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From *Jingxue* 經學 to Philosophy and from There, Whence?

SHIN Jeong-Keun

Abstract

Disciplinary classifications are subject to change because the purpose and method of pursuing knowledge change with the passage of time. Through the history of Western scholarship, philosophy has been regarded as the basis of all sciences, or as the “Queen of Sciences.” Before its import, *jingxue* 經學 (textual scholarship or the study of the Confucian classics) had been regarded as the most important type of scholarship in East Asia. *Jingxue* was one of the four traditional categories used in bibliographic classification in China. Since the initial encounter between the East and the West, *jingxue* has continued to exist, but has surrendered its privileged status to philosophy. Philosophers in Korea are confronted with the problematic condition of a lack of consensus on research subjects and methodology. This is different from Western situations in which philosophers have declared the demise of philosophy and cast doubts on the identity of philosophy. In Korea, intellectuals speak most frequently about the “crisis of philosophical research” or the “crisis of philosophy education,” not the crisis of philosophy itself. This paper intends to examine why the crisis of philosophical research has occurred and how to cope with it. The examination begins with revisiting the scholars who had a keen interest in the issue and explores some directions for philosophic inquiry in 21st century Korea.

Keywords: *jingxue* (textual scholarship), philosophy, science, classification of sciences, modernity

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1. Introduction

It has been over a century since the study of “philosophy” began in Korea. Yet, as academics begin to specialize in the philosophies of different countries and various subjects, many Korean researchers tend not to regard the academic achievements of others as “philosophy.” In other words, even though there is a large body of Korean academics all studying “philosophy,” there is no consensus among these scholars as to what constitutes “philosophical study” and how to study philosophy *per se*. This situation is, of course, different from what has transpired in the West (the United States and continental Europe, especially) where Wittgenstein and others have loudly and frequently proclaimed the death or demise of philosophy in the Western intellectual tradition and cast doubt on the very identity of philosophy. Korean philosophers appear to understand their current situation as a “crisis of philosophical research” or a “crisis of philosophy education” and do not speak about a “crisis of philosophy *per se*.” This paper attempts to examine why this “crisis of philosophical research” has occurred in Korea and provide some suggestions for overcoming it. Let us first examine the trajectory of scholars who have taken a profound interest in exploring this issue.

In 1999, Lee Cheol-seung took issue with the methodology of philosophical research, as part of his efforts to address the initial question of “How meaningful is Chinese traditional philosophy to contemporary Koreans?” At the time, he attempted to probe some of the problems underlying the study of Chinese traditional philosophy in Korea and explore an alternative path to cope with them. He suggested that researchers were faced with two problematic conditions: the lack of problem awareness and methodological monotony. He stressed the importance of both a scientific approach and creative thinking in regards to finding alternative approaches to problem solving. In order to link the intellectual problems of the time with the system of thought, he called on scholars to develop a more accurate understanding of the real conditions in which philosophic inquiry is conducted and suggested the need for a dialectic union of both concretization and abstraction and specificity and universality.¹⁾

1) See Lee, “Oneulnal ‘jungguk jeontong cheolhak-eul yeunguhaneun’ hangukin-eui eumie

In an interview with a newspaper more than a decade later, Lee described his view of unsatisfactory current research trends for Eastern philosophy in Korea and proposed a solution for the situation: “Having deep concerns about the pervasive uncritical adoption of ‘imported philosophy’ and blind overdependence on ‘traditional philosophy,’ I am pondering on the possibility to establish ‘*uri* philosophy’.”²⁾ For Lee, establishing “*uri* philosophy” entailed in-depth thinking about Korean problems in an era characterized by multi-faceted forms of conflict, such as those between nations, classes, religions, East and West, tradition and modernity, specificity and universality, etc. Two years later, in 2014, Lee commemorated the creation of the Institute of *uri* philosophy by organizing an academic forum on the theme of “How Should We Study *Uri* Philosophy?: Beyond Imported Philosophy and Textual Scholarship.”³⁾

In a nutshell, Lee’s argument is that due to the lack of critical consciousness and methodological sophistication the study of Eastern philosophy in Korea has been, unfortunately, dominated by imported philosophy and text scholarship. As a response, Lee has urged other Korean academics to establish our own philosophy by seeking a dialectic linkage between reality and thought.

From a glance at the forum’s proceedings, one can identify subtly divergent standpoints regarding current research on Eastern philosophy in Korea among both presenters (Gweon In-ho and Hong Weon-sik, in particular) and discussants (Choi Yeong-jin and Lee Seung-hwan). According to Gweon In-ho, “researches on Korean Confucianism show the habitual problem of tautology as exemplified in the discussions on the Four-Seven debate (originating from Yi Hwang and Yi Yi in the second half of the Joseon period), on the conception of whether humans and animals have the same nature, and Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian thought (including the study of mind). It makes me wonder that even after seven to eight decades, we have not been able to go beyond Takahashi Tooru’s 高橋亨 discussions on Korean Confucianism.” Meanwhile, Choi Yeong-jin

daehayeo,” 264-286.

- 2) “*Uri*” in *uri* philosophy literally means “our” in Korean. *Uri* philosophy can be understood as a term that reflexes the effort to establish Korean own philosophical tradition. Interview with *Gyosu sinmun*, November 7, 2012.
- 3) Held in commemoration of the establishment of the Institute for *uri* philosophy, the Forum was jointly sponsored by the Daedong Philosophical Association and Chosun University’s Humanities Research Institute and held in the Mock Courtroom on the second floor of the College of Law Building at Chosun University, Gwangju, on May 24, 2014.

claims in his comments on Gweon's paper that the facts tell otherwise: "Looking back, I remember that not a small number of research papers on the Four-Seven debate give a critical look at the logical fitness from an analytic philosophical perspective and excavate new issues. Also, as to the Horak Debate (discourse over where human nature is different from other creatures), some studies analyze its status in the politico-historical context and attempt an ecological reinterpretation."⁴⁾

In his remarks, Hong Weon-sik contended that Eastern philosophy in Korea is faced with the absence of three elements: communication, problem awareness, and proper perspectives and research methods. As a remedy, he urged scholars to acknowledge and then move beyond what he identified as the "pervasion of self-contented, self-believing research." In his comments on Hong's paper, Lee Seung-hwan pointed out that Hong's formulation of the problem facing Korean philosophy was not very different from what Lee Cheol-seung had described in 1999. If he is right, it means that Eastern philosophy in Korea, despite some keen reflections made on its direction, has made no real progress during the past fifteen years. Borrowing the expression "the lost 10 years," which is widely used in the Korean political sphere, Lee suggested that some might say, self-disparagingly, that Eastern philosophy in Korea "has lost the past 15 years." Yet Lee Seung-hwan himself would not fully agree with the accuracy of a description of "the lost 15 years." In his 2001 book, *Noja-eseo Derrida-ggaji* (From Laozi to Derrida), he contends that Taoist research in Korea has produced "creative collective work" by interpreting Taoist thought through the perspectives of the philosophy of language, Husserl's phenomenology, and Heidegger's existential thought, which had never been attempted elsewhere in the world. He also argued that "a series of novel researches anchored on the moral psychological viewpoint have been made on Neo-Confucianism, and semiotic and linguistic methods are applied to newly interpret the Confucian notions of *li-qi* and the Four-Seven."⁵⁾

To summarize, at least two competing views exist regarding the current condition of Eastern philosophical research in Korea. Some complain that without a keen sense of problem awareness and adequate methodology, it only imitates foreign research outcomes and pours most

4) Gweon, "Hanguk cheolhak-ui hyeonhwang-gwa banseong mit hyanghu gwaje," 1-2; Choi, "Discussion Remarks," 13.

5) Hong, "Dongyang cheolhak yeongu bangbeomnon-ui gungpip-gwa munjejeom, geurigo mosae," 31-40; Lee, "Discussion Remarks," 41-43.

of its effort into little more than terminological (re)interpretations. Others believe that the application of diverse new methodologies over the past 15 years have indeed broadened the research horizon in significant and potentially dynamic ways.

How should we understand the large gap between these two perspectives? First, we must admit that there is a lack of communication, in the sense that we do not check research outcomes produced in Korea as much as we do those made overseas. Second, we do not seem to agree as to the genuine value of employing philosophy of language-based approaches to Eastern philosophy. Third, despite some moves toward “*uri* study” in other disciplines that are comparable to that of “*uri* philosophy,” no compelling approach to “interdisciplinary science” or “transdisciplinary science” has yet been made in the Korean academy.⁶⁾

This paper aims to investigate how “philosophy” came into being with the classification of disciplines as well as some of the ramifications of the clash between premodern and early modern philosophical studies. Through this examination, it suggests that instead of being mere declarations, *uri* study and *uri* philosophy can in fact offer a consensus-based approach and direction for the future of academic inquiry in Korea.

2. Classification of Sciences and “Philosophy”

In “Taishigong zixu” 太史公自序 (Autobiography of Sima Qian) in the *Shiji* 史記 (Records of the Grand Historian), Sima Tan 司馬談 put forward his view that while each of the Six Schools (*yin-yang*, Confucianism, Mohism, the School of Names, Legalism, and Taoism) had its own characteristics, they had one thing in common, namely, that they upheld order.⁷⁾ He explained their core traits from this point of view. The fact that Sima compiled major summaries of the Six Schools lets us presume the existence of book classification methods and classified

6) Jo Dong-il explored the path to “Our Intellectual Study” early on, as demonstrated in his works, *Immun hangmun-ui samyeong* and *Uri hangmun-ui gil*. Also, the Society for Studying in the Korean Language led by Lee Gi-sang and Choi Bong-yeong has tried to bridge the gap between Korean language and intellectual studies by producing a series of books, including *Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui samuchim*, *Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui gomaum*, *Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui yongteurim*, and *Urimal-ro hangmunhagi-ui nalgaejit*.

7) Sima, “Taishigong zixu”: “易大傳，天下一致而百慮，同歸而殊塗。夫陰陽，儒，墨，名，法，道德，此務爲治者也。直所從言之異路，有省不省耳。”

catalogs in premodern times, although it cannot be effectively confirmed.

Liu Xiang 劉向 and Liu Xin's 劉歆 *Qilüe* 七略 (Seven Summaries) is generally regarded as China's earliest literature classification. While this is true in the sense of a classification which covers a wide range of subjects, as far as a single area is concerned, their work should not actually be considered the first effort at classifying literature,⁸⁾ especially as there are some interesting accounts in the military section in "Yiwenzhi" 藝文志 in the *Hanshu* 漢書. In the early Han period, Zhang Liang 張良 and Han Xin 韓信 made a summary of 182 Houses and grouped them into 35 categories. On the order of Emperor Wu 武帝, the military general Yang Fu 楊僕 collected scattered records of military tactics and compiled a classified catalog, although his was an incomplete list. Furthermore, Emperor Cheng 成帝 commanded Ren Hong 任宏 to classify military writings into four groups.⁹⁾ Demand for military strategies and military books rose sharply during Emperor Wu's reign due to increased military activities, both internal and external.¹⁰⁾ For those practical reasons, the earliest classified catalog dedicated to military books, named *Binglu* 兵錄, emerged. It is noteworthy that the first Chinese bibliographic classification targeted military books, not the Six Arts.

As we all know, Liu Xiang and Liu Xin's *Qilüe* and its successor, "Yiwenzhi" 藝文志 in the *Hanshu*, were classificatory works that were not limited to military books but attempted to cover all available fields at that time. In particular, the *Qilüe* was divided into seven sections: General Summary, Summary on the Six Arts, Summary on Noncanonical Masters, Summary on Poetry and Rhapsody, Summary on Military Writings, Summary on Science and Numerics, and Summary on Practical Technology.

The General Summary describes the main points of the book itself, meaning that there are actually six summaries. The six summaries can be roughly divided into two larger clusters as the Six Arts, Noncanonical Masters, and Poetry and Rhapsody are grouped into arts and literature, while Military Writings, Science and Numerics, and Practical Technology concern governance and practical fields. The *Lunyu* 論語 is listed in the Six Arts, implying a special authority reserved for Confucius, though

8) Lee Seong-gyu views "Yiwenzhi" in the *Hanshu*, which inherited the tradition of *Qilüe* compiled by Liu Xiang and his son, Liu Xin, as China's earliest book classification, but this view needs to be corrected. See Lee Seong-gyu, "Dongyang-ui hangmun chegye-wa geu inyeom," 12.

9) Ban, "Yiwenzhi": "漢興，張良，韓信序次兵法，凡百八十二家，刪取要用，定著三十五家。諸呂用事而盜取之。武帝時，軍政楊僕摺摺遺逸，紀奏兵錄，猶未能備。至于孝成，命任宏論次兵書為四種。"

10) Lai, *Jungguk-ui gojeon mongnokhak*, 30-31.

Confucianism itself is filed under Noncanonical Masters, indicating that its special authority was yet to be formed. Within this grouping scheme, writings of thought and ideology in modern-day classification were placed within either the “Six Arts” or “Various Masters” categories.

The *Seven Summaries* classification framework employed by “Yiwenzhi” in the *Hanshu* did not last very long. Within a relatively short period, the four-section scheme (classics, histories, masters, and collections) in “Jingjizhi 經籍志” in the *Suishu* 隋書, came to replace the old system of classification. Although there were slight inconsistencies in classification within sections depending on who was sorting the groups, the four-section system enjoyed dominance as the bibliographic classification framework until the release of *Siku quanshu* 四庫全書.¹¹⁾ In fact, the shift from the seven summaries to the four sections did not represent a radical change in bibliographic classification. In both systems, the groupings were further divided into multi-level subsections, when necessary. Taking into account the whole features of each system, the change from seven summaries to four sections would be best described as a readjustment of classification units rather than a real change in the system of disciplines.

In this context, it can be said that the classification of writings belonging to thought and ideology in the contemporary sense shifted from belonging to the Six Arts and Noncanonical Masters to belonging to the category described as Classics and Masters. Likewise, in terms of the study of each area, the study of the Six Arts and of Noncanonical Masters became known as the study of the Classics and of Masters.

A far more radical change in disciplinary classification occurred with the publication of *Minguo congshu* 民國叢書. The *Minguo congshu*, a collection of 1,126 books selected from over 100,000 produced during the period of the Republic of China (1912-1949), came out in five parts between 1989 and 1995. Part 1 was released in October 1989 with 100 writings in 258 categories; Part 2 released another 100 in 216 categories in October 1990; Part 3 printed in December 1991 included 100 books in 217 categories; Part 4 containing 100 of 232 categories was produced in December 1992; and Part 5 released in December 1996 had 100 in 203 categories.¹²⁾

11) Lee, “Dongyang-ui hangmun chegye-wa geu inyeom,” 12-15; Shin, “Sagojeonso-neun siljero ‘jeonso-’ inga?,” 103-122.

12) Zhou Gucheng 周谷城, the main editor of the publication, stated in the Preface (1989) that “The compilation and printing of *Minguo congshu* is intended, in plain terms, to

The *Minguo congshu* classifies books into eleven subject fields, using an entirely different scheme than had been employed in the seven-summary and the four-section systems. The eleven subjects in the *Minguo congshu* are as follows: 1: Philosophy and Religion; 2: Social Sciences in General; 3: Politics, Law, and Military Affairs; 4: Economy; 5: Culture, Education, and Sports; 6: Language and Letters; 7: Literature; 8: Aesthetics and Arts; 9: History and Geography; 10: Science and Technology; and 11: Others.

In fact, however, this grouping was not strictly adhered to. To provide one example, both Liang Shuming's 梁漱溟 *Dongxiwenhua ji qi zhexue* 西文化及其哲學 and Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi were classified under Philosophy and Religion, whereas Zhu Qianzhi's 朱謙之 *Wenhua zhexue* 文化哲學 was filed under Culture, Education, and Sports. Books having the same labels in their titles (like "philosophy" and/or "culture," for example) were frequently listed under different domains. Despite this weakness, however, the collection adopted a classification scheme resembling our modern-day disciplinary classifications. For that reason, it can be claimed that China's early modern knowledge or intellectual study began with *Minguo congshu*.

In comparing the bibliographic classification of *Minguo congshu* with those which had preceded it, we can see that the classification of works on topics which concerned thought and ideology has shifted over time: where they would have been considered first as belonging to the study of the Six Arts and Noncanonical Masters and later to that of Classics and Masters and then, finally to that of Philosophy and Religion, Culture and Literature, and Aesthetics and Arts. This shift in classification is one clear signal of the transition of the study of thought and ideology from text scholarship to philosophy.

3. The Early Modern Period and the Conditions of "Studying Philosophy"

Philosophy as a discipline was not born from text scholarship through the course of an internal progression, rather it was a sort of culture adopted during China's engagement and clashes with Western forces.¹³⁾ Philosophy,

preserve the historical materials, to protect the written records at the verge of extinction, and to play a role in the construction of a modernized nation by achieving a better understanding of the epoch."

13) Regarding the adoption and translation of the term "philosophy" and the emergence of

broadly constituted, a set of intellectual activities of diverse characteristics, on which consensus was difficult to achieve within a linguistic community in a general sense, or within a research community in a more narrow sense.

Let me give some specific examples of studies done under the name of “philosophy.” The *Qingdai xueshu gailun* 清代學術概論 compiled several streams of intellectual thought in the Qing Dynasty. *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang* 中國哲學史大綱 examined Chinese philosophy using a scientific approach from the position of textual criticism. *Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophical Thought* compared Chinese and Western philosophical thought. *Dazhong zhexue* 大眾哲學 illustrated a layman’s path to the study of Western philosophy. That was a notable feature of “studying philosophy” that arose in the spatio-temporal conjuncture of early modern China.

One is also compelled to ask how “philosophy” acquired such complex characteristics during the early modern period of China. Four factors were crucial in this process: the first being translation; the second being instrumental thinking; the third, the sense of national identity and zealous comparisons of China and West (East and West); and the fourth, linkage between science and philosophy.

(1) Translation

Intellectuals in early modern China aspired to draw up a blueprint of the future, but found that it was unable to do so under the premodern intellectual framework. Under the circumstances, translation was undertaken as a part of desperate efforts of future planning, not just for the introduction of foreign books. For instance, Liang Qichao believed that translation was essential for building a strong nation in the world. He saw that Europe, Russia, and Japan had established themselves among the powerful nations of the world in part by strengthening themselves through their translations of Western learning.¹⁴⁾ Due to limited foreign language skills, Japanese translations of Western books received a great deal attention in China. Liang Qichao described the fervor of translation as follows:

As soon as a new book was released in Japan, it was translated by several translators, introducing and spreading new ideas like a bushfire. However, as

the “history of Chinese philosophy” in China, see Yang, “Jungguk cheolhaksa-ui tansaeng: 20 segi junguk cheolhaksa tekseuteu seongnip-eul jungsim-euro.”

14) Wang, *Jungguk beonyeok sasangsa*, 43-44.

the importing was done in Liang Qichao's style, it was grossly unsystematic, without exercising care in selecting texts for translation, and without discriminating what was important and what was not and which schools they belonged to. The basic attitude was the more, the better, which was welcomed by society. Just as people in a long-lasting calamity will eat anything they can find grassroots, tree bark, frozen magpies, rotten mice, and what not, they were drooling over and devouring whatever was available. They did not care if it was digestible, or if it would not make them sick. In fact, there was, simply, no alternative source of food better in hygiene and quality.¹⁵⁾

If Liang Qichao's remarks are any guide, it is not going too far to say that the early modern period of China was an era of mostly undiscerning translation. As a part of ushering in an era of translation, guidelines for translation were proposed. In "Lun fanyi" 論翻譯, three essential factors were emphasized: careful selection of the text to be translated, accumulation of standard examples of expressions, and the training of excellent translators. He also claimed that the ideal translator should be someone who has both advanced intellectual knowledge and talent in linguistic articulation (*tongxue tongwen* 通學通文).¹⁶⁾

Unlike Liang Qichao, Yan Fu was well versed in the languages of the two worlds. Starting with his translation of *Tiyanlun* 天演論 (the Theory of Evolution of Heaven, a Chinese rendition of Thomas Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*) in 1895 (at the age of 43) and finalizing with the last piece *Zhongguo jiaoyu lunyi* 中國教育論議 published in 1914 (when he was 61 years old), he translated 11 books over an approximately 20-year period. Among them, his eight masterpieces covered a broad array of fields, including philosophy, political sciences, economics, sociology, law, and ethics.¹⁷⁾ While translating *Tiyanlun*, Yan Fu specified three criteria of good translation: faithfulness, communicability, and elegance. Faithfulness referred to fidelity to the original text; communicability meant that the meaning of the original text should be well-transmitted and understandable; and elegance meant construction of the translated text according to grammatical rules.¹⁸⁾

Early modern China came to adopt the ideas of *tianyan* 天演 (evolution of Nature) or *jinhua* 進化 (evolution) largely through the translated works of Liang Qichao and Yan Fu. Their translations did not

15) Liang, *Qingdai xueshu gailun*, ch. 29.

16) Liang, "Lun fanyi," 44-50.

17) Wang, *Jungguk beonyeok sasangsa*, 65-50.

18) Yan, "Yi li yan," 1321-1323.

introduce new ideas from Western works alone; premodern Chinese texts were also translated into early modern Chinese, imparting new meanings. For example, the phrase “self-strengthening” (*zhiqiang* 自强) was reinterpreted in the context that the sage emulates the operation of heaven and strengthens his character and moral spirit, and found support in passages like the following from the *Yijing* 易经: “the operation (movement) of heaven is steady and solid. The sage exerts himself on his own will and never ceases to.”¹⁹⁾ At a time when social Darwinism grew influential, ‘self-strengthening’ was reinterpreted as a rationale for a being (or a nation’s) self-preservation efforts.²⁰⁾

In early modern China, translation was regarded as a necessary, not optional, undertaking. Translation of foreign writings involved a process by which the self adopted an other and was transformed into a new self. In addition, translation of works from their own past gave the nation a chance to form an unfamiliar and perhaps more objective look at itself from across the distances of time and space.

(2) Instrumental Thinking

Premodern China recognized itself as both an empire and the center of the world. Because of this conception, premodern China did not represent itself as *fang* 方 (area), which signified a finite space, but as *tianxia* 天下 (all under heaven) or *sihai* 四海 (all within four oceans). In other words, without fixed external borders, an infinite expansion of this empire was within the realm of the possible. In contrast, early modern China had to see itself as a part of the larger world. This experience did not just mean attaining a new understanding of human geographic space; without proper adaption, China could have been driven to an extremely precarious condition which may have even resulted in the death of the nation and many of its people.

China experienced an unprecedented crisis of existence in the early modern period. Existential crises typically involve multi-layered conditions. In many of these crises, the conventional self proves unable to respond to new developments and becomes powerless. Under such conditions, as the self becomes estranged from its subject, it often loses the power to reconstruct its own subjectivity, thereby becoming a powerless, meaningless

19) Yan, “Qian gua,” vol. 1: “天行健，自强不息。”

20) Yang, *Yan Fu: Junguk-ui geundaeseong-gwa seoyang sasang*, 55-56.

being. Though nominally alive, the self is for all intents and purposes lifeless, barely continuing to exist and struggling for breath.

The preponderance of evidence suggests that early modern China regarded the crisis of its existence mainly as a struggle for survival. That could be a testimony to the gravity and perceived immanence of the risk of extermination of the nation and the people, that for many, there was little to no margin to think about and reflect on much of anything other than what was necessary for survival. Evading total destruction was a dire, but vital and very real task for early modern China and large numbers of Chinese people.

At the national level, salvation of the state was often viewed as tightly connected with the development of a stronger military force. One way that this concern can be seen is through the government's active involvement in translation projects, of which roughly half were directly related to military affairs. Although books on arithmetic, electrical science, chemistry, and mathematics were also translated, they were usually regarded as serving the purpose of producing a strong military. Regarding this imbalance, Liang Qichao protested that "even though the Westerners' strength lies in their military power, it is not the reason for their strength."²¹⁾

While the state was unable to grasp the essence of the West, ordinary Chinese people had no choice but to confront the changed circumstances and grope for survival. Finding itself incapable of fulfilling the public function of distributing proper rights to its citizens, and with its sustainability at stake, the state tried, perhaps perversely, to assign more duties and obligations to individuals. While the government was degenerating into a predatory institution, individuals were degraded into a condition in which they would do nearly anything, no matter how corrupt, simply for survival. Thus, existence in early modern China was, characteristically, reduced to an instrument in the sense that other beings were meaningful merely as the impacted the dimension of one's own survival. As Ling Qichao argued:

There was a fundamental reason why the advocates of the new learning failed in the late Qing period. They did not regard intellectual knowledge as a goal, but as a tool ... School was just another name for the civil service examinations, and the new learning was an eight-legged essay of a mutated form. Eight or nine out of ten students had impure motivations in their studies. They studied for worldly success, and gave up after a while if

21) See Liang, "Lun fanyi."

it did not work out. Not just inferior students but excellent ones regarded 'utility' as the key principle, thinking that what they learned should always be put to use.²²⁾

Application is associated with essence, whether it is utility, functionality, operationality, or practicality. Yet, with the tie with essence severed, it became independent and moved around uncontrolled in early modern China.

(3) Identity

To portray the picture with broad strokes: the early modern period in China was both an era of translation and one in which the state underwent a crisis of existence. Under these conditions, many people found it difficult to define their identity within their internal tradition and language, as they had heretofore done. Devoid of a clear understanding of who they were, they felt themselves undefined, before settling upon a possible solution, namely, looking at themselves through the lens of the early modern West or Westerners. For many in early modern China, identity was deeply comparative; in other words, one's own identity was best revealed through the glance of the other. Consequently, after the Opium War and the Wusu Reform (*wushu bianfa* 戊戌變法), most attempts to examine Chinese identity took the form of "comparing China and the West" in various areas, including culture, civilization, intellectual thought, and philosophy.

Writing in 1895, Yan Fu explicated on *zhong xi shi li* 中西事理 (situations in China and the West) by resorting to the usual format of "comparing" the two. In his view, China emphasized the past and overlooked the present, whereas the West stressed the present and tried to overcome the past. The former attached importance to *sangang* 三綱 (three bonds: emperor-official, father-son, and husband-wife), while the latter viewed equality as the foremost value. Chinese people, he continued, regarded kin (family) as the most important, but Westerners admired sagacious individuals. Governance was based on filial piety in China and on publicity in the West. His list goes on and on.²³⁾ This type of list making was initially unique to Yan Fu, but was continued by Chen Duxiu during the New Culture period and is still repeated

22) Liang, *Qingdai xueshu gailun*, ch. 29.

23) Yan, "Lun shibian zhi ji," 1-5.

frequently today.

Premodern Chinese people had a clear sense of identity without having to reflect on their existence through the mirror of the other. Entering the early modern period, however, the power to maintain and prolong their premodern identity was lost. Identity could be subject to post-examination, but could not be established as the norm for the future. Hence, early modern China was forced to ask, with some anxiety, as though in search of its identity, both “Who am I?” and “What am I going to be?”

(4) Philosophy and Science

The difference between textual scholarship and philosophy lay primarily in the method of verification. The former tried to prove the validity of an argument based on authentic precedents, analogies, and examples (i.e. by making appeals to tradition). The latter attempted to explain the legitimacy of a claim via conceptual analysis, logical validity, and scientific evidence (i.e. by making appeals to reason). For example, *ren* 仁 (benevolence) was a key virtue in defining humanity in premodern textual scholarship. Why did *ren* represent humanity and why should every human being have that virtue? Although Confucius made various attempts to define “*ren*,” he did not pay special attention to the question of why. Mencius clarified through a sort of experimental thinking that “compassion” is the natural psychological state of human minds. Later, drawing on the symptoms of paralysis as understood by Oriental medicine, he explained that *ren* means interconnection and life.

Tan Sitong searched for traditional philosophical concepts suitable for the ideas of science and democracy and reinterpreted them. One traditional concept he made particular note of was *ren*.²⁴⁾ Hence, he wrote *Renxue* 仁學 in the effort to transform *ren* from a feudal to a public ethic.²⁵⁾ Tan argued, among other things, that:

The first and foremost meaning of *ren* is interconnectivity. Ether, electricity, and mental power all show how things are connected with one another.²⁶⁾

24) On Kang Yuwei's and Tan Sitong's conceptions of benevolence, see Shin, *Saramdaum-iran mueot-inga?*, 301-335.

25) Tan, “*Renxue* jieshuo,” 291.

26) Tan, “*Renxue* jieshuo,” 291: “一. 仁以通爲第一義。以太也，電也，心力也，皆指出所以通之具。”

The essence of interconnectivity is that all existences are equal.²⁷⁾

Unconstrained by the conventional discussion of *ren* as meaning love of family or life in an abstract sense, Tan placed the concept in a new context. He started by approaching *ren* within the relationship between two sides. Then, he noted that the relationship had a bilateral connection. He even used such elements as ether and electricity, which he learned about through his study of Western science, to verify it based on empirical concepts instead of abstract imagination. Thereby, he hoped, *ren* could be reestablished as the foundation of civic ethics beyond the feudal dimension. Speaking of interconnectivity, Tan wrote that it:

has four meanings. The first one is the connectivity between China and foreign countries. My view on this is largely drawn from the *Chunqiu* 春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals). After difficult times and relatively stable stages pass and a period of great peace arrives, both distant and neighboring countries and both large and small countries are regarded as one without distinction. The second is the interconnection between the superior and the inferior, and the third is that between men and women, or between the inside and the outside. My idea of this is based mostly on the *Yijing* ... The fourth meaning is the interconnection between oneself and the other, which is largely derived from Buddhist scriptures.²⁸⁾

There is a particularly interesting point in Tan Sitong's verification of his concept. After verifying *ren = tong = pingdeng* (benevolence = interconnection = equality), he derived from it a notion of equality between China-world, superior-inferior, men-women, and self-other.²⁹⁾ To show *ren = tong*, Tan resorted to ether, a hypothesized material (since rejected) which was then thought to be akin to a connective substance or medium between two distant objects. He also used the example of electricity, by which he attempted to verify the existence of *ren* in a materialistic method, which no one before him had ever tried. What was most novel about Tan's approach was that he adopted the Western ideas of electricity and ether and used them as the basis of interpersonal linkage.

This manner of thinking was an extension of evolutionary theories which were sweeping through early modern China. At that time, many Chinese people struggled desperately to understand the reasons for their

27) Tan, "Renxue jieshuo," 291: "七. 通之象爲平等."

28) "通有四義. 中外通, 多取其義於《春秋》, 以太平世遠近大小若一故也. 上下通, 男女內外通, 多取其義於《易》. . . 人我通, 多取其義於佛經."

29) On this point, see Lee M., *Damsadong: Sotong-gwa pyeongdeung-eul sayuhan sasangga*.

perceived inferiority and to locate the basis by which they might recover their superiority in the future. These feelings can help explain the vehement dominance of social Darwinism during that time. Social Darwinism argues that the rules governing society and history can be found among those used to explain natural phenomena. In some of its most excessive applications, natural scientific rules are applied indiscriminately to both nature and society (history). Considering how Western ideas like that of ether and Social Darwinism were employed in that era, it could be argued that early modern Chinese thought began to diverge from textual scholarship as Chinese thinkers first began to attempt to construct logical explanations for philosophy or to explain philosophical views based on scientific knowledge.

4. From *Jingxue* to Philosophy and From There, Whence?

While the division of historical periods can be made in different fashions and given differing names, we can safely refer to the current era as that period of modernity which involves all the outcomes of the progression of modernization. What is the most appropriate approach to studying thought and ideology in modern times? If, in fact, all the tasks confronted by early modern China have been resolved, completely different ones should be taken up. In that case, modern Chinese thought and ideology will have to take on a drastically different form from the early modern counterpart. Conversely, if modern Chinese people still have unfinished agendas from the early modern period in addition to new ones for the modern period, some overlapping between the characteristics of modern and early modern thought and ideology is inevitable.

(1) Li Zehou's work

Let me first examine Li Zehou's work and then discuss the direction of modern thought and ideology. Instead of taking Lu Jiuyuan's phrases without alteration, Li Zehou distinguishes between the two approaches of 'I annotate the Six Classics' and 'the Six Classics annotate me,' and uses them as opposing frameworks for writing. The former means that the researcher interprets the content, form, system, and structure of philosophical thought from a historical standpoint. In the latter, he/she relies on the past history of philosophy and philosophers' thoughts to

explain his/her philosophical perspective.³⁰⁾ Taking up the latter approach, Li Zehou has generated various new concepts such as “*xiti zhongyong*” 西體中用 (Western learning as foundation but adapted to Chinese use), “*lishi bentilun*” 歷史本體論 (historical ontology), and “*jidian*” 積澱 (sedimentation), and has freely moved between Eastern and Western texts. This corresponds to a modernization of Eastern philosophy.

After the 1949 socialist revolution, China was reborn as a new country to such an extent that it is nearly impossible to evaluate it within the same dimensions as before. Amid vigorous efforts to forge out of economic backwardness ‘a wonderful nation without exploitation of a class by another’ in the years following the establishment of the new China, the velocity of social and cultural change inevitably become a highly contentious issue. As Mao Zedong 毛澤東 and the Gang of Four (*sirenbang* 四人幫) asserted their will on the state and its people, modern China underwent a series of fast-paced political experiments including the creation of People’s Commune (1958), the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). An excess of revolutionary fervor gripped the society and paralyzed rationality. One result of this upheaval was that many Chinese no longer behaved (or felt themselves to be) ordinary men and women with warm hearts and sympathetic feelings towards the suffering of their fellow human beings. Armed with full-fledged passion and extreme idealism, they acted like deities judging between good and evil. Li Zehou has contended that this period was characterized by a fanatical society dominated by something akin to religious morality and that these attitudes were the locus of tragedy in modern Chinese history.

Li has argued that China in the late 20th century and the early 21st century must shake off the grip of religious fervor to achieve a society where individuals protect and speak up for their rights. To prevent the suppression of private interests in the name of the public good and the suffocation of individuals by order of the state, Li suggests that individuals, society (state), and the values of private and public interests must be rearranged based on the contract theory, instead of communalism.

In a sense, Li Zehou is undertaking, based on the experiences of modern Chinese history, the intellectual adventure of overturning many of the prevailing values of Eastern philosophy. For this, some may well

30) See Li, *Lun Kangde Heigeer zhexue*; Li, *Hakseol*, 47.

wonder whether he can still be regarded as an Eastern philosophe, and from this alone, we can observe how different his interpretations of Eastern philosophy are from others who have preceded him. This is, definitely, a sure sign that he would “coin many new terms” while practicing the principle of “the Six Classics annotate me” in his writing.

Let us take a quick look at what he has termed ‘the fourth period’ of Confucian development and a culture of joy. Confucian scholars in Taiwan have traditionally divided Confucian history into three phases: the primitive Confucianism of Confucius and Mencius, the Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, and the New Confucianism in the early modern and modern periods. This division reflects the position of placing the Confucian conception of human mind and nature at the center. By recognizing the inherent nature of moral perfection and reining in personal desires, one can be a moral being, i.e. one who attaches more importance to the moral way over one’s greedy self-interest. In Li Zehou’s view, such morality is a personal virtue which is attainable only by those who are capable of it; hence, it is not suitable for modern society.³¹⁾ Offering an alternative view of Confucian development, he treats Han Confucianism as a separate phase which emphasized a correspondence between heaven and man and explained it with the concepts of *yin-yang*, the five elements, and *ki*. Further, he tries to engender a new brand of modern Confucianism which would reject the precepts of both Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism.

Li’s formulation of ‘the culture of joy’ refers to what he sees as the authentic Chinese cultural characteristic, as distinguished from the Western culture of sin and the Japanese culture of shame. According to this characterization, Chinese people pursue joy and pleasure in what they engage in, whereas Westerners and Japanese are sensitive to guilt (sin) and shame (humiliation), respectively, and that these fundamental differences in outlook or orientation have led to the development of divergent cultural traits. One consequence has been that the Chinese tend to regard wrongdoing and mistakes not as manifestations of fundamental character flaws in the wrongdoer, but as examples of temporary carelessness or negligence. Further, he writes, while Westerners long for transcendence from reality and redemption in an other world, Chinese people are far less likely to have a notion of otherworldly salvation, preferring to seek fortune and happiness in this world.

31) Li, *Hakseol*, 9-46.

Li Zehou attempts to discover Chinese cultural characteristics through comparison with Japan and the West and Japan. In this, his approach resembles the distinctions made by Liang Shuming between human cultures based on how they deal with human desires. In his book, *Dongxiwenhua ji qi zhexue* 東西文化及其哲學, Li notes that Westerners emphasize the satisfaction of desires, whereas Chinese stress their regulation, and Indians, their suppression. Liang Shuming pays attention to the mental aspect of culture and reinterprets traditional philosophical works in the modern context. Meanwhile, Li Zehou's thought is primarily based on materialism, as he imparts importance to the material dimension of culture (such as eating) and the acquisition and employment of adequate technology needed for the production of materials. Where Liang Shuming retains old Chinese philosophical concepts and tries modern interpretations of them, Li Zehou borrows freely from Eastern and Western texts alike, inventing a number of new appellations as part of his aim to present a future direction for modern China.

Liang Shuming believes that philosophical concepts of the past can be used both to explain Chinese culture in its entirety and to help build its future. By contrast, Li Zehou does not use old concepts as they are and prefers to alter them in substantial ways, claiming that modern society stands on entirely different socioeconomic conditions from the past. Needless to say, that he uses new labels does not mean that he entirely denies their connection with old ones.

Li Zehou notes that although Western philosophy began with Plato's notion of *noumenon*, several highly significant modern thinkers (including Marx, Husserl, and Heidegger) have exhibited a profound interest in everyday life and language. Disillusioned with the belief that human beings cognize transcendental and unchangeable *a priori* principles and represent them in reality, much modern Western philosophy focuses on empirical rules that people can agree on and relate to. Holding that philosophy must encompass more than everyday life and language, Li calls for a "philosophy of eating rice" (*chifan zhexue* 吃飯哲學). For him, modern philosophy is bound to develop in the vein of political philosophy, intending to solve the problem of eating. On this point, his thought is fundamentally incompatible with the 'Confucian school of mind and nature' which is currently gaining influence among New Confucians in Taiwan.

How then can a philosophy of eating rice which begins with the 'reality of eating' be constructed? Even if the problem of eating is most fundamental to human existence, it must not be approached solely based

on the so-called ‘law of the jungle’ advocated by a now discredited Social Darwinism.³²⁾ To find a solution, Li Zehou rejects ontological essence, reason, the absolute, god, and *a priori* values, and turns to history. He claims that the history of humankind is an evolutionary process of attempting to resolve the problem of eating in a better way. A particular historical period represents the accumulated body of intellectual wealth, experiences, and outcomes of addressing the problem of eating.

Li believes that as the intellectual wealth, experiences, and outcomes are reflected in individual consciousness and transmitted to a future generations, this process both forms the collective memory of society and generates cultural characteristics. The cultural traits transmitted across generations are what he calls sedimentation. His notion of sedimentation is similar to British biologist Richard Dawkins’s concept of memes as expressed in his 1976 book *The Selfish Gene*. For Dawkins, a meme is the unit of transmission of nongenetic culture which, like the gene in biology, is stored in an individual’s memory and copied onto another’s. Memes thus can be said to have an evolutionary characteristic, just as biological genes do.

For Li Zehou, sedimentation and history are the last bastion he can resort to in order to secure, over his starting point of reality, the publically shared zone or a public goodness to which people can consent. But he is yet to explain his views of the consequence of sedimentation in history or the mechanism of its composition. Sedimentation and history are, apparently, never neutral to power and values, nor do they reflect simple, linear, evolutionary processes. In this respect, he exposes a limitation that while negating the *a priori* realm, he is overly optimistic about history. How can anyone overlook that history has too often been a bloody river? The misplaced optimism of his historical vision may be one reason why he no longer plays the leading role in Chinese intellectual life which he had occupied during the 1980s, and has recently done little more than simply repeating ideas he had already expressed by 1990.

32) Korean novelist Jo Jung-rae portrays the “jungle” of modern China in *Jungle malli*.

(2) Early Modern Philosophy and What's Next?

If we assess Li Zehou's work in view of the tasks faced by early modern China, it can be roughly characterized as a relentless quest for Chinese identity via translation work, instrumental thinking, and comparisons of Eastern and Western philosophy. We could probably even say that Li was baptized in an early modern philosophy. Li himself has admitted the limitations of his work on several occasions, saying that China would usher in an age of professionals where standard intellectual norms are respected. In the Preface to the *Lishi bentilun* 歷史本體論, he says:

I wrote this book as I felt like, without giving too much thought to logical substantiation and citation. Some expressions even contain logical leaps. I just intend to give, borrowing Kant's term, subjective "doxa," instead of seeking "episteme," i.e., scientific truths universally accepted by people. In the book, I make statements which can only be regarded as personal points of view.³³⁾

In a sense, Li Zehou has not succeeded in fully linking Chinese philosophy with science. This appears an undeniable limitation of his thought. He has played a leading role as a great enlightenment figure, but has not necessarily functioned as a systematic theorist. Nevertheless, by consistently putting forth the agenda of religious and social morality, he has raised the important modern questions of how to establish new relationships between individuals and the state and between rights and duties. It is in this where modern thought and ideology diverges most sharply from that of the early modern period. Furthermore, Li's work differs from the recent move in Korea to study "*uri* philosophy," for the latter only insists upon the necessity of posing such questions. We must now go beyond the rhetoric and begin to develop a discourse around how to actually construct such a philosophy in and for our time.

Let us go back to the current situation in Korea discussed in the introduction of this paper. Which of the two positions is the more valid? Have scholars of the past few decades simply reiterated the same arguments, or have they achieved something notable? Do the proponents of either position present a proper way forward for the study of modern thought and ideology in Korea? In my view, neither position appears to posit an adequate agenda for establishing "*uri* philosophy" and '*uri*

33) Li, *Yeoksa boncheron*, 8-9. The quotations are from "Gimyo oseol" and "Musa jeontong-eul malhada."

study.’ They have to clarify, first of all, what the agenda pursued by early modern thought and ideology was and second describe how its modern counterpart is to differ from what it seeks to replace. After all, linguistic analysis and semiotics are primarily concerned with the methods of how to carry out an agenda, not its aims or direction.

In the philosophy and aesthetics of the East and Korea, ‘nature’ is often regarded as the principle of establishing order, the legitimacy of moral behavior, and the standard of aesthetic appreciation and creativity. Premodern Koreans, grounded in little more than intuitive insight, held that nature is valid and desirable and reiterated their claims over and over. How shall we contemporary Koreans verify that nature is valid and desirable and that it is the value and virtue for us to seek? If we are to pick up where Li Zehou left off and attain a philosophical understanding based on scientific truth, we must be able to provide an answer to this pressing question.

5. Conclusion

Among researchers studying philosophy in Korea, many of us who are pursuing “*uri* philosophy” or “*uri* study” have arrived at a similar conclusion. The study of Western philosophy in Korea must move beyond a purely imported philosophy, and the study of Eastern philosophy must move beyond mere textual scholarship. Both should be oriented toward “*uri* philosophy.” Unfortunately, just as the identity of “philosophy” itself is often unclear nowadays, so too is that of “*uri* philosophy.” As a consequence, too many scholars simply stop at reassuring their commitment and determination to study “*uri* philosophy” or reconfirm the vague direction which they believe it to be pointing.

Considering the current situation, Kim Sang-hwan’s proposition that modern Korean philosophy may be established on the basis of the “modern condition” has significant implications. As we all know, the ancient study of ethics was based on “virtue ethics” or the maximalism of Confucius, Mencius, and Aristotle, whilst the early modern study of ethics was grounded in Kant’s “duty ethics.” Kim’s contention is that the modern study of ethics should not be simply a revival of one of the two or their mixture; we claimed that contemporary inquiry into ethics can be revitalized only through careful acknowledgment of the modern condition, namely, the fact that we are called to make a creative metamorphosis,

called to answer the critical questions: “How should I change?” and “What can I be?”³⁴⁾

Modern ethics can create conditions of thought which directly correspond to the contemporary era as well as those cultural spaces where the premodern and the early modern intersect each other. By attending to the actual conditions of contemporary Korean life, we can suppose a community where virtue ethics enables emotional empathy and a space where duty ethics trades interests. A sharp bifurcation of the two conditions occurs between premodern and early modern times. Yet, in the modern period, the conditions reveal complex features of differentiation and intersection. A clear division is only possible in a textbook situation.

Let us take an example from ordinary experiences. *Goduri* is a popular pastime in Korean festivities. One characteristic of the game is that people can set rules adapted to the given situation whenever they play it. In a festival period, family members and friends coming from different places sit around and play it. Because they are often used to different rules, they may disagree on certain things. When the disagreement is resolved, the previously conflicting rules and conditions add more fun and turn it into an even more exciting game. Likewise, I think, the modern study of ethics should attempt to find a code which both corresponds to the premodern and the early modern study of ethics and which produces meaningful insight into the modern condition.³⁵⁾

In this paper, we have reemphasized the necessity of going beyond imported philosophy and textual scholarship in order to establish “*uri* philosophy.” Whether we should pursue the study of the “Classics,” or “philosophy,” or “thought” requires further discussion. Based on the discussion, we must formulate a new mode of study which embraces Eastern modern life on the horizon of enlightenment which has been sought by Li Zehou. This cannot be done by repeating the values of nature, mind, and human nature alone.

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34) Kim, “Bulhaenghan uisik-ui yullihak-eul neomeoseogi,” 8-13.

35) See Shin Jeong-Keun’s comments on Kim Sang-hwan’s paper (2014) cited in the previous footnote.

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從經學到哲學，然後是何處？

辛 正 根

中文摘要

每個時代學問的分類有別。因為每個時代追求知識的方向與方法有所不同。起源於西方的“哲學”原本被看作是最根本的學問。在哲學傳入之前，東方曾按照經史子集的學問分類方式，把經學當作最好的學問。近代因東西方交流，經學雖存續著，卻把從前的地位交給了哲學。然而，目前韓國哲學面臨著一個問題，即“關於研究什麼、怎樣研究，研究者群體並沒有達成共識。”這跟一面呼喊哲學的終結、一面質疑哲學的本性並不同。因為韓國雖然處於“哲學研究的危機”或“哲學教育的危機”，卻不談“哲學本身的危機”。本論文試圖探究關於“哲學研究的危機”是如何產生的、該怎樣克服等問題的線索。首先看看爲了克服“哲學研究的危機”，曾深入關注這個問題的研究者的經歷。進而探討在現代環境下，“哲學”應該向哪個方向前進。

關鍵詞：經學，哲學，科學，學文 分類，近代性

The Philosophy of Yi Hwang 李滉 and World Peace

LEE Sang-ik

Abstract

This study begins with a comparison between two approaches to peace: one suggested by Plato and the other by Thomas Hobbes. Believing that humans are “animals of reason,” Plato suggested a moral approach of using reason to control animal nature. In his view, peace would come as a natural consequence of our overcoming animal nature through the instrumental use of reason. In fact, however, there have not been very many people of character capable of overcoming their animal nature. Consequently, the world remained as chaotic as ever.

Hobbes argued that to have no desire is “to be dead.” He therefore rejected the idea of a life led by controlling animal nature with reason. Hobbes appointed desire as sovereign and described reason as the capacity to calculate self-interest. Because he saw reason’s self-interested calculation as essentially a series of calculated choices between the costs of war and the price of peace, Hobbes believed that people will gladly surrender some of their personal rights and enter into a social contract (i.e. a contract of peace) based on the calculation that peace brought greater benefits than war. Here, though, we find a trap: Self-interested calculation is based on the premise that anything can be done as long as it brings benefits to the perpetrator. It follows that any person or country accustomed to such reasoning will unhesitatingly start a war if victory can definitely be achieved at a low cost. This is why wars still erupt across the world today.

It is here that we discover the significance of *jigyeong* 持敬 (piety) and *gyeomyang* 謙讓 (humility). Yi Hwang 李滉 (a.k.a., Toegye 退溪)

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emphasized piety based on suppressing human desire and cherishing natural order; in the same way, piety rejects self-interest as a way of thinking, whether it be precise calculation or narcissistic miscalculation. Peace based on self-interested calculation is temporary and can be shattered at any time. Therefore, if we take the view that self-interested thinking must be overcome in order to attain genuine peace, the potential for this can be found in piety. Humility, meanwhile, means considering the benefits of others before one's own, based on satisfaction with one's own lot; in the same vein, it overcomes the will to compete with hostility against others, even if precise calculations lead to the conclusion that war would be a more profitable choice. If we take the view that the will for hostile competition itself must ultimately be overcome in order to attain real peace, the virtue of humility offers one way of achieving this.

Keywords: Yi Hwang 李滉 (a.k.a., Toegye 退溪), peace, war, *i-gi hobar ron* 理氣互發論 (Theory of *I-Gi* Mutual Dynamism), *jigyeong* 持敬 (piety), *gyeomyang* 謙讓 (humility)

1. Two Approaches to Peace

While some philosophers have praised war, the majority have yearned for peace. The paths to peace that they have suggested can be broadly divided into two categories. The first, proposed by classical political philosophers such as Socrates and Plato, is one of promoting correct or moral behavior in order to nullify even the possibility of war. The second, suggested by modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, involves inducing the choice of peace over war through rational calculation of the respective advantages and disadvantages of each.

Let us begin by looking at Plato's method. According to the Athenian, the essence of politics is "healing the soul"¹⁾ and among our chief political tasks as political actors is "examin[ing] how we, as citizens, can be as brilliant as possible."²⁾ Politics, then, is essentially about making each citizen into an upright man of character. Plato's ideal man of character is closely connected to his theory that the soul is tripartite, being a mixture of reason, spirit and desire.

Firstly, reason is "the wise, calculating part that provides foresight for the soul as a whole," and which "contains knowledge of what is advantageous not just for each of the three parts but for the community they constitute as a whole." Reason therefore plays the role of a "master," controlling the other two parts of the soul. The virtue of reason is wisdom.³⁾

Secondly, the spirited part of the soul plays the role of supplementing reason. Someone whose spirit does not yield to pain or pleasure and who obeys the commands of the logical part of the soul to fight bravely is a "courageous man."⁴⁾

Thirdly, desire is the largest part of the soul and is characterized by its insatiable hunger for wealth. In order to stop desire from wreaking general chaos in life, Plato argued that it must be monitored and subdued by reason and spirit. Someone whose desire is well governed by her or his reason and spirit is someone capable of "moderation."⁵⁾

1) Plato, *Gorgias*, 464b.

2) Plato, *Gorgias*, 515c.

3) Plato, *The Republic*, 442c.

4) Plato, *The Republic*, 442b-c.

5) Plato, *The Republic*, 442a-d.

As outlined above, Plato believed that reason must control spirit and desire, that spirit had to help reason in its domination of desire, and that desire had to be monitored by reason or spirit. Only then, in Plato's view, could "joy of the truest kind" be experienced.⁶⁾ Plato also applied his ideal ordering of the soul directly to the ideal ordering of the state. He argued that if the military class and the productive class follow wise orders from the ruling class, the private interests of each member of society and the common good could be achieved simultaneously.

For some early modern thinkers, however, Plato's assertion that reason must govern desire was met with serious objections. Among the first and most powerful objections was that of the Dutch humanist Erasmus, who asserted that the loins were "the true source of life" and a "sacred place" and questioned how "life can ever be called life if pleasure is removed from it."⁷⁾ These objections found perhaps their clearest and most divergent expression in Hume's statement that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions."⁸⁾ It was on these foundations that the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes built his own political philosophy.

One of Hobbes's key tenets was that "nature permits everything of us." In short, we, as humans, can do whatever we want to. Hobbes called this our "natural rights."⁹⁾ His idea of natural rights overturned the traditional master-servant relationship between "reason and passion" (desire). Most classical political philosophers, such as Aristotle, defined reason as the master of the soul and dictated that desire must submit to the control of reason. But Hobbes made desire the master, branding it "the origin of all life force," and regarded reason as no more than a calculating capacity to effectively satisfy our desires.¹⁰⁾ He commented as follows:

A man who has no great Passion for any of these things (Power, Riches, Knowledge, Honour); but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desire, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all

6) Plato, *The Republic*, 586e.

7) Erasmus, *Moriae encomium*, 34-36.

8) Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 415.

9) Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 189.

10) Anthony Arblaster maintains that defining desire as sovereignty is the general theory of liberalism; he identifies Hobbes as a leading proponent of this idea (Arblaster, *The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism*, 28).

quickness of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse.¹¹⁾

As the above quote illustrates, Hobbes took a positive view of human desire and passion. Once these have been affirmed, they are followed by reason and thoughts, which play roles of “scouts” and “spies.” Scouts and spies do not generally set goals of their own, but are entities that merely seek the means of achieving aims dictated to them by their military commander, which in Hobbes’s analogy is desire. The above quote neatly summarizes Hobbes’s view that desire is the supreme ruler and reason is merely its tool.

As is widely known, Hobbes defined the “natural state” as a “state of war,” claiming that human life was a process of competing for power, wealth, and honor. He also argued that the natural state was therefore inevitably bound to bring about chaos. In a situation of all-out war, the fear and danger of possible death made it a certainty that people would seek peace. Hobbes claimed that the role of reason at such times was to search for “convenient Articles of peace.”¹²⁾

In Hobbes’s conception of reason, there were two especially significant aspects: on the one hand, it increased desire in consideration of future uncertainties and possible poverty; but on the other it also induced people to yield (or transfer) their own rights in order to defend themselves and peacefully coexist with others. Reason, for Hobbes, both increases an individual’s desire for the sake of greater satisfaction, and urges that same individual to give up some of their rights in order to gain the satisfaction of guaranteed safety through peace. In this respect, Hobbes’s assertion that “reason designs the rules of peace” was not a claim that reason regulates desire but that it effectively sates it.

We have thus witnessed two prominent routes to peace found in Western philosophy. In the following section we will examine how these views compare with the route to peace proposed by the Korean Confucian scholar Toegye Yi Hwang?

2. Confucian Tradition

Let us begin with an overview of Confucianism as an ideology of peace. While Confucianism as a whole can be described as just such an ideology,

11) Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 139.

12) Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 188.

here we will note four particular aspects of it.

The first of these aspects is Confucius's *zhengminglun* 正名論 (theory of rectification of names).¹³⁾ As one of the central ideas of the *Lunyu* 論語 (*Analects*), this theory holds that all names have their own unique accompanying duty, and that each name must be brought into conformity with its duty. This, of course, is based on the theory of *yin* 陰 and *yang* 陽 as found in the *Yijing* 易經 (*Book of Changes*), but ideal human relationships in Confucianism are referred to as *ganying* 感應 (In other words, things will go well when there is mutual influence between *yin* and *yang*). In this respect, right name theory calls for each individual to fulfill her or his particular duty, thereby creating harmonious relationships, which in turn allow people to mutually influence each other, improving the lives of all.

Confucius's right name theory is symbolized by the phrase, "The prince is prince, and the minister is minister; the father is father, and the son is son."¹⁴⁾ Here, "being" denotes faithfully fulfilling the unique roles bestowed upon us by our names. The *Daxue* 大學 (*Great Learning*) contains the following passage: "King Wen 文王, as a sovereign, rested in benevolence. As a minister, he rested in reverence. As a son, he rested in filial piety. As a father, he rested in kindness. In communication with his subjects, he rested in good faith."¹⁵⁾ Here, benevolence on the part of a sovereign, reverence on the part of a minister, kindness on the part of a father, filial piety on the part of a son and good faith when interacting with others are all examples of "unique duties," corresponding to the various relational roles performed by Emperor Wen. According to the *Great Learning*, those who properly fulfill their unique duties "rest in the highest excellence (*chi yu zhi shan* 止於至善)." The *Great Learning* equates "resting in the highest excellence" with "making the whole kingdom peaceful and happy (*ping tianxia* 平天下)." From this point of view, Confucius's Right Name Theory is an ideology of peace, in the sense that the world will attain peace if all people fulfill their unique duties.

The second notable aspect of Confucianism is Mencius's doctrine of the "Kingly Way" (*wangdao* 王道). Mencius defines the Kingly Way as

13) Of course, the word "*ming* 名 (name)" here denotes not proper nouns but common nouns in the sense of social roles, such as parent, child, employer or worker.

14) *Lunyu* 12.11: "君君 臣臣 父父 子子."

15) *Daxue*, ch. 3: "詩云 穆穆文王 於緝熙敬止 為人君 止於仁 為人臣 止於敬 為人子 止於孝 為人父 止於慈 與國人交 止於信。"

“practicing benevolent rule through virtue” (*yi de xing ren* 以德行仁) and opposes it with “hegemony” (*badao* 霸道), which he defines as “feigning benevolent rule while using force” (*yi li jia ren* 以力假仁).¹⁶ The Kingly Way, in other words, involves first ensuring that the people are able to make a living, then enabling them to live in comfort and righteousness by teaching them about human relationships (*renlun* 人倫). Hegemony, by contrast, is aimed at achieving rule by force and involves using any means available to build a prosperous nation and powerful army in order to subjugate neighboring states and eventually extend a rule of tyranny across the world.

Mencius defends his advocacy of the Kingly Way by claiming that “The benevolent have no enemy” (*renzhe wu di* 仁者無敵),¹⁷ while deriding hegemony as “climbing a tree to catch a fish” (*yuan mu qiu yu* 緣木求魚).¹⁸ His basis for defending the Kingly Way with this claim is twofold: firstly, a king that rules benevolently will come to be regarded as a father not only by his own people but also by those of neighboring states; secondly, such benevolent rule will engender love for the state among its people, so that they will give everything they have to defend it, even against better-armed invaders. Mencius’s criticism of hegemony, meanwhile, is also based on two points: firstly, he maintains that seeking power through force will create enemies among neighboring states, making it impossible for one country to subjugate all others; secondly, that seeking to create a prosperous nation and powerful army through tyranny will lead, ultimately, to domestic resistance or collapse. In other words, the politics of hegemony involves excessive exploitation of the people to create national wealth and military power, leading in turn to popular resistance, while revering fame and private gain for the sake of creating a prosperous nation and powerful army produces clashes of interest among the people, leading to the internal collapse of the state. Mencius branded hegemony a “vicious cycle of violence” and sought to create a peaceful world via the Kingly Way.

The third aspect of Confucianism to be noted with regard to peace is the theory of the “*zhonghe* 中和” (equilibrium and harmony)” in the

16) *Mengzi* 2A3: “孟子曰 以力假仁者霸 霸必有大國 以德行仁者王 王不待大 湯以七十里 文王以百里。”

17) *Mengzi* 1A5: “孟子對曰 地方百里而可以王 王如施仁政於民 省刑罰 薄稅斂 深耕易耨 壯者以暇日 修其孝悌忠信 入以事其父兄 出以事其長上 可使制梃 以撻秦楚之堅甲利兵矣 彼奪其民時 使不得耕耨以養其父母 父母凍餓 兄弟妻子離散 彼陷溺其民 王往而征之 夫誰與王敵 故曰 仁者無敵 王請勿疑。”

18) *Mengzi* 1A7: “然則王之所大欲可知已 欲辟土地 朝秦楚 莅中國 而撫四夷也 以若所為求若所欲 猶緣木而求魚也。”

Zhongyong 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean). According to this text, “While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of Equilibrium. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of Harmony.”¹⁹⁾ The *Doctrine of the Mean* also comments, “Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish.”²⁰⁾ A happy order prevailing throughout heaven and earth, and the nourishing and flourishing of all things denotes the same thing as “resting in the highest excellence” as mentioned in the *Great Learning*: both signify states of utter peace. The *Doctrine of the Mean*, however, takes the view that this utter peace begins with equilibrium and harmony in the heart of each individual.

