

Restructuring Learning (*Xue* 學) on a New Foundation:

Zhu Xi's Reformulation of *Gewu* 格物 and *Zhizhi* 致知

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Abstract

This paper aims to shed fresh light on Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130-1200) reformulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*, which he proclaimed was the first and indispensable stage of the sequence of genuine learning, thus revealing the unique characteristics of his scheme of learning. As is well known, he fell back on the authority of the Cheng brothers in interpreting these two key concepts. It remains understudied, however, to what degree, and in what way, Zhu inherited the teaching of the Cheng brothers in interpreting *gewu* and *zhizhi*. In so doing, he directly challenged the authority of the direct disciples of the Cheng brothers. He also selected passages from *Henan Chengshi yishu* in support of his views and modified the Cheng brothers' ideas to make them better fit to his scheme rather than merely comprehensively representing the Cheng brothers' thinking about these concepts. In order to fully illuminate Zhu Xi's reformulations of *gewu* and *zhizhi* without bias, the present paper examines the 'two polarities'—broad learning (*boxue* 博學) and Chan Buddhism-oriented learning—against which he sought to contrast his own views. On the one hand, he criticized the one-sidedness of each of them, and on the other, he synthesized these two polarities into a single system so as to reestablish the authority and validity of the classics and discussions between teachers and colleagues as the source of meaningful knowledge. By doing so, he strove to reverse the tendency of focusing on the inner dimension in the Cheng learning tradition, a tendency which James Liu has called "turning inward." In response to this tendency, Zhu Xi presented a new vision of the integral unity between the inner realms of human nature and the mind and the outer realm of the externals. In this vein, the present paper sheds fresh light on the meaning of "*huoran guangtong*" 豁然貫通 as "the integral unity," that which bridges the division between the inner and the outer realms, instead of a mystic transcendence, a "sudden" "lofty" elevation, or the totality of the whole.

Keywords: Zhu Xi, learning (*xue* 學), *gewu* 格物, *zhizhi* 致知, broad learning (*boxue* 博學), Chan Buddhism-oriented learning, the integral unity, *huoran guantong* 豁然貫通

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1. Introduction

In interpreting the *Great Learning* (*Daxue* 大學), Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) ventured to challenge three authorities supporting its would-be canonical status. As is well known, he refused to fully accept the *Great Learning*'s textual authority. He conferred enormous significance on a mere single chapter of the *Liji*, saying that this text preserved the entire scheme of the literati learning in antiquity.¹ However, he had to revise characters in the text, rearrange its sequence, and, above all, interpolate his own "Supplementary Chapter" into it under the ungrounded premise that a chapter on the concepts of *gewu* 格物 and *zhizhi* 致知 must have existed in the original text, but had become lost in the intervening years. Zhu's daring revision of the text stemmed from his conviction that Master Chengs—Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107)—had revealed a previously undiscovered genuine Confucian scheme of learning within this text. In short, Zhu fell back on the authority of the Cheng brothers in carrying out his daring revision. It remains understudied, however, to what degree, and in what way, Zhu inherited the teaching of the Cheng brothers in interpreting *gewu* and *zhizhi*, concepts which he described as comprising the first stage of the proper sequence of learning, and upon which he presented his own scheme of learning to his contemporary literati. The present paper aims to investigate these questions.

It is beyond question that Zhu shaped his own scholarship in line with and under the enormous influence of the Cheng brothers. The teaching of the Cheng brothers was transmitted to Zhu mainly through two routes. One was the remains of their writings, including Cheng Yi's commentary on the *Book of Change* and the recorded conversations (*yulu* 語錄) compiled by the hand of Zhu and collected under the title *Henan Chengshi yishu* 河南程氏遺書. The other route would have been through the followers of the Cheng brothers, including Yang Shi 楊時, Xie Liangzuo 謝良佐, Lü Dalin 呂大臨, and You Zuo 游酢, who comprised a group conventionally called "the four direct disciples of Master Chengs." As his compilation of *Yiluo yanyuan lu* 伊洛淵源錄 indicates, Zhu aspired to substantiate an unbroken intellectual succession from the Cheng brothers to his time.

Nonetheless, Zhu directly and indirectly challenged these two authorities as well, particularly concerning his redefinition of *gewu* and *zhizhi*, as the present paper will elaborate below. Zhu criticized not only Lu Jiuyuan but also the direct disciples of the Master Chengs as being influenced by Buddhism, although all of them publicly devoted themselves

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1 Zhu Xi, "Preface to the Commentary on the Great Learning."

to the anti-Buddhist campaign launched by their masters.² Thus, Zhu refused to inherit the legacy from the disciples as it was, once expressing his discontent like this: “From my point of view, it seems that there is no one [among the disciples of the Cheng brothers] who received the robe and bowl of the two masters (以某觀之.二先生衣鉢.似無傳之者).”³ In addition, when interpreting the concepts of *gewu* and *zhizhi*, Zhu filled the lack of textual ground with a supplementary chapter, which he sought to establish in the words of the Cheng brothers, Cheng Yi in particular. However, concerning *gewu* and *zhizhi*, there exist fundamental discrepancies between the words of Cheng Yi and Zhu’s interpretation, suggesting that Zhu did not simply reflect Cheng Yi’s ideas but altered them to better fit his own view of the legitimate scheme of literati learning. In order to fully understand Zhu’s point of view, it is also indispensable to examine ‘two polarities’—broad learning (*boxue* 博學) and Chan Buddhism-oriented learning—with which he sought to contrast his own view. In so doing, the present paper also sheds fresh light on the meaning of “*huoran guangtong*” 豁然貫通, a concept which Zhu borrowed from Cheng Yi’s writing but which also bears strong Buddhist connotations.

2. Denial of the Succession through the Disciples of the Cheng Brothers

Zhu Xi constructed a triad system for explicating the *Four Books*, consisting of, first, “Collected Commentary” (*jizhu* 集註); second, “Catechistical Sub-Commentary” (*huowen* 或問); and finally, “Anthology of Thus-far Comments.” The first two are also collectively compiled under the titles of *Sishu jizhu* 四書集註 and *Sishu huowen* 四書或問. Zhu’s *Jingyan jiangyi* 經筵講義, which he produced while serving as an imperial tutor in 1194, is comprised of his commentary on the *Great Learning* interpolated with the relevant passages from *Daxue huowen*,⁴ indicating that he designed the commentaries and sub-commentaries to be read simultaneously. A large portion of the sub-commentaries consist of his discussions, critical comments, and appraisal of previous comments, which he compiled into a series of anthologies, indicating that he designed them together as well.

Zhu’s anthologies of thus-far comments are too extensive to enumerate the names of all the authors commented upon here, but while they sometimes included commentaries on Zheng Xuan and Kong Yingda, they mainly concentrated on the Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai, and their direct and indirect followers, including “the four direct disciples of the Cheng brothers.” Overall, Zhu constructed the series of works on the *Four Books* to be read as a system comprised of the main commentaries with the original texts, the sub-commentaries, and the anthologies, which can be named, the triad system of the *Four Books*.

2 Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類, 101.2555-2578.

