船山以氣爲根源。船山於是舉《易傳》之言以證成自己的講法，《易傳》言：“立天之道曰陰與陽，立人之道曰仁與義。”<sup>45)</sup>顯然是把陰陽與仁義並舉，故仁義是爲性理，仁義又是陰陽，則性是陰陽，性是氣，則告子若能認性爲氣則爲對了，何以朱子又要批告子呢？乃因船山認爲告子只懂氣之用。船山以陰陽比配仁義，而朱子的義理則不如此比附，因爲陰陽是形下，仁義是形上。<sup>46)</sup>船山與朱子的體系是不同的，於是船山認定，陰陽是氣，變合是理，乃陰陽未化，則爲氣、爲誠，一旦變化則爲氣化，氣化有其道、其理，故變而有理；在氣之未化之前，這時甚至以善言之不恰當，因爲善容易視爲與惡相對，此善是至善，不與惡對，不得已則以誠言之。故善者有理，不善者亦有理，如犬牛之不是性善，然天地有犬牛之存在，則亦有犬牛之理，故所謂犬牛之不善，乃指其理不是性善之理，不有仁義之理；沒有人性之理，但還是有犬牛之理，雖不能踐仁踐義，但還是有犬牛之理。天地之間有氣便有理，而且氣的根源位置更高，故吾人稱船山學爲氣學，而不以理學稱之，而程朱卻是理學。

朱子以理氣二分，分屬孟子與告子，而視告子認氣爲性，而氣者，在朱子學而言有貶低之嫌，然船山是氣學，認爲不該貶低氣，一旦賤之，則人倫氣化不被重視，似於原始佛學，以世間爲五濁惡世，而有厭世之嫌。故船山反對朱子的主張，朱子主張告子認性爲氣，或說是認氣爲性；船山則認爲告子並非真能認氣爲性，若如此，則已是正學，孟子則不用批評之。船山認爲告子是只知氣之動、氣之用，而不是真懂氣者。依於船山，則朱子的判定便有缺失，船山亦指出其缺失，在於人禽之辨處不明，人性、物性之差異不明，也在於尊性賤之說使然。然二人的立場，其實大相逕庭，朱子是理學，船山是氣學，在此可謂船山以氣學的詮釋，重新詮釋《孟子》，進而反對朱子的理學主張，可謂站在橫渠氣學之說，而不採程朱之說。<sup>47)</sup>

#### 四、結語與反省

以上吾人主要以船山的義理用以評論朱子、告子之失。然在此可再反

45) 見《易傳·說卦第二章》。

46) “‘立天之道，曰陰與陽’，是以氣言；‘立地之道，曰柔與剛’，是以質言；‘立人之道，曰仁與義’，是以理言。”黎靖德編：《朱子語類》第5冊，第77卷，易十三，說卦，頁1970。[Li, C.T. ed.: *Chu Tzu Yu Lei (Quotations From Zhu Zi)* (5), Vol.77, Yi 13, Dui Gua, p.1970].

47) 《清儒學案》對於船山的評述是：“平生爲學，神契橫渠，羽翼朱子，力闢陸、王。”見徐世昌等編纂，沈芝盈、梁運華點校：《清儒學案》第1冊(北京：中華書局，2008年)，頁369。[Xu, S.C. et al., Shen, C.Y. and Liang, Y.H. ed.: *The Academic Biographies of the Qing Confucian*, vol. 1, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2008, p.369]. 神契義，乃相合的意思，羽翼只是做爲朋友之幫助，但不全合。

省的是，首先，告子之學真的是認情才爲性嗎？孟子言‘乃若其情’、‘非才之罪’，情與才都隱含著談性，若如此告子則知性了，何以告子又不知性呢？於此看出船山以自己的系統以評定告子。又船山認爲‘可以爲善’，則可以爲不善，這是船山自己的推論，孟子處並未如此言之，船山可能做了過多推論，依此亦可說船山還是自己的系統，而不見得完全是孟子原意。

第二點，性真的不可喻嗎？其實吾人覺得船山的講法是有道理的，理由在於性不是具體物<sup>48)</sup>，只附於人物上而爲其本質，而此本質卻不是一物可比擬，如人之仁義禮智，只能就表現出來而談，而不可以物喻仁等等。但船山此說是否因而攻擊到孟子呢？因爲孟子亦以就下之水、牛山喻性。依於此，吾人認爲，船山以十德談孟子之喻恰當，其轉回之說，似有生硬。吾人的見解是，性不易喻，但若爲了使人知解時，不得已還是要以物喻之。孟子畢竟是真的做成了比喻。在舉性善的孟子爲正學時，亦必須尊孟，尊孟則亦要尊孟子之喻。

第三點，朱子學真的尊性賤氣嗎？這也是歷來有不同的意見，歷如韓國儒學朝鮮朝以尊朱爲主，故其論及朱子時，都視他不貶低氣。而到了中國明末清初的重氣思潮，甚至清代，反對朱子的見解，卻認定朱子有貶低氣的意思。爲何評價朱子的見解能如此的懸殊呢？吾人認爲，因爲朱子的學問，面面俱到，常常兩邊的話都提及到了，故韓國儒學可能顧及某一面，而明末學者卻顧及另一面，但都是朱子的義理。如朱子總是認爲理氣不離不雜，某些人側重其不雜面，某些人側重其不離面。而朱子亦常說理必附於氣，故理氣不離；但朱子也說，山河大地陷了，理還是在。<sup>49)</sup>這意思就有尊理貶氣的意思。故若只說朱子尊性貶氣，其實背後要有更多的說明。

又吾人於上文的判斷中，有一見解，即船山學的歸屬問題，當該較接近漢還是宋呢？<sup>50)</sup>然若只是以漢或宋來定義，似乎過大，吾人縮小問題，朱子與戴震的不同孟子詮釋，而船山的詮釋是近於誰呢？當然船山學是介於二人之間，但若不得已評介之，吾人會認爲其義理較接近戴震之學，理由在於其論人性、物性處，以宋學朱子而言，人性、物性本有其相同處，依著氣稟之異而不同，人能推物不能，故不同。但在船山，氣稟之不同，則其性亦不同了，絕不會相同，不是以理一分殊之理爲首而落於萬物。在此錢穆先生有言：“船山體用、道器之辨，猶之此後習齋、東原諸人理氣之辨也。顏、

48) 戴震對朱熹‘以性理爲別若一物’的批評似乎相似於船山批評以一物喻性之說。“張子見於必然之爲理，故不徒曰神，而曰神而有常，誠如是言，不以理爲別如一物，於六經，孔孟近矣。”見清戴震：《戴震集》（上海：上海古籍出版社，2009年），頁288。[Dai Zheng, *Dai Zhengji*, Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Press, 2009, p.288]。戴震談的是朱子以理如有一物，而朱子又認爲性即理，故性亦如一物。

49) “要之，也先有理。只不可說是今日有是理，明日卻有是氣；也須有先後。且如萬一山河大地都陷了，畢竟理卻只在這裏。”黎靖德編：《朱子語類》第1冊，頁4。[Li, C.T. ed.: *Chu Tzu Yu Lei (Quotations From Zhu Zi)* (1), p.4]。

50) 在此吾人指漢學宋學之爭，漢學指清儒的訓詁、考據等實樸之學，以戴震爲首；宋學以朱子爲首，以性命義理詮釋爲主，義理領導訓詁。

戴不認理在氣先，猶之船山不認道在器外，體在用外也。要之則俱爲虛實之辨而已。”<sup>51)</sup>錢先生的判定其實船山正是處於漢宋之間，此爲當然，吾人的問題是若一定要比較之，是接近何者？錢先生認爲是宋學(包括朱子學)，吾人卻認爲船山較近於漢學的戴震之學。<sup>52)</sup>判斷船山學爲宋學(如朱子學)<sup>53)</sup>的學者，包括周兵、錢穆先生，吾人不完全同意，吾人亦不能說船山完全無宋學的意味，而是說其主要的精神，卻是往橫渠發展，而橫渠是氣學，與清代的重氣相接，故可謂往漢學如戴震學處發展。<sup>54)</sup>故吾人更精確的說，船山學接近於橫渠、氣學、漢學，而遠於程朱之學。<sup>55)</sup>

以上，吾人以船山的觀點，舉出了，在氣學下，如何指出告子之失，告子若非認氣爲性，當該如何評斷之呢？船山認爲告子只懂氣之用，不知氣之體。又船山認爲告子所懂的氣之用，只是情才，故不知性，性不同於情才，前者必善，後者可善可惡。而告子不斷的喻性，正是不知性之不可喻，以致有失。至於朱子之失，失之於二元性的割裂，而不像船山的兩端卻能一致；另一方面朱子之失，失於以理一分殊之方式，人物相同，氣稟之異以致不同，人能推物不能推的解法，詮釋孟告之辯，與船山認爲的人、物性絕不相同的意思是相去甚遠，故船山批評之，也看出兩種義理架構，正在詮釋孟子，也可視孟子經典詮釋的生命發展。兩端皆收之亦可。

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- 51) 錢穆：《中國近三百年學術史》上冊(台北：台灣商務印書館，1980年)，頁107-108。[Chien, M.: *Book I of Academic History of China of the Past 300 Years*, Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1980, pp.107-108]。當然錢先生認爲船山與東原還是有不同，其認爲船山較東原多了些心性論，而規模亦不同，又說船山“其仍是宋明儒家矩矱。”見同書，頁124。
- 52) 錢先生認爲船山有宋學之矩矱者，吾人認爲乃因其認爲船山講明心性、道德，而戴震等人反成了自然主義者(生之謂性)，但吾人不認爲戴震等人的義理如此。故吾人的判斷與錢先生亦不相同。錢先生低看了戴震。
- 53) 周兵言：“以上所舉衆多材料，說明王夫之只是爲了發明正學，扶樹道教，衛護程朱正統理學，指斥陸王異端邪說，並不見什麼堅決反對程朱理學的影子。只是到了近代，梁啟超、譚嗣同爲了變法革命的需要，才把王夫之打扮成了反理學的啟蒙思想家。”周兵：《天人之際的理學新詮釋——王夫之《讀四書大全說》思想研究》(成都：巴蜀書社，2006年)，頁18。[Zhou, B.: *New Interpretation of School of Principle of Correlation between the Heaven and Human: Thinking Study on Wang Fu-zhi's 'Thorough Explanation for Reading the Four Books*, Chengdu: Pa Shu Books, 2006, p.18]。周兵的見解，不一定合於船山。此可參考唐先生之說，唐先生言：“船山之哲學，重矯王學之弊，故於陽明攻擊最烈。於程、朱、康節，皆有所彈正，而獨有契於橫渠。”唐君毅：《中國哲學原論·原教篇》(臺北：臺灣學生書局，1984年)，頁513。[Tang, J.Y.: *The Original Doctrine of Chinese Philosophy: Chapter of Natural Education*, Taipei: Taiwan Hsueh Sheng Books, 1984, p.513]。唐先生認爲船山對程朱有所彈正，而周兵認爲船山不至於反程朱。周兵的看法不準。
- 54) 橫渠的重氣的義理，可與後來明末清初重氣之思潮相接。
- 55) 吾人的理由有二，第一，船山認爲學不是復其初，此接近戴震，而不同於朱子；第二，船山認爲犬牛之性絕不相同，亦接近戴震，而遠於朱子。

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## Reflection of Wang Chuan-shan on “Gaozi treats *qi* as nature” Suggested by Zhu Xi: Interpretation on the Debate between Gaozi and Mencius

TSAI Chia-he

### Abstract

The debate between Gaozi and Mencius on humanity has been an important issue in the intellectual history of Chinese Philosophy. Zhu Xi understands that Mencius correctly treated nature as *li*, whereas Gaozi incorrectly regarded *qi* as nature because he did not understand nature properly. On the other hand, the thought of Wang Chuan-shan belongs to the school of thought based on the theory of *qi*. Wang also understands that Mencius's idea is correct, though he offers different understanding of the debate from the perspective of the theory of *qi* and questions Zhu Xi's understanding. On the one hand, Wang thinks that Zhu Xi incorrectly understands that Gaozi regarded *qi* as nature, for he thinks that proper understanding of *qi* leads to proper understanding of nature. However, Wang also points out that Gaozi merely understood the function of *qi*, but he did not properly understand the underlying substance of *qi*. On the other hand, for Wang, Zhu Xi misunderstands that Gaozi understood nature metaphorically in terms of concrete objects in the world, so that he did not understand nature at all. However, Mencius in fact also understood nature metaphorically in terms of concrete objects in the actual world. For this reason, the question raised in this paper is on what basis Wang can think that Mencius's metaphor is correct, whereas Gaozi's metaphor is wrong. Finally, Wang suggests that Gaozi regarded affection as nature, and therefore he did not understand nature and could not suggest the highest goodness of nature. This paper suggests that Wang Chuan-shan and Zhu Xi define *qi* differently.

**Keywords:** Nature, *Qi*, Gaozi, nature of dogs and cattle, perceiving movement

# 禮與身心和諧相契何以可能 ——以王船山身心和諧思想為考察中心

陳力祥

**中文摘要：**禮與人之身心和諧是相契的，這種契合的基本前提在於人心之和。船山認為：先王制禮唯以求人心之和，人心之和的途徑是以禮養之。禮以養人心之和乃船山身心和諧思想的邏輯起點：由人心之和，則內外交相省察以使人之身心合義(宜)。船山和諧思想的邏輯路線表現為由人之內心世界的和諧而發展到人之身心和諧。有禮則心泰而行亨，無禮則心歉而行競，治人之心莫急於禮。

**關鍵詞：**王船山、禮、身心和諧、調適。

船山系明末清初的思想巨擘，禮學思想是其哲學思想的重要組成部分，其禮之和合哲學價值為學術界所忽視。本文主要探究船山禮之調適視域中的身心和諧思想。

人之內心世界的和諧是人類和諧的前提與基礎，通過澄心與正心，使人之內心達到和諧幽靜之境地。人之內心世界的和諧是人之外在行為和諧的前提與基礎，易言之，人之內心世界的和諧是取得人與人、人與社會、人與自然之間和諧的前提與基礎。人之外在行為主要通過禮之規範來實現其和諧之序，人之內心世界的和諧則可通過禮之澄心與正心之價值而實現。由此，人之外在行為合乎禮之規範，則能實現人與人之間、人與社會之間的和諧，並因此則以禮實現人際和諧；反之，禮之調適視域中的人際和諧又能影響人的內心世界和諧，此時禮之和合價值表現為運禮以和順人心，禮以養人心之和。人心之和，則能使人之行為外在表現為“和”，即身心之和，並由此得出：治人之心，莫急於禮。

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## 一、先王制禮唯求人心之和

通常看來，禮的基本價值在於規範人之行為。事實上，在禮的這種外在規範價值得以實現以後，宇宙這個大生命場在禮的關照之下處於和諧之境地，此時禮的基本價值則表現為運禮以和順人心、禮以養人心之和。故此，禮的基本價值表現為兩個方面：一則，以禮可養人心之和。人之內心世界之和，此時人心之和主要表現為禮以求遂其心之所安。先王制禮，其目的即在於養人心之和。二則，人心之和而外，人之行為在外在之禮的約束之下，可實現人與人、人與社會之間的和諧。禮之存在有其合理性，這種合理性價值在於禮能維系人之內心世界的寧靜與和諧。然後人之內心世界和諧的外顯，逐漸實現人之外在行為的和諧。故此，禮的基本價值傾向即是為和而設。故此，船山在闡釋禮的基本價值之時，首先說明了先王制禮的目的：先王制禮作樂，其目的在於求人心之和。船山云：“先王之制禮，唯以求人心之和而允矣。用禮而和，則用禮可也；不必用禮，亦唯求和而已矣。”<sup>1)</sup>船山此言，明確了先王制禮的雙重價值，人心之和是禮的首要的基本價值，禮與“和”呈現出一體兩面的形式：即談及禮，則必然有和；談及和，必然是因禮之調適而和。

船山關於身心和諧的思想，主要是從人之內心世界之和開始的。內心世界的和諧主要是禮以養人心之和。以禮養之，則人心趨和；人心趨和，則外化人之行為之和。以禮調適人與人之間、人與社會之間關係，則其關係必定趨向於和，故此，船山身心和諧思想，取決於以下幾個層面：其一，身心和諧的起點在於人心之和，人心之和在於以禮養之；其二，人心之和是身心之和的前提與基礎。只有人之內心世界和諧，才能有人的身心和諧。其三，無論是人之內心世界的和諧，還是身心和諧，最終離不開禮之調適。其四，身心和諧的最終獲得離不開禮，治人之心莫急於禮，惟其如此，才能真正實現人之身心和諧。

## 二、禮以“養”人心之和

禮對人之內心世界的和諧具有重大價值，這是因為有禮而和，人之內心世界因由禮而趨向於和，這是其基本目的。有目的因，則必然有動力因，那麼以禮實現人之內心世界之和的動力因何在呢？禮不但具有規範倫理的基本價值以外，禮還有一種最基本的功能，那就是禮對人的內心世界的“養”，此“養：即是實現人之內心世界和諧的動力因。禮對人的行為的規範作用表現

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1) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第七冊)，岳麓書社，1990，第268頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*.(C)(Volume 7.), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1990: p268].