The *Great Learning* describes the relationship between self-cultivation and ruling the people as being akin to the relationship between roots and branches, with self-cultivation as the roots and ruling the people as the tips of the branches. In the same vein, the *Doctrine of the Mean* regards “external peace,” which is present when a happy order prevails throughout heaven and earth and all things are nourished and flourish, as beginning with the attainment of personal equilibrium—namely, harmony in one’s own mind. This is indicated by the passage that reads, “This Equilibrium is the great root from which grow all the human actions in the world, and this Harmony is the universal path which they all should pursue.”²¹⁾ The implication here is that internal states of mind are closely related to the external outcome of peace.

The fourth notable aspect is Zhu Xi’s doctrine of *renxin* 人心 (human mind) and *daoxin* 道心 (moral mind). According to the *Shujing* 書經 (*Book of Documents*), Shun 舜, upon handing power to Yu 禹 said, “The human mind is solely dangerous, while the moral mind is solely obscure. Therefore, always observe things closely, remain consistent and grasp the mean.” Zhu Xi 朱熹 explained this passage as follows:

The mind’s miraculous perception is one, but the difference between the human mind and the moral mind is that the former originates in the body’s personal feelings, while the latter is based on the rightness of nature and heavenly order. This is because they perceive in different ways. The human mind is dangerous and unstable, while the moral mind is subtle and does

19) *Zhongyong*, ch. 1: “喜怒哀樂之未發 謂之中 發而皆中節 謂之和。”

20) *Zhongyong*, ch. 1: “致中和 天地位焉 萬物育焉。”

21) *Zhongyong*, ch. 1: “中也者 天下之大本也 和也者 天下之達道也。”

not easily manifest itself. ... If one takes the moral mind as one's personal master and ensures that the human mind always obeys its commands, the dangerous human mind will lose its risky edge and the subtle moral mind will manifest itself, so that all excess and inadequacy will automatically disappear from one's behavior. Yao, Shun and Yu were among the great sages of the world; their successive appointments by each other as king were highly important events for the world. When these greatest of sages performed these most important of deeds, these were the only words of caution with which they admonished each other. How, then, could there be any other principle as important as this?²²⁾

The term "human mind," is conceived of as something that originates in the body and refers to such phenomena as wanting to eat when hungry, wanting to put on clothes when cold, and longing for the opposite sex when filled with desire. Zhu Xi explained the human mind by linking it to *xingqi zhi si* 形氣之私 (physical disposition of the self) or to *renyu zhi si* 人欲之私 (human desire of the self). Since the character *si* 私 here indicates "privacy," the human mind involves each person "pursuing her or his private desires." The moral mind arises from the natural laws of *ren yi li zhi* 仁義禮智 (benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom) and refers to feelings such as commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and complaisance, and approval and disapproval. Zhu Xi explained the moral mind by linking it to the "*tianli zhi gong* 天理之公" (fairness of Heavenly Principle) or the "*xingming zhi zheng* 性命之正" (rightness of nature and heavenly mandate). In other words, the moral mind is that which pursues rightness (*zheng* 正) in order to ensure fairness (*gong* 公) among the members of society.

Zhu Xi explained the meaning of the doctrine of the human mind and the moral mind in the *Book of Documents* by saying, "Dominate the human mind with the moral mind and make sure your behavior is neither excessive nor inadequate." If we avoid excess and inadequacy in everything we say and do, he argued, peace will naturally follow; in this sense, the doctrine of the human mind and the moral mind is itself oriented toward peace. Zhu Xi also asserted that the domination of the human mind by its moral counterpart was the most important principle behind the actions of the world's greatest sages. What he meant by this is that the doctrine of the human mind and the moral mind is the true core of political

22) *Zhongyong*, "中庸章句序": "心之虛靈知覺 一而已矣 而以爲有人心道心之異者 則以其或生於形氣之私 或原於性命之正 而所以爲知覺者不同 是以 或危殆而不安 或微妙而難見耳 ... 必使道心常爲一身之主 而人心每聽命焉 則危者安 微者著 而動靜云爲 自無過不及之差矣 夫堯舜禹 天下之大聖也 以天下相傳 天下之大事也 以天下之大聖 行天下之大事 而其授受之際 丁寧告戒 不過如此 則天下之理 豈有以加於此哉?"

philosophy. Toegye's Neo-Confucianism is a continuation of this doctrine: this is why we are able to portray it as an ideology of peace.

3. *I-gi sangbar ron* 理氣互發論 (Theory of *I-Gi* Mutual Dynamism)

As is well known, Toegye's Theory of *I-Gi* Mutual Dynamism refers to the "Four Sprouts" (*sadan* 四端, *siduan* in Chinese) as *i* dynamism (*ibar* 理發, *lifa* in Chinese) and the "Seven Feelings" (*chiljeong* 七情, *qiqing* in Chinese) as *gi* dynamism (*chibar* 氣發, *qifa* in Chinese). While traditional Confucianism referred to human emotions sometimes as the "Four Sprouts" and sometimes as the "Seven Feelings" Toegye believed that the Four Sprouts and Seven Feelings were essentially different. His fellow scholar Gi Dae-seung 奇大升 (a.k.a. Gobong 高峰) argued against Toegye's interpretation by asserting that the Four Sprouts and Seven Feelings were originally the same emotions, and the two men's correspondence began the now-famous "*sa chil nonjaeng* 四七論爭" Four-Seven Debate). Toegye explained his Theory of *I-Gi* Mutual Dynamism to Gi Dae-seung as follows:

The distinction between the Four Sprouts (*sadan* 四端) and the Seven Feelings (*chiljeong* 七情) seems to lie in the difference between original nature and physical nature. We have already divided nature into two parts: *i* 理 and *gi* 氣. Can this division really be impossible only when it comes to emotion? What is the source of emotions such as commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and complaisance, and approval and disapproval? They originate in the nature of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, knowledge. What is the source of happiness, anger, sadness, enjoyment, love, hate and greed? The mind is moved by contact between the body and external objects; it is these objects that generate such sentiments. . . . The ancients called avoiding analysis and attempting to lump issues together "swallowing a jujube without chewing." This is highly problematic. If you continue in this way despite everything I have said above, you will confuse *gi* with nature before you know it; this will lead you into the damaging trap of mistaking human desire for natural order.²³⁾

Toegye described the Four Sprouts as originating in original nature, which he then further described as stemming from the nature of

23) *Toegyejip*, vol. 16, 20-23, "答奇明彦論四端七情第二書": "情之有四端七情之分 猶性之有本性氣質之異也 然則其於性也 既可以理氣分言之 至於情 獨不可以理氣分言之乎 惻隱羞惡辭讓是非 何從而發乎 發於仁義禮智之性焉爾 喜怒哀懼愛惡欲 何從而發乎 外物觸其形而動於中 緣境而出焉爾 (….) 夫講學而惡分析 務合爲一說 古人謂之鵲圖吞棗 其病不少 而如此不已 不知不覺之間 駸駸然入於以氣論性之蔽 而墮於認人欲作天理之患矣."

benevolence, righteousness, propriety, knowledge. This means that the Four Sprouts have their source in the innate moral character of humans, and have nothing to do with physical desires. He also described the Seven Feelings as originating in physical nature, claiming that this meant they arose when the mind was stimulated by contact between the body and external objects, and that such objects were therefore the cause of the sentiments. For Toegye, it is “human instinct” that gives rise to desire or aversion when we come into contact with external objects; these desires are what he referred to collectively as the Seven Feelings. In the quote above, Toegye contrasts original nature, *i* 理 (*li* in Chinese, the Four Sprouts and natural order) with physical nature, *gi* 氣 (*qi* in Chinese, the Seven Feelings and human desire) and it is upon this contrast that he founds his doctrine of mutual dynamism.²⁴⁾ Toegye further believed that human mind and moral mind correspond with the Seven Feelings and Four Sprouts, respectively, commenting as follows:

You said the human mind is the Seven Feelings and the moral mind the Four Sprouts, but if you look at Zhu Xi’s and Xu Dongyang’s explanations in Zhu Xi’s preface to the *Doctrine of the Mean*, you’ll see that it can only be the case that the human and moral minds are the Seven Feelings and Four Sprouts, respectively.²⁵⁾

In his preface to the *Doctrine of the Mean*, Zhu Xi held that the human mind and the moral mind are distinguished in the same way as the personal feelings of the body (*xingqi zhi si* 形氣之私) are distinct from the rightness of nature and heavenly order (*xingming zhi zheng* 性命之正), while Xu Dongyang held that “the human mind originates in *gi*: for example, the desires of the ears, eyes, mouth and nose and the four limbs. . . . The moral mind originates in *i*: for example, the Four Sprouts: commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and complaisance, and approval and disapproval.” As his reference to these two explanations make clear, Toegye believed that the Four-Seven Debate and the doctrine of the human mind and the moral mind were two versions of the same thing. Let us now look again at Zhu Xi’s doctrine of the human mind and the moral

24) In Neo-Confucianism, “original nature (*benrean zhi xing* 本然之性) and physical nature (*qizhi zhi xing* 氣質之性)” are originally concepts that explain the universality and particularity, or the completeness and incompleteness of humans or creation. But Toegye understood “original nature and physical nature” to mean “moral nature and physical instinct.” This is a characteristic of Toegye’s scholarship.

25) Toegyejip, vol. 37, 27, “答李平叔”: “人心爲七情 道心爲四端 以中庸序朱子說 及許東陽說之類觀之 二者之爲七情四端 固無不可”

mind in this light. In the *Doctrine of the Mean*, Zhu Xi writes:

The human mind and the moral mind exist in a disorderly mixture in every one of us. Therefore, if we do not know how to control them, the human mind becomes more dangerous and the moral mind more subtle, so that the “fairness of natural order” is eventually unable to defeat personal feelings of human desire. “Observing things closely” means watching the gap between the human and moral minds and ensuring that they do not mix, while “remaining consistent” means faithfully maintaining the correctness of one’s true mind. If we remain devoted to this, without the slightest lapse, making the moral mind our master at all times and ensuring that the human mind follows its commands, the dangerous human mind becomes less threatening and the subtle moral mind appears, leaving our behavior free from all excesses and inadequacies.²⁶⁾

The above quote first explains the conflicting aspects of the human and moral minds, before explaining why effort is needed to observe things closely and remain consistent. It then describes the effect of these actions: the elimination of excessive and inadequate behavior. If we replace the human mind and the moral mind in Zhu Xi’s explanation with *i* 理 and *gi* 氣, respectively, and “observing closely and remaining consistent” with piety (*gyeong* 敬), we have something which closely resembles Toegye’s theory of mutual dynamism and thoughts on piety. Toegye made the following comment:

I 理 is lofty to the extent where it has no match. It only commands objects and takes no commands from them. *Gi* 氣, therefore, ought not to defeat *i*. But once *gi* takes form, it becomes the material and the instrument of *i*; frequently, then, it influences manifestation and reception. When *gi* easily follows *i*, *i* is naturally manifested. Therefore, *gi* is not weak but submissive. If *gi* defies *i*, *i* is obscured. Therefore, *i* is not weak but the victim of inevitable circumstances. This can be illustrated with the following metaphor: a king may be higher than all others, but if an unruly subject takes office in the royal court, he will come into competition with the king. This is a crime on the part of the subject; there is nothing the king can do about it. Therefore, a gentleman must study hard in order not to get carried away by his feelings, blocking material greed, enhancing virtue and returning to the path of the great mean and extreme righteousness.²⁷⁾

26) *Zhongyong*, “中庸章句序”: “二者雜於方寸之間 而不知所以治之 則危者愈危 微者愈微 而天理之公 卒無以勝夫人欲之私矣 精則察夫二者之間而不雜也 一則守其本心之正而不離也 從事於斯 無少間斷 必使道心 常為一身之主 而人心每聽命焉 則危者安 微者著 而動靜云為 自無過不及之差矣。”

27) *Toegyejip*, vol. 13, 17-18, “答李達李天機”: “理本其尊無對 命物而不命於物 非氣所當勝也 但氣以成形之後 却是氣為之田地材具 故凡發用應接 率多氣為用事 氣能順理時 理自顯 非氣之弱 乃順也 氣若反理時 理反隱 非理之弱 乃勢也 比如王者 本尊無對 及強臣跋扈 反與之或為勝負 乃臣之罪 王者無如之何 故君子為學 矯氣質之偏 禦物欲而尊德性 以歸於大中至正之道。”

After discussing *i* and *gi*, Toegye draws the conclusion that material greed must be blocked and moral virtue enhanced. When Toegye speaks of a battle between *i* and *gi*, he means the conflict between the natural order and human greed, or between the moral mind and the human mind. From this perspective, when our minds are aroused, it is important to observe these signs to better ensure that natural order or the moral mind is victorious. We will discuss this further in the next section of this essay.

To summarize what we have discussed so far: Toegye tried to divide the Four Sprouts and Seven Feelings into the respective dynamisms of *i* and *gi*. In his system, *i* dynamism arises from pure moral nature and is therefore desirable, while *gi* dynamism arises from instinctive physical desire and is therefore dangerous. This is why Toegye believed it necessary to keep *gi* dynamism under the control of *i* dynamism, it is equivalent to eliminating all excess and inadequacy from one's behavior by mastering the human mind with the moral mind, or to blocking human greed and preserving natural order. Ultimately, all of these concepts are aimed at achieving peace. In this sense, Toegye's theory of mutual dynamism is an ideology of peace, which aims to ensure that a happy order prevails throughout heaven and earth, and that all things are nourished and flourish.

4. *Jigyeong* 持敬 (Piety) and *Gyeongmyang* 謙讓 (Humility)

If Toegye's mind-nature theory can be integrated with the theory of *i-gi* mutual dynamism, his theory of practice can be integrated with *jigyeong* 持敬 (piety) and *gyeomyang* 謙讓 (humility). We will now discuss the meaning of Toegye's theory of practice, focusing on piety and humility.

As we have seen above, Toegye's writings on mutual dynamism discuss the tussle for supremacy between *i* and *gi*. Here, piety is the practical method used to ensure that *i* always wins over *gi*. Toegye often called for the domination of the mind through piety. In other words, the mind, which dominates the body, should in turn be dominated by piety. "Dominating the mind with piety" means distinguishing (and choosing) properly between natural order and human desire when the mind is aroused, thereby attaining peace. Toegye made the following comment:

The moment when human nature becomes emotion is the indication of a unified mind and the core of all creation; this is the juncture at which good and evil divide. A scholar must consistently remain pious and aware of natural order and human desire.²⁸⁾

For Toegye “the moment when nature becomes emotion” is the moment when the outcome of the battle between *i* and *gi* is decided; the outcome of this decision determines whether one is a “gentleman (*jungzi* 君子)” or a “petty individual (*xiaoren* 小人).” Toegye accorded piety its significance in relation to this moment. It is piety that ensures victory for *i* in the battle with *gi* by defending natural order and impeding human desire. But this is not to say that piety is only demanded at the moment when nature becomes emotion. Only if piety is habitually cultivated will it be capable of naturally ensuring victory for *i* at the decisive moment. In this respect, effort to cultivate piety is always needed, whether the mind is aroused or not, and in times of both emergency and non-emergency. Toegye wrote:

In general, when it comes to study, piety must remain one’s main priority regardless of whether anything is happening or not and whether one is conscious or not. If one maintains piety whether in motion or still, the mind itself will be clear, one’s true character will achieve deep purity when thoughts have not yet arisen; and loyalty will shine brightly and drive out material desire when thoughts have already arisen. ... If several events occur at once, or if we try to respond in two directions at the same time, how can we think amid all this complexity and respond in accordance with our thoughts? But if control of the mind is established and becomes the general principle behind everything, all indications reveal themselves. The body quietly becomes aware of this and there is no omission of detail.²⁹⁾

The above quote can be summarized as follows. First, effort is required to maintain piety at all times. This enables the true character of the mind to become clear and pure before arousal has taken place, and allows loyalty to drive out material desire when arousal has occurred. Second, working to maintain piety is a way of establishing domination of the mind. Third, establishing domination of the mind allows one to respond without undue complication even when several events occur at once. This is known as “dealing with all events precisely” (*beom eung*

28) *Toegyejip*, vol. 7, 24, “聖學十圖, 第六心統性情圖說”: “性發為情之際 乃一心之幾微 萬化之樞要 善惡之所由分也 學者誠能一於持敬 不昧理欲。”

29) *Toegyejip*, vol. 28, 17-18, “答金惇鉸”: “大抵 人之為學 勿論有事無事有意無意 惟當敬以為主 而動靜不失 則當其思慮未萌也 心體虛明 本領深純 及其思慮已發也 義理昭著 物欲退聽 ...若遇衆事交至之時 或左或右 一彼一此 豈可雜然而思 旋思旋應 只是心之主宰 卓然在此 為衆事之綱 則當下所應之事 幾微畢見 四體默喻 曲折無漏矣。”

gok dang 泛應曲當) and means “achieving peace” or “having no excess or inadequacy in one’s behavior.”

The effort to maintain piety is therefore concentrated on the mind. Since the mind dominates the body in Toegye’s worldview, establishing dominance over the mind will enable the body to deal with all events precisely in practice. In which case, why is piety essential in establishing dominance over the mind? Toegye makes the following case:

The reason of the mind is so vast that it cannot be imitated and so wide that its boundaries lie out of sight. How, then, could it preserve nature and establish substance in the absence of true and consistent piety? Arousal of the mind is so insignificant that observing it is as difficult as examining the end of a strand of hair and as dangerous as stepping into a hole. How, then, could signs be made proper and master function in the absence of true and consistent piety? In his learning, a gentleman should study for self-cultivation by making piety the master of his mind when arousal has not yet occurred, and conduct introspective study by making piety the master of his mind when arousal has taken place. This is why piety is all-important and penetrates substance and function when it comes to study.³⁰⁾

For Toegye, the mind is so unfathomably wide and its use is so subtle and dangerous that it cannot properly mastered without piety. Indeed, our minds touch on all matters in the world, and are subtle and dangerous, capable of suddenly becoming nasty over the most trivial things, even in the moments after feeling the most profound compassion. In Neo-Confucianism, piety is often described by phrases such as *zhuyi wu di* 主一無適 (concentrating on one thing), *zhengqi yansu* 整齊嚴肅 (achieving symmetry and maintaining gravity), *chang xingxing* 常惺惺 (being awakened at all times) and “*shoulian* 收斂” (convergence). This takes issue not with the dispersion of the mind but with the center around which it converges. If we were attempt to address the dispersed fields of the mind, there would be so many as to make examining them one by one impossible. The aim is therefore that piety make the mind converge into one place; it endeavors to reach even its outer extremities by gaining control of this hub of convergence. This is why Toegye commented that “piety is all-important and penetrates substance and function when it comes to study.”

30) *Toegye sokjip*, vol. 8, 20, “天命圖說”: “此心之理 浩浩然不可模捉 渾渾然不可涯涘 苟非敬以之一 安能保其性而立其體哉 此心之發 微而爲毫釐之難察 危而爲坑塹之難蹈 苟非敬以之一 又安能正其幾而達其用哉 是以君子之學 當此心未發之時 必主於敬而加存養工夫 當此心已發之際 亦必主於敬而加省察工夫 此敬學之所以成始成終 而通貫體用者也。”

If piety generally takes issue with the internal mind, humility concerns external actions. Humility means always lowering oneself and showing greater consideration to others when it comes to relationships. Toegye lived a life consistent with humility and modest retreat and advised his friends and students to show humility. The poem “Seokhae 石蟹” (Crayfish), composed by Toegye at the age of 15, reads as follows:

You make your home by digging into the sand under a stone.
 You move forwards; you move backwards. How many legs you have!
 You spend your whole life in one palm-sized patch of stream,
 Never even asking how big the river is.³¹⁾

This poem describes how a crayfish spends its whole life in a palm-sized area of a stream without wanting for anything or feeling a lack of freedom. The final line, “Never even asking how big the river is,” is a particularly direct reference to the idea of being content with one’s lot. The poem shows how Toegye, from a young age, sought a secluded life of modesty and containment.

Though he spent a considerable part of his middle age working in official positions, this was not Toegye’s ideal life. Eventually, at the age of fifty, he returned to his hometown, found a place to live, and built a home that he named Hanseoam 寒棲庵. In the poem, Toegye described his feelings at the time as follows:

Having retired, I feel comfortable in my foolish station.
 But my study has regressed, making me anxious in my old age.
 Since my new home lies next to a stream,
 I’ll spend each day gazing at the flowing water and reflecting.³²⁾

This poem clearly shows a new resolve in Toegye’s old age to live in humble satisfaction with his own lot while absorbing himself in study. The philosopher regarded humility as his own proper duty.

Toegye also advised humility on the part of his friends and students. To Jeong Yu-il, for example, he said, “Dealing with life means always taking one step further back than others and bowing your head once more than others as your primary consideration.”³³⁾ Most important in embodying humility is foregoing undue concern with worldly honor and riches. To Nam Eon-gyeong, he said, “Be sure to begin by disregarding

31) *Toegye sokjip*, vol. 1, 1, “石蟹”: “負石穿沙自有家 前行卻走足偏多 生涯一掬山泉裏 不問江湖水幾何.”

32) *Toegyejip*, vol. 1, 47, “退溪”: “身退安愚分 學退憂暮境 溪上始定居 臨流日有省.”

33) *Toegyejip*, vol. 24, 26, “答鄭子中”: “所以行於世者 則每以退人一步 低人一頭 爲第一義.”

obsession with profit and loss or glory and shame, in order to avoid sully the mind.”³⁴⁾ To Gi Dae-seung, Toegye described his feelings as he lived a life of modesty as follows:

When I think about it, I had no talent that could have been of use to the world. I soon fell ill and experienced many hardships before I had reached middle age. Only in my old age did I at last try to find satisfaction by gathering myself, addressing my inadequacies, reducing my flaws and fulfilling my long-held wish. If I did every single thing according to the old way in deciding my advance or retreat, without looking in front or behind and without gauging my own ability, it would be as if one of my legs was shorter than the other; in which case, how could I escape the fear of stumbling and falling flat on my face? That’s why, even though I know there is work to be done in the world by great men, I find myself hesitating instead of ambitiously launching myself into new responsibilities.³⁵⁾

“Work to be done by great men” refers to the possibility of taking a government post at the royal court and attempting to do good in the world through public service. The use of the term “old way,” meanwhile, refers to the perceived duty incumbent upon Confucian scholars to seek a civil service position and play a part in governing the world properly. But Toegye resigned from government and returned to his hometown. He gave two reasons for his avoidance of official life. Firstly, he had no original talent and therefore had to be mindful of his limits. Toegye claimed that he lacked ability and tried to make up for his inadequacies through study. Secondly, the political situation at the time was particularly unfavorable and Toegye keenly felt the need for circumspection. In other words, the royal court was such a hotbed of treachery that just being part of it brought the risk of falling victim to an unjust purge and offered no possibility of implementing policies in accordance with one’s convictions. Adverse circumstances thus also played a part in Toegye’s choice of a modest life outside politics. More fundamentally, however, this choice was the product of humility. Toegye sought to forsake egotism and devote himself to study because he genuinely believed he was inadequate.

To summarize: Toegye’s theory of practice can be reduced to cultivation of the virtues of piety and humility, where piety equates to

34) *Toegyejip*, vol. 14, 2, “答南時甫”: “第一須先將世間窮通得失 榮辱利害 一切置之度外 不以累於靈臺。”

35) *Toegyejip*, vol. 17, 10, “答奇明彥”: “顧渥自念 本乏世用 早嬰身痾 中歲以前 七顛八倒 迨至桑榆之景 方欲收拾補填 庶幾寡過 以畢素願足矣 若不顧前後 不揆力量 獨於出處一事 必欲節節而反古之道 是所謂一脚短一脚長 豈能免於顛仆之患乎 是以 雖知世有大丈夫事 而尚越趨 不敢奮發直前而承當也。”

“suppressing human greed and cherishing natural order” (*e renyu cun tianli* 遏人欲 存天理) and humility equates to “being content with one’s lot” (*an fen zhi zu* 安分知足). Because Toegye held that conflict generally has its origins in greed and egotism he sought to establish peace by impeding greed through piety and forsake egotism through the cultivation of humility.

5. The Significance of Toegye’s Work as an Ideology of Peace

In *To Have or To Be?*, the twentieth-century German philosopher Erich Fromm defines competition and greed as products of the “having mode” and cooperation and sharing as products of the “being mode.” He describes each of these phenomena as follows:

The fundamental elements in the relation between individuals in the having mode of existence are competition, antagonism, and fear. The antagonistic element in the having relationship stems from its nature. If having is the basis of my sense of identity because ‘I am what I have,’ the wish to have must lead to the desire to have much, to have more, to have most. In other words, greed is the natural outcome of the having orientation.³⁶⁾

In the being mode, private having (private property) has little affective importance, because I do not need to own something in order to enjoy it, or even in order to use it. In the being mode, more than one person—in fact millions of people—can share in the enjoyment of the same object, since none need—or want—to have it, as a condition of enjoying it. This not only avoids strife; it creates one of the deepest forms of human happiness: shared enjoyment. ... The experience of sharing makes and keeps the relation between two individuals alive; it is the basis of all great religious, political, and philosophical movements.³⁷⁾

According to Fromm, those dominated by the having mode equate their egos with what they have, which gives rise to competition and greed, eventually leading to bloody conflict. By contrast, the mode of being allows us to realize the joy of sharing, leading us on a path of cooperation and coexistence. According to Fromm, the having mode and the being mode both lie dormant within human nature. He writes that:

The truth is that both the having and the being modes of existence are

36) Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, 112.

37) Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, 114-115.

potentialities of human nature, that our biological urge for survival tends to further the having mode, but that selfishness and laziness are not the only potentialities inherent in human beings. We human beings have an inherent and deeply rooted desire to be; to express our faculties, to be active, to be related to others, to escape the prison cell of selfishness.³⁸⁾

Fromm explains the having mode by linking it to a biological urge, which can be taken to mean physical instinct. He also described the “desire to be; to express our faculties, to be active, to be related to others, to escape the prison cell of selfishness” as “the will to give, to share, to sacrifice.” This will, he claims, stems from the moral nature of humans. Fromm’s view, then, is that the having mode comes from physical instinct and the being mode from moral nature. His intention in developing this analysis, of course, was to break free from greed-based competition and to enjoy the pleasure of sharing.

Perceptive readers will have already noticed the remarkable similarity between Fromm’s having and being modes and Toegye’s *gi* and *i* dynamisms, respectively. Fromm asserts that a life dominated by the having mode is a life of greed, and that greed for possessions eventually leads to brutal war. The being mode, on the other hand, lets us realize the pleasure of sharing and leads along a path of cooperation and coexistence. In this respect, Fromm said, “peace as a state of lasting harmonious relations between nations is only possible when the having structure is replaced by the being structure.”³⁹⁾

A similar line of reasoning can be directly applied to Toegye’s theory of *i* and *gi* dynamism. Zhu Xi claimed that the human mind originated in the personal feelings of the body and the moral mind originated in the rightness of nature and heavenly order, while Toegye called the former dynamism of *gi* and the latter dynamism of *i*. For Toegye, the human mind of *gi* dynamism pursues personal physical desire, which eventually leads to conflict, while the moral mind of *i* dynamism, on the other hand, pursues fairness that allows coexistence among human beings, leading to harmony and peace. This is why Zhu Xi and Toegye were wary of the human mind of *gi* dynamism and supportive of the moral mind of *i* dynamism.

This study began with a comparison between two approaches to peace: that of Plato and that of Hobbes. The approaches of Fromm and Toegye can be likened to that of Plato. Hobbes, however, believed all

38) Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, 100.

39) Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, 114.

the approaches of classical philosophers such as Plato had failed in their search for the truth and their pursuit of peace. Classical philosophers had aimed to create a society full of virtue based on man's highest aspirations; Hobbes believed that this was the reason for their failure. Hobbes took a more pragmatic approach, pursuing lower goals that abandoned the idea of the perfectibility of man and took passion, rather than reason, as his starting point.⁴⁰⁾

According to Hobbes, living without desire was "to be Dead." He therefore rejected the classical ideal of a life led by controlling animal nature with reason. Hobbes appointed desire as sovereign and branded reason as the capacity for calculated self-interest. Hobbes explained that people would gladly surrender some of their personal rights and enter into a social contract (i.e. a contract of peace) based on the calculation that peace brought greater benefits than war. Indeed, most peace today is maintained in this way. Here, though, we find a trap: Self-interested calculation is based on the premise that anything can be done as long as it brings benefits to the perpetrator. It follows that any person or country accustomed to such reasoning will unhesitatingly start a war if victory can definitely be achieved at a low cost. Moreover, those with inadequate capacities for calculation or deluded by narcissism will choose war as a result of miscalculation. This is, perhaps, one of the fundamental reasons why wars still erupt across the world today.

It is here that we discover the significance of piety and humility. Toegye emphasized piety based on suppressing human desire and cherishing natural order; in the same way, piety rejects self-interest as a way of thinking, whether it be precise calculation or narcissistic miscalculation. Peace based on self-interested calculation is temporary and can be shattered at any time. Therefore, if we take the view that self-interested thinking must be overcome in order to attain genuine peace, the potential for this can be found in piety. Humility, meanwhile, means considering the benefits of others before one's own and is based on satisfaction with one's own lot; in the same vein, it seeks to overcome the will to compete with hostility against others, even if precise calculations lead to the conclusion that war would be a more profitable choice. If we take the view that the will for hostile competition itself must ultimately be overcome in order to attain real peace, we find that cultivating humility offers one possible way of

40) Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy*, 370-371.

achieving this aim.

The Han Dynasty Confucian scholar Dong Zhongshu left us with the immortal line, “Ensure that justice is upheld, do not scheme in your own interest, illuminate the true way and do not quibble over merit.” Zhu Xi adopted this line for his Regulations of the White Deer Grotto Academy, while Toegye in turn adopted the Regulations of the White Deer Grotto Academy for his Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning. In sum, Toegye rejected utilitarianism and chose a path of attaining peace through the illumination of moral virtues. This was the same path followed by Confucius with his Right Name Theory and Mencius with his doctrine of the Kingly Way.

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退溪學與和平

李相益

中文摘要

本文開頭以人們「接近和平的兩個方法」展開柏拉圖(Plato)與霍布斯(Thomas Hobbes)對和平的論述差異比較。如果說人類是理性動物的話，那麼柏拉圖用理性來控制動物性(sensible soul)是接近道德性的方法。其就由理性的統治(控制)來克服動物性的話，那結果自然達到和平的構成。然而事實上能克服動物性的人格者並不多，因此世上仍然處於混亂的狀態。霍布斯認為沒有慾望就如同死亡，若以此觀點來看便是拒絕以理性來控制動物性的人生。霍布斯認為人性是惡的，是自私自利的盤算者，為了求安全的欲望，經過盤算，甘願放棄了原來享有的自然權利，彼此訂立了一種社會契約，於是建立了國家。實際上現實生活中的和平也是經過人們對自我利益的盤算下，所做出來的協調性和平。然而若陷於自我的迷戀(對權力慾望的我執)、盤算失誤，便會造成戰爭。現今世界便是如此，因誤以為戰爭帶來的利益大過於人民的利益而紛爭不停。

因此吾人可由此找到持敬謙讓的價值與意義，退溪以持敬的方法來強調「遏人欲、存天理」。順理看來持敬便是「正確的計算」，從根本克服並抵制“自我陶醉的誤算、盤算式思考方式”等。從盤算的角度算計來的和平，總有因彼此利益失去平衡而崩毀之時，是假性暫時性的和平，為了真正的和平必須克服盤算性的思考方式，而持敬正具有此功能。另一方面，謙讓是藉由安分知足來使人們面對自我的利益的同時能優先顧慮到對方的利益，論理看來謙讓即是正確性的計算，克服‘爭辯的意志’。我們於「謙讓」中看到能積極且正面克服好爭辯的可能性，也找到能帶來真正和平之法。

關鍵詞：退溪學，和平，戰爭，理氣互發論，持敬，謙讓

The Paradox of Learning to become a Sage: Zhu Xi's 朱熹 Reintegration of Sagehood and Governing the World

MIN Byounghee

Abstract

This article explains how Zhu Xi attempted to reintegrate sagehood and governing the world, one of the most serious political questions in the Confucian tradition. Facing the gap between moral authority and actual political power, Zhu Xi presented a new alternative for integrating sagehood and ideal governance. This article explores his idea of sagehood in connection to his new approach to governance. I pay particular attention to the paradox of “learning to become a sage,” since Zhu Xi’s teaching included a seemingly self-contradictory promise. For Zhu Xi, every human being has the universal potential to become a sage and anyone can be a sage through learning. However, Zhu Xi also held that in physical and historical reality it is impossible for humans to become a sage through learning. This contradiction shifts the focus of learning from the result of learning to the process of learning. Zhu Xi emphasized learning as a lifelong project and argued that individuals seeking sagehood should engage in the processes of right learning throughout their lives without interruption. According to him, the importance of learning to become a sage lies in following a path of moral learning rather than the possibility of realizing its ultimate goal. The most crucial notions of Zhu Xi’s philosophical system are also described through the metaphor of process. The investigation of things, the most fundamental basis of his learning, has the same contradiction as learning to become a

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sage. With such a philosophical system, Zhu Xi also claimed that the sagely governance prepared by Confucius was his learning *per se*. As a result, he attempted to reintegrate sagehood and statecraft by presenting the learning process as analogous to or identical with the governing process. One consequence of this, I argue, is that Zhu Xi's learning process can also be seen as the process of governing the world in which it is a group of people with a shared purpose, rather than a single sage, who participate by committing to the lifelong project of learning to become a sage.

Keywords: Zhu Xi, sagehood, governing the world, process, paradox of learning to become a sage, reintegration of sagehood and governing the world

1. Sagehood as a Political Question

Tension between the ideal world ruled by sage-rulers and the real world ruled by secular political power has always cast a long shadow on the considerable history of the Confucian tradition.¹⁾ In the ideal world order the Confucian Classics envision, the rulers of all under heaven were also sages. The Three Dynasties (*sandai* 三代) are often regarded as the Golden Age in this tradition because of the perception that sagehood and real political power were in unity at that time.²⁾ However, since the desirable unity of sagehood and political power quickly vanished from the actual world and became entrenched in legend, Confucian scholars have faced serious questions about the practical relationship between Confucian sagehood and governing the world, namely: In the real world, how can we reintegrate these two realms which were initially indivisible? Should we redefine the relationship between sagehood and the secular political power? If so, how? To answer these politically sensitive questions, we must begin with the question of how to define sagehood.

Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130-1200) learning is often referred to as "learning to become a sage (*shengxue* 聖學)," largely because his learning is based on the assumption that every human being is born with the full potential to become a sage through learning. Because Zhi Xi posits a universal human potential for achieving sagehood, the tension between sagehood and the real political power of governing the world became more complicated in his learning: If everyone can become a sage through learning, should those who pursue sagehood also be entitled to govern the world? In other words, if someone were to achieve sagehood through learning, should they by virtue of this fact become a political ruler too? It should not be surprising that questions such as these would have been very uncomfortable questions for a monarchical system where rulers were decided by hereditary blood line rather than by claims of sagehood. The idea of "abdication to the worthiest" (*shanrang* 禪讓) rooted in the

1) Concerning the tension in the history of Confucian tradition, see Ching, "Neo-Confucian Utopian Theories and Political Ethics"; and Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History*.

2) Regardless of the historical reality of the three dynasties, Xia 夏, Shang 商, and Zhou 周, Confucian tradition believed in and supported the idealized image of the Three Dynasties in which the most desirable human state, one which integrated both morality and power, was realized.

Confucian Classics could lead to doubts about political legitimacy in the real world where a ruling family monopolized political power and the ruler was not necessarily a sage (and thus the worthiest to rule).³⁾ Zhu Xi's task, in part, was to tackle these sensitive questions by redefining sagehood and governance without abandoning the ideal that sages should have actual political power to govern the real world. It is not a simple enterprise to resolve such contradictions between the ideal and reality by proposing a compelling and practical alternative. However, Zhu Xi provided both a novel and persuasive solution to this potentially thorny problem. I would argue that his approach has exerted a significant impact not only on Chinese history but also on human history in general.⁴⁾

Recent studies on Zhu Xi's views on political governance have shown that his ideas regarding governing were quite novel.⁵⁾ Zhu Xi tried to build up a larger community and networks of literati as the basis of social and political reform instead of relying only on the emperor or government.⁶⁾ He also believed that the improvement of society should have its ground in moral cultivation rather than institutional reform. However, the moral self-cultivation proposed in Zhu Xi's learning is not cast simply as a private and personal enterprise of an isolated self. For Zhu Xi, self-cultivation should be pursued through participating in the right learning process, which is also a social and political process.

This article attempts to explain Zhu Xi's idea of sagehood in connection with his new approach to governing the world. Zhu Xi's idea of sagehood is much more complicated and paradoxical than expected. I

3) With regard to the idea of the abdication to the worthiest and the tension between the ideal and reality in Chinese history, see Allan, *The Heir and the Sage: Dynastic Legend in Early China*.

4) Accounts of Zhu Xi's significance in the history of Chinese philosophy that emphasizes his role as an architect of Neo-Confucianism often attenuates his important role in presenting a new alternative to the way of governing the world. However, East Asian societies since Zhu Xi have been seriously influenced by his novel approach to governance, which is one significant reason why his philosophical system had been so appealing to many literati. In fact, his philosophical system cannot be separated from his idea of governance, and this article tries to explain the relationship between two realms.

5) Refer to Hymes and Schirokauer, *Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in Sung Dynasty China*; and Bol, "Neo-Confucianism and Local Society, Twelfth to Sixteenth Century: A Case Study," "The 'Localist Turn' and 'Local Identity' in Later Imperial China," and *Neo-Confucianism in History*; and Min, "The Republic of the Mind: Zhu Xi's Learning (*Xue*) as a Sociopolitical Agenda and the Construction of Literati Society."

6) The studies of Tsuyuhiko Ichiiki, Min Byounghee, and Peter Bol (2010) present the structure of the approach and offer several concrete examples.

pay particular attention to the paradox of “learning to become a sage,” a notion which has recently received detailed attention from several scholars writing about Zhu Xi’s learning.⁷⁾ Although “learning to become a sage” is claimed as the primary purpose of Zhu Xi’s learning, a close examination of Zhu Xi’s texts reveals that he asserted both that in human history no one has ever become a sage through learning and that no one will do so in the future either. How can we explain this paradox of sagehood and learning? If it is impossible for anybody to become a sage through learning, why should we make an effort to become a sage through his learning? What does “learning to become a sage” really mean? What can learning do for us? Why do we still have to learn? As we shall see, the questions surrounding the paradox of “learning to become a sage” are, in fact, closely related to Zhu Xi’s concern with how to govern the world.

2. Zhu Xi’s Paradoxical Position on “Learning to become a sage”

The ultimate purpose of Zhu Xi’s learning is becoming a sage. “If one pursues learning to its ultimate,” he writes, “then one can become a sage. If one does not learn, then one cannot avoid remaining a simple villager. Can one afford not to make an effort?”⁸⁾ *Daoxue* 道學 is premised on the idea that all human beings can become a sage through learning because they are endowed with *li* 理 as their nature. However, to our surprise, Zhu Xi also implies that thus far in human history, no one has yet become a sage through learning. Furthermore, his logic suggests that becoming a sage through learning will never happen either.

Zhu Xi’s commentary on the *Analects* separated Confucius’ learning into two categories: Learning of *li* 理 and learning of concrete affairs like “the names of the objects used in ceremonial and music and the details of historical change.”⁹⁾ Zhu Xi claimed that Confucius did not need to learn in order to understand *li* and that he simply needed “to use unity to connect all things (*yi yi guan zhi* 一以貫之).”¹⁰⁾ The

7) See Kakiuchi, “Shu Ki no keisho no shushakubunken no kenkyu josetsu”; Fujii, “Sodai Dogaku ni okeru seijinkan”; and Makeham, *Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects*.

8) This paragraph is Zhu Xi’s commentary on *Lunyu jizhu* 5:28, *Zhuzi quanshu* 6, 108: “學之至則可以爲聖人 不學則不免爲鄉人而已.”

9) Zhu Xi’s commentary on *Lunyu jizhu* 7:20 reveals the idea. *Zhuzi quanshu* 6, 126: “蓋生而可知者義理爾，若夫禮樂名物古今事變，亦必待學而後有以驗其實也。”

implication of this position is that Confucius must have been born with a preexistent apprehension of *li* and applied it to concrete affairs. Since the final goal of learning in *daoxue* is to apprehend *li* and those who realize *li* are sages, within this view it follows that although Confucius would have needed to learn practical knowledge such as details of rituals and institutions, the sagehood he achieved was not through learning but by virtue of inborn capability.

In his commentary on the famous account in the *Analects* of Confucius' six life stages, Zhu Xi describes a sage as one who "has an innate knowledge and being at ease in realizing them in practice (*sheng zhi an xing* 生知安行)" and argues that no one can become a sage merely through efforts:

I maintained that the sage [Confucius] had an innate knowledge and was at ease in realizing them in practice and everything came without gradual or cumulative advancement. Despite this he never believed that he had already reached this stage. In daily life Confucius alone was able to realize his own advancement which other people could not reach. Accordingly it appeared that he was gradually accumulating learning so that he described himself that way. It was because he wanted students to follow his example as their model for self-motivation and make efforts for learning. It was not the case that he regarded himself as a sage but temporarily showed modesty. All subsequent examples of modesty on Confucius' part are motivated by the same intention.¹¹⁾

In the above passage, Zhu Xi claims that Confucius modestly described himself as one who made progress through learning because he wished to inspire others' learning with his example, not because he felt that it was accurate to explain his own experience of sagehood. Zhu Xi's claim that Confucius was born as a sage and he did not need to attain sagehood through learning follows a view advanced previously by Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107). Cheng Yi also described Confucius as one who was born with innate knowledge and explained Confucius' claim to have reached his stage through learning as designed to encourage later generations to advance their own learning.¹²⁾ According to both Cheng

10) See the context of the idea, see *Zhuzi yulei* 45, *Zhuzi quanshu* 15, 1548: "問 子貢一貫章。曰 聖人也不是不理會博學多識。只是聖人之所以聖，卻不在博學多識。而在一以貫之。今人有博學多識而不能至於聖者，只是無一以貫之。然只是一以貫之，而不博學多識，則又無物可貫。"

11) Zhu Xi's commentary on *Lunyu jizhu* 2:4, *Zhuzi quanshu* 6, 76: "愚謂聖人生知安行固無積累之漸，然其心未嘗自謂已至此也。是其日用之間，必有獨覺其進而人不及知者。故因其近似以自名，欲學者以是為則而自勉，非心實自聖而姑為是退託也。後凡言謙辭之，後凡言謙辭之屬，意皆放此。"

12) Zhu Xi's commentary on *Lunyu jizhu* 2:4, *Zhuzi quanshu* 6, 75-76. Zhu Xi quoted Cheng Yi's explanation of why Confucius pretended to learn.

and Zhu, although learning was effortless for Confucius, he never stopped exhibiting the incremental and cumulative learning process, since he wished to provide a role model for his students and encourage them to make ceaseless efforts.¹³⁾

When scholars posed the question of why Confucius would pursue learning if he was born with innate knowledge, Zhu Xi consistently explained that Confucius “pretended” to learn for other people. Zhu Xi thought that sages have an inborn *qi* 氣 component which is undefiled and inherently different from that of an ordinary human.¹⁴⁾ In his conversation on the *Analects* with students, Zhu Xi made a clear distinction between sages and those who engage in learning (*xuezhe* 學者).

Question: “Exhausting one’s own utmost sincerity (*zhong* 忠), this is the utmost sincerity of those who engage in learning. Then do sages also always make commitment to such utmost sincerity?” Answer: “Those who engage in learning (*xuezhe*) are those who emulate sages but have not reached sagehood yet. Sages are those whose learning reaches the utmost stage. Whereas sages are only [the product of] their nature, those who engage in learning (*xuezhe*) are [through] making efforts. If something is in ones’ nature, it lasts long and does not change. If it is achieved through making efforts, sometimes it could be lost and missed.” And he continues quoting Master Cheng’s words: “Mencius was doing what Confucius did, and exhaustively did that. But yet he had not been able to do just like the sage was doing.” Yang Shi 楊時 (1053-1135) said, “Confucius is similar to a Prefect, and Mencius is similar to an Inspector (*tongpan quanzhou* 通判權州).” This analogy is really good. One can conduct affairs as an Inspector, but it is not as long-lasting as a Prefect.”¹⁵⁾

Zhu Xi believed that even though Mencius was the crucial link in the transmission of *dao* 道, he did not reach the stage of Confucius. Master Cheng, Yang Shi, and Zhu Xi all maintained that Mencius cannot be considered as a sage. Therefore, judging from the gap between ordinary scholars who were far behind Mencius in their learning and born with more defiled *qi*, sagehood should be impossible to achieve. To use John Makeham’s term, Zhu Xi took an “exclusivist” position concerning sagehood.¹⁶⁾

13) Makeham, *Transmitters and Creators*, 217-219.

14) Makeham, *Transmitters and Creators*, 249.

15) *Zhuzi quanshu* 14, 724 (*Zhuzi yulei* 21): “問 盡己之忠，此是學者之忠，聖人莫便是此忠否。曰 固是學者是學聖人而未至者，聖人是為學而極至者。只是一箇自然，一箇勉強爾。惟自然，故久而不變。惟勉強，故有時而放失。因舉程子說 孟子若做孔子事，儘做得，只是未能如聖人。龜山言孔子似知州，孟子似通判權州，此喻甚好。通判權州，也做得，只是不久長。”

16) Makeham, *Transmitters and Creators*, 214-220.

Recently Kakiuchi Keiko 垣内景子¹⁷⁾ and John Makeham¹⁸⁾ analyzed Zhu Xi's view on learning, an issue which plays a very important role in Zhu's commentaries on the *Analects*. Both scholars concluded that Zhu Xi did not believe that sagehood can be achieved through learning. For example, Zhu Xi implied that even the best student of Confucius, Yan Yuan 顏淵, could not achieve sagehood even through diligent study.¹⁹⁾ Although Zhu Xi thought highly of Yan Yuan, he felt that there was still a huge gap between Confucius and Yan Yuan. In his commentaries on the text which states that Yan Yuan did not turn his back on benevolence (*ren* 仁) for three months, Zhu Xi quotes Yin Tun's 尹惇 (1071-1141) remarks that "there was a gap that separated Yan Yuan from the sage. As for the sage, he completely abided by benevolence (*ren*) without any momentary lapse."²⁰⁾ In writings other than the commentaries on the *Analects*, Zhu Xi constantly maintained the same view on sagehood.

Fujii Michiaki's 藤井倫明 study on the *daoxue* 道學 ideas of sagehood among Song 宋 (960-1279) thinkers also confirmed that *daoxue* scholars such as Zhang Zai 張載 (1020-1077), Cheng Yi, and Zhu Xi all revealed paradoxical views on sagehood.²¹⁾ They all placed sagehood in the realm of "nothing (*wu* 無)," "no intention (*wuyi* 無意)," and "non-doing (*wuwei* 無爲)." This seems contradictory, since *daoxue* always emphasized "real existence (*you* 有)" and "doing (*youwei* 有爲)" in contrast to the Buddhist and Daoist positions. Fujii interprets this contradiction by arguing that among *daoxue* thinkers "*wu*" of sages', in fact, presented a strong longing for something constant, unchanging, timeless, and eternal. However, he explains that putting sages in the realms of the eternal and timeless also creates an insurmountable gap between sages and ordinary people. *Daoxue* thinkers placed sagehood in the unreachable realm and at the same time expected all of their students to set sagehood as their final goal for learning. In the long run, this contradictory demand required students to exert unceasing efforts for

17) Kakiuchi, *Shu Ki monjin shūdan keisei no kenkyū*, 28-49.

18) See Makeham, *Transmitters and Creators*.

19) See Zhu Xi's commentary on *Lunyu jizhu* 6:7. *Zhu zi quanshu* 6, 111.

20) Zhu Xi's commentary on *Lunyu jizhu* 6:7. *Zhu zi quanshu* 6, 111: "尹氏曰 此言顏子於聖人未達一問者也 若聖人則渾然無間斷矣." Makeham quotes the similar passage: "Although Confucius was completely selfless (*wuwo* 無我), Yan Yuan merely stopped using "self" to suppress "other"; indeed he still entertained the relative distinction of self and other. Confucius, however, was completely without either self or other" (Makeham, *Transmitters and Creators*, 246).

21) Fujii, "Sodai Dogaku ni okeru seijingkan," 36-49.

learning throughout their lifetime even though such efforts were bound to fail in accomplishing their purported goal.

Zhu Xi clearly claimed that the purpose of learning is to become a sage. However, he simultaneously denied the possibility of being a sage through learning with references to physical and historical realities. For pedagogic and heuristic reasons, Confucius pretended to learn but he did not become a sage through learning. What does this paradox of learning to become a sage mean in the system of the *daoxue* philosophy and what kind of political implication does it have in regard to the relationship between sagehood and governing the world in the *daoxue* agenda? Makeham argues that what legitimated Zhu Xi's project of learning to become a sage was "the pragmatic import of following a path of moral learning rather than the possibility of realizing its ultimate goal."²²) Zhu Xi himself explained this as follows: "These days the important thing in learning is to see how the sages taught people to make an effort."²³) In *daoxue*, encouraging people make a constant effort is the goal of learning. In reality, the closest a person can arrive to sagehood is being "always in process" of learning. This means that the goal of learning to become a sage is not to enable people to actually become sages but to teach people to emulate sagehood. If the goal of learning is to make people learn, this sounds redundant and tautological. However, it shifts the focus of learning and sagehood into a very different direction as it relates to the accomplishment of sagehood. If the significance of learning does not lie in its result but in its process, the meaning of sagehood in the world has also changed. Sagehood, then, is no longer a goal which one can realistically achieve, but an eternal and changeless standard which everyone should make a ceaseless effort to emulate for the duration of their life. Learning thus becomes an all-encompassing and extensive enterprise. If nobody can actually acquire sagehood in the world, the only way to transform the world into one which possesses sagely governance is to make the learning process similar to sagely governance. The shift of the focus of learning onto the importance of its "process" is thus crucial to understanding Zhu Xi's philosophical system.

22) Makeham, *Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects*, 250.

23) I re-quote from Makeham, *ibid.* which is originally the paragraph in *Zhuzi yulei*.

3. Learning to become a sage as an Ongoing Process

For Zhu Xi, the importance of learning lies in the process instead of the result. Zhu Xi emphasized learning as an ongoing lifelong project. As long as one is alive, one should be always engaged in the learning process. Thus, what really matters is not whether one achieves sagehood or not but whether one is in the process of learning or not. In other words, what matters is whether or not they are engaged in the “right” processes. Zhu Xi’s learning to become a sage is actually learning to be “in the process of becoming a sage.” He argued that only his learning could provide the right process for those who aspired to become a sage.

Zhu Xi consistently adopted images of process or processing in order to describe the most crucial concepts in his philosophical system. Furthermore, he resolved many conflicts and contradictions in his philosophical system through defining something as a process in practice instead of a fixed entity. Because human consciousness can be described as something more akin to a flowing stream than to a fixed structure and human cognition is generally treated as a collection of cognitive “processes” rather than a set of components, it seems that thinking everything in terms of process is a natural derivative of the idea system which deals most seriously with human mind, perception, and cognition.

Adopting the image of process as a major metaphor is closely related to another major idea in Zhu Xi’s learning system: the dynamism of life. Zhu Xi’s system is full of images and notions of being alive, living, generating, regenerating and producing. Such images and notions are used for explanations of the core concepts in his philosophical system such as the mind (*xin* 心), *li*, the Supreme Ultimate (*taiji* 太極), and benevolence (*ren* 仁). In Zhu Xi’s thought, the mind is incessantly generating and regenerating (*shengsheng bu qiong* 生生不窮).²⁴⁾ The Supreme Ultimate (*taiji*) is also generating and regenerating (*shengsheng* 生生),²⁵⁾ and the Supreme Ultimate (*taiji*) is *li*.²⁶⁾ *Ren* is the Principle of generating and regenerating (*shengsheng zhi li* 生生之理).²⁷⁾ For Zhu Xi, the world never stops generating, producing, and nurturing life.

24) *Zhu Xi ji* 3, 1375: “Wen Zhang Jingfu 問張敬夫。” “心具衆理 變化感通 生生不窮 故胃之易。”

25) *Zhuzi quanshu* 13: “*Taiji tushu jie* 太極圖說解。”

26) *Zhuzi yulei* 1: “太極只是一箇理字。”

27) *Zhu Xi ji* 6, 3542-3544: “*Renshuo* 仁說。” When Zhu Xi explained “*Renshuo*” in the part in which he accounted for his own works (*Lun zizhushu* 論自注書) in *Zhuzi yulei*, he also expressed the same idea. “仁者天地生物之心。”

Everything is always in process. It is no wonder that many students were puzzled by Zhu Xi's remark that things which are withered and dead (*kugao* 枯槁) also have *li*.²⁸⁾ The predominant image of *li* in Zhu Xi is alive, living and generating in a dynamic process. Therefore, many questions were raised when Zhu Xi stated that the dead tree also has the same *li*. The major concepts of Zhu Xi's philosophy can be defined as a processes and he emphasized that the process should not be interrupted for one moment. It is very plausible that Zhu Xi's idea of learning to become a sage can also be defined as a process of becoming a sage. One function of this is that the learning process itself must be regarded as meaningful and the process of learning ought not to be ceased for one moment either.

It is also fair to say that for Zhu Xi, learning means employing the correct processes which lead to becoming a sage, even though nobody ever becomes a sage in their lifetime through these processes. However, it follows from this that what can be shared by a society is not the result of a sage's moral decisions but things which emerge from the process of being moral. The result of moral decisions could be expressed in the form of institutions or moral judgments. Once good judgments or decisions have been made, they can be observed by others in a more concrete form. In Zhu Xi's system, however, judgments and decisions cannot be imposed from outside oneself. In this case, the way in which sharable norms can be provided for society is by sharing the "process" of becoming a sage rather than through sharing the result of the embodiment of sagehood. The process of becoming a sage is learning. Now the crucial question for how to provide sharable norms for society leads to the question of how we can share the process of learning and produce some common ground in the learning process. The answer to this question determines whether or not Zhu Xi's system can be sustained.

In Zhu Xi's learning process, the "investigation of things" (*gewu* 格物) provides the common ground upon which people can share objective norms. The notion of the investigation of things can be viewed as underpinning the whole system of Zhu Xi's learning. Zhu Xi held that if people cannot find any way to share the processes of their mind, society

28) *Zhuzi yulei* 4 (*Zhuzi quanshu* 14) shows many examples: "問 曾見答余方叔書，以為枯槁有理。不知枯槁瓦礫，如何有理。曰 且如大黃附子，亦是枯槁。然大黃不可為附子，附子不可為大黃。" "問枯槁之物亦有性，是如何。曰 是他合下有此理，故云天下無性外之物。因行街，云階磚便有磚之理。因坐，云 竹椅便有竹椅之理。枯槁之物，謂之無生意，則可 謂之無生理，則不可。如朽木無所用，止可付之爨灶，是無生意矣。然燒甚麼木，則是甚麼氣，亦各不同，這是理元如此。" "問 枯槁有理否。曰 才有物，便有理。天不曾生箇筆，人把兔毫來做筆。才有筆，便有理。"

tends toward anarchy. In order to avoid total anarchy, Zhu Xi suggested that we recognize that the *li* in our minds and the *li* in things in the world are one and the same. The unity, however, cannot be reached at one moment and endure for long because we continuously come into contact with new things as long as we are alive. That is why the investigation of things is more like the “method” of learning rather than the theoretical explanation of the unity. It serves as the foundation for all the steps in the *Great Learning* (*Daxue* 大學) and eventually leads to bringing peace to all under heaven. The “thorough penetration” (*huoran guantong* 豁然貫通) which the investigation of things pursues has a paradoxical problem congruent with that of sagehood. The ultimate goal of the investigation of things, furthermore, of the entire enterprise of Zhu Xi’s learning, is to reach the state of “thorough penetration (*huoran guantong*).”²⁹⁾

When one encounters a situation, one takes up the situation and examines its *li* to the very end. After while there are many [such *li* that one has examined thus], and spontaneously, one can “penetrate thoroughly.”³⁰⁾

This idea of ‘thorough penetration’ is, admittedly, a confusing notion, particularly since it seems to resemble the notion of “sudden enlightenment (*dunwu* 頓悟)” in Chan Buddhism, which is precisely what Zhu Xi argued against. However, Zhu Xi’s “thorough penetration” can be achieved only after gradual accumulation (*jixi* 積習).³¹⁾ That makes the idea of “thorough penetration” much more puzzling.

Today this one item is understood thoroughly and tomorrow that one item is also understood thoroughly. When many [such items] have been accumulated, then one can “penetrate thoroughly.”³²⁾

To reach the ultimate state of penetration, one continuously investigates the *li* of many particular things. However, the *li* that is pursued as the ultimate goal of the thorough penetration is the one universal *li* which all the things in the universe share.³³⁾

29) Concerning the discussion on the investigation of things and “thorough penetration,” see Kim, *The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi*; Kim, ““Analogical Extension” (*leitui*) in Zhu Xi’s Methodology of “Investigation of Things” (*gewu*) and “Extension of Knowledge” (*zhizhi*),” 41-58. I refer to them for the translation in this chapter.

30) *Zhuzi quanshu* 14, 603 (*Zhuzi yulei* 18): “只是才遇一事，即就一事究竟其理，少間多了，自然會貫通。”

31) *Zhuzi quanshu* 14, 599 (*Zhuzi yulei* 18): “積習多後，自然貫通。”

32) *Zhuzi quanshu* 14, 598 (*Zhuzi yulei* 18): “今日格一件，明日又格一件，積習既多，然後脫然有貫通處。”

Although the myriad *li* are simply one *li*, scholars still need to proceed to understand all the thousand ends and hundred beginnings inside the myriad *lis*.³⁴⁾

It is true that for Zhu Xi, thorough penetration requires a moment in which our understanding undergoes a sudden leap, a process which bears at least a superficial similarity to the notion of sudden enlightenment in Chan Buddhism. However, what Zhu Xi advocated was enhancing the achievement of learning through cumulative, incremental effort, a gradual process made up of many smaller realizations. In fact, Zhu Xi explained the investigation of things with reference to probabilities many times:

Now let us talk about it with ten cases. If one can understand seven or eight cases then those two or three cases can be penetrated by means of [their being of the same] kind.³⁵⁾

[Suppose] *Dao* and *li* of one thing has ten portions. If one only sees two or three portions, then one has not seen exhaustively. One must keep extending and must try to see [all] ten portions exhaustively. Only then can it be the investigation of the thing. If one has seen [all] ten portions exhaustively, only then one knows [that one can] stop.³⁶⁾

This view of “thorough penetration,” the ultimate goal of the investigation of things, reminds us of the paradox connected with learning to become a sage examined earlier. Both the promise of being able to become a sage and also reaching the state of thorough penetration empower those who engage in the learning and legitimize the *process* of learning. Furthermore, for Zhu Xi, the goal of the investigation of things in practice is gradual accumulation (*jixi*). Therefore, our ability to find a way to share norms is tied to the process rather than the result of learning.