3 Zhu Xi, *ZZYL*, 101.2556:8.

4 Zhu Xi, “*Jingyan jiangyi*” 經筵講義, *Zhu Xi Ji* 朱熹集, 15.572-596.

Commentary	Catechistical Sub-Commentary	Anthology
<i>Daxue zhangju jizhu</i> 大學章句集註	<i>Daxue huowen</i> 大學或問	X
<i>Lunyu jizhu</i> 論語集註	<i>Luanyu huowen</i> 論語或問	<i>Lun Meng jingyi</i> 論孟精義
<i>Mengzi jizhu</i> 孟子集註	<i>Mengzi huowen</i> 孟子或問	<i>Lun Meng jingyi</i> 論孟精義
<i>Zhongyong zhangju jizhu</i> 中庸章句集註	<i>Zhongyong huowen</i> 中庸或問	<i>Zhongyong jilüe</i> 中庸輯略 (<i>Zhongyong jijie</i>) (中庸集解)

< Chart 1: Zhu Xi's Triad System of the Four Books >

The only exception is the *Great Learning*. Zhu completed the anthologies first, and they were published before the commentaries and sub-commentaries: *Lun Meng jingyi* 論孟精義 appeared in 1172 and *Zhongyong jilüe* 中庸輯略 in 1177 (it was made by abridging Shi Dun's *Zhongyong jijue* 中庸集解, a work completed in 1173). His compilation of anthologies on the *Analects*, the *Mencius*, and the *Zhongyong* demonstrates his indebtedness to and trust in the scholarship of the disciples of the Cheng brothers to a large degree. However, he refuted their interpretation only in relation to the *Great Learning*. It was not because the lack of sources. The literary collections and the records of sayings of the four direct disciples include a healthy number of comments about the *Great Learning*, which are systematically incorporated by Wei Shi 衛湜 into his *Liji jishuo* 禮記集說, an early 13th century work which comprehensively collected commentaries and comments on the *Liji*, including those of Zhu's. Lü, in particular, produced two commentaries on the entire *Liji*, (one of which is *Liji jie* 禮記解), which thoroughly cover both the *Great Learning* and the *Zhongyong*.⁵ Accordingly, unlike the other sub-commentaries, Zhu's catechistical sub-commentary to the *Great Learning*, *Daxue huowen*, scarcely contains any discussion or appraisal of the comments made by the followers of the Cheng brothers, but brought in direct utterances of the Cheng brothers almost exclusively. Zhu's refusal to compile an anthology for the *Great Learning* and his reliance upon the statements of the Cheng brothers themselves signifies his hidden intention of overshadowing with his new interpretation the influence that the Cheng brothers' followers had enjoyed upon the interpretation of the *Great Learning* up until then.

In his sub-commentary to the *Great Learning*, Zhu rather outspokenly denied the legitimacy of the disciples of the Cheng brothers in this respect:

[Someone says,] after Master Chengs equated *gewu* with 'exhaustive comprehension of li' (*qiongli* 窮理), his disciples transmitted this [teaching] through many routes. They also expound, to a certain degree, the masters' idea [on the investigation of things] and, thereby, give help to later scholars. Is it not true? ... [Zhu replies,] the disciples [of Master Chengs] may well claim that [their ideas] must have stemmed

5 Lü Dalin 呂大臨, *Nantian Lü shi yi zhu ji jiao* 藍田呂氏遺著輯校.

from the masters. However, according to my humble review of [their ideas], I am afraid that none of [the disciples] thoroughly understands [Master Chengs' idea].⁶

Here, Zhu claimed to have found substantial discrepancies between the Cheng brothers' interpretation of *gewu* as *xiongli* and the understanding of the disciples of the Cheng brothers on the same concepts, and in pointing this discrepancy out implicitly proclaims that he has discovered the Cheng brothers' genuine interpretation. He would ascribe the disciples' failure to "thoroughly understand" the Cheng brothers' ideas to their insufficient instruction from the masters as well as to the Cheng brothers' unique pedagogical method of meeting the personal needs of students.⁷

In fact, a strong argument for the legitimacy of Zhu Xi's claim to possess a more accurate understanding of the Cheng brothers' teachings is made by the fact that he was the first comprehensive compiler of the Cheng brothers' *yulu* 語錄 into a single text, *Henan Chengshi yishu*.⁸ Some versions of the records of sayings of the Cheng brothers were circulating during their life-times, but these records contained only small fractions of the whole.⁹ Because of the serious political and academic suppression from 1102, namely, *Yuanyou dangji* 元祐黨籍, their followers could not publicly promote the teaching of their masters until the last years of the Northern Song, by which time the Cheng brothers' teaching had already become widely scattered. A letter Yang Shi sent to You Zuo depicted the situation as follows:

When Master Yichuan was alive, people attributed all kinds of weird (*yu guai* 迂怪) things to him and ridiculed him. Now, time has passed and the number of the literati who trust his learning with admiration is growing beyond count. The records of the sayings of the master have been circulating somewhat widely. [However,] some of the [circulating] records miss the real [teaching of the master,] so I desire to collect them and delete overlapping or suspicious passages [from them]. Fortunately, you are not currently detained by anything urgent, so you might be able to find time to widely search [the records,] I am afraid that some of them are already lost, but I heard that when he was in Luoyang, Instructor Zhu (朱教授, i.e., Zhu Guangting 朱光庭) was circulating [Cheng Yi's *yulus*] in large quantity, and this copy is possessed by Kanghou (Hu Anguo). I will find the right time to send a letter to [Hu Anguo] to ask about this. In the future, we can compare [different records], modify them, and compile them into a book in order to transmit it to the future generations. Unless we do this, there is no way to restore the master's teaching [ever again]. Now, since only two of us are alive, we cannot ignore this responsibility.¹⁰

6 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen* 大學或問, 25-26: "曰自程子以格物爲窮理, 而其學者傳之見於文字多矣. 是亦有以發其師說而有助於後學者耶. ... 若其門人雖曰祖其師說. 然以愚考之. 則恐其皆未足以及此也."

7 Zhu Xi, *ZZYL*, 101.2555-2560.

8 Zhu Xi's postscripts to *Henan Chengshi yishu* (6) and *waishu* (9-10) in Cheng Hao 程顥, Cheng Yi 程頤, *Er Cheng ji* 二程集.

9 Yin Tun 尹焞, "Shi shuo" 師說 (3:4b-5a) and "Ti Yi Chuan xiansheng yulu" 題伊川先生語錄 (3:6a-b) in *Hejing ji* 和靖集.

10 Yang Shi, "Yu You Dingfu ji liu" 與游定夫其六, *Guishan xiansheng quan ji*, 18:826-7: "伊川先生在時. 世人迂怪之論皆歸之以爲訕笑. 今往矣士大夫尊信其學者漸衆殊不可曉也. 先生語錄傳之浸廣. 其間記錄頗有失真者. 某欲收聚刪去重複與其可疑者. 公幸閒居無事. 可更博爲尋訪. 恐有遺失. 聞朱教授在洛中所傳頗多. 康侯皆有之. 候尋便以書詢求. 異時更相校對稍加潤色. 共成一書. 以傳後學. 不爲無補. 先生之門. 所存惟吾二人耳. 不得不任其責也." This letter must have been written

Yang Shi's plan was interrupted by the Jurchen invasion and the subsequent collapse of the Northern Song in 1127. Soon after, however, he asked Hu Anguo for a copy of Zhu's collection of the *Cheng yulus* via letters, and his son, Yang Di 楊迪, later fetched him a copy. Despite these efforts, Yang Shi's death in 1135 further delayed their publication. In 1166, Zhang Shi 張栻, who had connections both with the Hu family and Yang Shi, printed the collection under the title of *Henan Chengshi cuiyu* 河南程氏粹語. However, this version is less than one third the size of *Henan Chengshi yishu* and included only the sayings of Cheng Yi.¹¹ It is a fair conjecture that although he had never directly met the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi's extensive labors as a compiler would tend to support his claim to be the one who got access to the sayings of the Cheng brothers most comprehensively up until then. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Zhu 'comprehensively' incorporated the sayings of the Cheng brothers into his interpretation of the critical concepts of *gewu* and *zhizhi*.

