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儒教文化研究

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Creation, Transformation, and Transcendence

SHIN Jeong-Keun

Abstract

In order to understand a cultural tradition, it is essential to examine the culture's basic views on important philosophical concepts, including their views of creation, movement, and transformation. This paper examines the characteristics of the socio-cultural traditions of East Asia by exploring some key concepts including creation, transformation, and transcendence. The same concepts tend to convey diverse meanings based on different contexts. Creation, for instance, can be used in terms of making goods and cultural activities, rather than in terms of cosmogony. This is because East Asian traditions do not assume an external cause or divine entity in the process of creation and movement. Instead, East Asians tend to think that things are self-generative as the term *ziran* 自然 (being so spontaneously) suggests. Within this tradition, humans have a unique status, in no small part because they are not regarded as beings created by God but as one of three fundamental agents operating in the universe. This unique cultural tradition of East Asia requires humans to interact with others and transform themselves so that they can realize all entities share the same origins. In this regard, constant transformation is idealized one of the essential human characteristics in East Asian thought.

Keywords: creation, harmony, transformation, transcendence, *ziran*

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1. Setting up the Problem

Today we live in fast-paced times, with new products being unveiled every day. It was not long ago that computers were combined with communication networks, thus bringing the Internet into wide use. But now the Internet of Things is already emerging as a future trend in the industry.

How does Chinese philosophy account for the origin and emergence of new things? As is widely known, East Asian cultures lack belief in a monotheistic deity that created the universe *ex nihilo*. Instead, various elements and forces intermingle, contact and collide with one another to assume the shape of one thing or another. This in short is formation (*xingcheng* 形成), the taking on of form. The process occurs entirely on its own, without the need for any external cause. This in short is nature, the “Being so spontaneously” (*ziran* 自然), what becomes so spontaneously, or of its own accord.

Of course, when examining Chinese philosophical texts, we sometimes come across passages that seem to presuppose or hint at the existence of a divine being that controls the processes of nature. For instance, the “Dazhongshi” 大宗師 chapter in the *Zhunagzi* 莊子 makes reference to a Transformer (*zaohua zhe* 造化者) or Maker of Things (*zaowu zhe* 造物者).¹ This might immediately suggest the idea of a Creator God (*zaowu zhu* 造物主). However, “Transformer” and “Maker of Things” in these passages do not refer to a divine being that creates the universe and presides over the formation of things. They merely personify the state of affairs in which things constantly and spontaneously transform into other things due to the confluence of various conditions.

The aim of this paper is to examine how Chinese philosophy accounts for generation and formation in a world without a Creator God. For this purpose, the paper will first take up the concept of creation to explain how the universe is generated, then the concept of transformation and motion to explain how the world operates, and lastly the concept of tracing/extending beyond to explain how human beings grow and change.

2. Creation

We now use the word “creation” (*chuangzao* 創造) in diverse fields such as ontology, art, culture and even the economy, as indicated by the term “creative economy.” We also attach importance to creativity by emphasizing the need for “originality” and “education in creativity.” In the Korean language these terms all use the Chinese character *chuang* 創. Unlike their meanings in ordinary language, however, the signification of “creation” and “creativity” as philosophical terms of art is not so self-evident.

1 *Zhuangzi*, “Dazhongshi” 大宗師: “夫造物者，將以予爲此拘拘也！曲僂發背，上有五管，顧隱於齊，肩高於頂，句贅指天。”

Ancient Chinese and Greek peoples did not have words corresponding to “creation” and “Creator God.” The ancient Greeks used the word *poiein* (“to make”) only in regard to poets (linguistic or musical creators), and did not apply the word to other artists like painters and sculptors. This is because while paintings and sculptures were believed to have been made in accordance with rules, poems were thought to be new works that were not bound by rules. Like the Greeks, the Romans sometimes set poetry apart from other arts, but they also considered all forms of art to be the products of imagination and inspiration. In Medieval Christian Europe the concept of creation went through a fundamental shift in meaning. Creation out of nothing (*creatio ex nihilo*) referred strictly to an act of God, and could not bear any relation to human activity. Thus Cassiodorus, the sixth century Roman statesman and Christian monk, said, “There is a difference between things made and created, for we cannot create, but we can make.”²

Corresponding to the Greek word *poiein*, the ancient Chinese had the word *zuo* 作. Kongzi had once said that he did not *zuo* 作, but only gave interpretations (*shu* 述).³ These are not humble words meant to show Kongzi’s modesty. The *Liji* 禮記 (Book of Rites) says, “Those who *zuo* are called sages,” and the *Zhouli* 周禮 (Rites of Zhou) says, “The tasks of all the artisans were *zuo*-ed by the sages.” As can be seen in these passages, *zuo* is not done by ordinary persons but by extraordinary ones like the sage kings of old.⁴ Thus Wang Chong 王充 (27-c. 97) in his work *Lunheng* 論衡 (Balanced Discussions) distinguishes between the respective subjects of *zuo* 作 and *shu* 述 as follows: “The sages *zuo*, and worthy persons *shu*.”⁵

In oracle bone scripts, *zuo* 作 is a character that combines *zuo* 乍, which depicts a fence or wall being put up, and *ren* 亻, which represents a person putting up the fence or wall. So, in terms of its etymology, the word *zuo* 作 derives from putting up a fence or a small wall, and comes to mean “first,” “to arise,” “to move,” “to raise,” “to make,” and so on.⁶

Wang Chong explained that *zuo* is “to make a fresh start and do something new, something that did not exist initially in former times. For instance, Cang Jie invented writing and Xi Zhong invented the chariot. In the *Book of Changes* it is said that Fu Xi *zuo*-ed the Eight Trigrams. This is because the Eight Trigrams did not exist until Fu Xi made them, and that is why it is said that he *zuo*-ed them.”⁷ Based on Wang Chong’s exegesis, Kong Yingda 孔穎達 (574-648) defined the word *zuo* in the sentence “in the past the sages *zuo*-ed the Changes”—found in the “*Shuogua zhuan*” 說卦傳 chapter of the *Zhouyi* 周易 (Book of Changes)—as meaning “to

2 See Tatarkiewicz, *A History of Six Ideas: An Essay in Aesthetics*, translated by Son Hyojun, 297–321.

3 *Lunyu* 7.1: “子曰：述而不作，信而好古，竊比於我老彭。”

4 *Liji*, “Yueji” 樂記: “故鐘鼓管磬，羽籥干戚，樂之器也。屈伸俯仰，綴兆舒疾。樂之文也，簠簋俎豆，制度文章，禮之器也。升降上下，周還裼襲，禮之文也。故知禮樂之情者能作，識禮樂之文者能述。作者之謂聖，述者之謂明。明聖者，述作之謂也。” *Zhouli*, “Kaogongji” 考工記: “百工之事，皆聖人之作也。”

5 Wang Chong, *Lunheng*, “Duizuo” 對作: “聖人作，賢者述。”

6 Shirakawa Shizuka 白川靜, *Jitō* 字統, 344.

7 Wang Chong, *Lunheng*, “Duizuo” 對作: “造端更爲，前始未有，若倉頡作書，奚仲作車是也。易言伏羲作八卦，前是未有八卦，伏羲造之，故曰作也。”

make for the first time” (*chuangzao* 創造).⁸ Therefore, it can be said that the ancient Chinese understood *zuo* or *chuangzao* as having particular reference to one of the sages making something that had not existed previously for the first time.