For Zhu Xi, thorough penetration refers to the moment of the leap from understanding particular principles of things to one universal principle, but is also predicated on the accomplishment of perfect unity between the *li* in things and the *li* in our mind. In Zhu Xi’s idea of the relationship between external world and self, there does not exist a

33) Kim, *The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi*, 19-21.

34) *Zhuzi quanshu* 18, 3691 (*Zhuzi yulei* 117): “萬理雖只是一理，學者且要去萬理中千頭百緒都理會。”

35) *Zhuzi quanshu* 14, 604 (*Zhuzi yulei* 18): “今以十事言之，若理會得七八件，則那兩三件觸類可通。”

36) *Zhuzi quanshu* 18, 475 (*Zhuzi yulei* 15): “一物有十分道理，若只見三分，便是見不盡。須是推來推去，要見盡十分，方是格。既見盡十分，便是知止。”

moment that human beings do not come into contact with the external world. Since human beings cannot be separated from the external world, we must begin anew the process of investigating and understanding a particular thing whenever encountering a new thing, even after one has already experienced the moment of “thorough penetration” in relation to other particular things. Therefore, an instance of thorough penetration cannot be the end of all the endeavors of apprehending *li*. One should start the process anew every time a new object is encountered. Thus the learning based on the investigation of things becomes a never-ending process and lifelong project, as the number of new things to investigate or encounter always exceeds our prior experience.

The paradox of learning to become a sage leads to an emphasis on the process of learning. As I have explained, Zhu Xi’s philosophical system also supports the same conclusion. The crucial notions like the mind, *li*, the Supreme Ultimate, and benevolence in his system are all explicated by images of processes. The investigation of things, the most important theory of learning in his system, has at its core a paradox similar to the one present in learning to become a sage. For Zhu Xi, thorough penetration, the ultimate goal of the investigation of things, cannot be achieved once and for all things as a consequence of learning and must be renewed incessantly. Therefore the learning which is fundamentally based on the investigation of things should be, like the process of becoming a sage, a lifelong process without any moment in which the task has been fully completed. Since the notion of sagehood and learning are both closely related to governing the world in the *daoxue* system, the idea that learning to become a sage is a lifelong process which can never be wholly completed should change the way of governing the world too. In the next section, I will explain how Zhu Xi reintegrated sagehood and statecraft and how sagely governance was presented within this paradoxical learning system.

4. Reintegration of Sagehood and Governing the World Prepared by Confucius

Zhu Xi depicted the antiquity as an ideal world where sages were also rulers, presenting his version of the lineage of *dao* 道 (the Way) in the “Preface to the *Doctrine of the Mean*” as below:

Yao 堯, Shun 舜, and Yu 禹 were great sages among all under heaven, and for them to pass on succession to [rulership of] the world was a major

matter for all under heaven. As great sages performing a major undertaking for all under heaven, on such momentous occasions their repeated admonitions still consisted only of these few words. How then could anything more to be added to this from among all the principles under heaven? Subsequently sages upon sages succeeded one another: King Tang 湯, King Wen 文 and King Wu 武 as rulers, Gao Yao 皋陶, Yi Yin 伊尹, Fu Yue 傅說, the Duke of Zhou 周, and Duke Shao 召 as ministers, received and passed on the succession to *dao*. As for our master Confucius, though he did not attain a position of authority, nevertheless his resuming the learning of the past sages and imparting it to later scholars was a contribution even more worthy than that of Yao and Shun. Still, in his own time those who recognized him were only Yan Hui 顏回 and Zeng Shen 曾參, who grasped and passed on his essential meaning.³⁷⁾

With the exception of Confucius, Zhu Xi's list of sages who passed *dao* includes only rulers and ministers. In antiquity, they received and passed rulership and *dao* simultaneously. Sages governed the world and learning and governance were integrated. Because the world was ruled by sage-rulers and they implemented a perfect system, the institutions that the government employed guaranteed good governance in antiquity. A reason why the world deteriorated into an undesirable situation is difficult to discern in Zhu Xi's texts, but his narrative asserts that the perfect order maintained by the unity of sagehood and political power eventually disappeared. In a world where rulers were no longer sages, a new type of sage appeared. Zhu Xi pointed out that Confucius was different from the other ancient rulers and ministers in that he did not hold an influential governing position during his lifetime. However, Zhu Xi claimed that Confucius' contribution was "even more worthy than that of Yao and Shun" because Confucius provided an alternative for future scholars. Confucius did not hold the deserved position so that "he took the way of the former kings, recited and passed them on to his disciples, to proclaim them to later generations." As Confucius was often regarded as an uncrowned king (*suwang* 素王), Zhu Xi believed that he should have attained the position of a ruler in the world as well. Zhu Xi argued that Confucius should be regarded as a sage not only because he had moral superiority but also because he prepared (or more properly, preserved) knowledge about the proper way to govern the world for later scholars.

In the "Personal Proposals for Schools and Official Recruitment" (*xuexiao gongju siyi* 學校貢舉私議), his famous discussion on the reform

37) *Zhuzi quanshu* 6, 29-30: "Zhonggong Zhangju xu 中庸章句序." "夫堯舜禹天下之大聖也。以天下相傳，天下之大事也。以天下之大聖，行天下之大事而其授受之際，丁寧告戒，不過如此。則天下之理，豈有以加於此哉。自是以來，聖聖相承若成湯文武之為君，皋陶伊傅周召之為臣，既皆以此而接夫道統之傳，若吾夫子，則雖不得其位，而所以繼往聖開來學，其功反有賢於堯舜者。然當是時，見而知之者惟顏氏，曾氏之傳得其宗。"

of the educational and examination system, Zhu Xi portrayed literati (*shi* 士) of the Golden Ages as follows:

In antiquity the method of selecting officials from the schools began with [school] in the villages and communities and reached up to [the Imperial College] at the capital. Students were taught moral conduct and the [six] arts, and those who were worthy and capable were promoted [to become officials.] There was just one place where students were educated, just one means by which they were made officials, and just one method by which they were selected. Therefore, literati (*shi*) had a fixed purpose and suffered no distractions. They made diligent efforts from morning to night and were only concerned about failing in moral cultivation rather than possible failure in attaining office or emoluments ... As a systematic process this could help people to cultivate their minds and nourish their *qi*. Consequently people were able to make progress toward the goal of virtuous conduct. It was for this reason that the ancient system could develop human talents, enrich culture, regulate society's affairs, and bring about great peace. This is not so, however, of the present system.³⁸⁾

According to Zhu Xi's view of the ideal system of antiquity, education, selection of officials, and bureaucracy in the system should all be selected from one source. He states that "there was just one place where students were educated, just one means by which they were made officials, and just one method by which they were selected." There was no other way to attain official positions. Everything was integrated into one perfect system. Through their employment of systematic processes, the ancient institutions could help people to cultivate their minds and nourish their *qi*. Therefore, literati in antiquity would naturally participate in governance; in fact, their participation was guaranteed in part by the government's very system and institutions.

Zhu Xi claimed that governance and learning had ceased to be properly integrated during the dynasties between Confucius and the Cheng brothers. Although government and learning had been united in antiquity, he felt that government failed to provide learning in later times, and claimed that no subsequent periods could equal the Three Dynasties, which he saw as exceptional.³⁹⁾ The exceptional standing of the Three

38) *Zhu Xi ji*, 6, 3632: "古者學校選舉之法，始於鄉黨而達於國都，教之以德行道藝，而興其賢者、能者。蓋其所以居之者無異處，所以官之者無異術，所以取之者無異路，是以士有定志而無外慕，蚤夜孜孜，唯懼德業之不脩，而不憂爵祿之未至……其為法制之密 又足以為治心養氣之助，而進於道德之歸此古之為法所以能 人材而厚風俗，濟世務而興太平也。今之為法不然。"

39) Concerning the topic, Zhu Xi's position is well expressed in the debate between Zhu Xi and Chen Liang 陳亮 (1143-1194) with regard to the unique status of the Three Dynasties and its difference from the later dynasties, see Tillman, *Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch'en Liang's Challenge to Chu Hsi*, 203-206.

Dynasties did not, however, prompt him to propose simply attempting to recover its political institutions and structures. Unlike many *daoxue* thinkers in the Song periods, Zhu Xi believed that such a recovery would be impossible, stating that we cannot achieve good governance simply by recovering the institutional formats of the Three Dynasties and implementing them in the contemporary world. Even as he expressed his admiration and showed great respect for ancient institutions and idealized them, Zhu Xi basically disagreed with proposals made by other of his *daoxue* contemporaries to “recover” them. He was not a part of the institutional “returning to the antiquity” (*fugu* 復古) movement in the Song period, for example. Instead, what Zhu Xi idealized in his portrayal of the Three Dynasties was the way in which the society of the Three Dynasties operated as an organic whole. He felt that the utopian mechanism which antiquity exercised could not be explained simply by the sum of its institutions. By bracketing the Three Dynasties as an inimitable exception to the historical pattern, Zhu Xi liberated Confucian tradition from history and created a new beginning. Furthermore, he foreclosed the possibility of reintegrating sagehood and governing the world as part of a method to recover ancient ideal institutions. Although Zhu Xi never denied the institutional features and functions of governments, he thought that the state was merely a part of the bigger system. He did not believe that institutional approaches alone could successfully reintegrate sagehood and governance.

Zhu Xi insisted that governance (*zheng* 政) and learning (*xue*) should be unified. While he held that no institution can guarantee good governance by itself, he did not oppose the idea that sages should govern the world, however. He believed that if Confucius had lived in the right time, he should have been able to enact governance and teaching together. Although Confucius did not achieve the way in his own life time, Zhu Xi thought that later generations would be able to resume the way through his teachings. Therefore, the way to reintegrate sagehood and governing the world is the “learning” per se prepared by Confucius. Since learning to become a sage is a lifelong process, governing the world is achieved not through the implementation of institutions or emergence of sage-rulers but through a process actively and voluntarily participated in by those who commit to learning to become a sage as their lifelong project.

5. Concluding Remarks: Governance in/as the Learning Process and Paths Untaken

The problem of how sagehood and governing the world could be reintegrated in a real society where political power was clearly separated from sagehood remained a fundamental question for Zhu Xi. There were some easy ways to evade this troublesome question: declaring the present ruler to be a sage-king, enabling those who pursue sagehood to become government officials and exercise power as a minister, or simply by redefining “governing the world” as the practice of moral self-cultivation.

Although many have argued that Zhu Xi realized his political vision through governance by a sagely emperor who cultivates his mind,⁴⁰⁾ I would argue that in fact Zhu Xi does not recommend any of the aforementioned ways to reintegrate sagehood and governing the world. While it is true that Zhu Xi emphasized that rulers should participate in the only “right learning” (meaning the *daoxue* learning), and the self-cultivation of rulers did have enormous implications in governing the world for him, he never relied exclusively on sagely emperors for the enacting of sagely governance.⁴¹⁾ Although a minister-centered governance (*zaixiang zhengzhi* 宰相政治) in which a minister who attempts to embody the *daoxue* vision in real politics and has power to check and control the absolute power of the monarch is also often referred to as the way to reintegrate sagehood and governing the world,⁴²⁾ Zhu Xi’s vision encompasses more than just minister-centered governance. Though Zhu Xi argued that governing the world should be based on moral self-cultivation, this does not mean that he advocated a naive moralist vision which failed to present any actual means to govern the world in the real society.⁴³⁾ This is, in fact, one of the many paths that Zhu Xi did not take.

Rather, Zhu Xi adopted a brand new approach, one which sought to integrate learning and governing the world into a unified process. In so doing, those who participate in his learning could also participate in governance. He designed his learning program as the way in which those who pursue his learning channel their aspiration for political participation into the public realm. Zhu Xi promoted an institutional basis for his

40) For the representative study of this type of perspective, see Yu, *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie: Songdai shidafu zhengzhi wenhua de yanjiu*.

41) See Bol, “On the Problem of Contextualizing Ideas” for a refutation of perspectives like those put forward by Yu Yingshi.

42) For an example of this perspective, see Wang, *Sōdai no kōtei kenryoku to shitaifu seiji*.

43) Min argued against this view.

learning via such organizations as academies, community granaries, and community compacts through which the learning process could be closely related to both public social activity and the political realm.⁴⁴⁾ However, the single most important feature of Zhu Xi's learning process as the way of governing the world was his effort to build powerful networks of literati and to influence public opinion (*gonglun* 公論) through the learning process.

This article examines Zhu Xi's idea of sagehood by focusing on the paradox of learning to become a sage. Zhu Xi's teaching contained a self-contradictory promise: on the one hand, he insisted that every human being has the universal potential to become a sage through learning. On the other, he admitted that in physical and historical reality it is impossible for human being to become a sage through learning, since sages have innate knowledge and their sagehood is an inborn trait (Confucius, for example, was born as a sage). Although the sagehood of Confucius was not achieved through learning, Zhu Xi claimed that Confucius pretended to learn so that other people might emulate his model. The effect of Zhu Xi's resolution of this seeming contradiction is a shift of the emphasis of learning from result to process. In other words, Zhu Xi emphasized learning to be a sage as a lifelong project that should be pursued even though it was impossible to achieve, since the importance of learning to become a sage lies in following a path of moral learning rather than the realizing its ultimate goal. Because learning to become a sage is, in fact, learning to be always in the process of being sage, the functional impact of having sagehood as the goal of his learning is to bind its followers to remaining continually in its process. Other crucial notions within Zhu Xi's philosophical system (such as *li* and the Supreme Ultimate) are also described using the metaphor of process. The investigation of things, the most fundamental basis of his learning, embodied many of the same contradiction as learning to become a sage. The ultimate goal of the investigation of things is perfect penetration, which can never be achieved once and for all, but must be renewed every moment and continually in relation to different things. As with sagehood, what is emphasized most heavily is the learning process. Zhu Xi also claimed that the sagely governance prepared by Confucius is

44) Concerning community compacts, see Übelhör, "The Community Compact (*Hsiang-yüeh*) of the Sung and Its Educational Significance." In regard to academies, see Walton, "The Institutional Context of Neo-Confucianism: Scholars, Schools, and Shu-yüan in Sung-Yuan China"; Walton, *Academies and Society in Southern Sung China*.

his learning *per se*. As a consequence, reintegrating sagehood and governing the world is nothing other than making the learning process coterminous with the governing process. Because it is functionally impossible for any person to actually achieve sagehood through learning, sagehood cannot be practiced as a result of the learning to become a sage. For Zhu Xi, then, there is no other way to reveal sageliness than by performing it in the process of making efforts to become a sage. Because no single person, no matter he is an emperor or minister, can be expected to govern the world as a sage, the world must be governed not by a single individual who has already become a sage but a group of people who have committed to the lifelong project of learning to become a sage. In this way, the paradox of learning to become a sage underpins Zhu Xi's significant new idea for how the world ought to be governed.

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‘聖學’的悖論 ——朱熹是如何將‘聖人之治’與 現實的“經世”再結合的？

閔 丙 禧

中文摘要

本文討論說明的是朱熹針對儒家政治思想中最重要的內容之一的“如何將‘聖人之治’與現實的‘經世’再結合”這一問題所提出的解決方法。針對現實中道德權威與政治權力乖離的問題，朱熹提出了將“聖人之治”與現實“經世”相結合的新的對策。本論文將朱熹新的“經世”觀點及其對聖人的思考結合起來進行了說明，並特別注意到朱熹所提出的“聖學”中所包含的悖論。朱熹一方面認為所有人都具備成聖的普遍潛力，通過“學”都能成聖。但同時另一方面他又指出在現實中與歷史上，從來都沒有人通過“學”而到達過聖人的境界，而且那也是不可能實現的。可見朱熹對於“學”其實持著自相矛盾的觀點。盡管如此，朱熹事實上是通過這一矛盾來啟發人們不要執著於“學”的結果而應該關注“學”的過程。朱熹強調說“學”是一個人應該一生不斷追求的，哪怕是一瞬間也不應該脫離正確的“學”的過程。為了成聖而堅持“學”之所以重要，並不是因為“學”就真的有可能實現成聖這一最終目的，而是因為參與到遵循倫理的正確的學的過程本身才是最重要的。朱熹哲學體系的主要概念和理論中也有很多可以用表現過程的比喻來予以說明的。而且他關於“學”的理論體系中處於最根本地位的“格物”也存在與“聖學”悖論類似的矛盾。在這樣的哲學體系基礎上，朱熹對他關於“經世”構想的說明繼承了孔子的思想，指的是準備好了的“聖王”的“經世”事實上就是“學”本身。朱熹對於“如何才能重新像三代理想時期一樣由聖人來治理天下”這一問題提出了將“學”的過程與“經世”的過程同一化的方法。他認為，不是由一個完美無缺的聖人來治理天下，而是通過讓更多的人參與到為了成聖而終身獻身於“學”的過程中來這一辦法才能夠真正參與到“經世”的過程中。

關鍵詞：朱熹，聖人，經世，過程，聖學的悖論，聖人之治與經世的再結合

A Logical Mechanism of Justifying the Sustainability of Social Networks in the Neo-Confucian School of Cheng-Zhu 程朱學

KIM Yon-jae

Abstract

This paper examines how a system of justice can be established in the Neo-Confucian School of Cheng-Zhu 程朱學 from the perspective of social networks. The keyword is the principle of sustainability, which stems from the ecological concept of “sustainable development.” For Neo-Confucianists, the world, which is represented as myriad things under heaven and on earth, is a coherent whole with a certain origin and unitary processes. This world-view is reflected in the sustainable operations of its social structure. The process of justifying the sustainability within this worldview can be approached from three categories: *tianli* 天理 (Heavenly Principle), *tiyong yiyuan* 體用一源 (one source of substance and function), and *liyi fenshu* 理一分殊 (one Principle and its multiple manifestations). One source of legitimacy in this system is expressed under the concept of the “Heavenly Principle.” In Neo-Confucian thought, it provides the basis for justice in human relations. Its mode of changeability is expressed as “one source of substance and function,” which provides an organic quality of appropriateness to the human social relationships. As a result, the structure in which relationships are sustained is sometimes expressed as “one Principle and its multiple manifestations.” It provides a holistic unity to the orientation of social networks. These three categories reciprocally support one another, but the first two are integrated into the

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third (*liyi fenshu*). In particular, the third works implicitly as the basis for positing a unified total system, in the sense that the same principle is seen as being comprehensively maintained in several complex individual relationships. Here, the ecological concept of sustainability provides several useful suggestions for explicating a logical mechanism of justification within a Neo-Confucian system. The structure of sustainability can be symbolized as a web of social networks, according to which members in a community are suited to play their roles in each field and, on this basis, bring forth their maximal productive activity. Such a model preserves an open horizon of coexistence and cooperation for newly emergent order within a series of integral relationships between person and community, knowledge and practice, ideal and reality, etc. The Neo-Confucian system, therefore, concentrates upon a principle of “reality” rather than upon one of “entity.” Neo-Confucianists, while diverse in their thought, tended to share a common way of thinking within a social network. In a reality characterized by incessantly changing processes, they constructed a sound system for a moral canon of justice oriented toward self-realization (*ziwo shixian* 自我實現). As a consequence, the Neo-Confucian world-view has a logical, sustainable mechanism for both moralizing justice and justicizing morality.

Keywords: sustainability, Heavenly Principle, one source of substance and function, one Principle and its multiple manifestations, justice, modes of change, structure of social networks

1. An Awareness of the Neo-Confucian Issues and Its Arguing Point

One of the main concerns for our shared human future is how well the global village can be integrated with natural environments. Our ability to do so is closely associated with the existence of life, continuous growth, balanced prosperity, a stable way of life, etc. In recent years, many branches relating to this topic have converged under a single rubric, namely, the idea of “sustainable development.”¹⁾ Although “sustainable development” is closely associated with the issue of how economic development can occur within the bounded constraints of ecological environments or made compatible with natural conservation, its implications touch upon all areas of human activities like natural science, economics, sociology, philosophy, and so on.

The essay focuses upon exploring how a system of justice can be established from the perspective of social networks in the Neo-Confucian school of Cheng-Zhu 程朱學.²⁾ The key is the principle of sustainability which stems from the ecological concept of “sustainable development.” Sustainability, whether it is that of economic development or that of an ecosystem’s operations, is an important key to setting up lasting relationships. Our ecological environments themselves have self-control systems, in which the input of elements cannot exceed the capacity of the whole to accommodate these elements. These self-control systems continually adjust (and are adjusted by) the conditions within which various organisms interact, generally seeking to establish both balance in change and change in balance. A similar understanding can be applied to human activities. Human activities are basically constituted into a web of relations, a social network composed of individuals and their surroundings, both natural and social.³⁾ In seeking to

1) The term “sustainable development” has a particular history. In 1970s, a slogan of “Only One Earth” was proposed in the UN Conference on the Human Environment. Early in 1980s, the term of “eco-development” was suggested in the Environmental Plan of UN. The term “sustainable development” derived from the 1987 UN report “Our Common Future.” It seeks to explore the delicate relationship between the natural environment and economic and social growth, and is specifically concerned with whether the community pursues social growth which also seeks to protect and preserve the natural environment. In 1992, the term was expanded to “environmentally sound and sustainable development” in the Rio Conference on the Human Environment in Brazil, though I will use the shorter formulation throughout this essay.

2) This topic provides a new way of thinking about the modernization of Neo-Confucianism. There has been no established study on this topic to date.

explain those social networks within which we conduct our lives within the global village, therefore, such social variations can be expanded into a sustainable regularity, and a mechanism of balance and change can be converted into the principle of sustainability.

The principle of sustainability, though stemming from an ecological field, can be understood as analogous to the organic structure of social networks since it relates both to how individuals live their lives within a social network and conversely how a social network continually supports individuals and their lives.⁴⁾ Therefore, the principle of sustainability can be explored in two dimensions: what it means to seek the value of a human life and how to actualize that value. The two are neither mutually exclusive nor independent but exist in the same line of continuity. As cultural beings with beliefs and values, human beings live their lives in a complicated web of populations, economics, energy, information, structures, etc., a fact which, when considered, greatly widens the belt of consensus. A conceptual application of “sustainability” to human lives, thus, is particularly significant because it orients us toward an open horizon of “globalization,”⁵⁾ which can be expressed as a structural way of coexistence and cooperation in the world. Throughout history, the solidity of human relationships have primarily been based upon such a series of social, economic, political, and cultural interactions. A community, as a specific crystallization of particular human relationships, can be characterized as an integrated system in which parts functionally adjust to the whole, and vice versa. The Neo-Confucian community is not exceptional in this regard. For Neo-Confucianists, how such an integrated system could be maintained in a community was a kind of barometer for its efficiency and soundness. This view is basically inspired by an emphasis on achieving the self-realization that a variety of human activities are secured in other lives and an awareness that all members of the community can cultivate their own unique selves, each capable of orienting itself toward the utopian community called *datong* 大同 (great harmony).

During the Song 宋 dynasty, especially in the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Neo-Confucianists experienced one of the greatest transformations in history. It was a kind of turn within Post-Confucianism (or what is called Neo-Confucianism) and was driven by their laudable

3) De Bary, “Individualism and Humanitarianism in Late Ming Thought,” 145-150.

4) Yang, “Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureaucratic Behavior,” 134-164.

5) The term is referred to as an expression of a harmonious unity of globalization and locality, which reflects an ideal oriented toward a larger and higher community.

desire to restore classical Confucianism. These thinkers shared a belief in the possibility of developing an integrated system which would be capable of filling up the large disjunction that had been made between social, political and economical practices on the one hand and cultural identities on the other.⁶⁾ Their system entailed maintaining a hierarchical class structure consisting of the ruling and the ruled, and they consequently emphasized those moral commitments which they believed to be necessary for the functioning of a traditionally hierarchical social network. In doing so, they incessantly sought to institutionalize the moral canon of classical Confucianism on the highest level of universal ultimacy (*gongji* 窮極), which is characteristic of identity, coherence, consistency, interconnectedness, continuity, harmony, wholeness, etc.⁷⁾

With regard to the establishment of Neo-Confucianism, we can raise a few questions: Why should Neo-Confucianists seek new values for their lives? Are there any values which might make their lives happier, and if so, how do they define them for the purpose of reconstructing Confucianism? How might these values enable them to achieve a higher quality of living? How might they constitute a Neo-Confucian system of orthodoxy? These questions are closely associated with thoughtful approaches towards comprehending a Neo-Confucian ideal of social networks and justifying their sustainability.

Against the grave challenge of Buddhism and Taoism, Neo-Confucianists faced the challenging of developing a new world-view capable of overcoming the discrepancy between the ideal and the real. They constructed a foundation upon which was laid the axiological scheme of *daoxue* 道學 (Learning of the Way).⁸⁾ From a cosmological perspective, they posited the existence of virtues shared in common between “*tiandao* 天道” (heavenly way) and “*rendao* 人道” (humane way), and claimed that these virtues also dwell in the inner essence of human existence, that is, that they are fundamental to human nature. According to their view, human value is legitimated through a holistic integration of the heavenly and the humane way. This integration is a universal ideal referred to by the expression “*tianren heyi* 天人合一” (unity of heaven and man) and is posited as the final stage of self-realization, namely, the ultimate goal of “*neisheng waiwang* 內聖外王” (inner sagehood and outer kingship). In concretizing *daoxue* 道學, thus, there is no sharp distinction

6) Smith, et al., *Sung Dynasty Uses of the I Ching*, 3-5.

7) Kim, *The Yijing Theories and Moralistic Metaphysics of Neo-Confucian Schools of Lixue and Xinxue in Song-Ming Dynasties*, 2-3.

8) De Bary, *Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart*, 1-17.

between human existence and its value, between subject and object, between human beings and their environmental conditions, or even between transcendence and immanence, which, until now, has usually been regarded as one of the chief characteristics of East Asian thought and culture.

Neo-Confucianists also attached great importance to the world's ecological unity. They recognized the world as participating in the biological processes of production and transformation, and inquire into the original source of all things and the constitution of nature in an ever-changing world. The world of all creation, which is representative of myriad things under heaven and on earth, is a coherent whole with a certain origin and unitary processes. An unfolding process of production and transformation is reflected in the operation of a hierarchical structure to make the Confucian orthodoxy of *daotong* 道統 (succession of the Way), and is applied to a just and great cause for social networks. And furthermore it is comprehensively categorized into an ideal of unity within which mutually sustaining relationships between the self and the others and the self and the government are maintained and extended in a certain way.⁹⁾ The world-view of the Cheng-Zhu school exhibits a particularly strong tendency towards the idealization and quest for such an identical unity. Crucial to an understanding of this worldview is “*tianli* 天理” (the Heavenly Principle) or “*li* 理” (Principle). For adherents of this school, the Heavenly Principle represented a moral cause of justice which is primarily oriented toward an ideal of sagehood as it was manifest in antiquity. Neo-Confucianists thought that the principle was fully manifest in the antiquity of the Zhou 周 dynasty but was no longer recognizable in their contemporary community. Since their goals was to realize a perfect community of integrated order which resembled the one they identified in “the Rituals of the Zhou (*zhoulǐ* 周禮),” they placed new ideological weight on certain aspects of the thought of Confucius, Mencius, and the sages, and advanced a particular method for transforming the self through learning, and furthermore for transforming government into an effective instrument for serving the common interest. This capacity for transformation can be expressed through the notion of *tiyong yiyuan* 體用一源 (one source of substance and function). As a result, Neo-Confucianists sought to establish a common, sustainable structure for all networks, social and otherwise, namely that *liyi fenshu* 理一分殊 (the Principle is one and its manifestations are many). For these

9) De Bary, *Learning for One's Self: Essays on the Individual in Neo-Confucian Thought*, 71-97.

thinkers, all things, including human beings, have the same unity of principle, even while enjoying particular (and differing) roles in individual relationships. Such a unity is conceptualized as the Supreme Ultimate (*taiji* 太極) and was believed to employ incessant processes of balancing between *yin* 陰 and *yang* 陽, movement (*dong* 動) and stillness (*jing* 靜), etc., which are recognized as the sources of heaven and earth and the fundamentals of the myriad things. It is comprehensively elevated to an organic cosmos ultimately to provide the full endowment of innate coherence for the world.¹⁰⁾ From the perspective of such a universal unity, human community can support social value and its realization, especially as it relates to moral obligations, like one's rights and duties. In this respect, it is possible to say that the concept of sustainability has all manner of implications when one considers a logical mechanism for justifying systems of Neo-Confucianist thought.

2. *Tianli* 天理 as an Ideal of Justice

One of the most crucial concepts for an understanding of the Neo-Confucian system of integrity is that of the "Heavenly Principle." This idea, first presented by Cheng Hao 程顥, is used to prescribe a kind of original and creative order in the heavenly body and thereby to probe into the natures and grounds of myriad things in the world. The notion is not only representative of a turn from cosmology to ontology, as scholars like John Henderson have pointed out,¹¹⁾ it also provides an ideal of justice for a social network which comprises a whole and healthy community.

To begin with, Cheng Hao draws attention to the word "*sheng* 生" (generation), which has a clear biological flavor. *Sheng* is the natural law which creates and transforms all things under heaven and on earth. Cheng writes:

"To generate over and over again, which is called Changes." This is the ground that heaven is the Way. Heaven simply regards generation as the Way. What succeeds to the principle of generation is goodness. Goodness has the implication of origin. "Origin is the head of goodness." Myriad things have all the significance of spring, which is that "what succeeds to it is goodness."¹²⁾

10) In general, a belief in unity was pervaded over the Neo-Confucian society. Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History*, 194-217.

11) Henderson, *The Development and Decline of Chinese Cosmology*, 119-136.

For Cheng Hao, all changes in the world can be characterized as the Heaven Way. In the world, the processes of “generation” are referred to as a natural course (*ziran* 自然), which can be envisioned as functioning like a circle of life. It has the quality character of producing itself in the sense of having a primordial beginning or source, from which things start to grow up. In the sense of the succession or continuity of organismic process that all things spontaneously unify one another in self-generating lives,¹³⁾ therefore, it is characterized by a virtue of “goodness” and is conceptualized into the law of Nature without any intention or consciousness,¹⁴⁾ Cheng Hao refers to this as “*shengli* 生理” (principle of generation) or “*chunyi* 春意” (generating function of spring). Cheng Hao asserts that there must exist a creative way of naturally producing all things, and prescribes it as the ecological law which justifies the existence of all things and especially supports the legitimacy of human beings. His position provides a basis for conceptualizing the Heavenly Principle.

Where can we find the deductive ground of the Heavenly Principle? Cheng Yi 程頤 answers the question by precisely analyzing the Heavenly Principle into an abstract stratum. He combines a term of the Way with an attribute of heaven, one which has the characteristic of the being strong and vigorous, in maintaining a process of its own creation. The Heavenly Way implies that all things proceed strongly and ceaselessly in their own way. Cheng Yi writes:

Now, there is a series of processes of creating in spring and growing in summer. These all are what results from the generation of the Way, and then there is a process of creation and growth. It is not true that the Way is such that the vital force, firstly, already generated and then there is a process of creation and growth. The Way generates myriad things again and again as naturally as it is in itself and is ceaseless.¹⁵⁾

The paragraph can best be understood within the context of Cheng Hao's

12) “Er xiansheng yu shang 二先生語二上,” *ErCheng yishu* 2:a: “生生之謂易，是天之所以為道也。天只是以生為道，繼此生理者即是善也。善便有一箇元底意思，元者善之長，萬物皆有春意，便是繼之者善也。”

13) Tu, *Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation*, 37-41.

14) In this sense, he says, “I deal with things by themselves, not by myself, and so it is non-myself. …… The Heavenly Way is like this. How can we go against it?” (“Mingdao xiansheng yuyi 明道先生語一,” *ErCheng yishu* 11: “以物待物，不以己待物，則無我也。… 天理如此，豈可逆哉?”)

15) “Yichuan xiansheng yuyi 伊川先生語一,” *ErCheng yishu* 15: “今夫春生夏長了一番。皆是道之生，後來生長，不可道卻將既生之氣，後來卻要生長。道則自然生生不息。”

notion of “generation.” He regards the Way as a universal network which contains the regularity of creation and transformation, according to which all things undergo a process of birth and growth in and by itself, a process that they undertake in themselves in a fashion which is as natural to itself as the Way is to itself. Most importantly, it can be understood as a process of completion that myriad things have their own respective ways, and that each of these different ways are provided for within the larger law of Nature. For example, in Cheng Yi’s view, the Way works as a law of networks by which all things maintain or continue their existences via continual processes of creation and transformation. In explaining the circular process of ䷗ *fugua* 復卦 (Restoration hexagram),¹⁶⁾ he applies a law of “shengsheng zhi li 生生之理” (the principle of generating over and over again) to the heavenly rule of creating and transforming all things. From this, he proposes the deductive inference that “a thing attains at the extremity of changing and then necessarily returns to the beginning. The principle is necessary to be like this.”¹⁷⁾ The principle reflects interchangeable, ongoing processes, like flourishing and decline or the going out and coming in of yin and yang. It entails things generating as naturally as it [the Way] is, and is compared to the phenomenal progress of the year, that is, a just and naturally ordained cycle of birth, growth, exhaustion, and rebirth under heaven and on earth. Therefore, the Heavenly Principle provides an ideal of justice for the observed reality that all things create and transform themselves in their own ways.

Furthermore, Zhu Xi is of the opinion that, in the more advanced level of “generation,” there is a constitutive way of the original substance and its *luxing* 流行 (stream). He uses the relationship of *taiji* 太極 (Supreme Ultimate) and *yin-yang* to explain one mode of the Heavenly Way.¹⁸⁾

16) In the Fu hexagram, yang returns below five yin lines, which it will gradually supplant. According to the Commentary of Xugua 序卦傳, when yang is stripped to the extreme above, it returns to be born below. This is how Fu hexagram follows Bo Gua 剝卦 (Deterioration hexagram). It is a process of decreasing yin and increasing yang according to a balancing principle of yin and yang, from ䷵ *gugua* 姤卦 (Temptation hexagram) through ䷶ *dungua* 遯卦 (Retreatment hexagram), ䷋ *fougua* 否卦 (Stagnation hexagram), ䷓ *guangua* 觀卦 (Contemplation hexagram), ䷧ *bogua* 剝卦 (Deterioration hexagram), ䷁ *kungua* 坤卦 (Reception hexagram), to ䷗ *fugua* (Restoration hexagram).

17) “Yichuan xiansheng yuyi,” *ErCheng yishu* 15: “物極必返，其理須如此。”

18) Yu, “The Great Ultimate and Heaven in Chu Hsi’s Philosophy,” 79-115.

The original substance of the Way cannot be seen. To observe it, one can see the substance of non-substance. For example, *yin-yang* and *wuxing* 五行 (Five Elements) are the substances of Supreme Ultimate.¹⁹⁾

Substance, as a quality of the Way, has two aspects. One of these aspects is original like the Supreme Ultimate, while the other aspect is unfolded like *yin-yang* and the Five Elements. The former, as the original substance, makes its individual way through the manifestation of the latter as the secondary substance. In particular, the relationship between the invisible original substance and its individual way constitutes the principle of generation that gives existence to all things. Zhu Xi describes the relationship as follows:

Therefore, the ultimacy of the substance of the Way is called the Supreme Ultimate, and the stream of the Supreme Ultimate is called the Way. Although they have two names, their origin does not have two substances.²⁰⁾

The Heavenly Way is described as a stream of *yin* and *yang* or movement and stillness. The most ultimate substance of the Heavenly Way is called the Supreme Ultimate and its individual manifestations are expressed as a stream. Zhu Xi writes, "That the Supreme Ultimate has movement and stillness is the stream of the heavenly mandate and is so-called one *yin* and one *yang* are called the Way."²¹⁾ The Supreme Ultimate, as the original substance, is also a creative principle, naturally producing all things, and its "stream," which has the quality of the heavenly mandate, is the law of justifying the existence of all things. And so the Supreme Ultimate is the principle of *yin* and *yang*, and its stream is revealed in the heavenly mandate.²²⁾

For Zhu Xi, all things under the heaven and on earth should be considered to be expressions of the Supreme Ultimate in the sense of their ultimate origin, and as *yin-yang* and the Five Elements in the sense of their unfolding type. While the Supreme Ultimate, *yin-yang*, and the Five Elements are all different aspects of the original substance, Zhi Xi

19) *Zhuzi yulei* 36: "道之本然之體不可見，觀此則可見無體之體，如陰陽五行爲太極之體。"

20) "Da luzijing 答陸子靜," *Zhu Xi ji* 36: "故語道體之至極則謂之太極，語太極之流行則謂之道，雖有二名初無二體。"

21) Zhu, *Taiji tushuo jie*: "太極之有動靜，是天命之流行也，所謂一陰一陽之謂道。"

22) Concerning the philosophical methodology of Cheng-zhu school, refer to Kim, *The Yijing Theories and Moralistic Metaphysics of Neo-Confucian Schools of Lixue and Xinxue in Song-Ming Dynasties*, 124-135.

claims that they do not just share the simple genetic relationship of production or creation like physically timely order. He emphasizes a reality of originality, creativity and transformation, and conceptualized it into a metaphysical rule through his notion of the original substance and its unfolding stream.

For the Neo-Confucian school of Cheng-Zhu, thus, the Heavenly Principle is the law by which all existing things in the real world operate. We can even say that it provides the foundational idea of justice necessary to make a sustainable ruling system in the Neo-Confucian world-view.

3. *Tiyong yiyuan* 體用一源 as a Holistic Mode of Change

Cheng Yi generalizes the idea of the Heavenly Principle into a mode of change. The mode of change is none other than the famous proposition that “*tiyong yiyuan xianwei wujian* 體用一源，顯微無間” (substance and function are of one source, and there is no difference between the manifest and the hidden). The proposition that “one source of substance and function are of one source” is a kind of deductive rule drawn from a holistic understanding of the world, and thus provides a ground for prescribing the unitary nature of all existences in a network of reality. Cheng Yi concretizes this proposition into more applied relationships, as when he writes:

The most manifest is no other than the affair, and the most hidden is no other than the Principle. Therefore, the Principle and the affair are identical, and the manifest and the hidden are of one source.²³⁾

According to Cheng’s deductive logic, all things possess the doubled aspect of both *li* 理 (Principle) and *shi* 事 (affair). The Principle is the ground of all existence, while the affair is their specific type, that is, the exterior form assumed by the general principle. It is the relationship between the two, between the general and the specific, which constitutes the living reality of existence. Cheng Yi further writes:

“They are calm and unmoved, and respond and finally penetrate as a whole.” This implies that one already differentiates the affair from the

23) “Yichuan xiansheng yushiyi,” *ErCheng yishu* 25: “伊川先生語十一，至顯者莫如事，至微者莫如理，而事理一致，微顯一源。”

Principle. If one mentions the Way, myriad Principles are already equipped in it, and so one does not discuss the distinction of the responded (*gan* 感) and the unresponded (*weigan* 未感) anymore.²⁴⁾

A single affair is characteristic of the creation and transformation of all things, and as the general principle takes its operation within it, there is no distinction or separation as there is in the dichotomy of the responded and the unresponded. The principle and the affair, therefore, have such a unitary relationship that they are distinct but inseparable, like a pairing of “*ben* 本” (the main) and “*mo* 末” (the subsidiary). From such a relationship, he draws a significant conclusion:

It doesn't need to be necessary that Changes are the affair. If one, in doing an affair, does the Heavenly Principle to the fullest, it is none other than Changes.²⁵⁾

Here, the affair, which is characterized as the content of human activities, participates in the larger general category of human nature. The specific activity can be thought as an ontological type of which exists in accordance with the Heavenly Principle, in that the Heavenly Principle is concretized or manifest in all things, including human nature. Thus, since it is the case that the Heavenly Principle is prevalent in the existences of all things in the world, the unity of the Principle and the affair necessarily exist in human activities. This is the key foundation necessary for establishing “*libenlun* 理本論” (Doctrine of Principle as the substance), which the Neo-Confucian school of Cheng-Zhu advocates as the great Golden Rule.

How then does Zhu Xi explain the deductive relationship of the Principle and the affair? Commencing with Cheng Yi's standpoint of “*yi yuan* 一源” (one source) and “*wu jian* 無間” (no difference), Zhu Xi analyzes how and on what ground the Supreme Ultimate reveals itself. He contends that while the Supreme Ultimate reveals itself as the Principle prevalent in the unfolding course such that one *yin* and one *yang* or one movement and one stillness wholly correspond to each other, it itself is not *yin* and *yang* or movement and stillness. This has a purpose of mentioning a relationship of the substance and its stream through the paired terms “substance-function” or “*xingershang zhi dao* 形

24) “Yichuan xiansheng yuyi,” *Ercheng yishu* 15: “寂然不動，感而遂通，此已言人分上事，若論道，則萬理皆具，更不說感與未感。”

25) “Er xiansheng yu shang,” *Ercheng yishu* 2:a: “不要將易又是一個事，卽事盡天理，便是易也。”

而上之道” (the way above the physical realm) and “*xingerxia zhi qi* 形而下之器” (things with physical shapes). From the standpoint of “*tiyong* 體用” (substance and function), the Supreme Ultimate is the ultimate principle of making no distinction between movement and stillness, whereas, from the standpoint of “*xianwei* 顯微” (the manifest and the hidden), it is the unfolded affair of making a distinction between movement and stillness.²⁶⁾ Therefore, the relationship between the general principle and the specific affair has a kind of organic type in the relationship of “one source” or “no difference.” Furthermore, he explains the character of such a type comprehensively:

It is right that the Supreme Ultimate includes movement and stillness (according to the comment, it is called the original substance). It is right that the Supreme Ultimate has movement and stillness (according to the comment, it is called stream). However, if the Supreme Ultimate is said to be movement and stillness, then, it makes no distinction of what is above shapes and what is within shapes. In that case, the phrase that “there is the Supreme Ultimate in Changes” is not necessary.²⁷⁾

The Supreme Ultimate itself is characteristic of the principle of movement and stillness, not the specific instance of movement and stillness, and the specific instance wholly rests on the principle. The Supreme Ultimate itself cannot be moving or still, but encompasses the Principle which makes its own way of being wholly moving and still. Zhu Xi refers to a “stream” of the Heavenly Way as the characteristic method by which the Supreme Ultimate reveals its own substance. The Supreme Ultimate, as the original substance, can make its own revelation of stream. Thus, the view of the original substance of Supreme Ultimate and its stream are conceptualized into the organic mode of the one source of substance and function and no difference of the manifest and the hidden.

Furthermore, Zhu Xi explains the significance of such a unity by exploring the relationship between the Principle and the vital force. The Principle and the vital force are different, in that one is “*xingershang* 形而上” (metaphysical) and the other “*xingerxia* 形而下” (physical); but, Zhu Xi claims they are not temporally ordered in terms of their production:

26) Chan, *Chu Hsi: New Studies*, 222-234.

27) “Da Yangzizhi 答楊子直,” *Zhu Xi ji* 45: “蓋謂太極含動靜則可(自注：以本體而言也)，謂太極有動靜則可(自注：以流行而言也)，若謂太極便是動靜，則是形而上下者不分，而易有太極之言亦贅矣。”

It is possible to say that the Principle and the vital force originally have no distinction of before and after. But, from an inference, it seems that the Principle is before and the vital force is after.²⁸⁾

While simple inference seems to suggest that the Principle is prior to the vital force, Zhu Xi insists that from the standpoint of a unity of original substance, no simple distinction in terms of production time can be made between them. He says in a metaphorical way:

The Supreme Ultimate is the Principle, and movement and stillness are the vital forces. The vital force is on going, and so is the Principle, too. Both of them are dependent on each other and are never divided respectively. The Supreme Ultimate is like a man, and movement and stillness are like a horse.²⁹⁾

This paragraph means that, for Zhu Xi, the Principle and the vital force have a relationship of undividable necessity. The Principle and the vital force are necessarily mentioned together and exist in a relationship of reciprocity, with the Principle, as the original substance of Supreme Ultimate, revealing itself in an unfolding way through the manifestations of the vital force. In their relationship, it is important to note Zhu Xi's insistence that the vital force manifests itself only according to the Principle. For this reason, Zhu says,

It is possible to say that this originally has no distinction of before and after. However, if we infer from their belonging, it should be said that there is this Principle firstly. Nevertheless, the Principle is not something different, but something which exists in this vital force. If this vital force did not exist, then this Principle would not have a dependent place.³⁰⁾

While it is possible to say that the Principle is prior to the vital force, they both are wholly necessary to each other and depend on each other for their existence, or as Zhu Xi claims, "In the world, there is no vital force without the Principle, and there also is no Principle without the vital force."³¹⁾ This is because the relationship of the two is based upon an organic relationship of the original substance of Supreme Ultimate and its unfolding way. Both have their origin in each other: the Principle

28) *Zhuzi yulei* 1: "理與氣本無先後之可言。但推上去時，如理在先，氣在後相似。"

29) *Zhuzi yulei* 94: "太極，理也。動靜，氣也。氣行則理亦行，二者常相依而未嘗相離也。太極猶人，動靜猶馬。"

30) *Zhuzi yulei* 1: "此本無先後之可言。然必欲推其所從，則須說先有是理。然理又非別爲一物，即存乎是氣之中。無是氣，則是理亦無掛搭處。"

31) *Zhuzi yulei* 1: "天下未有無理之氣，亦未有無氣之理。"

serves as the ground of the vital force, and, as for the unfolding way, the vital force serves as the revelation of the Principle. As the original substance of Supreme Ultimate, the Principle must serve as the prior ground of the vital force, meaning that in one sense the vital force falls into a subsidiary function subordinate to the Principle. But Zhu's main interest is showing how their mutual dependence establishes fundamental principles, as he concludes: "If there is this principle, there should be this vital force. But the Principle is fundamental."³²⁾ From this we see that his larger aim is applying the view of the original substance of the Supreme Ultimate and its unfolding way to the essential and unitary relationship of the principle and the vital force.³³⁾

Consequently, the Neo-Confucian idea of "one source of substance and function" has all kinds of implications which flow from the way it understands the reality of the world: implications which touch on the unification of community as well as the particularity of its members and the ideal shape of their relationships. The Cheng-Zhu School positively accepts holistic modes of changeability in order to justify the necessity of an absolute canon in the organized unity of the Neo-Confucian system.

4. *Liyi fenshu* 理一分殊 as a Sustainable Structure of Network

Using the doctrine of *liyi fenshu* 理一分殊 (one Principle and its multiple manifestations) to construct a theory of unity of identity and difference, Cheng Yi gives an explanation for self-evident facts about the world. For him, everything is composed of the two vital forces of yin and yang and the existence of things requires a continual balancing of the forces. In Cheng's worldview, opposite phenomena, like male and female, are naturally drawn together into one unity. Therefore, all the things of the world naturally form types with each other according to their apportionment of yin and yang. Such types are not merely a means for classifying things by groups. More fundamentally, they manifest the orderliness that naturally occurs within the network of heaven and earth. For Cheng, this orderliness is characteristic of the harmonious unity of differences. In their concrete manifestations, things may have multiple distinctions and perform many different roles, but the Principle remains

32) *Zhuzi yulei* 1: "有是理便是氣，但理是本。"

33) Lokuang, "Chu Hsi's Theory of Metaphysical Structure," 58-78.

unitary in that their differences are subtle and related within a unifying system. This unified system constitutes a kind of network under heaven and on earth, in human relations, and among all living things.

Cheng Yi argues that the true functioning of society is similar to the functioning of *yin* and *yang*. Indeed, he viewed the sage's actions as identical to such physical processes as natural cycles of growth and decline. He felt that human beings should have imperatives to act according to the Principle that the physical world is structured in a natural hierarchy. For him, this principle also explains the basis of social solidity and the efficiency of its organic system. For Cheng Yi, how human relationships are going on for a community of higher class implicitly includes a way to accomplish the harmonious unification and distinctive difference of all things in a universal network. Concerning the understanding of *Tuan-zhuan* 彖傳³⁴⁾ of 睽卦 *kuigua* 睽卦 (Opposition hexagram), he says:

Extend the sameness in the Principle of things to illuminate the timely use of Kui. This is the way the sage unites differences. It is commonly known how sameness is the same. A sage, however, illuminates the fundamental sameness in the Principle of things. Thereby he can take the world as being the same, and harmonize and unite the myriad types.³⁵⁾

This shows how to understand the world from the implied meaning of Kui Gua. The world is a dynamic system in which we can observe great diversity in unity and great unity in diversity. Therefore, he says:

Living things have myriad differences that set them apart. But in attaining the harmony of heaven and earth and in receiving the vital forces of *yin* and *yang*, they form corresponding types. Therefore, though the vast of the world and groups of things are differently set apart, a sage can unite them.³⁶⁾

Here Cheng Yi claims that while things appear to be disparate and unconnected by virtue of their differences, these differences are actually fundamentally connected and united by type. Distinctions between things are both real and fundamentally ordered by type; in other words, the

34) "Heaven and earth are set apart but their affairs are the same. Male and female are set apart, but their aspirations comprehend each other's. The myriad things are set apart, but their affairs are ordered by types. The timely uses of Kui are great indeed!"

35) *Zhouyi chengzhi zhuan* 2: "推物理之同, 以明睽之時用, 乃聖人合睽之道也。見同之爲同者, 世俗之知也。聖人則明物理之本同, 所以能同天下而和合萬類也。"

36) *Zhouyi chengzhi zhuan* 2: "生物萬殊, 睽也, 然而得天地之和, 稟陰陽之氣, 則相類也。物雖異而理本同, 故天下之大, 群生之衆, 睽散萬殊, 而聖人爲能同之。"

sage is able to perceive differences which really (and naturally) exist between high and low, father and son, ruler and minister, etc. Here, the Principle is regarded as an authentic type for prescribing the particular nature of all things. He would later apply it, in particular, to the moral standard of human nature which manifests itself as the inherent consciousness of goodness. Thus, he can present the significance of humanity as being that it manifests "human nature in Principle." It imputes such value to morality that a human being can elevate his good nature to the fullest according to the orientation of his own life. Such an orientation, Cheng Yi, insists can only result from recognition of commonality shared between the Heavenly Way and the humane way. The sage's human nature (which is shared and united with the nature of heaven) provides the basis for making a community sustainable.

On the other hand, in Cheng Yi's system, a Principle's conceptualization is used not just to explain the existence of things in the world of reality, but also to explain how moral actions are natural and obvious. For an example, he endeavors to show how the whole of the principle can be seen within the particular principle of filial piety. The principle of filial piety is representative of the structured, hierarchical system of the ideal Neo-Confucian community and was theorized as operating equally on two levels. It is both one and many: it orders the whole in the sense of offering some unitary control over the country, while it also arranges the specific particulars in the case of the myriad individual parent-child relationships. He explains how social networks are constantly sustained through the relationship of whole to parts. Since the Principle is present everywhere and is complete in every instance, and the relationship of all things makes up one body with heaven and earth, he concludes that there is no separate repository where the Principle could reside apart from in all things. The whole of the Principle then is fully present, available and complete in anything and everything. It is possible to say that the nature of all living things, including human nature, is identical with the nature of heaven and earth. In this respect, the inner character of human beings is provided with a real and unshakable basis. It, by its nature, justifies their actions, and this justification is based upon the reality of heaven and earth.

From an organic perspective, we can infer a generalization of ethical morality as follows: if we realize the Heavenly Principle exists and is manifest in such a relationship as that enjoyed between the ruler and the ruled or a father and his son, we also can realize morality's basis in

human nature in our ordinary lives. And if we recognize morality's basis in human nature, we can understand the orientation of the Heavenly Mandate to ultimately attain sagehood, that is, the ultimate achievement of self-realization in a Confucian community.

According to the generalization, the principle of the ruler and the ruled or father and son, which is equivalent to the Heavenly Principle, reveals itself in the human nature through the specific instance of the ruler and the ruled or father and son. That is why the Principle is the "main" and the affair is the "subsidiary." In the implied meaning of *qiangua* 乾卦 (heaven hexagram), the Principle, which is revealed in the hexagram of heaven, has the nature of being strong, ceaseless and everlasting, and heaven, the ruler, and fathers all regard such a nature as their principle. In such a way, a justification of hierarchical order can be made in any Confucian community. The Principle, the substance of the particular instances of moral life, is unchangeable in an organic unity, regardless of where the particular conditions take place within a human's life cycle. This is the ideological significance of ethical morality drawn from the organic unity of the Principle and the particular instance, and its logical foundation is the holistic mode of "one source" or "no difference."

Furthermore, Zhu Xi combines the Supreme Ultimate and its unfolding way, which is characterized by "*tiyong yiyuan* 體用一源" (one source of substance and function), with his conception of human nature. In particular, he claims that there is a law in such a combination, and calls it the law that "*liyi fenshu* 理一分殊" (the Principle is one but its manifestations are multiple). "*liyi* 理一" (the Principle is one) refers to his belief that the Supreme Ultimate, as the Principle of one *yin* and one *yang* or one movement and one stillness, is universally inherent in all things. And "*fenshu* 分殊" (its manifestations are multiple) makes reference to his belief that this one Principle streams within the inherent nature of all things (including human beings). It implies that human nature accords with the principle of the Supreme Ultimate. It is through the view of the original substance of the Supreme Ultimate that he establishes an organic network built upon the notion that "Principle is one and its manifestations are many," and thereby attempts to explain the contents of morality or the ground in which human beings have their moral nature. He writes:

This, in the unification of myriad things, reveals itself as one Supreme Ultimate to be one unity. All that are from the main to the subsidiary are really one Principle, but multiple things differentiate it into their original

substances. Therefore, myriad things all have one Supreme Ultimate respectively, and there is nothing small or large that has no certain kind of differentiation respectively.³⁷⁾

The paragraph explains his view of the law of all existences in accordance with the identification and differentiation of the Supreme Ultimate. All things have the same original substance in their individual natures, and any distinctions and differences between them are also conferred by one Supreme Ultimate in a way that constitutes their own unique natures. More importantly, he extends this idea to explain the nature of all things and their significance:

In terms of unification, myriad things all embody one Supreme Ultimate as a whole, while, in terms of division, each thing has one Supreme Ultimate respectively. What is called that there is nothing that has no nature in the world and there is no nature that does not exist can, here more apparently, reveal the entire whole.³⁸⁾

As the principle of the heavenly mandate and the nature of all things, the Supreme Ultimate plays the vital role of original substance in the existence of all things. All things are constituted through the combination of the Principle and the vital force. As the original substance of Supreme Ultimate makes its unfolding way of stream, the Principle reveals itself as the unfolding way of the vital force. This structure is conceptualized into a network of “one Principle but its multiple manifestations.” From this conceptualization he makes implicative descriptions as follows:

Everything has the Principle, which is always the same and one Principle.³⁹⁾

Every man has one Supreme Ultimate, and everything has one Supreme Ultimate.⁴⁰⁾

All real things in heaven and earth are existentially based upon the Principle of the Supreme Ultimate and its manner of unfolding. All the natures of things are a kind of fractal in which the original substance of Supreme Ultimate plays a vital role in the Principle of the Mandate and natures.

37) “Lixingming 理性命,” *Tongshu jie*: “是合萬物而言之，爲一太極而一也。自本而之末，則一理之實，而萬物分之以爲體。故萬物之中各有一太極，而小大之物，莫不各有一定之分也。”

38) *Zhu, Taiji tushuo jie*: “蓋合而言之，萬物統體一太極也，分而言之，一物各具一太極也。所謂天下無性外之物，而性無不在者，於此尤可以見其全矣。”

39) *Zhuzi yulei* 94: “物物各有理，總是一個理。”

40) *Zhuzi yulei* 94: “人人有一太極，物物有一太極。”

What significance does the Principle of the Mandate and natures have in relation to human nature? For Zhu Xi, the Supreme Ultimate, as the Principle of the Mandate and natures, reveals itself in human beings through the five virtues of benevolence, righteousness, courtesy, knowledge and sincerity. Thus, his understanding of human nature is fundamentally based such a universal network as an unfolding process of generation. The key point here is in the effort to explicate what human nature is and its grounding in moral value, which is characteristic of “one Principle and its multiple manifestations.” The effort to do so is what enables Confucianism to construct the ideal of a sustainable network represented by the holistic unity in which the humane and Heavenly Way are identical.

Given the premise that human nature is based upon the constitutive way of the Principle of Supreme Ultimate, Zhu understands Mengzi’s claim that “human nature is good” as being founded upon its ontological similarity with the Heavenly Way. Zhu Xi writes,

“What succeeds to it is goodness, what it is constituted into is nature.” This Principle, when being between the heaven and the earth, is goodness itself, and there is nothing that is not good. Things are born, and then their names are called natures. There is only this Principle. It in the heaven is called the Mandate, and it in a human being is called the nature.⁴¹⁾

The key point in the passage above is that it posits a relationship between the Principle and the natures of all things: identification and differentiation. The principle of one *yin* and one *yang* in total correspondence cannot be regarded as the natures of all things, but as the heavenly mandate or the Heavenly Principle, and, on the other hand, the natures with which things and human beings are endowed have an ontological network with the Principle. So, things and human beings are good in the sense that their natures are endowed upon them by the Heavenly Principle, and there is no axiological distinction of good and evil in their natures.⁴²⁾

41) *Zhuzi yulei* 5: “繼之者善，成之者性，這個理在天地間時，只是善，無有不善者。生物得來，方始名曰性。只是這理，在天則曰命，在人則曰性。”

42) Apart from arguments in the *Mengzi* 孟子 and *Zhongyong* 中庸, Zhu Xi 朱熹 mentions the issue of human nature on the ground of the Heavenly Way. He emphasizes that Mengzi’s doctrine of the goodness of human nature should be based upon the ontological relationship of the natures and the Heavenly Way. In his view, what Mengzi calls the goodness of human nature is only the fact that human beings have already been endowed with their natures. And so he argues that human natures depend upon explicating such a primordial relationship. Human nature is not good until a human being obtains such an original nature that is in accordance with the Heavenly

For Zhu Xi, then, all existences coexist in a unified network, one that is united by the identity of “*liyi* 理一” (the Principle is one) and the difference of “*fenshu* 分殊” (its manifestations are multiple). Because the Heavenly Way is the ground which constitutes human nature, a human being has the original character of goodness, and thereby human nature, that which makes up the essential quality of a human being, is constituted into a higher quality of personality. It is possible to say that the original nature of a human being, thus, is a reality of network that is based upon the original substance of the Heavenly Way and, at the same time, determines the particular existence of a human being.⁴³⁾

Furthermore, Zhu Xi analyzes “the nature of original substance,” “the nature of physical quality” and their relationship as part of his reconstruction of the Mencian doctrine of human nature. He says:

The physical quality is what *yin-yang* and Five Elements make up, and the nature is the entire substance of Supreme Ultimate. But when one mentions the nature of physical quality, there is the entire substance in the physical quality, but there is no independent nature separated from the physical quality.⁴⁴⁾

The relationship of the Supreme Ultimate, *yin-yang* and Five Elements is expressed as that of “the original substance” and “the physical quality” in human nature. The principle of the Supreme Ultimate as a whole takes part in the original substance in a human being, but, on the other hand, the original substance exists in a physical form. For Zhu Xi, neither the principle nor the vital force can be absent from human nature. Therefore, the nature of original substance is included in that of physical quality, and, it is in this vein that he writes: “The nature is the entire substance of Supreme Ultimate.” According to the rule of “one Principle and its multiple manifestations,” there is a unity of distinction but no differentiation between the original substance and the specific physical qualities manifest in human nature. This is because, Zhu Xi thinks, the nature of original substance is equivalent to “one Principle” and the

Way. Only through this manner of thinking are Mengzi’s claims that “the Heavenly Mandate is called the nature” in the *Zhongyong* and that “human nature is good” comprehensible. One consequence of this is that while Mengzi’s view that “human nature is good” is basically a kind of value judgment, Zhu Xi makes an existential or ontological argument prior to such a value judgment.