3. Modification and Selection of the Cheng brothers' Words

In his *Daxue huowen*, Zhu Xi proposed an overall scheme of learning on the basis of the eight items in the *Great Learning*. Centering around *gewu* and *zhizhi*, the scheme is organized into three propositions. First, he establishes that *gewu* and *zhizhi* enjoy priority over the six subsequent items in the sequence of learning (格物致知所以當先而不可後之意); second, he describes the conditions needed to properly practice *gewu* and *zhizhi* and details the relationship between these two concepts and other methods of learning such as inner mental attentiveness (*jing* 敬) (格物致知所當用力之地與其次第工程); and lastly, he insists upon the necessity of cultivating the origin (i.e., the mind and human nature) as the basis for *gewu* and *zhizhi* (涵養本原之功. 所以為格物致知之本).¹² In *Daxue huowen*, each proposition is paired with quotations from *Henan Chengshi yishu*, thus showing that his scheme is firmly grounded on the words of the Cheng brothers:¹³ Zhu

before 1123 when You died and probably after 1120 when Xie Liangzuo died.

- 11 In *SKQS*, this is titled as *Er Cheng cui yan* 二程粹言, but from reading Yang Shi's letters addressed to Hu Anguo and Zhang Shi's preface to this text, there is no doubt that this is the record of the words of Cheng Yi alone. For this, see, Yang Shi, "yu you ding fu ji liu 與游定夫其六," *Yang Shi ji*, 18:826-7, and Zhang Shi, "*Henan Chengshi cuiyan xu* 河南程氏粹言序," *Er cheng ji*, 1167. In 1166, Zhu Xi also edited Two Cheng Brothers' *yulu* preserved in the Hunan Hu family (see. Shu Jingnan 東景南, *Zhu xi nian pu chang pian* 朱熹年譜長編, 360 and 364) and was involved in disputes with Zhang Shi, Liu Gong 劉珙, and, ultimately, Hu Dayuan 胡大原, concerning his editing of the writings of the two Cheng brothers, which had been preserved in the Hu family.

- 12 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, 20-22.

- 13 In 1194, Zhu Xi serves as a tutor of Emperor Guangzong 光宗 for a short period. His note for tutorial, "Jingyan jiangyi" 經筵講義, remained in his collected works. Though it stops at the "Sincerity of the Will" chapter (*chengyi* 誠意), this is almost identical with his *Daxue zhangju* 大學章句 and *Daxue huowen* 大學或問, which he might have revised in 1189. Since "Jingyan jiangyi" was for the emperor, he replaced the two paragraphs in which he emphasized the extensive duties of literati with those suitable for the emperor. Except this modification for the sake of the special audience, these two texts almost completely correspond to each other except the part in which Zhu listed the Cheng brothers' words to back up his supplementary chapter to *gewu* and *zhizhi*. More than half of the passages quoted

paired two quotations with the first proposition, nine for the second, and five for the third.

Despite this, it is questionable to what degree Zhu truly fell back on the authority of the Cheng brothers. A comparison of the sixteen passages Zhu cited to those as they appear in *Henan Chengshi yishu* shows that Zhu quoted just one without change, namely: “Nurturing requires inner mental attentiveness; the pursuit of learning depends upon the extension of knowledge”(涵養須用敬。進學則在致知). The other fifteen passages were presented either by combining two or three separate passages into one, by culling out parts instead of whole passages, or by attaching some extraneous phrases or sentences beyond the original passages.

Furthermore, in the process of modification, Zhu frequently altered the seeming intent of the original passages as well. For example, a passage in *Daxue huowen* reads as follows:

The essential in *zhizhi* is to comprehend where the utmost goodness lies. We can take “fathers abide in affection” and “children abide in filial piety” as examples. If one desires to extensively observe the *li* of all the myriad things without putting efforts to these [norms,] I am afraid that this is like that a huge army on campaign sending cavalymen too far away, so they cannot return.¹⁴

In contrast, the original passage in *Henan Chengshi yishu* reads as follows:

Zhizhi is simply to comprehend that [we should] abide in the utmost goodness. [We can take] “fathers abide in affection” and “children abide in filial piety” as examples. [However, this] must not be from outside.¹⁵ If you put effort only into extensively observing the *li* of [external] things, this is just like the case of the wandering cavalymen that cannot return.¹⁶ (Italic added)

Although the literal difference between the two passages quoted above looks trivial, the main points are substantially at odds. The passage from *Daxue huowen* intends to advise that *zhizhi* as a pursuit of knowledge should not aim at endless extension of knowledge and that its main objective lies in the understanding and utmost practice of moral norms. In contrast, as the phrase “must not be from outside” signifies, the passage from *Henan Chengshi yishu* emphasizes the risk of turning attention outwardly at the cost of the significance of moral practices under the cause of extension of knowledge. As is discussed below, this issue is related to Zhu’s strategic criticism against the validity of “broad learning” (*boxue* 博學). The following examples demonstrate the discrepancy more clearly. The following passage comes from *Daxue huowen*.

in the *Daxue huowen* were replaced in “*Jingyan jiangyi*”. Moreover, the first section – the priority of *gewu* and *zhizhi* and the following passages were completely removed. Instead, he added a new section, “the way to practice inner mental attentiveness (所以為敬之方).”

14 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, 22: “致知之要當知至善之所在。如父止於慈。子止於孝之類。若不務此而徒欲汎然以觀萬物之理。則吾恐其如大軍之游騎出太遠而無所歸也。”

15 This sentence also can be translated “This does not need to be done at the outside,” but this would not change the following argument.

16 *Er Cheng ji*, 100.5: “致知但知止於至善。為人子止於孝。為人父止於慈之類。不須外面。只務觀物理汎然。正如遊騎無所歸也。”

From within the self to the *li* of the myriad things, [if you] comprehend [them] to a great extent, you will naturally experience sudden insight.¹⁷

The corresponding full passage in *Henan Chengshi yishu* reads as follows:

If one desires to *zhizhi*, one must *gewu*. “Thing” does not necessarily indicate [external] things and affairs. From within the self to the *li* of the myriad things, [if you] comprehend them to a great extent, then, you will naturally experience sudden insight.¹⁸

In *Daxue huowen*, Zhu Xi’s omission of the preceding sentence in the original passage significantly alters the overall implication. The former passage is inclusive in terms of the target of *gewu*, including both the internal self and the external things. Thus, it signifies the accumulative increase of comprehension of *li* would lead to a mystical experience of sudden insight. In contrast, the latter passage underlines that the focus of *gewu* is not confined to external things but the self is also a legitimate source for comprehension of *li*. Thus, it implies that insofar as one can extend one’s comprehension of *li* to a certain extent, it does not matter whether one focuses attention either to the self or the externals. Taking this idea one step further, one can infer from the latter the possibility that one can achieve a sort of universalistic comprehension of *li* by exclusively concentrating solely on the self. As will be discussed later, however, this type of ‘inwardness’ is one of the two polarities that Zhu Xi characterized as a Chan-oriented learning and purported to replace with his formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*.