In particular, *zuo* and *chuangzao* apply well to Wang Chong’s examples of Cang Jie writing characters, Xi Zhong making chariots, and Fu Xi drawing the Eight Trigrams for the first time.⁹ Furthermore, *zuo* and *chuangzao* can be used in the sense of producing a particular political situation or atmosphere,¹⁰ as well as in reference to the composition of literary works.¹¹

The question still remains, however, as to whether the sages depend on something to create, or whether they create out of nothing. According to the “Xici zhuan” 繫辭傳 chapter in the *Zhouyi*, sages like Fu Xi looked up and observed the forms in the sky, looked down and observed the regularities on earth, and observed the patterned appearances of animals to come up with their inventions.¹² So the sages observed the sky, the earth, and animals, and read off the forms, regularities and patterns found in them. In other words, the sky, the earth and animals were as texts wherein the sages could peruse their messages. The sages then, would not have been thought to have created *ex nihilo*, but from the forms, regularities and patterns that they themselves had read in the book of nature.

To take stock of our discussion thus far, *zuo* or *chuangzao* can be said to involve the discovery of rules and models by the sages, who work in accord with these rules and models to make something that did not formerly exist for the first time. Therefore, going by the ancient Greek method of classification, *zuo* and *chuangzao* are closer to “making” than to “creation.” They take on a wide variety of meanings, such as clarifying values, devising institutions, inventing devices, fostering a particular kind of atmosphere, etc. It can be seen, however, that *zuo* and *chuangzao* are not used in the context of a cosmogony that explains the creation of the universe, nor are the terms used in relation to the radical social changes that inaugurate entirely new eras in history.¹³

How did the ancient Chinese explain the generation and the formation of the universe? Nowadays we use either of two locutions, “the creation of

8 Kong Yingda, *Zhouyi zhengyi* 周易正義, “Juanshou” 卷首: “凡言作者, 創造之謂也。”

9 *Songshu* 宋書, “Lizhi” 禮志 5: “至于秦漢, 其(指南車)制無聞, 後漢張衡始復創造。”

10 *Sanguozhi* 三國志, “Weizhi” 魏志, “Cao Mao zhuan” 曹髦傳: “諸葛亮創造凶亂, 主簿宣隆部曲督秦襲秉節守義, 臨事固守, 爲誕所殺。”

11 *Houhanshu* 後漢書, “Ying Shao zhuan” 應邵傳: “其見漢書二十五, …… 其二十六, 博採古今瓌璋之士, 文章煥炳, …… 其二十七, 臣所創造。”

12 *Zhouyi*, “Xici zhuan xia” 繫辭傳 下: “古者包犧氏之王天下也, 仰則觀象於天, 俯則觀法於地, 觀鳥獸之文與地之宜, 近取諸身, 遠取諸物, 於是始作八卦, 以通神明之德, 以類萬物之情。” Of course, this passage does not specifically explain how the sage’s observations (*guan* 觀) are made. *Guan* 觀 is thought to involve observation through the senses and recombination via the use of imagination. The *Book of Changes* generally takes sages to be exceptional beings that are different from ordinary people. It is perhaps for this reason—because the observational powers of sages apply only to sages—that there was no discussion of the possibility that these powers might be generalized.

13 Li Dazhao 李大釗 (1890-1927) in his “Jin yu gu” 今與古 relates creation to history (i.e. new historical eras) in this way: “Humans create history. The antiquity was created by the ancients, and the modern age was created by the moderns.” It is interesting that Li does not take the creation of history to be a divine act, but to be the result of human action.

heaven and earth” (*tiandi chuangzao* 天地創造) and “the opening up of heaven and earth” (*tiandi kaipi* 天地開闢). However, according to the ancient way of thinking about these matters, the generation of the universe would have been explained not in terms of “creation” *chuangzao* 創造 but in terms of “opening up” *kaipi* 開闢. Originally the term “opening up” was used in the sense of cultivating or reclaiming land.¹⁴ But even as early as the Han Dynasty period, when new apocryphal texts (*weishu* 緯書) were being produced in response to the authoritative classics (*jingshu* 經書), the term *kaipi* was conjoined to *tiandi* to form the expression *tiandi kaipi*. At this time *tiandi kaipi* meant both “opening up (launching) a new world” and “creating the universe.”

In relation to cosmogony, the concept of *tiandi kaipi* came to be fused with the Chinese creation myth of Pan Gu 盤古. It was during the Three Kingdoms period that the myth of Pan Gu acquired its shape as a coherent story which attempts to explain the origin of the universe. As can be seen in Xu Zheng’s 徐整 *San wu liji* 三五歷紀 (Historical Records of the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors), Pan Gu is unlike the transcendental deity in the Book of Genesis who creates the world through commands.¹⁵

According to the Pan Gu creation myth, the world is shaped like an egg, and evolves from the heaven and earth enveloped within the egg. So the world does not arise *ex nihilo*. Though the world begins from some pre-existent being, the account does not explain how the pre-existent being comes to be in the first place. And because the account presupposes that something already exists, it cannot involve creation out of nothing. As for Pan Gu, he resides within the cosmic egg and does not stand outside of it. The various parts of his body transform into mountains, rivers, trees, grasses, etc. As the transformation takes place, heaven and earth unfold into all the multifarious things having their own forms. This shows the “opening up of heaven and earth” *tiandi kaipi* in its entirety.

Here it can be seen that the enfolded heaven and earth were thought to already contain all the latent forms and possible states of the heaven and earth that would later unfold. And the opening up of heaven and earth was attributed to Pan Gu’s growth and transformation, not to the will or intervention of any external agency.

3. Transformation and Motion

Pan Gu’s opening up of the world also indicated how the world would operate thereafter. “Opening up” was considered to be the process whereby heaven and earth, with their mutually distinct features (i.e. functions), unfold from their initial state of enclosure, without the intervention of any external agency, like God. Even after the conclusion of this process, the world was believed to carry

14 *Guoyu* 國語, “Yueyu” 越語 下: “田野開闢, 府倉實, 民衆殷.”

15 Xu Zheng, *San wu liji*: “天地混沌如鸡子, 盘古生其中. 萬八千岁, 天地開闢, 阳清为天, 阴浊为地. 盘古在其中, 一日九变, 神于天, 聖于地. 天日高一丈, 地日厚一丈, 盘古日长一丈, 如此萬八千岁. 天数極高, 地数極深, 盘古極长. 後乃有三皇. 数起于一, 立于三, 成于五, 盛于七, 处于九, 故天去地九萬里!”

on via the cyclical alternation of contrary features, without any external intervention. This process of alternation is well described in the *Zhouyi*, which says, “The alternating succession of Yin and Yang is the way of the world. To continue this way is goodness (positivity), and to complete this way is the nature (tendency) of things.”¹⁶

Yin and Yang with their mutually contrary features were thought to take turns to exercise dominion. In particular, Yang is dominant in spring and summer, and Yin is dominant in autumn and winter. Yin does not become extinct when Yang is dominant. When Yang dominates, Yin lies dormant, and once the season of change is past, the exactly opposite phenomenon appears. When this alternation between Yin and Yang occurs in due season and degree, then the positive work of vitalizing the world continues, and individual things go through the process of birth, growth, decay and death according to their inherent tendencies. As the way of alternation between Yin and Yang proceeds continuously in due measures, heaven and earth constantly bring life into existence.¹⁷