為兩個方面：一是對人的行為的規範而取得人之內心世界的和諧；二是對人之內心世界的調養，也即因禮以“養”人心之和。那麼禮對人心之和是如何調養的呢？這又回到了儒家哲學所談及“欲”的問題，禮之產生的前提與基礎即是人欲之爭奪。人欲是人類的共性，霍布斯認為人與人之間的關係就是“狼性”，如若單純地以爭奪作為解決欲望的方式，那麼人欲事實上得不到真正的解決。於是在西方哲學史上出現了以社會契約的方式來解決欲望的爭奪。在中國哲學史上，解決欲望的方式不同於西方，而是以禮解決。中西方解決欲望的手段雖然不同，但在很大層面上與西方社會契約論有著異曲同工之妙。在儒學史上，爭奪一方面不利於社會的和諧，另一方面也確實解決不了問題。那麼如何解決利益紛爭，荀子提出了以禮養和的模式。荀子云：“人生而有欲，欲而不得，則不能無求；求而無度量分界，則不能不爭；爭則亂，亂則窮。先王惡其亂也，故制禮義以分之，以養人之欲，給人之求，使欲必不窮乎物，物必不屈於欲，兩者相持而長，是禮之所起也。故禮者，養也。”<sup>2)</sup>。禮的基本價值就在於養、在於止紛爭，紛爭的緣由在於人有欲望，而解決紛爭的最好方式即是“禮”。禮的基本價值在於養心，養心即在於養人之欲。養心即在於止人之欲，其思想淵源於孟子。孟子曰：“養心莫善於寡欲。其爲人也寡欲，雖有不存焉者，寡矣；其爲人也多欲，雖有存焉者，寡矣。”<sup>3)</sup>孟子此言，直陳養心的邏輯前提：寡欲。就“欲”而言，程子與朱子皆進了解釋。程子曰：“所欲不必沈溺，只有所向便是欲。”朱子亦對欲進行了注解。“朱子解釋欲，如口鼻耳目四支之欲，雖人之所不能無，然多而不節，未有不失其本心者，學者所當深戒也。”<sup>4)</sup>朱子在孟子對“欲”理解的基礎之上，更爲深入地進了解釋，不但說明了人欲之所在，同時也說明了對過多欲望節制的具體辦法，其目的在於告誡大家以理性的方式對待人欲。船山在朱子哲學的基礎之上，對人之欲闡釋得更爲深入：一方面，船山認為人正當欲望是存在的，“禮雖純爲天理之節文，而必寓於人欲以見。”<sup>5)</sup>另一方面，他又認為人之心是可存可養的。“人之所可存可養者，心而已矣”<sup>6)</sup>。很顯然，船山所提倡的存養之功就在於以禮遏欲，終極價值在於以禮養心。“養心之功則在遏欲存理、靜存動察之學”<sup>7)</sup>。由此，船山辯證地處理禮與和順人心之間的關係，並

2) 王先謙：《荀子集解》(下冊)，北京：中華書局1988，第346頁。[Wang Xianqian, *Xunzi Commentaries* (Volume 2.), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1988. p.346].

3) 朱熹：《四書章句集注》，北京：中華書局1983年版，第374頁。[ZhuXi, *Zhu Xi's commentaries on the Four Books*. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1988. p.374].

4) 朱熹：《四書章句集注》，北京：中華書局1983年版，第374頁。[ZhuXi, *Zhu Xi's commentaries on the Four Books*. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1988. p.374].

5) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第911頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.911].

6) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第1074頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.1074].

7) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第903頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi.

說明了禮的終極價值指向為和順人心、途徑是以禮養人之心。欲取得人之內心世界的寧靜與和諧，則必然對禮有所存養，對禮這種規範倫理“擇善固執”，如此方能實現內心世界的寧靜與和諧，其內在的根據何在？船山給出了自己的答案。他說：“唯當從事於存養者，則心已習於善，而一念之發為善，則善中之條理以動天下而有餘者，人不知而已知之矣。心習於善，而惡其素有，則惡之叛善而去，其相差之遠，吉凶得失之為懸絕者，其所自生與其所必至，人不知而已知之矣。”<sup>8)</sup>在船山看來，以禮存心，以禮遏欲，鑒於有禮，人之心可向善，則人必將棄惡從善，放棄過分的欲望，以取得內心世界的寧靜與和諧。存養事實上有兩重意思：一是存禮，即對工具的存養；二是有禮養心，不動心，前者是後者的基礎，後者是前者的最終結果，這種存養是儒家成聖、成賢之門徑。船山總結了禮之調適對社會和諧的基本作用。他說：“須徹根徹底，見得聖人正衣服，慎飲食一段靜存動察，極密極實之功，所謂‘致中和’者，即此便在，方於聖人作聖之功，得門而入。”<sup>9)</sup>船山此言，大致表明了兩層涵義：第一重涵義即是前面所說的固禮，第二重涵義表明了固禮的基本價值與終極目標，即“致中和”，也即禮能養人心之和，船山恰當地分析與總結了禮的基本價值，禮對人心之和順的基本價值是值得肯定的。

人之心有已發與未發之分已發外在表現為人之情，未發表現為人之性。故此，如若禮未能和順人之心，則人心已發，表現為情，則仍然需要以禮抑情。則如若人之心在禮的調適之下，業已和順人心，和順的人之心必將發展為人之性，也即禮以和性。

內外交相養，使禮以和順人心。人非聖賢，故此，人心也有已發之狀態，此時人之心即表現為情，人之情需要以禮調適以複性。因為人心可能有兩種狀態，未發與已發狀態：已發之狀態會導致人之情外泄，則需要以禮遏人之情，惟其如此，才能使人之行爲處於和諧之境地。

### 三、有禮則心泰而行亨 無禮則心歉而行競

人有其禮，行禮之人在為人處世之時，能求得人心之和，歸因於此人乃是以禮待人以利和，因為禮多不為怪。那麼以禮是如何求得人心之身心和諧呢？在船山看來，有禮之人，取得身心之和的基本途徑是求得內外之和，即由內心世界之和過渡到身心之和。易言之，禮的基本價值是取得和諧，這種

*The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.903].

8) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第464頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.464].

9) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第745頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.745].

和諧主要是通過內外兩個層面來實現的。船山云：“無違者求之心，禮者求之於事，此亦內外交相省察之意。”<sup>10)</sup> 船山此言，闡明了個人以禮不僅僅可取得人之內心世界和諧，通過禮之規範人之行為，亦可取得人與人、人與社會之間的外在和諧。內外相合，則能取得人之身心和諧。在日常生活中，人之視、聽、言、動等基本行為是否合禮，這是人心能否和諧的首要的基本前提：如若人的行為合禮，則人之內心世界處於寂靜的狀態，處於“敬”之境地，此時人之身心也必將處於和諧之境地。如若人之視、聽、言、動違禮，則自然而然會造成人之內心世界的矛盾與衝突，也即導致人之身心的不和諧。其實，船山之意在於說明禮與人之內心世界的和諧，人之身心的和諧是一雙向互動的關係。圖示為：禮以養人心之和→促成人身心之和；反之，人身心之和→內心世界之和。故此，禮能否使人之身心和諧，關鍵在於船山所說的“內外交相省察”，也即是說，禮以和順人心即能使人之身心處於和諧之狀態。很顯然，在日常生活中，有禮之人則此人表現為君子，君子坦蕩蕩，其內心世界自然和諧；無禮之人，或者人之行為表現為無禮，則其內心世界亦處於矛盾與衝突中，故此，無禮之人，其內心世界也必然處於不和諧之境地，表現為人之身心不和諧。船山認為禮與人之身心和諧之間的關係密切。他說：“外利內養，身心率徇乎義，逮其熟也，物不能遷，形不能累，唯神與理合而與天為一矣。”<sup>11)</sup> 人之行為合乎禮，則其內心世界將處於和諧之狀態；如若人之行為不合禮，則其身心將處於不和諧之境地。故此，在禮之調適下，人之身心將處於合宜之境地，也即船山所說的“義”，“義”乃合宜之意。在禮之調適的合宜的狀態之下，則人之內心世界不因物喜，不因己悲，不為外物所牽累，其內心世界自然而然地處於寂寥之狀態，人心之和諧，則自然導致其行為的禮之規制的合宜，如此則身心和諧至也。為了說明有禮能使人之內心世界處於和諧之境地，船山以衣、食是否合乎禮節這個具體的實例，並以此說明人之內心世界與外在之禮的內外交養以實現身心和諧的具體途徑。船山云：“蓋不正之服食，始以不正之心，失其本人之節，胡亂衣之、食之，此內不能制外也。迨其衣其不正之衣而心隨以蕩，食不正之食而性隨以遷，此外不能制內也。內外交養，卻一邊則不足以見聖。且如今人衣紅紫綺麗之服，此心便隨他靡靡搖搖去；衣葛爾無所表出，此心便栩栩軒軒去。即此推之，凡服之不衷者，皆足以生人驕奢僭忒之心；服之不盛者，皆足以生人苟且猥下之心。”<sup>12)</sup> 船山於此說明了禮與人心之間的關係，由此可知，禮與人心是一種交互關係：人

10) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第601頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.601].

11) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第十二冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1992年版，第90頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 12), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1992. p.90].

12) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第601頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.746].

有禮，其行為和諧，則表現為人之內心世界和諧，也即有禮則心正，也即禮以養心：因禮→養心；同時人若能養心，則能抑人之欲，遏制人過分的欲望，則人之行為表現為彬彬有禮：養心→有禮。船山云：“人心固有之退讓，禮所生也，雖負販者不能泯之。”<sup>13)</sup>人心固有之退讓，表明人之內心世界和諧之後則人之行為有禮有節，即身心和諧是也。禮與養心是相互聯系、相互影響、相互制約的關係：有禮之人，其內心世界表現平靜，不為外物所誘惑，如此，其外在行為表現為禮之規制，其身心和諧。為此，船山用極為通俗的語言對禮與內心世界的和諧作了歸納與總結，其目的在於凸顯出禮在人的內心世界和諧方面所表現出來的和合價值。他說：“禮著於儀文度數，而非有恭敬之心、撙節之度、退讓之容，則禮意不顯。君子知禮之無往不重，而必著明其大用，使人皆喻其生心而不容已，故內外交敬，俾禮意得因儀文以著，而禮達乎天下矣。”<sup>14)</sup>船山於此凸顯出禮與人心之和的交互關係。

以上說明禮與人心之和的交互關係：即有禮能取得人心之和；另一方面，人心之和則外在行為表現為彬彬有禮。那麼，禮以和順人心的具體路徑是什麼呢？易言之，有禮，身心和諧而後則以何種方式以求得人心之和呢？在船山看來，禮以求得人心之和，其基本路徑就是節制人之欲望。禮所產生的動力基礎就在於人類之間的利益爭鬥。荀子闡釋了禮產生的利益依據，禮之產生，其基本目的就在於養人之欲，也即以禮節制人之欲望。禮的價值就在於養人之欲，有禮而又使人能節，即節制人之欲望，則能取得人之內心世界的和諧。故此，船山云：“蓋禮之有節，所以養人心之和，而使無一往而盡之憂，則唯其節也，是以和也。先王知和而全其和，彼乃知和而究以失其和，則較之拘於禮文而不知者，其失更甚。而抑知不善用禮者，違人心之和，以行其非禮之禮，故使高明之士激而為叛道之教，此君子所為大懼也。”<sup>15)</sup>人心之和的取得，關鍵在於人心之“節”。故此，船山認為欲得人心之和，以禮節制人之欲望必不可少，因為欲望是人的內心世界騷動的原因。如若在禮的約束之下，人皆保持其良好的心態，則能使人之內心世界處於最佳狀態。如若不能以禮節制人之行為，則人之心就不能處於和諧之境地。因為“心所不容已而禮不容已矣，故復禮斯為仁矣。禮者，復心之動而求安，以與事物相順者也”。<sup>16)</sup>由於禮之節制，人之欲望在心的關照之下，最終使人心處於寂寥狀態，也即心不外求，則人之內心世界自然和諧。由

13) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第四冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第19頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 4), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.19].

14) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第四冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第17頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 4), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.17].

15) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第七冊)，岳麓書社，1990，第268頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 7), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1990: p268].

16) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第十二冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1992年版，第90頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi(C)(Volume 12), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1992. p.66].

於禮之節制，繼而使人過分的欲望限定在和諧之境。基於此，船山認為是以禮制心，而不是以義制心。“義是心中見得宜處，以之制事；禮乃事物當然之節文，以之制心：此是內外交相養之道。固不可云義制心，以禮制事。以禮制事，則禮外矣；以義制心，則義又外矣。若但於可食、不可食上，分得天理、人欲分明，則以禮制事之謂，飲食亦在外而非內矣。”<sup>17)</sup>以禮制心，而不能以義制心。從倫理學視角來看，禮是一種規範倫理，是一種外在的規範，而“義”多為德性倫理的範疇，是一種內在的德性。禮乃規範倫理，規範倫理才能對人之內心世界進行規範。顯然，船山強調以禮制心，義只能是禮制心的合宜程度而已，這亦是船山以禮制心的重要緣由。為了說明以禮制心，船山還從具體的事例方面予以詳細地闡釋。“夫子之容色言動，施之於上下親疏而中其等者，以吾心之宜制事也；飲食衣服，必期於正而遠其魯莽者，以事物之宜養心也。內外交養而無有忒者，聖功也。內外得所養而自不忒者，聖德也”。<sup>18)</sup>船山此言，明確區分了禮與義：即禮是外在的行為規範，義是內在的德性模式。“施之於上下親疏而中其等者”與“飲食衣服，必期於正而遠其魯莽者”，皆屬於禮的範疇。故此，禮以制心亦維系人之內心世界的和諧，內心世界的和諧即是我們所說的人之內心合宜處。以禮之節則能和順人心，和順人心並非只是嚴格意義上的禮之節而後有人心之和，禮只不過是外在“和”的動力模式，而人心之和則是內在的和之質，故此，船山認為禮之節與人心之和是相輔相成、不可分割的，二者是一體兩面的東西。誠如船山所說：“乃非以為嚴束，而要以和順夫人心，亦必不廢禮之節而後得和，此文質同體之固然者。如有見夫節者不過以和順夫心，因以謂節以效和，而所貴非節，則將有如老聃之知禮而反賤禮者。要之，舍禮亦終不能和，而又何以行哉？”<sup>19)</sup>雖然禮之節與人心之和是不可分離的，但舍禮終究是無以達到和諧之境，從而辯證地闡釋禮以和心之得宜處，即內心世界之和諧的問題。

綜上，船山從禮之節的角度闡釋了人心之和的問題。從內心世界和諧的動力機制角度予以詳細地闡釋。除此而外，船山還從心理學的角度闡釋了緣何有禮則人之內心世界是和諧的。他說：“有禮則心泰而行亨，無禮則心歉而行競。”<sup>20)</sup>從心理學的角度來看，船山認為有禮之人，其內心世界是寂靜而和

17) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第745頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.745].

18) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第746頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.746].

19) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第592頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.592].

20) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第四冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第19頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 4), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.19].

諧的，此人與世無爭，則內心世界處於和諧之狀態，鑒於內心世界無外求，寂然不動，必然導致其行為無外求，最終必將導致身心之間的和諧；無禮之人內心世界有外求，總是為外物所擾，故此，其內心世界總是外求的不安定狀態。鑒於外物的誘惑，則人之內心世界總是處於矛盾與沖突之中，鑒於內心世界的矛盾與沖突，則必將導致外在的行為的不和諧，即是我們通常所說的人之身心的不和諧。因此，在此種意義上說，以禮存心，則人之內心世界必將處於和諧之境地，因為“以禮存心而不憂橫逆之至者也”<sup>21)</sup>。

鑒於以禮調適人之內心世界有著不可替代的價值，為此，船山對禮贊美有加。他說：“禮者，人心之所共安，百姓之所與能者也，既盡其質，又備其文，以利導人情使之相長，而非有所強於天下，故極其盛美而非過也。”<sup>22)</sup>於此，船山明確說明了禮在調適人之內心世界和諧的基本價值，禮乃人之內心世界得以和諧、身心和合的重要手段。在禮的調適尺度之上，不僅僅達官貴人能以禮調適其內心世界，普通百姓同樣也能以禮調適其內心世界以實現其身心和諧。故此，禮能使人之內心世界達到和諧，這是具有普世性的倫理規範。鑒於禮能養人心之和，禮能促使人身心和諧，由此，治人之心莫急於禮。

#### 四、治人之心莫急於禮

正因為禮之價值在於求人心之和，因此“治人之心，莫急於禮”。以禮治心的終極價值是求得人心之和，此言巧妙地反映了禮在求人心之和中所凸顯出來的基本價值。荀子亦認為，養人之心沒有比遵循禮義更為尊貴的了。荀子云：“凡治氣養心之術，莫徑由禮。”<sup>23)</sup>荀子此言表明，人心之和，離不開禮之調養，治人之心，更要遵循禮義。總之，禮為人心之和而備，禮與和有著千絲萬縷的關係。為此，船山闡明了和與禮之間的關係。他說：“和者，應事接物皆適得其宜，不與理相乖，不與物相戾也。”<sup>24)</sup>船山於此既表明了禮的基本價值，也即禮是人們應事接物方面得體的基本尺度，以禮求之，則使人之行爲得體，也即合宜，因為應事接物皆合其宜即是禮。如此，以禮調適人之行爲，則最終能使人得以和立，人與人之間能夠得以和處，人與萬物之間能

21) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第一冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1988年版，第1058頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 1), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1988. p.1058].

22) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第四冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第1181頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 4), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.1181].

23) 王先謙：《荀子集解》(上冊)，北京：中華書局1988，第26頁。[Wang Xianqian, *Xunzi Commentaries* (Volume 1), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1988.26].

24) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第127頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.127].