In addition to the matter of modification, Zhu Xi’s claim that he discovered the genuine teaching of the Cheng brothers also involves the problem of judgment and choice. *Henan Chengshi yishu* is a compilation of verbal communications recorded by different figures in different times, which implies the high possibility of inconsistency. Concerning *gewu* and *zhizhi*, the compilation contains multiple relevant passages, but some of them seem mutually incompatible, unless additional explications were provided.

The following passage is the record of Cheng Yi’s conversation which Zhu Xi most frequently cited to support his interpretation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*:

Someone asks what the top-priority is in the art of moral cultivation.
Answer: Nothing is prior to rectifying the mind and making the will sincere. The sincerity of the will depends upon *zhizhi*, and *zhizhi* depends upon *gewu*. The word “*ge*” means “to arrive,” as it is used in the saying that “the spirit of imperial progenitors have arrived.” There is *li* in everything, and one must comprehend *li* to the utmost. There are many ways to carry out this. One is to elucidate *li* through reading books and participating in discussions. Another is to distinguish right from wrong in the middle of reassessing people and events of the past and present. Still

17 Zhu Xi, *Ibid.*, 21: “自一身之中，以至萬物之理，理會得多，自當豁然有箇覺處。”

18 *Er Cheng ji*, 181.2: “今人欲致知須要格物，物不必謂事物然後謂之物也，自一身之中，至萬物之理，但理會得多，幾(相)次自然豁然有覺處。”

another way is to handle affairs and settle them in a proper manner. All these are the proper ways to exhaust *li*.

Someone asks: In probing things, is it necessary to probe each and every thing? Or, can one know all myriad *li* by probing only one thing?

Answer: How can one understand everything like this? Even Yanzi would not dare say he could readily understand *li* by probing only one thing. One must probe one item today and another item tomorrow. When one has accumulated much knowledge he will naturally experience a thorough penetration like a sudden release.¹⁹

Apparently, Zhu Xi's supplementary chapter is substantially based on this passage. The fact that *Henan Chengshi cuiyan*, which, as discussed above, is the record of Cheng Yi's sayings, includes a virtually identical passage reaffirms its authenticity.²⁰ Nonetheless, not all of Zhu's contemporaries accepted its authenticity, casting particular doubt on the phrase "probe one item today and another item tomorrow."²¹ It is also precarious to rely so heavily on this single passage as representing Cheng Yi's genuine ideas on *gewu* and *zhizhi* particularly since the *Henan Chengshi yishu* contains no other passages comparable to the one cited. This problem becomes more apparent when we encounter passages which seem inconsistent with the one quoted above. The following passage is a noticeable example:

Question: Do observation of things and self-examination mean looking for [*li*] in the self after observing [them] at external things?

Answer: It is not necessary so. Things and the self are one *li*. If you understand this, you understand that as well. This is the unity of inner and outer. In its magnitude it reaches the height of heaven and the depth of earth, but in its refinement it constitutes the reason of being so of every single thing. The student should appreciate it.

Further question: In the process of *zhizhi*, how about seeking first of all in the Four Beginnings?

Answer: To seek in our own nature and feelings is indeed to be concerned with our own moral life. But every blade of grass and every tree possess *li* and should be examined.²²

Both passages quoted above are included in chapter eighteen of the sayings of Cheng Yi, as recorded by Liu Anjie 安節 from Yongjia 永嘉 between 1090 and 1097, a copy of which Chen Yan 陳淵 obtained from Liu's son.²³ It is therefore beyond our latitude to address the question of which one, between the two, is more authentic in presenting Cheng Yi's

19 *Er Cheng ji*, 188.2: "或問進修之術何先。曰莫先於正心誠意。誠意在致知。致知在格物。格至也。如祖考來格之格。凡一物上有一理。須是窮致其理。窮理亦多端。或讀書講明義理。或論古今人物別其是非。或應事接物而處其當。皆窮理也。或問格物須物物格之。還只格一物而萬理皆知。曰怎生便會通。若只格一物便通衆理。雖顏子亦不敢如此道。須是今日格一件。明日又格一件。積習既多。然後脫然自有貫通處。" The translation is from Chan, *A Source Book*, 560-561 with minor modifications.

20 *Henan Chengshi cuiyan in Er Cheng ji*, 1191:5.

21 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen*, 27.

22 *Er Cheng ji*, 193.1: "問觀物察己。還因見物。反求諸身否。曰不必如此說。物我一理。纔明彼即曉此。合內外之道也。語其大。至天地之高厚。語其小。至一物之所以然。學者皆當理會。又問致知。先求之四端。如何。曰求之性情。固是切於身。然一草一木。皆有理。須(是)察。" For translation, Wing-chit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 563 with minor changes. Also see *Er Cheng ji*, 193:6.

23 *Er Cheng ji*, 4.

actual ideas on *gewu* and *zhizhi*. What is conspicuous, however, is the discrepancy between them.

The first passage Zhu Xi resorted to is based on some underlying premises. First, the requirement of gradual accumulation implies the coexistence of diverse, mutually distinguishable particularities of *li*, which are associated with related things. The sum of such particularities of *li* cannot be reduced to the unity of *li* without losing the unique sense of each particular *li*. The reason that one should “probe one item today and another item tomorrow” can be justified under the premise that the *li* one can comprehend by probing one particular thing should differ from the *li* one can comprehend by probing another thing.

Although human nature is theoretically equal to *li*, the internal dimension of mind and nature is not included in the discussion of the range of things to probe; rather, the focus is turned to externals, such as books. Nor is the relationship between the internal dimension and external things explicated. Such a formulation may lead to a belief that *li* is something that an agent can acquire *from* external things.

The gradual process of *gewu* (i.e., , “*jiu* 久”) seems teleological, aiming for a kind of transcendental “leap” from the accumulation of *li* from particulars to a type of perfect integration of the whole, which is called “sudden penetration or *huoran guantong*.”²⁴ The passage does not provide an explication about how this transcendental leap from particulars to the whole is possible. However, in order to justify this leap solely on the basis of the accumulation of *li* from external things, it implies the premise of an orderly relationship among particular *li*, namely, the comprehension of a coherent higher-order (or highest-order) conception of the arrangement of the human and natural worlds.²⁵ This highest-order picture of the world’s arrangement does not sufficiently explicate the *li* of particulars but embraces them all in terms of order and coherence.

This interpretation brings to light a substantial discrepancy between the two passages quoted above. The gist of the latter passage lies in the unity and ubiquity of *li* crossing the borders not only between external particulars but also between the internal and the external, as represented by the idiomatic phrase of “the unity of inner and outer.” In particular, it appears that the second questioner assumed the internal aspect of the Four Beginnings as the legitimate starting point for the extension of knowledge, and Cheng Yi’s reponse shows general agreement with this premise. Thus, this passage apparently brings the internal dimension into the range of things for *gewu* and *zhizhi* without making an explicit demand for probing external things. It suggests that the *li* one can comprehend by “self-examination” is equivalent to the *li* one can comprehend from “observation of things.” This idea is predicated upon the hidden presupposition that a single *li* penetrates both the internal and the external, and also signifies that one does not have to accumulate the knowledge of *li* through gradually probing things one by one. In this context, *li* must be something universal

24 On this issue, see Kim Yung Sik, “‘Analogical Extension’(*leitū*) in Zhu Xi’s Methodology of ‘Investigation of Things’(*gewu*) and ‘Extension of Knowledge’(*zhizhi*).”