In attempting to illustrate this continuous production of life, the *Laozi* 老子 employs the image of the bellows, and the *Zhuangzi* 莊子 uses that of the furnace. In both instances, the emphasis is not placed on whoever might be working the bellows or the furnace, but on the fact that when the bellows or the furnace are set in motion there is a constant outpouring of things. At the same time, these texts take the alternation of contrary features to constitute the process of transformation.¹⁸

Transformation, usually described as the alternation of Yin and Yang, would have been seen as the most comprehensive way of referring to all the life processes that occur between heaven and earth. In keeping with this idea, many polar terms were used to designate the activities that arise in all the domains and at each hierarchical level of existence, including nature, society, humanity, the seasons, emotions, the diverse properties of things. These terms include the pairs “day” and “night” (*zhou* 晝, *ye* 夜), “the past” and “the present” (*gu* 古, *jin* 今), “nature” and “emotions” (*xing* 性 *qing* 情), “sadness” and “joy” (*ai* 哀, *le* 樂), “hard” and “soft” (*gang* 剛, *rou* 柔), “high” and “low” (*gao* 高, *di* 低), “difficult” and “easy” (*nan* 難, *yi* 易), “strong” and “weak” (*qiang* 強, *ruo* 弱), “exhaling” and “inhaling” (*hu* 呼, *xi* 吸), “going” and “coming” (*wang* 往, *lai* 來), “opening” and “closing” (*kai* 開, *bi* 閉), and so on, too many to enumerate one by one.¹⁹ There is also a corresponding lack of emphasis on objective standards (or measures) which combine the opposite terms in a pair into a scale with absolute, fixed end points; like height, which combines high and low, or strength, which combines strong and weak, and so forth. In other words, high and low are not measured according to some absolute standard, but instead are measured according to the relative difference (i.e. the distance) between them. Thus there is no such thing as absolute height, and things are measured according to differences in their relative positions, so that something low can be high

16 *Zhouyi*, “Xici zhuan” 繫辭傳 上: “一陰一陽之謂道。繼之者善也，成之者性也。”

17 *Zhouyi*, “Xici zhuan” 繫辭傳 下: “天地之大德曰生”; “Xici zhuan” 繫辭傳 下: “天地絪縕，萬物化醇，男女構精，萬物化生。”

18 *Zhuangzi*, “Dazongshi” 大宗師: “今一以天地為大鑪，以造化為大冶，惡乎往而不可哉!”

19 Jullien explains transformation in terms of the process of alternation. See Jullien, *Procès ou Création*, 35–43.

in comparison with something else that is even lower, and something high can be low in comparison with something else that is even higher.

In the late Joseon Dynasty period, Choe Han-gi 崔漢綺 in his *Gihak* 氣學 (Philosophy of *Qi*) sought to capture the numerous and varied transformational processes that occur in the world through the unified concept of “motion” *yunhua* 運化 or “activity and motion” *huodong* *yunhua* 活動運化. While this unified concept made reference to transformation on the global scale, Choe also differentiated it into various domains and hierarchical levels covering the self, the family, the state, and heaven and earth.²⁰

When these workings of transformation arise in due measures—according to the middle way (*zhongdao* 中道) or the mean (*zhongyong* 中庸)—this constitutes the realization of goodness (*shan* 善) and nature (*xing* 性). Thus transformation (*zaohua* 造化, *johwa* in Korean) is perpetuated through harmony (*tiaohua* 調和, *johwa* in Korean). However, in nature, society and history, there are events like droughts, floods, agitation, frustration, lean years, invasions, defeats, etc. that jeopardize the realization of goodness and the natures of things. For this reason, the workings of transformation also require the self-regulative ability to maintain dynamic equilibrium within some permitted range of parameters.

There is a passage in the *Zhuangzi*, however, that raises a question regarding the mechanism that maintains dynamic equilibrium in transformation. Ji Zhen claimed that nothing is in charge of maintaining dynamic equilibrium (*mowei* 莫爲), while Jiezi had claimed that there is something in charge of it (*huoshi* 或使). For his part, Zhuangzi asserted that the name “Way” is borrowed for some temporary purpose and does not refer to anything real, and that both *mo wei* and *huo shi* apply only to small corners of the world.²¹ Here one should take care to note Zhuangzi’s peculiar use of personification. In classical Chinese, for instance, *ren* 仁 can mean either the virtue of *ren* or the person who is *ren*. Zhuangzi exploits this distinctive feature of the language to personify many concepts like Knowledge (*zhi* 知) in “Zhi bei you” 知北遊 and Shapeless (*xiangwang* 象罔). Consequently, when Zhuangzi personifies transformation it should not be read as referring to a personal being like a creator god (*zaohuaweng* 造化翁), but as an abstract noun personified.

However, debate on the nature of the mechanism for dynamic equilibrium continued long after Zhuangzi. The being/nonbeing (*you wu* 有無) debate during the Wei and Jin period, and the principle/material force (*li qi* 理氣) debate during the Song and Ming period both addressed the question raised by the earlier debate. For instance, in regard to the statement “the alternating succession of Yin and Yang is called the Way” (*yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao* 一陰一陽之謂道) in the *Zhouyi*, Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi opposed the reading that took the alternating succession of Yin and Yang to be continuous with the Way. Instead, they proposed a reading that took the Way to be the cause (i.e. regulative agency) of the alternating succession of

20 Shin Jeong-geun, *Saramdaum-iran mueosinga?*, 301–316.

21 Zhuangzi, “Zeyang” 則陽: “季眞之莫爲, 接子之或使。……道之爲名, 所假而行。或使莫爲, 在物一曲, 夫胡爲於大方?”

Yin and Yang. The heated debate that took place during the Song and Ming period in China and the Joseon Dynasty period in Korea regarding the relationship between principle and material force (*li qi* 理氣), human nature and feelings (*xing qing* 性情), and unmanifested and manifested states (*weifa yifa* 未發已發) ultimately relates to the question of how to understand the nature of the mechanism which produces dynamic equilibrium. This debate can also be viewed as a discussion about whether dynamic equilibrium is maintained in a uniform way across nature, society, history and humanity (i.e. human psychology and desires), or whether it arises in differentiated ways across these domains. Above all, by seeking to establish the primacy of principle over material force, Zhu Xi launched a tug-of-war between transcendence and immanence that stirred countless debates in later years.

Despite the intense debate on how principle and material force and human nature and feelings are related, philosophers in China and Korea—with the exception of the likes of Shang Yang 商鞅 and Han Fei 韓非—tended to define the transformation that arises from the alternation of contrary features, and the constant regeneration due to the continuance of this transformation, as a kind of dynamic equilibrium with self-restorative powers. This can be seen, for instance, in Zhuangzi's notion of *ziran* 自然 and Seo Gyeong-deok's 徐敬德 concept of *jizier* 機自爾. These terms refer to the process of transformation that arises through spontaneous internal movements, without any external intervention and influence. Here *ziran* means "being so of its own accord," and *jizier* means "the springs and triggers [of motion] being so all on their own."