夠得以和愛，政治上能夠得以和達。在禮的基本價值功用得以實現而後，就可實現政通人和的和平氣象。誠如船山所言：“‘和’者，以和順於人心之謂也。用之中有和，而和非用禮者也。……唯和順於夫人之心而無所矯強之爲貴；唯其然，斯先王之以禮爲小大共由之道者，以純粹而無滯也。”<sup>25)</sup>船山此言表明和的基本價值在於和順人心，而且這種和順是在禮用之時凸顯出來的“和”的基本價值，而在“和”之境界業已實現以後，禮即可退出實現和諧的基本手段，也即自然而和。由此，禮的基本價值在於調適並實現人心之和、人際之和等，當全面和諧實現以後，禮業已完成其規範價值並退出其調適之領域。故此，船山云“行禮者以求遂其心之所安，而無拘牽苦難之意，貴禮者貴此禮也。若矯強以違其情之所順，則先王之道亦不美，而大小可不由矣，故行禮者不可不知其本和也；然知和之爲貴，便廢禮之節，則和非其和，而不可行必矣。章意倒重下節，以異端棄禮而自謂和，不知禮文具在，特在用禮者根心而行，則和自有節，不許舍禮求和也。”<sup>26)</sup>禮本來就根於人心，以禮求和；人心之和，舍禮而無所求也。船山從根本上闡釋了禮在人心之和的價值。在禮意流行於天下之際，在那種禮意濃濃的和諧社會中，人心也就因此而和<sup>27)</sup>。行禮者之目標就是求得人心之和諧，這是每個行禮之人的基本價值傾向。故此，治人之心莫急於禮。

持禮運禮能促使人與人、人與社會之間的和諧；人與人、人與社會之間的和諧而後，更爲深入的是可促成個人身心之和，即運禮最終能促使人身心和諧。即“有禮則能心安而身泰”，由此可知，禮不僅能養人心之和，同時禮亦能促進人身心之和。船山之禮是促成人之身心和諧的“調節器”。

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25) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第590頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.590].

26) 王夫之：《船山全書》(第六冊)，長沙：岳麓書社1991年版，第164頁。[WANG Fuz-zhi. *The Complete works of Wang Fuzhi*(C)(Volume 6), Changsha: Yuelu academy press, 1991. p.164].

27) 李秀娟、陳力祥：《人性爲善何以可能——王船山關於人性爲善思想的形上學批判及其認爲價值》，《中南大學學報》2010第1期，第22頁。[Why humanity tends to be good: a study of Wang Chuanshan's humanity thoughts on metaphysics and its value. *Journal of central south university*, 2010(1): 22].

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Wang Xianqian, *Xunzi Commentaries*(Volume 2.), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1988.346.
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## How Can *Li* Get Harmonized with the Human Body and the Mind? - a Discussion with a Focus on the Theory of the Harmony between Body and Mind in the Thought of Wang Chuan-shan

CHEN Li-xiang

### Abstract

*Li* (Rite) is compatible with the harmony between the human body and the mind. This compatibility is based on the harmony of the mind. Wang Chuan-shan thinks that the sage king established *li* precisely in order to pursue the harmony of the human mind; the way of realizing the harmony of the mind is only through self-cultivation based on *li*. This idea lays the foundation to the notion of the harmony between body and mind in Wang's thought: The achievement of the harmony of the mind leads to a proper reflection of the inner and the outer, which in turn leads to the harmony between the body and the mind. This implies in Wang's thought that the harmony at the physical level can be developed on the basis of the harmony at the mental level.

**Keywords:** Wang Chuan-shan; Rite; the harmony between body and mind



# 熊十力之反求實證的本體論\*

南 相 鎬

**中文提要：**熊十力的哲學方法基礎是體用論，其動機對於以‘唯識無境’為中心的法相宗唯識論和以量論為中心的西洋哲學批判。他認為，法相宗之‘唯識無境’是無本體的，而且西洋之量智是無法知道本體的。只有儒家之性智，在修養實踐過程中，通過反求自己才可以實證自己的本體。所以他的本體論，就成為修養實踐的重‘用’的本體論。

熊十力把形而上學以《周易》之力動的乾元為基礎，建立了以作用為本體的‘即用顯體’的體用論。道德的修養實踐論是在孟子的‘反身而誠’的基礎上建立了‘反求’為方法的‘反求實證論’。他所謂的‘反求實證’，由高度的修養實踐過程中所體得之後，再以一連過程來實證的。無數無限的刻苦努力而後才能取得其證明。所以他的哲學成為一個大心本體論的‘境界哲學’。

他認為，哲學的第一個任務是闡明本體。進而筆者把本體與修養實踐先討論以體用論為中心的本體內容與哲學構造，後討論以‘反求實證’為中心的修養實踐方法，最後在結論上討論熊十力哲學之界限問題。總而言之，筆者用哲學的方法論來討論熊十力之‘反求實證的本體論’。

**關鍵詞：**熊十力，反求實證，即用顯體，性智，境界哲學。

## 一、緒論

任何時代都有當代所面對的問題，而且有其解決的方法。在1900年前後在東洋，當時的問題是對西洋的民主與科學的批判吸收，而其方法是體用論。從宋明以後，這樣的體用論就成為儒家所使用的普遍方法。因學者而異體與用的比重與內容有一些不同，有重體的，有重用的，有體用平等的。譬如宋代程頤，朱熹等對應道家與佛家的本體論建立了重‘體’的本體論，明代王守仁等要克服程朱學之觀念的影向，建立重‘用’的本體論，王夫之亡國之

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後爲了漢族復興，而建立了把道從屬於具體事物‘器’的重‘用’的本體論。

熊十力<sup>1)</sup>(1885~1968)的哲學方法，其基礎亦在於體用論。但他哲學的開端，卻是對‘唯識無境’的法相宗唯識論與以量論中心的西洋哲學的批判。他認爲法相宗之‘唯識無境’無本體，而且以西洋之量智也無法知道本體，只有儒家之性智在修養實踐過程中，通過反求自己的才能實證自己的本體。因此他的本體論，就成爲修養實踐的重‘用’的本體論。

熊十力之本體論是修養實踐論。因此他的哲學不僅在體用論上保有‘即用顯體’的構造，而且在哲學史上繼承了《周易》的體用論和孟子的‘反身而誠’的實踐哲學。如此，他的體用論不但具有‘即用顯體’的特徵，而且也有所有的作用已經在其原因中體現的‘因中有果論’的特徵。

熊十力認爲，哲學之第一個任務是闡明本體，闡明方法是修養實踐的‘反求實證’。但筆者爲了更明確地闡述觀點，把本體與修養實踐分開，先討論以體用論爲中心的本體內容與哲學構造，後討論以‘反求實證’爲中心的修養實踐方法，最後在結論裏討論熊十力哲學之界限問題。

## 二、本論

### (一) 方法論的背景 - 《周易》和孟子

熊十力之哲學的基礎出自於哪裏？他從《周易》和孟子哲學中，取得其哲學的研究方法。第一，形而上學以《周易》之力動的乾元爲基礎，從而建立以作用爲本體的‘即用顯體’的體用論；第二，道德的修養實踐論以孟子的‘反身而誠’爲基礎，從而建立了‘反求實證論’。

熊十力對哲學是如何劃分的呢？因爲中國哲學大部分是將學問與人生等同在一起的，所以在中國哲學研究上，很難適用西洋的分析方法。因此熊十力把哲學分爲境論與量論；把本體論，宇宙論等歸屬於境論，把知識論歸屬於量論。<sup>2)</sup>他以闡明本體<sup>3)</sup>爲哲學之窮極目標，把性智看做本體的認

1) 原名繼智，升恒，字子真，湖北省黃岡縣人。本論文臺本以《新唯識論》[壬辰刪定本](北京：中國人民大學出版社，2009)[Xiong Shili, *Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009.]爲主，而以《新唯識論》(台北：廣文書局，民國63年)[Xiong Shili, *Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974.]來補完。因爲1952年熊十力直接寫〈唯識論語體文本壬辰刪定記〉而改訂原文。但在其中已刪除，而有參考價值的則以《新唯識論》(台北：廣文書局，民國63年)來補完。

2) 《新唯識論》〈節錄印存上中卷初稿記〉[壬辰刪定本]，第19頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.19]: “原本擬爲二部。曰境論。境者義境，佛典組織每作三分。其一曰境，如本體論或宇宙論等理論，以佛典三分衡之，當名境論。曰量論。量猶云知，佛家有證量及比量等分類，可考因明及諸經論。”

3) 《新唯識論》〈明宗〉[壬辰刪定本]，第22頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.22]: “則謂哲學建本立極只在本體論，是說極成。然從來哲學家

識主體。

什麼是對本體認識的主體？那就是性智。性智原來是唯識論的概念，即沒有我相而自我與境界亦不見而轉成末那識(*manas*)的‘真性’。<sup>4)</sup>性智如何認識本體？熊十力所提出的方法就是‘反求’。‘反求’就是對自己的省察。即淨化自己的精神世界的時候，性智是實現‘真實的自己’的一個方法。所以反求的省察把自己作一個對象，同時亦不作對象。因此那是一個包越的<sup>5)</sup>認識。如果把‘真實的自己’看做一個對象，則理障<sup>6)</sup>會發生，如此性智亦作不動。如《周易》以力動的乾元作用為本體一樣，熊十力亦把‘真實的自己’反求省察的時候，實證相應的主體與對象成為一體兩面。這是對中國哲學立地確保，在保全中國儒家傳統的整體性的，同時對西洋哲學本體論進行區別化。

是實證相應者，名為性智。(性智，亦省稱智)這個智確與量智不同。云何分別性智和量智？性智者即是自性的明解，此中自性即日本體。<sup>7)</sup>

本體是要反求自得的。本體就是吾人固有的性智，吾人必須內部生活淨化和發展時，這個智才顯發的。到了性智顯發的時候，自然內外渾融(即是無所謂內我和外物的分界)，冥冥自證，無對待相。(此智的自識，是能所不分的。所以是絕對的。)即依靠著這個智的作用去察別事物，也覺得現前一切物莫非至真至善。<sup>8)</sup>

熊十力如何看待對象的‘境’與主體的‘心’之關係呢？熊十力哲學的大前提，就是要我們要省察道德本體，則就要作高度的精神修養，而且與萬物本體互相相應。即道德本體(性智)之實證，就是本心知道自己本身。<sup>9)</sup>因此實證

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談本體，未免戲論紛然，其根本謬誤即在其特理智以向外推求而不曾反諸自心，這個道理要待本論全部講完才會明白。”

- 4) 《哲學大事典》，首爾：學園社，1963。[*Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Seoul: Hakwon Publishing Co., 1963]參照
- 5) Karl Jaspers(1883~1969)所使用的Umgreifende在《哲學大事典》[*Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Seoul: Hakwon Publishing Co., 1963]中翻成爲‘包括者’或‘包越者’。包括者就是譬如‘事物’存在於這‘世界’，即這‘世界’就成爲包括所有的‘事物’之‘包括者’。(《哲學大事典》，學園社，首爾，1963)在韓國多人使用‘包越’概念，雖然很難確定，看來都由於Karl Jaspers概念。元正根用過‘包越’概念(〈透過包越概念看莊子的言語特性〉《哲學》60號，韓國哲學會，1999)。筆者所使用的‘包越’之意義，以無然觀來作論議則如下。筆者所使用的‘無然’概念是逆說的，所以無然之內容肯定一切事物。因此‘無然’就是‘即然’。‘無然’的‘然’與‘即然’的‘然’是同字異義的。因爲‘無然’否定某一個事物，所以‘無然’的‘然’就只是某一個事物。可是‘即然’肯定一切事物，所以‘即然’的‘然’是不關任何事物都可以貫通的。所以透過無然觀而得到的東西，把它以形容詞形講則是‘即然’，以動詞形講則爲‘包越’。
- 6) 理障原來佛教概念，其涵義是邪見妨害正見。比如“爾卻去心上尋箇天理，此正所謂理障。”(《王陽明全書》(1)《傳習錄》(下，門人陳九川錄)第77頁)
- 7) 《新唯識論》(明宗)[壬辰刪定本]，第22頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.22]
- 8) 這文章載於《新唯識論》，台北：廣文書局，民國63年。第28頁。(《明宗》第8頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.28]，但《新唯識論》[壬辰刪定本]上不見。因此《新唯識論》跟著版本頁。數不同而爲了研究便利附記括弧裏篇名與頁。數。

相應經由高度的修養，而後在“物我無間，一多相融”<sup>10)</sup>的精神境界上才可以得到。這樣熊十力哲學的基礎，可以看作是在歷代中國哲學家的‘境’[事物]<sup>11)</sup>與‘心’[真心]混融整體觀上。<sup>12)</sup>雖然境與心成爲一個渾融整體，但當以主體的‘能’與當對象的所來區分，則‘能’該當屬於‘心’，‘所’該當屬於‘境’。因此唯識之旨趣就是在把境從屬於心的。<sup>13)</sup>

## (二) 主要問題

### 1) 道佛家哲學之問題

熊十力對道家所提出的問題是什麼？簡而言之就是道家沒有看透真本體。<sup>14)</sup>因爲把萬物歸屬於虛無，以太一爲萬物之根源，而且以柔弱爲‘用’。他對佛家所提出的問題是什麼？那是以對與境(對象)獨立的識爲主的法相宗的‘唯識無境’論的批判。他批判，法相宗的‘唯識無境’是因於不覺自我之故。<sup>15)</sup>他反駁說，境就是心之所追求與所思構的一切事物<sup>16)</sup>；如果沒有這樣的對象，則認識如何成立？因此他主張以心爲本體的‘心外無境’<sup>17)</sup>，但這

9) 《新唯識論》〈明宗〉[壬辰刪定本]，第27~28頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.27~28]: “吾所謂內緣者，乃專就證量言。(孔子言默識與佛氏證量義相當。)證量者，即吾本心自知自識。易言之，只是本心自己知道自己，(用宗門語)這裏所謂知或識，絕沒有想像與推求等作用參入，絕沒有能所和內外及同異等分別，卻是照體獨立，炯然自識，不是渾沌無知。吾儕只有在這樣的境界中才叫做實證。”

10) 《新唯識論》〈唯識上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第43頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.43]: “境和心是渾然不可分的完整體。”《中庸》“合內外之道也，故時措之宜也。(隨時應物，無有不宜)”，孟子之“萬物皆備於我。”，程顥(1032~1085)之“仁者渾然與萬物同體。”，陸九淵(1139~1193)之“宇宙便是吾心，吾心即是宇宙。”，王守仁(1472~1528)之“心外無物，心外無理。”

11) 《新唯識論》〈唯識上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第40頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.40]: “吾儕須知，從我的身迄大地乃至諸天或無量世界以及他心，一切都叫做境。(此中他心者，謂他人或衆生的心。)”

12) 《新唯識論》〈唯識上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第42~43頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.42~43]: “吾國先哲對於境和心的看法，總認爲是渾融而不可分。……總之境和心是渾然不可分的完整體。”

13) 熊十力，《新唯識論》，台北：廣文書局，民國63年，第60頁。(〈唯識上〉第24頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.60]“能謂心，所謂境。心能了別境，且能改造境的，故說心名能。境，但是心之所了別的，且隨心轉的，故說境名所。唯識的旨趣，是把境來從屬於心。”

14) 熊十力，《體用論》，台北：台灣學生書局，民國69年。〈贅語〉：第2~3頁 參照。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.2~3]以下表記爲《體用論》。

15) 世親菩薩造，唐三藏法師玄奘譯，《唯識三十論約意》：“我癡者，謂無明。愚於我相，迷無我理。故名我癡。”[Vasubandhu, Hsuantsang, *Weishih 30 Lun Yueh*]

16) 《新唯識論》〈唯識上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第40頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.40]: “吾儕須知，從我的身迄大地乃至諸天或無量世界以及他心，一切都叫做境。《新唯識論》，第503頁。(〈明心上〉第65頁。): “凡爲心之所追求與所思構，通名爲境。”第510頁。(〈明心上〉68頁。): “境者，不獨實物名境，凡爲心之所向往與競逐者，皆境也。”

是與王守仁所主張的‘心外無物’<sup>18)</sup>屬於同樣的脈絡。

雖然熊十力透過佛教唯識論來入門於哲學，可是卻因相宗之唯識論的問題點而站在批判的立場上。他在《新唯識論》上說：“本書根本問題，不外體用。立言自有統紀，一依原本之底蘊。[學者如透悟體用義，即於宇宙人生諸大問題，豁然解了，無復疑滯。]”<sup>19)</sup>如此他的著述目的不在唯識論，而在於繼承發展儒家哲學。尤其‘心外無境’的本體論，就是他的哲學的基礎方法與內容。

今造此論，為欲悟諸究玄學者，令知宇宙本體非是離自心外在境界及非知識所行境界，唯是反求實證相應故。<sup>20)</sup>

(超越的本體，卻是其心外之境。)……是故禪家興，而直指本心，心即是如(真如省云如)，如即是心，於是‘心外無境’。<sup>21)</sup>

熊十力針對法相宗之‘唯識無境’曾說：“唯識的說法，但斥破執有外境的妄見，並不謂境無。因為境非離心獨在，故說唯識。唯者殊特義，非唯獨義。”<sup>22)</sup>他如此批判‘唯識無境’，是因為站在儒家的本體論立場上。他還批判說：“佛氏認為性體祇是寂靜，將導群生以同歸於寂滅之鄉。”<sup>23)</sup>他批判佛家的生滅觀，亦因為站在《周易》的立場而把化機不息本身為本體。<sup>24)</sup>並且他說：“大乘法性一名，與本論實體一名相當。大乘法相一名，與本論功用一名相當。然佛家性相之談(法性省稱性，法相省稱相，見基師識論述記等)，確與本論體用不二義旨，極端相反，無可融和。”<sup>25)</sup>他認為，我們不

17) 《新唯識論》〈唯識上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第177頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.177]: “(超越的本體，卻是其心外之境。)……是故禪家興，而直指本心，心即是如(真如省云如)，如即是心，於是心外無境。”《新唯識論》，第529~530頁。〈明心上〉第77~78頁: “(超越的本體世界，卻是其心外之境。)……心即是理，理即是心，於是心外無境。”

18) 《王陽明全書》(1)〈傳習錄〉(上)第5頁。[*Wangyangmingquansu*, Taipei: Chengchung Book Co., 1990. p.5]: “如意在於事親，即事親便是一物。……所以某說無心外之理，無心外之物。……天理即是明德，窮理即是明明德。”《王陽明全書》(1)〈傳習錄〉(上)第20頁。[*Wangyangmingquansu*, Taipei: Chengchung Book Co., 1990. p.20]: “心外無物，如吾心發一念孝親，即孝親便是物。”

19) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第5頁。〈初印上中卷序言〉第2頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.5]