43) Hsu, “A Comparative Study of Chu His and the Ch’eng Brothers,” 43-57.

44) “Da Yanshiheng 答嚴時亨,” *Zhuxi ji* 61: “氣質是陰陽五行所爲，性即太極之全體。但論氣質之性，則此全體墮在氣質之中耳，非別有一性也。”

nature of physical qualities to “its multiple manifestations.” For this reason, he argues that the nature of original substance, being more fundamental in a human being, is not influenced by any factor of physical quality. The nature of the heavenly mandate, as the original substance of human nature, is combined with the physical form to make up and sustain a unity of human nature. He admits that while such a combined nature cannot be the same as the nature of the original substance, he continues to assert that the combination does not lose a kind of fractal nature, that is, the essential character of its own original substance. He asserts that “human nature is the Principle,” in the sense that human nature is in accordance with a sustainable system of original substance and its unfolding way, independent of the nature of its physical qualities.⁴⁵⁾

Consequently, for Neo-Confucianists, human nature can be traced to the ultimate ground of the original substance of the Heavenly Way. It is ontologically based upon the principle of Supreme Ultimate, and thereby comes to have the quality of goodness by virtue of the fact that human beings share a portion of that principle. A network of sustainability can be applied to “one Principle and its multiple manifestations” and, thus, extends it to the theory of human nature. In this respect, it can be said that human existence is conceived of as taking place within a sustainable structure of “one principle but its many manifestations.”

5. Neo-Confucian Problems Awaiting Solution

For Neo-Confucianists, the world of all creation, represented as myriad things under heaven and on earth, is a coherent whole with an origin and unitary processes. This world-view is reflected in the operation of its sustainable social structures. The process of justifying sustainability can be approached from three categories: “The Heavenly Principle,” “one source of substance and function” and “one Principle and its multiple manifestations.” The underlying idea which is used to legitimize the system itself is expressed as “the Heavenly Principle,” which provides a kind of justice to human relations. Its mode of changeability is explained through the idea of “one source of substance and function,” which

45) Concerning Zhu Xi’s human nature, refer to Cheng, *New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-Confucian Philosophy*, 375-395.

provides an organic quality of appropriateness to the relationships of human lives and society. As a result, its structure for sustaining the relationships between differing types of beings is expressed as “one principle but its many manifestations.” The idea provides a holistic unity for orientation within social networks. These three points are reciprocally supportive, but the first two are integrated into the third. In particular, this final category provides a theoretical unity for the entire system in that it proposes that a certain principle is comprehensively maintained in myriad complex individual relationships. Here, the concept of sustainability is full of suggestions in a logical mechanism of justifying a Neo-Confucian system. The structure of sustainability is closely associated with a web of social network. According to a web of social network, members in a community are inherently suited to play the roles assigned to them within each field and, on this basis, are able to bring forth their maximum possible production.

From the perspective of the integrated Neo-Confucian system, it seems to me that human existence and human value are in the same line for an open horizon of sustainability. By examining the scholarly tradition of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, we find that a system of Neo-Confucian world-view has a basis of universality and identity called the Heavenly Principle for a reality of life. This Neo-Confucian system can be characterized as a sustainable network of “one Principle and its multiple manifestations,” on the one hand, and its mode of “one source of substance and function,” on the other. It reflects the open horizon of coexistence and cooperation for newly emergent orderliness in a series of integral relationship between person and community, knowledge and practice, ideal and reality, etc.

In this system, moral value and its realization are considered compatible with a system of social solidity. What is sometimes called “social justice” is done on a horizon of unifying the two, which is oriented toward the Golden Rule of Confucianism, namely, achieving a unification between the Heavenly Way and the humane way. In this respect, the Neo-Confucian world-view also contains an idealized web of social networks. According to this idealization, each member of the community is suited and equipped to play their assigned roles and, if properly placed and arranged, are capable of bringing forth their maximal production. In this sense, The Neo-Confucian integral system focuses upon a principle of “reality” rather than upon that of “entity.”⁴⁶⁾ It provides a logical mechanism of sustainability for both moralizing justice

(正義的道德化) and justicizing morality (道德的正義化).

To reconstruct an integrated society and prescribe rules for its political practices, Neo-Confucianists emphasized constant, inevitable historical change. It clings to a tradition of *daotong* 道統 (succession of the Way) in the sense of a continuity between past and present practices. Neo-Confucian commentaries are full of suggestions that literati should be given frequent opportunities to advance into positions of real political power and stimulate an increasingly vigorous economy. They portrayed their real community as filled with ambitious and greedy men making an unending series of wrong decisions. To solve this problem, they argued that one must choose righteousness over personal benefit, and further claimed that this path leads to sagehood, that is, the ultimate stage of the superior man. For Neo-Confucianists, righteous behavior essentially means acting without selfishness, since selfishness is characterized by the absence of self-consciousness and is considered an inappropriate state of mind. As a result, Neo-Confucianists demanded a severe and constant vigilance of self. What is called morality is based upon the vigilant way of life required to sustain their ideal social network.

Finally and most significantly, the Neo-Confucian system of sustainability greatly helps us understand some general traits of East Asian identity. From the Han dynasty through the Song and Ming dynasties and even into the present, a Neo-Confucian ideal of sustainability has pervaded East Asian thought and culture. It had a particularly significant status in the academic circle called *Songxue* 宋學 (School of the Song dynasty), which was enormously influential on the thought and culture of its time and place. While they disagreed about some particulars, in the larger picture Neo-Confucianists shared a fairly common way of thinking about social networks. In a world they saw as being marked by incessantly changing processes, they continued to articulate a shared vision for the reestablishment of a sustainable social network oriented toward self-realization.

46) Kim, "The Idea of Sustainability and New Horizon of Korean Society: Focused upon the Reality of Change-penetrating Process," 211-244.

A Scheme of Sustainability in Neo-Confucianism

Category	Conception	Horizon
idea	<i>tianli</i> 天理 (Heavenly Principle)	justice
mode	<i>tiyong yiyuan</i> 體用一源 (one source of substance and function)	change
structure	<i>liyi fenshu</i> 理一分殊 (one Principle and its multiple manifestations)	network
orientation	<i>tianren heyi</i> 天人合一 (unity of heaven and man)	sustainability

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Zhouyi 周易 (Book of Changes)
Zhu Xi ji 朱熹集 (Collected Works of Zhu Xi)
 Zhu, Xi 朱熹. *Taiji tushuo jie* 太極圖說解 (Commentary on the Explanation of the Supreme Ultimate Diagram)
 _____. *Tongshu jie* 通書解 (Commentary on the *Tongshu*)
Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類 (Assorted Sayings of Zhu Xi)

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程朱學的思維方式與社會網的可持續性的正當化之邏輯機制

金 演 宰

中文摘要

本論文集集中闡明從社會網的眺望上如何能夠確立關於社會體系的程朱學的邏輯正當化。其論點就是“可持續性”的原理。可持續性的原理來自現代社會所爭論的“可持續發展”的生態學觀念。儒家從人的存在上揭示整個世界的觀點，即在一個創造的世界上有某種本原，從中進行一系列派生的統一過程。這個世界觀反映於社會的構造和可持續的體系。據此，本論文從三重的範疇上揭示一個正當化程朱學的可持續性原理的過程。三重的範疇就是天理、體用一源及理一分殊。它們具有互相密切的關係。首先，天理作為一個體系的規律性理念，成為從人的關係上發現的正義的名分。天理發揮的變動性方式就是體用一源。體用一源表現為某種人生及社會上存續的適合性的關係。這種適合性的關係在現實上作動的構造就是理一分殊。理一分殊為社會網的指向性提供某種統一的原理。這種原理是從複雜多變的個體的、集團的關係上發揮的，具有有機性的、整體性的、繼續性的。所以，從邏輯的次元來看，天理和體用一源最終歸結到理一分殊。這裏，理一分殊能夠發揮一個正當化可持續性體系的程朱學的邏輯機制。它提供一個共存和協調的開放地平，即從個體和集團、理論和實踐、理想和現實等的統合關係上不斷創發的秩序意識的境界。這個地平，與其說是“實體”的原理作動的，毋寧說是“實在”的原理作動的。在不斷變化的實在世界上能夠繼續維持一個走向自我實現的道德規範的健全性體系。可以說，這個可持續的世界才能發揮一個“正義的道德化”和“道德的正義化”的原則。

關鍵詞：可持續性的原理，天理，體用一源，理一分殊，正義的名分，適合性的關係，社會網的構造

From a Prohibition of Talk about Otherworldly Elements to Harangues about Heavenly Morality in Confucianism

CHEN Yan · MENG Qinglei

Abstract

True to his motto, “Don’t pretend to know what you don’t know,” Kongzi was reasonably aloof from talking about anything outside the empirical world. One consequence of his reticence has been that Confucianism has avoided becoming a religion and has preserved a clear demarcation between what is known in Kantian philosophy as the empirical realm and the transcendent realm. Since Zisi 子思 and Mengzi, two of his followers made efforts to build a Confucianism with an emphasis on kinship, later generations of Confucians have sought to establish transcendent foundations for human morality in notions of heavenly morality and obligation, thereby transgressing Kongzi’s strict demarcation between the empirical realm and transcendent realm, as well as spoiling the rationalism of the original Confucianism. A modern Confucianism which is able to dialogue with the world could be established through the removal of the later Confucian dogmatism and a restoration of Kongzi’s Confucianism.

Keywords: Kongzi, Confucianism, empirical, transcendent, knowledge

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The so-called “*guai li luan shen* 怪力亂神” (fantastical entities, feats of strength, disorder, and supernatural beings) in the *Analepts* generally refer to those preposterous things that cannot be verified by empirical observation. Kongzi 孔子 never talked about these kinds of things actively, and tended to sidestep or interpret them with logic according to experiential facts whenever asked about them. These situations are also recorded in other early texts besides the *Analepts*. For instance:

Duke Ai 哀公 asked Kongzi: “I heard that *Kui* 夔 has only one foot. Is that right?” Kongzi said: “*Kui* is a person, and why is he characterized as having only one foot? Actually he has nothing different, but knows music well. So Yao says that *Kui* is competent by himself, and gives him the position of attuning music. So we say that having one person such as *Kui* is enough, not that *Kui* has one foot.”¹⁾

Giving rational interpretations to old myths and legends is one of the characteristics of Kongzi’s teaching. In this way, Kongzi can be said not to give credence to “fantastical entities, feats of strength, disorder, and supernatural beings.”²⁾ This sentence is frequently cited as the basis of Kongzi’s exclusion of mysticism and preference for rationality. If we analyze the interpretation of this sentence throughout Confucian history from an epistemological viewpoint, what can we get from it?

The term “*ru* 儒” (scholar-related) is widely understood to refer to a kind of profession before it became a kind of theory or school: “Some scholars in modern times assert that the predecessors of Confucians were always spiritualists, historians, prayers, and augurs. During in the period of Spring and Autumn of social upheaval, Confucians lost their original positions, and began to make a living as ‘helping about the rituals’ (*xiangli* 相禮) for their familiarity of rituals.”³⁾ It is worth noting that the tasks of the “spiritualists, historians, prayers, and augurs” that they replaced were very closely related to those fantastical entities, feats of strength, disorder, and supernatural beings which Kongzi had dismissed, so why would these Confucians be silent when it came to their

1) *Han Feizi*, 33.2.

2) *Lunyu*, 7:21.

3) Hu, *Zhongguo dabaike quanshu: Zhexue*, 73.

relationship with these preposterous phenomena? It is largely because in the great historical change during the Yin and Zhou dynasties, the rulers in early Zhou transformed many of the religious tendencies which characterized the Yin dynasty, during which people respected and “served the gods, with the ghosts going before rituals, and penalties before rewards.⁴⁾” Instead, they changed religious rituals into secular rites with carefully formed procedures, and proscribed ethical duties, such as showing respect for parents and the honorable, so that it could be said of them that “Zhou people respected rituals and execution, serving ghosts and gods while keeping away from them.”⁵⁾ Kongzi asserted that “The Zhou dynasty learned a lot from the cultural heritage of the Xia and Shang dynasties and I worship the Zhou dynasty because of its prosperous cultural achievements,⁶⁾” which demonstrates his own adherence to this humanistic spirit. Not only did the titles and positions alter during the transition from spiritualists, historians, prayers, and augurs in ancient times to Confucians as *xiangli* in the pre-Qin period, but so did the concepts and beliefs surrounding the observance of these rituals.

These changes were most reflected in the sacrifice rites. Although sacrifice was originally directed towards the ghosts and gods, the *Analects* records that “When one is giving offerings, it seemed that the gods are present. Kongzi says: I do not give offerings myself, I feel that the sacrifice rite is not implemented at all.”⁷⁾ The emphasis here is not laid on the objects of sacrifice, but on the living people who perform the sacrifice as subjects. People today pay respect to the predecessors at their tombs on the *qingming* 清明 day (tomb-sweeping day) not because they are gods, but as a way of expressing their sadness and cherishing the memory of their ancestors. Does this mean that we should regard Kongzi as an atheist then? It is unclear. On the one hand, he refuses to acknowledge the spirits, while at the same time, he does not deny the possibility of their existence. The word “seem” leaves great space for imagination. In *the Doctrine of the Mean*, Kongzi is quoted as saying: “The virtue of the ghosts and gods is great. It cannot be seen when looked at, cannot be heard when listened to, but it is felt without leaving anything out. Everyone on earth wears splendid attire to sacrifice and it seemed that the ghosts and gods are above their heads and with them.”⁸⁾

4) *Liji*, ch. 32.

5) *Liji*, ch. 32.

6) *Lunyu*, 3.14

7) *Lunyu*, 3.14

Note still the persistence and effect of the work “like” here, in regards to ghosts and gods as the objects that cannot be described.

This kind of equivocal expression can be seen everywhere in the *Analects*. For instance, “*Jilu* 季路 asked about serving the ghosts and gods, Kongzi said: How can you serve the ghosts before serving people?” *Jilu* asked again: ‘How about death?’ Kongzi replied: ‘How can you know death before knowing life?’”⁹⁾ Kongzi neither answered the question about whether the ghosts and gods exist, nor replied to the question whether people have spirits after death. He kept silent to these questions about fantastical entities, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual beings without referring to them face to face. In this light, when *Fanchi* 樊遲 asked about wisdom, Kongzi said: “Civilizing the common people and respecting the ghosts and gods while keeping away from them is the so-called wisdom.”¹⁰⁾ As the first teacher in Chinese history, Kongzi was very careful and discreet with his study, advising others that wisdom consists of “Admit[ting] what one really understands and what one does not know.”¹¹⁾ The implication is that therefore there’s no need to discuss such things as the ghosts and gods which humans cannot truly understand.

In addition to fantastical entities, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual beings, Kongzi seldom talked about *tian* 天 (heaven), *dao* 道 (Way), *xing* 性 (human nature), and *ming* 命 (fate or mandate). Despite his use of the term in phrases like “how can Hengtui 桓魋 deal with me if heaven endows virtue in me,”¹²⁾ and “how can the Kuang 匡 people deal with me if heaven does not lose its elegance,”¹³⁾ his use of the rhetorical question “could I deceive heaven?”¹⁴⁾ and his claims that “what I negate is also what heaven negates”¹⁵⁾ and “it is only the heaven that is so great and lofty,”¹⁶⁾ when taken on balance these sentimental words alone cannot confirm the existence or personality of heaven in Kongzi’s thought. In the passages just cited, Kongzi’s references to heaven are little more than usages of a kind of common expression or widespread belief that provides rhetorical power to his

8) *Zhongyong*, ch. 16.

9) *Lunyu*, 11.12.

10) *Lunyu*, 6.22.

11) *Lunyu*, 2.17.

12) *Lunyu*, 7.23.

13) *Lunyu*, 9.5.

14) *Lunyu*, 9.12.

15) *Lunyu*, 6.28.

16) *Lunyu*, 8.19.

claims in a shorthand way. Kongzi himself does not appear to deem the expression or belief as universal knowledge that can be propagated and popularized. So Kongzi says: “Do not impute the faults to heaven or to others. Study downward and achieve upward. It is only heaven that knows me.”¹⁷⁾ For Kongzi, belief has only personal validity and cannot be taught to others. This is why he remarks to Zigong that “I want to say nothing.” When Zigong worries about this, he says: “What does heaven say? The four seasons just turn around, and myriad things just grow.”¹⁸⁾ For Kongzi, heaven is no more than an invisible belief and discipline that cannot be described or formed, not a god of personality that can intervene in people’s lives in any real way. Thus Zigong claims: “Master’s articles can be heard, but his words about *xing* 性 and *tiandao* 天道 cannot be heard.”¹⁹⁾ Education can be used only to teach people knowledge, but it cannot force beliefs which cannot be confirmed upon the educated, otherwise it would turn out to be a sermon.

Though Kongzi does speak about *dao*, he never makes it mysterious, but always refers to ordinary experience, as in the following phrases: “An bachelor [a member of a particular social class in ancient China located between senior officials and the common people] who makes his mind on *dao* while feeling ashamed about his poor clothes and food is not worthy of discourse”²⁰⁾; “since my *dao* is making no headway, I shall get upon a raft and float out to sea”²¹⁾; “if I heard *dao* in the morning, I would rather die this evening.”²²⁾ *Dao* here refers to the standard or norm of being a person able to “serve the father at home and serve the king at court,”²³⁾ so it is the norm of people instead of heaven. In the 13th chapter of *The Doctrine of the Mean*, Kongzi is quoted as saying “*Dao* is never far from people. If people following *dao* keep away from others, they could not do *dao*.”²⁴⁾ Zengzi’s 曾子 interpretation was that “Master’s *dao* is nothing but *zhong* and *shu*.”²⁵⁾ For Kongzi, we can only practice the *dao* of everyday ethics in an experiential domain, the transcendent “*Tiandao*” cannot and should not be

17) *Lunyu*, 14.35.

18) *Lunyu*, 17.19.

19) *Lunyu*, 5.13.

20) *Lunyu*, 4.9.

21) *Lunyu*, 5.7.

22) *Lunyu*, 4.8.

23) *Lunyu*, 17.9.

24) *Zhongyong*, ch. 13.

25) *Lunyu*, 4.15.

talked about.

Holding to this principle, Kongzi never sits in judgment on human nature. He never claims directly that it is good or bad, saying only that “Human nature is similar, but conventions are far different.”²⁶⁾ In the *Analects*, Kongzi mentions *ming* 命 five times, stating that “one cannot be an exemplary person without knowing *ming*,”²⁷⁾ asserting that “I know *tianming* 天命 at 50,”²⁸⁾ noting that “it is *ming* that he dies for the disease,”²⁹⁾ and that “it is *ming* that *dao* goes and stops.”³⁰⁾ Generally speaking, the first *ming* means *shiming* 使命 (mandate), while the other usages of the word refer to an emotion of fatalism that relates only to personal belief. This is especially clear in “Ji’shi (季氏)”: “The exemplary people have three fears: *tianming*, great people, and the sage’s words”³¹⁾ Whether or not one is afraid of *tianming* becomes a line of demarcation between exemplary and petty men. However, one has the right to choose whether to become an exemplary person or not. There is no inevitable command to supplant personal choice. In the last analysis, Kongzi’s interpretation of *ming* related only to belief rather than knowledge, just as it is in regards to his understanding of *tian* 天, *dao* 道, and *xing* 性.

The most difficult and important concept in Kongzi’s thoughts is that of *ren* 仁 which is not at all mysterious. For Kongzi’s successors, “*Ren* refers to loving people”³²⁾ and “filial piety and brotherly giving-in is the root of *ren*.”³³⁾ In antiquity, the son’s love for his father was called filial piety (*xiao* 孝), and a younger brother’s love for his elder brother was called brotherly giving-in (*di* 悌). *Ren* can be interpreted as nothing more than the ethical relations founded on the proper affinity between parents and their offspring, without any religious emotion or metaphysical meaning. Kongzi’s thoughts and words are generally plain and warm-hearted, instead of mysterious and speculative. He makes an effort to construct an ethics permeated with personal experience instead of theology or metaphysics.

In sum, Kongzi’s ideas for pursuing knowledge could be generalized like this: “Four behaviors are refused by Kongzi: not foregoing conclusions,

26) *Lunyu*, 17.2.

27) *Lunyu*, 20.3.

28) *Lunyu*, 2.4.

29) *Lunyu*, 6.10.

30) *Lunyu*, 14.16.

31) *Lunyu*, 16:8.

32) *Mengzi*, 4A2.

33) *Lunyu*, 1.2.2.

no arbitrary necessities, no obstinacy, and not sticking to one's own ideas"³⁴⁾. These behaviors reflect both a viewpoint about experiential reality and a proper attitude to the world of beliefs. For Kongzi, our understanding of experiential reality should be based on facts without false presumptions or indiscreet judgments, while our attitude to the world of beliefs should be one of respect for others' choices, not a desire to bend the world to accord with our own will. Kongzi's plain words contain a standard for knowledge, the freedom of belief, and many precious resources which are still of great use in our contemporary age. However, the situation of Confucian thought changed a great deal after Kongzi.

2

According to *xianxue* 顯學, the 50th chapter of the *Hanfeizi*: "Ever since Kongzi died, there has been Confucians of Zizhang 子張, Zisi 子思, Yan shi 顏氏, Mengzi, Qidiao shi 漆雕氏, Zhongliang shi 仲良氏, Sun shi 孫氏, Lezheng shi 樂正氏."³⁵⁾ Although Xunzi 荀子 counts Mengzi and Zisi together, regarding them as sequentially derived from the same origin, the point is clear, namely that Confucian thought devolved into competing schools and interpretations. From this it is clear to see that some men follow the model of the ancient kings in a fragmentary way, but fail to understand its guiding principles. Still their abilities are manifold, their memory great, and their experience and knowledge both varied and broad. They have initiated a theory for which they claim great antiquity, calling it the Five Processes theory. Peculiar and unreasonable in the extreme, it lacks proper logical categories. Mysterious and enigmatic, it lacks a satisfactory theoretical basis. Esoteric and laconic in its statements, it lacks adequate explanations. To give their propositions a cloak of respectability and to win respect and veneration for them, they claim that these words represent the genuine thought of Kongzi, the great gentleman of the past. Zisi provided the tune for them, and Mengzi harmonized it. Some indecisive, deluded *ru* 儒 of today enthusiastically welcome these notions, unaware that they are false. They pass on what they have received, believing that, on account of these theories, Kongzi and Ziyou 子遊 will be highly esteemed by later generations. It is Zisi and Mengzi that are to be blamed for this situation.³⁶⁾

34) *Lunyu*, 9.4.

35) *Han Feizi*, ch. 50.

36) *Xunzi*, 3.6.

That is the origin of “the school of Zisi and Mengzi”. As a Confucian, Xunzi’s words should be respected as trustworthy. However, it is a pity that all 23 chapters of Zisizi 子思子 mentioned in the Record of Literature and Arts in the *Hanshu* 漢書 have been lost since the Tang dynasty, since this loss radically damages our efforts to better understand Kongzi.

Sima Qian 司馬遷 points out in the “Gentlefolk of Kongzi” chapter in the *Shiji* 史記 that “Zisi composed *the Doctrine of the Mean*.”³⁷⁾ Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 in the Han dynasty, Lu Deming 陸德明, Kong Yingda 孔穎達 in the Tang dynasty, and Cheng Hao 程顥, Cheng Yi 程頤, Zhu Xi 朱熹 in the Song dynasty all held that *the Doctrine of the Mean* was composed by Zisi, and that from it Zisi’s thoughts can be determined and explored. In contrast to Kongzi’s avoiding “*xing* and *tiandao*”, *the Doctrine of the Mean* begins with the notion that “the mandate of *tian* is called *xing*, going according to *xing* is called *dao*, and cultivating *dao* is called education.”³⁸⁾ In this way, an attempt is made to base Confucian ethical education on *xing* and *tiandao*. The 12th chapter of *the Doctrine of the Mean* says: “Exemplary people’s proper path starts from husband and wife, and culminates with perception of heaven and earth. ... It is through *cheng* (sincerity) that can make the most of one’s nature, then the nature of myriad things, and then one can take part in transforming and nourishing heaven and earth and correspond with it.”³⁹⁾ The 24th chapter says:

It is the characteristic of the utmost sincerity to be able to foreknow. When a state and family is about to flourish, there are sure to be happy omens. When it is about to perish, there are sure to be unlucky omens. Such events are seen in the milfoil and tortoise, and affect the movements of the four limbs. When calamity and happiness is about to come, the good shall certainly be foreknown by him, and the evil also. Therefore the person possessed of the most complete sincerity is like a spirit.⁴⁰⁾

The 29th chapter says: “So exemplary people’s proper path roots in him, and identifies itself in the mass; it can be investigated from the ancient kings, can construct the world between heaven and earth without violation, and can be inquired by spirits and ghosts without doubt. That is the so-called knowing the heaven.”⁴¹⁾ The 32nd chapter says: “It is

37) *Shiji* 47.17.

38) *Zhongyong*, ch. 1.

39) *Zhongyong*, ch. 12.

40) *Zhongyong*, ch. 22.

41) *Zhongyong*, ch. 29.

only the utmost sincerity that can set the basis and regulate the great path on the earth under heaven. It can also know the transforming and nourishing of earth and heaven. What should we rely on? Only *ren* can be our reliance. How earnest one's benevolence (*ren*) was! How deep and still the abyss is! How vast and mighty the heaven is!"⁴²⁾ The 31st chapter says: "Therefore his fame overspreads the Middle Kingdom, and extends to all barbarous tribes. Wherever ships and carriages reach; wherever the strength of man penetrates; wherever the heavens overshadow and the earth sustains; wherever the sun and moon shine; wherever frosts and dews fall: all who have blood and breath unfeignedly honor and love him. Hence it is said that he is the equal of heaven."⁴³⁾ In this light, all the extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, spiritual beings, and *tian*, *dao*, *xing*, *ming* become the theoretical foundation upon which Zisi elaborates Confucian ethics, thus leading to his claim that virtue (*Ren*) is "the equal of heaven".

In 1993 some important texts dealing with Confucian thought were excavated in *Guodian* 郭店, Hubei province. These texts included *Zi Yi* 緇衣, *wuxing* 五行, *Zun de yi* 尊德義, *Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出, and *Liu de* 六德. Most scholars hold these texts as rooted in Zisi's thought. Actually, the content of these texts have a number of connections with *the Doctrine of the Mean*. For instance, "*Xing* derives from *ming*, and *ming* comes from *tian*" in *Xing zi ming chu* is not unlike the similar claim in *The Doctrine of the Mean* that "the mandate of *tian* is called *xing*, going according to *xing* is called *dao*, and cultivating *dao* is called education." in the 1st chapter of *the Doctrine of the Mean*, and the style of *Zun de yi* is also similar to that of *the Doctrine of the Mean*. This seems to further verify the thoughts of Zisi.

Zisi is a direct descendent of Kongzi (his grandson), and his later years belonged to the Warring States Period. Mengzi, who learned from a disciple of Zisi, lived in the middle of Warring States Period. Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 has compared the difference between the "Spring and Autumn Period" and the "Warring States Period": "Rituals and trust were still respected in the Spring and Autumn Period while they are not mentioned in the seven states. Funerals and other affairs like fortune and misfortune were informed to each other in Spring and Autumn, but they are not heard any more in Warring States Period. States do not have

42) *Zhongyong*, ch. 32.

43) *Zhongyong*, ch. 31.

fixed associations, and scholars do not have definite masters. These transformations took place for 133 years.”⁴⁴⁾ The merging of states, the intensification of punitive expeditions, and the annexation of the central plains to minorities all led to breaking the kin and clan networks which had previously existed and weakening the familial bonds which had been so important for social cohesion. In this situation, founding social ethics on consanguineous relationship seems to be out of date. Consequently, Mengzi searched for a deeper foundation for Confucian theories after Zisi, finding it ultimately in a conception of human nature which was initially absent in Kongzi’s teachings.

If it is still too broad to say that “the mandate of *tian* is called *xing*, going according to *xing* is called *dao*” in *the Doctrine of the Mean*, Mengzi further proposes that “*Xing* is originally good”. How does Mengzi prove that human being’s *xing* is good? First he uses the metaphor as the method:

Gaozi 告子 says: “*Xing* is like rushing water, rushing to east when breached at the east, and to west when breached at the west.” Mengzi says: “Water indeed does not differentiate between east and west. Does it differentiate between up and down? Human’s *Xing* is good, just like water goes down. There is no one that is not good, just like there is no water that does not go down.”⁴⁵⁾

The second method he uses is illustration:

Anyone has a heart that cannot bear others’ misery, in that when any person has a sense of fright and sympathy when he sees a child falling into a well. That is neither for associating with the child’s parents, nor for obtaining reputation among neighbors and friends, nor for disliking the child’s cry.⁴⁶⁾

Mengzi’s concept of *xing* has had a profound influence on subsequent Confucian thought. However, speaking epistemologically, metaphor can only explain something, not prove it; and illustration can only indicate probable knowledge, not necessary truths. For example, Mengzi can use the example that “there is no water that does not go down” to explain that “there is no one that is not good”, while Xunzi can also use a similar metaphor to explain “there is no one that is not bad”; Mengzi

44) Gu, *Rizhilu*, 13.1.

45) *Mengzi*, 6A1.

46) *Mengzi*, 2A1.

can use the instance that “a person sees a child dropping in a well” to infer that “human’s *xing* is good”, and Xunzi can also use an opposite instance to demonstrate that “human’s *xing* is bad.” Actually, it is not uncommon that we see two children fighting for a toy. Can we prove that human’s *xing* is bad from that instance?

Mengzi uses this far-fetched method to strive to prove that “human nature (*xing*) is good” in order to found the moral standard set by Kongzi upon the basis of human nature. He continues from the example of “a child falling into a well” to the four virtues of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom. They are founded on the four ends, he claims, which refer to the sense of sympathy, the sense of shame, the sense of reverence, and the sense of right and wrong.⁴⁷⁾ For Mengzi, the four ends are founded on a human being’s good nature, as determined by *tian* and *ming*:

He who has exhausted all his mental constitution knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows heaven. To preserve one’s mental constitution, and nourish one’s nature, is the way to serve heaven. When neither a premature death nor long life causes a man any double-mindedness, but he waits in the cultivation of his personal character for whatever issue; this is the way in which he establishes his heaven-ordained being.⁴⁸⁾

In this way, the concepts *tian*, *dao*, *xing* and *ming*, all of which had been evaded by Kongzi, become hot topics for Mengzi; Kongzi’s experiential ethics seem to find a transcendental basis in Mengzi’s thought. If we review Xunzi’s criticism of Mengzi, a more in-depth understanding can be obtained about the sentences that “peculiar and unreasonable in the extreme, it lacks proper logical categories; mysterious and enigmatic, it lacks a satisfactory theoretical basis; esoteric and laconic in its statements, it lacks adequate explanations.” However, these mysterious remarks that can neither be proved nor falsified were developed even further by Confucians in the Han Dynasty.

As a representative of Confucian thought in the Han Dynasty, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 tries to bring Confucian ethics founded on family consanguinity into a cosmic mode of “correspondence of heaven and man.” He does this in order to adapt to his contemporaneous political situation of “big unification”. Dong proposes that “the great root of *dao*

47) *Mengzi*, 6A1.

48) *Mengzi*, 7A1.

comes from *tian*. *Tian* does not change, and neither does *dao*.”⁴⁹⁾ For Dong, *tian* not only has permanent existence, but is also a master that has personality. Taking it even further, he claims that *tian* is not only a natural dominator, but also the root of ethics.

The command of *tian* is called destiny that cannot run without the saint; modesty is called *xing* that cannot attain an achievement without education; human want is called emotion that cannot be restricted without institutions. So the king is cautious in carrying *tian*’s mandate in conformance of destination, and deals with education to cultivate people’s nature; he appropriates institutions and laws, discriminates the order of up and down to control human’s want; if the three are done, the great root is set.⁵⁰⁾

Elsewhere, Dong would claim that “Only the son of heaven gets his destination from *tian*, and people under heaven get their destination from the son of heaven.”⁵¹⁾ In this way, both the validity and immutability of ethics could find their roots in *tian*. Further, Dong Zhongshu brings *yin-yang* and Five Elements theory into the logical relation of heaven and human, and asserts both that “heaven and man have *yin-yang*” and that “master and minister, father and son, husband and wife all take the path of *Yin-Yang*.”⁵²⁾ At the same time, Dong matches the five elements of Metal, Wood, Water, Fire and Earth with the five general virtues of Humaneness, Righteousness, Ritual Propriety, Wisdom and Trust, and with the spatial orientations of east, west, north, south and center. Since Earth is in the center, it embodies the sovereign position of imperial power during a period of “Big Unification.”

If Dong Zhongshu’s cosmic mode of “correspondence between heaven and man” still seems a little coarse, the moral metaphysics that Neo-Confucians endeavored to build is much more elegant. The founder of Neo-Confucianism, Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤, wrote a book titled *Taiji tu shuo* 太極圖說 in order to build a theoretical mode of “harmony between heaven and man” which would fuse nature and morality together:

The Non-ultimate is also the Great Ultimate. When the Great Ultimate is brought into action, yang is derived. When the activity reaches its climax, it becomes inactive. And yin is thus derived. When the inactivity reaches its climax, the activity returns. The activity and inactivity alternate and

49) Ban, *Hanshu*, 56.26.

50) Ban, *Hanshu*, 56.26.

51) Dong, *Chunqiu fanlu*, ch. 11.

52) Dong, *Chunqiu fanlu*, ch. 57.

constitute the root of each other. By the distinction between *yin* and *yang*, the Two Modes (heaven and earth) are thus established. And by the change of *yang* and the coordination of *yin*, water, fire, wood, metal and earth are generated. With the proper arrangement of the emanative material elements, then four seasons come to run. The Five Elements integrate into *yin* and *yang*. The *yin* and *yang* integrate into the Great Ultimate. And the Great Ultimate is originally the Non-ultimate. When the Five Elements are generated, each of them gains its specific nature. The reality of the Non-ultimate and the essence of the Two and the Five mysteriously combine and coagulate. Due to the *dao* of *qian* 乾, the male come into being; due to that of *kun* 坤, the female come into being. The interaction between the two emanative material forces (*yin* and *yang*) transforms and produces myriad things, and the myriad things produce and reproduce, resulting in endless changes and transformations. It is man alone who gets the highest excellence in this transformation; therefore he is the most intelligent among creatures. Now that his physical body is already formed, his spirit begins to be conscious. In response to the action of the Five Elements in their natures, the good and the evil are distinguished, and the ten thousand affairs of human society take place. The sages settle these affairs by the doctrines of the mean, justice, benevolence, and righteousness and lay emphasis on tranquility. In this way they establish the very standard for human being. Therefore, the sages' character is identical with that of heaven and earth; their brilliance is identical with that of the sun and the moon; their scheduled actions are identical with those of the four seasons; and their fortunes are identical with those of the spiritual beings.⁵³⁾

The cosmic mode of complementation of *yin* and *yang*, together with the prevalence of Five Elements, unifies the natural thing-in-itself and the ethical spirit together in the form of self-generating, self-negating, self-developing, self-externalizing and self-returning. Cheng Yi generalizes it simply: "It is *ming* in heaven, *li* 理 in righteousness, Nature in the human, Heart in human's body, all of which are actually one thing."⁵⁴⁾

Zhu Xi inherited the thoughts of Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao and formed a large systematic philosophy by assimilating a number of other schools of thought, including Buddhism and Daoism. First, Zhu maintained that the essence of the world is *li*, or *dao*, *taiji* 太極. For Zhu, *li* is the metaphysics that goes ahead of natural and social phenomenon, and it is prior to *qi* 氣. This priority is not that of chronological order, but that of logical order: the myriad things have their *li* that cannot exist independent of *qi*. "*Li* never separates itself from *qi*. However, *li* is metaphysical and *qi* is physical. In respect of the distinction between 'beyond the forms' and 'below the forms', ('beyond

53) Zhou Dunyi ji, 3-11.

54) ErCheng yishu ch. 18.

the forms' means 'being metaphysical' and 'below the forms' means 'being physical') how could we suppose that there is no distinction of priority and posterity between them?"⁵⁵⁾

Zhu also considered *li* to be both a natural and an ethical principle. "Myriad things all have *li* that comes from the same root, but its uses are different in that its different positions."⁵⁶⁾ No matter whether it is natural phenomenon or social principle, it partakes the cosmic thing-in-itself in the form of "one Principle and its multiple manifestation" (*li yi fen shu* 理一分殊). Finally, through the process of editing the Four Books he valued the thought of "obtaining knowledge lies in the investigation of things, for knowledge comes when things are investigated" in the Great Learning. Zhu Xi also maintained that people can realize transcendental knowledge through experiential phenomena, and that they are capable of finally understanding the mystery of *li*. Zhu Xi says:

By obtaining knowledge lying in the investigation of things, we mean that investigating things to inquire its *li* thoroughly if we want to obtain our knowledge. Everyone's heart has the ability of obtaining knowledge, and everything under heaven has its *li*. As *li* has not been inquired thoroughly that knowledge has not been obtained. So in *the Great Learning*, learning man should keep in investigating myriad things under heaven through *li* that is already known till its utmost. People commit themselves to the investigation for a long time until everything is suddenly seen in a clear light, thus both the outside and inside, and the concentrate and roughage of things could be reached, and entire knowledge of our hearts could be completely obtained. That is investigation of things, and the thoroughly obtained knowledge.⁵⁷⁾

As opposed to the path followed by *Cheng Zhu lixue* 程朱理學 in which ethical principles are sought in outside cosmic thing-in-itself through the method of investigating things and obtaining knowledge, *Lu Wang xin xue* 陸王心學 proposes that cosmic spirits should be appreciated through the heart's internal nature. *The Four Sentence* of Wang Yangming 王陽明 reads: "It is no good or bad of the root of heart, while the good and bad comes into being with the tendency of will. Knowing what is good and bad is called intuition, and doing the good while dispelling the bad is called investigation of things."⁵⁸⁾ In Wang Yangming's view, intuition in the heart is the standard of judging good

55) *Zhu zi yulei*. 1, 2.

56) *Zhu zi yulei*. 18, 398.

57) *Zhu zi quanshu* 6, 526.

58) *Wang Yangming quanji*, 117.

and bad, and that of *tianli*; under the domination of *tianli* and intuition, people's behavior of doing good and dispelling bad comprises the investigation of things. Departing from the subjective idealistic path, Wang Yangming even derives the conclusion of "nothing exists outside the heart" and "no *li* exists outside the heart," claiming that: "The heart is the dominator of body. It is the reason why eyes can see, why ears can hear, and why mouth and four limbs can say and move. ... Every sensation comes from the heart."⁵⁹). Elsewhere, he writes: "It is the heart that makes heaven and earth to find their position, and myriad things get nurtured. There is nothing outside our heart"⁶⁰). For Wang, the heart is not only the supreme dominator, but also provides the universal principle for social ethics.

In general, from "the school of Zisi-Mengzi" in the period of warring states, through Confucianist thought in the Han dynasty represented by Dong Zhongshu and into the Neo-Confucianism which flourished during the *Song* and the *Ming* dynasties, Confucians continued making efforts to develop their metaphysical thinking in order to find a basis for a cosmic ontology or Heart-Nature thing-in-itself within an ethical system originally founded on patriarchal kinship. Their efforts have been largely conducted outside of the tradition of "Kongzi not talking about extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual beings" and "Kongzi seldom talking about *tian*, *dao*, *xing* and *ming*." Instead, metaphysical category of *li*, *qi*, *tian*, *dao*, *xin*, *xing*, *ming*, the spirit, intuition, intuitive ability, *wuji*, and *taiji* have become the hot topics that people fall over themselves in thinking about and speculating on. People today often highly value novelty, changes of direction in thought, no matter how well founded. Some says that this tendency fits into the social needs of the day, and some hold that it achieves the high level of rational speculation. However, whether a thought seems to fit the present situation is one thing, and whether it accords with a theoretical standard or stands the examination of time is another thing. The danger of believing that the Neo-Confucianism of the *Song* and *Ming* dynasties represents the climax of Chinese philosophical thinking leads to the arrogation of rationality, and it is important that this belief, and the tenets of Neo-Confucianism more generally, be subjected to an investigation under the platform of "critical philosophy."

59) Wang Yangming *quanji*, 119.

60) Wang Yangming *quanji*, 239.

3

The so-called “critical philosophy” is a special appellation of Kantian philosophy. In contrast to Confucian theory, which starts from ethical experience, Western philosophy first pays attention to “primordium,” attempting to inquire into the nature of what substance, being, or forces integrate the complicated objective world. Philosophers in ancient Greece proposed various views on the central question: Thales asserted that the world originated in Water; Anaximenes thought that it was Air; Heraclitus held that it was Fire; Empedocles credited the Four Elements of water, fire, earth, and air; Anaxagoras saw the origin in Seed; Leucippus and Democritus founded substance upon what they called Atom; Pythagoras made a case for Number; Parmenides and Zeno saw the origin as Existence; and Socrates and Plato made a case for Logos. Faced with a situation in which these several views argued with and criticized each other without conclusion or consensus, the 18th century philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested that instead of criticizing others’ thoughts, we should first criticize ourselves, reflecting on human rationality to see whether it is even capable of satisfactorily resolving the metaphysical question of the world’s origin. This inquiry into our epistemological ability and the limit of human rationality is what is often referred to as Kantian “critical philosophy.”

How does human knowledge come into being? Kant says: “Understanding cannot intuit, and sensibility cannot think. Only when the two combines, knowledge can come into being.”⁶¹⁾ In Kant’s opinion, human arrive at knowledge only by first obtaining experiential material in time and space, and then bring that experienced data into logical categories through their capacity for understanding. However, as objects like cosmic originality and the primordium of myriad things do not exist in time and space, they cannot be experienced by our sensibility, we cannot be properly said to be capable of obtaining any knowledge about them. “Because the principles it uses transcend the limit of experience, and are not examined by experience, this argumentation that has lost its battlefield is called metaphysics.”⁶²⁾ In this light, in Kant’s view, because they remain firmly impervious to experience, ancient people’s viewpoints about ontology are nothing but dogmatism. That is, asserting emphatically

61) Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 73.

62) Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 3.

that the originality of the world is Water, Fire, Earth, Air, Seed, Logos, Existence, etc. is only the result of self-important human rationality.

If we judge by Kant's theory, the cosmic ontology that Zisi and Mengzi make efforts in building is no more than metaphysics, and taking the cosmic originality as *li*, *qi*, *dao*, *xin*, *wuji*, or *taiji* is the so-called dogmatism. Some may say that Neo-Confucianism does not always exclude sensory experience; for example, Zhu Xi emphasizes "*liyi fenshu*" (one Principle and its multiple manifestations) and "investigating things to obtain knowledge." Indeed, Zhu Xi has used the metaphor of "the moon cutting its image in myriad rivers" in Chan Buddhism to illustrate the principle of "*liyi fenshu*", and maintains that people could arrive at transcendental *li* by traveling through experiential phenomenon. Though we may acknowledge the beauty or even cleverness of this metaphor, it remains the case that metaphors can but explain, not prove a claim, just like we cannot prove "every human is good" by resorting to the argument that "water must go down." Likewise, "*Liyi fenshu*" is physical phenomenon, while "*Liyi fenshu*" tries to explain physical phenomenon in metaphysical *Tianli*. Zhu Xi asserts:

Heaven is up, and earth is down. Between heaven and earth there are myriad things like sun and moon, mountains and rivers, human beings and animals, etc. They are all concrete and material stuff, in which principles exist separately, and that is the metaphysical *dao*. The so-called investigating thing refers to inquire the metaphysical principle to the utmost through the material stuffs.⁶³⁾

Here Zhu Xi makes it explicitly clear that experiential physical phenomenon is only significant as a means to understand a deeper reality, as a point of access into the transcendental world, so that his theory, though more elegant, does not differ in its essence from that put forward by Dong Zhongshu. Kant points out even more soberly: "Every separate experience is only part of the whole experiential area; while the absolute whole of all the possible experience is not one experience."⁶⁴⁾ The implication of Kant's assertion is that we cannot hope to obtain the principle of *tianli* through investigating things in experiential phenomenon, nor can we obtain the principles of human ethics merely from a thorough investigation of natural phenomenon. That is why Wang Yangming fails in obtaining *li* from the investigation of bamboo. In the

63) *Zhuzi yulei* 62, 1496.

64) Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, 104.

last analysis, it is because that Neo-Confucians wants to find infinite transcendental basis for a limited experiential value system that they endeavor to link physics and metaphysics by founding the latter on the basis of the former.

Influenced by Kantian “critical philosophy,” “analytical philosophy” has become the mainstream of western philosophy. As a western philosophical trend characterized by the careful, sustained analysis of language, “analytical philosophy” first treats philosophical propositions with linguistic analysis in order to exclude metaphysics through eliminating pseudo-propositions. For instance, the Logical Empiricism School follows the Kantian viewpoint of dividing valid propositions into analytical and synthetic propositions, emphasizing that all synthetic judgments are based on experience. In such a system, judgments have epistemological meaning only when they fit the principles of verifiability, testability, and accountability; because metaphysical propositions are neither analytical nor synthetic, and can neither be proved nor falsified, they are essentially reduced to being pseudo-propositions of nonsense. In this light, the pseudo-propositions disposed of in such fashion include not only the various proposals made by ancient Greek philosophers briefly detailed earlier, but also the notions of *tian*, *dao*, *xing* and *ming* proposed by ancient Chinese scholars and from which Confucian ethics come from. This is also why they cannot persuade each other, just like Mengzi cannot convince Xunzi of his “doctrine of good human nature.” If pseudo-propositions develop as they please and can neither be categorically proven or refuted, people may propose more omnifarious views, while no reliable conclusion can be reached.

Influenced by analytical philosophy, some Western philosophers began to change their interests from the exterior physical and interior psychological world to language itself. For some structuralist philosophers, each symbol has two parts, the *signans* and the *designatum*. The former refers to the symbol’s discernable form, which the latter refers to the precise meanings of the symbol’s content. However, for the ancient creator of dogmatism, the *signans* must be regarded as is sliding, and the *designatum* as functionally empty. For example, Thales’s idea of ‘Water’ is absolutely not H₂O in physical meaning; Zhang Zai’s *qi* is not hydrogen, nitrogen or oxygen. In regards to logos, *taiyi*, *wuji* and *taiji*, all are nameless, unutterable *signans*. In the same token, no matter whether what is pointed to is Originality, Existence, the Thing-in-itself, *tiandao*, or *xin*, *xing*, *ming*, *li*, it is still empty *designatum*. Using a nameless and unutterable

signans to refer to an empty *designatum* is tantamount to tautology of nonsense. Who can know how “*wuji* and *taiji*” occur? Who can know what “the mandate of *tian* is called *xing*” means?

In the 20th century, phenomenology complemented this linguistic turn. Viewed from the standpoint of the German philosopher Edmund Husserl, since we cannot obtain any valid knowledge about world ontology, phenomenon is the last resort on which knowledge can be founded. For Husserl, no matter whether we speak of an objective ontology or a subjective idea, it cannot constitute pure knowledge outside of phenomena, and should be suspended in brackets, a process which is often referred to as “the phenomenological reduction.” This method looks a lot like Kongzi’s “leaving the question open.” Of course, Kongzi neither knew the method of the phenomenological or the eidetic reduction. He does not talk about extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, spiritual beings and *tian*, *dao*, *xing*, *ming*, in that he just leaves the question open and politely keeps speculation at arm’s length when faced with those irreducible preposterous objects. His is a sober attitude of study that agrees with the most precise methods of inquiry.

As a student of Husserl’s, Martin Heidegger takes *Dasein* instead of abstract existence as the concrete beings that can only be phenomenon. (I can’t understand what this sentence is trying to say at all. Please explain this sentence in Chinese.) While ancient philosophers tried to ordain existence with concrete beings, (Confused again. Explain it in Chinese.) and posed the wrong metaphysical question (namely, “What is existence?”), thus incurring all sorts of strange statements such as ascribing the origin of world to Water, Fire, Air, etc. Avoiding this trap, Heidegger insists that existence is not only not any concrete being, but also that it is not the genus nature of all beings, claiming: “If beings are differentiated and connected by species, then being is not the definition of the highest-level of beings: being is not species. The universality of being transcends that of any species.”⁶⁵) Thus, being is not only not grounded in a recognizable physical substance like water, fire, or air, but also not rooted in logos, *Taiyi*, or Absolute Spirit. Being is not an object for us to recognize, nor can it be deduced from those objects. In this way, Heidegger definitely cuts off the path that traditional ontology had formerly pursued, holding the former as “ontology without root.” Following this standard, both western philosophers’ inquiry for cosmic

65) Heidegger, *Coming Back to the Foundation of Metaphysics*, 2.

origin and ancient Chinese's quest for moral origin are included in "ontology without root." Obviously, the key here is not the difference between eastern and western world, but that of ancient and modern time.

In a word, from the criticism to old metaphysics, to the abandoning of dogmatism, from the analysis of pseudo-proposition to the clearance of "ontology without root," modern western philosophy brings traditional metaphysics into epistemology. It does not aim to depreciate ancient philosophers' contribution, but to evade following a historical route which leads to ruin. This important work has not yet been accomplished by Chinese philosophers, however. Thus, instead of effectively ordering and analyzing the accomplishments of ancient thinkers, we only perform some superficial judgments, like singing their praises; facing academia abroad, we always complain about the lack of dialogue without noticing that we have not found the premise and terminology of the discourse.

4

In the 20th century, Modern New Confucianism has come after traditional Confucianism. Arguably, the new form is supposed to be founded on a newly theorized basis, actualizing the modern transformation of Confucian study. However, Modern New Confucianism has neither reviewed the historical reason that Confucian ethics came about within the context of globalization, nor self-criticized the theoretical problems in Confucian development under the premise of epistemology. It simply treats Confucian cultural heritage with an attitude of "continuation of living wisdom," attempting to carry on Confucian theoretical construction in a enhancing rather than a critical or interrogative spirit.

This approach brings up a number of questions. First, instead of beginning to investigate the social historical conditions under which Confucian ethics formed with Kongzi, they begin with the school of Zisi and Mengzi and further ontologize Confucianism. Xiong Shili 熊十力 clearly points out in the beginning of his *Xin weisshilun* 新唯識論: "The theory is created today to make those who want to inquire into metaphysics appreciate that the ontology of myriad things neither stays away from human heart, nor comes from epistemology, but is only proved by corresponding demonstration."⁶⁶) Later in that text, he

66) *Xiong Shili ji*, 81.

wonders: “Some may ask: Does not the study of Kongzi teach people to commit themselves to matters of fact instead of talking about conscience or ontological humanity, as seen in *The Analects*? Says: The records of disciples asking about human nature have been a lot in *The Analects*, and why not look at those? Kongzi has lived for more than 70 years, with up to 3000 students, in which 72 know Six Classical Arts and the utmost *dao*. As can be seen, his discourses about studies are quite complex, while *the Analects* is only a pamphlet, and there is no doubt that the records on it are limited. However, the topics about human nature occupy large spaces of the book. It is because Kongzi commits himself to seeking human nature that his disciples straightforwardly ask about it. Similar to Kongzi’s talking about human nature, later Confucians such as Wang Yangming applies themselves to carrying out in good intuitive terms. As is known to all, the intuitive conscience is also ontological heart-mind.”⁶⁷⁾ That Kongzi commits himself to human nature is one thing, while “never talking about human nature” is another. In the passage just cited, it is clear that Xiong Shili confuses the two. His New Cittamatra is not so much development of Kongzi studies as a continuation of Wang Yangming’s study of heart. Another Modern New Confucian, Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, simply passes over Kongzi to treat directly with Mengzi, claiming that:

Mengzi’s doctrine of human good nature is world-shaking great discovery of human beings, within which everyone is a cosmos, a universality, or eternity. One’s destiny can be seen, mastered, and resolved through one’s nature and heart-mind. Just from self-consciousness of nature and heart-mind, everyone can obtain satisfactory and self-sufficient settlement without seeking outside.⁶⁸⁾

Regrettably, this “world-shaking great discovery” lacks a reliable theoretical basis and cannot resolve people’s destiny as easily as Xu Fuguan supposes.

Although Modern New Confucians differ from traditional Confucians in that they have some knowledge about western philosophy, they tend to either dabble in it but ultimately dismiss it as overemphasizing physical science instead of metaphysics or keep the standpoint of Chinese studies while making use of and misinterpreting western studies. Xiong Shili asserts: “Western philosophy and science lack wonderful meaning and values for study.”⁶⁹⁾ Fang Dongmei 方東美

67) *Xiong Shili ji*, 174.

68) *Xu Fuguan ji*, 281.

even goes far as to acknowledge that:

The development of western philosophy in modern times follows the route of logical science, and aims at realizing subjective and objective world, emphasizing epistemology. If Chinese philosophy is to be understood in this way, only penalty term school (represented by Hui Shi 惠施 and Gong Sunlong 公孫龍) and Moist (revisionist school of Moism) in the warring states period can be studied, which declined after the Qin dynasty. I do not take the path of logical science here.⁷⁰⁾

Too often, these thinkers do not realize that modern Western philosophy diversion into epistemology is made to avoid repeating the failures of ancient ontology. This attempt to conceal the “difference of ancient and modern” under the guise of “discrimination of eastern and Western” is rather pervasive among Modern New Confucians. Zhang Junmai asserts: “There is a big question about the distinction between Chinese and Western philosophy. The question includes three points: First, the human world is emphasized in the east, while the physical world is highlighted in the West; second, values of good or bad is focused on in the East, while it is held secondary in the West; morality is hung on knowledge is the east, while the opposite is in the West.”⁷¹⁾ The popular comparison of Eastern and Western philosophy is obviously shallow.

Among the Modern New Confucians, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 is perhaps most famous for his attainments in western philosophy. He not only translated the Three Critiques of Kant, but also committed himself to well digesting and completely understanding both Eastern and Western philosophy. Unfortunately, by departing from the standpoint of constructing Confucian ontology, Mou Zongsan fails to understand Kant’s creation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; instead, he transforms the *Critique of Practical Reason* in a way that is not as successful as he would have liked it to be. In order to prove his viewpoint, he utilizes Kant’s differentiation between phenomenon and the thing-in-itself (物自體). For Kant, people can only understand phenomena in time and space, but have no access to the thing-in-itself, which while it may exist behind or beneath the phenomenon is ultimately unavailable to us and thus something that we cannot comment upon. But Mou Zongsan refused to take the thing-in-itself as a fact, negating the unknowability of the

69) Xiao, *Wenxue jianwang lu*, 111.

70) Fang Dongmei ji, 46.

71) Zhang Junmai ji, 406.

Kantian thing-in-itself; furthermore, he insisted that thing-in-itself is the root of human value, and is a moral or ethical entity which could be recognized through sensible intuition. In this way, he hands the metaphysics that Kant declines to construct in epistemology over to “theory of gongfu 功夫” in traditional Confucianism, that is, the process of comprehending moral ontology through sensible intuition. While’s Kant’s epistemology is based on the premise of perception that is shared by human beings and is pervasive, the conclusions Mou draws from sensible intuition are inherited from Wang Yangming and are similarly improvable. As is known to us, Wang Yangming suggested that one could achieve the clarity of heart-mind and human nature through the *gongfu* of determination, dhyana, and chastening in affairs, and posited that reaching the realm of “*Gongfu* appears together with realization of the root, merging objects and self, inside and outside thoroughly”⁷²). This notion of *gongfu* saturated with meditation is tinted with religious mystery, and thus totally unrelated to the philosophical premise of modern epistemology. Since everyone has his/her own *gongfu*, if your *gongfu* cannot reach my realm, then your *gongfu* is not good enough, while the validity of my *gongfu* cannot get your recognition. Thus, although this attempt to pass through ontology while avoiding strict epistemology looks pragmatic and succinct, it gets nowhere theoretically, leading to the failure of fideism.

Finally, since Modern New Confucians attempt to found their ethical theories on a philosophical metaphysics that transcends time and space, they tend to deem Confucian ethics as possessing the universal value. Mou Zongsan asserts:

The study of Confucianism has developed thousands of years from ancient time to today, and it represents the constant *dao*. The Chinese always talk about the constant *dao* that has two meanings: one is the constancy that is passing through; the other is universality that is fit for everyone, or that is extensive and universal for all human beings.⁷³)

Everyone lives in given cultural circumstance, inheriting value ideas from our ancestors. Thus, we tend to believe that this idea of value is absolutely right and reasonable. For Chinese living under the circumstance of Confucian ethical culture, the relationships of “love with distinctions” between and among monarch and minister, father and son, brothers, and husband and

72) Wang Yangming *quanji*, 117.

73) Mou, “Cong rujia de dangqian shiming shuo zhongguo wenhua de xiandai yiyi,” 154.

wife constitute the constant *dao*. For westerners living under the cultural circumstances of Christianity, human life is seen as given by God, and because all are equal before God, there should be no personal distinction between monarch and minister, father and son, brothers and sisters, or husband and wife, and thus there exists no disposition of constant *dao*. For an Indian living under the cultural circumstances of Brahmanism, one's life is given by parents while one's soul is obtained through Retribution and Samsara, thus still no disposition of constant *dao* exists.

In history, we have seen thinkers in many countries try to ontologize the ethical standard they have inherited or wish to promote in order to intensify ideology's influence. Chinese thinkers claim that "heaven does not change, and *dao* is also unchanging"; Westerners posit the existence of "innate human rights." But the fact is that nothing stays still in the world: heaven is changing and *dao* is changing too; rather, we might say that human *dao* is generated, not discovered, and that human rights are not innate, but obtained through struggle! Thus, in the historical context of globalization, any effort to ontologize the ethical system of a certain nation and impose it on other nations is detrimental or even dangerous. Therefore, we would rather seek to determine the social and historical basis of existence of different ideologies than dogmatize the ethical values that we hold onto like the fabled frog in the well. According to historical materialism, the ethical system of a nation neither drops from the sky nor is inherent in people's heads; rather, it is constructed under certain historical situations. It is for this reason that the ethical system of the Chinese differs from that of Westerners or Indians. Also, it is for this reason that the differing ethical systems of various nations have generally followed a pattern of gradual convergence in the historical context of globalization.