25 On this, see Kim, *Ibid.*, and Peterson, “Another Look at *Li* 理,” 13-32. Also, see, Peter K. Bol, “Chu His’s Redefinition of Literati Learning,” In *Neo-Confucian Education: The Formative Stage*, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary and John W. Chaffee, 184-185.

and highest-ordered, which cannot be equal to the mere gloss of the *li* of several particulars, since the *li* of particular things must be associated with the unique attributes and/or properties that explain the existence and function of each particular thing. In sum, whereas the former passage requires a diverse range of external things to probe, the latter underrates such a requirement.

The comparative analysis we have performed thus far drives us to reassess Zhu's claim that he discovered the genuine teaching of Master Chengs. Zhu's "Supplementary Chapter" to the *Great Learning*, which is the *locus classicus* for his conceptualization of *gewu* and *zhizhi*, is not entirely grounded on his synthesis of the Cheng brothers' overall ideas on the relevant concepts. Rather, when encountering mutually incompatible passages, he seems to have "opted for" the parts that were better fitted to his objective against those which departed from his conceptualizations. In particular, when one takes into consideration that the two passages quoted above come from the same chapter in *Henan Chengshi yishu*, it is also likely either that the Cheng brothers may have held inconsistent ideas on *gewu* and *zhizhi* or that they promoted an idea which does not fully cohere with that of Zhu. This matter of selective adoptions and reinterpretations leaves us with a question as to what degree Zhu's ideas on *gewu* and *zhizhi*, as well as on the learning in general, really do coincide with those held by the Cheng brothers. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a clear answer to this question, but it is now clear that Zhu's reliance on the authority of the Cheng brothers involves modification and selection, which cannot be counted as merely simple reiteration and reinterpretation.

4. The Two Polarities

Arguably, the most provocative aspect of Zhu's rendering of *gewu* and *zhizhi* consists in the expression of "sudden penetration" or "*huoran guantong*." At the level of appearances, this is because this phrase is reminiscent of "sudden enlightenment" (*dunwu* 頓悟), while his reformulation of *gewu* is also similar with "gradual cultivation" (*jianxiu* 漸修), and, at the philosophical level, this usage is significant because it is his only proposed explication of the transcendental "leap" from particulars to the unity of *li*.

It is hardly difficult to find a phrase in Buddhist texts which seem largely interchangeable with "*huoran guantong*." For example,

If you can comprehend this, this can be called the true repentance. You, sir, already possess the spirit of *dazhangfu*; you must resolutely practice *chan* (contemplation). If you can practice this, then you will definitely experience *sudden* enlightenment.²⁶

Cheng Yi's usage of this expression has a different significance from that of Zhu. Cheng's words are put down by a recorder of the sayings,

26 Dahui Zonggao 大慧宗杲, *Dahui pujue chanshi yulu* 大慧普覺禪師語錄, (Taisho ed.) T47n1998Ap0866b19(05)-20(02): "若能如是見得。是真懺悔。道上座既具大丈夫志氣。決定要參禪。但怎麼參。須是豁然悟去。" Also see, Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹, *Fan wen zheng ji* 范文正集 (SKQS ed.) Bieji 別集 4:2a; and Juefan Huihong 覺範 惠洪, *Shi men wen zi chan* 石門文字禪 (SKQS ed.), 30:2a.

implying the high possibility of rewording by the recorder. To the contrary, Zhu's adoption of this expression is entirely deliberate. From a different angle, however, Zhu's intentional adoption of the expression in the most controversial part of his commentary on the *Great Learning*, namely, the supplementary chapter, also urges us to rethink his ulterior motivation for doing so. As he proclaims in his preface to the *Zhongyong*, the establishment of the genuine learning is largely predicated on the sectarian agenda of how to illuminate the seemingly subtle differences between Daoxue 道學 and Buddhism.

Schematically, Zhu Xi's reformulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* can be approached through identifying "two polarities" which he was eager to avoid from the early stage of his career—broad learning and Chan-type introspective sudden enlightenment.

Then, the learning you propose is not sought in the mind but in the traces; not sought in the internal but in the external. I am afraid that the learning of the sages and worthies is not so superficial (*qianjin* 淺近) or fragmented (*zhili* 支離) as this.²⁷

This straightforward denigration is put forward no other than Zhu Xi himself. In *Daoxue huowen*, this criticism quoted above is appended right next to Zhu's defensive explication of his supplementary chapter on *gewu* and *zhizhi*, suggesting that he was fully aware of the provocative characteristic of his formulation. His explication includes the following account:

The proper method for making an effort is comprised of inspecting it (i.e., *li*) at the emergence of events and actions, examining it at the subtlety of burgeoning thoughts, seeking it in the middle of books and language, and looking into it when being involved in discussions.²⁸

With little doubt, this formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* is a simple reiteration of Cheng Yi's suggestion quoted in the previous chapter. However, Zhu's self-posed criticism signifies that despite the almost sacred authority of Cheng Yi at least in the Daoxue tradition, this method was not congruent with the conventional understanding of *gewu* and *zhizhi*. The harsh criticism quoted above is paired with another self-posed rebuttal, which reads:

If so, how do you differentiate the proposed learning of *gewu* and *zhizhi* from the so-called 'broadly absorbing various things'?²⁹

By posing this question, Zhu intended to defend his formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* from a possible criticism about its resemblance to so-called 'broad learning,' suggesting that for the followers of the Cheng brothers,

27 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen*, 24: "然則子之爲學不求諸心而求諸迹. 不求之內而求之外. 吾恐聖賢之學. 不如是之淺近而支離也."

28 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen*, 23: "若其用力之方. 則或考之事爲之著. 或察之念慮之微. 或求之文字之中. 或索之講論之際."

29 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen*, 28: "然則所謂格物致知之學. 與世之所謂博物洽聞者. 奚以異?"

broad learning is not compatible with genuine learning. Zhu's response reads as follows:

This [learning I propose] takes "look into the self" and "exhaustively comprehend *li*" as its main tasks, but this is necessarily [undertaken] in the way of thoroughly probing the utmost both of the fundamentals and their derivatives and of right and wrong. [In contrast,] that [i.e., broad learning] takes pursuing the externals and boasting of abundance as its business without examining the veracity of the manifest and the hidden or truth and falsehood. Thus, probing to the utmost will make [one's] knowledge (*zhi* 知) wider and, at the same time, the mind brighter, whereas not examining veracity will make [superficial] knowledge (*shi* 識) wider but the mind will be more clogged. This is the very point where [learning] for the self and [learning] for others diverge, so it is necessary to carefully pay attention to this.³⁰

In this comparison, Zhu presented his standards for discerning genuine from pseudo knowledge. In essence, he acknowledged the analogy between his formulation of *gewu* and the conventional practice of broad learning in two senses: knowledge should be broadened or extended, and this qualitative change should be pursued in the connection with external things (*wai* 外). In other words, the extension of knowledge should be in line with the expansion of the range and kinds of external things and affairs that one has examined and comprehended.