In order to become clear on the nature and significance of creation and opening up, transformation and motion, we need to determine the position of human beings relative to these processes. Given that dynamic equilibrium was believed to be maintained via the mechanism of *jizier*, what attributes would it have been possible for humans to have? If humankind is taken to be one resultant state among others in the process of transformation, then our lives and deaths, morality and values cannot be viewed as having any special standing. On the other hand, if humans are not confined to the tracks left by the process of transformation, then we humans bear some sort of responsibility for participating in the transformations and motions of the universe even as we reside in their midst. Although Kongzi and Zhuangzi share the same stance on the dynamic equilibrium of *jizier* and *ziran*, they stand on different sides of the boundary between responsibility (*zeren* 責任) and free rein (*fangren* 放任). In short, it is on this point where the two most clearly part ways.²²

In the *Liji* there is the doctrine that the Son of Heaven (i.e. the representative of human beings) "forms a triad with heaven and earth" or, alternatively, "participates in the work of heaven and earth" (*yu tiandi san[can]* 與天地參). "Thus his virtue matches with heaven and earth to provide benefit to all things, and his radiance is equal to the sun and the

22 Even within what is called the Confucian school, there are some differences in this regard. For this, see Shin Jeong-geun "Dodeok-jeok wanseong-e ireuneun ne gaji-ui gil – chuwol (追越/推越)-ron jeonglip-eul wihan siron," *Dongyang cheolhak yeongu* 37 (2012).

moon, illuminating all within the Four Seas and leaving nothing out however small it may be.”²³ A similar statement is made in the *Zhouyi*: “The great man combines his virtue with heaven and earth, his radiance with the sun and the moon, his orderliness with the four seasons, and his fortune with the ghosts and spirits.”²⁴

Both the *Liji* and the *Zhouyi* take humans (the Son of Heaven, the great man) to be special beings. Humans are shaped by the process of transformation, and at the same time, they take on the role of joint operators participating in the process of transformation alongside heaven and earth, the sun and the moon, the four seasons, and ghosts and spirits. This provides a further criterion for splitting up Kongzi and Zhuangzi. According to Zhuangzi, humans too are shaped by the process of transformation, and in this respect they are not distinguishable from other things. However, according to Kongzi, when the transformations of heaven and earth due to the activity of *yin* and *yang* temporarily fail to maintain their balance, while it is true that the balance will eventually be restored by *ziran* or *jizier*, humans for their part should seek to offset the damages inflicted by that loss of balance.

4. Transcendence

The idea of “forming a triad (or participating in the work of) heaven and earth” gives rise to the Chinese doctrine of Three Powers (*sancai* 三才). Heaven, earth, and humans are the three axes that support and sustain the order of the universe. The doctrine of Three Powers imparts to human beings a sense of responsibility for maintaining due measure in the transformations that occur in the world. This sense of responsibility has to do with the awareness that humans, as joint operators alongside heaven and earth, are contributors in shared governance or joint governance.²⁵ This is true participatory governance (*canzheng* 參政), involving the management of heaven and earth in accordance with due measure. In other words, humans are fundamentally beings that have both the ability and the responsibility to participate in governance, though according to their differing roles and social functions there must of course be some differences among persons in the scope and the depth of their responsibility and their participation in governance.

In order for humans—as responsible beings tasked with participatory governance—to maintain due measure in the transformations that occur in the world, the doctrine of Three Powers holds that they must also maintain due measure in themselves. In the *Liji* this “due measure” is defined in terms of “the mean” (*zhongyong* 中庸) and “equilibrium and harmony” (*zhonghe* 中和). These are like the two sides of a coin. While “equilibrium and harmony” refers to due measure in human nature and feelings, “the

23 *Liji*, “Jingjie” 經解: “天子者, 與天地參, 故德配天地, 兼利萬物, 與日月並明, 明照四海而不遭微小.”

24 *Zhouyi*: “夫大人者, 與天地合其德, 與日月合其明, 與四時合其序, 與鬼神合其吉凶。先天而天弗違, 後天而奉天時。天且弗違, 而況於人乎? 況於鬼神乎?”

25 See Shin Jeong-geun, “Yugyo jisigin-ui ‘sahoe’ gaeseon-ui uiui”: seonjinsidae-eseo songdae-kkaji yugyo jisigin-eul jungsim-euro,” *Dongyang cheolhak yeongu* 26 (2001).

mean” refers to due measure in human conduct, and these two are thought of as being interconnected. When human beings maintain due measure in these ways, then “heaven and earth will find their proper places and all things will be nourished thereby.”²⁶ To borrow the terms used in the *Zhouyi*, this is to fulfil goodness (*shan* 善) and the nature of things (*xing* 性).

As responsible beings tasked with participatory governance, even up to the time of Kongzi and Mengzi people could not avoid discrimination with respect to their social and intellectual standing. Kongzi himself had distinguished the tasks of creating (*zuo* 作) and interpreting (*shu* 述), assigning them respectively to sages and worthies (i.e. non-sages). Mengzi did not admit the transcendence of sages to the extent that Kongzi had, yet he laid even greater emphasis on the need to distinguish between those who labor with their minds (*laoxinze* 勞心者) and those who labor with their bodies (*laolizhe* 勞力者), and between those who awaken first (*xianjue* 先覺) and those who awaken later (*houjue* 後覺).²⁷ According to the general classification of human beings accepted by Kongzi, Mengzi, and Confucianism on the whole, these moral and social distinctions amount to the distinction between noble persons (*junzi* 君子) and petty people (*xiaoren* 小人).

Let us now endeavor to characterize the life of a person as a responsible being tasked with participatory governance. When Kongzi and Mengzi drew distinctions among classes of people, they based it on an asymmetric relationship between noble persons and petty people, the former serving to edify the latter, and the latter imitating the former. By the Song Dynasty period, however, this asymmetric relationship gradually transitions into a symmetric relationship. In this context it is necessary to examine Zhou Dunyi's 周敦頤 thoughts on the matter.

First, Zhou employed a developmental stage theory to explain the improvement of a person in matters of responsibility and participatory governance. As he put it, “The gentleman longs to be a worthy person, the worthy person longs to be a sage, and the sage longs to be Heaven.”²⁸ Second, in order for the stage-by-stage development of a person to be possible, the stepping stones of progress must be laid. Thus Zhou Dunyi proposed that it is possible for a person to become a sage through acquired learning (*shengren ke xue lun* 聖人可學論). “Learning” here refers not to the accumulation of knowledge about a body of facts, but to a transformative knowledge that enables one to break through one's limitations and ascend to a higher stage.

Third, in order for improvement and progress to be possible, humans must be regarded as changeable beings. Song Dynasty Neo-Confucian thinkers advanced this idea in their doctrine on changing one's material constitution (*qizhi bianhua lun* 氣質變化論). Given that humans are caught up in the transformations of the world around them, this doctrine seems like the natural conclusion to draw. But while changing one's material

26 Liji, “Zhongyong” 中庸: “中也者, 天下之大本也, 和也者, 天下之達道也。致中和, 天地位焉, 萬物育焉。”

27 Mengzi 5A7: “天之生此民也, 使先知覺後知, 使先覺覺後覺也。予天民之先覺者也, 予將以斯道覺斯民也, 非予覺之而誰也。”

28 Zhou Dunyi, *Tongshu* 通書, “Zhixue” 志學: “士希賢, 賢希聖, 聖希天。”

constitution involves the process of transformation, it also includes other bases of change. Transformation that occurs through the alternation of contrary features has its focus on the maintenance of life. But changing one's material constitution is not confined to the maintenance of life, and is also capable of pointing to moral growth, since it also refers to life advancing in a given direction.