In general, the authors of this article do not dispute that various stages of Confucian theory, including ancient Confucianism, Han Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, have exerted important influence and even had positive effects on society. However, in our contemporary global context, if we want to make the development of Confucianism a steady accumulation of "knowledge" instead of widely disputed "opinions," if we actually want Confucianism to participate in international discourse instead of "speaking" on its own, and if we really want Confucianism to influence human beings instead of initiating cultural "conflict," we should settle down and reflect on Confucianism from a modern epistemological perspective.

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從不語天神到奢談天德 ——儒家思想的遷移

陳炎 · 孟慶雷

中文摘要

作為儒家學派的開創者，孔子本著“知之為知之，不知為不知”的理性精神，“不語怪、力、亂、神”，對經驗世界之外的信仰本體採取“存而不論”、“敬而遠之”的態度。這種樸素的“理性精神”不僅避免了原始儒學宗教化的發展方向，而且區分了經驗世界與超驗世界的知識閾限，暗合了現代化的知識標準。然而自子思、孟子以降，後儒們為了將建立在親子血緣關係之上的儒學本體化，便試圖在天、道、性、命之中尋找人倫法則的先驗依據，從而僭越了經驗世界與超驗世界的知識閾限，背離了原始儒學的理性精神，陷入了形而上學的思辨誤區。因此，剔除這些獨斷論的話語體系，不僅可以還原儒學的本來面目，而且有助於建構一種符合現代知識標準的、能夠與世界對話的中國儒學。

關鍵詞：孔子，儒學，經驗，超驗，知識，信仰

二程理學“天人感應”論略析

彭耀光

中文提要

“天人感應”觀念是中華文化傳統中的一個重要觀念。隨著宋代理學的興起，傳統的“天人感應”觀念獲得了新的發展，形成了一種新的理論形態。二程作為理學的創始人，其“天人感應”論以“理”(“天理”)為終極根據，並注重從心與事物的感應理解“天人感應”的發生原理，這大大消弱了神秘之“天”在“天人感應”中的主宰地位，將“天人感應”轉向了內在，轉向了主體內心，凸顯了心在“天人感應”中的主導地位。它實質上為傳統的“德福一致”觀念提供了一個更加深刻的理論基礎和更加有力的支撐；同時也表明，理學並非是一個單純的道德義理系統，其中也包含了功利性關懷；理學追求的“善”，是包含了幸福在內的圓滿的善。

關鍵詞： 二程，理學，天人感應，德福一致，圓善

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“天人感應”觀念在三代時期已成為一個流行的觀念，這在先秦文獻中有比較清晰的體現。¹⁾孔子雖以傳承三代文化自任，但他以義利辨天命，強調通過道德修養上達天德，三代時期那種基於功利性需求而有的“天人感應”觀念被明顯淡化。孔子這一立場為孟子、荀子等先秦儒者所繼承。而到了漢代，董仲舒為適應當時政治的需要，在吸收陰陽五行等思想的基礎上對傳統經典及儒家思想進行了新的詮釋，構建了一個以“天人感應”為核心的龐大儒學體系，“天人感應”觀念被重新加以強化，並隨著漢王朝“罷黜百家，獨尊儒術”政策的實施上升為國家統治意識形態，成為支配漢唐時期社會政治生活的重要精神力量。至宋代理學勃興，“天理”取代“天帝”成為宇宙最高實體，通過心性修養體證“天理”最終實現“天人合一”取代“天人感應”成為理解天人關係的基本模式，但傳統的“天人感應”觀念並沒有完全退出理學思想系統，而是以一種新的理論形態保留下來，形成了有別於先秦及漢代的獨具特色的“天人感應”論。深入理解這種“天人感應”論理論內涵和特色，對於全面把握理學精神具有重要意義。程顥、程頤兄弟是開創理學的核心人物，亦為理學“天人感應”論的奠基者，本文擬對二程“天人感應”論略作分析，以見理學“天人感應”論的理論特色。

一

一般而言，所謂“天人感應”是指天意與人事的交感相應，人的行為能感應上天，上天也能幹預人事，預示災祥。二程以態度理性著稱，但他們明確承認“天人感應”現象是存在的。如對《春秋》所載“隕石於宋”、“六鷁退飛”等怪異之事，程頤評論說：“‘隕石於宋’，自空凝結而隕；‘六鷁退飛’，倒逆飛也。倒逆飛，必有氣驅之也。如此等，皆是異事也，故書之。大抵《春秋》所書災異，皆天人回響應，有致之之道。如石隕於宋而言‘隕石’，夷伯之廟震，而言‘震夷伯之廟’，此天應之也。但人以淺狹之見，以為無應，其實皆應之。然漢儒言災異，皆牽合不足信，儒者見此，因盡廢之。”²⁾又說：“《春秋》書隕石隕霜，何故不言石隕霜隕？此便見得天人一處。昔嘗對哲宗說：‘天人之間甚可畏，作善則千裏之外應之，作惡則千裏之外違之。昔子陵與漢光武同寢，太史奏客星侵帝座甚急。子陵匹夫，天應如此，況一人之尊，舉措用心，可不戒慎！’”³⁾程頤明言《春秋》所記災異都是“天人響應”的表現，他認為“隕石”、“隕霜”、“震夷伯之廟”等春秋筆法意在說明這些災異的發生都是“天應之也”，並且用子陵與漢光武同寢的故事告誡哲宗“天人之間甚可畏”，這都表明他承認“天人感應”的存在。而

1) 黃樸民，《“天人感應”與“天人合一”》，16頁。

2) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，159頁。

3) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，309頁。

且在他看來，這些“天人感應”現象自有“致之之道”，即有其發生的原理，一些人不承認這種天人感應，那是持“淺狹之見”使然；但他不滿意漢儒對“天人感應”的解釋，認為那些皆是牽強附會，並不可信。

那麼，二程認為應該如何理解“天人感應”現象呢？《遺書》卷十八記載了程頤與學生的一段對話，這段對話頗能體現二程對這一問題的立場：學生問：“鳳鳥不至，河不出圖，不知符瑞之事果有之否？”程頤回答說：“有之。國家將興，必有禎祥。人有喜事，氣見面目。聖人不貴祥瑞者，蓋因災異而修德則無損，因祥瑞而自恃則有害也。”學生又問：“五代多祥瑞，何也？”程頤回答：“亦有此理。譬如勝冬時發出一朵花。相似和氣致祥，乖氣致異，此常理也。然出不以時，則是異也。如麟是太平和氣所生，然後世似有以麟駕車者，卻是怪也。譬如水中物生於陸、陸中物生於水，豈非異乎？”⁴⁾天降祥瑞是“天人感應”的重要表現形式，程頤認為“符瑞之事”有之。在程頤看來，“和氣致祥，乖氣致異”，祥瑞和災異是感得天地之“和氣”和“乖氣”所致；五代多祥瑞不過是“和氣致祥”的結果，故“亦有此理”，沒什麼好奇怪的。可以看出，程頤是用氣的感應來解釋“天人感應”的發生原理的，這與漢儒用簡單的比附解釋“天人感應”，並最終將“天人感應”的發生歸結為上天的意志確有很大不同。

這一點在另外的一些材料中可以看得更為清晰。如有人問：“人有不善，霹靂震死，莫是人懷不善之心，聞霹靂震懼而死否？”程頤回答：“不然，是雷震之也。”又問：“如是雷震之，還有使之者否？”程頤說：“不然。人之作惡，有惡氣與天地之氣相搏擊，遂以震死。霹靂，天地之怒氣也。如人之怒，固自有正，然怒時必為之作惡，是怒亦惡氣也。怒氣與惡氣相感故而。且如今人種蕎麥，自有畦隴，霜降時殺麥，或隔一畦麥有不殺者，豈是此處無霜，蓋氣就相合處去也。”⁵⁾一般來說不善之人被霹靂震死屬於“天人感應”的範圍，程頤也強調確有其事，但他否認這是天帝對人施以懲罰，而是根據同氣相感的原理，指出這是人作惡形成的惡氣與天地惡氣相感的結果。這顯然也是在用氣的感應解釋“天人感應”現象。此外，程頤在解釋“堯、舜之民，何故仁壽？桀、紂之民，何故鄙夭”的問題時也體現了同樣的立場，所謂：“才仁便壽，才鄙便夭。壽夭乃是善惡之氣所致。仁則善氣也，所感者亦善。善氣所生，安得不壽？鄙則惡氣也，所感者亦惡。惡氣所生，安得不夭？”⁶⁾

漢儒也用陰陽之氣的感應解釋“天人感應”現象，二程用氣的感應解釋“天人感應”的發生原理看似與其相同，實則有根本的區別。事實上，二程表面上是用氣解釋“天人感應”，而背後則體現了他們的理學立場。在二程理學中，“天理”(或“理”)作為形上本體具有創生性，其發用流行而為“氣”，如程頤說：“屈伸往來只是理，不必將既屈之氣，複為方伸之氣。生生之

4) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，238頁。

5) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，237頁。

6) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，224頁。

理，自然不息。”⁷⁾“生生之理”即是指理的創生性，而這種創生性表現在氣的“屈伸往來”之中，亦即陰陽二氣的相互交感推移之中。換句話說，理不是在氣之外獨立存在的實體，理不過是氣交感運行的必然性與條理性，二者構成了形而上與形而下的關係。這正如程頤所說：“離了陰陽更無道，所以陰陽者是道也。陰陽，氣也。氣是形而下者，道是形而上者。”⁸⁾因此在二程看來，理的創生性決定氣必交感：而氣的交感體現了理的創造性及其固有的條理與秩序。世界正是氣在理的支配下交感凝聚形成的，“物生則氣聚，死則散而歸盡。”二程甚至據此宣稱，“感應”是宇宙間最基本的規律，所謂“天地之間，只有一個感與應而已，更有甚事。”⁹⁾又說：“有感必有應。凡有動皆為感，感則必有應。所應複為感，所感複有應，所以不已也。感通之理，知道者默而觀之可也。”¹⁰⁾

瞭解了二程的理學立場，再看他們對“天人感應”的解釋就比較清楚了。既然理必然體現為氣的交感，氣的交感遵循理的原則，那麼怎樣的氣必然感得同樣的氣以作回應，因為它們有相同之理。更明白地說，善氣必然感得善氣相應，惡氣必然感得惡氣相應；而不同的氣又凝聚形成相應性質的事物，因而必然有相應的祥瑞或災異等事情發生。前面二程所言“相似和氣致祥，乖氣致異”、“人之作惡，有惡氣與天地之氣相搏擊，遂以震死”即典型地體現了此點。這也就是說，二程用氣的感應解釋“天人感應”，實則表明“天人感應”的發生具有“天理”的根據，是自然而必然的，體現了宇宙的法則。正如程頤回答“福善禍淫如何”的問題時所講：“此自然之理。善則有福，淫則有禍。”¹¹⁾

事實上，二程對“天人感應”能否發生以及以怎樣的形式發生，最終都歸結為“理”，將理視為發生“天人感應”的主要根據。如《外書》卷五載：“《春秋》書災異，蓋非偶然。不雲霜隕，而雲隕霜；不雲夷伯之廟震，而雲震夷伯之廟；分明是有意於人也。天人之理，自有相合。人事勝，則天不為災；人事不勝，則天為災。人事常隨天理，天變非應人事。如祈寒暑雨，天之常理，然人氣壯，則不為疾；氣羸弱，則必有疾。非天固欲為害，人事德不勝也。如漢儒之學皆牽合附會，不可信。”¹²⁾這段話應該說與前引《遺書》卷十五程頤評論“隕石於宋”、“六鷁退飛”的話表達的是同一個意思，但這段話更明確地表達了二程對“天人感應”發生原因的看法，即“天人之理，自有相合”，即是說如果人做事符合天理，那麼即便天道出現反常的情況，也非是對人的譴告；只有人違理悖德，天才降下災異，才發生“天人感應”。可以看出，二程終究是以理作為解釋“天人感應”的根

7) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，167頁。

8) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，162頁。

9) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，152頁。

10) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，858頁。

11) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，290頁。

12) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，374頁。

據。在另外一個地方程頤說得更清楚。有人問“神明感格否？”程頤明確回答說：“感格故在其中矣。孝弟之至，通於神明。神明孝弟，不是兩般事，只孝弟便是神明之理。”¹³⁾意即孝悌、神明本為一理，所以孝悌必能感格神明。這典型地是從理的角度解釋“天人感應”發生的可能性。相反，如果與理不符，二程斷然否認發生這種“天人感應”的可能性，如說：“匹夫至誠感天地，固有此理。如鄒衍之說太甚，只是盛夏感而寒栗則有之，理外之事則無。如變夏為冬降霜雪，則無此理。”¹⁴⁾可以說，以理作為“天人感應”的終極依據，是二程站在理學立場對“天人感應”發生原理所做的獨特詮釋，這與其前將“天人感應”的發生歸結為上天意志，或用簡單比附解釋“天人感應”的發生原理有根本的不同，體現了理學“天人感應”論的重要特色。

二

二程以理為“天人感應”的終極依據，實質上認為“天人感應”即是理的感應。而在二程理學中，天理具於人心，心、性、天是相通為一的，所謂“在天為命，在義為理，在人為性，主於身為心，其實一也”¹⁵⁾；又“自理言之謂之天，自稟受言之謂之性，自存諸人言之謂之心”¹⁶⁾。因此在二程看來，“天人感應”本質上是心的感應。換言之，注重從心與事物的感應理解“天人感應”現象的實質，是二程“天人感應”論另一重要特色。如前引“匹夫至誠感天地，固有此理”，“孝弟之至，通於神明。神明孝弟，不是兩般事，只孝弟便是神明之理”等等，都是從心與事物的感應理解“天人感應”，因為無論“至誠”還是“孝悌”，都是心的狀態和心的道德意識活動。又如：有人問：“東海殺孝婦而旱，豈國人冤之所致邪？”程頤回答說：“國人冤固是，然一人之意，自足以感動的天地，不可道殺孝婦不能致旱也。”¹⁷⁾即是說一人之意足以感動天地。與此相似，程頤還說：“且如水旱，亦有所致，如暴虐之政所感，此人所共見者，固是也。然人有不善之心積之多者，亦足以動天地之氣。如疾疫之氣亦如此。”¹⁸⁾明言不善之心能感疾疫之氣。這些都比較典型地體現了二程用心與事物的感應理解“天人感應”的立場。

總地來說，以理為“天人感應”的終極根據，並注重從心與事物的感應理解“天人感應”的發生原理，是二程詮釋“天人感應”的基本立場，構成了二程“天人感應”論的基本特徵。二程的這個立場在他們解釋荀彧之能應、祭祀之能享、朕兆先見於夢等問題上得到了貫徹。如《遺書》卷二下記二

13) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，224頁。

14) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，161頁。

15) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，161頁。

16) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，296頁。

17) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，237頁。

18) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，224頁。

程語：“蔔筮之能應，祭祀之能享，亦只是一個理。蓍龜雖無情，然所以為卦，而卦有吉凶，莫非有此理。以其有是理也，故以是問焉，其應也如響。若以私心及錯卦象而問之，便不應，蓋沒此理。今日之理與前日已定之理，只是一個理，故應也。至如祭祀之享亦同。鬼神之理在彼，我以此理向之，故享也。不容有二三，只是一理也。如處藥治病，亦只是一個理。此藥治個如何氣，有此病服之即應，若理不契，則藥不應。”¹⁹⁾在二程看來，占蔔之所以能得到應驗，祭祀之所以能感格鬼神來享，原因都在於它們有內在的相同之理，所以可以感應。就蔔筮言，蔔筮者以此理問之，卦以相同之理應之（一卦象代表一事物之理），所以蔔筮可以應驗。同理，祭祀者以理祈請鬼神，鬼神以同理應之，故能享祭祀。總之這些感應的發生，都遵循了與“天人感應”相同的原則，即同理相感的原則。

正如在前面已經提到的，理的感應實質上是心的感應，所以二程有時直接用心與事物的感應解釋人與鬼神的感通。如二程說：“楊定鬼神之說，只是道人心有感通。如有人平生不識一字，一日病作，卻念得一部杜甫詩，卻有此理。天地間事，只是一個有，一個無，既有即有，無即無。如杜甫詩者，是世界上實有杜甫詩，故人之心病及至精一有個道理，自相感通。以至人心在此，托夢在彼，亦有是理，只是心之感通也。死者托夢，亦容有此理。有人過江，其妻墮水，意其為必死矣，故過金山寺為作佛事。方追薦次，忽其婢子通傳墮水之妻，意度在某處作甚事，是誠死也。及三二日，有漁人撐舟，以其妻還之，乃未嘗死也。蓋旋於急流中救活之，然則其婢子之通傳是何也？亦是心相感通。既說有感通，更說甚生死古今之別？”²⁰⁾在二程那裏，鬼神是否存在以及以怎樣的形式存在是一個頗為複雜的問題²¹⁾，此處不贅。但無論在怎樣的意義上理解鬼神，這則材料表明人是可以與鬼神相感通的，而感通的方式即是心與鬼神之理的感通，人死托夢即是其表現之一。二程所言“既說有感通，更說甚生死古今之別？”其實說明人所感通者是鬼神之理，因為二程認為，生死古今本為一理。

二程對“朕兆先見於夢”的解釋同樣體現了心與事物相感通的原則。

《遺書》卷十八載：問：“高宗得傳說於夢，文王得太公於蔔。古之聖賢相遇多矣，何不盡形於夢蔔乎？”曰：“此是得賢之一事，豈必盡然？蓋高宗至誠，思得賢相，寤寐不忘，故朕兆先見於夢。如常人夢寐間事有先見者多矣，亦不足怪。至於蔔筮亦然。今有人懷誠心求蔔，有禱輒應，此理之常然。”又問：“高宗夢往求傳說耶？傳說來入高宗夢耶？”曰：“高宗只是思得賢人，如有賢人，自然應他感。亦非此往，亦非彼來。譬如懸鏡於此，有物必照，非鏡往照物，亦非物來入鏡也。大抵人心虛明，善則必先知之，不善必先知之。有所感必有所應，自然之理也。”²²⁾很明顯，在程頤

19) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，51-52頁。

20) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，46-47頁。

21) 參見張海英、張松輝，《二程之鬼神觀探析》，15頁。

22) 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，227-228頁。

看來，高宗之所以能在夢中預先知道傳說，是因為高宗至誠一心想得賢相，心有所感，故有賢人來應，高宗之夢只是這種感應的表現形式。

在寬泛的意義上說，荀箴之能應、祭祀之能享、朕兆先見於夢等現象也屬於“天人感應”的範圍。上述三方面的案例進一步表明，以理為“天人感應”的終極根據，並注重從心與事物的感應理解“天人感應”的發生原理，確實構成了二程“天人感應”論的基本立場和重要特色。

三

二程“天人感應”論的內涵看似簡單，但其中隱含的意義卻頗為重要。這可以從三個層面來談：

其一，二程以天理為“天人感應”的終極根據，在宇宙的自然運行法則意義上理解“天人感應”發生原理，相對於其前將“天人感應”歸結為上天意志，以及用簡單比附解釋“天人感應”現象，二程的“天人感應”論無疑顯得更為理性和精緻。正如前面所看到的，二程明確肯定“天人感應”現象的存在，只不過是，他們站在理學的立場上對那些看似怪異而神秘的“天人感應”現象做了新的解釋，儘量消解掉其中的神秘性和偶然性，將“天人感應”的發生視為天道運行過程中自然而必然的現象。但是，“天人感應”的神秘性並不能因此而徹底消除。正如他們所解釋的荀箴之能應、祭祀之能享、朕兆先見於夢等現象，顯然仍不同於一般的純自然的經驗事件。事實上二程明確指出，“天人感應”不是可以簡單推理認知的。如有人問“日食有常數，何治世少而亂世多，豈人事乎？”程頤回答說：“理會到極處，煞燭理明也。天人之際甚微，宜更思索。”又問：“莫是天數人事看那邊勝否？”程頤答曰：“似之，然未易言也。”²³⁾程頤提醒對方，像人事與日食之間的“天人感應”關係非常微妙，不是容易認識和說清楚的。這說明二程也承認完全對“天人感應”做出理性而清晰的解釋並不容易。但即便如此，二程仍堅信“天人感應”的發生具有理的必然性。這誠如程頤所言：“天之報應，皆如影響，得其報者是常理也；不得其報者，非常理也。然而細推之，則須有報應，但人以狹淺之見求之，便謂差互。”²⁴⁾因此，二程用天理詮釋“天人感應”，與其說是要對“天人感應”做出一種理性的解釋，不如說是要用天理為“天人感應”提供一個可以依託的基礎，從而幫助人們對“天人感應”確立一種牢固的信念。

其二，二程用“天理”取代人格神性質的“天帝”作為“天人感應”的基礎，將“天人感應”視為理的感應，並在理學立場上將理的感應轉化為心與事物之理的感應，這無疑削弱了“天”在“天人感應”中的絕對權威，凸顯了

23) 程頤、程頤，《二程集》，237頁。

24) 程頤、程頤，《二程集》，161頁。

人的主體性，其後果是客觀上終結了以往天子和朝廷對“天人感應”的壟斷地位，使每一個人都成了“天人感應”的主體。因為按照二程理學思想，每個人都內在地稟受了天理（理具於心而為性），因而每個人都與天理直接相關，當然也就不再需要通過天子和朝廷的仲介作用發生“天人感應”。從前文所引大量材料中可以看到，二程的確更重視在普通人身上所發生的“天人感應”現象。這相對於以往“天人感應”論集中在朝廷和天子與“天”的互動中說明“天人感應”現象確實是一個重大變革。同時，隨著意志之“天”被“天理”取代和“天人感應”轉化為心與事物之理的感應，“天”在“天人感應”中的地位被大大弱化，“心”成為“天人感應”中的主導和決定因素，這正如我們在前文所看到的，二程強調有心之感才有理之應，理之應是隨心之感而來的。這就意味著“天人感應”的發生及其結果，其實完全取決於人的內心意識活動，取決於自身的道德修養狀況。這樣就將“天人感應”完全轉向了內在，轉向了主體內心。這種轉向既體現了二程理學體系的內在要求，又保留了“天人感應”的精神傳統，是一個重大的理論創造。

其三，“天人感應”本質上體現了人趨吉避凶的功利性關懷，因為無論是對國家降下的祥瑞或災異，還是導致個人的吉凶禍福、生死壽夭，都關係到人的利害得失。二程不但承認“天人感應”現象的存在，而且認為其發生有理的必然性，表明二程理學並非只關注人的道德修為，並非只講“存天理，滅人欲”，完全無視人的禍福等功利性需求。只不過是，二程將“天人感應”轉向了內在，轉向了主體內心，凸顯了心在“天人感應”中的主導地位。而在二程理學中，心所標誌的是一個道德抉擇的主體，心的活動主要表現為是否遵循道德法則而動（所謂“道心”與“人心”）。所以在這樣的“天人感應”中，人的禍福完全取決於心之善惡，心善必然感應善而獲福，心惡必然感應惡而招禍，而無需上天和神靈居中裁決或予以保障。這無疑為傳統的“德福一致”觀念提供了一個更加深刻的理論基礎和更加有力的支撐。同時它也表明，只要加強內在的道德修養，即便不求福福也會自至；相反，如果內心不善，則欲避禍而不能。由此我們就可以理解，二程的理學雖然看似是一個道德義理系統，實則在“天人感應”論的配合下，這個義理系統內在地蘊含了“善則有福，淫則有禍”的功利性關懷。換言之，理學雖然宣導重義輕利甚至“存天理，滅人欲”，要人放下個人利害計較將全副精力放在內心的道德修養上，看似完全無視人的功利性需求，其實在其“天人感應”論的支持下，暗中已經做出了有德者必有福的承諾。在這樣的意義上，理學所講的“善”，並非單純的道德上的善，而是包含了幸福在內的圓滿的善²⁵⁾。

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25) 牟宗三先生對儒家的“圓善”有系統的疏解。參見牟宗三，《圓善論》。不過，就本文來看，二程理學的“圓善”與牟先生的理解有所不同，此問題另有專文探討。

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An Analysis of the “Interaction between Heaven and Man” in Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi’s Neo-Confucianism

PENG Yaoguang

Abstract

Tianren ganying 天人感應 (the interaction between Heaven and man) is an important notion in traditional Chinese culture. Along with the flowering of Neo-Confucianism during the Song dynasty, the traditional notion of the “interaction between Heaven and man” also developed new aspects during this period. Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, key founders of Neo-Confucianism, both held that the *li* 理 (Principle) or *tianli* 天理 (Heavenly Principle) is the ultimate basis of the “Interaction between Heaven and man.” They also emphasized the interaction between original mind and all things when they explained the generating principle, which greatly reduced the dominant status of the mysterious “Heaven.” As a result, the theory of the “Interaction between Heaven and man” within their thought was converted to an emphasis on the immanence or the innermost being of the subject, which they referred to as “original mind.” One long-term consequence of their interpretation is that the traditional notion of “consistence between virtue and happiness” has been fitted with a more profound theoretical basis and stronger support. In this regard, it can be said that the Neo-Confucianism was not a simple system confined to the righteousness and virtue, since it also paid attention to utilitarian values and practices. What Neo-Confucianism advocates is the highest good which can create more happiness.

Keywords: Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, Neo-Confucianism, interaction between heaven and man, consistence between virtue and happiness, the highest good

王夫之對《大學》的理解 ——以與朱熹比較為中心

林 玉 均

中文摘要

筆者在本論文中，作為理解王夫之經學的第一步，以《讀四書大全說》為中心考察了王夫之對《大學》的理解。

對於《大學》八條目的關係，王夫之說《大學》只說“先後”而沒說“前後”，認為在追求這八個條目的同時，只要區分緩急即可。因此把八條目的相互關係概括為“理一分殊”。《大學》從“大學之道，在明明德。”這句話開始。王夫之認為所謂“明德”，是指通過功夫來彰明的最高境界“心”，而不是指“性”。因為性是不可加以明之的功夫。

王夫之把“知”分為兩種：一種是知道物件，另一種是知道善惡。他強調朱熹所說的“知”應該解釋為徹底地知道善惡的“知”。因此，王夫之也理所當然地把“知”理解為知道善惡。對於知與行的關係，朱熹主張“知先行重”，王夫之則主張“知行並進”。他強烈主張不能從根本上把知與行分離開，不但知需要行，而且行也需要知。對於王夫之來說，“誠意”不是在否定意義上約束或壓制什麼，而相反是在肯定意義上使其充溢。讓“所知之理”充滿心中，徹底貫穿物件，讓“意”從那裡出來。它既不是生來就能做到的，也不是可以強求的，而是通過功夫達到一定境界時能自然而然做到的。而且，王夫之認為自謙、好好色、惡惡臭並不像朱熹所說的那樣是對意的說明，而是對心的說明。同時對於意和心的關係提出獨特的主張，即意和心互為體用、互為內外，所謂“正心”的心就是“志”。他批判朱熹沒有正確地理解“心”。

在東方的傳統社會中，很多時候把君主比喻為父親，把大臣和百姓比喻為子女，對家庭和國家給予同等的地位。所以認為，就像父親在家庭裡慈愛地對待子女一樣，君主要在國家裡慈愛地對待大臣和百姓。王夫之卻

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主張不能那麼做。如果把他們聯繫在一起，國家和家庭就沒有分別了。兩者之間雖然具有相通的道理，但是分明家庭用的是“齊”，國家用的是“治”，它們是有區別的。因此王夫之對“推”解釋說，不是把家庭的慈愛推衍到國家的慈愛，而是把家庭中的教育內容推廣到國家教育之上。可以看出，他把《大學》看作是一本徹底為教育而寫的書。

關鍵詞：八條目，理一分殊，明德，知行，誠意，家庭與國家

一、序論

新中國成立以後，中國的學問界受到唯物史觀的諸多影響，發生了各種各樣的變化。其中之一就是以前不被世人所矚目的許多學者被推崇為唯物論的先驅者。王夫之也是其中的一位。當然，現在是揚棄機械地將哲學史分為唯心論和唯物論的敘述方式，但是即使脫離新中國以後的評價，王夫之也是在朱熹以後建立了龐大的哲學體系的哲學家。這是不可否認的事實。

無論是受到了何種影響，對於王夫之的研究從1960年代以來都很活躍。只不過令筆者惋惜的是沒有關於王夫之經學的先行研究。以《周易內傳》和《周易外傳》為中心的研究較為活躍，儘管他在經學方面留下了許多業績，但是對其經學的研究卻寥寥無幾。最大的原因在於他的文章比較難解。清代考證學者的文章以難解著稱，而王夫之的文章比起清代的其他學者更是難上加難。當他渴望的“恢復明朝”以失敗告終之後，即在三十歲以後就過著隱遁的生活，全心致力於著述事業，使得他與當時學界的共同語言相隔絕。

源於這種結果，無論中國還是韓國、日本，都沒有一本關於王夫之著作的翻譯書籍。只有幾本在原文上附加注釋的注釋書。筆者作為東洋思想研究會的一員，從二十年以前開始研讀王夫之的《讀四書大全說》，已經讀完《大學》、《中庸》和《論語》部分，現在正在讀《孟子》。《大學》光讀就用了五年的時間，為了出版韓文版又在翻譯、修改、講解上用了五年的時間，共計十年。可見王夫之的文章有多麼難解。

可是在筆者看來，如果沒有對王夫之經學的先行研究，就不能真正瞭解王夫之的思想。尤其是他在讀《四書大全》時以筆記形式披瀝其想法的《讀四書大全說》，對於這部著作的研究是理解王夫之思想所必需的先行研究。

因此筆者在本論文中，首先對王夫之《讀四書大全說》中的《大學》部分進行研究。然後是《中庸》、《論語》、《孟子》的研究。因為《讀四書大全說》綜合了朱熹以及後世學者們學說，自然王夫之在著述《讀四書大全說》的時候，時而接受他們的學說，時而又批判他們的學說。但是王夫之的爭論焦點仍然在朱熹身上。對於其他人的論述是次要的。所以本論文將以王夫之對朱熹《大學章句》的論述為中心，考察《讀四書大全說-大學》中他對《大學》的理解。

二、對《大學》的理解：理一分殊

朱熹說：“致知格物只是一事，非今日格物，明日又致知。”¹⁾雖然朱熹只是在論述“致知”和“誠意”的順序，但是《大學》八條目的整體順序也

是如此的。

王夫之也和朱熹一樣，認為沒有必要說“致知”和“誠意”的前後，對《大學》八條目的關係明確下結論：“經言先後，不言前後。”²⁾ 按照王夫之的解釋，前後是時間順序，先後是緩急順序。³⁾ 即是說，這不是按照時間順序在前面做、在後面做的問題，而是根據重要程度先做急的、後做慢的問題。當然王夫之的話也有問題。按照時間順序來看，急著要做的事情終究要在前面進行。然而王夫之所要強調的是，不能嚴格地按照時間順序上的“前後”來解釋《大學》的八條目。

事實上，如果嚴格地按照時間順序上的“前後”來解釋《大學》的八條目，只有做完一個條目才能開始下一個條目的功夫，《大學》一書就不具備可能性。單純窮究對象時間都不夠用。所以《大學》的這八個條目，實際上是應該同時去追求的德目。

即便是同時發生的事情，其境界分明也是不同的。一個階段的完成是不能保障其他階段的完成的。例如，不是窮究了對象就能自然地達到“致知”。王夫之認為，如果那樣想，就會造成省略掉“致知”之“致”功夫的結果。⁴⁾

如果因為作用是一樣的，所以“窮究物件”等於“致知”，那麼“致知在於窮究物件”這句話不過是同語反復罷了。那樣就絲毫沒有區分八條目的意義。

歸根結底，對於《大學》八條目的相互關係，王夫之的結論是“理一分殊”。就是說，雖然能用一個道理去貫穿，但是不能用一個去自動地保障另一個，而且包含著另一個層次的功夫和事情。因為王夫之是這樣理解八條目關係的，所以把整篇《大學》理解為“理一分殊”。對此筆者將在以下篇章進一步探討。

三、明德問題

《大學》從“大學之道，在明明德，在新民，在止於至善。”⁵⁾一文開始。首先討論“明德”問題。朱熹在《大學章句》中對“明德”這樣說明：

1) 黎靖德，《朱子語類》，4738頁。

2) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，18頁：“經言先後，不言前後。前後者，昨今之謂也，先後者，緩急之謂也。”

3) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，18頁：“前後者，昨今之謂也，先後者，緩急之謂也。”

4) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，10頁：“竟雲格物則知自至，竟刪抹下「致」字一段功夫矣。”

5) 胡廣，《四書大全》，34頁。文章中的“新民”在《古本大學》裏為“親民”，是朱熹接受程子之說將“親民”改為“新民”。這裏明確反映了一個士大夫把百姓當作要革新的對象的立場。王陽明反對朱熹之說，主張要像《古本大學》那樣寫為“親民”。對於“新民”的討論並非本論文的主題，加以省略。由於本論文是在比較朱熹和王夫之，所以將以朱熹《大學章句》為基準，引用《大學》。

明明之也。明德者，人之所得乎天而虛靈不昧，以具衆理而應萬事者也。但為氣稟所拘，人欲所蔽，則有時而昏。然其本體之明，則有未嘗息者，故學者當因其所發而遂明之，以復其初也。⁶⁾

首先，朱熹對“明德”之“明”解釋為“明明之也”。可是王夫之更進一步，將其分為“明”和“光”兩種。“明”是指內在的明亮，“光”是指外在的明亮。王夫之認為，鏡子雖然有內在的明亮，卻不向外發出光芒。相反，火雖然向外發出光芒，內部卻不存在明亮。⁷⁾ 所以“明德只是體上明，到致知知字上，則漸繇體達用，有光義矣。”⁸⁾ 即是說，“明德”作為個人的心狀態，只有當它進入致知的階段，才能對其他物件產生影響。

王夫之還主張，《大學》畢竟是關於個人修身的書，並不是關於治理別人的書。用現代語言說，是道德教科書，而不是政治教科書。因此，“明明德於天下”一語也不能解釋為明明德於一般百姓，⁹⁾ 而應該解釋為廣泛地明明德。¹⁰⁾

其次，按照上面引用的朱熹的話，朱熹把“明德”理解為“虛靈不昧，以具衆理而應萬事”的“心”。王夫之基本上接受朱熹的這個主張。他也把“明德”理解為“心”。

王夫之把“心”看作是我們身上具備的所有“用”。“手能持”的能力，這正是“心”。¹¹⁾ 這和現代將“用”與大腦聯繫起來進行思考的思維方式是有區別的。如果按照王夫之的主張，就不能有脫離身體的“心”存在。雖然身和心是不能分離的，但是無論怎樣身體都是主要的。正如不能脫離具體的事物去思考某種功能，不能脫離身體去思考“心”。

但是王夫之認為，這個“心”與“正心”之“心”的意思是不同的。¹²⁾ 它不是要端正的對象“心”，而是把它作為基準去端正的“心”。因此王夫之強調，只有“明德”才是人與蒙昧的動物之間的區別所在。就是說，人只有具備了明德才能被稱之為人。¹³⁾ 王夫之說：“繇有此明德，故知有其可致而致之，意有其不可欺而必誠焉，心有所取正以為正。”¹⁴⁾

歸根結底，王夫之雖然承認“明德”不是本性而是“心”，但是這個“心”

6) 胡廣，《四書大全》，34-35頁。

7) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，3頁：“如鏡明而無光，火光而不明，內景外景之別也。”

8) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，3頁。

9) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，13頁：“固如朱熹所雲規模須如此，亦自我之推致而言，非實以其明明德者施教於民也。

10) 具體來說，正如在家庭進行孝道、恭遜、慈愛的教育，國家也應當廣泛進行教育。參照第六章。

11) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，3頁：“此處說心，則五臟五官，四肢百骸，一切虛靈不昧底都在裏面。

12) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，2頁：“緣德上著一明字，所以朱熹直指為心。但此所謂心，包含極大，託體最先，與正心心字固別。”

13) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，2頁：“此則合得停勻，結得清爽，終留不失，使人別於物之蒙昧者也。”

14) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，3頁。

不是朱熹所說的應萬事的“心”，而是作為最高境界去彰明的“心”。所以這個“心”始終是要通過功夫去彰明的“心”。

因而，王夫之主張決不能對“明德”與“性”等同看待。他主張，因為只有人具有“明德”，所以不能將“明德”視為“性”。因為“性”是陰陽五行之妙合、凝結而成的，它是對自然賦予人的所有一切的統稱。¹⁵⁾ 即是說，王夫之把自然賦予人的“心”通過磨練而獲得的德性表現為“明德”，認為正是這個“明德”使人成為區別於其他動物的人。因為單從“性”上看，無論人還是動物，都是自然賦予給他們的。

王夫之對“明德”不能是“性”的理由這樣說明：人的本性不能被拘束或遮蔽，終究要以某種形式顯露出來。孟子為說明人人都具有惻隱之心，舉出無論誰看到將要掉進井裡的孩子都會瞬間產生惻隱之心的例子。這正是“仁”的本性以惻隱的感情顯露出來。這是人奈何不得的。¹⁶⁾ 而且《大學》說“明明德”，“性”也不是“可加以明之”的功夫。¹⁷⁾ 所以決不能把“明德”看作是“性”。於是王夫之說，可拘蔽的是“心”，而且能通過格、致、誠、正的功夫恢復原來之“明”的也是“心”。

朱熹把“明德”表現為“虛靈不昧”，王夫之則把“虛”解釋為“未有私欲”，“靈”解釋為“鹹善”，所以“不可雲如虛空”，“不可作機警訓”。¹⁸⁾ 這樣看來，他是完全從價值論的角度去理解“心”的。而且把“不昧”解釋為將最初得到的維持到最後，從外部得到的同樣延續到內部，所以不能按照佛教方式把“不昧”解釋為“常惺惺”。¹⁹⁾ 如果參照王夫之的這種解釋，那麼事實上與其把“明德”解釋為明亮的德，不如解釋為純粹的德。

朱熹指出，因為明德“為氣稟所拘，人欲所蔽，則有時而昏”，所以要通過功夫去“復其初”。但是王夫之卻不認為，“人生來就被上天賦予明命，在生存的過程中受到外部影響而變得昏暗。因此要不懈地努力去明之”。王夫之強調，這種觀點和以尋找本來面目為修養目標的佛教沒有什麼區別。他反而認為，明命面對的是未來，而不是過去，所以需要不斷地追求。

在這種意義上看，王夫之比起在主張“性善”說的同時又主張“復初”的孟子，更接近於在主張“性惡”說的同時又主張“積致”的荀子。事實上王夫之認為，“性”不是生下來被賦予一次就結束了，而是每天都在被賦予。他這樣說道：

15) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，2頁：“性是二氣五行妙合凝結以生底物事，此則合得停勻，結得清爽，終留不失，使人別於物之蒙昧者也。”

16) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，3頁：“性自不可拘蔽。儘人拘蔽他，終奈他不何，有時還迸露出來。[如乍見孺子入井等。]”

17) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，3頁：“既不可拘蔽，則亦不可加以明之之功。”

18) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，3頁：“虛者，本未有私欲之謂也。[不可雲如虛空。] 靈者，曲折洞達而鹹善也。[《尚書》靈字，只作善解，孟子所言仁術，此也。不可作機警訓。]”

19) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，3頁：“不昧有初終表裏二義，初之所得，終不昧之，於表有得，裏亦不昧。[不可雲常惺惺。]”

愚於周易尚書傳義中，說生初有天命，向後日日皆有天命，天命之謂性，則亦日日成之爲性，其說似與先儒不合。今讀朱熹無時而不發現於日用之間一語，幸先得我心之所致。²⁰⁾

這篇文章充分體現出，王夫之是一位比“本體”更重視“作用”，比“靜”更重視“動”的哲學家。他認為，“本性”並不是出生時就被固定下來，而是在每天的運動中形成。“本性”不是一成不變的。他的這一發言，令一直以來圍繞“本性”所展開的無數辯論變得黯然失色，至少可以說是與這些辯論相提並論的一個“性論”。

四、知行關係

(一) 以價值論為中心的認識論：“知”是知道善惡

朱熹所說的“知”不是經驗的“知”，而是“知愛其親；及其長也，知敬其兄；以至於饑則知求食，渴則知求飲。”²¹⁾的原本已有的“知”。朱熹的“致知”可以說是通過“格物”確認到天下萬物都具有仁義禮智的道理，知道這個道理也存在於我的內心，需要不斷地實踐下去。²²⁾

按照王夫之的說法，“知”有兩種：一種是知道物件，另一種是知道善惡。前面朱熹所說的“知”指稱的不是前者，而是後者。客觀地知道物件並不直接與自身的行為相關，只有通過研究物件去知道善惡，取得行為準則，才可以說是朱熹的“知”。而王夫之批判，由於後世學者們在解釋朱熹的時候，混淆了兩種“知”，從而造成了混亂。

王夫之強調，對於朱熹的“知”，應當從價值論的角度解釋為徹底地知道善惡。而不是從存在論的角度解釋為通過研究知道物件。因此，朱熹的“格物”雖然也是研究物件，但不是從客觀、科學的角度加以認識的。可以說這不僅是朱熹思想的特徵，還是東方思想的普遍特徵。至於它帶來了什麼結果，給予了什麼影響，又是另外一個問題。²³⁾

正如我們從“強調在價值論的觀點上將朱熹的‘知’解釋為知道善惡”中可以看出，王夫之本人的“知”也當然是知道善惡。即使王夫之所說的“知”不是關於對象的客觀性的知，王夫之也認為有時關於物件的客觀性的知就

20) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，13頁。

21) 黎靖德，《朱子語類》，539-540頁。

22) 林玉均，《戴震》，29頁。

23) 通常認為，將存在論還原為價值論的東方思維造成科學思維的缺陷，致使東方在現代落後於西方。可是，如果想一想不做任何邏輯上的探討、只追求“如實地說明(wie es eigentlich gewesen)”的現代科學和醫學不知道會帶來何種破滅，那麼把所有事物都與價值聯系起來的東方思維的作用，也是不容忽視的。上面引用的“如實地說明”是德國著名的史學家蘭克所說的話。蘭克生活在一個人類的內心充滿希望的時期。所以史學界也認為可以如實地究明過去的事實，從而把它作為學問的標語。

是知道善惡，這時的善惡就與物件相關。王夫之舉的例子正是知道“不能與壞人交往”和“不能服用壞藥”的情況。在這種情況下，因為壞的因素存在於物件，所以窮究物件就能達到“致知”。可是，在我的心裡產生壞的想法，決不是窮究物件所能知道的，只有在自身上求索才能知道。知道暴食對身體不好也同樣是因為自己親身經歷過，所以才知道的事情。²⁴⁾ 無論是知道存在於對象的善惡，還是知道存在於自身的善惡，最終可以總結為王夫之所說的“知善知惡是知”。

(二) 知行並進

朱熹用比喻的方法說明必須同時需要知與行，“如目無足不行，足無目不見”²⁵⁾。即是說，當我們把某個地方指定為目標時，用眼睛觀察方向和距離等，實際用腳去走才能到達目標，只憑一個是不能到達目標的。和這個比喻相同，知與行都是我們所需要的。朱熹聽弟子說湖南有個先生只教“行”，便反問道：“義理不明，如何踐履？”²⁶⁾就是說，知得在先。

而另一方面，就像不能只用眼睛看，還要用腳去走，才能到達目標一樣，只有“知”就不能稱之為學問，要加以“行”。因此朱熹承認“知”是為“行”而存在，強調“行”的重要性。作為結論，他這樣說：“論先後，當以致知為先；論輕重，當以力行為重。”²⁷⁾朱熹對於知行關係的說明，一句話可以說是“知先行重”。²⁸⁾

可是王夫之卻批判朱熹，因為知與行是並進的，所以不能說知是先於行的。王夫之的立場是，由於知與行緊密相連，所以不能從時間上論其先後。就是說，不是“致知”以後才付之於行動。

例如，《大學》所說的定、靜、安、慮是一個邏輯順序，而不是時間順序。它們不是依次進行，而是在相互關聯的基礎上同時進行。所以不是按照結束“定”之後開始“靜”功夫的方式進行。因而王夫之說，沒有必要費力氣去重新開始各自的功夫。²⁹⁾只有按照這種方式下功夫，得到“條理”，才能結束篤行的階段，而邁向另一個階段。

從王夫之的立場上看，反而不是得到條理之後去行事，而是行事之後得到條理。即是說，在實踐的過程中獲得理論。可以說毛澤東的實踐論也

24) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，10-11頁：“且如知善知惡是知，而善惡有在物者，如大惡人不可與交，觀察他舉動詳細，則雖巧於藏奸，而無不洞見；如砒毒殺人，看本草，聽人言，便知其不可食，此固於物格之而知可至也。至如吾心一念之非幾，但有愧於屋漏，則即與蹠為徒，又如酒肉黍稻本以養生，只自家食量有大小，過則傷人，此若於物格之，終不能知，而唯求諸己之自喻，則固分明不昧者也。”

25) 黎靖德，《朱子語類》，309頁。

26) 黎靖德，《朱子語類》，315-316頁。

27) 黎靖德，《朱子語類》，309頁。

28) 參見林玉均，《戴震》，41-42頁。

29) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，8頁：“定靜安慮相因之際，不無相長之功，而不假更端之力。”

在這個延長線上。之所以新中國成立之後王夫之重新受到矚目，就是因為王夫之的實踐觀給予了很大的影響。

按照王夫之的想法，因為我們所要知道的物件是無限的，所以既不能知道所有的物件，也沒有必要都知道，況且就算充分知道了物件，把它付之於行動時也不能保證肯定是對的。請看下面的文章。

蓋天下之事，固因豫立，而亦無先知完了方纔去行之理。使爾，無論事到身上，繇你從容去致知不得；便儘有暇日，揣摩得十餘年，及至用時，不相應者多矣。³⁰⁾

王夫之主張：正是在這個部分上，儒學的功夫不同於異端佛教的參禪。他認為，即使佛教徒按照這種方式參禪後達到“致知”，在實際行動時也只能出現錯誤。要想達到知的最高境界，就必須終生不斷地研究。即便如此，也不是把行動推到後面，而是通過反復的行動去驗證知，完成知(致知)。

因此王夫之主張，致知的功夫要有行功夫與之並行，才能成為真正致知的功夫。舉例說明一下。我們在小的時候對“孝道”進行學習。其中最平常的一句話就是“冬天使父母溫暖，夏天使父母涼爽”。但這不是孝道的原理，只不過是一個“禮”而已，不能說那樣就盡完孝道了。其他行動準則也是如此。如果按照“這種時候要這樣做”的方式定立孝道的準則，就會無窮無盡。就算學了再多的孝道，如果不付之於行動，也就不能說他是真正盡孝道的人。想要盡孝道的人必須用心去察看父母的心，將注意力集中在與父母相關的事情上，盡自己的最大努力。這時自己所知道的關於孝道的知識就能成為一個準則。但它不能告訴你關於孝道的所有一切。因此，按照王夫之的話，想要盡孝道的人不能光滿足於知道孝道，還應該不付之於行動。只有這樣，知才能成為真正的知。王夫之對此說：“是知中亦有行也。”³¹⁾

不僅是孝道，世上所有的人際關係和事情也都是如此。如何能對所有的具體情況一一制定行動準則？可是人的認知能力具有一個特性，就是即使不去窮究所有的物件和事情，也能通過對其中重要部分的窮究，領悟出普遍的原理。這便是朱熹所說的“豁然貫通”。

與上述情況相反，從“誠意”到“平天下”，朱熹雖然把它們包括在“行”之中，但是其中也會存在知的領域。³²⁾並不是盲目地用心去做，所有事情就都能圓滿完成，必須要有事先知道以後再去做的事情。例如治理國家的事情，不是盡了最大的努力，就能得到最好的結果。只有瞭解治理國家的方法和當前國家的現狀，才能做出準確的判斷和正確的行動。所以，王夫之認為“行”絕對需要“知”。

正是這樣，王夫之的思想中知與行不是一分為二的，而是合二為一

30) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，17頁。

31) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，17頁。

32) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，3頁：“知此，則誠意以下亦有知之之功，亦可知矣。”

的。在東方思想家之中，提出最近似於辯證法理論(粗略概括為通過實踐驗證理論，通過理論為實踐提供準則)和實踐邏輯的人可以說是王夫之。

五、誠意問題

(一) 毋自欺

《大學》的本文中說：“所謂誠其意者，毋自欺也，如惡惡臭，如好好色，此之謂自謙。故君子必慎其獨也。”³³⁾

可是王夫之卻解釋說，“毋自欺”不是對誠意下定義，而是通過相反一面的說明突出誠意。就是說，想通過說明自欺之人的弊端，反過來形容誠意。³⁴⁾就像我們不直接說A就是B，而是說A不是C、不是D、不是E來突出A。孔子也是在說“仁”的時候，不直接說仁是這樣的，而是說這樣的不是仁，從而間接地突出仁。

因此王夫之強調，絕對不能因為說“毋自欺”，就以為是對誠意的定義，認為誠意具有在否定意義上所說的約束之意。所謂“誠意”，是指將“意”只傾注在一個地方，而不是約束這個“意”。“意”也不是能約束的。意不誠，心裡就無法樹立任何主觀。《中庸》把它表現為“不誠無物”。只有意誠之時，心裡的主觀才能明確樹立，成為行動或說話的準則。否則，在實際說話或行動的時候不能給予任何幫助。

因此，王夫之將“毋自欺”定義為：“如此撲滿條達，一直誠將去，更不教他中間招致自欺，便謂之毋自欺也。”³⁵⁾然後繼續對“誠意”說：

要此誠意之功，則是將所知之理，遇著意發時撞將去，教他喫個滿懷；及將吾固正之心，喫緊通透到吾所將應底事物上，符合穿徹，教吾意便從者上面發將出來，似竹筍般始終是者個則樣。³⁶⁾

概括地說，王夫之所說的“誠意”結果就是，讓“所知之理”充滿心中，徹底貫穿物件，讓“意”從那裡出來。

“誠意”不是在否定意義上約束或壓制什麼，而相反是在肯定意義上使其充溢。王夫之用下面的例子來比喻它。即，誠意不是像窮人家那樣總是擔心缺少什麼，而是像富人那樣自由地使用充溢的東西。³⁷⁾就是說，

33) 胡廣，《四書大全》，79頁。

34) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，18頁：“傳文原非以「毋自欺」為「誠其意」硬地作註腳，乃就意不誠者轉念之弊而反形之。”

35) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，18-19頁。

36) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，18頁。

37) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，20頁：“若誠其意者，須是金粟充滿，而用之如流水，一無吝嗇，則更不使有支撐之意耳。”

不能因為要戒慎就把“誠意”理解為謹言慎行。當誠意充滿心中，形成一種習慣，能自然行動時，才能把它稱之為“誠意”。

自然地體現“誠意”不是馬上能做到的，而是要通過功夫達到一定境界的時候才具有可能性。要是想像“惡惡臭”和“好好色”那樣從一開始就會做，那是不可能的。因為惡惡臭和好好色是很自然的事情，所以誠意的階段已經達到這種程度人自然會做到。³⁸⁾ 但是，沒有達到這種程度的人硬要去做是做不到的。一方面，全然沒有努力去做的人好比“閹宦”和“黷室人”，既不會好好色，也不會惡惡臭。³⁹⁾

可是“誠意”是關於功夫的說明，與母親精心地照顧子女是不同的。母親精心照顧子女是出於天性，無須功夫也自然能做到。⁴⁰⁾ 但是“誠意”必須要有戒欺、求謙、慎獨的功夫。王夫之強烈批判，同樣一個“誠”字能具有完全不同的含義，就算是一樣的字，也不能不考慮前後文章的內容，認為它具有同樣的含義。這和玩“拈字酒令”時，不考慮字的含義，只考慮字的外形，是沒有區別的。⁴¹⁾

(二) 自謙、好好色、惡惡臭不是對功夫的表現，而是對心體的表現

朱熹對《大學》本文中的“自謙”加了這樣的注釋：“使其惡惡則如惡惡臭，好善則如好好色，皆務快去而求必得之，以自快足於己。”

但是，王夫之認為《大學》中的“自謙”不是對功夫過程的表現，而是對通過功夫過程所獲得的心體(心狀態)的表現。因此，朱熹在《大學章句》中使用的“務”和“求”是錯誤的表現。⁴²⁾ 這是因為它們是適合於表現功夫過程的語言，而不是適合於表現通過功夫過程所獲得的心體的語言。

《孟子·公孫醜上》中有一個描寫“揠苗助長”的故事。⁴³⁾ “揠苗助長”不是幫助禾苗成長，而是把禾苗弄死。王夫之批判，朱熹在說明“誠意”的時候，說明“務快去而求必得之”，就和這個故事是一回事。王夫之認為，朱熹的這個說明不僅不能讓人正確地掌握“誠意”的意思，反而會誤導那些初學的人。就是說，好之者必求之、惡之者必去之的做法絕對不能成為“誠”功夫。而且指出，“毋自欺”所表現的只是“誠意”的反面，並沒有提示具體的功夫方法，是朱熹理解錯了。

38) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，20頁：“好好色惡惡臭，已然則不可按遏，未然則無假安排，是以得謂之誠。”

39) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，20頁：“其不爾者，如閹宦之不好色，黷室人之不惡臭，豈有所得用其力哉？”

40) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，39頁：“凡母之於子，性自天者，皆本無不誠，非以「誠」字為功夫語。”

41) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，39頁：“此如拈字酒令，搭著即與安上，更不顧理。”

42) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，20頁：“傳雲此之謂自謙，明是指點出誠好誠惡時心體，非用功語。章句中務字求字，於語勢既不符合。”

43) 胡廣，《四書大全》，2217頁：“宋人有閹其苗之不長而揠之者，芒芒歸歸，謂其人曰，今日病矣，予助苗長矣。其子趨而往視之，苗則槁矣。”

王夫之反而認為，《大學章句》中適合於“自謙”的表現是，“其雲內外昭融，表裏澄徹，正是自謙時意象”。⁴⁴⁾因為這段文章才是形容心體的表現。

而且按照王夫之所說，好好色、惡惡臭的主體不是“意”而是“心”。⁴⁵⁾這是因為“意”是主動的，能把自己的想法投影到物件上，而“心”卻是被動的，只能接受物件其本身。⁴⁶⁾於是王夫之認為，所謂好好色、惡惡臭，不是把自己好惡的想法投影到好色和惡臭這兩個對象上，而只是當好色和惡臭作為對象向我靠近時，把它接受為好與惡而已。所以它們不屬於“意”而屬於“心”。

那麼，王夫之是怎樣理解“意”和“心”的關係，才這樣說的呢？下面將更為仔細地考察這個問題。

《大學》的本文中說誠意→正心→修身，所以即使不考慮時間順序，單從邏輯順序來看，通常也會認為意在心之前，意為體、心為用。可是王夫之卻說，不能被《大學》的這個順序所迷惑，做出錯誤的判斷。

王夫之的主張很獨特，他認為意和心互為體用、互為內外。即是說，有時意為體、心為用，有時心為體、意為用，有時意為內、心為外，有時心為內、意為外。

而且王夫之還認為，所謂“正心”的“心”接近於“志”。王夫之批判：“朱熹於此心字，尚未的尋落處，不如程子全無忌諱，直下志字之爲了當。”⁴⁷⁾

論述志與意的關係時，王夫之首先說志為體、意為用。

惟夫志，則有所感而意發，其志固在，無所感而意不發，其志亦未嘗不在，而隱然有一欲爲可爲之體，於不睹不聞之中。⁴⁸⁾

根據這段文章，志為體、意為用。在王夫之看來，當我們具有某種志的時候，它會以意的形式向外部表現。所以王夫之說，只有做到誠意和正心之後，才能在此基礎上走向修身、齊家、治國、平天下。如果不正心，就算有誠意也不能期待永久性，從而不能進行那之後的事情。這是因為沒有正心作為其根本。⁴⁹⁾

可是王夫之又說：“然意不盡緣心而起，則意固自爲體，而以感通爲因。故心自有心之用，意自有意之體。”⁵⁰⁾論述意也能成為體，心也能成

44) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，21頁。

45) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，23頁：“且以本傳求之，則好好色、惡惡臭者，亦心而已。”

46) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，23頁：“意則起念於此，而取境於彼。心則固有焉而不待起，受境而非取境。”

47) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，30頁。

48) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，8-9頁。

49) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，9頁：“不於此早授之以正，則雖善其意，而亦如雷龍之火，無恒而易爲起滅。[故必欲正其心者，乃能於意求誠。]乃於以修身，而及於家、國、天下，固無本矣。”

50) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，26頁。但是，因為“意”不具有常體，所以在“體”的角度上不能說是意→心→身的順序。

為用。如此看來，王夫之在理解《大學》的時候，認為志和意的關係是可以互相交替的。王夫之主張的獨創性就在於他認為二者的關係是可以互相交替的。

對於心和意的內外問題，王夫之也持有獨特的見解。即，不能一概而論地說心內意外或者心外意內，而是要說時而心內意外、時而心外意內。

首先王夫之承認心靜、意動，從因心發意的角度來看，說“心為體於中”、“意發用於外”是對的。⁵¹⁾ 但是從另一個角度來看，“意”是別人不知道只有自己知道，相反“心”則是無論自己知道與否，都會被別人看穿。比起對別人隱藏的意，心更容易向外表現，所以還可以說意為內、心為外。⁵²⁾ 於是，王夫之最後主張說，心和意互為內外。

六、家庭與國家

《大學》的第八章《齊家章》借用《書經·康誥》之語，說道：“康誥曰，如保赤子，心誠求之，雖不中，不遠矣。未有學養子而後嫁者也。”王夫之解釋說，這段文章中的“如”字所強調的是，齊家和治國具有相通的道理，不是脫離家庭另外樹立一個教導，而只在於推廣。⁵³⁾

對上述《康誥》之語，朱熹注釋為：“此引書而釋之，又明立教之本，不假強為，在識其端而推廣之耳。”王夫之認為朱熹的這個注釋裡需要注意的是“耳”字，要求仔細觀察這個注釋。所謂“耳”是限定的意思，既然說“推廣之耳”，就是限定在那裡。而且“推”也不是說像在家庭裡做的那樣在國家進行。因為只是說“明立教之本”，所以就是說推廣家庭中的教育內容，在國家裡進行同樣的教育。

在東方的傳統社會中，很多時候把家庭和國家等同看待。即，把君主比喻為父親，把大臣和百姓比喻為兒女等等。可是按照王夫之的主張，這種想法是錯誤的。“推”並不是說，推衍家庭中父親對子女的慈愛，君主在國家裡慈愛地對待大臣和百姓們，只是說君主應該在國家裡對大臣和百姓們教導父親在家庭中教育子女的內容。⁵⁴⁾即是說，在家庭裡教導孝道、恭敬、慈愛，在國家裡還是教導孝道、恭敬、慈愛。⁵⁵⁾王夫之這樣反問：

51) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，25頁：“自一事之發而言，則心未發，意將發，心靜為內，意動為外。又以意之肖其心者而言，則因心發意，心先意後，先者為體於中，後者發用於外，固也。”

52) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，26頁：“人所不及知而已所獨知者，意也。心則己所不睹不聞而恒存矣。乃己之睹聞，雖所不及而心亦在。乃既有其心，如好惡等 皆素志也。則天下皆得而見之，是與夫意之為人所不及知者較顯也。故以此言之則意隱而心著故可雲外。”

53) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，38頁：“所引書詞，斷章立義。但據一‘如’字，明二者之相如。而教有通理，但在推廣，而不待出家以別立一教。”

54) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，38頁：“所謂推者，乃推教家以教國也，非君子推其慈於家者以使國之衆也。”

認章句之旨不明，乃謂君子推其慈家之恩以慈國，其於經傳「齊」「治」二字何與？⁵⁶⁾

即，如果君子推慈愛家庭的恩惠去慈愛國家，家庭和國家就沒有分別。那麼用齊家和治國把家庭和國家分開來說，就絲毫沒有意義。這種情況，只要說齊家庭和國家，或者說治家庭和國家，不就足夠了嗎？王夫之認為，既然《大學》本文中說家要齊、國要治，那麼兩者之間肯定是有差別的。因此，不能推齊家去治國，只能推衍教育家裡人的內容，用這種教導去治理國民。

正如我們從王夫之對家庭與國家關係的論述中所看到的，王夫之在解釋《大學》的時候一再強調的是“理一分殊”。雖然個人、家庭、國家、世界都具有相通的一個道理，但是它們分別屬於不同的層次，所以具有各自的道理。因此，王夫之認為彰明一個個人之德，即便它是君主之德，也不能直接延伸到治理好國家。因為治理國家需要的是與個人修養具有不同層次的治理理論。因此，在王夫之看來，就像過去許多前輩學者們那樣，大敵當前時也要求君主正其身心的行為，只不過是那些完全不懂得“理一分殊”理論的人們的愚蠢行為。

七、結論

筆者在本論文中，作為理解王夫之經學的第一步，以《讀四書大全說》為中心考察了王夫之對《大學》的理解。

對於《大學》八條目的關係，王夫之說《大學》只說“先後”而沒說“前後”，認為在追求這八個條目的同時，只要區分緩急即可。因此把八條目的相互關係概括為“理一分殊”。

《大學》從“大學之道，在明明德。”這句話開始。王夫之認為所謂“明德”，是指通過功夫來彰明的最高境界“心”，而不是指“性”。因為性是不可以明之的功夫。

王夫之把“知”分為兩種：一種是知道物件，另一種是知道善惡。他強調朱熹所說的“知”應該解釋為徹底地知道善惡的“知”。因此，王夫之也理所當然地把“知”理解為知道善惡。對於知與行的關係，朱熹主張“知先行

55) 關於王夫之對孝道、恭敬、慈愛與明明德關係的想法，可以概括如下：明明德的事情只有在格物、致知、誠意、正心、修身等全部完成之後，才有可能做到。但是孝道、恭敬、慈愛並非如此。如果孝道、恭敬、慈愛像明明德那樣要求很高的水平，那麼永遠都無法實現。另一方面，如果孝道、恭敬、慈愛就是明明德，就得承認大部分的人已經實現了明明德。可是怎麼能說大部分的人已經實現了格物、致知、誠意、正心、修身等全部完成之後，才有可能做到的明明德呢？因此不能承認孝道、恭敬、慈愛就是明明德的事情。

56) 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》，38頁。

重”，王夫之則主張“知行並進”。他強烈主張不能從根本上把知與行分離開，不但知需要行，而且行也需要知。

對於王夫之來說，“誠意”不是在否定意義上約束或壓制什麼，而相反是在肯定意義上使其充溢。讓“所知之理”充滿心中，徹底貫穿物件，讓“意”從那裡出來。它既不是生來就能做到的，也不是可以強求的，而是通過功夫達到一定境界時能自然而然做到的。

而且，王夫之認為自謙、好好色、惡惡臭並不像朱熹所說的那樣是對意的說明，而是對心的說明。同時對於意和心的關係提出獨特的主張，即意和心互為體用、互為內外，所謂“正心”的心就是“志”。他批判朱熹沒有正確地理解“心”。

在東方的傳統社會中，很多時候把君主比喻為父親，把大臣和百姓比喻為子女，對家庭和國家給予同等的地位。所以認為，就像父親在家庭裡慈愛地對待子女一樣，君主要在國家裡慈愛地對待大臣和百姓。王夫之卻主張不能那麼做。如果把他們聯繫在一起，國家和家庭就沒有分別了。兩者之間雖然具有相通的道理，但是分明家庭用的是“齊”，國家用的是“治”，它們是有區別的。因此王夫之對“推”解釋說，不是把家庭的慈愛推行到國家的慈愛，而是把家庭中的教育內容推廣到國家教育之上。可以看出，他把《大學》看作是一本徹底為教育而寫的書。

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Wang Fuzi's Understanding of the *Great Learning*: In Comparison to Zhu Xi's Understanding

IM Ok-kyun

Abstract

This paper examines Wang Fuzi's 王夫之 understanding of the *Daxue* 大學 (Great Learning). Wang interpreted the concept *ba tiaomu* 八條目 (eight steps of moral cultivation) in the *Daxue* as *liyi fenshu* 理一分殊 (one Principle and its multiple manifestations). The *Daxue* begins with the phrase: "The way of the *Daxue* is to brighten the luminous virtue." Wang Fuzi held that the luminous virtue belongs to *xin* 心 (mind), not *xing* 性 (human nature), because *xing* has no ability to brighten something.