20) 《新唯識論》〈明宗〉[壬辰刪定本]，第22頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.22]

21) 《新唯識論》〈唯識上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第177頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.177]

22) 《新唯識論》〈唯識上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第40~41頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.40~41]

23) 《體用論》，第97頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.97]

24) 《體用論》，第41頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.41]: “化機無一息之停。故萬物恒相續起，不斷絕也。汝復須知，佛家說剎那滅義，祇顯無常。本論闡明化機不息，活潑潑地。此是餘與佛家根本不同處。”54頁: “佛氏以剎那滅即是無常，而作空觀，卒流於反人生。老莊雖見到剎那生滅，而卒歸本自然，遂至守靜任化(因任自然之化)，而廢人能。”

應該像窺基(慈恩大師, 632~682)一樣以心爲空無, 要以心爲本體。

## 2) 西洋哲學之問題

熊十力對西洋哲學批判是以量論爲主的。他說: “中國哲學由道德實踐而證得真體。(證者證知。此知字義深, 非知識之知, 乃本心之自證, 而無有能知所知等相。真體猶云宇宙本體。)異乎西洋學者之搏量構畫而無實得。(無實得者, 言其以窮索爲務, 終不獲冥應真理, 與之爲一也。)”<sup>26)</sup>因此熊十力所批判的量智該當同於張載(1020~1077)的見聞知。即透過見聞知或邏輯的思惟, 則無法達到真理本體即‘真實自我’。所以他所提出的概念, 就是如張載德性知一樣的宇宙大心或性智。

今世之玄學者, 全不於性智上著涵養工夫, 唯憑量智來猜度本體, 以爲本體是思議所行的境界, 是離我的心而外在的境界。<sup>27)</sup>

大其心, 則能體天下之物。物有未體, 則心爲有外。世人之心, 止於聞見之狹。聖人盡性, 不以見聞梏其心, 其視天下無一物非我。孟子謂盡心則知性知天以此。天大無外, 故有外之心, 不足以合天心。見聞之知, 乃物交而知, 非德性所知。德性所知, 不萌於見聞。<sup>28)</sup>

孟子不云乎, 夫道一而已矣。宇宙大心, 即是徧在一切人或一切物之無量心, 所謂一爲無量是也。一切人或一切物之無量心, 即是宇宙大心, 所謂無量爲一是也。老云, 玄之又玄, 義在斯乎。<sup>29)</sup>

熊十力有關‘反求實證’的主體, 雖然接受孟子與張載見解。但其哲學的基礎擺在《周易》的本體論上, 而另一方面需要一統儒·佛·道家。這樣他的本體論以變化作用爲中心<sup>30)</sup>, 而強化儒家哲學之實用性與力動性。可是如王守仁在德性知內說明見聞知一樣, 熊十力亦是在性智內說明量智<sup>31)</sup>, 沒有積極靠近知識論與科學問題。所以他說: “難者所云: ‘科學上所發見定律公則等, 是離心自存的, 並非待吾心去了別他方才有他。以此證明一切境離心

25) 《體用論》, 65頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.65]: 這論議因於窺基大師之《成唯識論述記》主張。

26) 熊十力, 《讀經要義》, 台北: 廣文書局, 民國68年。第102頁。[HsiungShihli, *Tuchingshihyao*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1979. p.102]

27) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本), 第27頁。(<明宗>第7頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.27]

28) 張載, 《正蒙》〈大心〉[Zhang Zai, *Changtsaiji*, Taipei: Lijen Book Co., 1981]

29) 《體用論》, 第29頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.29]

30) 《體用論》, 第4頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.4]: “功用以外, 無有實體。”

31) 《新唯識論》〈明心上〉[壬辰刪定本], 第174頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.174]: “此(作用)不即是心體(心體是獨立無待, 沖寂無朕, 故見聞覺知不即是心體, 但心體亦非離見聞覺知而獨在。”



獨在。‘汝持此見，確是錯誤。’<sup>32)</sup>因此後來牟宗三(1909~1995)為解決這樣的問題而提出‘良知自我坎陷’<sup>33)</sup>的方法。

### (三) 主要方法

熊十力對道，佛家與西洋哲學，以儒家傳統的‘反求實證’的本體論來作一個代案。他認為，心之本體(即本性)與宇宙本體(即太極)是一樣的。因為他的體用論基礎在於《周易》，所以把一陰一陽的宇宙大作用看做為一個仁，而且這樣的仁看做人間與宇宙的本體。

易大傳曰，顯諸仁，藏諸用。一言而發體用不二之蘊，深遠極矣。顯仁者何？生生不息，謂之仁。此太極之功用也。(太極，即宇宙本體之名。……)藏用者何？用，即上文所言生生不息的仁。<sup>34)</sup>

造化之大德曰仁。(仁，只是生生義。)<sup>35)</sup>

太極，是宇宙實體，亦名乾元。<sup>36)</sup>  
乾元，即實體之名。<sup>37)</sup>

殊不知心物同由實體變成。實體是萬化萬有之大原。<sup>38)</sup>

易立乾元，是為心物萬象之大原。(乾元者，生生之實體。)<sup>39)</sup>

32) 《新唯識論》〈唯識上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第42頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.42]

33) 牟宗三，《從陸象山到劉蕺山》，台北，台灣學生書局，1979。第251~252頁。[Mou Zhongsan, *From Lu Hsiangshan to Liu Chisan*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1979. p.251~252]: “但即在致字上，吾心之良知亦須決定自己轉而為了別。此種轉化是良知自己決定坎陷其自己：此亦是其天理中之一環。坎陷其自己而為了別以從物。從物始能知物，知物始能宰物。及其可以宰也，它復自坎陷中湧出其自己而復會物以歸己，成為自己之所統與所攝。如是它無不自足，它自足而欣悅其自己。……在知識宇宙中，物暫為外，而心因其是識心，是良知自己決定之坎陷，故亦暫時與物而為二。然及其會歸於行為宇宙而為行為宇宙之一員，則即隨行為宇宙之統攝於良知之天心天理而亦帶進來。”

34) 《體用論》，第216~217頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.216~217]

35) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第500頁。(〈明心上〉第63頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.500]

36) 《體用論》，第313頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.313] 因為熊十力以乾元為本體，金大洙把熊十力之本體論看做一個‘乾元本體論’。(金大洙，《熊十力之體用論研究》，嶺南大學校博士學位論文，2011。第79頁。)

37) 《體用論》，第313頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.313]

38) 《體用論》，第327頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.327]

39) 《體用論》，第332頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.332]

一陰一陽之謂道。……仁者見之謂之仁，知者見之謂之知。<sup>40)</sup>

如《周易》一樣，把天地萬物認為仁或真理者，應該是仁者或智者。  
《論語》亦說：“子張問善人之道。子曰，不踐跡，亦不入於室。”<sup>41)</sup>因此不經過高度的精神修養，則無法得到一個仁智眼光而洞察真理。如果有人把本體看做絕對至善，則他已經有很深的高度的精神修養與實踐工夫。

### 1) 體用論 - 即體即用, 即用顯體

熊十力認為中國哲學之體用論，就來自《周易》。他認為，從周代後期諸子百家無所不繼《周易》，儒家亦沒有離脫於孔子的基本思想。即如：“(宇宙實體簡稱體；實體變動，遂成宇宙萬象，是為實體之功用，簡稱為用。)……體用之義，創發於變經。(易經古稱變經)晚周群儒及諸子無不繼承大易(易經亦稱大易)，深究體用。大概儒家未甚離孔子本旨。”<sup>42)</sup>并且對他自己的體用論說：“餘之宇宙論主體用不二，蓋由不敢苟同於佛法，乃返而遠取諸物，近取諸身，積漸啟悟，遂歸宗乎大易也。”<sup>43)</sup>

熊十力對自己的本體論<sup>44)</sup>，作了一個定義。即“有問，本體具何等義？答曰，略說四義。一，本體是萬理之原，萬德之端，萬化之始。二，本體即無對即有對，即有對即無對。三，本體是無始無終。四，本體顯為無窮無盡的大用，應說是變易的。然大用流行，畢竟不曾改易其本體固有生生，健動乃至種種德性，應說是不變易的。”<sup>45)</sup>按照其內容來看；其一，本體是萬物與道德之宇宙論的根源者；其二，體用一體；其三·四，本體是萬物之無窮反復化生現象一切。按照其體用關係看，則其一、二、三以本體為中心；其四是，以作用為中心，但體與用之關係還是‘體用不二’。熊十力從《姚江學案》引用王守仁之語說：“即體而言，用在體。即用而言，體在用。是謂體用一源。”<sup>46)</sup>而且他所主張體用不二，是如程頤所說的“體用一源，顯微無間”<sup>47)</sup>一樣的。總之，熊十力所謂的本體就是包羅萬象之大用本身，而且

40) 《周易》〈繫辭上〉5[《Zhouyi》Xichishang 5]

41) 《論語》〈先進〉19[*Lunyu Xianjin* 19]

42) 《體用論》，第1頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.1]

43) 《體用論》，第59頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.59]

44) 熊十力把本體和實體為同樣的概念。即《體用論》8頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.8]：“實體與本體二名，雖有一字不同，而其義則一也。本者，言其本來有故，亦即是萬物的自身。實者，言其真真實實。”

45) 《體用論》，第9頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.9]

46) 熊十力引用《王陽明全書》〈傳習錄(上)〉(台北：正中書局，1979。)第26頁。[*Wangyangmingquansu*, Taipei: Chengchung Book Co., 1990. p.26]的“即體而言，用在體。即用而言，體在用。是謂體用一源。”在於《明儒學案》〈姚江學案〉86頁。所以熊十力雖然說即體即用，即用即體在《體用論》(台北：台灣學生書局，民國69年。10頁。)，其思想模型與王守仁同樣。

47) 程頤，《易程傳》序文。[Chengi, *Ichengchuan*, Introduction]

除了其大作用以外沒有本體。把這樣的本體論與‘反求實證論’連結看，則一切萬物即是本體，因此透過反求的修養實踐而可以實證其‘真實自己’與‘萬物之本體。如此熊十力的本體論直接與他的修養實踐的境界哲學。

無體即無用，離用元無體。48)

實體是完完全全的變成萬有不齊的大用，即大用流行之外無有實體。49)

本體是能變者，作用是所變者；可是其‘能’字只是一個形容詞。所以能變者與所變者沒有對峙的，50)那就是離作用則無本體的意思。所以他以‘即用即體’說一切，其體用關係就成為‘無先無後’的關係。雖然體用是不可分離的，可是邏輯上本體中已有一切作用。因此那屬於因中有果論。尤其是他主張，哲學家以主要概念為本體，所要重點研究的是本體論。如此看來，他還離不開本體中心之思想。

熊十力之本體論屬於境論。雖然他把本體論在作用上說：“言心即本體者，即用而顯其體也。”51)，但那并不能成為量論之對象。因為以量論的方法無法取得其本體，所以多人對本體採取遮詮方法。因此聽者要自己覺悟其間接描寫的本體世界。52)雖然在作用上顯出本體，若不是生而知之者則一定要經由高度的修養過程。因為學而知之者以下難得，所以才有後天所形成的妄習。因此修養實踐之程度到了“從心所欲不踰矩”的境界之後，才可以說‘即用顯體’，而不是一般人的日常生活。

熊十力哲學雖然有或多或少的唯識論的要素，但他闡明自己的立場就意味著在《周易》與孟子哲學之上。因此我們應該看他是一個儒家哲學家。

哲學家將本體當做外界獨存的物事來推度者是極大錯誤。……不過提到一心字應知有本心與習心之分。本心才是吾人與天地萬物所同稟之真性。53)

48) 《新唯識論》〈唯識下〉[壬辰刪定本]，第58頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.58]

49) 《體用論》第10頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.10]

50) 《體用論》第9~10頁。[Xiong Shili, *Tiyunglun*, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1980. p.9~10]: “復次，前文已云，不妨假說本體為能變。還要補充一段話。此能變一詞的能字，只是形容詞，並不謂有所變與之為對。如果說，由能變造起所變，必將以能變為超脫乎所變之上而獨在。不惟同於宗教擬人之神，更有能所對峙不得圓融之大過。須知，實體是完完全全的變成萬有不齊的大用，即大用流行之外，無有實體。”

51) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第507頁。(〈明心上〉第66頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.507]

52) 《新唯識論》〈唯識下〉[壬辰刪定本]，第57頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.57]: “遮詮者，這種言說的方式。對於所欲詮釋的事物和道理，無法直表，只好針對人心迷妄執著的地方，想方法來攻破他，令他自悟。”《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第102頁。(〈唯識下〉第45頁): “玄學上的修辭，最好用遮詮的方式。”

53) 《新唯識論》〈明宗〉[壬辰刪定本]，第25~26頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.25~26]。《新唯識論》〈明心上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第171頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.171]:

孟子亦云，‘萬物皆備於我矣。’蓋以爲萬物都不是離心獨在，故所謂我者，并非小己孤立，卻是賅備萬物通爲一體。<sup>54)</sup>

心是什麼？熊十力認爲心之作用卽是本體。卽如他所說“言心卽本體者，卽用而顯其體也。”<sup>55)</sup>同樣他在說明萬物本體的時候，在自然以乾坤、陰陽、闢闢、動靜等的作用來說明本體，在人以仁義禮智信等的具體的實踐行爲來說明本體。因爲他堅持作用顯示本體的‘卽用顯體’觀。這是他在‘有自性’的道德本體論上，主張‘本心與萬物實證相應’的大前提。因此熊十力所說的本體，不是如西洋形而上學所推論的觀念，而是在修養實踐過程上，通過性智所反省自己省察來體會的內外合德的精神境界。

## 2) 反求實證論 - 以修養實踐的方法來實證

西洋哲學對於本體，以邏輯推論的方法來接近。但熊十力把它歸屬於修養實踐論，而採取反求實證的方法。因爲“此(作用)不卽是心體(心體是獨立無待，沖寂無朕，故見聞覺知不卽是心體)，但心體亦非離見聞覺知而獨在。”<sup>56)</sup>所以在修養實踐中，他以自己顯示自己的本性爲本體。這樣的看法卽如王守仁之‘致良知’<sup>57)</sup>是一樣的，熊十力亦是修養實踐工夫以外別無本體。<sup>58)</sup>

熊十力爲什麼以性智作爲是對本體的自覺主體？因爲性智是已經具備萬物之本體。那麼如何知道其本體？性智在實踐過程上自己發現自己本體，透過自省的反識<sup>59)</sup>則可以知道其本體。如果以知識論的分類來劃分的話，這則屬於自己內的直觀。<sup>60)</sup>如此性智透過反識而超脫事物，同時本心確立

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“夫性者，吾人與天地萬物所同具之本體。”《新唯識論》〈明心上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第174頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.174]: “此(作用)不卽是心體(心體是獨立無待，沖寂無朕，故見聞覺知不卽是心體)，但心體亦非離見聞覺知而獨在。”

54) 《新唯識論》〈唯識上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第42頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.42]

55) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第507頁。(〈明心上〉第66頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.507]

56) 《新唯識論》〈明心上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第174頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.174]

57) 《王陽明全書》(1)〈傳習錄下〉，台北：正中書局，1979。第89~90頁。*Wangyangmingquansu*, Taipei: Chengchung Book Co., 1990. p.89~90]: “人的良知，就是草木瓦石的良知。若草木瓦石無人的良知，不可以爲草木瓦石矣。……你未看此花時，此花與汝心同歸於寂。你來看此花時，則此花顏色一時明白起來。便知此花不在你的心外。……目無體，以萬物之色爲體。……心無體，以天地萬物感應之是非爲體。”

58) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第541頁。(〈明心上〉第83頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.541]: “不用真工夫，卻沒有真本體。”

59) 反觀(《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第505頁。(〈明心上〉第65頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.505], 反求自識(《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第508頁。(〈明心上〉第67頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.508]

主宰力而沒有執著境物，則可以主宰事物，而且不再為物化。<sup>61)</sup>那麼什麼時候沒有自己覺悟而妄執於事物？如同在西洋知識論對性智認為外物一樣，則理障發生。理障發生，則就無法自己覺悟。因此熊十力把知識論分類為量智領域，而本體論則歸類為修養實踐論的領域。

性智之自我實現是有自己原因的。<sup>62)</sup>那麼為什麼妄執發生，如何除去其妄執？熊十力認為妄執原因在習氣，即本能上，因此要靜察本能。他說：“本能即是習氣。習氣纏縛於人，茫無涯涘，不可窮詰，隱然為吾身之主人公，非有極深靜定工夫，不能照察而克除之也。”<sup>63)</sup>性智即本性已經具備萬理，為什麼還再需要修養、實踐工夫？本性已具的萬理，就是仁體。<sup>64)</sup>所以修養·實踐工夫就是以‘反身而誠’而體得其本體實現。如果沒有實踐工夫，則本體之實現無法得到，還有久而不作修養工夫則喪失其本然。知與行之關係又如何？熊十力如王守仁的致良知一樣，採取行中有知的知行合一方法。他取《周易》的剛健的乾元作用本身為本體<sup>65)</sup>，而且以實踐性很強的儒家道德哲學來對應道、佛家與西洋哲學之戰略。實現本體的方法是什麼？從熊十力的本體論看，就是在作用上顯示自己<sup>66)</sup>的‘即用顯體’的體用論。所以他說“如何得實證？實證乃本體之自明白了。……未知工夫即本體，是工夫皆外鑠，而昧其真性，此之謂冥行。”<sup>67)</sup>他不說‘本體即工夫，而說工夫即本體。而且他認為沒有實踐工夫則本體無法呈現，沒有作實踐工夫則本體只是想像荀度的腦中觀念而已。<sup>68)</sup>即工夫與本體有同實異名關係，雖

60) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第503～504頁。(《明心上》第64～65頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.503～504]: “本心亦云性智。(從人生論與心理學的觀點而言，則名以本心。從量論的觀點而言，則名為性智)是吾人與萬物同具之本性。”第532頁。(《明心上》第79頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.532]: “本心不倚於物，故非知識的。……本心即是吾人與萬物同具的本體。”但他反對 Henri Bergson 的直觀，即如熊十力，《十力語要》卷3，台北，廣文書局，民國66年。第520頁。[Xiong Shili, *Shihliyuyao* No.3, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1977. p.520]: “但柏氏言直覺，不甚明瞭，時與本能混視。本能即是習氣。”

61) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第513頁。(《明心上》第69頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.513]: “以其既現為物，而即運於物之中，以主宰乎物，畢竟不物化故，故云超脫。……妄執境物，而不可反識自己。”

62) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第533頁。(《明心上》第79頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.533]: “即工夫實自本體出。非是離本體，別有一心來用工夫。”

63) 熊十力，《十力語要》卷3，台北：廣文書局，民國66年。第520頁。[Xiong Shili, *Shihliyuyao* No.3, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1977. p.520]

64) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第554頁。(《明心上》第90頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.554]: “夫皆備者，仁體也。”

65) 《體用論》，第25頁。：“乾元謂本體”第37頁。：“大用流行(大用謂實體變成大用)，至剛至健，至奇至怪。”第52頁。(《唯識上》第20頁。): “儒家哲學，稱一切物的本體，曰太易，是無形兆可見的。(太易者，本不易也，而涵變易，亦即於變易而見不易。故云太易。)”

66) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第507頁。(《明心上》第66頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.507]: “言心即本體者，即用而顯其體也”

67) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第534頁。(《明心上》第80頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.534]

68) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第533頁。(《明心上》第79頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen

然實踐工夫是本體自己呈現自己而不是免費的，因為跟著工夫正比。<sup>69)</sup>所以他不得不採取以實踐工夫為修養方法。

反求實證的修養方法是什麼？由於量智之妄習，則本體無法呈現自己。因此要徹底斷切妄習，則經常可以服從於性智。那麼脫離妄習之過程有什麼方法？首先得到懸解而後可獲得真解。即是，

此智(量智或理智)元是性智的發用，而卒別於性智者，因為性智作用，依官能而發現，即官能得假之以自用。(此中得者，言其可得。而非定然。若官能恒假性智以自用，即性智不得顯。無此理也。)……此乃量智之懸解。(懸解，借用莊子語。)懸解者，量智離妄習纏縛而神解昭著之謂，……然以為‘真解’則未也。……必妄習斷盡，性智全顯。量智乃純為性智之發用，而不失其本然，始名真解。<sup>70)</sup>

那麼妄習之原因是什麼，而且量智如何得到懸解與真解？妄習發生之第一原因在由量智看本體。然則本體亦當做外在事物一樣。即如：“本體唯是實證相應，非量智可證得者。因為量智起時，總是要當做外在的物事去推度。”<sup>71)</sup>第二原因在性智藉官能之力量而作用。即“形氣的權能，本當隨順乎性，而亦可以不順乎性。”<sup>72)</sup>如此妄習之發端就在‘動量智’與‘藉官能’之中。筆者認為這些只是次要原因，真正的主要原因在性智之脆弱性上。只有像聖賢一樣修養工夫作好，才不會那樣。

雖然妄習由於量智即理智<sup>73)</sup>作用而後天所發生的，但理智已經在性智裏。即“智是本有，是先天的。理智即新論初版〈明宗章〉所謂慧。是從經驗發展出來，是後天的。但後天的并不是別有來源，實即依智故有。”<sup>74)</sup>那麼為什麼由理智(量智)作用而因起妄習？性智透過官能而作用的時候，官能好像自己主管性智作用一樣奪取主權，那麼性智作用就歪曲了。那麼問題發生之原因是在官能的嗎？如此則性智為什麼被打敗呢？孟子認為不服大體而順從小體就是欲心遮斷良心<sup>75)</sup>一樣，熊十力亦認為其原因在官能遮斷性智。可

Book Co., 1974. p.533]: “無工夫而言本體，只是想像筍度而已。非可實證本體也。”〈明心上〉第83頁。：“與人而忠，仁就在與人。此工夫即本體。……不用真工夫，卻沒有真本體。”

69) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第540頁。(〈明心上〉第83頁。)[*Hsinweishihlun*, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.540]: “學者求識仁體，卻須如此下工夫。工夫做到一分，即是仁體呈露一分。工夫做到十分，即是仁體呈露十分。”

70) 《新唯識論》〈明宗〉[壬辰刪定本]，第24頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.24]

71) 《新唯識論》〈明宗〉[壬辰刪定本]，第27頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.27]

72) 《新唯識論》〈明宗〉[壬辰刪定本]，第219頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.219]

73) 《新唯識論》〈明宗〉[壬辰刪定本]，第24頁。[*Hsinweishihlun*, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.24]: “量智是思量和推度與簡擇等作用，能明辨事物之理則及於所行所歷簡擇得失故，名為量智，亦名理智。”

74) 《十力語要》卷2，第252頁。[Xiong Shili, *Shihliyuyao* No.3, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1977. p.252]

是孟子說我們順從四端之心不是取捨選擇問題而是應當作的而已<sup>76)</sup>，熊十力亦是遮斷妄習而應當作順從性智而已。因此我們追求高品格境界的方法，就是除了‘反身而誠’或‘求其放心’以外沒有別的。所以熊十力說“斯學歸趣，唯其復其本心。”<sup>77)</sup>“吾以返本爲學。”<sup>78)</sup>像熊十力的反求實證不是目的而只是一個結果。脫離妄習的具體的方法是什麼？如孔子說：“學而不思則罔，思而不學則殆。”<sup>79)</sup>一樣，熊十力亦主張把‘思惟’與‘修養’所交叉形成‘思修交盡’。即他說：“思惟與修養交致其力，而修養所以立本，思修交盡(思而無修只是虛見；修而不思終無真解)，久而後有獲也。”<sup>80)</sup>把它比較，則熊十力的‘思’即如孔子的‘學’，熊十力的‘修’即如孔子的‘思’。與‘思修交盡’類似的概念就是‘性修不二’。性就是本性，修就是以本性爲主體而作修養的。所以這思與修亦有不二關係。

熊十力在《新唯識論》〈明心上〉(廣文書局本)上完全刪除其工夫論，而後在《原儒》〈緒言〉與《新唯識論》〈明宗〉[壬辰刪定本]上論議到這‘思修不二’的‘思修交盡’的工夫論。但只有幾個字而已，他要寫《量論》，最終沒有寫出。所以不得不以‘思修不二’的‘思修交盡’爲中心而論議他的修養論。但他的本體論可以說是‘大心本體論’<sup>81)</sup>，因此量論亦可以歸結於本心的自我發現。<sup>82)</sup>

75) 《孟子》〈告子上〉15[Mengzi Gaozishang 15]: “曰鈞是人也，或從其大體，或從其小體，何也？曰耳目之官，不思而蔽於物，物交物則引之而已矣。心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。此天之所與我者。先立乎其大者，則其小者不能奪也。此爲大人而已矣。”參照。

76) 《孟子》〈離婁下〉26[Mengzi liluhsia 26]: “孟子曰：天下之言性也，則故而已矣。故者以利爲本。”〈告子上〉11[Mengzi Gaozishang 11]: “學問之道無他，求其放心而已矣。”〈盡心上〉17[Mengzi Chinsinshang 17]: “孟子曰：無爲其所不爲，無欲其所不欲，如此而已矣。”參照。

77) 《新唯識論》〈明心上〉[壬辰刪定本]，第185頁。[Hsinweishihlun, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.185]

78) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第556頁。(〈明心上〉第91頁。)[Hsinweishihlun, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.556]

79) 《論語》〈爲政〉15章[Lunyu Weizheng 15]

80) 熊十力，《原儒》〈緒言〉，北京：中國人民大學出版社，2009。第8頁。[Xiong Shili, Yuanru, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.8] 熊十力的修養論代表概念有如‘思修交盡’只說在《新唯識論》〈明宗〉[壬辰刪定本](1952)與《原儒》〈緒言〉(1956)。他對於量論說在《論六經·贅語》(1951): “吾欲出入華、梵、西洋而爲量論，胸中已有一規模，然非精神飽滿，興會時發，斷不能提筆。人或動餘急寫一綱要，其實綱要二字談何容易？真正著述確是不堪苟且，老而愈不敢苟也。綱要如能作，亦絕不同於西洋知識論之內容與體式，自別是一種作意，然暮年意興消沮，恐終不能作也。”(景海峰，《熊十力哲學研究》，北京大學出版社，2010。第189頁。中再引用。)

81) 郭齊勇，《熊十力與中國傳統文化》，台北：遠流出版社，1990。第99~109頁。[Guo Qiyong, Xiong Shili & Chinese Traditional Culture, Taipei: Yuanliu Publishing Co., 1990. p.99~109]

82) 郭齊勇，《熊十力與中國傳統文化》，台北：遠流出版社，1990。第164頁。[Guo Qiyong, Xiong Shili & Chinese Traditional Culture, Taipei: Yuanliu Publishing Co., 1990. p.164]: “這是甚麼意思呢？即是說，性智和量智是不同層次的思維。量智只是一般概念，判斷，推理，屬科學思維；性智是超越理性思維之上的直覺體悟，屬哲學思維。他進而把這種哲學思維歸結爲本心的自我發現。”

雖然量智引起妄習，可是與性智一起配均衡而成思修交盡，則可以成為聖人之學問。熊十力說：“夫哲學以上達天德為究竟，（達者猶云證會，天德猶云本體，非謂天帝，此用《中庸》語）其工夫要在思修交盡。專尚思辨者，可以睿理智，（理智以思辨之功而益深銳博通也。故云睿。）而以缺乏修為故，（修為亦云修養，孔門求仁思誠與存養篤行等工夫是。）則理智終離其本，無可語上達也。專重修為者，可以養性智，而以不務思辨故，則性智將遺其用，無可成全德也。是故‘思修交盡’，二智圓融，而後為至人之學。（此意待‘量論’方樣）”<sup>83)</sup>量智透過與外部事物外緣而探究其作用，性智透過與本性內緣即返緣而恢復其本性本體，然則可以積思修交盡之德而後與天道合一。作用即本體之實現，所以這思想模型可以說‘攝用歸體’<sup>84)</sup>。我們如此則可以看出熊十力在反求實證的哲學境界中，是要融攝量智與性智。

反求實證工夫隨時隨地何人都可能作到嗎？因為人人先天固有皆有善性，所以我們都反求實證則隨時隨地誰亦都可以反求實證。但理論的‘不可’與實際的‘能不能’是不同的。並且除去後天累積惡習或妄習，就需要大量的修養工夫。反求實證論上實證本體的方法，就在反求過程上。熊十力把本體看做能變者，並且把他的詞分類為形容詞，都因於他的本體論以作用為中心。所以反求實證不是反求的結果知道本體的，而是在反求的過程中顯出本體。尤其是‘境界哲學’不是完整型，而是發展型之故，更要如此。

顯出本體有哪些具體的工夫？此有‘誠’與‘樂’。熊十力對孟子的“反身而誠，樂莫大焉”，說“此誠字不與妄對，樂字不與苦對。誠與樂正是仁體故。”<sup>85)</sup>那不限於‘誠’與‘樂’工夫，還有‘順性’一切都是修養實踐工夫。因為所精華的性智作用都是現出其本體的。所以他說那樣的境界不是普通人能夠達到的，而是如聖賢上智者才能夠達到的。<sup>86)</sup>

反求實證論需要修養實踐工夫，則要作多少才好哪？孔子說“從心所欲不踰矩”，孟子說把仁義禮智擴充到浩然之氣為至。實際上本體在實踐過程上實現，所以本無完了形或完成形，至於離世為止持續要作修養實踐工夫。<sup>87)</sup>如果說其最高境界是什麼？那可能是沒有內外或心物分離對立的‘心境渾融’的境界。<sup>88)</sup>

83) 《新唯識論》(明宗)[壬辰刪定本]，第28頁。[Hsinweishihlun, Beijing: Jenmin University Publishing Co., 2009. p.28]

84) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第331頁。(〈功能下〉第66頁。)[Hsinweishihlun, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.331]

85) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第555頁。(〈明心上〉第90頁。)[Hsinweishihlun, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.555]

86) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第555頁。(〈明心上〉第90頁。)[Hsinweishihlun, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.555]: “境地乃上智事。”這話類似於《莊子》(大宗師): “有真人而後有真知。”

87) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第531~533頁。(〈明心上〉第78~79頁。)[Hsinweishihlun, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.531~533]: “工夫誠至，即本體呈顯。若日用間工夫全不得力，則染習熾，邪妄作，斯以障礙本體而喪其真矣。(真謂本體)故曰：即工夫即本體，此盡人合天之極則也。……即工夫實自本體出。非是離本體，別有一心來用工夫。”



熊十力所謂的本體不是如西洋形而上學的觀念的存在，而是在修養實踐工夫中所動的‘作用’的本身，亦是性智的‘道德境界’。其作用與境地在高度的修養實踐過程中所體得的，體得之後才能夠以一連過程來實證道德本體就是反求實證。無數無限的刻苦努力之後才能取得其證明，所以他的哲學成爲一個‘境界哲學’。

### 三、結論

熊十力爲了克服道佛家與西洋哲學之問題，而繼承《周易》之體用論與孟子人性論、工夫論，建立‘反求實證的道德本體論’。從他的哲學之得失來看，儒家哲學對道佛家與西洋哲學之差別化是比較成功的。尤其是把本體看做‘境界事物’，而提高儒家哲學之修養實踐性，那就是很大的學術的成果。這些成爲後來牟宗三定立‘境界哲學’概念的一個發端。<sup>89)</sup>但心外無境的世界觀是加強了唯心論的傾向，所以科學遇到困難。就如同中國築萬里長城可以防禦北方民族之侵略，卻不可防禦從南海攻擊來的西洋艦船一樣。熊十力之本體論亦踏襲了中國哲學，不但沒有改善中國哲學之因中有果論的傾向反而更強化，從而使得中國儒家哲學難得有自己革新和新的方法。

熊十力的體用論，定立了因中有果論的道德的基準。如果人生有一個基準，則比較安定一貫。如此則因而把人類社會爲豫測可能。但那個離不開本體之存在，則無法從自己自由。所以不關因中有果論或因中無果論都可以作爲自己世界觀。進一步就如果哲學的窮極目標就是追求普遍的自由精神，那麼中國傳統體用論的本體論亦是否要講究得其自由？因爲哲學不是宗教。

熊十力哲學的大前提(presupposition)就是反求實證論的本體論。所以如果他所謂的本體不是絕對的存在，則就沒有反求實證的對象。他詮釋本體的時候所用的‘絕對’概念，如果只是純粹理性的二律背反的‘觀念’中一個，那將怎麼辦？雖然那只是個觀念，但還是要長期反復學習，才可以形成與

88) 《新唯識論》(廣文書局本)，第7頁。(〈初印上中卷序言〉第3頁。)[Hsinweishihlun, Taipei: Kuangwen Book Co., 1974. p.7]: “內心外物，分成兩界對立。此於真理大悖。悟到心境渾融，方是實際理地。”

89) 牟宗三，《中國哲學十九講》，台北：台灣學生書局，民國72年。第103頁。[Mou Zhongsan, Chinese Philosophy 19 Lecture, Taipei: Hsuehsheng Book Co., 1983. p.103]: “道家式的形而上學、存有論是實踐的，實踐取廣義。平常由道德上講，那是實踐的本義或狹義。儒釋道三教都從修養上講，就是廣義的實踐的。儒家的實踐是moral，佛教的實踐是解脫，道家很難找個恰當的名詞，大概也是解脫一類的，如灑脫自在無待逍遙這些形容名詞，籠統地就說實踐的。這種形而上學因爲從主觀講，不從存在上講，所以我給它個名詞叫〈境界型態的形而上學〉；客觀地從存在上講就叫〈實有型態的形而上學〉，這是大分類。中國的形而上學——道家、佛教、儒家——都有境界型態的形而上學意味。但儒家不只是個境界，它也有實有的意義；道家就只是境界形態，這就規定它系統性格的不同。由和儒家佛教及西方哲學的分別就顯出它系統性格的不同，這個和其他系統不同的智慧很特別，所以要注意。”

它同樣的精神。因此道德的自我亦可能是由後天學習而獲得的。毋論那是‘反求的工夫’還是‘觀念的模倣’，真正的哲學精神是否能包越這樣的界限？

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## A Study of Xiong Shili's Ontology of Verification by Self-reflection

NAM Sang-ho

### Abstract

While the basis of Xiong Shili's (熊十力) philosophical method lies in ontology, it is mainly driven by Fa-xiang-zong's (法相宗) concept of cognition-only which is based on the theory of "cognition-only without the existence of external objects" (唯識無境) and criticism against inferential cognition (比量) found in Western philosophy. In short, his view was that the Fa-xiang-zong's way of understanding saw substance as non-existent, whereas Western philosophy saw it as unknowable. Only through Confucian reason and wisdom can one reflect and realize one's own "true body" (substance). Through this line of thought, Xiong's ontology settled as an ontology that promotes the action of disciplinary practice at its core. With a metaphysical basis in the dynamic qianyuan (乾元), Xiong constructed Tiyonglun (體用論) which sees action as its substance, and based the fundamentals of moral discipline and practice on the concept of reflection and faithfulness of Mencius. He also established an ontology of self-reflection which can only be achieved through intense discipline and practice. In this sense, his philosophy is truly a "philosophy of a holy state." In his view, it was the first mission of philosophy to bring clarity to the substance of all things. In the present study, substance (body) and practice will be examined separately. The content of substance and the structure of philosophy will be explained within the framework of Tiyonglun philosophy, after which the methodology of discipline and practice will be presented through the ontology of self-reflection. In the conclusion, limitations of Xiong's philosophy will be discussed. The overall subject matter is Xiong's ontology of verification by self-reflection.