Zhuangzi accommodated the first two points mentioned above, but could not accept the third. In his view, humans are part of the natural process of creation and transformation, and human life from birth to death also proceeds according to the natural sequence, thus making it pointless or perverse for feelings of joy and sorrow to intervene.²⁹

Now, in order for us humans as changeable beings to improve individual persons and society through responsible participation in governance, we need to have a new outlook. Where does this new outlook come from? To answer this question, let us consider the saying "keeping warm the old so as to apprehend the new" (*wen gu er zhi xin* 溫故而知新) in the *Lunyu* 論語. The process of keeping warm (*wen* 溫) is essential for the old to change into the new. Here apprehension (*zhi* 知) refers to discovery that consists in perceiving the result of keeping warm, or *wen*. *Wen* is basically keeping warm something that has the capacity to hatch life, much like how a hen incubates eggs. When heat is conveyed by this process, fissures appear in the organization and structure of the old. As these fissures become more well-defined, creases and furrows are made. These creases and furrows loosen up the old so that it becomes amenable to editorial revisions. In other words, the heat severs the binding and the fabric of existing components to make something new that was not present in the old.

In producing something new that was not present in the old, the process of keeping warm spontaneously gives rise to entirely new and irreducible higher-level (structural) properties or patterns from lower-level (component) properties or patterns that lacked them. That is, these novel structural properties are emergent properties. The process of keeping warm, or *wen*, which gives rise to emergent properties, might in some sense be the same as *yinyun* (氤氲/網緼), the process whereby heaven and earth interpenetrate and merge into one another. It is by keeping warm that we advance from the old to the new, and are also able to apprehend this advance. "Keeping warm the old so as to apprehend the new" is not a one-off process or activity. As we apprehend our advance from the old to the new by means of keeping warm, we eventually reach the point where the new in its turn becomes the old, and this is when we must repeat the entire process over again. This repetition is what the *Daxue* 大學 (Great Learning) chapter in the *Liji* refers to as "daily renewal,"³⁰ and what Liang Qichao describes as "fighting against the me of yesterday with the me of today" (以今日之我與昨日之我戰).³¹ In short, it is self-revolution.

29 Zhuangzi, "Dazhongshi" 大宗師: "俄而子輿有病, 子祀往問之。[子輿]曰: 偉哉! 夫造物者, 將以予爲此拘拘也! 曲僂發背, 上有五管, 頤隱於齊, 肩高於頂, 句贅指天。陰陽之氣有沴, 其心閒而無事。..... 曰: 嗟乎! 夫造物者又將以予爲此拘拘也! 子祀曰: 女惡之乎? [子輿]曰: 亡, 予何惡? 浸假而化予之左臂而爲鷄, 予因以求時也。浸假而化予之右臂以爲彈, 予因以求鴉炙。浸假而化予之尻以爲輪, 以神爲馬, 予因以乘之, 豈更駕哉! 且夫得者, 時也; 失者, 順也。安時而處順, 哀樂不能入也。此古之所謂縣解也。"

30 *Liji*, "Daxue" 大學: "湯之盤銘曰: 苟日新, 日日新, 又日新。"

31 For the context of this saying, see Gong Maohong, "Yi jinri zhi wo yu zuori zhi wo zhan."

I propose to comprehend the above-mentioned properties of human beings under the Korean term *chuwol*. It is meant to be a double entendre which can be written in Chinese as either *zhuiyue* 追越 or *tuiyue* 推越. As I have explained elsewhere, “[A]s humans trace (retread) [*zhui* 追] the tracks established by the edification of the sages and the corroboration of history, they can also pass beyond [*yue* 越] the earlier tracks. Moreover, they can extend [*tui* 推] the previously reached horizon over and over again through constant self-transformation, thus moving beyond [*yue* 越] the lower stage to a higher stage.”³² In this regard, the terms “*zhuiyue*” 追越 or “*tuiyue*” 推越 can be understood as two facets of transcendence.

To recapitulate, the two kinds of *chuwol*, 追越 and 推越, are based on the continuous preservation of life insofar as they involve the process of transformation. However, they also comprise the process of rejuvenation that consists in advancing and expanding further beyond the earlier stages while maintaining continuity with them. This *chuwol* (“transcendence” or “tracing/extending beyond”) adds responsibility and participatory governance to the process of transformation, operating through continuity and weak negation to enable self-revolution in the form of growth and rebirth.

Is there any textual evidence for interpreting creation and opening up, transformation and movement as the process of tracing/extending beyond? As evidence, let us take a look at the notion of “being good at extending” (*shan tui* 善推) in the *Mengzi*.³³ Being good at extending is to keep on expanding by pushing out the boundaries of the self. To use the sort of horticultural analogy that Mengzi preferred in reasoning, just as the growth rings of a tree keep increasing, and a sapling grows into a large tree, so do humans keep pushing out the boundaries of their selves so that their broadness of mind can encompass others.

To be more specific, given the limits of their experience, humans cannot help but start by focusing on themselves and their immediate surroundings. However, they are also capable of broadening their concerns outward from their families to strangers, from their own nations to the entire world, and from humankind to all other living creatures,³⁴ which is what it means to be good at extending. This is the decisive basis supporting the *chuwol* theory.

We have now reached the point where we must confront Mengzi with the following subversive question. Being good at extending is the process that enables humans to surpass their limitations while remaining within the bounds of their age. But what must humans do to surpass the bounds of their age? The clue to the answer can be found in the kind of knowing that Mengzi denied, the knowing that bores its way through old paths into new ones. Mengzi distinguished between two kinds of knowing. One is the kind of knowing that the sage king Yu used to guide the waters in preventing

32 Shin, “Dodeok-jeok wanseong-e ireuneun ne gaji-ui gil – chuwol(追越/推越)-ron jeonglip-eul wihan siron,” 7–8.

33 *Mengzi* 1A7: “老吾老，以及人之老。幼吾幼，以及人之幼。天下可運於掌。詩云：刑于寡妻，至于兄弟，以御于家邦。言舉斯心，加諸彼而已。故推恩足以保四海，不推恩無以保妻子。古之人所以大過人者，無他焉，善推其所爲而已矣。”

34 *Mengzi* 7A45: “孟子曰：君子之於物也，愛之而弗仁。於民也，仁之而弗親。親親而仁民，仁民而愛物。”

flood. This kind of knowing finds its way by simply following the tracks that have been made earlier, and does not make a fuss or seek to depart from them when encountering obstacles. The other kind of knowing keeps on boring its way through the earlier tracks.

Knowing that seeks out former tracks (*qiu gu* 求故) can never be the same as knowing that bores its way through the tracks. Viewed in terms of its consequences, knowing that seeks out former tracks does not raise any anomalies or inexplicable problems for the existing system of knowledge. (In Kuhnian terms this corresponds to “normal science.”) By contrast, knowing that bores its way through delights in poking holes in the existing system. These holes introduce currents that are reversible in the sense that what is inside flows outside and what is outside flows inside. As a result, cracks begin to appear in the stable and unified hegemony of the existing body of knowledge. Boring through enlarges these cracks into creases and grooves and furrows by pursuing logical implications to the limit, thus bringing the existing system of knowledge into question. Because it raises problems, boring through represents the spirit of danger and rebellion.³⁵

Thus Mengzi believed that the kind of knowing that bores its way through must be stopped. However, as we have seen in our earlier discussion on “keeping warm the old so as to apprehend the new,” if humans do not express the spirit of knowing that bores its way through, there can be no revolution that renews the old and foments the transition to a new age.³⁶ If there had been no attempts at boring through in this way we might expect East Asian society to have remained stagnant and not to have undergone any fundamental changes. However, once we are cognizant of the fact that the history of Chinese philosophy is a series of challenges issued by the kind of knowing that bores its way through and responses to this kind of knowing, we can expect much from the diversity contained in this history.