Wang Fuzi argued that there are two sorts of knowledge: knowledge of objects and knowledge of good and evil. Wang held that Zhu Xi's 朱熹 teachings about knowledge are the latter, and further argued that knowledge and conduct are inseparable since knowledge requires conduct and conduct requires knowledge.

Wang maintained that when *xin* is filled with *li* 理, *yi* 意 comes from it. This can be achieved through inner self-cultivation. Based on his understanding of *xin* and *xing*, Wang attempted to argue the following: In some cases *yi* is *ti* 體 and *xin* is *yong* 用. In some cases *yi* is *yong* and *xin* is *ti*. Sometimes *yi* is internal and *xin* is external. Sometimes *yi* is external and *xin* is internal. Wang Fuzi also criticised Zhu Xi for misunderstanding *xin* and insisted that *xin* in the phrase *zhengxin* 正心 refers to *zhi* 志.

In East Asian traditions, the state was often compared to the family. The emperor of the state was also compared to the father in the family. Wang Fuzi held they were different, but the principle of regulating them is the same. Therefore, the contents of education should be the same both in the state and in the family. To that end, Wang argued that the *Daxue* was a

book on education, not on politics. In short, this paper argues that Wang Fuzi's understanding of the *Daxue* was based primarily on the principle *liyi fenshu* 理一分殊.

Keywords: *ba tiaomu* 八條目 (eight steps of moral cultivation), *liyi fenshu* 理一分殊 (one Principle and its multiple manifestations), *mingde* 明德 (luminous virtue), *chengyi* 誠意 (sincerity), knowledge and practice, the family and the state.

國家、儒學、知識份子

——建議“作為批判性論述的儒學”

趙京蘭

中文提要

這篇文章統攬改革開放時期前後中國近現代100-150年間的儒學的存在形象，並用批判的形式探討對國家和知識分子將儒學以怎樣調動。執政者的立場來說孔子和儒學，無論是正面還是反面的，都是最能左右人民的情緒的核心象征。所以無論是冷落它還是提倡它，始終不能擺脫孔子的影響。在這種認識之下，在現代中國的儒學復興與文明中國的再建有密切聯動的前提下，此文章進行討論性。改革開放以後，經濟增長作為基礎，儒學成為文明治國的再建計劃的基礎思想。所以現在中國的儒學復興現象可以說是歸於國家的決定和知識分子自發與半自發的合作的結果。這篇文章將它視為‘作為權力-知識複合體的儒學’這個角度研究，‘作為批判談論的儒學’是針對‘作為權力-知識複合體的儒學’。為了‘作為批判談論的儒學’的再建我們需要關注擔任著道德覺悟，天下秩序的承擔者的士階層的傳統角色。為此，此篇文章將儒學從國家和資本分離，並限制和批判它們，限制既得權力的社會理念，主張21世紀的大同思想的重建。

關鍵詞：儒學復興，文明帝國，作為權力-知識複合體的儒學，作為批判談論的儒學，中國模式論，新左派

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一、“作為權力-知識複合體的儒學”和“作為批判性論述的儒學”

中國政府從1980年代開始關注以日本和四小龍為首的東亞國家的資本主義發展與儒學有關。1990年代，中國政府正式“批准”儒學，2000年代更是加以學制化和積極宣揚。可見儒學論的活躍，以國家的介入作為背景。繼江澤民和胡錦濤，習近平政府上臺後孔子和儒學仍然代替馬克思主義，成為最受矚目的意識形態。

正如人們從2008年北京奧運會所看到的那樣，中國政府和知識份子欲把孔子和儒學作為代表中國軟實力的主幹。所以說，目前出現在中國的儒學復興現象與其說是靠知識份子的自覺而出現的“自然產物”，不如說是由國家來“選擇”的結果。儒學從被國家選擇的那一刻起便很難保持其“純潔性”。鑒於中國社會主義機制的特點，商業資本、媒體權力、以及知識份子的介入，很容易使原來的儒學變質為權力-資本-媒體-知識的複合體。2000年之後，以儒學為主題的各種會議、出版物、教育機構如雨後春筍般湧現，並得到普通市民的回應，這說明中國政府針對“作為權力和知識的複合體的儒學”的規劃在一定程度上取得了成功。改革開放以後，儒學基於經濟發展正在成為中國重建文明帝國規劃的意識形態核心。

隨著儒學的復興，曾被“邊緣化”的中國知識份子(士)們重新受到重視，而這可以說是再自然不過的事情了。¹⁾因為自古以來，士便與儒學有機地結合起來，作為制定和維持天下秩序的主體，被賦予了一種歷史責任。而今天的知識份子在與後社會主義時期、近代社會截然不同的條件下，被“自發”動員而成為了建設“文明帝國”的主體。可以說，“重建新中華文明”的重任被託付給了“作為權力和知識的複合體的儒學”。這種國家、儒學、知識份子相互合作的現象，在以“階級中國”為象徵的毛澤東時代是根本無法想像的。

具體來看，如果說上世紀九十年代的儒學會議是文化保守主義者的聚會，那麼2000年之後，儒學不再僅僅是這群人的關心對象。²⁾尤其是在2005年前後出現中國模式後，中國不僅用這一框架來說明改革開放30年來所取得的經濟發展成就，更將其與中華文明聯繫起來，而儒學逐漸成為新左派不可或缺的政治文化理念的主幹。³⁾當然，在這個過程中也不缺少名分。作為現實資本主義的代替方案，中國需要樹立自己在全世界的威望，

1) 在中國近現代時期，儒學知識份子隨著1905年科舉制度廢除後被第一次“邊緣化”，而現代時期的知識份子被“邊緣化”是在1957年反右派鬥爭時期，並在文化大革命時期達到頂峰。改革開放後，知識份子重新受到重視，而“民的邊緣化”和“夷(少數民族)的動搖”不斷加速。

2) 參見陳來，《孔子與當代中國》。

3) 參見甘陽，《文明·國家·大學》。

而這時儒學與有中國特色的社會主義相結合，可成為其核心意識形態。⁴⁾

與此相比較，從鴉片戰爭到改革開放之前的近現代時期，儒學是以怎樣的形態存在的呢？西方勢力進入中國後，在政治上建立國民國家，在經濟上形成資本主義成為中國最亟待解決的課題，而以“天下”為象徵的儒學成為了被否定的對象。雖然儒學被否定，但通過重新架構儒學來創建國民國家的嘗試並非全無。在清朝考證學延長線上，出現了被降級為“諸子百家之一的孔子”、“具有宗教人格的孔子”、“開名的孔子”等新的孔子像，而綜合以上三點的就是康有為的孔教。⁵⁾對於康有為來說，孔教是可以形成國民文化基礎的一種核心情緒。而這種情緒是打造“均質國民”的基礎。在國民國家體制傳遍全世界的情況下，對於清末的士人來說，大清帝國的國民國家化同樣是一個不能回避的“時代課題”。

但在100年前的世紀大轉換時期，中國建立近代國家的工程需要從根本上改變整個系統，而只知道孔子和儒學的舊知識份子是不難擔負起這一切的。因此，這一重任只能交給1905年廢除科舉制度後出現的大批接受新教育的新知識份子。新知識份子認為在全世界掀起近代性潮流的背景下，孔子和儒學與時代課題相對立，於是開始從根本上大肆加以批評。辛亥革命後在革命潮流中開始的1915年的新文化運動便是這種問題意識的產物。在此後100年的中國近現代史上，孔子和儒學的命運並不順坦，經歷了幾番浮沉。

從執政者的立場來看，孔子和儒學不管是從正面還是負面都是可以左右國民情緒的最核心象徵。因此，無論是在近代時期建設國民國家，還是現在重建文明帝國，孔子都必然成為熱門話題。如果說改革開放之前的國家方針傾向於批評孔子和儒學，那麼改革開放之後則轉變為肯定孔子和儒學。兩者的目的相同，只是方法不同而已。不論是邊緣化的方式，還是宣揚的方式，都未能擺脫孔子。這也說明，對於統治者來說，孔子和儒學都十分具有利用價值。

如上所說，儒學復興是國家的選擇，從原理上來說是國家對儒學進行了重新挖掘，若其目的是明確的，那麼圍繞儒學，知識份子會採取兩種態度。一種是，知識份子積極配合中國政府重建文明中國，即帝國國民國家的構想，自覺地扮演起對國家方針進行理論粉飾的角色。另一種是，扮演起自古以來士的雙重角色，即除了作為士大夫階層的官僚角色之外，以道德自覺，維護天下秩序為榮，並為此做出貢獻。若今天的知識份子重視士階層的傳統角色，將儒學重構為批評包括國家在內的中國市場社會的公共論述，那麼這種論述和進行論述的空間便可轉變為抵抗、介入，進而創造新價值的公共空間。這樣，討論“作為批判性論述的儒學”，而不是“作為權

4) 新左派知識份子對儒學也持有自己各自的觀點，其中，甘陽是對儒學最關注的一位學者，他推崇將儒學和中國模式相結合。

5) 高柳信夫，〈梁啟超の“孔子”像とその意味〉，231頁。這部分可以與陳明提出的最近儒學出現宗教化的主張進行比較。參見陳宜中，〈從儒學到儒教：陳明訪談錄〉。

力和知識的複合體的儒學”也找到了依據。但現在主導中國儒學論述的大多數知識份子的思想傾向於後者而不是前者。在理解這種現象時，共產黨的統治這一特殊的因素不再是免死金牌(免罪符indulgence)，因為一旦如此，就無法另行評價那些雖然是少數，但與政府對立的知識份子的信念和所受痛苦。

當然，即使國家和知識份子圍繞儒學建立了合作關係，也並不是說沒有任何可變的空間。這是因為國家具有多面性，而知識份子如前所說也具有多重性格。在知識份子對國家應採取什麼樣的姿態這個問題上，首先要看在中國如何理解國家這個概念。其中，重要的一點還是要先具體認識國家和資本、媒體之間的關係，以及國家和人民、少數民族之間的關係。

在中國，國家是資本的代理人，是獲得個人利益的最大主體，同時也是發揮防禦市場的作用，實現公共性的一個主體。即，時至今日仍很難說，在中國國家不是控制市場，防禦公共性的角色。自古以來，知識份子扮演對國家統治以及與人民的關係進行批判，貫徹大眾性的角色也是其實現公共性的一種方式。在以民為本的傳統色彩濃厚的中國，政府向扮演著君主和平民間的中間角色、屬於統治階級範疇的士大夫聽取意見，也是其實現公共性的一種表現。根據這種傳統，知識份子對國家大事該合作的合作，該批評的批評，展示出具有伸縮性的一面並不是沒有可能的。然而，若考慮到在權力和知識的相互作用中，從短期來看，權力會選擇理念，但從長期來看，理念傾向於對權力實施進行合理化⁶⁾，則有人認為，現在中國的知識環境並不是完全樂觀的。

假設“作為權力和知識的複合體的儒學”和“作為批判性論述的儒學”兩者並存，若對後者有所留意，那麼需要重新質疑在當今中國儒學為什麼又成為話題，而對於質疑，除了“認為是肯定自己傳統”這種消極答案之外，還需要進一步尋找其積極意義。首先要研究是否可以以儒學來和中國現代社會進行溝通。其次再進一步，在正視世界資本主義的問題時，中國的儒學是否可以成為解決西方近代問題的方法也是極其重要的。如果說前者是有可能性的，那麼後者的可能性也比較大。這也是儒學和現代性相聯系的一個問題⁷⁾。

在這種問題意識下，本文正是為提出上述提問而做的基礎工作。為提出上述問題，要瞭解中國儒學論述的整體輪廓，而且要對這些論述有自己的立場。本文將批判性地探討，在長達100-150年的近現代時期，儒學在中國的存在形態，也就是國家如何動員儒學，知識份子又是持哪種態度的。

在敘述最近的儒學論述之前，先從儒學與國家的關係簡略描述儒學在20世紀是怎樣存在的，然後概述儒學得到“公認”後，即從1990年代中期到

6) Simpson, 〈大學、帝國和知識生產〉, 30頁。

7) 現在在探討儒學時，若不把儒學當作是一種固定的文化價值，而是當作以其基本理念為基礎進行分析和實踐的問題的話，那麼探討儒學不是那麼簡單的事情。這是因為這和探討主體的態度有關。

現在主要的儒學論述是什麼，以及爭論焦點是什麼，並在此基礎上批判性地探討最近新左派主導的中國模式論怎樣引用和利用了儒學。在結尾部分，在中國這一現在的脈絡中，留意重建“作為批判論述的儒學”，提示幾個構想和課題。

二、通過“批判儒學”建設“國民國家”

在中國近現代150年的歷史長河中，根據為政者的意圖，儒學歷經幾經浮沉，其中沉多於浮，可以說這段歷史是反儒學的歷史。正因如此，東亞和中國的近代史也可謂是自我否定的歷史。⁸⁾當然，前提是將儒學與自我認同(self-identity)聯繫起來的思考方式是合法的。

儒家學說周而復始的浮與沉，也可以證明儒學並未能與國家完全脫離關係而存在。眾所周知，孔子和儒學在中國現代史上首次遭受全面而系統的批判，是在新文化運動期間。1911年辛亥革命爆發後不久，中國思想界轉變為清一色的復古主義。當時的中國雖然名義上實施著共和政治，但社會氛圍與封建王朝統治下的社會相比絲毫沒有變化。例如，主導戊戌變法的康有為力說弟子們建立孔教會來尊孔，短暫掌權的袁世凱則試圖強制在學校祭孔，誦讀儒家經典。

當共和國無法運作時，知識份子也曾為此幻滅：魯迅棄筆隱居，整日以拓本度日；陳獨秀這樣進步的知識份子變成厭世主義者。⁹⁾曾留學海外的年輕知識份子則奮起反抗這種復古潮流，這就是新文化運動。緊接著爆發的五四運動，則是今天掌握政權的共產黨的出發點。中國共產黨的最主要創始人——陳獨秀和李大釗雖然方式上稍有不同，但也將儒學看作是封建文化的象徵而加以批判。¹⁰⁾

但中國共產黨在20世紀30年代抗日時期對孔子和儒學並未像之前那麼堅持全面的否定。因為在這時需要將戰略重點從反封建轉移到反帝國主義上。¹¹⁾毛澤東曾在1938年說：“從孔子到孫中山，我們應當給以總結，繼承

8) 不能否認，東方主義和自我東方主義起到了作用。

9) 陳獨秀以極其厭世的論調撰寫了《愛國心與自覺心》(1915)。對此，李大釗也以一篇《厭世心與自覺心》(1915)的文章闡述，在絕望的局勢下，應如何抓住實踐機會。這些文章的氛圍與最近的中國知識份子以文化自覺為主題編寫的文章論調形成鮮明對比。當時的文章聚焦於中國作為弱者應如何重構主體，今天則是，作為強者不應鋒芒畢露，要求保持一種謙虛的姿態。這樣的內容在被封為新左派的張旭東的文章《離不開政治的文化自覺》，《文化縱橫》2012年4月第2期)中也能看到。

10) 這一時期儒學被利用為國家回歸封建主義，新知識份子集團與之對抗，發行《新青年》等雜誌，形成了公開的討論空間。年輕的知識份子們通過啟蒙這一“態度同一性”，全面批判封建國家和意識形態基礎——儒學。他們以自己對舊秩序的批判、獨立的態度，日後在近現代史上成為有良知的知識份子的典範。

11) 石川啟二，〈近現代中國における孔子評價の變遷-民族的アイデンティティの危機に關す

這份珍貴的遺產。”¹²⁾他在「新民主主義論」(1940)中提議，將批判繼承傳統文化當做黨的原則。除了毛澤東，劉少奇也在「論共產黨員的修養」(1939)中說，要以馬克思主義哲學為基礎，並將孔子和孟子的道德實踐哲學適用於共產黨員的修養。他的這番話，日後在文革期間成為批判對象。

但中華人民共和國成立後這種批判的繼承轉變為更傾向於批判，而非繼承。起始點是1951年發生的武訓傳批判。這時的學術界，即使基於唯物史觀的批判繼承是一個方針，但實際上已經出現難以進行自由討論的局面。¹³⁾此後，1956年出臺的百花齊放，百家爭鳴政策，使學術界與51年相比自由了一些。但眾所周知，該政策實行後頻繁出現對政府批評的聲音，僅一年便被取消了，並從57年中旬開始展開了激烈的反右派鬥爭。政府讓人們自由討論，於是知識份子信以為真坦誠提出自己的意見，卻因此受到批評。此後學術界又回到冰凍的時代，對孔子和儒學的再評價也頓時受到了挫折，而且知識份子們對社會主義產生了幻滅。¹⁴⁾

大躍進失敗後，60年代初中國進入調整期，有關孔子和儒學的研究部分復活。各地舉辦孔子研究的學術研討會，還將毛澤東的政敵劉少奇過去寫下的「論共產黨員的修養」出版為單行本，總之古典研究重新活躍起來。當時發生在後來的文革派的關鋒和新儒學名家馮友蘭之間的爭論是非常著名的。爭論的焦點是：孔子是沒落的奴隸主貴族階級的代表還是新興地主階級的代表。這場爭論又是在理論方面預告文化革命的一場爭論。馮友蘭認為，從孔子所處的時代背景來看，孔子代表新興的地主階級，他將古代思想從神權的束縛中解放出來，為中國歷史和文化做出了重大貢獻。孔子的思想具有超越階級的普遍價值(他的這一主張在文革期間被指為是尊孔思想，因而受到批鬥。)

1966年文化大革命爆發後，孔子和儒學再次受到全面批判。劉少奇因前述言論，被批尊孔崇儒。公認為是毛澤東接班人的林彪也被當做封建的象徵遭到肅清，這種情況從“批林批孔”的口號便可知一二。¹⁵⁾甚至周恩來也被江青比喻為“現代孔子”，遭到批判。不管怎麼說，這一系列事件說明，孔子的影響力之大，甚至能在毛澤東時代影響到他的權威。

從中國內部來看，儒學在中國是從1980年代開始受到推崇的。中國政府在改革開放之後，對以亞洲四小龍為首的東亞近代化模式產生興趣，開始關注儒學潛力。民間學術界則紛紛召開關於孔子的學術研討會。1985年，孔子研究所在位於孔子誕生地的曲阜師範大學內成立。1986年，全國性學術基金孔子基金會成立。此外，80年代後期，馮友蘭、梁漱溟等新儒

る研究ノート》，37-45頁。

12) 需要分清此話是出於統一戰線的戰略目標，還是本質的尊重。

13) 參見裴毅然の〈自解佩劍：反右前知識份子的陷落〉。

14) 知識份子是不是因為孔子的再評價受挫而對社會主義產生幻滅，需要研究。

15) 批林是指批判林彪，批孔延伸到了批判林彪的封建性。關於批林批孔參照了金承旭，『孔子批判的政治學』；全仁甲，『孔子，橫穿現代中國』。

學(new-confucianism)大家開始受到學術界的關注，對於港臺地區儒學家的評價問題也開始成為討論對象。但黨和政府並沒有因1978年進行改革開放，便在進入1980年代後馬上就孔子和儒學確定有關方針。儘管民間學術界流行對新儒學的討論，中國共產黨並沒有從官方立場上通過有關孔子和儒學的明文文件。為了拯救改革開發後由於經濟優先政策而陷入“精神汙染”的中國，共產黨在提倡建設“具有中國特色的精神文明”時，也只說“在馬克思列寧主義的領導下吸收古今中外的精神文明精髓”，而沒有具體指出孔子和儒學。在學校教育中從制度層面對孔子和儒學進行平反，也比1980年代中後期在大學和部分知識份子之間掀起的儒學熱潮¹⁶⁾晚了好幾年。

但這一時期中國共產黨並不是沒有關注儒學。其實內部已對東亞四小龍——韓國、臺灣、新加坡、香港的發展模式特別感興趣。這裡有兩點尤其值得關注：第一，四小龍都屬於儒家文化圈，其中三個地區又屬於華人文化圈，(三個地區中的)兩個地區更是“中國領土不可分割的一部分”；第二，隨著中國民間對民主、法制、反腐、反特權、社會平等和正義的呼聲日益高漲，最高領導層希望引進亞洲四小龍於1980年代後期實現民主化之前在威權主義(authoritarianism)政治體制下取得經濟發展的模式。¹⁷⁾

但這時儒學仍未得到正式認可。改變這種情況的轉機則是1989年的天安門事件。天安門事件是中國共產黨成立以來所遇到的最大危機，共產黨認為不能讓即將走上軌道的經濟增長因天安門事件而中斷，並將視線轉向以孔子的儒學為核心的傳統思想。具有諷刺意味的是，共產黨開始思考可以給中國人自信的某種東西，即中國人的認同(identity)是什麼，恰恰是在遭遇國家危機之後。¹⁸⁾1991年，江澤民就加強對青少年兒童進行中國近代、現代史及國情教育下達指示，要求加強提高民族自尊心的教育。截至80年代初期，教科書上對孔子的評價還是奴隸制度的讚美者，但此後開始有了大幅修改。政府方面正式下達重新評價傳統文化的方針則是在1994年¹⁹⁾，並且終於出現了“要進行中華民族優秀的傳統道德教育”的口號。

政府方針之所以改變，首先是因為國內團結被認為是最亟待解決的問題，此外還考慮到爭取海外華僑社會的合作以及實現臺灣統一的問題。但一味宣導儒學對中國共產黨並不是只有益處。與大部分意識形態一樣，儒學對中國政府也會成為雙刃刀。中國共產黨成立當初是批判儒學，支持社

16) 參見《現代中國的探索》(1992)。這本書是韓國哲學思想研究會集體研究的成果，還收錄了1980年代中國人文學者有關文化熱討論的譯文和論文。

17) 丁學良，《中國模式的革新》，59-61頁。

18) 用簡單的演算法來看，若天安門事件的核心是民主主義問題，那麼共產黨處於其對立面，而若共產黨針對天安門事件找到的解決方案是儒教，那麼共產黨關注的儒教豈不是應對(或對抗，或遏制)民主主義的儒教？天安門事件的對立結構如果不是尋找中國的認同或自信的問題，而共產黨突發奇想地聯繫到自信問題，想出用儒教來解決問題，可見真的是無計可施了。

19) 這裡要提醒，中國政府推進市場化改革正是1994年初。1997年，中國黨政確認“非公有制經濟是中國社會主義市場經濟的重要組成部分”，並為民營經濟提供了一定的活動空間。吳敬璠，〈前言：“中國模式”還是過度體制〉，2-3頁。

會主義的，從這種立場來說，不得不要考慮儒學的合法性問題。即使儒學合法化，還要考慮今後隨時都可能成為焦點的少數民族問題。

三、通過“肯定儒學”建立21世紀“文明帝國”的各種計畫

在中國的100-150年的歷史中執政者根據自己的需要或扼殺或重用儒學，而中國的知識份子一直在圍繞如何處理傳統與現代、中國與西方文明的對立，進行爭論。而其核心便是在中國人的世俗和精神生活中為“儒學”重新定位。²⁰⁾如今在中國進行的儒學討論大致上也是這種問題意識的延伸，不同的是討論比之前更加全面，更加全方位。

儒學討論公開出現在社會上是2004年胡錦濤政府出臺和諧社會論之後。2000年代中期，哲學界為了從儒學的和諧理論尋找和諧社會論的理論基礎，產生數千篇相關主題的論文，哲學界出現了前所未有的活躍氣氛。其規模在質和量上都遠勝1990年代的國學熱。

下面要介紹幾個需要關注的出現在2000年的有關儒學的討論和儒學團體。考慮到篇幅，這裡只做簡短的評價。首先要介紹較早發現儒學所具有的潛力，以儒學為主題發行的雜誌。這本雜誌叫《原道》，於中國政府正式對儒學確定方針予以積極評價的1994年創刊。該雜誌試圖將中國的命運和儒學的命運一體化，將儒學復興運動聯繫到中國的崛起，也就是把中國的“時代任務”當做自任。截至2012年，該雜誌已發行17期。由於資金問題一再更換出版社，以雜誌書(mook)的形式發行。通過該雜誌，學者蔣慶於2005年宣佈要重建中國儒教，一時在媒體引起了轟動。²¹⁾蔣慶還是《政治儒學》的作者，他主張應從儒學探尋中國政治的正統性，中國應超越西方民主制度，回歸儒家本源，並基於儒學制定中國獨自的政治體制。對他來說，儒學等於憲法。蔣慶排斥牟宗三的心性儒學，主張復興政治儒學，即在現代中國的政治社會組織形態下賦予儒學以合法性。²²⁾為了宣傳“政治儒學”的復興，他還親自編寫“中華文化經典基礎教育誦本”，通過中國儒教協會提出了10項具體的儒教復興計畫。²³⁾

此外還要關注《原道》的主編陳明和康曉光的主張，他們分別提倡儒教的公民宗教化²⁴⁾和儒教的國教化。包括蔣慶在內，這些人認識到中國政

20) 筆談‘人民儒學’編者按，《文化縱橫》，72頁。

21) 任劍濤，〈中國人文與社會科學結構性危機〉，83頁。李澤厚批評蔣慶的主張是國粹主義的極端例子，比慈禧太後還要保守。李澤厚，〈李澤厚：我一直是孤獨的(訪談)〉，57頁。

22) 參見蔣慶，《政治儒學》。這本書的特點在於，維護儒家的基本價值，主張這些價值適合中國和中國的未來。據悉，在儒家相關學術著作中最強烈主張儒學的本質。可以說，這本書暗含著對中國政治現狀的挑戰。也許正因如此，在中國等了五年才獲批出版。Bell, *China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society*, 2008, 12頁。

23) 參見〈關於重建中國儒教的構想〉。

治如今在正統性和合法性問題上處境難堪，因此試圖構想出一個基於民族文化文化帝國。但在這裡我們要關注的是，對於這些儒學相關運動(主要由蔣慶開展的)，不只文化保守主義者，甚至一些自由主義者也表示認同。²⁵⁾而且這種主張和運動先不論其現實的可行性，重要的是已在社會上受到較大關注，並引起了有關其實現的可能性的巨大爭論。這些事例或許因為超越了國家應用儒學的範圍，因此讓國家有些緊張。目前還不知道究竟是哪些內容令國家緊張，但據推測，很有可能是關於在目前的中國如何建立合法的政治秩序，如何將政治權力合法化的內容²⁶⁾。先秦儒學根本價值和目標在於用理想的政治建設理想社會，越是宣揚這樣的²⁷⁾的內容，越會讓中國政府緊張。這反過來說明，中國政府出面宣導儒學復興的目的，與儒學本身的價值和目標是有距離的。

有關中國哲學的合法性問題的討論也是2000年代哲學界最值得關注的現象之一。²⁸⁾中國新儒家著名學者鄭家棟問道，用基於西方歷史形成的語言體系和作為論述方式的“philosophy”重構的“中國哲學”概念，能否詮釋在中國的歷史文脈和精神土壤中誕生的傳統思想。即，“中國哲學”能否用中國的魂魄，針對今天人類面臨的環境和問題提出一個根本性的答案，而不是作為單純的西方哲學的偽造品或收割者。²⁹⁾人們開始認為應用以中國為背景總結的哲學理論解釋中國思想和倫理學，這是出自與100年前的思維完全逆轉的問題意識和自信的提問。100年前，胡適等留學派曾試著用“philosophy”這一概念重新解釋中國歷史，進行國故整理，那麼今天，學者們對其方式提出了根本性的問題。出於相同脈絡，對過去被錯誤認知的王國維、梁啟超等人初期的嘗試也應進行新的評價。這些工作是必需的，而且要盡量排除政治意圖，嚴謹地進行。

2008年出版的《孔子與當代中國》(陳來、甘陽主編)是2000年代儒學討論的一個拐點。這本將儒學大討論會的內容整理成書的文集之所以重要，是因為中國學術界的主流和非主流的幾乎所有值得關注的學者紛紛參加了那一次以論壇形式舉行的討論會。甘陽、陳來、王紹光、王曉明、王富仁、汪暉等左派或批判知識份子也出席了論壇。從書中我們可以發現，他們針對儒學的討論並不消極。在論壇圓桌討論上，主持人劉小楓的發言

24) 參見陳宜中〈從儒學到儒教：陳明訪談錄〉。陳明的主張可與康有為的孔教運動相比較。

25) 緒形康，〈自由主義的中國化〉，340頁。

26) 蔣慶，《政治儒學》，33-40頁。

27) 參見成奎輔，〈看待原始儒教的理想社會論的今天的視覺〉。

28) 該主題入選2003年《學術月刊》和《文匯讀者週報》評選的學術界十大話題。日本哲學家西周在《百一新論》(1874年)中將philosophy翻譯成哲學，這時西周是將哲學這一詞與東方的儒學分開來使用的。在中國，1902年《新民業報》首次將哲學用於中國傳統思想。儘管如此，中國傳統思想中是否有可叫做“哲學”的內容，這個問題當時並沒有得到解決。參見張汝倫，《重寫中國哲學史》；彭永捷，《重寫哲學史與中國哲學學科範式創新》，352頁。上述合法化討論卻在說，這個提問如今已變得沒有意義了。

29) 參見鄭家棟，〈“中國哲學”及び中國の思想的傳統の現代における難局〉，200-201頁；鄭家棟，〈為“中國哲學”把脈〉。

給我留下很深的印象。他主張，應檢查中國人戴著的西方中心主義眼鏡。他拿「奧德賽」比喻說，漂流他鄉重返故土時，自以為熟悉的東西已變陌生，但在他鄉漂流的經驗能使故土的東西更豐富，能讓人從不同角度去審視。³⁰⁾劉小楓的話我理解為，要摘除西方中心主義的眼鏡，重新審視中國，同時因為曾戴過西方中心主義眼鏡，故土的東西看起來會陌生，也顯得更豐富。在這裏如何看待中國傳統和西方文明的關係非常重要，我認為不管怎麼說焦點是故土，其他地區的漂流經驗則是工具化(instrumentalization)。依此類推，儒學和近代的問題，近代不是“理性”而只是工具。

2000年代有關儒學的各種思潮中，必須要提到中國經典熱潮。以中國古典名著為主題編輯的中央電視臺百家講臺節目，在國家和資本的庇護下取得了空前的成功。通過該節目誕生的最著名的人物要數《論語心得》的作者於丹。當然，她對論語的解讀也遭到了很多批評。在韓國也有出版的這本書，雖然也遭到不少批評³¹⁾，但包括盜版在內共售出1000萬本以上，甚至出現了“於丹現象”的說法。³²⁾這本書可以說是自文革時期紅寶書(文革中對毛澤東著作的稱呼)以來最暢銷的一本書。若考慮毛澤東的著作是義務學習物件，有強賣性質，那麼《論語心得》的銷量可就很不一般了。³³⁾銷量或許是這本書給普通百姓帶來的反響巨大的佐證，而且出現“於丹現象”也可能說明於丹個人具有讀懂時代的“感性”和“能力”。但若深入探究這種現象，不應只分析個人的能力，不應忽視這是一個國家、知識份子、資本圍繞儒學協同籌畫的結果。利用《論語》這一人文學的最高經典，向那些深陷在“看不見的國家權力的控制”和“怪物資本主義”橫行霸道的現實中，體驗著剝奪感而無法找到出口的老百姓傳遞“個人的幸福取決於個人的心態”的資訊，並且反復通過電視這一媒體來灌輸，沒有反響才不正常。

但有人指出，雖然在知識份子和普通老百姓群體中掀起了空前的儒學熱潮，但中國社會目前的道德真空，並沒有由儒學填補，而是由基督教、法輪功、極端的民族主義等來填充。³⁴⁾儘管中國共產黨將孔子和儒學編入學校教育正規課程裡，試圖正式使其復活，但能否完成當初的目標，實現人民的社會團結和每個人確定自己作為中國人的自我認同？或許現在下結論為時過早，但看似不會很順利。由知識、權力、民間企業組成的大規模複合體在努力幫助儒學復興，可是對人民的日常生活會起到多少效果，還

30) 陳來、《孔子與當代中國》，486頁。

31) 參見貝淡寧，〈《論語》的去政治化-於丹《論語心得》簡評〉，46頁。貝淡寧在文中批評於丹的《論語》過於脫離政治。

32) 通過媒體進行的古典講座中，於丹的人氣堪比韓國的金容沃。但或許因為於丹並非專攻古典，所以在中國經典方面不像金容沃那樣有著自己獨到的構思和體系。

33) 參見趙京蘭，〈現代中國的保守主義文化-新保守主義的出現和儒學重受關注〉。

34) Bell, *China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society*, 8頁。

需要更具體的調查。

不過甘陽的以下敘述說明，儒學至少在民間，尤其是大學正在漸漸復蘇。他說：站在2010年來看，最近10年、15年最大的變化，包括晚清以來最大的變化，是中國社會、中國普通民眾，特別是中國大學生對中國傳統文明的態度發生了根本性的變化。現在在大學裡如果還像從前那樣對中國文明一棍子打死，人家就認為你是白癡了。而這一切在10年以前是不可想像的。³⁵⁾大學校園的這種反應為中國知識界的儒學討論注入了活力。儒學和宗教問題，³⁶⁾目前的儒學討論非常多樣而複雜：將儒學聯繫到社會主義來說明的嘗試，³⁷⁾自由主義和儒學，³⁸⁾儒教的制度化問題等等。今天中國的這種儒學熱潮被叫做大陸的第四期儒學。成中英評價，大陸第四代儒學主要是與目前中國大陸社會發展過程中出現的問題相對應的。也就是說，生活儒學、政治儒學、現正儒學³⁹⁾、人民儒學等都是基於目前中國社會的需要存在的。⁴⁰⁾可以說，目前的中國是儒學的時代，中國在用儒學的眼光重新審視著一切。⁴¹⁾

四、中國模式論和儒學探討

(一)中國模式論的起源和發展

處於空前鼎盛時期的儒學，被推上又一個高度，是在與中國模式論相聯繫起來之後。儒學與中國模式論相結合後，便不再只是文化保守主義者們的討論對象，更成為新左派的主要關注對象。正因如此，聚焦新左派的構想，便可接近儒學探討的實體。從某些方面來看新左派和文化保守主義者成為了中國的思想界的“新主流”。⁴²⁾新左派對於關注世界，同時希望中

35) 甘陽，〈中國道路還是中國模式〉，83頁。

36) 參見繩山新，〈中國における國民國家形成と儒教〉，111頁。中島隆博，〈國家のレジティマシ-と儒教中國〉。

37) 這一部分主要考慮到甘陽的主張。他提出“新時代的通三統”，強調孔夫子的傳統，毛澤東的傳統，以及鄧小平的傳統，是同一個中國歷史文明連續統，中國的發展方向是“儒家社會主義共和國”。〈中國道路：三十年與六十年〉，4-13頁；甘陽，〈文明·國家·大學〉，33-44頁。

38) 參見緒形康，〈自由主義的中國化〉。

39) 參見唐文明，〈儒教，憲政與中國：一個初步的思考〉。

40) 成中英，〈儒學復興與現代國家建設〉，97頁。

41) 據筆者瞭解，目前在中國思想領域最受矚目的兩本雜誌有《開放時代》(月刊)和《文化縱橫》(雙月刊)。《開放時代》2011年第6期以“特輯：儒學的現代轉型”為主題刊登了四篇論文。第7期轉載了“儒學和現代社會的治理”學術研討會的內容。《文化縱橫》深入討論儒學相關問題，一旦有儒學相關的重要論文，幾個月後就由四人通過筆談進行討論。例如，2011年10月號以“儒學和民族主義”為主題，有四人參加了筆談。2012年2月號則以“人民儒學”為主題由三名學者進行了筆談。主要雜誌況且如此，其他雜誌更不用說了。

國崛起的宏大構想的執著，遠遠超過文化保守主義者。進入2000年代中後期，新左派和國家之間形成無形的蜜月關係，這是與1990年代相比截然不同的現象。儒學和中國模式論接軌是最近的事情，因此首先要敘述中國模式論誕生的背景和與之相關的各種探討的進程。

有關中國模式論的討論，是在2005年前後開始的。當時在一次規模不算大的學術會議上，有人提出北京共識(Beijing Consensus)，作為包含新自由主義立場的“華盛頓共識”(Washington Consensus)的抗衡概念。⁴³⁾此後，北京共識概念不僅局限於經濟發展經驗，其範圍還擴大到政治體制的特性，自然而然地發展到中國模式論或中國道路。最近，更是擴大到中國文明問題，也促使儒學的相關討論積極展開。可以說，2008年的美國金融風暴更進一步為這種潮流營造了條件和環境。先不談中國模式論這一理論本身的合理與否，它具備成為取代方案的性質後受到了廣泛矚目。

指出華盛頓共識問題，並追捧北京共識的西方著名人士有英國的約書亞·庫珀·雷默 (Joshua Cooper Ramo)和美國的約瑟夫E. 斯蒂格利茨(Joseph E. Stiglitz)等。⁴⁴⁾此外，馬丁·雅克(Martin Jacques)和馬克·倫納德(Mark Leonard)等英國左派人士，盡管不是中國模式論者，但也持肯定的立場。⁴⁵⁾他們與中國的新左派知識份子有一定的溝通。在中國，被封為新左派的知識份子對中國模式論態度積極，尤其是王紹光、胡鞍鋼等被稱為國家主義者的，⁴⁶⁾持左派立場的人積極支援中國模式論，但傾向於自由主義的知識份子則持批評態度。但站在左派立場的人中也有人反對，同樣，自由主義者中也有不反對中國模式論的人。隨著將政治、經濟、文化全盤聯繫到中國模式論的氛圍日盛，原先的文化保守主義者和新左派，以及國家主義者之間⁴⁷⁾開始友善起來了。

有關中國模式論的討論非常複雜。有反對意見指出，中國的經濟發展是遵循新自由主義方式的成果，用中國模式論來歸納有矛盾的因素。⁴⁸⁾但汪暉再次反駁說，中國的經濟增長不能只用新自由主義來解釋。⁴⁹⁾他認

42) 這種情況形式上可以描述為“極左”和“極右”的結合。

43) 參見雷默，〈北京共識〉。

44) 汪暉，〈中國道路的獨特性與普遍性〉，《上海國資》2011年4月12日，〈中國崛起的經驗及其面臨的挑戰〉，國內論文有張潤美(音譯)《中國崛起和中國模式論》，現代中國學會2011年春季學術大會發表論文。

45) 像原先的具有殖民性，並且貶低亞洲的東方主義，他們的爭論也忽略了中國和東亞的現實。從這一點來看，他們的立場可以說是左派東方主義。他們似乎只對可替代美國的體制——文明中國感興趣，而對於中國自身內部的現實問題或中國與東亞的關係毫無興趣。不，與其說沒有興趣，或許他們沒有思考這一問題的根據或能力。西歐左派中也有些人對中國持批判態度，代表人物是斯拉沃熱·齊澤克(Slavoj Žižek)。

46) Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, 141.

47) 在中國的政治、經濟現狀下，國家主義者和新左派(有時甚至民族主義者之間)的主張有不少重疊。並且，據瞭解，他們私交甚密。

48) 丁學良，〈中國模式的革新〉，參見36頁。

49) 參見汪暉，〈中國道路的獨特性與普遍性〉。

為，中國迄今為止取得的成果並非中國很好地適應新自由主義的結果，相反是傳統經驗和社會主義體制經過自我調節相結合而帶來的結果。在社會主義時期，若沒有經濟積累和自立的國民經濟，中國的城市改革不會取得如今這樣的長足發展。也就是說，1980年代以後中國實行的經濟調整政策不能簡單地用新自由主義來概括。⁵⁰⁾汪暉認為，中國的改革危機與新自由主義政策導向恰恰是有著密切關係。他的這種解釋是認為，中國改革開放的“成果”與中國的社會主義經驗，以及改革開放初期農村改革的成果有著密切關係，而且這種解釋看似是一種自我評價，即1990年代他本人參與展開的爭論也對這種改革方向起到了一定影響。

但自由主義者中最活躍的分子之一秦暉則對中國模式論表示反對。他主張，中國模式論基於低薪水、低福利、低人權，因此提倡中國模式論等於是把這三個因素全球化。⁵¹⁾他還批評進入2000年代後中國的改革開放是財富集中在部分群體，貧富差距拉大的“官制資本主義”。吳敬璉也認為，若說“中國模式”是用來說明中國改革開放30年的高速發展的，那麼如此優異成績的根本原因，在於中國獨特的經濟和政治體制。中國現行的經濟體制是一種“半統制、半市場”的過渡性經濟體制，是一種既包括新的市場經濟因素，又包括舊的指令經濟或稱統制經濟。⁵²⁾雷頤也針對新左派表示，中國的改革開放之所以重要，其理由之一就是與國際社會的接軌。中國的新左派卻一貫否定這一點。他們認為中國將被編入全球資本主義體制。但他們在主張“中國模式論”時反而強調這三十年取得的經濟成就，顯然這是自相矛盾的。他們當初否定30年的改革開放，現在卻強調30年的改革開放造就了“中國模式”。⁵³⁾與新左派和自由主義者都保持一定距離的批判知識份子賀照田也批評中國模式論恰恰以中國經濟的高增長和中央財政能力的強化作為後盾。他說，在這種模式之下，經濟發展速度或中央財政吸收能力一旦下降，中央的問題處理能力也會同時減弱。因此“胡溫新政的有效性實際上是以順利的經濟發展和國家對社會的過度吸收為前提的”。⁵⁴⁾賀照田有關國家對社會的吸收的認識中，吸收物件看似也包括知識份子。

儘管存在上述種種問題，但人們之所以從全球角度提出中國模式論和北京共識，並對中國人的思想基礎儒學表現出關注，正是因為他們認為目前全球性的經濟情況很難走出危機。因此，中國的新左派，即汪暉、崔之元、王紹光等人聚焦制度創新，關注中國的社會主義和改革開放的經驗，並將此與中國模式論相聯繫起來，可能有所裨益。他們認為現代中國的思

50) 參見汪暉，《思想空間としての現代中國》的序文。

51) 因此秦暉主張，中國應崛起，但“中國模式”不應崛起。秦暉，〈中國的崛起和“中國模式”的崛起〉，71頁。

52) 吳敬璉，〈前言：“中國模式”，還是過渡性體制？〉，4-5頁。

53) 雷頤曾批評，蘇聯和東歐解體後，曾有些人說只有中國才能拯救社會主義，但金融危機爆發後又有些人自命不凡，說中國既可以拯救社會主義，還可以拯救資本主義。雷頤，〈統制經濟在中國具有思想淵源〉，166-167頁。

54) 賀照田，〈現代史研究と現在の中國の思想と政治〉，245-246頁。

維空間應成為積極而主動的平臺，形成基於自己的經驗的思維，並加以理論化，推向世界。

(二) 被中國模式論傳召的儒學

新左派中對於將中國模式論和儒學相結合最為積極的學者是甘陽。⁵⁵⁾他在最近發表的文章中表示，中國道路⁵⁶⁾的特點就是包括各種模式，它具有最大的開放性和實驗性。例如中國道路可包括廣東模式、重慶模式，還可包括香港模式，今後甚至可以將臺灣模式列為中國模式的一種。中國是大國，各地方之間存在極大差異，這一點必須要強調。⁵⁷⁾甘陽說，在短短的幾年內，論述中國發展問題就經歷了三個階段，第一個階段是論述“中國模式”，主要講30年來中國經濟發展是不是具有特殊性，但隨後馬上變成了一個60年的問題。繼而，這個60年的問題，又變成了一個中華文明的問題。所以，現在論述中國的問題並不是一個30年、60年的問題，而是中國文明和西方文明整體性的不同道路問題。⁵⁸⁾這番發言闡明了，對他來說，他提出的儒家社會主義共和國，即“新三統”論便是中國模式論。

甘陽主張，討論中國模式論最終要延伸到，提出“中國是一個什麼樣的國家，中國想成為什麼樣的國家”這種規範的問題。⁵⁹⁾“中國道路”的討論問題，一定要與重新認識中華文明的整體性結合起來，在這個基礎上，“現代化”這些詞都可以拋掉不要，首要面臨的就是中華文明自我更新的問題。⁶⁰⁾雖然形式較粗糙，但甘陽將中國模式論看成儒學和中國人形成自我認同的問題。而新左派試圖在中國改革開放時期所創造的某種特殊的政治、經濟模式範疇內說明問題。這就是甘陽與其他新左派人士不同之處。

那麼有人會問，按照甘陽所說，單憑拋掉“現代化”，應對西方單純主張文化整體性，就可簡單解決近代的問題嗎？這是不容忽略的重要問題，不僅是因為如阿裡夫·德裏克(Arif Dirlik)所指的那樣，“西方”已成為東亞不可分割的一部分，還因為這些主張在新的文化面具下可能會助長社會

55) 甘陽的主張能否代表目前的儒學討論，或許也能成為問題。縱觀儒學討論整體，這是合理的提問。但目前中國模式論主要由新左派提倡，而且最熱衷於將中國模式論與儒學相連接的人便是甘陽，因此不能不提到他。我在本文中之所以引用很多他的話，並非因其論文的水準或實現可能性，而是因為他在中國人文學界中所占的地位。只要他提出某個議程(agenda)，馬上便會成為中國人文社會科學界的爭論主題。

56) 目前中國的新左派知識份子常用意為中國model的中國模式這一措辭，但更推崇中國道路這一詞。理由有兩個，一是他們認為中國模式不能否定西方量化的社會科學理論的影響，二是model這個詞具有可複製的意思。中國的新左派認為，將中國的情況適用於其他國家，這本身就是不可能的。

57) 甘陽，〈中國道路還是中國模式〉，83頁。

58) 甘陽，〈中國道路還是中國模式〉，83頁。

59) 當然，他主張，政治上要說明憲政方面儒家社會主義是不是一定和中國共產黨領導下的多黨合作制有一個根本性的、制度性的契合關係，經濟分配方面能否保證相對平等的原則，所有制不是根本問題。甘陽，〈中國道路還是中國模式〉，84頁。

60) 甘陽，〈中國道路還是中國模式〉，83頁。至於如何更新，他未作詳解。

上的壓迫和不公正繼續延續下去。⁶¹⁾這也意味著，當文明批評與社會批評分開來時，有可能導致一種不均衡，使對國家和中國社會內部的批判從此消失無蹤。

中國模式討論迎來質的轉變，是在2008年的美國金融危機和北京奧運會之後。甘陽認為，這時中國無論左、右，形成了一個新的共識，中國知識份子開始擺脫對西方模式的迷信、對美國模式的迷信。這就是甘陽所說的第二次思想解放的內容。他論述的一個要點，就是主張從西方和美國模式中解放和擺脫出來。這個時候必須要特別強調，第二次思想解放和第一次思想解放的關係，就是沒有第一次思想解放就不可能有第二次思想解放。那麼第一次思想解放到底是什麼。第一次思想解放的最重要的成果是，從對西方化的粗暴而簡單化的否定和批判中解放出來，轉向大規模地學習西方，所以第一次思想解放的實質是大規模地學習西方。可以說這個30年來向西方學習的幅度，那根本是五四運動無法相比的，這是有史以來從來沒有過的。甘陽認為，大規模地學習西方的同時，中國知識份子開始逐漸提高中國人自己的水準，來判斷，來辨別，哪些西方的東西可能對我們比較有用，可能比較適合我們國情，哪些東西僅僅是對它那邊有用，對我們並沒有用。⁶²⁾對於有些人認為“新三統”論好像對毛的文革時代有過多的肯定，甘陽回答說：這個我覺得要排除意識形態，就是說中國經濟改革為什麼相對比較成功，我覺得這個問題在整個世界的社會科學裡面沒有得到解答，因為很難理解，因為特別是你考慮到70年代末80年代初，一直到80年代末，整個西方的學界在看中國的改革和蘇聯東歐的改革，當然有一個很想當然的預設，如果蘇聯、東歐的改革都不成功，中國怎麼可能成功呢？但中國成功了，為什麼？而這個理由我認為和毛澤東是有很大的關係。毛澤東的一個最大的特點，他就是搞破壞，當然毛澤東破壞的同時，他把中國的中央計劃經濟體制完全給摧毀掉，也就是中國本來是要學蘇聯式的，中央計劃經濟，但是毛澤東搞大躍進，就是最徹底地破壞計劃經濟，這個是一個非常簡單的一個道理，另外還有一點，就是毛澤東時代，有一點我認為是不能否定，就是毛澤東的平等主義的這個傾向，平均主義，他力圖把這個工業化帶到農村，雖然大躍進是失敗的，而是說我們必須理解這樣一些問題所在，然後我們會看到我們中國，它的發展的道路是有它自己獨特性的，而說不定，我們在這裡面可以找到解釋為什麼蘇聯、東歐不成，中國反而走出來的一個理由。這是我考慮問題的一個大概思路，並不是說從一個意識形態出發，而是說這個問題本身怎麼解答。⁶³⁾對於甘陽的上述主張，有些中國的知識份子，尤其是那些瞭解甘陽1980-1990年代的思想立場的人提出質疑，其“新三統”論是不是向中國政府的現實政

61) Arif Dirlik, 〈是與歷史對立的文化嗎〉, 111頁。

62) 甘陽, 〈當代中國的思想解放〉; 摘要: 鳳凰衛視“世紀大講堂”講稿; 甘陽, 《文明·國家·大學》, 125-129頁。

63) 甘陽, 〈當代中國的思想解放〉, 鳳凰衛視“世紀大講堂”講義原稿。

治有某種靠攏。甘陽對此回答說，假如政府的說法正好符合我的，有什麼不可以支援？他還說，現代社會的知識份子要特別警惕的就是作為權力的附庸，但是現在社會最大的權力未必是政府，它可能是商界，可能是媒體。不過，對於他的這種回答，也可能有人提出尖銳的質疑。比如丁學良認為，中國模式包括三個相互交織的子系統——政治方面的權力(不是right, 是power)架構、社會方面的社會控制、經濟方面的管制的市場經濟。中國社會靠這三個支點運轉。基於列寧主義的一黨集權原則和社會控制系統，⁶⁴⁾這兩個支點是第三個支點——管制的市場經濟的政治環境和社會保障，並從市場經濟吸入新鮮的血液和氧氣，得到各種物質資源。這三個支點相互融合、相互依存的過程中，一個完美的中國模式誕生了。⁶⁵⁾堅持這種立場的學者出乎意料地多。吳敬璉也認為中國經濟仍然是國家部門(state sector)在資源配置方面起著主導作用。他主張，雖然國有經濟在國民生產總值(GNP)中並不佔有優勢，但它仍然控制著國民經濟命脈(commanding heights)。⁶⁶⁾這些主張使甘陽在前所述“商界和媒體比政府或黨擁有更多權力”的主張毫無說服力。

甘陽的關於儒學思維方式的說法也會引起不少爭議。他說：“我的一位經濟學家朋友，他是非常不喜歡中國傳統文化的，但是有一點，他說他肯定要感謝孔夫子，否則兒子不會那麼孝順。我覺得這是一個很特別的問題，就是人在生活當中對此用而不知。幾千萬工人下崗，怎麼過來的？當年這不是靠政府補貼解決的，當時政府並沒有錢。之所以沒有出大問題是因為兄弟姐妹親戚們互相幫忙。這些不滿之所以沒有爆發，是因為這種不滿在相當程度上被緩解了。這個緩解的機制不是政府，而是家庭關係。這和儒家常年形成的文化觀念和它對社會結構的影響存在很大關係，如果不把這個講清楚，整個社會環境當中欠缺的環節我們都不知道在哪裡。所以，儒家這個問題並不僅僅是一個理想，它在現實當中起到了很多的實際作用，只是這一點往往被忽視。家庭的結構、親情的結構仍然是中國社會極為關鍵的一點，沒有這一點，中國經濟改革可能早就在兩極分化上出了大問題。”⁶⁷⁾他的發言實在是令人吃驚的主張，好似家人承擔原本應由國家承擔的事情是理所應當，而且將此與儒學聯繫了起來。在某些方面，這讓我想起，“為了(噴發出或欲噴發出經濟發展的殘酷內部矛盾的)國家動員，一而再，再而三強調忠孝”的樸正熙時代禦用學者的主張。他的言論從某種角度來看，可以說是儒學被利用為親體制的一個事例。但甘陽是為了強調儒學被人們“用而不知”，其實在現實生活中起到的作用之多超乎想像。他的問題意識正是，應思考如何將此理論化。很顯然他是考慮到自己

64) 中華人民共和國的社會統制系統沒有從國家官方機構獨立出來，但高高凌駕於官方機構之上。丁學良，《中國模式的革新》，82頁。

65) 丁學良，《中國模式的革新》，78-96頁。

66) 吳敬璉，〈前言：“中國模式”，還是過渡性體制？〉，4頁。

67) 甘陽，〈中國道路還是中國模式〉，85頁。

的“儒家社會主義共和國”的發言，是功利主義的表露，儘管如此，暗示著在中國的現實社會中作為思維方式的儒學並不是簡單的問題。就此，佐藤慎一的言論值得回味。他說，中國人在儒學制度下經過悠久歷史積累下來的思維或行為模式，幾乎是不自覺的，因此在儒學自覺地被否定之後反而能夠持續的可能性很大。經歷過五四和文革期間否定儒學的浩劫之後，仍然殘留下來的意識，才是行為樣式的層面。⁶⁸⁾他可能是在說明，即使沒有傳承儒教原形，但作為政治理念的儒教存在形態在繼續傳承。⁶⁹⁾關於這一問題，要慎重觀察在中國的政治權力和日常生活中自我是怎麼構成的。或許，甘陽在前面的發言是不是想說，儒學的思維樣式在中國應從習性(Habitus)或習俗的角度去研究。

中國模式論之所以受到關注，還因為中國的規模。鑒於中國的國家規模，若不同時考慮傳統和近代、開發與生態、商品化和另一種生活，中國的生存本身便是不可能的。目前，世界資本主義也處於同樣的轉捩點。⁷⁰⁾在這種情況下，中國模式論不只是對中國這一大國之發展的理解和展望，還涉及到對世界資本主義的理解和展望。對於自由主義者來說，2000年代的這些討論或許只不過是一種流行，但從文明史的觀點來看並不如此簡單。因此中國模式論同時引來擔憂和期待。正如《亞當·斯密在北京》的作者阿裡吉(Giovanni Arrighi)所期待的那樣，中國是否有可能擺脫歷史性的資本主義的惡性循環，打造新的世界秩序框架。⁷¹⁾