Nonetheless, the expansion of the range and kinds must result in the increase of one's genuine knowledge of the things and affairs one has inspected. Such knowledge should illuminate both "the fundamental" and "the derivative," as well as "the manifest (or common)" and "the hidden (or inner)" aspects of things,³¹ and such illumination should be "thorough" (*ji* 極) and "truthful" (*shi* 實). Additionally, genuine knowledge should be combined with one's judgment on the externals in terms of "morality" and "veracity" (*shifei* 是非 and *zhenwang* 真妄). Therefore, the knowledge thus acquired is not merely 'about' the externals but should have something to do with the self by "making the mind brighter." Put differently, the practice of *gewu* and *zhizhi* should be accompanied by the moral and epistemological judgment of the mind as the genuine agent of the self about these external things, thus being beneficial to, and meaningful for, the moral and rightful management of life of the self (*weiji* 爲己).

In contrast, knowledge acquired through the conventional practice of broad learning tends to be disqualified as genuine knowledge, not only because it does not aim to acquire thorough and truthful knowledge but also because it is merely "about" the externals. Therefore, while it can be expanded endlessly as there is a seemingly infinite diversity of external things, it is not sufficient to providing an agent with meaningful knowledge for his or her life but tends to end up being "fragmented" and "superficial."

Zhu's confutation of broad learning had significant bearings on the intellectual milieu of the time. For instance, he once aimed this criticism to

30 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen*, 28: "此以反身窮理爲主.而必究其本末是非之極至.彼以徇外誇多爲務.而不嚴其表裏真妄之實.然必究其極.是以知愈博而心愈明.不嚴其實.是以識愈多而心愈窒.此正爲己爲人之所以分.不可不察也."

31 For Zhu's elaboration on these terms, see Zhu Xi, *ZZYL*, 16.322-324.

Lü Zuqian 祖謙, one of his most important partners in the Daoxue camp. He branded Lü's intellectual interests as "miscellaneous" (*boza* 博雜), and took him to task for failing to "return to the essentials" (*yaoyue* 要約) and warned of the danger of "losing one's will while being engrossed by things" (*wanwu sangzhi* 玩物喪志).³² Zhu also classified his contemporary utilitarian statecraft thinkers into the category of broad learning in their lack of the essentials.³³

Despite this outward criticism of broad learning, the most striking characteristic of Zhu's formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* remains its resemblance to broad learning, particularly their shared prescription that one's extension of knowledge should be practiced in relation to the external 'things.' As a consequence, one's view of things is altered from their long-established negative characterization as the main cause for disturbing the self's tranquility and harmony to a consideration of them as beneficial entities which are indispensable for the extension of knowledge. In order to fully understand his ulterior motive for incorporating the feature of broad learning into his interpretation of *gewu*, it is necessary to examine Chan Buddhism, the opposite polarity he set to void in his formulation of the genuine learning.

In his self-defense against the denigration quoted above, Zhu disclosed the reason why he would rather take the risk of predicted serious misinterpretation of his proposal as being superficial and fragmented. It reads:

If [someone], considering this [proposal of learning] superficial and fragmented, then desires to desert the tangible and set up a sort of dimly deep, dazzling, hardly practicable, and transcendent doctrine, thus urging learners to imprudently set their minds beyond books and language, and say that this is the only way to comprehend the Way, this is the worst of the recent wantonly one-sided and viciously concealing form of Buddhist learning, which would like to move [the mind of learners in a wrong direction] and thus disorder the genuine learning (*shixue* 實學) of "luminous Virtue" and "renewing people" in antiquity. It is also wrong.³⁴

The description of searching for the Way outside of books and language unambiguously refers to the key phrases of the Chan Buddhist lexicon: "A special transmission outside the teaching; Not based on the written word. Directly pointing to the human mind; Achieving Buddhahood by seeing one's nature" (*bu li wenzi* 不立文字, *jiaowai biechuan* 教外別傳, *zhizhi renxin* 直指人心, *jianxing chengfo* 見性成佛). Here, Zhu Xi relentlessly disparaged the Chan-based learning as the most spurious form even in Buddhism and as the most serious threat to "the genuine learning," which he sought to revive.

Clarifying the fundamental but elusive difference between Confucianism and Buddhism was arguably the most central issue for Zhu throughout his lifetime.

32 Zhu Xi, *ZXJ*, 31.1310.

33 Zhu Xi, *ZZYL*, 11.188:5.

34 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, 24-5: "今必以是為淺近支離,而欲藏形匿影,別為一種幽深恍惚艱難阻絕之論,務使學者莽然措其心於文字言語之外,而曰道必如此然後可以得之,則是近世佛學詖淫邪遁之尤者而欲移之以亂古人明德新民之實學,其亦誤矣。"

Generally speaking, recent [pursuers of] the learning of the Way (*daoxuezhe* 道學者) have usually slipped into [the pitfall of] excessive loftiness. Reading the Classics and engaging in discussions, [they] take a sudden elevation through shortcut as a standard but are not willing to climb the ladder rung by rung. So, they ignore and desert all the intricate or subtle things which are, in fact, good to ponder over, since they presume these things are too shallow and crumbled to pay attention to. ... [However, when] *li* has not been completely comprehended, doubts tend to arise in the reader's mind. Nevertheless, rather than looking for [*li*] nearby, they are deluded into consulting the doctrines of the heterodox learning. Furthermore, placing [their attention] at the dim and unfathomable realm, they loftily taste meaningless words and wait for [experiencing] *wide-opening* and *sudden enlightenment*. They absolutely do not know that things must be investigated in order to understand [*li*] or that moral norms must be probed in order to exhaustively [realize them].³⁵

This sectarian statement comes from one of Zhu's letters written in 1164, dated rather earlier than the period when he established his distinct philosophical system between the late 1160s and the early 1170s. Nonetheless, the high degree of consistency and continuity between this statement and the quotations from *Daxue huowen* is easily noticeable, suggesting that his reformulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* aimed mainly to challenge the prevailing Chan Buddhist influence over literati learning. Here, Zhu analogized *gewu* ("wu bi ge 物必格") to "climb[ing] the ladder rung by rung," empathizing its gradual characteristic. By "things," he primarily meant "reading the Classics and engaging in discussions," as had been prescribed by Cheng Yi. Zhu claimed that the attention of learners, which were then focused on the lofty, dim, and unfathomable realm beyond the reach of ordinary persons, should be lowered down to the realm of things that are "nearby" (*jin* 近) to those who pursued to learn the Way. The derogatory expression "shallow and crumbled" (*beijin suoxie* 卑近瑣屑) is almost synonymous to the phrase "superficial and fragmented" used in the self-posed rebuttal quoted earlier. With these strong words, Zhu intended to highlight the incompatibility between the legitimate practice of *gewu* and the inappropriate attitude of seeking for "a sudden elevation through shortcut" and "wide-opening and sudden enlightenment." In the same letter, he more unequivocally compared the accumulative aspect ("*jilei* 積累") of *gewu* to "sudden enlightenment" (*dunwu* 頓悟) in the Chan doctrines and encapsulated the overall process of *gewu* and *zhizhi* into the phrase "the procedure of ascent from the lesser learning to the higher achievement" (*xia xue shang da* 下學上達).³⁶