5. Conclusion

East Asian cultures are distinctive in accounting for the generation and formation of the world without resorting to some divine being. Consequently, humans occupy a unique position in these world views. Heaven and earth are the locus where diverse forces and factors are set in motion. Along with the passage of time, heaven and earth make the seasons change in orderly sequence, and cause all things to cycle through generation, growth, maturation, and preservation. Though heaven and earth play vital roles in the generation and formation of things, they are not perfect. Heaven sends down timely rain, but it can also cause drought by not sending down

35 *Mengzi* 4B26: “孟子曰：天下之言性也，則故而已矣。故者以利爲本。所惡於智者，爲其鑿也。如智者，若禹之行水也，則無惡於智矣。禹之行水也，行其所無事也。如智者，亦行其所無事也，則智亦大矣。天之高也，星辰之遠也，苟求其故，千歲之日至，可坐而致也。”

36 It may be worth comparing the notion of “observing forms” (*guanxiang* 觀象) in the *Zhouyi* with Sikong Tu’s 司空圖 “passing beyond the realm of forms” (*chao yu xiangwai* 超以象外) (for short, “passing beyond forms” [*chao xiang* 超象]) in his *Ershisi Shipin* 二十四詩品.

any. Earth makes the grain grow in due season, but if the conditions are not right the grain can wither and die. Thus human activity has to substitute for the work that heaven and earth cannot do completely. Humans make reservoirs to prepare for the absence of rain from heaven and use fertilizers to counteract the increasing barrenness of earth. Thus the proper place of human beings is not among the creatures made by some creator god; instead they work with heaven and earth in maintaining and guiding the course of the world. For this reason, the East Asian worldview groups heaven, earth and humans together as the Three Powers (*sancai* 三才). This means that they are the three axes that maintain the order of the universe.

Humans are one of the principal agents that maintain the universe, but they are not divine entities. They supplement the shortcomings of heaven and earth, but they are also subject to heaven and earth's limitations. In order to make up for these limitations, humans have to rely on learning and commitment. Learning is the process by which one acquires things that were lacking in oneself, and commitment is the strength by which one sustains the aspirations that subside over time. When humans persist in learning and uphold their commitment with steadfast resolve, they can complement heaven and earth, and earnestly fulfill the role of maintaining order in a godless universe. However, if humans neither learn nor commit themselves, the world is at risk of falling into an uncontrollable chaos. That is to say, the order of the world degenerates into the law of the jungle where the strong prey upon the weak. Then there could be those who pose as saviors of the world by appealing to some quasi-divine authority like the Mandate of Heaven, the future Buddha Maitreya, or some sort of Messiah. Nevertheless, the task of carrying out the revolution and inaugurating a new age in history remains a heavy burden and responsibility that we humans must bear.

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創造和調和以及追越

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中文摘要

如果想要了解一個世界的特性，那麼就需要仔細觀察那個世界的運動，生成，以及運行。本文的目的是，以創造，調和，以及追越的概念為中心，簡單明了地掌握東亞世界的特性。即使人們都使用相似的概念，但是根據此概念獨特的文脈會呈現出多種多樣的含義。例如，創造不是宇宙生成論的脈絡，而是和器物以及文化的製作相關聯的概念。由於世界的生成以及運動 不是以外部的的原因或神為前提的，而是像自然一樣，依據自身的原因而產生的。因此，人擁有獨特的地位。人作為神的造化之物，不是要以遵守契約而矮小的存在，而是作為運營天地甚至世界的三才的一員存在的。因此，人類需要不斷地收容別人，為了最終實現與天地(世界)擁有同根同源性，需要不斷地創造出自己，改變自己。在此方面，變化(運化)則是給予東亞社會的命運。

關鍵詞：創造, 和調, 運化, 追越, 自然

A Comparative Study on the Quest for Individuality in Confucianism and Dewey

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Abstract

This paper explores the issue of individuals in Confucian tradition from a comparative perspective, by viewing it alongside of American Pragmatism, as expressed by the philosopher John Dewey. Dewey devoted much effort to describing people as necessarily social beings without losing track of their status as unique and independent individuals capable of forming the basis of a democratic society. It is striking to note the converging points in the two remote strains of thought on the relationship between an individual and a society. By taking a comparative perspective, my aim is to describe the points where the two diverge in their views on the relation between individuals and society, and to examine how their notion of the individual can lead all the way to an uncompromising insistence upon democracy in the case of Dewey, but fail to envision democracy, and even still impeded efforts to bring it about in a full-blown sense in the other. Confucianism, I argue, suffers from inner conflicts that pose a particularly important contemporary dilemma, and has to meet a challenge of making itself compatible with democratic ideals of equality and individual freedom. Dewey's thoughts on the relation between the individual and the society could help us reinterpret Confucian ideas of individuals.

Keywords: Individuals, society, Confucianism, American pragmatism, Dewey

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1. Introduction

When one considers Confucian values in the modern context,¹ the most baffling question to consider is whether or not they can get along with the ideals of democracy, equality and freedom. This question seems pressing not only in the context of the recent effort to recast Confucianism as a living force in the contemporary world (including the East and the West), but also in the context of the actual political quest for democracy in the Far Eastern countries where, in many cases, Confucianism is still a living cultural reality. If democracy is the destination every contemporary political system aspires to reach, efforts to measure and evaluate Confucianism it is not merely an intellectual quest for Far-easterners, but an existential quest to live in a better world by establishing modern ideals in such a way that they do not conflict with or are not dragged on by the premodern tradition. But it seems that we have to go long way until we make Confucian democracy a reality, notwithstanding recent strong optimism concerning the remaking of Confucianism put forward by the “Confucian project” of Tu Wei-ming.

My concern in this essay is to explore the possibility of Confucianism coming to terms with democracy in view of the existence of individual as a socio-political unit. Before hailing Confucian humanism and communalism, I think we must take note of the fact that, however fully they are compatible with democratic ideals, and however humanistic they are in essence, Confucian ideals have never afforded a democratic society in the East even in its least form. And we must also think about the reason why that has been the case, and about the possibility of some internal elements or logic of Confucianism being responsible for that unfolding of history. I argue that there is irrevocable conflict among Confucian values, especially *ren* 仁 (i.e., *jen* in Wade-Giles, benevolence, or humanity) and *li* 禮 (propriety, or rules of conduct), and that *ren* and *li* function in a conflicting way that keeps individuals from full self-realization as social subjects and from growing into citizens in a democratic society.

I will also consider the issue of individual in Confucianism from a comparative perspective, as contrasted with American Pragmatism, expressed especially in the thought of John Dewey. Dewey devoted much effort in depicting the individual as necessarily a social being without losing his emphasis on unique and independent individuals as the basis of democratic society. It is striking to note the converging points in the two remote strains of thought on the relationship between an individual and a society.² But in addition to the intellectual amazement, the comparison

1 As there is no unified system of Confucian values or Confucianism as such, I use “Confucian values” or “Confucianism” in a broad sense including the thoughts of not only Confucius and Mencius, but also of various Confucian and neo-Confucian schools. The multiple veins of thought developed on the basis of pretty much unified Confucian problematics made the sense narrow enough to represent them as a philosophical unity as German Idealism or Continental Rationalism in the western tradition.