不管從物理還是心理方面，我都希望東方主義和西方霸權支配的知識結構能構轉變為平等的結構，並認為這一歷史責任是中國不可回避的責任。在這一點上，包括新左派在內的中國知識份子試圖通過中國模式論找出意義的動向，可以說具有歷史意義。而這必然會與可抑制資本主義現代性問題的新體制的登場有關聯。因此，中國找出替代方案不只是中國的問題，也是世界性問題。儘管如此，我們不能以浪漫的態度看待問題。拉斯基曾說，共產主義並非靠現實主義，而是靠理想主義(Idealism)，並非靠唯物展望，而是靠精神承諾得到進展的。⁷²⁾儘管今天我們所處的狀況不同，但參與儒學討論的知識份子有必要重新回味拉斯基對革命的這番領悟。

若中國模式論不具備本身的內在正當性，即使滿足了其論述外在條件和環境，也很難具有積極意義，進而難以長久地持續下去。尋找可代替美國的方案，其重要性再強調也不為過，但若要成為真正的代替方案，同時要找到能夠解決中國內部問題的方案。因為能夠解決中國內部問題的方案，自然便可成為全球的代替方案。對中國內部大多數人民的幸福、人權視而不見，而要成為外部世界的代替方案，這本身便是說不通的內部和外

68) 佐藤慎一，〈儒教とナショナリズム〉，35頁。

69) 閔門基，〈傳統思想和現代中國的理解〉，106-107頁。

70) 張潤美，〈中國崛起和中國模式論〉，3頁。

71) 參見阿裡吉，〈亞當·斯密在北京〉。

72) Laski, *Communism*, 245; 丸山真男，〈現代政治的思想和行動〉，285頁再引用。

部是不可能分割的。因此，從與新左派不同的角度提出問題的秦暉或賀照田的主張，我們也有必要關注。同時思考如何將儒學變革性地進行重構。

五、重建“作為批判性論述的儒學”的條件

和孔子與儒學謳歌幸福時代不同，論述儒學的現代中國飽受各種社會問題的困擾。通過媒體報導可以看到中國目前面臨貧富差距、腐敗、人權等問題，中國大多數人似乎並不幸福。因此，有不少具有批判精神的知識份子自嘲地問道，中國擁有悠久的歷史，且經歷過社會主義，但為什麼會演變成問題最多的“資本主義”社會？

不管是源自肯定自我的文化，還是源自文明史的轉折，在國家重建文明帝國的規劃下被挖掘出來的正是儒學。若知識份子不把自己的角色局限於表示認同並自覺地對此進行粉飾的話，應圍繞儒學提出一些其他不同的問題。當然，對於儒學在近現代社會一直被否定，而到現在又重新被重視這一點，我們沒有必要用否定的視角來看待。但儒教確實在進入現代之後，逐漸失去了其影響力。而儒教為什麼衰落下去，現在又為什麼在中國重新復興起來，儒學在當今中國重現其脈絡需要什麼樣的條件？在探尋這些問題的答案時應秉承前面提到的具有批判精神的知識份子的問題意識。為了重現前面所提到的“作為批判性論述的儒學”有幾個必要的前提。第一，雖然如今儒學得以復興，但仍有必要對其衰落，甚至被批判的原因進行研究。因為衰落有可能是其復興的原因和背景。⁷³⁾另外，衰落的原因不僅僅是因為外因，若假設衰落是儒學自身存在的內因和外因相互作用的結果，那麼探求其內因和外因也會給研究復興的原因帶來不少啟示。因此，不管是批判還是宣揚，不管是衰落還是復興，只從政治方面來分析其原因是妥當的。即，儒學在近代解體是單純出於外因，還是因其自身的內容和結構，還是因兩者的相互作用，需要進行細緻的研討和歸納。另外，西方後結構主義者對近現代性進行批判，實現了自我瓦解。而近現代的儒學沒有經歷過這種“自發”的自我瓦解過程，因此也有必要對其進行研究。

第二，中國若要重新探討儒學，想從中創造出新的價值的話，需要研究怎麼和全面批判儒學的新文化運動時期的儒學批判問題聯繫起來，以及1949年社會主義時期儒學被“他者化”，特別是文化大革命時期的一系列問題等都是必須要研究的問題。有不少有關社會主義時期思想改造運動、反右派鬥爭和大躍進運動的論文從各個層面展示出，社會主義時期的包容和排擠的標準是很任意的和不自然的。⁷⁴⁾儒學和知識份子被否定，又被肯定都是在同一個政權下發生的，而對這部分內容進行清算在短期內並不容

73) 劉擎，〈儒學復興與現代政治〉，<http://www.aisixiang.com/data/56401.html>(檢索天：2013年8月5日)

74) 參見裴毅然，〈自解佩解：反右前知識份子的陷落〉。

易，要想對儒學曾被“他者化”不提出任何異議就想實現儒學復興，只要是有有一點常識的中國人都不會接受。

如果把前兩點當作預備工作的話，那麼接下來要考慮重建“作為批判性論述的儒學”的條件和方法。為此，在把儒學當作一種體制理念之前有必要重新回到孔子的先進儒學，關注其包含的雙重性，在中國現在的脈絡中對儒學進行改革性的重新詮釋。即，把儒學與國家和資本分離開來，對國家和資本進行警戒和批判，使儒學重生為限制既得利益的社會理念和21世紀的大同思想。這和傳統的士階層將“亡天下”和“亡國”分離開來的認識方式也有一定的關聯，即，強烈喚起將天下作為文化主體的中國式秩序。這樣一來，儒學反倒會作為一種批判性論述而擁有持續的生命力。作為一個例子，我們可以看看韓國學者申榮福的《講義》。他認為《論語》是有關人際關係的寶庫，認為孔子有意對人類關係進行根本的變革。從這一點來看，《論語》是可以和《資本論》並駕齊驅的革命書籍。另外，還可以看到韓國學者李佑在(音譯)的《李佑在讀論語》。作者認為孔子在當時的局勢下試圖提倡為民政治和全新標準的身份秩序，是個具有改革精神的思想家。⁷⁵⁾與此相比，於丹的《論語心得》從“去政治化的人文主義”這一點來看脫離了批判性。她認為，個人的幸福和不幸在於你和我、個人的決心，與社會關係和共同體的性質沒有關係。

最後，探討儒學的主體們有必要重新回顧儒學“絕對普遍性的瓦解”從另一方面開啟了“普遍性的發展可能性”的歷史經驗。例如，儒學在隋、唐對道家 and 佛教產生了危機意識，並為了進行應對而在宋代發展為新儒學(neo-Confucianism)。近代時期的新儒學(new-Confucianism)在中國受到西方侵略的危機中參考西方哲學，是儒學追求現代化的產物。宋代朱子學和近代初期的新儒學的誕生都是為了擺脫危機。從這一點來看，普遍性的擴大都是在遇到某種歷史危機時才會實現的。

相比之下，在當今中國，儒學迎來了西勢東漸之後最幸福的時代。中國的經濟發展和美國的金融危機等客觀條件和契機比任何時候都在誘惑著儒學和知識份子重建自我中心性。這種條件和契機給活躍儒學探討創造了很好的條件，但從對豐富儒學自身的內容和結構卻很有可能起到消極影響。現在在中國，儒學反倒是在國家權力和知識份子的庇護下，在理論方面發展霸權的可能性並不小。最終，中國人喜歡的“王道”，即縮小普遍性的可能性有可能會增大。如果說宋代和近現代追求的是“儒學的現代化”，那麼可以說現在打造的是“現代的儒學化”。前者很可能是通過自我改革來確保“普遍的發展可能性”，而後者則是通過自我肯定來實現“絕對的普遍性擴張”。

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75) 成泰鏞，〈低調的論語，高調的論語〉，391頁。根據理想的政治來實現理想社會是儒教最關心的內容之一。這是作為統治階級的士階層需要承擔的部分，修己和治人不可分，任何一方都沒有優先權。參見成泰鏞，〈看待原始儒教的理想社會論的當今視角〉。

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Confucianism, Intellectuals, and the State: Reconstructing Confucianism as a Critical Discourse

CHO KeongRan

Abstract

This paper examines how Chinese intellectuals and the Chinese government utilized Confucianism when China began to open its markets in 1980s. For many Chinese politicians, Kongzi and Confucianism are key symbols which can greatly impact the perceptions of Chinese people in regards to their policies and actions, both positively and negatively. In this regard, Kongzi cannot be overlooked when examining Chinese policies which are concerned Confucian traditions. While Confucianism was widely dismissed when Socialist systems prevailed, it has risen to become a key ideology in Chinese political life following the economic reforms which began in the 1980s. This trend shows that the revival of Confucianism has not been a natural, spontaneous historical consequence, but an intentional discovery by the Chinese government. This paper argues that the revival of Confucianism is a cooperative creation between the state, intellectuals, and the media with the common goal of recreating a Chinese cultural empire. This paper refers to the Confucianism which has been created by the three parties as “Confucianism as a compound of power and knowledge,” and uses the term “Confucianism as a critical discourse” as its counterpart. This paper also attempts to disseminate Confucianism as a critical discourse with an emphasis on the traditional role of *shi* 士 (literati) who tried to internalize moral awareness and universal order.

Keywords: Chinese cultural empire, revival of Confucianism, Confucianism as a compound of power and knowledge, Confucianism as a critical discourse, intellectuals

十八世紀“儒學西傳”的代表作 ——耶穌會士衛方濟及其《中華帝國六經》一書

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中文摘要

“四書”域外傳播史是“儒學西傳”跨文化研究中的重要課題，本文結合“儀禮之爭”這一時代背景，以比利時來華耶穌會士衛方濟1711年在布拉格出版的《中華帝國六經》(Sinensis imperii libri classici sex)書中《中庸》譯文為例，比較衛氏譯文與其他拉丁文譯本之間的異同，一方面勾勒出16—18世紀來華耶穌會士對儒學典籍翻譯與闡釋的基本路徑；另一方面著重探討衛氏譯文的獨特之處及個中緣由。

關鍵詞：耶穌會士，禮儀之爭，《中華帝國六經》，《中庸》，儒學，跨文化譯介

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比利時來華耶穌會士衛方濟(François Noël, 1651-1729)是十八世紀中西“禮儀之爭”歷史舞臺上的關鍵人物，其重要性一方面體現於他在耶穌會飽受各方批評質疑的危機時刻，兩度被任命為中國副省的差會“代理人”(Sinensis missionis procurator)返回羅馬，就中國禮儀的性質向教宗上呈來華耶穌會士收集的各方教友證詞，並憑藉自己出色的語言能力以及對於中國文化的深入瞭解，撰寫報告為耶穌會的“文化適應政策”進行辯護；另一方面作為一名拉丁文語文學家，他不僅在古典文學及修辭學方面造詣頗深，曾撰寫若幹的拉丁文詩歌並創作拉丁文戲劇。沿襲比利時天主教教會(當時與盧森堡、荷蘭以及法國北部同屬於西屬尼德蘭地區)的開明傳統¹⁾，他撰寫的《在印度和中國所進行的數學及物理學觀察》(*Observationes mathematicae et physicae in India et China... ab anno 1684 usque ad annum 1708, Pragae 1710*)一書保留了許多寶貴的天文學觀測資料，例如中國城市的經緯度、日蝕月蝕及木星的觀測數據、中國星宿的名錄等；更值得稱道是他名下三部介紹中國文化的巨著：包括“四書”、《孝經》及《小學》六部儒學經典拉丁文譯本的《中華帝國六經》(*Sinensis imperii libri classici sex, Pragae 1711*)、介紹中國哲學思想特質的《中國哲學》(*Philosophia sinica, Pragae 1711*)以及旁徵博引意圖解析中國“禮儀”性質的《中國禮儀的歷史記錄》(*Historica notitia rituum et ceremoniarum sinicarum, Pragae 1711*)。他在1708年第二次作為“代理人”前往羅馬彙報工作並為中國禮儀進行辯護，此後不知何故²⁾他來到位於布拉格的耶穌會大學並於同一年集中出

1) 耶穌會在16世紀便已確立一整套培養耶穌會士的教育方案(*Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum Societatis Jesu*)，其內容包括：為期5-6年的人文中學階段的學習、3年哲學以及4年神學的學習。其中，人文中學的學習主要集中於古典語言方面的訓練，包括了語法、人文和修辭學方面的課程(耶穌會特別重視拉丁文訓練)；哲學階段的學習則明顯打上了亞裡斯多德思想體系的烙印，主要學習邏輯學、自然哲學、形而上學以及倫理學；而最後神學階段的學習則以湯瑪斯阿奎那的經院哲學思想為主。耶穌會的教育方案採取階層中立的態度，面向來自各個階層的受教育者；強調靈修經驗的同時採取訓練軍人的模式，著重培養受教育者針對具體情況進行分析、獨立反應並綜合判斷的能力，其最終目標是要培養教會內部的領導精英。這一教育方案的制定也為羅馬天主教內部的改革提供了一個積極範例，詳見：Walter Kasper, *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 842-843。有別於大多數耶穌會學校都遵循這一固定的學習計畫，弗萊芒——比利時耶穌會在教育體系方面表現出更多的靈活性：他們將通常的文科學習(“Arts Course”，主要是學習希臘哲學)從三年縮短為兩年，將更多的時間用於數學、天文學方面的學習，因而比起其他葡國、法國、德國以及義大利的來華傳教士，南懷仁、柏應理等弗萊芒傳教士在哲學方面所獲訓練較少，他們更多是以天文曆法以及學術研究方面的成就著稱，參見Brockey, *Journey to the East: The Jesuit Mission to China, 1579-1724*, 212-214。

2) 關於衛方濟為何會來到布拉格的原因，學界一直存在多種揣測。例如費賴之(Louis Pfister)追隨(Frédéric Alvin)的說法，認為衛方濟是接到當時的耶穌會會長的命令前往布拉格；魯保祿(Paul Rule)認為在“禮儀之爭”這一敏感時期，可能布拉格耶穌會大學是一個遠離羅馬及法國這些論爭中心的安全處所；還有另一種意見認為是當時耶穌會的反對者詹森派(Jansenists)出於積怨，介入並直接導致衛方濟被貶布拉格，因為衛氏此前提交給教宗克萊蒙十一世的報告中，將批評的矛頭直接指向詹森派這一主要“敵人”。詹森派此前聲稱教皇亞歷山大七世由於受到耶穌會士在中國禮儀性質方面的欺騙，才會容許耶穌會在華實行適應政策並允許中國教徒祭祖祭孔，因而他們主張鐸羅主教應該推翻這一論

版這三部著作。其中，後兩部作品更因其爭議性以及隱含的“挑釁性”，傳聞耶穌會內部曾對其進行審查並下令查封，以致後世流傳下來的藏本甚少。³⁾

學界對於衛氏著作的關注一直存在，而與之相關的專題研究卻不多見。⁴⁾ 下文謹以《中華帝國六經》一書的《中庸》譯文為例，試圖通過勾勒“天”這個在“禮儀之爭”中極具爭議性的概念，深入瞭解衛方濟本人的儒學觀及其對於中國禮儀的定位。

一、衛方濟其人及其《中華帝國六經》一書

1651年衛方濟出生於比利時北部埃諾省(Hainaut)的埃斯特呂城(Hestrud)。⁵⁾ 19歲時他加入耶穌會高盧——比利時會省(Gallo-Belgium)位於圖爾奈(Tournai)的初學院成為一名見習修士。在此，他一邊學習神學，一邊教授了多年的文學及修辭學。1684年1月他與另一名比利時傳教士Philippe Selosse(1649-1685)一同從裏斯本登船被派往東方傳教，此時衛方濟希望加入的是日本會省。1685年8月他成功在澳門登岸，而同行的Selosse神父此前已在途中不幸逝世。

在此期間，他曾於1687年和1690年兩次計畫乘船奔赴日本傳教，但都以失敗告終，遂被派往中國江西會省常駐南昌佈道。1701年奉中國副省會長安多(Antoine Thomas, 1644-1709)的指示，他與龐嘉賓(Kaspar Castner, 1665-1709)同為“代理人”前往羅馬就中國禮儀之爭向教宗報告教務工作並從耶穌會的立場進行辯解，但最終教宗克萊蒙特十一世作出了反對耶穌會的決定。1707年7月衛方濟重返澳門，不久他二度被選為“代理人”並於1708年1月陪同康熙特使艾遜爵(Antonio Francesco Giuseppe Provana, 1662-1720)、陸若瑟(José Ramón Arxó, d.1711)再次前往羅馬，同行的還有艾遜爵的

令。衛方濟在其報告中反駁並指出：按照這樣的做法，那麼亞歷山大七世譴責詹森派的諭令也可出於同樣的理由被推翻。參見Rule, “François Noël SJ and the Chinese Rites Controversy,” in *The History of the Relations between the Low Countries and China in the Qing Era (1644-1911)*, 155-156.

- 3) 法國漢學家鮑狄埃(M. G. Pauthier)和雷慕莎(Abel Rémusat)都持這一觀點，而澳大利亞當代漢學家魯保祿則認為尚無充分的證據說明這一點，參見Rule, “François Noël SJ and the Chinese Rites Controversy,” 159.
- 4) 筆者對於衛方濟其人及其譯介儒學典籍活動的關注，始於無意中閱讀到臺灣學者潘鳳娟所撰《天主、罪人、聖治：衛方濟與〈人罪至重〉》一文(北京：基督宗教與近代中國國際學術研討會，2009年)，此後又接觸到潘氏梳理衛方濟著述的研究論文《衛方濟的經典翻譯與中國書寫：文獻介紹》(台北：《翻譯論叢》，2010年第1期)並深受啟發。
- 5) 關於衛方濟的生平，筆者主要參考了下列學者的著述：[法]費賴之，《在耶穌會士列傳及書目(上)、(下)》，418-423頁；[法]榮振華，《16-20世紀入華天主教傳教士列傳》，253-254頁；Rule, “François Noël SJ and the Chinese Rites Controversy,” 138-156；Mungello, “The First Complete Translation of the Confucian *Four Books* in the West,” 515.

中國助手樊守義(Louis Fan, 1682-1753)。1709年2月他們一行在羅馬彙報工作並提交了數種教務報告及回憶錄，此時，衛方濟認為教宗在綜合瞭解各方面的證詞後，已傾向於支持耶穌會的觀點。⁶⁾之後衛方濟先是來到布拉格的耶穌會公學並於1710-1711年出版了多部重要著作，繼而在1713年前往法國裏爾，在此兩度申請返回中國都被拒。1716年他來到裏斯本第三次申請返回中國，仍舊無法成行——魯保祿猜測或是因為身體狀況或是由於船隻故障，待考——終於1729年在裏爾去世。

衛方濟是16、17世紀來華耶穌會士的集體譯經活動的重要參與者以及集大成者，儘管他的《六經》譯稿直至他第二次返回羅馬彙報工作並利用在布拉格逗留的機會，才於1711年刻印出版。但早在南昌傳教期間，他已完成“四書”大部分的拉丁譯文。筆者查證過現藏於布魯塞爾皇家圖書館、署名為“中國耶穌會傳教團神父衛方濟”(a P. Francisco Noël Societatis JESU Missionario sinensi)的《中庸》《孟子》兩部拉丁文手稿⁷⁾，兩稿扉頁上標注的“1700年於中國南昌”(Nancham in China 1700)字樣都證明了這一點。另據費賴之所載，衛方濟三卷本的《論語》手稿現藏於俄羅斯聖彼德堡圖書館，亦為“1700年南昌手寫本”。⁸⁾

衛氏的譯文不管在體例上還是譯詞的選用上，都與其修會前輩有所不同。鑒於衛氏《六經》譯文篇幅甚大⁹⁾，而《中庸》一書被程朱視為“孔門傳授之心法”，是儒家論述修身以及“至德”的著作之中最具“形而上”色彩的一部，下文遂以《中庸》譯文為例來分析衛氏譯文的特色。

二、衛方濟《中庸》拉丁譯文的特點

(一) 翻譯底本及譯文手稿

在翻譯底本及體例上，衛方濟的“四書”譯文同時參照了朱熹及張居正的注解。以《中庸》的譯文為例：衛氏先是全文翻譯了朱熹的《中庸章句序》，之後將朱熹《中庸章句》所定33章的內容、依據朱熹的斷句逐句翻譯；其譯文明顯參照張居正《中庸直解》一書的注解，除開第一段在正文

6) 衛方濟在一封寫給自己的贊助人阿維羅公爵夫人(Duchess of Aveiro)的信中透露了這一觀點，參見Aveiro, *The Far Eastern Catholic Missions, 1663-1711: The Original Papers of the Duchess d'Aveiro*, 99, 轉引自Rule, “François Noël SJ and the Chinese Rites Controversy,” 155, note 86。但實際上教宗克萊蒙特十一世後來在1715年3月19日頒佈了《從登極之日》(Ex illa die)通諭，完全否定並禁止了中國禮儀。


7) 兩部手稿皆藏於比利時皇家圖書館手稿部，編號分別為19.930及19.931，關於該館所藏中文文獻的書目及內容概述，可參閱Dudink, *Chinese Books and Documents (Pre-1900) in the Royal Library of Belgium at Brussels*。

8) [法]費賴之，《在華耶穌會士列傳及書目(上)》，420頁。

9) 衛方濟《中國帝國六經》一書可從Google Books上搜索到掃描文本。

之後有明確說明(sic hujus textum fusius explicat Cham Kiu Chim, 意為“張居正對該段文字的詳解如此”)¹⁰⁾, 其餘各處都是將朱注及張注直接融解在自己的譯文中。此外手稿中有一段被刪去的譯文其出處標注為明朝著名理學家蔡清(1453-1508年)的《四書蒙引》(Su Xu mum in)。

儘管在後來正式出版的《六經》中沒有出現任何漢字, 但衛氏的《中庸》譯文手稿採取中拉雙語對照排版。其中《中庸》原文部分包括朱熹所作《中庸章句序》及正文全文, 用黑色毛筆抄錄(手稿中的漢字似出自兩位中國人筆下: 大部分章節的字跡統一端正並有紅色句讀; 中間有兩處出現另一人的娟秀筆跡, 這兩部分無句讀圈讀, 且與前文分開單獨裝訂,



衛方濟《中庸》拉丁文譯本手稿
現藏於布魯塞爾皇家圖書館

似是後來補入抑或更替的部分), 各個章節前方的序號都是衛方濟依據朱熹集注的章節劃分及斷句自行標注的。拉丁譯文部分, 經與耶穌會檔案館所藏衛方濟親筆書信比對, 可以確認手稿前半部分並非衛方濟本人的字跡。該部分字體工整娟秀, 而且刪改調整的篇幅頗大(刪改者的字跡為衛方濟本人), 可能是由他人主筆翻譯抑或抄錄衛氏早期譯文——也可能是由衛氏口述譯文, 他人筆錄而成——衛氏本人明顯對於該部分譯文不甚滿意, 故出版前進行了大幅度的修改; 後半部分譯文出自衛方濟筆下, 該部分修改甚少, 似是經過深思熟慮之後一氣呵成。

經由比對《中庸》手稿與之後《六經》中的正式出版物, 可以發現被刪的語句主要是譯者對原文所做的注釋。例如《中庸》手稿開篇“天命之謂性”一句譯畢, 譯者直接借用張居正注釋中的舉例¹¹⁾, 以“在天為元亨利貞, 在人為仁義禮智”來說明上天賦“理”於萬物並成就其本性, 出版時該例被刪; 翻譯“致中和, 天地位焉, 萬物育焉”一句時, 手稿一方面借用湯瑪斯·阿奎那《神學大全》(Summa theologiae)中的術語“appetitus rationalis”(指意志)和“appetitus sensitivus”(指感覺)分別比喻“天”和“地”的屬性; 另一方面也使用“天為父”“地為母”這一中式比喻來說明天、地與萬物之間的關係, 出版時也被刪; 此後手稿原本還引用張居正——除開篇一處, 此後手稿譯

10) 孟德衛在其研究中指出衛氏《六經》兼用朱注與張居正的直解, 並明確提及朱熹及其他理學家的名字, 卻唯獨“沒有明確指出張居正的名字”, 參見Mungello, “The First Complete Translation of the Confucian Four Books in the West,” 529. 據筆者查證, 衛氏《大學》《論語》及《孟子》譯文中, 確有多處明確參考張氏直解但未點出處, 唯獨在《中庸》譯文中譯者明確表明自己參考了張居正的注解, 詳見Noël, *Sinensis imperii libri classici sex*, 41.

11) 孟德衛曾指出: 早期來華耶穌會士之所以選擇張居正的注本, 不僅因為張氏的直解簡潔易懂, 同時比起具有“無神論”傾向的理學闡釋, 張居正的注解則帶有明顯的“一神論”色彩, 因而更受耶穌會士的青睞。詳見Mungello, “The Jesuits’ Use of Chang Chü-cheng’s Commentary in their Translation of the Confucian Four Books (1687),” 16-18.

者凡引張注皆隱去姓名，只稱之為sinac interpretes(中國的闡釋者)。這一稱謂頗有經院哲學的古風，十二世紀阿拉伯哲學家亞味羅(Averroes)因其對於亞裡斯多德學說所做的著名詮釋及深遠影響亦被稱為“詮釋者”(The Commentator)——《中庸直解》中“由是吾之心正，而天地之心亦正，吾之氣順，而天地之氣亦順”的一席話，亦被刪。此外，翻譯“詩曰。神之格思。不可度思。矧可射思。夫微之顯。誠之不可揜如此夫”一段，手稿中除原文翻譯外還新增兩處注釋，介紹中國人在祭神之前如何進行齋戒(ieiunium sinicum)並援引《四書蒙引》中有關“太極”作為事物本源，因其生化出“陰”“陽”兩氣並成為天地萬物造化的根源，這兩處注釋(Nota)都不見於最終的出版物。

除刪去部分注釋外，為使譯文更為簡練準確，衛氏在出版前也刪去一部分修飾性、重複性的衍文，增添一些語氣詞、連詞或根據上下文補充實詞以貫通句意，一併訂正譯文中出現的錯誤¹²⁾；行文中多處出現句式調整以及同義詞更替，也體現出譯者在用詞上的斟酌以及修辭、文采方面的考量。另有部分調整則似乎受限於當時刻印技術，例如手稿中所有用底線來表示的專有名詞(人名、書名)及引語，出版時均改用斜體標示；手稿人名注音中凡是使用ç的名詞，如Chim çu(程子)，Çu su(子思)，Yen et Çem(顏氏和曾氏)，刻印時都統一用ts取代，改為Chim Tsu, Tsu Su, Yen et Tsem等。

(二) 譯詞的確定性及體系化

十六、十七世紀來華耶穌會士在處理儒學典籍中概念的西譯時，往往會結合具體的上下文選擇不同的拉丁詞彙來翻譯同一個儒學概念，例如《中國哲學家孔子·中庸》(Confucius Sinarum philosophus Liber secundus, 1687 Paris)一書“道”的拉丁文譯詞包括：regula(準則)、via(道路)、vigeant virtus & leges & ipse Magistratum gerat(美德、律法強大並能為官從政)和ratio(理性/道理)等。且不論耶穌會士在主觀上是否深入瞭解儒學概念內涵多層次性的特徵——抑或是充當他們漢語老師的中國文人對此進行詳細的分梳解說——客觀上一詞多譯的做法確實有效體現了儒學概念內涵的豐富

12) 譬如手稿中“性”一詞的翻譯有時用natura，有時用natura rationalis，為了統一詞義出版時都改為natura；手稿中《中庸章句序》開篇將《中庸》的書名另譯為immutabile rectae rationis medium(不被改變的正確理性“中”)，出版時為使它與標題譯文相一致，改為Immutabile Medium(不被改變的“中”)；將vivendi modo absolutis(借助完善的生活方式)改為vivendi regula illustribus(借助卓越生活準則)、將verborum forma(言辭的形式)改為verborum formula(言辭的方式)、將et sui successorem(和他的繼承人)改為suique successorem(以及他的繼承人)等也都屬同義替換。此外，手稿中刪去多處etiam, igitur, id等不具實意的副詞、連詞，也是為了使語言簡潔。手稿中增詞的例子有：將illi enim Sapientes(那些智者)改為Prisci illi Sapientes(那些古代的智者)、刻印“天命之謂性”時，根據上文在指示代詞huius(這個)後面增添rationis(理性)，在infusio(傾注)後面增添receptio(接受)，通過補充實詞來方便讀者的理解；刻印“國有道，不變塞焉，強哉矯”一句加上表示感歎的proh(啊、噢)以及連詞dum(當……時)，這些增補都是為了使句意表達及指向更為明確。衛方濟訂正手稿譯文錯誤例子則有：翻譯“子曰。武王周公。其達孝矣乎”一句，原本是將周公譯為武王的孫子(nepotes)，後又改為兄弟(fratis)。

性，但也會給西方讀者留下儒學概念的所指含混、定義多變的印象，不利於借助概念建構起清晰明確的哲學體系。

有別於修會前輩譯本中充斥著豐富的一詞多譯現象，衛方濟更傾向於一詞一義的做法¹³⁾，只在個別篇章會根據朱注或張注對既定的譯詞加以調整。例如“道”的譯文基本固定為“道路”(via)，但衛氏在翻譯“率性之謂道”時，將“道”處理為“正確行事的道路”(recta agendi via)；將“君子之道”譯為“正確的、不可更改的中道”(recta immutabilis Medii via)；在翻譯“誠者天之道”“誠之者人之道”時，則把“道”譯為“道路或是正確的理性”(via, sive recta ratio)等。¹⁴⁾ “天”“鬼神”“君子”“小人”等詞的情況也是如此，衛氏翻譯這些概念時統一使用“coelom(天)”“spiritus(氣息/精神體)”“vir sapiens(有智慧的人)”“vir insipiens(愚蠢的人)”等譯詞。¹⁵⁾

(三) 中西文化意象的比附

衛方濟《中庸》譯文儘管在體例、句式及譯注內容上都有別於前人的譯本——《中庸》一書最早的拉丁文譯本是由義大利來華耶穌會士殷鐸澤(Prospero Intorcetta, 1626-1696)完成的《中國政治道德學說》(Sinarum scientia politico-moralis, 1667/1669 Quamcheu/Goa)，後來他的譯文經過進一步的補充修訂，再次收入《中國哲學家孔子》書中——但在儒學概念拉丁文譯詞的選擇上，卻有相當一部分與其修會前輩殷鐸澤的譯文有重合。對於這些貌似相同的譯詞，倘若結合它們所在譯文的上下文，以及譯者在前言及注解中所流露的翻譯動機，我們會發現在相同的譯詞背後，各有譯者意欲強調的不同內涵(下文對此有詳述)。但衛氏與殷氏確有一共同之處：他們延續了來華耶穌會士致力於以耶釋儒、尋求兩種文化共通之處的一貫手法。例如在翻譯《中庸》開篇“天命之謂性”時，衛氏引用張居正的觀點注解到：

“上天孕育眾人時，用氣息 [aer, 直譯為“空氣”] 或是能被感知的質料來塑造(人的)身體，繼而注入理性使人性完整。這裡所說的理性，當它位於上天時，它被稱為“第一原理”，這一原理是偉大而完善的，它為萬物所共有並具備指導性；當它存在於人的身上時，它被稱之為仁慈 [pietas

13) 十九世紀之後儒學經典的外文譯本都採取了“一詞一義”的做法，例如：理雅各譯本中“道”統一翻譯為path / way，辜鴻銘的《中庸》英譯本統一譯“道”為the moral law；當代美國漢學家安樂哲的《中庸》譯本也統一譯“道”為way，保持術語譯名的統一及其內涵的固定明顯符合近代“哲學”學科構建自身理論體系的需要。

14) 此外在自行添加的注釋中(Nota)，衛方濟也曾把“道”譯為“人類生活的正確道路”(recta hominum vivendi via)，參見Noël, *Sinensis imperii libri classici* sex, 42。

15) 例如《中庸》涉及“天”的多處譯文有：“天命之謂性”衛氏的翻譯是“Caeli lex est ipsa natura”；“致中和天地位焉”的翻譯是“in quo Coelum ac Terra debitum suum locum servant”；“上不怨天(下不尤人)”則譯為：“si Caelum ipsi non conferat quod amat, Caelo non succenset”等各處的“天”均統一翻譯為“Coelum”，參見Noël, *Sinensis imperii libri classici* sex, 41, 43, 50。

“仁”]、公正 [aequitas“義”]、尊敬 [honestas“禮”]、睿智 [prudential“智”] 或者說與生俱來的理智，這一理性的注入和接納就相當於上天將律法及其教導下達給眾人。因此說：本性是上天的律法(自然也包括在第一推動力之中)。”¹⁶⁾

此處，衛氏譯文“名義上”遵循張居正注解的相關論述，但他所選擇的核心譯詞實則具有鮮明的神學色彩，舉隅如下：

倘若用拉丁文中表示“氣息、空氣”的一詞來對應理學中的“氣”說尚可接受，那麼衛氏借用亞裡斯多德、尤其是在湯瑪斯阿奎那神學思想中的重要術語ratio(原義為理性)來翻譯程朱學派的“理”一詞，則有望文生義、乃至刻意模糊抑或調和兩者之間思想差異之嫌。其實這一做法早在殷鐸澤的早期譯本中已經多次出現，但其始作俑者則是利瑪竇，從他用希臘語拉丁化的名詞“Tetrabiblion”(原指托勒密在西元2世紀完成的四卷本占星學著作《占星四書》)來對譯儒家“四書”一詞即可見其端倪。¹⁷⁾ 本質上這是來華耶穌會士試圖調和中西文化差異、為方便西方人理解中國經典，借用西方神哲學術語來對應、注解儒學術語的一種翻譯技巧以及積極嘗試，只是後來這種手法被以白晉(Joachim Bouvet, 1656-1730)為代表的“索隱派”發揚光大，將中西文化意象的附會視作神學闡釋的例證乃至依據時，這就觸及天主教神學闡釋正統的底線，嚴令禁止其發表觀點，著述亦被封存。有趣的是雖無明確證據表明白晉與衛方濟有過直接接觸，而馬若瑟(Joseph Henry-Marie de Prémare, 1666-1736)及傅聖澤(Jean-François Foucquet, 1665-1741)等索隱派成員也只在來華初始與衛方濟有過短暫的接觸，但衛氏確曾被視為索隱派思想的積極推動者。¹⁸⁾

此處張居正注解中的“理”沿襲自朱熹在集注中的看法，是指上天(確切地說是指太極)映照在萬物包括人身上的一種完美至善的存在。在朱子的

16) “Coelum in producendo homine, post quam illi aerem seu materiam sensibilem indidit ad formandum corpus, tum eidem rationem ad perficiendam naturam infundit; haec ratio, quatenus in Coelo residet, dicitur principium primum seu magnum, communicativum, directivum, perfectivum. Quatenus autem in homine existit, dicitur pietas, aequitas, honestas, prudentia, seu intelligentia congenita. Hujus rationis infusio & receptio est instar legis ac praecepti a Coelo impositi. Idcirco dicitur: natura est Coeli lex; (scilicet in actu primo.) [...]”, 參見Noël, *Sinensis imperii libri classici* sex, 41; 此段對應的是張居正在《中庸直解》中引用子思所說的一席話：“蓋天之生人，既與之氣以成形，必賦之理以成性，在天為元亨利貞，在人為仁義禮智，其稟受付畀，就如天命令他一般，所以說，天命之謂性。”，詳見陳生鳳譯解，《張居正講評〈大學中庸〉》，55頁。

17) 利瑪竇最早使用“Tetrabiblion”(希臘語ΒΙΒΛΙΑΤΕΤΡΑΒΙΒΛΙΩΝ)一詞作為“四書”的譯名，在其書信中他多次提到這點，此外他也使用義大利語的“Quattro Libri”來指稱“四書”。參見D’Arelli, *Matteo Ricci Lettere (1580-1609)*, 184, 192n, 315n, 337n, 349, 364n, 518n.

18) 參見Mungello, “The First Complete Translation of the Confucian *Four Books* in the West,” 525-526; 費賴之在衛氏列傳中也強調“方濟諳練中國語文，昔有傳教師若干人，以為曾在中國古籍中發現基督教網，而為熱烈辯護者，方濟蓋為其中一人也”，詳見費賴之，《在華耶穌會士列傳及書目》，419頁。；Fernando Bortone在其書中也指出衛方濟明確的索引派傾向，致力於在中國典籍中重新發現基督教的真理，詳見Bortone, *I Gesuiti alla corte di Pechino*, 139.

理論中，理氣是一體中的兩分，兩者處於一種相互依存的關係。其中，“理”為本，絕無不善且無偏差。正是由於人、物稟之於天的“理”墮於俗世形氣之中交混形成了“性”，亦即張注所言“蓋天之生人，既與之氣以成形，必賦之理以成性”。而耶穌會士用以翻譯“理”的Ratio一詞，其本義是指人與生俱來所具備的一種主動認知能力，依靠這種能力每個人都能夠認識事物的意義並理解其原因¹⁹⁾，這與“理”的儒學意指可謂相差甚遠。

此外，用principium primum亦即“第一原理”——阿奎那在《神學大全》(Summa theologiae, Ia, Q4, a.1.)中曾指出“上帝是第一原理”——指代“理”；將原文的“天命”(主謂結構，此處“命”是動詞，解作令)轉譯為lex coeli(“上天的律法”)；以及衛氏譯文最後“包括在第一推動力之中”這樣的補充說明，都帶有鮮明的神學闡釋色彩，亦是中西文化意象附會的明確例證。

(四) 變幻莫測的中國之“天”

以“天”一詞為例，自先秦始，中國的“天”便一直交織著自然之天和神性之天的雙重身份，只是在不同的時期各有偏重。早期耶穌會的《中庸》譯本包括衛氏的《中華帝國六經》一書都是用“coelum”來對譯儒家之“天”，關於“coelum”一詞在西方宗教史中的含義以及來華耶穌會士選取該詞、人為構建起這一新意義鏈條的原因及其中存在的問題，筆者在此前相關研究中已有討論。²⁰⁾ 此處將重點梳理該詞的內涵在各個早期譯本中出現的轉變。

殷鐸澤《中國政治道德學說》一書²¹⁾是耶穌會歷史上第一個正式出版的《中庸》拉丁文譯本。該書作為殷氏在華的早期作品，採取簡潔明瞭的直譯風格並具有明顯的教科書乃至雙語字典的功能²²⁾，沒有添加其他主觀闡釋。殷氏在其譯文中並未將中國之“天”等同於基督宗教的唯一真神(Deus)，徑直譯為自然之天；在翻譯“郊社之禮，所以事上帝也”一句時，他只是將“上帝”譯為supremus Imperator(最高的帝王)。但後來當殷氏的《中庸》譯本再度被收錄到《中國哲學家孔子》一書時，譯者在正文翻譯之後加入大段以斜體字形式標示的主觀闡釋²³⁾，並明確指出此處的“上帝”即

19) 參見Kasper, *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 842.

20) 可參見敝作〈十七世紀來華耶穌會士對儒學概念的譯介——以“天”的翻譯為例〉，26-31頁。

21) 回應衛匡國神父(Martino Martini, 1614-1661)的招募，殷鐸澤於1659年抵達澳門。之後他先是前往杭州跟隨衛匡國神父學習中文，而後奉派至江西傳教，跟隨在建昌成功開教並建立耶穌會會院的郭納爵(Inácio da Costa, 1603-1666)學習中文並寫下很多的筆記。1662年他們共同出版了名為《中國的智慧》的《大學》拉丁文譯本。此後殷鐸澤完成自己題為《中國政治道德學說》的《中庸》譯本，並於1667、1669年先後在廣州及果阿將該書刻印。

22) 該譯本為中拉雙語合刻本，每半葉左側為西式排版的拉丁譯文，右側為中式排版的《中庸》原文；原文每個漢字都標有注音及數字標號，可與左側的拉丁譯文逐一對應。除了逐字直譯的部分，譯者因應西方人慣用的表達方式，為使拉丁文句意完整、通順，也添加了一些輔助性的虛詞。此外，為了理順篇章中上下句之間關聯，殷鐸澤也在為數不多的情況下補充過一些實詞以解釋漢語的句意。

Deus。²⁴⁾ 另外，結合該書詳細介紹中國文化的《初序》，亦可清晰地看到譯者致力於在中國典籍中搜集古人已經信仰真神的痕跡，以此證明從伏羲到孔子，中國人憑藉其出色的理性已經認識到真神，只是後來由於“釋”“道”的興起以及“新闡釋者”(“Neoterici Interpretes”，指理學家，耶穌會士有時也稱之為“atheo-politicus”無神論政客)的錯誤理解，中國人原初的純真信仰才會受到“玷汙”(“obscurassent ac foede contaminassent”)，導致迷信及墮落。耶穌會士此舉實為利瑪竇首創，在其《天主實義》一書第二章，利氏借助亞裏斯多德哲學中關於本質與偶然的劃分，明確反對宋代理學家將“太極”或“理”這種物質性本源作為世界開端，並大量徵引“五經”、尤其是《尚書》中的話來印證自己的觀點，批評駁斥朱熹的注解。《中國哲學家孔子》的譯者皆為利瑪竇適應政策的擁護者，他們沿用利氏區分原儒新儒、厚古薄今的做法，用亞裡斯多德的“四因說”來理解古代中國哲學(用質料因來定性“太極”，用“形式因”來認識“理”，以典籍中出現過的“上帝”來對應“動力因”)；以西方人的視角及其價值判斷來描繪中國的情況，比如稱理學家為“無神論政客”、稱中國為“君主國”(“monarchia”)而伏羲則是這一“君主政體的創始人”(“monarchiae sinicae conditor”)；用“Lex naturae”(自然律法時期)這樣的西方神學話語來描述中國上古史，試圖將信奉“上帝”、未受佛、道思想影響的古代中國人劃入自然律法時期，從而使之納入基督宗教史學觀以及基督宗教神學討論的範疇。經由西方經院哲學式的闡釋及改造，《中國哲學家孔子》譯本試圖證明中國先民所認識的“天”及他們崇拜的“上帝”亦即西方的Deus。儘管後來事實表明，這樣的做法未能給來華耶穌會在“禮儀之爭”中爭取到更多的支持，但譯文中的這一看法卻直接影響了萊布尼茨(Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 1646-1716)有關中國“自然神學”的思考。²⁵⁾

衛方濟在《中華帝國六經》一書的序言中明確指出：儘管來華耶穌會傳教團已經數次翻譯過“四書”等儒學典籍，他之所以要再次翻譯以盡可能地完善這些譯本，並非不知感恩或浪費時間的無益之舉，而是他認為之前

23) 從現藏於法國國家圖書館《中國哲學家孔子》一書的手稿判斷，《中庸》部分雖無譯者署名，但主要有兩種字跡。其中主體的字跡為殷鐸澤。筆者做此判斷的依據有二：一是從手稿字跡判斷，譯文字跡通過與藏於羅馬耶穌會檔案館殷鐸澤的親筆信比照，不管是在字母書寫形態還是縮寫習慣上都保持高度一致，基本可以確定是殷鐸澤本人的字跡；二是從譯文內容的一致性進行判斷。殷鐸澤1667、1669年所出版的《中國政治道德學說》書中的譯文在《中國哲學家孔子》一書中得到充分保留，尤其是從譯詞的選擇以及句式安排上都與他之前的譯文保持一致，但在直譯的基礎上，殷鐸澤又增添了许多個人的補充以及八篇關於中國文化的專題小論文。另一字跡出自比利時來華耶穌會士柏應理，1687年他借助法國皇室的資助於巴黎出版《中國哲學家孔子》，在出版前柏應理對殷鐸澤的譯文又進行了刪減和修改。

24) “Hic locus illustris est ad probandum ex Confucii sententia unum esse primum principium; nam cum dixisset esse duo sacrificia, caeli et terrae, non dixit, ad serviendum caelo et terrae, nec ad serviendum coeli et terrae distinctis numinibus, sed ad serviendum superno seu superno Imperatori qui est Deus [...]”, Prospero Intorcetta et al., *Confucius Sinarum Philosophus*, 59.

25) 李文潮，〈“自然神學”問題——萊布尼茨與沃爾夫〉，280-284頁。

的這些譯本在翻譯的準確性上存在問題，而這直接導致了閱讀這些譯本的歐洲人無法據此對中國文化做出判斷，繼而在這一討論中爭論不休。因此，他決心“準確地追隨中國的闡釋家及其(書中)原意，致力於用清楚、恰當的拉丁文逐句翻譯高雅的中文語句，其中很多都涉及(中國人的)風俗習慣。”²⁶⁾可見他將儒學譯本的準確性欠佳視為“禮儀之爭”中有關中國祭祖祭孔以及上帝譯名爭論的一個主要原因，並期望通過提供一個“如實”追隨中國闡釋者原意的譯本來解決這個問題，最終使“基督成為這兩種文化中共同的基石”(Utinam utrisque lapis angularis fiat CHRISTUS!)

正是基於這樣的考量，衛方濟的譯文不管是在體例上還是概念譯詞的選擇上，都更為明顯地參照了朱注及張注，因而也較其前輩更“忠實”地體現了儒學概念內涵的豐富性。例如在“天”的譯介上，衛方濟明確指出中國之“天”所具備的自然存在與神性存在這一雙重性。衛氏沿用殷鐸澤早期譯文中caelum一詞²⁷⁾，使得作為自然存在物之“天”的形象非常明確。在翻譯“上帝”一詞時則採取音譯加意譯的謹慎做法，如實表達為coeli Dominum seu Xamti(天的主人)，並未將其與Deus對譯。同時他也毫不掩飾地徵引各家闡釋，充分表露中國人對於上天的敬畏崇拜：如上文所引，在翻譯《中庸》開篇三句時，衛氏忠實地翻譯張居正注釋中“蓋天之生人，既與之氣以成形，必賦之理以成性”(衛氏譯為“上天孕育眾人時”，詳見前引)、“性命於天，可見道之大原出於天”(衛氏譯為：對本性的引領都源於上天。因此，它是指導人們如何正確生活的那條偉大的第一原理。²⁸⁾)等文段，明確指出儒家之“天”作為世間萬物的締造者及最高主宰者的身份；在翻譯朱熹為《中庸》劃分章節、概況每一章旨意而增補的“右第一章”時，衛方濟也如實翻譯朱注中引子思的話：“(子思)首先指出‘道路’或者說正確理性的源頭都來自上天，它自身是絕對不會改變的”²⁹⁾，再次強調了上天賦予萬物理性、確定其運行規律的神性特徵。此外，在翻譯“上不怨天，下不尤人”時，他說到：“如果上天沒有賜給自己想要的東西，不要因此向上天發怒”³⁰⁾；翻譯“故大德者必受命”時，他也遵從朱注翻譯為“因此那個擁有至高德行的人會從上天那裡獲得如此之大的獎賞，他理應從上天那裡獲得帝國並成為帝王”。³¹⁾在這些文段裡，“天”作為眾生祈願的物件以及帝國王權正當性及合法性的賦予者、

26) Noël, “Praefatio ad lectorem,” in *Sinensis imperii libri classici sex*, p. a3 v.

27) 按照西方宗教史的觀點，Caelum被定義為在土地之上並與之相分離的宇宙空間。在聖經舊約中，“天”被視為雅威的居住地(“Theologisch gilt der Himmel im AT als Wohnort Jahwes”)，但是與東方宗教不同的是，舊約中的“天”並沒有被神聖化，而是被視為雅威的受造物：他造出了穹蒼，從而“把穹蒼下的水和穹蒼上的水分開，並稱這穹蒼叫天”。參見Kasper, *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 115-122.

28) Noël, *Sinensis imperii libri classici sex*, 42.

29) 朱注原文為“首明道之本原出於天而不可易”，衛氏譯文參見Noël, *Sinensis imperii libri classici sex*, 43.

30) Noël, *Sinensis imperii libri classici sex*, 50.

31) 此處朱注原文為“受命者，受天命為天子也”，衛氏譯文參見Noël, *Sinensis imperii libri classici sex*, 53.

裁決者，堪比《聖經》中《撒母耳記》、《列王紀》和《歷代志》裡所記載的賦予君王正義性及統治合法性的耶和華。

事實上，衛方濟曾在他另一部深入討論儒家思想宗教性的《中國哲學》一書中更為明確直接地總結中國人的“天”：

在中國的古代經典中存在著一些關於真神的真實認識[...]古代中國人認為：世間萬物最初的源頭(*prima origo*)都來自上天(*a coelo*)或者說“上帝”這位上天的人和統治者(*seu coeli Dominus ac Rector*)。萬物從一開始就依賴於上天的美德，因此，天或者說上帝是所有事物的第一原因(*prima Causa*)，正是它孕育了(*producit*)人類並賦予人正確的理性本質，沒有人能置身於上天的統治及天意之外 [...] 在中國的典籍中，他們將*Deus*所獨有的“完善”這一屬性，歸於“天”或者說“上帝”。對民眾而言，他們的帝王是由上天任命的，帝王就像上天的輔助者、使者或者說是它公正的代理人。人們都敬畏上天，向它禱告，服侍、祭拜並服從上天的旨意。上天會對人們的罪行表示憤怒並通過德行來約束眾人。它嘉獎行善，懲治作惡；它關注著眾生，體察(人的)精神，指導人的內心；上天無所不及，人無法欺瞞上天，因為它是最偉大、顯赫、崇高、智慧、博愛、仁慈的協助者和保護者。難道你還沒發現中國經典中所提到的這一切與《聖經》中的記載十分類似？³²⁾

可見衛氏對於儒家之“天”的雙重性、尤其是其神性的一面了然於心並且在研究專著中毫不掩飾地將它與《聖經》中的“上帝”相提並論，只是在《六經》譯文中，他仍儘量遵循自己在前言裡提出的目標：為了保證譯本的準確性，應“如實”地翻譯中國典籍，因而並未給予過多的闡發。

儘管衛氏的譯作留存於世的藏本數量極少³³⁾，並最終伴隨著教廷禁止就“禮儀之爭”問題繼續發表演論而被塵封多時，但衛氏試圖在《中國哲學家孔子》之外另闢蹊徑，結合朱熹及張居正注解，忠實於中國典籍的原貌，重譯“四書”的努力卻並未被完全抹殺。作為少數直接接觸到衛氏譯本並深受其影響的歐洲啟蒙思想家，沃爾夫(*Christian Wolff*)正是基於衛氏的《六經》譯文從未將*Deus*與“天”對譯³⁴⁾，尤其是譯文對於中國人在道德實踐上突出表現的影響，才會撰寫出那篇著名的《關於中國實踐哲學的講話》(*Oratio de Sinarum philosophia practica*, 1721)，將孔子與耶穌相提並論，並將中國人的“道德實踐”視為無需依靠神的啟示以及基督宗教，借助自身理性以及不懈的道德修為即可實現個人完滿並獲得幸福的新模式。雖

32) 筆者譯自《中國哲學》一書，詳見Noël, *Philosophia sinica*, 23-24。

33) 德國哲學家Georg Bernhard Bilfinger以及德國古典學家、著名的早期漢學家Gottlieb Bernhard Bayer都曾感慨衛氏的“六經”譯本難得一見。參見Lühmann, “Die Übersetzungen der Vier Bücher durch die Jesuiten ins Lateinische: Couplet und Noël. Übertragungen in andere westliche Sprachen,” 39。

34) 沃爾夫曾坦言他在發表《關於中國實踐哲學的講話》時，尚未讀過更早的儒學“三書”譯本《中國哲學家孔子》，他對中國文化的判斷完全以衛氏的譯本為基礎。詳見李文潮：《“自然神學”問題——萊布尼茨與沃爾夫》，286-288頁。筆者猜測：他當時恐怕也未曾讀到過衛方濟《中國哲學》一書，否則他會做出完全不同的判斷。如前文所述，《中國哲學》書中明確指出中國人的“天”與基督宗教的*Deus*具有相似性。

然這篇演講直接導致了沃爾夫被驅逐出境以免受絞刑，但也恰是這篇演講證明了衛方濟譯文對於中國人在“道德實踐”上出色表現的宣傳是何等到位，致使崇尚理性的德國啟蒙思想家都會為了中國，這個由“哲人王”孔子——來華耶穌會士在其譯本中一直稱呼孔子為“中國哲學之王”(Sinensis Princeps Philosophiae)——所統領的理想國而無比神往。此外，《耶穌會士通信集》的編者之一、著名法國耶穌會士杜赫德(Jean Baptiste du Halde, 1674-1743)在編寫其《中華帝國全志》(Description géographique, historique, chronologique et physique de L'empire de La Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise, 1735)一書第二卷涉及“作為次典的六部中文典籍”時，也全然參照了衛氏的《六經》譯本，依次為這六部著作撰寫內容摘要。³⁵⁾其中給予《孟子》一書的介紹篇幅尤多，甚至還專門為孟子作傳，這一舉動或許是受到衛氏在譯文前言中流露出對孟子格外推崇與喜愛的影響。³⁶⁾

筆者認為：衛氏重譯儒學經典的初衷，除了為歐洲讀者提供一個更為準確和接近其原貌的譯本外，恐怕還包括：(1)借助中國典籍中的記錄，衛方濟明確肯定中華民族不管是在古代還是近代——即不管是原儒還是以理學家為代表的後世闡釋者——已對真神的存在有所瞭解，“天”“太極”“理”“氣”“性”這樣的字眼於衛方濟而已，其實是對世界起源的思考以及指向某種原初的、精神性存在的不同說法而已³⁷⁾，這可視為衛氏對於中國人從古至今如何探尋“真理”(包括對於真神的認識、思考事物的起源等)的理論思考層面；(2)另一方面，衛方濟在序言及譯文中多次提及中國人對於倫理道德的重視，並將中國人祭拜禮儀定義為“風俗習慣”(mos)的一部分，似欲將評價的標準從此前西式的“宗教性抑或是世俗性”的神學標準³⁸⁾，轉為中式的以表達敬意和感激之心、踐行禮儀為核心的禮法標準，從而擺脫修會前輩從西方的視角及神學判斷出發的路徑以及牽強附會地為儒家禮儀進行辯護的做法，果敢地以中國人的視角來定位中國祭祀問題的本質。這體現了他試圖肯定中國人對於“真理”的不同評價標準，以及這一標準如何運用於組織安排個體行為、形成固定的風俗及禮儀，以規範人類行為實踐性層面

35) 引自Theodore Foss為孟德衛關於衛氏六經譯文專題論文的點評，參見Mungello, “The First Complete Translation of the Confucian Four Books in the West”, 540-541。

36) 衛方濟在《致讀者的前言》中，開篇就指出中文典籍不同於歐洲近代著作的獨特之處在於“這些書裡更多地是談論那些古老的事物，而不是追求技藝[...]經由對話銜接方面的高雅文風，時常構建出有序的論證說理的表述方式。”隨後衛氏直接點明並推崇《孟子》一書作為中文典籍的突出代表：“尤其在孟子的書中(Doctoris Mencii liber)，他熟練地使用論證及說服的技巧來安排各個對話之間的銜接”，絲毫沒有因為孟子“性本善”等思想觀點與基督教思想有所抵觸而對他加以回避。詳見Noël, “Praefatio ad lectorem,” in *Sinensis imperii libri classici* sex, p. a2 r.

37) 對於衛方濟而言，包括程朱等理學家在內，後世那些遵循古代中國的禮法、繼續踐行祭祀禮儀的中國人都不是無神論者。參見Noël, *Philosophia Sinica*, 146-149。

38) 在《中國哲學家孔子》一書《中庸》部分的手稿中，殷鐸澤屢次在頁邊加注強調：儒家祭祖祭孔的性質是非宗教性的(Ex textu ipso liquet, quod ritus et officia Sinensium erga defunctos, à prima Priscorum institutione, fuerint mere civilia)，試圖為耶穌會在華實行“適應”政策進行辯護。

的思考，也正是這個獨特的層面激發了沃爾夫對於中國“實踐哲學”的思考及高度肯定。

三、結語

縱觀明清來華耶穌會士的多個儒學譯本，無一不在透露著他們對於中國文化內在理性的肯定和欣賞，而耶穌會傳教士通過對中國文化中宗教性元素的尋找和定位，無疑也豐富了西方自身對於所謂“宗教”的認識。不管是刻意強調原儒神性之“天”的利瑪竇，還是一度彰顯自然之“天”此後又極力證明“天”即為中國先民原初信仰的殷鐸澤，抑或是後來揭示出“天”之雙重性，敢於打破利瑪竇、龍華民(Niccolò Longobardo, 1565-1655)等修會前輩對於宋明理學家乃無神論者的貶斥並肯定其神性認識的衛方濟，耶穌會士在跨文化語境下對這一概念的內涵進行人為的重新設定，在此背後掩蓋的是中西異質文化之下，對於宇宙間“最高存在”的不同表述及理解。

耶穌會神父在西譯儒學概念時充分體現了“語言”的創造性特徵以及概念意涵的多層次性。他們的“四書”譯本之所以能對當時的歐洲啟蒙思想家產生如此深遠的影響——儘管跨文化譯介及推廣儒家文化並非他們的目的所在，但他們的譯本對於儒家文化在歐洲的傳播並使孔子的學說廣為人知，無疑起到開創性的作用——一方面固然是與啟蒙時代的精神需求、文化氛圍，亦即“時機”有關；另一方面則是因為承擔其譯介工作的耶穌會士自身兼通中西的深厚文化修養，因此他們才能基於西方的主流價值觀(即前文所說的“以耶穌釋儒”，借助中西文化意象的附會將異質文化吸納到自身文化框架的解釋之中)，借助當時西方的學術語言(借助亞裡斯多德哲學、聖保祿的神學觀以及阿奎那神學思想體系中的關鍵術語概念，來轉譯、套用儒學概念)靈活純熟地改寫他們所需要的儒學文本。假如說明清來華的耶穌會譯者，他們憑藉著聖保祿式歸化異教徒的熱情以及對於中國文化“同情之理解”，尚能夠透過“非理性”的軀殼(祭天祭祖、八卦算命等文化現象)發現並欣賞中國文化中的內在理性，那麼18世紀以後的西方人則更多是以外在理性的缺乏——亦即不符合西方世界為現代社會所制訂的各種範式，大至法律法規，小至學術論文的引文格式——來否定中國文化的內在理性。如何主動面對西方，及時回歸傳統，通過結合經驗研究及理論反思，經由它們之間的反復連接來思考如何建設一個既是中國的又是現代的、一個有別於西方現代主義模式卻又具備普世性價值的中國學術傳統乃至現代中國形象，這已然成為當下學界之重任。

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A Masterpiece of Confucian Latin Translation in the 18th Century: François Noël S.I. and His *Sinensis Imperii Libri Classici Sex*

LUO Ying

Abstract

The spreading of Confucian Four Books abroad is among the most important topics in cross-cultural studies of the transmission of Confucianism to the West. Based on the historical background of the “Rite Controversy,” this paper explores the legacy of *Sinensis imperii libri classici sex*, a text translated by the Belgian Jesuit François Noël (1651-1729) in 1711. This paper focuses on Noël’s Latin translation of the *Zhongyong* 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean) comparing it with other Latin translations of the *Zhongyong* published earlier by other Jesuits of different generations. This article provides a broad summary of both the Jesuit missionaries who came to China from the 16th to 18th century and their approaches to translation and interpretation of Confucian works and a closer investigation and discussion of Noël’s translation and his motives.