**Keywords:** Xiong Shili (熊十力), verification by self-reflection (反求實證), calipering body with explicit (即用顯體), holy wisdom (性智), philosophy of a holy state (境界哲學)

<書評>

## 《爲了朝鮮後期思想史的未來：從概念和思維體系的維互和對立來看的18、19世紀的韓國思想》一書的書評 (李炯丘著, Bluehistory, 2013年5月, ISBN: 13-9788994079936)

趙 成 山

### 一、問題意識的出發點

此書是在概念史的問題意識下，對朝鮮後期儒學思想史整理的著作，它以連續的觀點嘗試總結了朝鮮後期儒學思想的變化以及其近代的產物。作者將此段時間放在概念史的方法論下，對朝鮮後期的思想史進行了思考和研究，而本書就是其辛勤研究的成果。最近，在韓國曆史研究者中，不將前近代與近代分別開來，而是試圖在一個模式下進行理解的努力已經部分得以實現。這是對在既存的將前近代與近代鮮明的區分開來加以認識的過程中，以近代歪曲或者評價前近代的錯誤進行反思的產物。

這可以說是所謂的通過對近代中心主義進行批判性的反思，來試圖尋找新的研究方法論而進行的努力，再進一步可以說是對西方中心主義的反省。觀察本著作中的所涉及的主題，主要是在18世紀到19世紀末的200到300年之間。但是期間插入了區分前近代與近代的的一段重要時期，也就是說本著作是同時將前近代與近代結合在一起的。它橫穿了區分前近代與後近代界限，同時又展開了自己的論理。

### 二、目錄與內容構成

考察本書的目錄，我們能夠確定它是在橫穿了前近代與近代的界限的問題意識下完成的。

序章：韓國的概念史研究與近代思維模式

第一部. 變化的征兆

一章. 構建並完善儒教秩序：朱子主義的構建與破裂

二章. 時間與空間認識的變化：‘時’與‘俗’關聯用語的出現

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三章. 由外部刮來的風：燕行出現，對於世界的認識

四章. 價值的調整，信念的變化：‘利用厚生’的出現與西學的傳播

第二部. 與概念的持續對立

五章. 中華與攝取文明：中華-文明的交接批判

六章. 近代發現的傳統：實學與內在的發展

七章. 價值的內在化與認同

結論：溯迴與展望

作者在序章中講述韓國的概念史研究與近代思潮的關係的同時警戒出現分裂前近代與近代的曆史意識，並說明了為掌握、安排前近代·近代概念的多種途徑而進行的常識劃分以及所做出的努力。為此它強調了如下三點。第一，從當代的觀點，經驗，文脈中掌握曆史的所謂的“內部視線”。第二，對立的理解西方近代，同時必須要依據西方學術認真的觀察概念化以前的東亞的各種變化。第三，探索長期持續的概念能否使韓國概念史的固有層面凸顯。以此克服既存的傳統（=前近代）-近代思維模式（即立足於將前近代與近代區分開來進行觀察的視角）的研究傾向。這種問題意識貫通與本著作的始終。

作者在第一部中要觀察朝鮮後期思想的各種變化征兆。作者在結論部分提及的如下內容很好的向我們展示了“征兆”這句話中所蘊含的複雜的意義。作者在結論部分提及了北歐神話。

我偶然再次讀到北歐神話的時候，看到了一個比喻，能夠很好的表達小小的種子的力量。神話中出現的光之神巴爾德被槲寄生的幼芽刺到了胸膛而斃命。一個柔弱的幼芽刺到了巴爾德，北歐的神們卻預感到了滅亡。柔弱的幼芽的最強大的難道不是“承載著變化的未來”嗎？由於一個人的覺醒、信念而結成果實，幾句不起眼的言述等，有時也會打倒強大的神。因此，征兆雖然微小，但是確要經常注意。此書中所關注的變化與分裂的征兆雖然不全面不平常，但卻充分值得我們去品味。（225頁）

我認為這句話很恰當的說明了變化的征兆所具有的小但是又絕對不小的未來影響力。此章的主題大體上可以分為一個部分，主要講了朝鮮後期思想界中出現的變化。首先，在朱子主義的構建與破裂部分中，由於追求極度的整合性的朱子主義為了再次整合性的構建自己理念而進行的努力，那樣的整合性追求再次使朱子主義破裂，這種情形通過舉湖洛辯論的例子進行了敘述。繼而，通過‘時’與‘俗’關聯用語的頻繁出現，提及了當時與‘古’相比集中於‘今’，與‘雅’相比集中於‘俗’的時代傾向。

18世紀是中國清朝的全盛期，朝鮮也未能擺脫這一影響。朝鮮的知識分子作為使臣去清朝體驗清朝的繁榮，以此為基礎，展開了‘北學論’。作者敘述了北學思想所帶來的世界觀的變化。關於我與世界的新的認識體系使朱子主義由外部開始動搖。這與前邊的在整合性的追求中自己走向破裂



的朱子主義不同，從其他的方向對朱子主義造成了威脅。朱子主義從裏外都面對著思想上的挑戰。現在反朱子主義思想荒謬地出現於曾徹底修煉朱子主義的人之中已經到了無法阻擋的階段。

本書的最後一部分介紹了“利用厚生”思想的興起與西學的影響。“利用厚生”這一詞語原本是在《書經》中同“正德”一起使用。但到了18世紀，卻開始頻繁地單獨用於《朝鮮王朝實錄》等編年史書之中。此時的“利用厚生”也有了其特定的含義，不再指《書經》中的“利用厚生”。西學中湧現的各種思想也在這一時期傳入了朝鮮，促使朝鮮社會出現了多種思想變化。雖然這些思想變化僅局限在一小部分知識分子之間，並沒有引起全社會的普遍關注，但是這種變化卻預示著未來朝鮮社會思想的巨大變革。

在第2部第一章中，作者介紹了近現代中華思想如何適用於現代文化，並發展變化爲一種文明概念。近現代的中華與夷狄概念很容易變化爲近代文明與野蠻概念，因爲兩者是二元的、敵對的概念。通過對兩者的融合過程及相互關係的研究，作者揭示出了傳統社會認知模式與近代社會認知模式的共同點和差異點。在此基礎上，作者通過重新審視近代以來朝鮮後期進行的實學傳統研究，闡明了近代是如何使前現代概念化的過程。作者在書中不僅指出了實學思想存在的缺陷，還提出了應在清醒認識實學思想局限性的前提下，繼續進行實學研究，而不是盲目地摒棄實學思想

在最後一章中，作者借鑒中華和基督教文明的經驗，探究了應如何實現價值的內化。朝鮮的儒學思想家比東亞各國的思想家都更加努力實現儒教思想的內化。然而當傳統的儒教思想的內化同近代基督教文明相遇，又會碰撞出怎樣的火花呢？對此，作者也進行了詳細論述。尹致昊、李承晚等人致力於實現基督教文明的內化，正如當初朝鮮時代的儒學思想家始終致力於推動中華思想的內化。作者還揭示出了這兩種思想的內化過程中出現的共同點，並指出了韓國思想史中殘留的以“假”和“亞”爲中心的思想體系。作者認爲只有摒棄“中心-周邊”的認知模式，才能克服這種以“假”爲中心的思想體系。

在結論部分，作者重新梳理了前文的論述，並再次明確了本書重點研究的基本問題。他指出近年來韓國的概念史研究工作主要是集中於主體內部對近代概念的導入這一事實，並對本書也是以這種批判意識爲基礎，展開了相關的研究與論述。指出對‘中心’與‘周邊’進行的思考有時指向中心，有時將亞中心作爲存在的意義，在這種安定與不安定中進行思考的模式在本著作涉及的18、19世紀以及之後的近代時期都曾出現過，也提議說能否長期將其模式作爲近代發展的框架。本書的第2部充分體現出了這種批判意識，正是在這種批判意識的指導下，本書還取得了兩大意想不到的研究成果。第一是深化了對17~18世紀東方和西方交流問題的認識。在東方和西方的交流過程中，雙方相互取長補短，謀求共同發展。第二是明確了該時期朝鮮對歐洲的認識問題。原來朝鮮一直盲目崇拜西方，認爲西方處處都是天堂樂土。然而在這一時期，通過對歐洲的客觀了解與觀察，朝鮮開

始對西方有了正確的認識，不再盲目崇拜。通過這樣的問題意識以及取得的成果，最終，現在韓國概念史應該制定計劃，引導出周邊共同特點，而不是去認識西方的經驗。這些經驗可以說是朝鮮知識分子通過對18-19世紀時期‘中華’的批判與反省而得到的。

### 三、研究的意義：概念史研究的探索

本書運用概念史研究方法論的相關理論，在辯證批判的指導思想下展開論述，旨在打破所謂近代模式的局限性。作者介紹了概念的具體內容以及外在形式的變化過程，並試圖跨越時代的鴻溝來論述這種變化現象，在此論述過程中本書取得的研究成果頗豐。本書認為今後韓國概念史研究的中心工作應該是將起源於西方的近代思想進行剖析並重組，借以創造出嶄新的思想體系。正如語言不通就無法進行思考，概念如果不通，思想更是無從提及。概念對我們的思想有著極其重要的意義，正確的概念指引著光明的前進方向，錯誤的概念則將思想禁錮在泥潭。本書詳細論述了概念的相關問題，希望能對今後朝鮮後期思想史的研究工作有所幫助。

## 李震相著,《心即理說》 (《寒洲先生文集》卷32)

崔英辰

李震相(1818-1886年)是19世紀嶺南學派的代表性性理學者,字汝雷,號寒洲,出生於慶尚道星州。17歲時在叔父李源祚(1792-1871年)的指導下學習性理學,雖然沒有特別的師承關係,但寒洲特別仰慕退溪,認為自己繼承了退溪學的正統。

寒洲不僅僅是一位卓越的學者,而且還積極的參與到現實社會中,如針對時弊上疏,並在1876年的雲揚號事件時策劃發動了義兵。1919年既是寒洲兒子同時又是寒洲弟子的李承熙和他的弟子郭鍾錫,以及郭鍾錫的弟子金昌淑等主導了“巴里長書事件”(第一次儒林團事件),之後金昌淑又主導了“軍資金事件”(第二次儒林團事件)等獨立運動,而這一系列具有強烈實踐性的事件都與寒洲的義理思想有著不可分割的關係。

1861年寒洲爲了批判栗谷學派的“心即理”和重新建構退溪學派的整體性,著了《心即理說》一書。用理氣論來解答“心爲何物”這一問題時,我們可以得出三個結論,即‘心合理氣’‘心即理’‘心即氣’。衆所周知,朱子學中把心規定爲“理+氣”,退溪也是主張“心合理氣”。但是自栗谷主張“心是氣”<sup>1)</sup>之後,這便成爲了畿湖學派的宗旨。而寒洲認為“心是氣”這一主張歪曲了由“孔子-孟子-朱子-退溪”所傳承下來的儒學的一貫宗旨。這一點通過寒洲“論心莫善於心即理,莫不善於心即氣”可以得到很好的證實。

爲了批判“心是氣”,寒洲提出了“心即理”,並認為自己的“心即理”才是真正傳承並發展了退溪的理論。<sup>2)</sup>但‘心即理’類同於被退溪劃爲異端的陽明學的理論,所以不僅在嶺南學派內部受到了極大的批判,在畿湖學派內部也是如此。

寒洲在世的時候雖也有對其理論批判的學者,但遠沒有寒洲過世後激烈。1886年寒洲過世後,學界對其理論的批判正式拉開了帷幕。曾爲柳致明的門人,且與寒洲生前有過交情的金麟燮(號端溪,1824-1903),批判寒洲的“心即理”同陽明學沒有區別,並在晚年(1898年)撰寫《心即理說辨》<sup>3)</sup>

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1) 栗谷,《栗谷全書》卷10,《答成浩原》“心是氣也”

2) 《寒洲先生文集》:“(退溪)先生常曰,心之未發,氣未用事,惟理而已,安有惡乎?此乃指心體之論。吾所謂莫善於心即理者,此也。”

來系統地批判寒洲。

1897年，寒洲的門人們爲了表示對他的敬意，刊行文集並獻呈陶山書院（現在韓國廣尚北道安東），這就成了寒洲學說公開受到批判的契機。陶山書院認爲寒洲的文集內容有悖於退溪的學說，所以不宜作爲書院的藏書，故同通知文一起把寒洲的文集返還回去。退溪的後孫們認爲寒洲的理論否定了退溪的“心合理氣”，推崇了陽明學的“心即理”。其代表人物李晚寅更是撰寫了《寒洲李氏動靜說條辨》<sup>4)</sup>來對《寒洲文集》進行了逐條批判。對此作爲寒洲的兒子兼門生的李承熙撰寫了《宣錄條辨》，此文的主要內容是先刊載李晚寅批判寒洲的理論，其後又有寒洲的兒子李承熙對此的批判，並擁護寒洲的主張。1902年又發生了寒洲文集在道南書院（韓國廣尚北道尚州）被焚燒的事件，其理由是人們認爲寒洲的“心即理”等同於異端的陽明學說。

寒洲對‘心是氣’批判的原因體現在《心即理說》的後半部中，這些原因可以總結爲以下幾點：

心是身體的主宰（將心看作是氣），如果‘主宰’屬於氣，那麼天理就會聽命於形氣，導致惡盤踞靈台（心）。<sup>5)</sup>

心無體而是以性爲體，如果說心是氣那麼性也會被認爲是氣。

心統性情，心若是氣則大本與達道都成了氣，理成了死物，會陷於虛空之處。

如果承認‘心是氣’的情況，理和氣‘主宰者和被主宰者’的關係就會被顛倒，理的地位弱化就會喪失道德性。將本來是理的心和性看作是氣，犯了認理做氣的錯誤。上一節我們說到的禪家將心認做理的學說，批判其將心認做是氣，‘只看到氣，看不到理’，與‘心是氣’說並無二異<sup>6)</sup>，二者可以從相同的角度來理解。寒洲認爲陸象山與王陽明的‘心即理’最終也無異於‘心是氣’。<sup>7)</sup>他們所說的‘心即理’與寒洲認爲的‘民彝物則，真至之理’也就是‘四德五常之理’心的意義是屬於不同層面的。<sup>8)</sup>

寒洲的‘心即理’以《易學啟蒙》中‘心爲太極’這一命題爲論據<sup>9)</sup>，認爲‘心者人之太極也’<sup>10)</sup>，‘心者太極之在人者也’<sup>11)</sup>。根據朱子‘天下無無氣之理’

3) 《端溪先生文集》卷15,《雜著》

4) 李晚寅,《龍山文集》卷5,《雜著》

5) 同上, p4: 心爲一身之主宰 而以主宰屬之氣 則天理聽命於形氣 而許多錄羶惡 盤據於靈臺矣

6) 同上, p1: “禪家之以心爲理 則認石爲石者之謂玉者也 其實則以心爲理與以心爲氣 氣爲見氣而不見理 則一也

7) 同上, p3-4,寒洲對王陽明‘心即理說’的批判請參照李炯性譯《寒洲李震相的性理學研究》，成均館大學校博士論文，2001, p106-112.

8) 《寒洲集·心即理說》，p4: 既不知民彝物則 真至之理 不以四德五行之理 謂之心也

9) 《寒洲集·心即理說》，p2

10) 《寒洲全書》2, 卷6, p86

這一命題，寒洲也承認心里存在氣的因素，也因此心有不善的層面<sup>12)</sup>，但是心的‘真體’最終並不受到氣的拘束，因為心就是太極。<sup>13)</sup>從宇宙論的層面來說，‘元亨利貞’和‘天地生物之心’就是人的心，因此未發時心具四德，已發時四德就會顯現<sup>14)</sup>。四德和四端在寒洲看來就是‘理’。在這裏我們應該特別注意寒洲所說的‘心之真體’的部分。他認為孔子的‘從心所欲不逾矩’就是‘本心分明在理不在氣’的實例<sup>15)</sup>，又說‘程叔子以心性同一理釋之，而又曰心則性也，性則理也’<sup>16)</sup>。寒洲將心分為‘血肉之心’·‘仁義之心’·‘精爽之心’·‘知覺之心’<sup>17)</sup>，‘心即理’的心是‘仁義之心’，心的本體·本心是與性一致的心。

‘心即理’的心就是《聖學十圖·心統性情圖》三幅圖中‘中圖’所說的心，它不是理氣之合的心而是單只理的本心。寒洲認為‘心合理氣’是‘普說’，即一般學說；而‘天理在人之全體’是‘豎說’，這樣就可將二者區分開來。<sup>18)</sup>前者是‘下圖’的立場，後者是‘中圖’的立場。‘豎說’是寒洲豎看·橫看·倒看學說中‘豎看’的學說。‘豎看’是在本源上以理為主來掌握事物本質的方法；‘橫看’在流行處看理和氣；‘倒看’是在形跡上以氣為主來分析理。<sup>19)</sup>

退溪的‘心合理氣’可以看作是‘橫看’，這時的心‘豎看’的話雖兼有理和氣，但只是將理看作是心的本質，因此這時‘心為太極’這一命題成立。<sup>20)</sup>這也與退溪所說的“心之未發，氣不用事，純理無惡”一句一致。因此寒洲說“此乃的指心體之論，吾所謂莫善於心即理者此也”<sup>21)</sup>。

寒洲自認為自己的‘心即理說’的根據在於朱子晚年的定論<sup>22)</sup>，但是就像我們在前面討論過的，朱子在修養論的層面上主張‘心即理’和‘心與理一’，在存在論的層面上主張‘性=理，心=理+氣’，這與在存在論層面上主張‘心即理’的寒洲立場是決然不同的。另外，寒洲認為退溪‘心合理氣’中的心是橫看時‘下圖’的立場，豎看時‘中圖’中退溪的立場其實是‘心即理’。但是退溪將情中的四端規定為‘理發而氣隨之’，七情規定為‘氣發而理乘之’，因此不管是有橫

11) 同上，卷34，p720.