What calls special attention is that Zhu's conception of "the higher achievement" at this early stage was substantially different from that of "sudden penetration" in his mature interpretation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*. Although the expression "wide-opening and sudden enlightenment" (*kuoran er yiwu* 廓然而一悟) in the above quotation is certainly analogous to

35 Zhu Xi, ZXJ, 32.1268-1269: "大抵近世言道學者，失於太高。讀書講義，率常以徑易超絕，不歷階梯為快。而於其間曲折精微正好玩處，例皆忽畧厭棄，以為卑近瑣屑，不足留情。... 理既未盡，而胸中不能無疑，乃不復反求諸近，顧惑於異端之說，益推而置諸冥漠不可測知之域，兀然終日味無義之語，以俟其廓然而一悟，殊不知物必格而後明，倫必察而後盡。"

36 Zhu Xi, "Da wang shang shu" 答汪尚書, ZXJ, 30.1268-9.

“*huoran guangtong*” in its literal meaning, he associated it with the sudden enlightenment of Chan in a negative sense. Furthermore, he described the process and state of the higher achievement as “gradually illuminating and, subsequently, transparent understanding of *li* in its multitude” (*cun jiu jian ming* 存久漸明, *zhong li dong ran* 衆理洞然).³⁷ In both Cheng Yi’s words quoted from *Henan Chengshi yishu* and Zhu’s supplementary chapter, the utmost stage is described as a sudden and fundamental leap from the gradual accumulation of one’s knowledge on the *li* of particulars to the entire integration and penetration of the whole, which transcends the bound of particulars. Therefore, as discussed above, *li* in this utmost stage should be universal and highest-ordered, which, therefore, can be applicable to all but be reducible to nothing particular. In contrast, the term “*zhong li*” here has the connotation of a mere gross totality of multitudinous things which does not lead to such a fundamental and transcendental breakthrough. In this light, this term may also lead one to estimating Zhu’s formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* as only a modified version of broad learning in terms of the pursuit of qualitative extension of knowledge as the main goal, as the self-posing accusation quoted above implies. One may also offer the conjecture that a fundamental change in Zhu’s formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* occurred in the meanwhile. Nonetheless, there still remains a third way of reinterpretation which may bridge the interpretive gap between these two types understanding of “the higher achievement.”

5. A Synthesis between the Polarities

In articulating his formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*, Zhu Xi strategically set the two polarities of broad learning and the Chan Buddhist mode of learning. On the one hand, these polarities are meant to serve as reference posts to mark his distinct position elsewhere. On the other, they also indicate that his formulation shares a certain degree of common features with them. As seen above, Zhu’s self-posed accusation of his proposal as “superficial and fragmented” was necessary since he did incorporate the features of broad learning into his formulation to an apparent degree. As is demonstrated by the expression of *huoran guantong*, his overt and straightforward denial of the Chan mode of learning also does not mean that the separation from it was not the primary purpose of his formulation.

In the following passage quoted from *Daxue huowen*, Zhu presented a further explication of his supplementary chapter. It reads:

I answer, “The main ends of learning are none other than the mind and *li*. The mind is the master of a body (or the self), and [the mind of] empty and numinous substance is self-sufficient to deal with *li* of the world. *Li* is ubiquitous in the myriad things, however, the subtle and delicate manifestations [of *li*], in fact, do not [happen] outside the mind of one person. From the beginning, it is wrong to make an argument on the basis of the division between the inner and the outer, or the fine and the crude. Nevertheless, those who do not know the numinous-ness of the mind cannot

37 Zhu Xi, “*Da wang shang shu*” 答汪尚書, *ZXJ*, 30.1268-9.

preserve it, so their minds will be dim and confused. Nor can they exhaust the subtlety of the myriad *li*. [On the contrary,] those who do not know the subtlety of myriad *li* do not exhaust them, so they will be narrow and stagnant. Nor can they complete the whole of the mind. It is necessarily so.

Therefore, the sages set up teachings, on the one hand, to let people calmly understand the numinous-ness of the mind and, then, preserve it in the state of being solemn, discriminating, and undivided. This is the basis of exhausting *li*. [On the other, the sages] let people realize the existence of the subtlety of myriad *li* and exhaust them while inquiring, studying, thinking, and discriminating, and eventually, extend this to the effect of completely realizing the mind. The huge and the tiny mutually support, the dynamic and the static nurture each other. From the beginning, there is no need to make a choice between the inner and the outer, or the fine and the crude, but, if one sincerely practice these in a long-term, one can achieve “thorough penetration” [between the inner mind and the outer *li*]. Then, one can comprehend the integral unity [of the inner and the outer] and the absurdity of the division of the inner and the outer as well as of the fine and the crude.³⁸

As a supplementary explication of the supplementary chapter, this passage’s content largely overlaps with the supplementary chapter itself, and most is of little additional significance. What attracts our attention, however, are two points which are not as manifest in the supplementary chapter. First, the overall framework of this explication is restructured on the basis of the bipolarity of the mind in the self and the *li* of external things, which also corresponds to the conceptual distinction “between the inner and the outer.” Zhu prescribed preserving the “solemn, discriminating, and undivided” “state” of the numinous mind as the preliminary condition to proceed the practice of *gewu*. In the opposite direction, he also insisted upon the second condition that the complete realization of the mind is predicated on the exhaustive comprehension of *li*, which “is ubiquitous in the myriad things.”

As is clarified by the argument, “no need to make a choice between the inner and the outer,” this bilateral direction of learning explicitly means that the realm either of the inner or the outer alone cannot be a sufficient field of learning. Correspondingly, Zhu indirectly ascribed the two modes of the one-sided method of learning described above to the two polarities he had previously confuted against in *Daoxue huowen*: “Not knowing the numinous-ness of the mind” corresponds to broad learning, which focuses exclusively on the external things, while “Not knowing the subtlety of myriad *li*” indicates the Chan method of introspective contemplation like “Directly pointing to the human mind; Achieving Buddhahood by seeing one’s nature,” which focuses exclusively on the internal realm. Such a mutual dependence is not conceivable without a certain distinction between the inner and outer realms.

38 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, 24: “曰人之所以爲學。心與理而已矣。心雖主乎一身而其體之虛靈。足以管乎天下之理。理雖散在萬物。而其用之微妙。實不外乎一人之心。初不可以內外精粗而論也。然或不知此心之靈而無以存之。則昏昧雜擾而無以窮衆理之妙。不知衆理之妙而無以窮之。則偏狹固滯而無以盡此心之全。此其理勢之相須。蓋亦有必然者。是以聖人設教使人默識此心之靈而存之於端莊靜一之中。以爲窮理之本。使人知有衆理之妙而窮之於學問思辨之際。以致盡心之功。巨細相涵。動靜交養。初未嘗有內外精粗之擇。及其真積力久而豁然貫通焉。則亦有以知其渾然一致。而果無內外精粗之可言矣。”

Second, the distinction between the inner and outer realms provides us with a clue to a third way of interpreting Zhu's use of "*huoran guantong*." As Zhu rejected "the division between the inner and the outer," we should understand that Zhu's distinction between the two did not mean an unbridgeable gap lying between them for him, but questions remain regarding how we are to bridge them and by what means. Unlike in the supplementary chapter, *huoran guantong* is explained in the passage quoted above with a description of "the integral unity" (*hunran yizhi* 渾然一致) in contrast to "the absurdity of the division of the inner and the outer as well as of the fine and the crude" (*wu neiwai jingcu zhi keyan* 無內外精粗之可言), which can be read as a defense of the unity of the inner and the outer. In the same vein, the overall formulation of learning on the basis of the bipolarity of the mind and the *li* of the external things seems to converge on the point that such a specious division completely dissolves, which Zhu encapsulated into the concept of "the integral unity."