2 In fact, it is even more intriguing to note some aspects with respect to which the two quite remote intellectual traditions come closer than one can imagine on the surface level. I think that an interesting comparison can be made with respect to the concept of truth, the relation

serves its own purpose. By taking a comparative perspective, my aim is to see the point where the two diverge from their similarly held views on the relation between individuals and society, and to examine how similar views on the individual can make all the way to the uncompromising insistence upon democracy in the one, but fail to envision and even still hamper the development of democracy in a full-blown sense in the other. That way, we may have better understanding of both.

2. Individuation: Christian and Confucian Models

It is often believed that individualism and the highly-developed consciousness of individual rights in the West owe much to the idea that all men are equal before God. The conception of God-given rights or natural rights has provided a cause for people to fight for both liberty (from church and the nobility) and democracy. Dewey, though not an advocate of individualism based on natural rights, is one of those who acknowledged the importance of these ideas in the formation of western culture, as we find him saying:

Cicero had maintained that every man had its principles innate within him....The Roman law itself was most often used in the interest of absolutism, but the idea of a natural law, and so of a natural right more fundamental than any human dictate, proved a powerful instrument in the struggle for personal rights and equality. 'All men naturally were born free,' wrote Milton. 'To understand political power right,' wrote Locke, 'and derive it from its original, we must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature; without asking leave or depending on the will of any other man....These doctrines found eloquent portrayal in Rousseau, and appear in the Declaration of Independence of 1776.³

We may find passages in similar spirit in Confucian texts: "The commander of three armies may be taken away, but the will of even a common man may not be taken away from him,"⁴ "Therefore all things of the same kind are similar to one another... The sage and I are the same in kind,"⁵ "From the fact that we possess the principles of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, we know that others also possess them. Of the thousands and tens of thousands of human beings and of all things, there is none independent of these moral principles."⁶ "The innate

between knowledge and action (or the primacy of action), anti-representationalism, contextualism, naturalism and so on.

3 Dewey, *Ethics*, 143. Hereafter I follow the general convention of referring to Dewey's work as in "MW 5: 143" where MW stands for The Middle Works, numbers for a volume and a page. Also EW for *The Early Works*, and LW for *The Later Works*.

4 *Analects* 9.25: "三軍 可奪帥也 匹夫 不可奪志也." For translation, Wing-chit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 36.

5 *Mencius* 6A.7: "凡同類者 舉相似也...聖人 與我同類者." For translation, Chan, *A Source Book*, 55. cf. 6A.6, 4B.28, 32.

6 Zhu Xi, "The Nature of Man and Things," sec. 46: "自家有這仁義禮智 便知得他也有仁義禮智 千人萬人 一切萬物 無不是這道理." For Translation, Chan, *A Source Book*, 617. Concerning

knowledge of my mind is the same as the Principle of Nature....And it is possessed by all men.”⁷ Why couldn't all these avid claims to equality in rational ability and human dignity have led to the struggle for procuring individual rights? How does a similar view of the natural endowment of reason and will in human beings have given rise to the concept of natural rights in one culture, and that of natural duty in the other? I use the term 'natural duty', as it counts as the natural duty of human beings in Confucianism to submit themselves to the dictate of the principles of humanity as the Way of Heaven or Nature (*tianli* 天理), or as the Way of Tao (*daoli* 道理). It is of course a moot point whether only Confucianism is responsible for the historical development in the Far East. But, considering the fact that, from the very early stage of its civilization, Confucianism has contributed much to the formation of political ideals and bureaucracy and to the content of education and morals in the East no matter the dominant religion of a given period, the above questions are worth considering.

One clue for approaching the questions may be found in the comparison between Christian and Confucian models regarding personal individuation made by R. C. Neville. Neville notes that Christian individuation is made through a contractual relation with God while Confucian individuation occurs through harmonized social, psychological, and physical structures.⁸ In Christian contractual model, he further notes, there is a double relation of individual to society because of society's having an ontological ground, other than moral and ritual ground, in God or in a primordial community of people (in the case of secular culture). Thus, while one has social roles and responsibilities, one also has a covenantal responsibility to the founding being. The neglect of the former brings about shame, but that of the latter guilt its effect turning one against oneself. In the ontological dimension, one's identity stands against their social relations. As Neville puts it, “one's personal identity in the dialectical depths of guilt is defined in the alienation of endless doubling of the depths of self” (Neville, 131). Here, “the unit of identity is the self, the autos” (Neville, 132). All that matters is one's relation to oneself in face of “the demands of the contract” with God. Following Neville, we may say that the ontological dimension in the western Christian model of individuation made it possible for one to stand against the world, insomuch that the world was conceived as existing in violation of the ideas of equality and of covenantal individuality.

On the other hand, Confucian individuation is made possible through carrying out socio-moral obligations and perfecting shared social codes. Self-cultivation and personal development cannot be pursued without growing sensitivity to and an appreciation of the network of human relations and one's roles within that network. As personal identity cannot be separated from identifying the structural relations in one's own society and

the Neo-Confucian discussion of *li yi fen shu* 理一分殊, which means, “The Principle is one, but its manifestations are many,” and Chu His's analogical exposition of egalitarian perspective, see Donald J. Munro, “The Family Network, the Stream of Water, and the Plant: Picturing Persons in Sung Confucianism,” in *Individualism and Holism*, 259-291.

7 Wang Yangming, “Instructions for Practical Living,” sec. 155: “五心之良知 即所謂天理也 良知之在人心.” tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 683.

8 Neville, *Behind the Masks of God*, ch. 8.

mastering its rules of conduct relative to one's place in it, an acknowledgement of the equality of all humans and the absolute dignity of persons will necessarily leads to the acknowledgement of an equal obligation among individuals to respect the social morality which regulates the community's structural relations by prescribing relative moral obligations depending on social roles. (Even the king was not an exception.) It seems, at this point, that the motivations for the pursuits of personal rights in the Christian model and of moral obligation in the Confucian model are the same, i.e. self-fulfillment, whereas the effects and the consequences are radically different, being the development of an individualistic contractual politics in one case and the development of a holistic and familial moral politics in the other.

However, moral obligation in the Confucian model is taken not merely as a social duty, but as a natural one, since one's moral and ritual performance follow the dictate of Heaven or Nature and thus go beyond the realm of mere social significance. Nor are one's duties simply confined to a social and historical context. It is true that fulfilling moral obligations in Confucian context is characteristically of a social nature and also there are elements that make morality a matter of "adjustment to the world,"⁹ as Weber put it.

But it is also true that there is a fundamental moment in which individuals spontaneously connect themselves to *ren* as a universal principle or the Mandate of Heaven or the Principle of Nature.¹⁰ The moment is not as much social as metaphysical since it relates one to the very condition of one's own being as a human and thereby to one's very own self. Mencius epitomized this moment in following terms: "He who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature (*xing* 性). He who knows his nature knows Heaven. To preserve one's mind and to nourish one's nature is the way to serve Heaven."¹¹ Confucius (a.k.a., Kongzi 孔子, 551-479 BCE) also wrote, "To master oneself and return to propriety is humanity. If a man (the ruler) can for one day master himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will return to humanity. To practice humanity depends on oneself."¹² To perform one's moral duty is not, according to these positions, just to play one's social role and obligation, but to be in harmony with all things in the universe under *ren* or the principle of Heaven. It is, in other words, to follow one's own nature and thereby Heaven, as was intimated by this saying in the *Doctrine of the Mean*: "What Heaven (*tian*) imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way (*dao*). Cultivating Way is called education."¹³

The metaphysical moment becomes especially important in the Neo-Confucian context where the pursuit of *ren* commits one to an ontological

9 Weber, *The Religion of China*, 235.

10 I would like to use the expression "spontaneously" with some reservation, as the nature of spontaneity in the Confucian context must further be explored in relation to the way an individual relates to the Mandate of Heaven.