Keywords: Jesuits, Rite Controversy, *Sinensis imperii libri classici sex*, *Zhongyong*, Confucianism, cross-cultural translation

論印尼孔教精神領袖徐再英的孔教觀

鄭文泉

中文摘要

本文是對印尼孔教界譽之為印尼孔教百科全書及“學師的學師”的孔教精神領袖徐再英(Tjhie Tjay Ing)的孔教觀研究，而集中評析他在2006年《儒教基礎教育嚮導課本》一書所表達的孔教教義觀。按本文的釋析，徐再英是在前人歸納出來的“八誠箴規”(Delapan Pengakuan Iman)之教義基礎上，進一步予以經文闡釋與證說，但這些努力成果都還未臻學理精純之境。這當中的學術原因，既有來自對伊斯蘭教“六誠箴規”信條的借鑒、調整的不成功之客觀因素，也有徐再英個人及印尼孔教總體對傳統儒家的禮學體系不熟悉的主觀條件所導致。

關鍵詞：印尼，孔教，徐再英，八誠箴規，禮教

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一、印尼孔教與孔教精神領袖徐再英的研究概況

印尼孔教(下稱“印尼孔教”或“孔教”)在中、英學界的整體情況,可說是大家都略有所聞而少有人嚴加考釋和研究的階段。從中國2003年的邱巍《近年來孔教問題研究述評》一文到2011年中國人民大學孔子研究院《中國儒教發展報告(2001-2010)》一書來看,中國相關學界對印尼孔教的存在並不陌生,¹⁾但認真的學術研究就只有2007年的王愛平《宗教儀式與文化傳承:印尼孔教研究》博士論文一篇;²⁾同理,英語世界的學位論文或學術專著,迄今為止仍然只有Lasiyo在1993年向英國倫敦大學亞非研究學院提交的《孔教:新興印尼華人宗教生活形式》博士論文一篇,³⁾其他則是與中國學界一樣是為數相當有限的單篇期刊或書籍論文。⁴⁾換句話說,印尼孔教在中、英文學界的學術意義,尚未被充分體察與覺知。

印尼孔教在印尼文學界的情況似乎也未容樂觀,整體上還是一未開拓(under-developed)的學術狀態與階段。印尼文的孔教專書肯定不是個位數,而是雙位數,但一來這些專書都是教內的非學術類教義書、維權書居多,如《從神學與儀禮的角度看孔教信仰》(專著,2008)、《孔教徒的婚姻權與信教權:社會、法律與神學的視角》(論文集,1998)等,⁵⁾二來教外的學術類專書(含學術專著及論文集)也偏低,而且和教內出版品一樣都類似“內部流通”而不易在一般公共場所(如書店)取得,⁶⁾從《印尼孔教自我身份的

1) 前文有“海外孔教活動的研究”一節,唯尚未觸及印尼孔教,見邱巍,〈近年來孔教問題研究述評〉,《福建論壇·人文社會科學版》,2003年第2期,50-54頁。後一書〈序言〉有提到印尼孔教,但書中所輯無一文研究印尼孔教者,見彭永捷、方國根主編,《中國儒教發展報告(2001-2010)》,2011。

2) 原廈門大學博士論文,後正式出版為:王愛平,《印度尼西亞孔教研究》,2010。出生印尼的新加坡籍學者廖建裕(Leo Suryadinata)歷年用英文、印尼文、中文撰寫了若幹篇印尼孔教的論文,最近才有專書問世:廖建裕,《印尼孔教初探》,新加坡:華裔館,2010。無論如何,以中文著作來說,仍應以王愛平一書研究最為全面和嚴格。

3) 英文原題*Agama Khonghucu as an Emerging Form of Religious Life Among the Indonesian Chinese*,後正式出版為:Lasiyo, *Agama Khonghucu as an Emerging Form of Religious Life Among the Indonesian Chinese*, Yogyakarta: Lintang Pustaka Utama, 2012。按Lasiyo為1956年出生之印尼爪哇裔,屬中國哲學、印尼孔教之專家,今任教國立Gadjah Mada大學哲學學院。

4) 這是ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Full text、JSTOR、SAGE Humanities and Social Sciences、Scopus等電子資料庫的搜尋結果,確實是沒有第二篇Lasiyo意義的學位論文或專書。

5) 這兩本書的原文是:Winarso, *Keimanan dalam agama konghucu: suatu tinjauan teologi dan peribadahnya*; Cenggana, *Hak Asasi Beragama dan Perkawinan Khonghucu: Perspektif Sosial, Legal, dan Teologi*。

6) 這是筆者個人的資料搜羅經驗與體會,在孔教基地如雅加達、梭羅(Solo/Sala)等地的印尼連鎖書店Gramedia都不容易見到孔教類書籍(伊斯蘭教、基督教極易尋得,佛教、印度教較少,但還不至於像孔教那樣幾乎是“絕蹤”),而要透過孔教會或孔教朋友介紹與找到。

尋索》(論文集, 1995)、《論孔教的宗教性》(小冊子, 2003)、《貼近認識印尼的“孔教”》(專著, 2005)等書來看,⁷⁾可被引用、參考的印尼文學術類書目其實也非常地少(都在個位數之內, 而且來來去去都是同樣那幾筆)。這也是說, 關於印尼文的孔教專書, 目前的情況是我們還是要借由教內自己的出版品來進行進一步的學術研究, 而非相反。

從這個角度來說, 被教內人士公認為“孔教精神領袖”(Bapa Rohani)的徐再英(Tjhie Tjay Ing),⁸⁾就是一個中、英、印學術界尚未正式展開專題認識與研究的學術課題。徐再英的教內形象, 一直到2012年孔教總會為其七十七歲大壽出版的《徐再英學師傳略》(Sekilas Riwayat Haksu Tjhie Tjay Ing)一冊, 時任孔教總會會長黃耀德(Wawan Wiratma)在其序言所說的一段話, 頗可以為詮解:

感覺上幾乎所有的印尼孔教徒都知道他, 其他宗教的領袖也一樣認識他。如果把他形容為印尼孔教信徒、宗教和組織的主要支柱, 我想應該不會有人反對我。他自青年起迄今近半個世紀的“學師”生涯的奉獻, 已足以讓他登上備受世人敬重的舞臺。如果還把他對近乎所有孔教的重要教義和經典翻成印尼文, 以及他在孔教作為一個宗教、組織最為艱辛的日子的那些奮鬥的歷史也包括進來, 只會更加增添他的領袖的卓偉形象。⁹⁾

按照這樣的說法, 徐再英是一個教內、教外的人皆已周知的孔教領袖, 但學術界還未對他展開認真的學術研究與探討。作為專家研究的本文, 從黃耀德所提的“信徒、宗教和組織”三方面來說, 只能算是徐再英“宗教”這一方面的初步的專題研究之作。

二、徐再英“孔教觀”之生成背景

承上所述, 印尼孔教及其精神領袖徐再英對學界來說還是個未開拓的學術課題與範圍, 由此本文在展開專題研究之前對徐再英個人的生平略作敘述, 或不無必要。然而, 徐再英在印尼孔教社會既是個黃耀德所說具有“信徒、宗教和組織”等多面性關係的人物, 則本文似有必要集中在與其“宗教”有關的事蹟來說, 以免敘述失焦或掛一漏萬之失, 應為情理可解之事。

確切地說, 本文所說的“宗教”也僅指認識論意義的“宗教觀”而言, 也

7) 這三本書的原文是: Sumartana, *Konfusianisme di Mencari Jati Diri*; Nahravi, *Memahami Khonghucu Sebagai Agama*; and Tanggok, *Mengenal Lebih Dekat “Agama Khonghucu” di Indonesia*.

8) 這至少是出自潘昌明學師(Xueshi Buanadjaya Bing S.)層次的說法, 值得留意, 參見 Buanadjaya, “Catatan Emas Ulang Tahun Ke-70 Bapa Rohani Umat Ru Jiao Indonesia Xueshi Tjhie Tjay Ing,” 15-22.

9) 本文中譯, 參見Wiratma, “Pengantar,” iii.

就是徐再英個人的“宗教觀”。而所謂的“宗教觀”，是指對什麼是宗教(什麼不是)、宗教包括哪些構成、為什麼需要或為什麼會有宗教等問題的整體看法。¹⁰⁾對於與徐再英這個宗教觀有關的生成背景，本文以為以下幾點當可一提，以助吾人後續理解：

第一，徐再英對孔教的接解與孔教觀的形成，既不是在家鄉，也不是在正規教育中養成。徐再英於1935年3月26日生於爪哇的婆羅拉(Blora)，是一個與過去一百多年印尼孔教史幾無任何歷史淵源的地方；以馬來西亞的用語來說，他本人(家中長子)也是生在一個所謂“土生華人”的家庭之中，閩南方言雖還保留住(在1969-2012年間譯出的《四書》、《五經》之印尼語術語都是閩南語的音譯)，但已失去華語文的話語能力，更無從接觸以華語文記載的孔教經書。他自小就和一般印尼同胞那樣接受國民教育，一直到後來念師專(教育學專業)、大學(印尼語專業)，也不是他的孔教觀的孕育場所。

其次，徐再英是到梭羅(Solo，印尼語發音Sala)深造才得以接觸體制外的孔教，人生從而轉航成為全職的孔教神職人員，進而奠定今日孔教精神領袖的因緣。徐再英1954年在家鄉中學畢業，前往梭羅的基督新教師範學院(Sekolah Guru Agama Kristen)深造，才得以在11月28日當天的閒逛中得遇梭羅孔教會(Khong Kauw Hwee Sala)，而引發他對孔教的興趣與嚮往，並在第二年(1955)立願為“教生”即“孔教門生”(宣道員)的最低孔教神職人員。實際上，他在1957年師專畢業後是開始到小學任職並於1958年升任校長，不幾即於1960年放棄正規教職，接受相當“宗教師”一職的孔教“文師”之立願，足見他已全然奉獻孔教的決心與願望。

再次，徐再英的孔教教育應是在教會中完成，且均是非正式的他教與自習二途。從現有的《徐再英學師傳略》、《徐再英學師七十壽慶：朋生文集》(70th Xs. Tjhie Tjay Ing Di Mata Para Sahabat)等有限資料來看，我們對他在1955年成為“教生”、1960年成為“文師”並於1963年(時年28歲)榮膺孔教最高神職人員“學師”迄今的過程所知甚少，只知道他此時的學識應已符合教會的要求與標準。依這些資料記錄來看，徐再英的孔教學識或不外以下二途所習得：

第一，他教：徐再英自1955年立願為“教生”開始，是跟從教會一些長老學習孔教，這些記錄既符常情，也應屬事實。¹¹⁾至於他從長老們那裏學些什麼，對他的孔教觀形塑有哪些作用，現在都還是個有待查考才能進一步確知的基本問題。至少從孔教儀式的部分來看，他一直到了七十歲彙編《儒教基礎教育嚮導課本》(原中文譯名，Panduan Pengajaran Dasar Agama Khonghucu)一書時，仍然採用同輩兼領導柯貴安(Suryo Hotomo, 1936-1997, 1967-1987年間之孔教總會主席)的〈儒教本源與禮儀制度〉(原中文譯名，Tata Ibadah & Dasar

10) 參見Gellman and Hartman, *Religion for Dummies*.

11) 參見Adjie Chandra, “Sekilas Riwayat Haksu Tjhie Tjay Ing,” 3. Adjie Chandra在文中列出的長老，計有Auw Ing Kiong、Tio Tjien Ik、Kwik Thie Tiok、Lie Hwat Swie等人。

Agama khonghucu)一冊而無個人論著，可見他在這方面是有所取於他人而無自家特殊見解的；

第二，自習：徐再英的另一大孔教學識來源於自修，這在當時正規學校均無孔教教育的情形之下既是唯一可能之途，也符合常理。同樣的，他自修了些什麼，又構成他孔教觀的哪些實質內容，也是一個目前還無從得知的基本問題，均有待他日查考。從《儒教基礎教育嚮導課本》一書的證據來看，他的華語文應該也是自修的，因為其中一冊〈儒教基本道德教育〉(原中文譯名，Pokok-Pokok Ajaran Moral Dan Etika Konfusiani)所析27個德目頗多援自民國江希張《四書新編》一書的《論語》之“為人”、“為學”、“為政”等德目分類，¹²⁾可見他此時已能利用國外的中文孔教文獻；

複次，徐再英孔教觀之系統闡述，應得益於1983年出任國立Gadjah Mada大學孔教教師一職(至2005年七十歲乃止)。眾所周知，Gadjah Mada大學是位於爪哇日惹(Yogyakarta)的著名國立大學，徐再英既於1983年受聘於孔教一科講師(dosen)，他當時也為此準備了一本共148頁的《孔教概論》(Agama khonghucu Selayang Pandang)的講義，內文計有前言、孔教史、孔教經書、孔教信仰、孔教倫理教義、孔教儀式、結語共七個部分。這些部分後來都個別印成小冊子在教內流通，¹³⁾且於2006年左右修訂成《儒教基礎教育嚮導課本》一書，內容均無大異。可見，出任國立Gadjah Mada大學孔教教師一職為徐再英提供了系統闡述一己之孔教認識的契機與條件，應是有根據的說法。

最後，徐再英對孔教的構成與認知，基本上是認為由五個部分組成。從1983年的《孔教概論》到2006年的《儒教基礎教育嚮導課本》等文獻來看，他是認為孔教的完整闡述應該包括以下五個部分：第一，孔教歷史(或《儒教基礎教育嚮導課本》的說法是“儒教聖史”，下同)；第二，孔教經書(“儒教經書常識”)；第三，孔教教義(“儒教基本誠信旨”)；第四，孔教道德(“儒教基本道德教育”)；第五，孔教儀式(“儒教本源與禮儀制度”)。承上所述，除了孔教儀式之外，徐再英對孔教的這些組成都有自己的闡說與文字留下，為我們瞭解他的孔教觀提供了文本憑據與便利。

換句話說，徐再英的“孔教觀”是透過非正規體制與管道習得的，且個人自修成分恐怕居大，一如印尼語《四書》、《五經》的譯本概由他一人主理其事所見。依上提背景來看，他在1963年成為“學師”起至1983年受聘為國立Gadjah Mada大學孔教教師之前，對孔教的完整認知應已大致成形，故能於是

12) 見江希張，《四書新編》，1935。江(1907-2004)在民國初年即以“神童”之名聞世，後以科技方面之成就終老於社會。

13) 這些小冊子一般都未署名作者，但從內文可知是徐再英個人的著作，分見Selayang Pandang Sejarah Suci Agama Khonghucu; Pengetahuan Kitab Suci Agama Khonghucu; Pokok-Pokok Keimanan Konfusiani; Pokok-Pokok Ajaran Moral dan Etika Konfusiani; and Tata Ibadah dan Dasar Agama Khonghucu。唯一例外為後一書，署名作者是B.S. Suryo Hutomo，即柯貴安文師；“B. S.”是“文師”的閩南語“Bun Shi”的縮寫。

年撰就《孔教概論》一冊作教材用。

當時任孔教總會主席黃耀德(已於2014年12月卸任, 由副手林孔昇 [Ung Sendana L. Linggaraja] 接任)回顧說徐再英的孔教貢獻有“信徒、宗教和組織”的三大面向時, 這個“宗教”應該包括他為孔教作為一個宗教提供了一個完整的輪廓與闡說。這種工作可能是空前之舉, 且為後來編寫、流通的孔教概論及教材提供了範本, 前者如Lim Khung Sen(即林孔昇 [Ung Sendana L. Linggaraja] 另一署名)於2010年編寫的《樂天: 孔教 / 儒教的心靈、思想進路》(“樂天”為原中文書名, 改寫自徐再英《儒教基礎教育嚮導課本》一書)、後者如另一學師陳克興(Indarto)於同年編撰的《初級儒教教科書》(原中文書名)一冊, 可見一斑。¹⁴⁾由於這樣(以及其他“信徒、宗教和組織”等層面)的緣故, 徐再英甚至被視為印尼孔教的百科全書及“學師的學師”(“Gurunya para haksu dan sumber agama Konghucu di Indonesia”), ¹⁵⁾其精神領袖之姿與地位於此可以想知。

三、徐再英孔教觀芻議：“八誠箴規”的孔教教義例子

承上所析, 按徐再英本人的認知, 他的孔教觀是分別由歷史、經書、教義、倫理與儀式等五個部分組成的孔教觀點。顯而易見, 要在這有限的論文篇幅兼析這些不同組成的內容, 在空間上既不許可, 而且徐再英的這些觀點形成時間跨度相當大, 從1983年《孔教概論》一冊算起迄今也都已有三十年的歷史, 這間中難保若幹觀點或認知不會出現變化, ¹⁶⁾從而增添了本文的論析難度。由於這樣的原因, 本文此節僅將集中論析其2006年《儒教基礎教育嚮導課本》一冊所見的孔教教義(“儒教基本誠信旨”), 以見一斑。

孔教教義或“儒教基本誠信旨”在徐再英個人的孔教觀乃至印尼孔教的重大意義, 可說是不言而喻。原因不外是在徐再英闡述為“八誠箴規”(Delapan Pengakuan Iman)的“儒教基本誠信旨”中, 有著對“儒家是不是宗教”的教義認知與答復, 從而解決了孔教在現實印尼的宗教屬性與地位

14) 此二出版品之書目分別為Lim, *Hidup Bahagia Dalam Jalan Suci Tian*; and Indarto, *Buku Pelajaran Ru-jiao Pemula*.

15) 這是另一學師林兩儀(Oesman Arif)的說法, 參見“Xs. Tjhie Tjay Ing-Pejuang Eksistensi Khonghucu,” <http://www.meandconfucius.com/2010/10/xs-tjhie-tjay-ing-pejuang-eksistensi.html>, 2013年7月24日閱。林兩儀現任印尼孔教師範學院(Sekolah Tinggi Agama Khonghucu)的院長, 也是2005年後徐再英國立Gadjah Mada大學講師一職的接任者; 博士論文為荀子研究。

16) 以本節將要論析的“八誠箴規”(Delapan Pengakuan Iman)來說, 孔教經書的意義就在2003年2月之前的“誠欽四書”(sepenuh iman memuliakan kitab Su Si)變成兩個月後(即2003年4月起迄今)的“誠欽經書”(sepenuh iman memuliakan kitab Sishu dan Wujing), 後一“經書”的“經”指“五經”、“書”指“四書”。分見SGSK 25 (01 Februari 2003) 及SGSK 26 (16 April 2003)二期會刊。SGSK是印尼孔教總會的不定期會刊Seri Genta Suci Konfusiani (字面意思為“聖教金鐸”, 代指孔子)之縮寫, 唯每年至少發行一期。

之(教義)問題, 是其他孔教歷史、經書、倫理與儀式等組成所不能直接供給的論證與辯說。按印尼官方對“宗教”的界定, 首先取決於其是否具有一“至上唯一之神”(Tuhan Yang Maha Esa)的信仰對象與內涵而定, 故徐再英的“八誠箴規”即是對此而發。

關於徐再英的“八誠箴規”之內容, 且容本節暫以“提綱”的方式評析如下:

- 一、首先, 將孔教教義歸納為“八誠箴規”並非徐再英個人創舉。至少遠在他之前的柯貴安在1967-1987年擔任孔教總會會長於1977年編印的《孔教教義與儀式制度》(Tata Ibadah & Dasar Agama Khonghucu)一冊中即已存在,¹⁷⁾所以“八誠箴規”的生成或專利恐怕是一個有待來日查考的問題;¹⁸⁾
- 二、將孔教教義歸納為“八誠箴規”是中國儒學、儒教史上所不及見, 應該是印尼孔教人士借鑒伊斯蘭教的信條(akidah)所作, 即以為伊斯蘭教基本教義可歸納為“六大信條”(用孔教的說法是“六誠箴規”), 分別為信阿拉、信天使、信先知、信天經、信末日審判、信前定, 其中“信阿拉、信先知、信天經”三條被調整為孔教的“誠信皇天”、“誠順木鐸”和“誠欽經書”三條;
- 三、儘管孔教的“八誠箴規”從表述上、形式上明顯是借鑒自伊斯蘭教的“六大信條”, 但徐再英對這一在他之前即已存在的信條少有溯源(是否源自伊斯蘭教)之析, 在《儒教基礎教育嚮導課本》一書的全部闡釋之中也未嘗和伊斯蘭教的信條作評比之作, 所以我們很難了解他對伊斯蘭教的看法是什麼, 故而略而不論;¹⁹⁾
- 四、徐再英的“八誠箴規”在印尼文的表述上(用詞上、次序上)和柯貴安無異(中文表述是否徐後來所加, 容考), 依序為: 誠信皇天、誠尊厥德、誠立明命、誠知鬼神、誠養孝思、誠順木鐸、誠欽經書和誠行大道;
- 五、不論是徐再英或柯貴安, 對孔教教義之可被歸納為“八誠箴規”的教義來源與根據都缺乏一個明確的證說。徐再英認為孔教的核心教義已表述在《大學》和《中庸》的首章, 這點和王陽明“接初見之士, 必皆《學》、《庸》首章以指示聖學之全功”一樣,²⁰⁾問題是這些章節僅能分析出誠信皇天(“天命”之“天”)、誠尊厥德(“天命之謂性”、“在明明

17) 徐再英在《儒教基礎教育嚮導課本》一冊附上的中文譯名是“儒教本源與禮儀制度”, 但印尼文書名的“Tata Ibadah & Dasar”可以是“Tata Ibadah & Tata Dasar”的簡寫。這在內容上是有根據的, 因為它們分佔60頁小冊子的21頁和39頁。另: “Tata Dasar”譯為“孔教(或儒教)教義”遠較“儒教本源”達意和貼切。

18) 更重要的證據是來自印尼語的術語使用, 孔教的“Delapan Pengakuan Keimanan”明顯是借用伊斯蘭教的“Keimanan”的說法, 例見Daud, *Akidah Mukmin*。

19) 外審意見希望本文能對徐再英是如何透過“誠信皇天”、“誠養孝思”的信條來結合伊斯蘭教的“安拉”、“孝”的信仰, 這恐怕在徐再英個人既沒有這樣的問題意識, 在他的《儒教基礎教育嚮導課本》一書也沒有相關的文字可尋。要回答這樣的要求, 只能來自於本文作者未來的自覺的比較研究之作了。

20) 參見(明)王陽明, <大學問>, 《王陽明傳習錄及大學問》, 187頁。

德”之“性”、“德”)、誠立明命(“天命”之“命”)、誠行大道(“率性之謂道”之“道”)等四條，再加上上提宗教化的“誠順木鐸”、“誠欽經書”二條，仍遺有誠知鬼神、誠養孝思二條的教義出處及其地位有待論說；21)

- 六、和柯貴安只是徵引幾段經文而未加闡釋不同，22)徐再英是在經文的基礎上再附加個人對“八誠箴規”的意涵的理解與詮釋，但更多時候是引用了更多經文(如“誠信皇天”、“誠立明命”、“誠欽經書”等條)以及釋文不見得更為清晰可解(如“誠知鬼神”條)的情況下，再加上彼此對“八誠箴規”的內容關連與體系關係都缺乏解說，整體上並不能使人對孔教的宗教性教義有整體和清楚地認知；
- 七、徐再英對“誠信皇天”一條的闡說共有四段，但都是孔立地援引、陳列《易傳》、《書經》、《中庸》和《禮記》的四段原文，變得要讀者自己去串聯這些引文的意思來加以理解；接下來七大段文字是從文字和經書的兩方面來證明“天”是歷來儒者所信守的最高實在，用意或不無可解，但穿鑿附會之處也不可免(如象形字“天”被解說成“一”、“大”的最大、最高之“一”的會意字)，影響了闡釋本身的可信度；
- 八、徐再英對“誠尊厥德”的闡說形式也大致同於“誠信皇天”一條，是以《易傳》的“乾道”之“元亨利貞”對釋《孟子》的“仁義禮智根於心”，並以為這是《大學》的“明明德”之內涵，要求信徒相信自己內心之“明德”並尊崇之、明白之；
- 九、徐再英對“誠養孝思”、“誠順木鐸”(將“天將以夫子為木鐸”之“木鐸”類比為伊斯蘭教的“先知”)、“誠欽經書”三條的闡說大致來說問題較少，一方面是這些都是儒學的常識，但印尼文的闡說卻衍生不少義理枝節，特別是以孔子為“先知”(nabi)、孟子為“使者”(rasul)可說是有悖於伊斯蘭教的常識，23)這些恐怕不是中文世界所能理解的(故本文亦無須在此申論)；
- 十、但是，徐再英對其餘“誠立明命”、“誠知鬼神”、“誠行大道”三條的闡說就不是這麼清楚的了。“誠立明命”不能和伊斯蘭教的“信前定”信條相比，它更像是“誠信皇天”一條的進一步闡說，即“誠信皇天(之命)”；“誠知鬼神”也不是伊斯蘭教的“信天使”，且釋義相當模糊，似乎是指人的“魂”為“神”、“魄”為“鬼”，即人的心、身之二分構成，並以

21) 此處意見或可回答外審意見之一的要求，即王陽明借《學》、《庸》首章以指示聖學之全功與徐再英“八誠箴規”之間“在思想與慣例上相異的方面很有可能難以相融，作者沒有表明對這個問題的看法”，本文已指出前者無法析出後者的誠知鬼神、誠養孝思二條，已經預留和表達了個人看法。

22) 參見Hotomo, *Tata Ibadah dan Dasar Agama Khonghucu*.

23) 按“先知”、“使者”這兩個詞的本意，前者指受到真主的啟示者，後者則在真主的啟示基礎上進一步傳播給世人者，先知不必是使者，但使者一定是先知，故後一義尊於前一義。以“孔子”為先知、孟子為使者，形同是孟子尊於孔子，這種印尼文的闡說的問題性，是很明顯的。

此條教導人之心、身要協合；“誠行大道”一條的意義應相當於伊斯蘭教的“信末日審判”(Yaum al-Akhirat)，因為後者的其他二十二個說法中之“信宗教之日”(Yaum al-Din)、“信真理之日”(Yaum al-Haqqah)、“信見主之日”(Yaum al-Talak)等都相當於伊斯蘭教的“道”，²⁴⁾但徐再英的闡說沒有這樣的意思，它更像是“誠尊厥德”一條的進一步發揮，即指人依“厥德”而行(“誠養孝思”也包括在內)即是“行大道”之意，這麼說來不免流於空泛；

從以上的析釋來看，印尼孔教的“八誠箴規”應該是借鑒了伊斯蘭教的“六誠箴規”，只是另外添加了“誠尊厥德”和“誠養孝思”的兩條信則。除了“誠信皇天”、“誠順木鐸”、“誠欽經書”三條之外，包括徐再英的個人闡說都無法使“誠立明命”、“誠知鬼神”、“誠行大道”取得相當伊斯蘭教“信前定”、“信天使”、“信末日審判”等信條意義的作用和地位，而更像是其他信條的附屬闡釋與發揮。這個“無法”是不是徐再英或孔教總體在調整伊斯蘭教“信前定”、“信天使”、“信末日審判”為孔教的“誠立明命”、“誠知鬼神”、“誠行大道”信條上的不成功之後果，還有待未來進一步的學理考析與研判。

應該說，以上只是外在的視角和評論，對我們瞭解孔教的印尼化的現實根源或不無助益，但還不能說明問題的全部面向。一個更為基本、攸關的內在學理是：印尼孔教在借鑒了伊斯蘭教的“六誠箴規”為孔教的“八誠箴規”上，多大程度成功地歸納與闡釋了孔教的宗教性內涵與教義？一如本文已指出的，印尼孔教與王陽明一樣都是“必皆《學》、《庸》首章以指示聖學之全功”，也就是以為儒家的“聖學”之全貌可由《學》、《庸》首章看出，而“八誠箴規”中的四條也已碰觸到這些內涵，至此似可說已大體無誤。但是，這畢竟是“聖學”而非“聖教”的內容範圍，對我們認識孔學或不無助益，但是否也是孔教(作為一種宗教)內涵的妥適反映，似還有待商榷。

這也是說，孔教作為一種宗教，在多大程度上可被視為是一種篤信“誠信皇天、誠尊厥德、誠立明命、誠知鬼神、誠養孝思、誠順木鐸、誠欽經書、誠行大道”的信仰體系？撇開徐再英闡釋不明的缺點不談，我們發現他對傳統儒家的五禮(吉禮、嘉禮、凶禮、賓禮、軍禮)特別是吉禮的“教義與儀式”甚少闡述，可能也是對此知之較少之故。從吉禮的實踐角度來看，印尼孔教的“誠信皇天”是屬於王朝禮的信仰物件，但等而次之的邦國禮之“山川”諸神則未見闡述，“誠順木鐸”是學禮的範圍，“誠知鬼神”按理應該是鄉禮的祭拜層次(但徐的闡述不成功，也未有此自覺)，“誠養孝思”則屬家禮範圍的宗教行為與現象。²⁵⁾每一階層的吉禮都伴隨有各自的嘉禮、凶禮、賓禮、軍禮等內容，顯然不是其餘“誠尊厥德”、“誠立明命”、“誠行大道”三條信則所能涵蓋與解釋到完的。換句話說，從傳統禮學/禮教的角度來看，印尼孔教的“八誠箴規”肯定不是這個傳統的完好歸納與表達。²⁶⁾

24) 伊斯蘭教“信後世審判”的全部23種說法，參見Daud, *Akidah Mukmin*, 119。

25) 吉禮在實踐上因王朝、邦國、學、鄉、家階層的不同而有祭祀對象的分別，參見朱熹，《儀禮經傳通解》，《朱子全書》第2-5冊。

從這個角度來看，徐再英對在他之前已出現的“八誠箴規”之教義歸納是繼承之意多，澄清或釋疑之事少。按照本文上述的認識與評析，“八誠箴規”顯然是孔教人士於外借鑒伊斯蘭教的“六誠箴規”的表述形式、於內概括孔學 / 孔教的整體內涵的一種嘗試，這個放諸儒學史來說都是一個極有啟發性的創舉，值得認同和肯定。問題在於徐再英或孔教中人對這“八誠箴規”的歸納以及個別信則的闡釋無法提供一個學理精純的文字，既可釋眾疑又可達成孔教作為一種宗教的證說目的。

四、小結：需要加強對徐再英的全面認識與評析

徐再英是印尼孔教界內公認的精神領袖，某些人甚至譽之為印尼孔教的百科全書及“學師的學師”，其形象與地位之崇高可見一斑。這種形象與地位顯然來自多方面，總的來說也許就是當時孔教總會主席黃耀德所說在長時間內成為印尼孔教“信徒、宗教和組織的主要支柱”的結果。對學術界來說，我們的任務不單是要加強對徐再英的認識與研究，更重要的是評估他在“信徒、宗教和組織”這些方面的實際貢獻與意義，以及這些方面的成就是否彼此都對等、同樣的大。

以本文就他的“宗教”也就是宗教觀方面的教義闡釋來看，徐再英似乎不是個深思熟慮、學理精湛的學者型或思想型人物。他對他之前歸納出來的“八誠箴規”信條之有效性少作省思，個人對“八誠箴規”信條的闡釋也不能算是成功之舉，這裏頭可能有本文如上所說的內(儒家之禮教)外(伊斯蘭教)認識條件上的不完善之故。然而，如果我們瞭解到他是在一個幾無儒家資源的國度透過個人的自修取得如上的認識與成就，這在印尼孔教內既是個異數，則他作為信徒唯一可以徵詢的物件而取得如上的人物形象與地位，也就愈發增強我們對他的同情理解與肯定。

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26) 按西方宗教學的某些見解，“宗教”與“哲學”或道德倫理學說的差別，或儒教與儒學的差別，在於它有沒有有一套完整的儀式制度，而不是沒有神，參見Gellman and Hartman, *Religion for Dummies*, 27。

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A Study of Tjhie Tjay Ing's Views of Confucian Religion in Indonesia

TEE Boon Chuan

Abstract

This paper attempts to analyze how Tjhie Tjay Ing, an encyclopedic spiritual master of the Confucian religion in Indonesia, understood the Confucian tradition. This paper argues that Tjhie's view of Confucian religion is not as sophisticated and systematic as he endeavors to show through his presentation of the doctrinal eight creeds of confucian religion in his *Fundamental Textbooks of Confucian Religion* (2006). This is because his creeds are an unsuccessful imitation of the six creeds of Islamic religion. Furthermore, his book reveals an essential misunderstanding of the Confucian ritual systems.

Keywords: Indonesia, Confucian religion, Agama Khonghucu, Tjhie Tjay Ing, eight creed of Confucian religion, ritual system.

Regulations of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

I. General Regulations

1. (Name) The official name for the institute is “Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture” (ICPC, hereafter), which is an organization that belongs to the Academy of East Asian Studies (AEAS, hereafter) at Sungkyunkwan University.
2. (Objective) ICPC primarily conducts research mainly in the field of Confucian thought. It also covers general Confucian culture, as well as its development and modernization, in an attempt to guide fundamental principles for humanity in a rapidly developing society.

II. Organization

3. (Constitution) ICPC is constituted of the following: 1) the director, 2) the management committee, and 3) an editorial board.
4. (Director)
 - 1) The director must be a full-time professor of Sungkyunkwan University, with a specialization that conforms to the objective outlined in article I of this document. The director must be nominated by the university president and appointed by the chairman of the board.
 - 2) The director, representing ICPC, controls the general affairs of ICPC.
 - 3) The basic term for the director is 2 years, which is extendable.
5. (Assistant Director)
 - 1) The director may appoint (an) assistant director(s) to assist director's various tasks.
 - 2) Assistant director(s) must be a research member of ICPC, nominated by the director of ICPC and appointed by the director of AEAS.
 - 3) The basic term for the assistant director is 2 years, which is extendable.
6. (Office)
 - 1) ICPC may assign (an) office(s) according to different research area.
 - 2) The head of the office must hold a position equivalent to or greater than that of a research professor. The head must be nominated by the director of ICPC, approved by the management committee, and appointed by the director of AEAS.

III. Management Committee

7. (Constitution)

- 1) ICPC may establish a management committee, in order to discuss and make important decisions regarding general management.
- 2) The management committee shall be no larger than 10 persons. The director will serve as the head of the management committee.
- 3) Members of the management committee must be research members of the ICPC, nominated by the director and appointed by the director of AEAS.

8. (Agenda) The agenda for the management committee includes:

- 1) Establishing basic plans for management and research.
- 2) Declaring and eliminating various rules and regulation.
- 3) Settling the budget and accounts.
- 4) Other relevant management

9. (Call for Meeting)

- 1) The director must call for any meetings of the management committee.
- 2) Meetings are valid only when more than half of all members are present. In order to settle an agenda, more than half of all members present at a meeting must agree to any decision or action.

IV. Editorial Board

10. (Constitution)

- 1) ICPC includes an editorial board which discusses and makes decisions regarding ICPC publications.
- 2) The editorial board includes the editor-in-chief and noted scholars both in Korea and abroad. The editor-in-chief is the director of ICPC.
- 3) Each editorial board must be appointed by the director. The basic term is 2 years.
- 4) Each year, the editorial board will publish the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*. Rules and dates for publication are established separately.

11. (Call for Meeting)

More than half of the editorial board members present at the meeting must agree in order to settle an agenda.

* The above regulations take effect from March 1st, 2000.

The Code of Management for the Editorial Board of the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

I. General Regulations

1. (Objective)

This regulation is established according to article IV-10-4 of the Regulations for The Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (ICPC, hereafter). It comprises the regulatory guidelines for publishing the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*. (JCPC, hereafter).

2. (Mission)

- 1) To supervise publication of JCPC and the related affairs of acceptance, review, editing, and so on.
- 2) To set up rules and regulations for publishing JCPC.

II. Organization of Editorial Board

3. (Constitution)

The editorial board is comprised of editorial advisors, editorial councils, the chief manager (the director), the editor-in-chief, the head of the editing team, and other editing team members.

4. (Appointment of Editorial Advisors and Members)

The director of ICPC appoints editorial advisors and members among noted scholars of highest achievement, both in Korea and abroad.

5. (Terms)

The basic term for editorial board members is 2 years, extendable when necessary. The editor-in-chief is tenured by principle, in order for the journal to maintain its congruity.

6. (Chief Manager)

The director of ICPC is also the chief manger and supervises the editorial board.

7. (Editor-in-chief)

The editor-in-chief is appointed by the director of ICPC and is responsible for all editorial issues.

8. (Head of Editing Team, Editing Team)

The head of the editing team and the editing team's other members are appointed by the director of ICPC. The head of the editing team is responsible for general issues concerning editing, and the assistant head is responsible for assisting with related editorial matters.

III. Publication of JCPC

9. (Numbers and Dates of Publication)
JCPC is published twice in a year: on August 31 and February 28.
10. (Circulation)
The size of circulation for JCPC is determined by the editorial board.
11. (Size)
The standard size for JCPC is 176mm x 248mm.
12. (Editorial System)
 - 1) Academic articles written in either Chinese or English.
 - 2) Academic articles includes: title, abstract, keywords, contents, bibliography, an abstract written in Chinese or English, keywords written in Chinese or English.
 - 3) The English title and name of the author must be specified.
 - 4) The affiliation of the author must be specified.
 - 5) Regulations, bulletins, and material other than academic articles may be included according to the decision of the editorial board.

IV. Submission of Articles and Management

13. (Subject and Character of the Submitted Article)
The subject of article includes
 - 1) Confucian thought and culture in Korea and abroad.
 - 2) Reviews on books, translations, or research articles on related subjects published in Korea or abroad. It may include dissertations.
 - 3) Critical reviews on academic trends, mainly in the arts and humanities, related to Confucianism and East Asian studies.
 No certain qualification for submission is required.
14. (Number of Words)
 - 1) The number of words for each article is limited to 10000 words for Chinese, 6000 words for English, including abstract, footnotes, bibliography, etc. Reviews are limited to 4000 words for Chinese, and 2500 words for English.
 - 2) The number of words permitted for material other than academic articles and reviews are to be determined by the editorial board.
15. (Submission Guidelines)
 - 1) A general call for papers is always extended, but only articles submitted at least 3 months prior to the publication date are subjected to the review process for a specific issue.
 - 2) Digital texts must be submitted for articles written in Chinese or English.
 - 3) Abstracts in Chinese or English must include 5 or more keywords.
 - 4) If written jointly, the first (main) author and the second (joint) author,

as well as their respective name, affiliation, area of research, part(s) of writing, must be noted.

- 5) E-mail address(es) and phone number(es) must be provided for all authors.

16. (Control of Submitted Articles)

- 1) Submitted articles are, as they arrive, subject to a controlled process.
- 2) Submitted articles are not returned, and copyright for published articles belongs to ICPC.

V. Reviewing Submitted Articles

17. (Obligation to Review)

All published articles must pass the reviewing process.

18. (Regulations for Reviewing Board)

- 1) For each submitted article, the editorial board will select 3 reviewers and commission them to evaluate the article. At least two of the reviewers must agree in order for the article to be published.
- 2) In principle, the board of reviewers must maintain a just and fair attitude, and should not review articles written by scholars with whom they are personally affiliated.
- 3) For the sake of fairness, the review process will remain anonymous.

19. (Standard of Review)

- 1) Articles will be reviewed for basic format (20%), originality (20%), clarity of subject (20%), logic (20%), and congruity (20%)
- 2) The result will divide the articles into two groups: publishable and not publishable.
- 3) Articles evaluated as not publishable cannot be re-submitted with the same title.

20. (Feedback time)

Reviewers must submit their feedback on each article to the editorial board within two week from it being assigned to them.

21. (Reporting Back the Result)

The editorial board must report back to the author(s) as soon as the results of the reviewing process have been received.

VI. Revision of Regulations

22. (Principle)

This code of management is subject to change when 2/3 of the editorial board agrees, provided that more than half of the editorial board's members are present at the time of voting.

*** Other Regulations**

23. (Others)

- 1) Other issues not written in this code will be treated following customary practices.
- 2) The above regulations take effect from December 20th, 2006.
- 3) The editorial board will determine and deal with all other details concerning the above regulations.

The Code of Ethics and Management for the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

I. General Regulations

1. (Objective) This regulation is established in order to define the ethical principles and standard of management of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (ICPC, hereafter).
2. (Application) This regulation is applied to prevent any unjust act within academic agenda of ICPC, and to provide a framework for systematic investigation, management, and resolution if an unjust actions occur. At the same time, it is geared toward protecting the creativity of academic research and strengthening an ethical spirit within academia.

II. Research Ethics

3. (Ethical Code for Authors)
 - 1) All authors who submit their articles to the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (JCPC, hereafter) must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) All research outcomes that are mainly based on faked or fraudulent research or upon already published work without providing any new insight are regarded as forged.
 - 3) Any close imitation of another author's ideas and arguments without giving explicit and objective credit to that author is regarded as plagiarism.
 - 4) Submission of one's own work that has already been presented and published elsewhere as the first research outcome is regarded as duplication or self-plagiarism.
 - 5) Sponsored articles must follow the regulations of the sponsor before submission.
 - 6) Authors must take full responsibility for their presented articles.
 - 7) Co-authors must make it clear which parts of the essay each author has contributed to, and take responsibility for those parts of the essay.
4. (Ethical Code for the Editorial Board)
 - 1) The editorial board members of JCPC must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) Editorial board members must participate in editorial meetings and assume responsibility for receiving articles, the election of reviewers, and the selection of articles for publication,

- 3) Editorial board members must be silent about any personal information of all authors submitting articles. Otherwise, it will be regarded as a misuse of their rights.
 - 4) Editorial board members must strictly follow regulations in confirming submissions and selecting reviewers, etc., lest it should arouse any conflict between reviewers and general board members.
 - 5) If any doubt or questions concerning ethical matters arise, the editorial board must immediately call for an investigation by the ethics committee.
5. (Ethical Code for the Reviewing Committee)
- 1) Members of reviewing committee of JCPC must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) Reviewers must follow the established regulations for providing an objective and fair review of the submitted article, and provide their honest feedback to the editorial board. If a reviewer feels that they cannot review an article assigned to them for an objective reason, they must promptly notify the editorial board.
 - 3) Reviewers must rely on academic standards and their own conscience in reviewing submitted articles. Reviewers cannot reject an article based on their own personal standpoints without sufficient basis, and cannot conclude the review without scrupulously reading the whole article.
 - 4) Reviewers must keep the author's personal information as well as the content of the article confidential throughout the process of review.

III. Establishment and Management of Ethics Committee

6. (Ethics Enforcement)

This regulation is established according to the general regulation, and is already in effect. The director will decide on establishing specific rules to applying these regulations.

7. (Constitution of Ethics Committee)

The Ethics Committee is constituted of the director of Ethics Committee, the editor-in-chief, and up to five members of the editorial board. The director of ICPC is also the director of the Ethics Committee

8. (Function of Ethics Committee)

- 1) Upon a suspected violation of the ethical code, the ethics committee will proceed to conduct an investigation and issue a decision, notifying the accused of the opinion of the committee. It will also report the issue to the editorial board.

- 2) When investigating the violation, the ethics committee must secure sufficient evidence and keep the whole process confidential.
9. (Accusation of Violation)
 - 1) An accuser must secure specific evidence when reporting an act of violation. Even if the report turns out to be false, the ethics committee can continue an investigation if other evidence is discovered.
 - 2) The same process of accusation applies to both editorial board members and reviewers.
10. (Investigation and Decision)
 - 1) If accused of violating the ethical code, the accused must comply with the investigation conducted by the ethics committee. Noncompliance is regarded as acknowledging the accused violation.
 - 2) All articles under investigation will be postponed for publication until the investigation has been completed and a report issued to the editorial board. Investigations are to be completed before the next term for publication.
11. (Chance of Defense)

The accused has right to defend their article. Their defense can be made before the general members of the editorial board, if the accused wishes to do so.
12. (Forms of Penalty)

Penalties which the ethics committee can impose include warnings, submission restrictions, and expulsion from membership. Already published articles can be deferred or pulled out completely. Sponsored articles, when used unfairly or warned by the sponsor, may also be subject to penalty.
13. (Revision of Regulations)

Any revisions made to this regulations must follow ICPC's revision principles.
14. (Others)

Regulations not written in the above will follow customary practices.

*** Other Regulations**

This regulation is established according to the article 21 of ICPC. It is agreed by the editorial board (Oct. 20th, 2007), and is in force since Jan. 1st, 2008.

Submission Requirements for Contributors

I. Submission

1. Manuscripts should be done in docx file and are to be submitted as an email attachment to jicpc@skku.edu.
2. Type in "Author's Contact Information" on top of the title of your manuscript, which includes your academic title, affiliation, e-mail address, telephone number(s), and mailing address.
3. On the first page of the body text, make an abstract of about 300 words (including 5 key words or more)
4. Unless specially invited, a length of each manuscript (including footnotes) should not exceed 10,000 words. (font: Times New Roman, font size: 12 pt., line space: double).

II. Style Guidelines

1. In general, we follow the editorial guidelines established in the 16th edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Please consult the online information of it at www.chicagomanualofstyle.org.
2. The citation style required by the Journal is short references in footnotes and complete citation data in the REFERENCES section. Short references contain only the author's last name, title of work (shortened if necessary), and page number(s) as in the following example: (Fingarette, *Confucius*, 15-16).
3. Imagine that the readers of your article have little understanding of Asian philosophical and cultural background. Provide explanations for technical terms as well as any words or concepts which are essential to a clear understanding of your article.
4. When romanizing Chinese terms, use pinyin or Wade-Giles systems.
 4. 1. Terms in Korean should be romanized according to the romanization system established in 2000 by the Korean government. For Japanese terms, follow the Hepburn romanization system.
5. When historic figure(s) and state(s) are first mentioned, provide their dates in parenthesis as follows: Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), Han 漢 (206 b.c.e-220 c.e.).
6. When you quote a passage in pre-modern Chinese texts, put the English translation in the body and the original Chinese text in the footnote.

* For a more detailed submission guideline, please contact at jicpc@skku.edu

儒教文化研究所章程

第一章 總則

第一條（名稱）本研究所的正式名稱爲“儒教文化研究所”（以下簡稱“研究所”），是成均館大學東亞學術院的下設機關。

第二條（目的）本研究所以研究儒學思想爲主，同時兼顧整個東亞的儒學文化研究，並對儒學的傳統進行現代化的解釋和發展，使之成爲指引人類發展的基本理念。

第二章 組織

第三條（機構）研究所的機構如下設置：1. 所長，2. 運營委員會，3. 編輯委員會。

第四條（所長）

1. 所長必須由與第一章規定中的目的相符合的專業的本校教授擔任，由學校校長提請理事長任命。
2. 所長代表研究所，總體掌管研究所的事務。
3. 所長的任期爲2年，可以連任。

第五條（部長）

1. 爲了輔佐所長，並分擔所長的一部分業務，所長下面可以設置部長。
2. 部長由研究委員中產生，所長提請學術院院長任命。
3. 任期爲2年，可以連任。

第六條（研究室）

1. 研究所可以根據研究領域的不同而設置研究室。
2. 研究室長由研究教授以上的人擔任，須經運營委員會的審議通過，再由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第三章 運營委員會

第七條（構成）

1. 爲了便於審議和決定與研究所運營相關聯的重要事項，研究所可以設置運營委員會。

2. 運營委員會由所長和10 人以內的委員構成，委員長是所長。
3. 委員由研究所的研究委員中產生，由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第八條（審議事項）運營委員會主要審議以下事項：

1. 基本運營計劃的確立以及與研究計劃相關的事項。
2. 研究所諸規定的制定與廢除問題。
3. 預算以及結算等諸問題。
4. 其他與研究所運營相關的事項。

第九條（會議）

1. 會議由委員長召集。
2. 會議要有在職委員過半數以上的出席才可以召開，出席委員過半數同意才可以決議。

第四章 編輯委員會

第十條（構成）

1. 爲了審議決定研究所刊行的出版物的編輯事宜，故設立編輯委員會。
2. 編輯委員會由委員長和國內外的知名學者構成，委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員由所長任命，任期2年。
4. 編輯委員會每年刊行《儒教文化研究》，論文的刊行原則以及刊行日期等規定另外制定。

第十一條（會議）編輯委員會會議要有出席編輯委員的過半數同意才可以決議。

附則（施行日）本規定自2000年3月1日起施行。

《儒教文化研究》編輯委員會運營章程

第一章 總則

第一條（目的）本規定是根據儒教文化研究所文件中第4 節編輯委員會（以下簡稱委員會）第27條第1項研究所刊行物的出版條目中《儒教文化研究》的相關規定而制定的。

第二條（任務）

1. 主管《儒教文化研究》的發刊和相關論文的策劃、接收、評審、編輯等工作。
2. 制定與《儒教文化研究》的發刊相關聯的一系列規定。

第二章 編輯委員會構成

第三條（構成）委員會由編輯顧問、編輯委員、主任（委員長）、主編、編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯構成。

第四條（編輯顧問和委員的選任）編輯顧問和編輯委員由儒教文化研究所所長在世界各國中有卓越研究業績的權威學者中選擇並任命。

第五條（委員的任期）委員任期為2年，必要時可以連任。但為了保證學術雜誌的長期穩定性，主編原則是連任的。

第六條（主任）主任（委員長）由儒教文化研究所長兼任，主管編輯委員會。

第七條（主編）主編由研究所所長任命，總體負責所有的編輯事務。

第八條（編輯部主任、編輯）編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯由研究所所長任命。編輯部主任全面負責編輯事務，編輯輔助室長處理相關的編輯事務。

第三章 《儒教文化研究》的發刊

第七條（發行的次數和日期）《儒教文化研究》每年兩次刊行，出版日期為8月31日和2月28日。

第八條（發行數量）《儒教文化研究》的發行數量由委員會決定。

第九條（開本）實行176mm×248mm開本。

第十條（編輯體制）

1. 學術論文使用中文或英文制作。
2. 學術論文的編輯順序原則上分為論文題目、提要、關鍵詞、正文、參考文獻、中英文抄錄、中英文關鍵詞。
3. 必須注明學術論文的英文題目和作者姓名。
4. 必須注明作者的所屬單位、職務和具體的聯系方式。
5. 學術論文以外的各種文章以及會則、會報的刊載與否由委員會決定。

第四章 論文的投稿和管理

第十一條（投稿論文主題和資格）

1. 投稿範圍是以儒學思想為中心的世界各國的儒學文化。
2. 對國內外刊行的相關儒學著作、翻譯著作以及研究類刊物的書評。
3. 對國內外的儒學和東亞學等人文科學類相關論文（包括學位論文）的論評和研究動向。
4. 不限論文投稿資格。

第十二條（原稿字數）

1. 一般情況下按照中英文10000字/6000words 左右（包括腳注、參考文獻、抄錄等），書評4000字/2500words 左右的標準。
2. 論文和書評以外的原稿字數由委員會決定。

第十三條（論文投稿要領）

1. 隨時可以提交論文，但以本刊出版3 個月前到達的論文作為該版的審查對象。
2. 論文使用中文或英文格式，投稿時須提交電子版。
3. 中英文的抄錄需各附5 個以上的關鍵詞。
4. 如果是共同研究的論文，需要分別標出責任研究員和共同研究員，並且須分別注明姓名和所屬單位、研究領域、執筆範圍和分擔的領域。
5. 來稿須注明作者的電子郵件地址以及聯絡電話。

第十四條（投稿論文的管理）

1. 投稿論文按照來稿順序，建立文檔進行統一有序的管理。
2. 來稿論文概不退還，所刊載論文的著作權歸研究所。

第五章 投稿論文的審查

第十五條（審查義務）記載的論文必須經過審查。

第十六條（審查委員規定）

1. 對於投稿的每篇論文，編輯委員會將選定3名評審委員，並委託給他們評審。論文必須經過審查委員2/3以上的贊成才可刊登。
2. 原則上，審查委員應堅持公正、公平的作風。而且不得審查與自己同一單位的投稿者的文章。
3. 爲了審查的公正性，審查全部採取匿名制。

第十七條（審查標準）

1. 審查按照基本格式（20%）、獨創性（20%）、主題明確性（20%）、邏輯性（20%）、完整性（20%）來進行綜合評定。
2. 審查結果分爲刊載可、否兩類。
3. 被評爲不可刊載的論文，不得再以同一題目向本會投稿。

第十八條（審查結果報告） 審查委員從收到評審論文之日算起，應於2周內將審查結果報告給委員會。

第十九條（審查結果通告） 委員會收到審查結果報告書後，立即告知投稿者。

第二十條（稿費支付） 對於刊載文章，支付給作者一定的稿費。

第六章 章程的修訂

第二十一條（原則） 本章程的修訂要有過半數編輯委員參加，並且經參加人員2/3以上的同意方可實行。

附 則

第二十二條（其他）

1. 以上沒有列入章程的事宜按照慣例處理。
2. 本規定自2006年12月20日起生效並施行。
3. 本規定在施行過程中發生的細部事項由委員會來決定並處理。

《儒教文化研究》研究倫理及運營規定

第一章 總則

第一條（目的）本規定的目的在於闡明儒教文化研究所（以下簡稱“本研究所”）學術研究活動的研究倫理和運營基準。

第二條（作用）本規定的作用在於抵制研究活動中的不正當行為，以及不正當行為發生後體系性的追查，並且保護有創意性的學術研究，提高學問的倫理性。

第二章 研究倫理

第三條（作者倫理）

1. 凡是向本研究所刊行的《儒教文化研究》投稿的作者都應該遵守運營規定。
2. 虛造研究成果或將以前的研究成果刪改變用的一律視為偽造、編造。
3. 對他人的觀點或主張缺乏客觀分析而直接拿來用作自己的觀點，此種行為視為剽竊。
4. 將自己已經發表的研究成果拿來用作首次發表，此種行為視為重複刊載或自我剽竊。
5. 受研究經費資助的論文只有遵守資助單位的管理規定才可投稿。
6. 對於自己公式發表的論文，作者要負全面責任。
7. 共同研究的情況要注明每個人分擔的部分，以此來各負責任。

第四條（編輯委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的編輯委員應該遵守運營規定。
2. 編輯委員要積極參與編輯會議，要對論文的接收、選定評委以及刊載與否負責任。
3. 編輯委員對於投稿者的個人信息要保密，不得利用私權。
4. 編輯委員要嚴格按照既定的標準來確認論文的投稿以及評審情況等，注意不要引發審評者以及一般會員間的是非。
5. 編輯委員會一旦發現研究倫理上的問題要立即通報倫理委員會。

第五條（審查委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的論文審查委員應該遵守審查規定。
2. 審查委員要根據所定的審查規定來對投稿論文進行客觀、公正的審查，並將審查結果通報給編輯委員會。若自己因客觀情況不能審

查，則應及時通報編輯委員會。

3. 審查委員要根據學者的良心和學問的客觀基準來審查論文。在缺乏充分根據的情況下，不能一味的依據自己的學術觀點來判定“不可刊載”，也不能不仔細通讀全文就擅作審查。
4. 審查委員對於審查過程中所知道的作者的個人情況要進行保密，不能私自公開或利用審查論文的内容。

第三章 倫理委員會設置以及運營

第六條（倫理規定的遵守）本規定依據本會的會則制定，一經施行，立即生效。只是與此相適應的施行細則由委員長決定。

第七條（倫理委員會的構成）倫理委員會由所長、主編和編輯委員（5人左右）組成，所長兼任委員長。

第八條（倫理委員會的職能）

1. 對於違反本規定的行為，倫理委員會要進行調查和議決，並將相關意見通告給當事人，然後報告給編輯委員會。
2. 在審議違反規定的行為時，要確保能夠充分掌握證據並對事情的經過保密，不到最後時刻不能公開審議意見。

第九條（違反倫理規定行為的揭發）

1. 若有違反倫理規定的事實，揭發者可以持具體的事實證據向倫理委員會揭發。若揭發的事實是虛偽的，倫理委員會可以繼續維持決議。
2. 編輯委員或審查委員在評審過程中若發現有違反倫理規定的事實也依據如上方法揭發。

第十條（調查以及審議）

1. 會員若被揭發有違反本研究所倫理規定的行為，則應積極配合倫理委員會的調查，若不配合，其行為則視為違反倫理規定。
2. 對於被揭發的有違反倫理規定的論文，在事實查清以前應采取保留措施。調查審議應在下一期學術期刊發行前結束。

第十一條（解釋的機會）對於被揭發有違反倫理規定實施的會員，要給與其充分的解釋機會。解釋的方式可依據當事者的意願公開。

第十二條（處罰的類型）倫理委員會的處罰類型有警告、限制投稿、解除委任等。對於已經投稿或刊載的論文可以采取保留或撤銷的措施。對於接受研究經費資助的論文，若因不正當的使用而受到資助機關的警告，也屬於處罰對象之列。

第十三條（規定的修改）此規定的修改要遵守本研究所的修改原則。

第十四條（其他）以上規定中沒有涉及的事宜依據慣例處理。

附則

本規定依據本研究所會則第21條制定，並經過編輯委員會（2007年10月20日）的審議，於2008年1月1日起施行。

投稿須知

1. 本刊實行176mm×248mm 開本，來稿一律使用中文（或英文）制作，請提交電子版。中文一律使用繁體，英文按照一般慣例。
2. 論文的格式順序原則上依次分為論文題目、中文提要（300-400字）、中文關詞（5個以上）、正文、參考文獻、英文題目、英文摘要（300 words）、英文關鍵詞（5個以上）等。
3. 作者簡介可置於文章的最後，須注明作者的性別、所屬單位、職務、E-MAIL、聯系地址以及具體的電話聯系方式，以便編輯部聯絡。必要時可附上自己的簡歷。
4. 正文內容請用10.5號字，行間距為1，文章字數以10000字為宜，可以適當的增減。但最好不要超過15000 字。
5. 文章的章節可以用“一、二、三……”來表示，若還要細分，則請用“（一）、（二）、（三）……”來表示。章節題目一律左側對齊，使用黑體加粗字體。
6. 文章內提到的一切書籍，都要在正文後的“參考文獻”內注明。參考文獻標記序次如下：作者，《書名》，出版地：出版社，出版年度。
如：楊伯峻，《春秋左傳注》，北京：中華書局，1981。
- 6.1. 需要標記編者或譯者時：作者，〈章節/論文〉，編者/譯者編/譯《書名》，頁碼，出版地：出版社，出版年度。
如：張立文，〈程朱思想的時代精神〉，楊曉塘編《程朱思想新論》，1-8頁，北京：人民出版社，1999。
- 6.2. 引用期刊內容時，請依次注明：作者，文章名，刊物名（包括期數），文章所在頁碼。如：蒙培元，〈儒學是宗教嗎？〉，《孔子研究》，2002年第2期，39-46頁。
7. 文章正文的引用文，採用簡式腳注標記。腳注標記方式如下：作者，論文名稱/書名，引文所在頁碼。
如：楊伯峻，《春秋左傳注》，56頁。
張立文，〈程朱思想的時代精神〉，7頁。
蒙培元，〈儒學是宗教嗎？〉，42頁。
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