12) 《寒洲集·心即理說》，p2: 理未有無氣之理 … 心即理也 而又謂發於思慮 則有不善

13) 同上，p2: 然心之真體，終不囿於氣 故心為太極 …:

14) 同上，元亨利貞 天地生物之心 而人得之為心 未發而四德具 已發而四端著

15) 同上，孔子之從心所欲不踰矩 心即理也

16) 同上。

17) 《寒洲集》卷39，血肉之心 以質言 仁義之心 以理言 精爽之心 以氣言 知覺之心 兼理氣言 各有攸主 相須乃成

18) 《寒洲集》卷15: 近來以來 若有所了然者 因作主宰說以會通之 其曰兼理氣者普說也 其曰天理在人之全體者豎說也

19) 《寒洲集》，卷7: 故有就本源上豎看者 有就流行處橫看者 有就形跡上倒看者 窮理之始 倒看而有所據 析理之精 橫看而無所遺 明理之極 豎看而得其真

20) 《寒洲集·心即理說》p2: 苟其雜氣而言之 惡亦不可不謂之性 而放辟奢侈 亦此心也 然心之真體 終不囿於氣 故心為太極 …

21) 同上，p3

22) 《寒洲集》卷33: 孟子仁人心章 朱子說曰 仁者 理即是心 心即是理 答鄭子上書曰 正為吾以心與理為一 彼心與理為二 陣北溪已未錄曰 心者 天理在人之全體 … 如是即最晚年定論 固主乎心即理者 明矣

看的區別，還是有豎看的區別，都很難說‘心即理’是退溪理論的本質。這也是寒洲理論受到退溪學派內部激烈批判的原因。同時他也受到了畿湖學派艮齋田愚的批判，並由此引發了19世紀中期到20世紀初的‘心說論爭’。<sup>23)</sup>

寒洲以朱子和退溪的理論為基礎，對陽明學·佛教，以及畿湖學派的心性論進行批判，並在此過程中構建了自己的理論體系。<sup>24)</sup>但是這一體系既不同於朱子，也不被退溪學派所承認。寒洲與陽明同樣都使用了‘心即理’這一命題，但是寒洲認為陽明的理論是氣論，並對此進行了批判。另外他拒絕陽明的分析方法，嚴格區分並分析心性情的概念，維持其邏輯上的一貫性。<sup>25)</sup>以上可以說就是寒洲‘心即理說’的特點。

## 《 心即理說 》

古今人論心，莫善於心即理，莫不善於心即氣。夫心即氣之說，實出於近世儒賢，而世之從事此學者，多從之。若所謂心即理，乃陽明輩猖狂自恣者之說，為吾學者莫不斥之為亂道。今乃一切反之，何也？夫玉，天下之至寶，而世有認石而為玉者。荊山之玉，蘊於石中，惟卞和知其為玉抱而獻於王，王召玉工示之。曰：“石也”。此見其外之石，而不知其中之玉者也。在朝之人，稍知玉、石之別者，亦皆以為石，而獨向之認石而為玉者，曰：“此玉也”，此豈真知玉者哉？其謂之玉者，即與謂之石者無以異。由是觀之，儒賢之以心為氣，玉工之謂之石也，而世學之靡然從之者，即在朝之人皆以為石者也。禪家之以心為理，即認石為玉者之謂之玉者也。其實則以心為理，與以心為氣，其為見氣而不見理則一也。舜之戒禹曰：“人心惟危，道心惟微，惟精惟一，允執厥中。”夫心一而已矣。而謂之人心者，心之從氣者也；謂之道心者，心之從理者也。人心易見，道心難明，精以察之，一以守之，則本心之正，在理而不在氣也明矣。孔子之“從心所欲不踰矩”，心即理也。【體即道，用即義。】苟其氣也，安能從之而不踰矩乎？《孟子》七篇許多心字，并未有一言指作氣。而憂氣之不能存心，患氣之反動其心。程叔子以心性同一理釋之，而又曰：“心則性也，性則理也。”是聖賢者，非不知心之不離於氣，性之微別於心，而猶且云然，蓋亦主心體而為言耳。夫心者，性情之總名，其體則性，性外無心，心外無性。若心之以盛性言者，心之舍也，醫家之所謂心，而非吾之所謂心也。心之所異於性者，以其兼情，而情乃已發之性也。性情只是一理，則心之為理者，固自若也。但理未有無氣之理，單言理，則有所不備。故性則理也，而又言氣質之性，心即理也，而又謂發於思慮，則有不善。苟其雜氣而言之，惡亦不可

23) 李宗雨,《19-20世紀韓國性理學的心性論爭》,心山,2005,p23-50

24)《寒洲集》,卷1:陸禪迷似鄭聲淫 朱李書中正麥尋

25) 李亨成,上書,p115

邪不謂之性，而放辟奢侈，亦此心也。然心之真體，終不囿於氣也。故心爲太極之語，揭之於《啓蒙》之首，而以一動一靜、未發已發之理當之，又曰，“心固是主宰底，而所謂主宰者，卽此理也。”又曰，“元、亨、利、貞天地生物之心，人得之爲心。未發而四德具，已發而四端著。”又於養心說，以認之爲氣有存亡，而欲其致養於氣爲非。心卽理三字，實是千聖相傳之的訣也。但卞和以玉之在石者，單謂之玉而見刖於楚。向使卞和告之曰：“此乃玉石也”，則豈至於刖也？退陶李先生論心曰：“統性情，合理氣”，而中圖單指理，下圖兼指氣。夫所謂合理氣，卽此乃玉石之說。而單指理者，明其所用之在玉；兼指氣者，示其所包之實石也。然而卞和之獻以玉，而不以石，論心者，主理而不主氣。先生嘗曰：“心之未發，氣未用事，唯理而已，安有惡乎？”此乃的指心體之論。吾所謂莫善於心卽理者此也。若夫禪家之說，則認氣爲理而謂心卽理，彼所謂理者，卽吾之所謂氣也。象山以陰陽爲道，以精神爲心。朱子譏之曰：“象山之學，只在不知有氣稟之雜，把許多羶惡底氣，都做心之妙理，率意妄行，便謂無非至理。”又曰：“釋氏棄了道心，卻取人心之危者而作用之。”然則象山之所謂心者，氣而已，而所謂理者，非真理也。陽明之學原於象山，而其言曰：“吾心之良知，卽所謂天理，致吾心良知於事事物物，則皆得其理矣。”又曰，“良知一也，以其妙用而謂之神，以其流行而謂之氣，以其凝聚而謂之精，安可以形象方所求哉？眞陰之精，卽眞陽之氣之母；眞陽之氣，卽眞陰之精之父。陰根陽，陽根陰，非有二也。”又曰：“心者理也，天下豈有心外之事，心外之理乎？”夫吾心之天理，卽太極之全體，而今以眞陰、眞陽流行凝聚者當之，則遺了太極，而反以陰陽爲本體矣。天下事物莫不有自然之理，而一切掃除，只欲於吾心上認取，則所謂理者，亦甚猥雜，而非其潔淨之全體矣。故李先生辨之曰，“陽明不知民彝、物則、眞至之理，卽吾心本具之理，顧乃欲事事物物，攬入本心衰說，既不知民彝、物則、眞至之理，是不以四德五常之理謂之心也。”所謂理者，果何理也？卽向所謂陰陽精氣流行凝聚之物而已，此豈非心卽氣之謂乎？然則其不以陰陽精氣流行凝聚之物，謂之理，而眞能以仁、義、禮、智、忠、孝、敬、慈之實，謂之心，謂之理，則退陶亦當首肯之矣。是以《傳習錄》止善條忠孝的理，只所此心，心無私欲，卽是天理之說。則先生只辨其工夫功效之衰說而止，則心卽理三字，果可以出於彼而判舍之也哉？夫謂心卽氣者之所以爲不善，何也？心爲一身之主宰，而以主宰屬之氣，則天理聽命於形氣，而許多羶惡，盤據於靈臺矣。心無體，以性爲體，而今謂之氣，則認性爲氣，告子之見也，而人無以自異於禽獸矣。心是性情之統名，而以心爲氣，則大本達道皆歸於氣，而理爲死物，淪於空寂矣。從古聖賢莫不主義理以言心，而以心爲氣之說行，則聖賢心法一一落空，學無頭腦，世教日就於昏亂矣。近世之以十六言傳心，爲梅賾僞撰者，此其兆也。吾所以寧見刖於楚，不得不以玉爲玉也，豈容懲於認石爲玉者之一以爲玉，而泛言其兼玉石而已乎。尤何恐懼其刖而誣玉爲石也耶？雖然心爲氣稟所拘，而不若聖人之光明純粹，則不可恃本心之同，而不求所以明之也。固當於吾心合理氣處，擴其理而制其氣，然後眞心之純乎天理者，可得以見矣。苟不到聖人之心渾然天理 [聖

人之心，乃天地之心，而人之本心也。] 處，則心即理三字，未可以遽言之也。石中之蘊，固真玉也；氣中之理，固真心也。苟徒恃其中，而不恤其外，并其氣稟之拘者而謂之理，頑礪之蔽者而謂之玉，人孰信之哉？吾故曰：“論心莫善於心即理，而亦莫難明於心即理。”



## **Regulations for Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture**

### **I. General Regulations**

1. (Name) The official name for the institute is “Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture” (ICPC, hereafter), which an organization that belongs to Academy of East Asian Studies (AEAS, hereafter) at Sungkyunkwan University.
2. (Objective) ICPC researches mainly on Confucian thoughts. It also covers general Confucian culture, as well as its development and modernization, in an attempt to guide fundamental principles for the humanity in this fast developing society.

### **II. Organization**

3. (Constitution) ICPC is constituted of 1) Director, 2) The management committee, and 3) editorial board.
4. (Director)
  - 1) Director must be a full-time professor of Sungkyunkwan University, with the specialty that meets the objective outlined in the article I. The director must be nominated by the university president and appointed by the chairman of the board.
  - 2) The director, representing ICPC, controls the general affairs of ICPC.
  - 3) The basic term for the director is 2 years, which is extendable.
5. (Assistant Director)
  - 1) The director may appoint (an) assistant director(s) to assist a part of director’s task.
  - 2) Assistant director must be a member of researchers, nominated by the director of ICPC and appointed by the director of AEAS.
  - 3) The basic term for the assistant director is 2 years, which is extendable.
6. (Office)
  - 1) ICPC may assign (an) office(s) according to different research area.
  - 2) The head of office must hold a position equivalent to

research professor or above. The head must be agreed by the management committee, again nominated by the director of ICPC and finally appointed by the director of AEAS.

### **III. Management Committee**

#### **7. (Constitution)**

- 1) ICPC may establish a management committee, in order to discuss and make important decisions regarding general management.
- 2) Management committee is under 10 persons. The head of management committee is the director.
- 3) Member of the management committee must be research member of the ICPC, nominated by the director and appointed by the director of AEAS.

#### **8. (Agenda) The agenda for the management committee includes:**

- 1) Establishment of basic plans for management and research.
- 2) Declaration and elimination of various rules and regulation.
- 3) Settlement of budget and accounts.
- 4) Other issues concerning the management.

#### **9. (Call for Meeting)**

- 1) The director calls for meeting.
- 2) The meeting is valid only when more than half of the members are present. More than half of the members present at the meeting must agree in order to settle an agenda.

### **IV. Editorial Board**

#### **10. (Constitution)**

- 1) ICPC holds editorial board, in order to discuss and make decisions regarding publications of ICPC.
- 2) Editorial board includes the editor-in-chief and noted scholars of Korea and abroad. The editor-in-chief is the director of ICPC.
- 3) The member of editorial board is appointed by the director. The basic term is 2 years.
- 4) Each year, editorial board publishes Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture. Rules and dates for publication are established separately.

#### **11. (Call for Meeting)**

More than half of the editorial board members present at the

meeting must agree in order to settle an agenda.

\* The above regulation begins at March 1st, 2000.

## **Code of Management for The Editorial Board of Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture.**

### **I. General Regulations**

#### **1. (Objective)**

This regulation is established according to the article IV-10-4) of the Regulations for Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (ICPC, hereafter). It is the regulative guideline for publishing Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture. (JCPC, hereafter).

#### **2. (Mission)**

- 1) To supervise publication of JCPC and the related affairs of acceptance, review, editing, and so on.
- 2) To set up rules and regulations for publishing JCPC.

### **II. Organization of Editorial Board**

#### **3. (Constitution)**

Editorial board is constituted of editorial advisors, editorial councils, the chief manager (the director), the editor-in-chief, the head of editing team, and editing team members.

#### **4. (Appointment of Editorial Advisors and Members)**

The director of ICPC appoints editorial advisors and members among noted scholars of highest achievement, in Korean and abroad.

#### **5. (Terms)**

The basic term for the editorial members is 2 years, extendable when necessary. Editor-in-chief is tenured by principle, in order for the journal to maintain its congruity.

#### **6. (Chief Manager)**

The director of ICPC is also the chief manger, supervises the editorial board.

#### **7. (Editor-in-chief)**

The editor-in-chief is appointed by the director of ICPC, responsible for all the editorial issues.

#### **8. (Head of Editing Team, Editing Team)**

The head of editing team and editing team are appointed by the director of ICPC. The head of editing team is responsible for general issues concerning editing, and the assistant head is responsible for assisting related editorial matters.

### III. Publication of JCPC

9. (Numbers and Dates of Publication)

JCPC is published twice in a year: August 31st, and February 28th.

10. (Circulation)

The size of circulation for JCPC is determined by the editorial board.

11. (Size)

The standard size for JCPC is 176mm x 248mm.

12. (Editorial System)

- 1) Academic article written in either Chinese or English.
- 2) Academic article includes: title, abstract, keywords, contents, bibliography, abstract written in Chinese or English, keywords written in Chinese or English.
- 3) The English title and name of the author must be specified.
- 4) The affiliation of the author must be specified.
- 5) Regulations, bulletins, articles other than academic articles may be included according to the decision of editorial board.

### IV. Submission of Articles and Management

13. (Subject and Character of the Submitted Article)

The subject of article includes

- 1) Confucian thoughts and culture in Korea and abroad.
- 2) Reviews on books, translations, research articles of related subject, published in Korea or abroad. It may include dissertations.
- 3) Critical reviews on academic trends, mainly in arts and humanities, related to Confucianism and East Asian studies.

No certain qualification for submission is required.

14. (Number of Words)

- 1) The number of words for each article is limited to 10000 words for Chinese, 6000 words for English, including abstract, footnotes, bibliography, etc. Reviews are limited to 4000 words for Chinese, and 2500 words for English.
- 2) The number of words for articles other than academic articles and reviews will be determined by editorial board.

15. (Submission Guidelines)

- 1) Call for papers all time, but only the articles submitted 3 months before the publication date are subjected to reviewing process.
- 2) Digital texts must be submitted for articles written in Chinese or English.
- 3) Abstracts in Chinese or English must include 5 or more

keywords.

- 4) If written jointly, the first (main) author and the second (joint) author, as well as their respective name, affiliation, area of research, part of writing must be noted.
  - 5) E-mail address and phone number of the author must be provided.
16. (Control of Submitted Articles)
- 1) Submitted articles are, as they arrive, subject to a controlled process.
  - 2) Submitted articles are not returned, and copyright for the published articles belong to ICPC.

## **V. Reviewing Submitted Articles**

17. (Obligation to Review)  
All published articles must pass the reviewing process.
18. (Regulations for Reviewing Board)
- 1) For each submitted article, editorial board will select 3 reviewers and commission them evaluate the article. 2/3 of reviewers must agree in order for the article to be published.
  - 2) In principle, board of reviewers must maintain just and fair attitude, and do not review the articles written by scholars of their affiliation.
  - 3) For the sake of fairness, anonymity will be kept.
19. (Standard of Review)
- 1) Articles will be reviewed for basic format (20%), originality (20%), clarity of subject (20%), logic (20%), and congruity (20%)
  - 2) The result will divide the articles into two: publishable and not publishable.
  - 3) Articles evaluated as not publishable cannot be re-submitted with the same title.
20. (Feedback time)  
Reviewers must feedback the article within two-week's time to the editorial board.
21. (Reporting Back the Result)  
Editorial board must report back to the author as soon as the results come out.

## **VI. Revision of Regulations**

22. (Principle)  
This code of management is subject to change when 2/3 of editorial board agrees, given that more than half of the editorial board members are present.

**\* Other Regulations**

## 23. (Others)

- 1) Other issues not written in this code will be treated following customary practices.
- 2) The above regulation begins at December 20th, 2006.
- 3) The editorial board will determine and deal with details concerning the above regulations.

## **Code of Ethics and Management For the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture**

### **I. General Regulations**

1. (Objective) This regulation is established in order to define the ethical principles and standard of management of Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (ICPC, hereafter).
2. (Application) This regulation is applied to prevent any unjust act within academic agenda of ICPC, and to manage systematically if an unjust act arises. At the same time, it is geared toward protecting creativity of academic research and strengthening ethical spirits within academia.

### **II. Research Ethics**

3. (Ethical Code for Authors)
  - 1) All the authors who submit their articles to the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (JCPC, hereafter) must follow this code of ethics.
  - 2) All the research outcomes that are mainly based on a fake research or already published article without any new insight are regarded as forged.
  - 3) Any close imitation of another author's ideas and arguments without giving an objective credit or mention is regarded as plagiarism.
  - 4) Submission of one's own work that is already presented and published elsewhere as the first research outcome is regarded as duplication or self-plagiarism.
  - 5) Sponsored articles must follow the regulations of the sponsor before submission.
  - 6) An author must take a full responsibility of one's presented articles.
  - 7) Co-authors must mention the part to which each author has contributed, and take responsibility for the part.
4. (Ethical Code for the Editorial Board)
  - 1) Editorial board members of JCPC must follow this code of ethics.
  - 2) Editorial board members must participate in editorial meetings and take responsibility of receiving articles, selection of reviewers, and selection of articles,
  - 3) Editorial board members must be silent about personal information of the authors submitting articles. Otherwise, it



will be regarded as abuse of right.