In this light, *huoran guantong* also should be interpreted in line with this integral unity. This figurative description, I argue, is meant to depict the ultimate state of a complete removal of a certain kind of barrier, depicted with the adjectival phrases of "dim and confused" (*hunmei zarao* 昏昧雜擾) and "narrow and stagnant" (*pianxia guzhi* 偏狹固滯), which lies between the distinctive realms of the mind and the *li* of the externals. Differently put, this phrase illustratively describes the experience of an unobstructed "penetration" between the two virtually divided realms which leads to "the integral unity."

This interpretation of *huoran guantong* in the light of the integral unity between the inner and the outer eliminates the suspicion raised earlier regarding its possible Buddhist origin. This interpretation does not disprove its possible Buddhist origin or its semantic resemblance to its Buddhist counterpart, but brings to light its fundamentally different meaning and significances within this context. The rendering of *huoran guantong* into a sudden and fundamental leap from the gradual accumulation of the *li* of particulars to the entire integration and penetration of the whole derives from the ungrounded postulate on its correspondence to the idea of "the principle is one but the manifestation is many" (*li yi fen shu* 理一分殊) as well as the relationship between the supreme ultimate (*taiji* 太極) and the myriad things (*wanwu* 萬物).

In the previously cited explication, Zhu emphasized two functions of the mind: it's acting as the genuine agent of the self in its relationship with body ("*zhu fu yi shen* 主乎一身") and its faculty of knowing ("*xu ling [zhijue]*" 虛靈[知覺]), but he left out any description of it as a sort of bearer of human nature as the ultimate *li* in the Daoxue scheme, namely, "*xing ji li* 性即理." This deliberate omission was probably made because its inclusion might lead to a counterargument: "Granting that the ultimate *li* is inherent in the mind of all, why then should one outwardly direct attention to the externals in a "superficial and fragmented" manner?", which he believed had caused not only Buddhists but also the followers of the teaching of the Cheng brothers to turn their attention exclusively to the inner realm of

human nature and the mind.³⁹ In response, Zhu strove to restructure literati learning on the firm ground of classics, conversations, and practices, thus turning the attention to the external as well.

6. Conclusion

The intellectual milieu was quite pluralistic in the twelfth century when Zhu presented his proposal for reforming literati learning on the basis of his reinterpretation of the *Great Learning*. The legacies from the Northern Song such as Wang Anshi and Su Shi as well as Buddhism were still competing with the teaching of the Cheng brothers.⁴⁰ More abstractly and strategically, Zhu presupposed the two polarities of learning, which remained relevant to his contemporaries, thus demarcating the border between the polarities and the genuine learning, which he claimed to have discovered directly from the remaining words of the Cheng brothers. Nonetheless, as is analyzed above, he did not confine his mission to providing a legitimate ‘interpretation’ of the teaching of the Cheng brothers. Rather, he modified and selected their teachings to best fit and support his own views.

Historically, the two polarities against which Zhu positioned his own work represent the coexistence of two intellectual trends from the Tang dynasties on—one seeking to preserve the diversely developed moral, cultural, and social traditions from the past, and the other attempting to search out the higher- or highest-order principles with which one was believed to be able to embrace the world of particulars more comprehensively and universally.⁴¹ The Cheng brothers distinguished these two trends and put more emphasis on the latter.⁴² In contrast, Zhu attempted to bring an end to this long-enduring intellectual tension by synthesizing the two polarities into an integral scheme, thus striking a new balance between them. He attempted to reestablish the authority and validity of the classics and discussions between teachers and colleagues as the legitimate source of meaningful knowledge, which he felt had been undervalued by a tendency to focusing exclusively on the inner dimension. He labelled this as Chan Buddhism, which was the most serious denigration in the Cheng learning tradition. In so doing, he refused to recognize the authority of the direct disciples of the Cheng brothers and also even manipulated the words of the Cheng brothers, suggesting the unique features of his interpretation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*.

In restructuring the genuine learning of the Cheng brothers, as is demonstrated in his letters to Wang Yingchen quoted above, Zhu’s main and most persistent concern was focused on the assimilation of literati learning into Chan Buddhism at the era of the real “Golden Age” of Buddhism in Chinese history, when Chan Buddhism permeated the literati more deeply

39 For this, see Junghwan Lee, “Zhang Jiucheng 張九成 as an Eminent Advocate of the Cheng Learning (*Chengxue* 程學) in the Early Southern Song,” 1-26.

40 Bol, “Chu His’s Redefinition of Literati Learning,” 151-185.

41 Bol, *This Culture of Ours*, in specific, 1-3.

42 Bol, “Ch’eng Yi as a Literatus.”

than even before.⁴³ He characterized this tendency, which James Liu has a “turning inward,”⁴⁴ as the exclusive attention to the inner realm. Zhu’s restructuring aimed to reverse it by synthesizing the two polarities, each of which, he contended, was inclined toward one side on the false presumption of the division of the inner and the outer. His expressions of “*huoran guantong*” and “the integral unity” represent this synthesis, bridging the division between the inner and the outer realms in the place of a mystic transcendence, a “sudden” “lofty” elevation, or the totality of the whole.

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43 Gimello, “Marga and culture: learning, letters, and liberation in Northern Sung Ch’an,” 371-437; Gimello, “Changing Shang-ying on Wu-t’ai Shan,” 89-149; Gregory, “The Vitality of Buddhism in the Sung,” 1-20.

44 Liu, *China Turning Inward*.

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在新的基礎上學的重構：朱熹格物、致知新解

李定桓

中文摘要

本文從新的角度對朱熹論學的第一階段，即對“格物、致知”作進行重新解釋，以此闡明朱熹論“學”的結構特徵。眾所周知，朱熹對這兩個概念的解釋源自二程。但到目前為止，對於“格物致知”的解釋朱熹在很大程度上沿襲了二程，仍是一個尚待研究的問題。在對“格物、致知”做重新解釋的過程中，朱熹正面挑戰了二程弟子們的權威，而對《河南程氏遺書》中的相關文字，根據自己的目的做了有選擇的解釋。為了不帶偏見地、全面地審視他對“格物致知”的重新解釋，在本文中，筆者探討了朱熹為了凸顯自己“學”的觀點而設定的作為比照的兩個極端，即博學和禪學。

朱熹一方面批評兩者的偏頗，另一方面，為了重新確立“經傳讀書”與“師友講論”作為知識來源的權威性和妥當性，他又把博學和禪學兩者納入到“學”中。由此，他想要反轉當時被劉子健稱為“內向化”的程學對內在層次關注的潮流。為此，朱熹提出了心、性之內在領域與物之外在領域之間渾然一致的新視角。由此，本文重新探明了朱熹所提出的豁然貫通，不是神秘的超越一切的東西，而是內在領域和外在領域的渾然一致。

關鍵詞：朱熹，學，格物，致知，博學，禪學，渾然一致，豁然貫通