- 4) Editorial board members must strictly follow regulations in confirming submission, reviewers, etc., lest it should arouse any conflict between reviewers and general members.
- 5) Once any problem regarding ethical matters arises, the editorial board must immediately call for ethics committee.
5. (Ethical Code for the Reviewing Committee)
  - 1) Members of reviewing committee of JCPC must follow this code of ethics.
  - 2) A reviewer must follow the established regulations as one proceeds an objective and fair review of the submitted article, and gives the feedback to the editorial board. If one cannot review the given article for an objective reason, one must notify the editorial board.
  - 3) A reviewer must rely on one's conscience and academic standard in reviewing the submitted article. A reviewer cannot reject an article based on personal standpoint without any sufficient basis, and cannot conclude the review without scrupulously reading the whole article.
  - 4) A reviewer must keep the author's personal information as well as the content of the article confidential throughout the process.

### **III. Establishment and Management of Ethics Committee**

6. (Ethics Enforcement)

This regulation is established according to the general regulation, and it is already in effect. The director decides on establishing specific rules in applying the regulations.
7. (Constitution of Ethics Committee)

Ethics Committee is constituted of the director of Ethics Committee, the editor-in-chief, and members of editorial board (about five members). The director of ICPC is also the director of Ethics Committee
8. (Function of Ethics Committee)
  - 1) On violation of the ethical code, the ethics committee proceeds investigation and decision, and notifies the violator the opinion of the committee. Then it will report the issue to the editorial board.
  - 2) When investigating the violation, ethics committee must secure sufficient evidence and keep the whole process confidential.
9. (Accusation of Violation)
  - 1) An accuser must secure specific evidence when reporting an

act of violation. Even if the report turns out to be false, the ethics committee can keep the meeting.

- 2) The same process of accusation applies to editorial members and reviewers.
10. (Investigation and Decision)
  - 1) When accused for violating the ethical code, the accused must comply with the investigation by the ethics committee. Noncompliance is regarded as acknowledging the violation.
  - 2) The accused article will be postponed for publication until investigation clears its doubt. The investigation finishes before the next term for publication.
11. (Chance of Defense)
 

The accused has right to defend one's article. The method of defense can be open to general members, if accused pleases.
12. (Forms of Penalty)
 

The penalty from ethics committee includes warning, restriction of submission, and expulsion from the membership. An already published article can be deferred or pulled out completely. A sponsored article, when it is used unfairly or warned by the sponsor, is also subject to penalty.
13. (Revision of Regulations)
 

Revising this regulation must follow ICPC's principle of revision.
14. (Others)
 

Regulations not written in the above will follow customary practices.

#### **\* Other Regulations**

This regulation is established according to the article 21 of ICPC. It is agreed by the editorial board (Oct. 20th, 2007), and is in act since Jan. 1st, 2008.

## SUBMISSION REQUIREMENT FOR CONTRIBUTORS

1. Submit an academic c. v. within 250 words.
2. Type "Author's Contact Information" on top of the title of your article, which shows date, mailing address, affiliation, e-mail address, telephone and fax.
3. On the first page of the main text, make a 300 word abstract outline(including 5 key words or more)
4. On the first page of the main text, make a footnote (by marking a superscript\* on the right top of the author's name) to provide your "Author's Academic Information": academic title, affiliation including the names of Department and University (omitting mailing address and e-mail address).
5. Each article should only use footnotes (at the bottom of the page) but not endnotes or parenthetical references (in the body of the article) for frequently cited source. Bibliography and other documentations are not preferable. Footnotes shall refer to the format of Chicago Manual Style.
6. Unless specially invited, the length of each article (including notes, references, and glossaries) should not exceed 20 pages (letter font of size 10.5 and American standard paper size of 8.5 × 11), namely, approximately 6,000 words. Regular book review is to be limited within 8 pages, approximately 2,500 words.
7. Each article, if needed, should supply its own Chinese or other linguistic glossary by either (1) itemizing each term with a superscript in the text and listing it according to alphabetical order of the superscripts in the glossary, or (2) listing all terms by their transliteration in alphabetical order and then adding the Chinese or other characters after these transliterations. The list of glossary is to be in two parallel columns and single spaces. When there is more than one linguistic glossary, please provide separate lists. Each glossary should be properly given a full name, i.e., "Chinese Glossary." Each glossary shall not exceed 80 items by selecting major terminologies.

For a more detailed submission guideline, please contact at [jicpc@skku.edu](mailto:jicpc@skku.edu).

# 儒教文化研究所章程

## 第一章 總則

第一條（名稱）本研究所的正式名稱爲“儒教文化研究所”（以下簡稱“研究所”），是成均館大學東亞學術院的下設機關。

第二條（目的）本研究所以研究儒學思想爲主，同時兼顧整個東亞的儒學文化研究，並對儒學的傳統進行現代化的解釋和發展，使之成爲指引人類發展的基本理念。

## 第二章 組織

第三條（機構）研究所的機構如下設置：1.所長，2.運營委員會，3.編輯委員會。

第四條（所長）

1. 所長必須由與第一章規定中的目的相符合的專業的本校教授擔任，由學校校長提請理事長任命。
2. 所長代表研究所，總體掌管研究所的事務。
3. 所長的任期爲2年，可以連任。

第五條（部長）

1. 爲了輔佐所長，並分擔所長的一部分業務，所長下面可以設置部長。
2. 部長由研究委員中產生，所長提請學術院院長任命。
3. 任期爲2年，可以連任。

第六條（研究室）

1. 研究所可以根據研究領域的不同而設置研究室。
2. 研究室長由研究教授以上的人擔任，須經運營委員會的審議通過，再由所長提請學術院院長任命。

## 第三章 運營委員會

第七條（構成）

1. 爲了便於審議和決定與研究所運營相關聯的重要事項，研究所可以設置運營委員會。
2. 運營委員會由所長和10人以內的委員構成，委員長是所長。
3. 委員由研究所的研究委員中產生，由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第八條（審議事項）運營委員會主要審議以下事項：

1. 基本運營計劃的確立以及與研究計劃相關的事項。
2. 研究所諸規定的制定與廢除問題。

3. 預算以及結算等諸問題。
4. 其他與研究所運營相關的事項。

第九條（會議）

1. 會議由委員長召集。
2. 會議要有在職委員過半數以上的出席才可以召開，出席委員過半數同意才可以決議。

第四章 編輯委員會

第十條（構成）

1. 爲了審議決定研究所刊行的出版物的編輯事宜，故設立編輯委員會。
2. 編輯委員會由委員長和國內外的知名學者構成，委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員由所長任命，任期2年。
4. 編輯委員會每年刊行《儒教文化研究》，論文的刊行原則以及刊行日期等規定另外制定。

第十一條（會議）編輯委員會會議要有出席編輯委員的過半數同意才可以決議。

附則（施行日）本規定自2000 年3 月1 日起施行。

## 《儒教文化研究》編輯委員會運營章程

### 第一章 總則

第一條（目的）本規定是根據儒教文化研究所文件中第4 節編輯委員會（以下簡稱委員會）第27 條第1 項研究所刊行物的出版條目中《儒教文化研究》的相關規定而制定的。

第二條（任務）

1. 主管《儒教文化研究》的發刊和相關論文的策劃、接收、評審、編輯等工作。
2. 制定與《儒教文化研究》的發刊相關聯的一系列規定。

### 第二章 編輯委員會構成

第三條（構成）委員會由編輯顧問、編輯委員、主任（委員長）、主編、編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯構成。

第四條（編輯顧問和委員的選任）編輯顧問和編輯委員由儒教文化研究所所長在世界各國中有卓越研究業績的權威學者中選擇並任命。

第五條（委員的任期）委員任期為2 年，必要時可以連任。但為了保證學術雜誌的長期穩定性，主編原則是連任的。

第六條（主任）主任（委員長）由儒教文化研究所所長兼任，主管編輯委員會。

第七條（主編）主編由研究所所長任命，總體負責所有的編輯事務。

第八條（編輯部主任、編輯）編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯由研究所所長任命。編輯部主任全面負責編輯事務，編輯輔助室長處理相關的編輯事務。

### 第三章 《儒教文化研究》的發刊

第七條（發行的次數和日期）《儒教文化研究》每年兩次刊行，出版日期為8月31日和2月28 日。

第八條（發行數量）《儒教文化研究》的發行數量由委員會決定。

第九條（開本）實行176mm×248mm 開本。

第十條（編輯體制）

1. 學術論文使用中文或英文制作。
2. 學術論文的編輯順序原則上分為論文題目、提要、關鍵詞、正文、參考文獻、中英文抄錄、中英文關鍵詞。
3. 必須注明學術論文的英文題目和作者姓名。
4. 必須注明作者的所屬單位、職務和具體的聯系方式。

5. 學術論文以外的各種文章以及會則、會報的刊載與否由委員會決定。

## 第四章 論文的投稿和管理

### 第十一條（投稿論文主題和資格）

1. 投稿範圍是以儒學思想為中心的世界各國的儒學文化。
2. 對國內外刊行的相關儒學著作、翻譯著作以及研究類刊物的書評。
3. 對國內外的儒學和東亞學等人文科學類相關論文（包括學位論文）的論評和研究動向。
4. 不限論文投稿資格。

### 第十二條（原稿字數）

1. 一般情況下按照中英文10000 字/6000 words 左右（包括腳注、參考文獻、抄錄等），書評4000 字/2500 words 左右的標準。
2. 論文和書評以外的原稿字數由委員會決定。

### 第十三條（論文投稿要領）

1. 隨時可以提交論文，但以本刊出版3 個月前到達的論文作為該版的審查對象。
2. 論文使用中文或英文格式，投稿時須提交電子版。
3. 中英文的抄錄需各附5 個以上的關鍵詞。
4. 如果是共同研究的論文，需要分別標出責任研究員和共同研究員，並且須分別注明姓名和所屬單位、研究領域、執筆範圍和分擔的領域。
5. 來稿須注明作者的電子郵件地址以及聯絡電話。

### 第十四條（投稿論文的管理）

1. 投稿論文按照來稿順序，建立文檔進行統一有序的管理。
2. 來稿論文概不退還，所刊載論文的著作權歸研究所。

## 第五章 投稿論文的審查

### 第十五條（審查義務）記載的論文必須經過審查。

### 第十六條（審查委員規定）

1. 對於投稿的每篇論文，編輯委員會將選定3 名評審委員，並委託給他們評審。論文必須經過審查委員2/3 以上的贊成才可刊登。
2. 原則上，審查委員應堅持公正、公平的作風。而且不得審查與自己同一單位的投稿者的文章。
3. 為了審查的公正性，審查全部采取匿名制。

### 第十七條（審查標準）

1. 審查按照基本格式（20%）、獨創性（20%）、主題明確性（20%）、

邏輯性 (20%)、完整性 (20%) 來進行綜合評定。

2. 審查結果分爲刊載可、否兩類。

3. 被評爲不可刊載的論文，不得再以同一題目向本會投稿。

第十八條（審查結果報告）審查委員從收到評審論文之日算起，應於2周內將審查結果報告給委員會。

第十九條（審查結果通告）委員會收到審查結果報告書後，立即告知投稿者。

第二十條（稿費支付）對於刊載文章，支付給作者一定的稿費。

## 第六章 章程的修訂

第二十一條（原則）本章程的修訂要有過半數編輯委員參加，並且經參加人員2/3 以上的同意方可實行。

## 附 則

第二十二條（其他）

1. 以上沒有列入章程的事宜按照慣例處理。

2. 本規定自2006 年12 月20 日起生效並施行。

3. 本規定在施行過程中發生的細部事項由委員會來決定並處理。



## 《儒教文化研究》研究倫理及運營規定

### 第一章 總則

第一條（目的）本規定的目的在於闡明儒教文化研究所（以下簡稱“本研究所”）學術研究活動的研究倫理和運營基準。

第二條（作用）本規定的作用在於抵制研究活動中的不正當行為，以及不正當行為發生後體系性的追查，並且保護有創意性的學術研究，提高學問的倫理性。

### 第二章 研究倫理

第三條（作者倫理）

1. 凡是向本研究所刊行的《儒教文化研究》投稿的作者都應該遵守運營規定。
2. 虛造研究成果或將以前的研究成果刪改變用的一律視為偽造、編造。
3. 對他人的觀點或主張缺乏客觀分析而直接拿來用作自己的觀點，此種行為視為剽竊。
4. 將自己已經發表的研究成果拿來用作首次發表，此種行為視為重複刊載或自我剽竊。
5. 受研究經費資助的論文只有遵守資助單位的管理規定才可投稿。
6. 對於自己公式發表的論文，作者要負全面責任。
7. 共同研究的情況要注明每個人分擔的部分，以此來各負責任。

第四條（編輯委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的編輯委員應該遵守運營規定。
2. 編輯委員要積極參與編輯會議，要對論文的接收、選定評委以及刊載與否負責任。
3. 編輯委員對於投稿者的個人信息要保密，不得利用私權。
4. 編輯委員要嚴格按照既定的標準來確認論文的投稿以及評審情況等，注意不要引發審評者以及一般會員間的是非。
5. 編輯委員會一旦發現研究倫理上的問題要立即通報倫理委員會。

第五條（審查委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的論文審查委員應該遵守審查規定。
2. 審查委員要根據所定的審查規定來對投稿論文進行客觀、公正的審查，並將審查結果通報給編輯委員會。若自己因客觀情況不能審查，則應及時通報編輯委員會。
3. 審查委員要根據學者的良心和學問的客觀基準來審查論文。在缺乏充分根據的情況下，不能一味的依據自己的學術觀點來判定“不可刊載”，也不能不仔細通讀全文就擅作審查。

4. 審查委員對於審查過程中所知道的作者的個人情況要進行保密，不能私自公開或利用審查論文的内容。

### 第三章 倫理委員會設置以及運營

第六條（倫理規定的遵守）本規定依據本會的會則制定，一經施行，立即生效。只是與此相適應的施行細則由委員長決定。

第七條（倫理委員會的構成）倫理委員會由所長、主編和編輯委員（5人左右）組成，所長兼任委員長。

第八條（倫理委員會的職能）

1. 對於違反本規定的行為，倫理委員會要進行調查和議決，並將相關意見通告給當事人，然後報告給編輯委員會。
2. 在審議違反規定的行為時，要確保能夠充分掌握證據並對事情的經過保密，不到最後時刻不能公開審議意見。

第九條（違反倫理規定行為的揭發）

1. 若有違反倫理規定的事實，揭發者可以持具體的事實證據向倫理委員會揭發。若揭發的事實是虛偽的，倫理委員會可以繼續維持決議。
2. 編輯委員或審查委員在評審過程中若發現有違反倫理規定的事實也依據如上方法揭發。

第十條（調查以及審議）

1. 會員若被揭發有違反本研究所倫理規定的行為，則應積極配合倫理委員會的調查，若不配合，其行為則視為違反倫理規定。
2. 對於被揭發的有違反倫理規定的論文，在事實查清以前應采取保留措施。調查審議應在下一期學術期刊發行前結束。

第十一條（解釋的機會）對於被揭發有違反倫理規定實施的會員，要給與其充分的解釋機會。解釋的方式可依據當事者的意願公開。

第十二條（處罰的類型）倫理委員會的處罰類型有警告、限制投稿、解除委任等。對於已經投稿或刊載的論文可以采取保留或撤銷的措施。對於接受研究經費資助的論文，若因不正當的使用而受到資助機關的警告，也屬於處罰對象之列。

第十三條（規定的修改）此規定的修改要遵守本研究所的修改原則。

第十四條（其他）以上規定中沒有涉及的事宜依據慣例處理。

### 附則

本規定依據本研究所會則第21條制定，並經過編輯委員會（2007年10月20日）的審議，於2008年1月1日起施行。

## 投稿須知

1. 本刊實行176mm×248mm 開本，來稿一律使用中文（或英文）制作，請提交電子版。中文一律使用簡體，英文按照一般慣例。
2. 論文的格式順序原則上依次分爲論文題目、中文提要（300-400 字）、中文關詞（5 個以上）、正文、參考文獻、英文題目、英文摘要（300 words）、英文關鍵詞（5 個以上）等。
3. 者簡介可置於文章的最後，須注明作者的性別、所屬單位、職務、E-MAIL、聯系地址以及具體的電話聯系方式，以便編輯部聯絡。必要時可附上自己的簡曆。
4. 正文內容請用10.5 號字，行間距爲1，文章字數以10000 字爲宜，可以適當的增減。但最好不要超過15000 字。
5. 文章的章節可以用“一、二、三……”來表示，若還要細分，則請用“（一）、（二）、（三）……”來表示。章節題目一律左側對齊，使用黑體加粗字體。
6. 文章引用古典文獻請採取隨文夾注的形式，須注明古典名、卷數，章節名等。有的古典須標明出版社，如：朱熹，《朱子全書》（第三冊），上海古籍出版社，2002，905 頁。
7. 引用書籍內容時，請依次注明：作者、書名、出版地、出版社、出版年度、引用文所在頁碼。如：楊伯峻，《春秋左傳注》，北京：中華書局，1981，56 頁。
8. 引用期刊內容時，請依次注明：作者，文章名，刊物名（包括期數），文章所在頁碼。如：張立文，《論羅從彥的內聖外王之道》，載《孔子研究》2006 年第5期，4 頁。
9. 外文參考文獻（包括出版社、出版地）一律使用原出版語種，西方作者名字全部用大寫，書名、雜誌名用黑體。
10. 若作者本人有對文章題目、文章內容的解釋性說明，請放在當頁用腳注表示。
11. 來稿一經采用，即付稿酬。不采用的稿件，一律不退，也不奉告評審意見。三個月內未接到采用通知的，作者可自行處理。
12. 本刊對采用的稿件有刪改權，不同意刪改者，請在來稿中申明。
13. 本刊刊發的文章，作者著作權使用費與稿費一次性付清。如作者不同意文章轉載，請在來稿時聲明。

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