11 Mencius 7A.1: "盡其心者 知其性也 知其性 則知天矣 存其心 存其性 所以事天也," tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 78.

12 *Analects* 12.1: "克己復禮爲仁 一日克己復禮 天下歸仁焉 爲仁由己 而由人乎哉," tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 38.

13 *Doctrine of the Mean*, 1: "天命之謂性 率性之謂道 修道之謂教," tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 98.

level going far beyond social dimension. In the Neo-Confucian tradition, to become a man of *ren* (a sage or a man of perfect virtue) is to become one body with all things in the universe. *Ren* is the mind of Heaven and Earth to produce things. As humans also received this mind as their minds, *ren* is also those human's mind. *Ren*, as the principle of producing myriad things, was thought to produce seasonal properties (origination, flourishing, advantages, and firmness) in Heaven and Earth, and more qualities, such as the principle of love, in humans. Thus, by perfecting moral virtues, one does not merely achieve social fit, but more importantly a person achieves unity with all humans and other things. In this spirit, Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) interprets Confucius's advice to "master oneself and return to propriety" (*keji fuli* 克己復禮) as suggesting that "if we can overcome and eliminate selfishness and return to the Principle of Nature, (*tianli*, Principle of Heaven), then the substance of this mind (that is, *ren*) will be present everywhere and its function will always be operative."¹⁴ Wang Yang-ming also claimed that we, being based on innate knowledge, could share with all a universal sense of right and wrong. Partaking in this innate moral consciousness, we become one with myriad things in the universe.¹⁵ In this metaphysical moment, all that matters is one's relation to Heaven or the Way or the Principle (*li*).

If, following Wang, we interpret Heaven or the Way or *li* 理 to be related in some way to Mind (*xin* 心), the metaphysical moment constitutes the moment one turns to one's self. Contemporary scholars on Confucianism make the best use of this metaphysical moment to establish a strong self-transforming Confucian subject¹⁶ not to be diffused in the network of human relationships. It is the moral subject who spontaneously carries out his or her moral duties to be one body with others, but with his or her eyes always looking into his or her own self for growth. It is the self-reflective and sincere moral subject standing in contrast to those who "act without understanding and do so habitually without examination."¹⁷

Because of the metaphysical aspect mentioned above, the contrast between the Christian and the Confucian models of individuation acquires a more complex layer than was first deemed. It even provides a moment in which individuals stand against society in the Confucian context. When one's society goes awry by running counter to Confucian ideals, one could fight for one's right to be a moral being, and for dignity. This struggle would not be to establish the right to own what belongs to one, but a fight for the very condition of one's existence as (or to become) a moral being. If a king and his subjects or the general social surroundings are not in accordance with what is taken to be the Way of Heaven, then a Confucian who felt "righteous anger" (*yifen* 義憤) must fight for his own cause because the social setting stands in the way of his self-fulfillment, which is

14 Zhu Xi, "A Treatises on *Ren*": "如說 '克己復禮' 亦只是要得私欲去後 此心常存耳 未說到行處也。" tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 594.

15 Wang Yangming, *Chuanxilu*, sec. 179: "世之君子惟務其良知 則能公是非...而以天地萬物為一體。"

16 Tu Weiming emphasizes the two aspects of a Confucian self, that is, the self as a center of relationships, and the self as a dynamic process of spiritual development. See Tu, *Confucian Thought*, 113-130, and *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 6: 239-246.

17 Mencius 7A.5: "行之而不著焉 習矣而不察焉," tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 79.

reached only by performing the Way of Heaven. The fight may take the passive form of retreating from society, but often takes a more active form of writing letters to the king and even risking one's life. Confucians in such positions have sometimes committed suicide from shame and anger, or as an expression of protest. Now a lingering question comes to the front, that is, how can these incompatible conceptions of the self, the self as being dependent on relations and the self as transcending the limits of relations be invoked in one philosophical system? How are we to understand the conflicting aspects of a Confucian self? It is with respect to this question that the comparison with Dewey becomes illuminating.

3. Dewey and the Social Individual

Dewey comes very close to the Confucian conception of self, when he claims that the identities and the fulfillments of individuals come from communal participations:¹⁸ "Men are not isolated non-social atoms, but are men only when in intrinsic relations to men" (EW 1: 231). "Individuality is not originally given but is created under the influences of associated life" (MW 12: 193). "Assured and integrated individuality is the product of definite social relationships and publicly acknowledged functions" (LW 5: 66-67).

Dewey's conception of social self is in radical opposition to Lockean and Hobbesian conceptions of the individual as a self-enclosed unit in which political and economic institutions such as democratic government, general suffrage, and private property have traditionally found justification. Even the philosophical theories of knowledge and psychology have traditionally appealed to the self, or ego, in the form of self-consciousness, the access to which is denied to others. In opposition to this tradition of individualism, Dewey claims that customs and institutions, as well as tools, materials, and techniques, are all grounded in both associated actions, like learning and communication, as well as their association with the past (tradition).¹⁹ For Dewey, desires, wants, and intentions also are not naturally or organically formed on an individual level, but operate as functions of an associated life. Even knowledge is functions of association and communication:

It [knowledge] depends upon tradition, upon tools and methods socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned. Faculties of effectual observation, reflection and desire are habits acquired under the influence of the culture and institutions of society, not ready-made inherent powers (LW 2: 334).

Thus, for Dewey, existing customs and institutions are to find their ultimate justification not in the individual but in the community.²⁰ The

18 For a more detailed discussion of Dewey's individualism in the more general context of social philosophy, see Campbell, *Understanding John Dewey*, ch. 5.

19 Cf. "The Public and Its Problems," LW 2: 235-372, especially ch. 3.

20 Dewey uses "community" as meaning a special society "in which the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying consequences of associated activities shall be known in the full sense

concept of self as creation of associated life is part of Dewey's general claim that "nothing in the universe, not even physical things, exists apart from some form of association; there is nothing from the atom to man which is not involved in conjoint action." "Apart from the ties," he says, "which bind him to others, he is nothing" (LW 7: 323). Even an individual in total isolation, like Robinson Crusoe, is in associated life, as prior social connections and associations still persist in his memories, expectations, imaginations, and emotions. Furthermore, he must think in the language he shares with others in the past and the present. Humans need community and relatedness to become human and develop their individuality: "To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community (LW 2: 332).

For all of his rigorous claims on the essential sociality of the individual, Dewey was also a strong believer in the uniqueness, irreplaceable value, and distinctiveness of the individual, claiming: "Life still centers in individuals, and always will" (LW 11: 388). As a center of associated life, an individual's thoughts and beliefs are *spontaneous* functions of the community life he or she shares with others. Dewey also believed that unless consensus is generated from the spontaneous participation of individuals and there is a vital interplay between an individual and community, there is only benumbing conformism everywhere. Thus the value of individuals involves their ability to form new conceptions of things "differing from that authorized by current belief" (MW 9: 305). The importance of individuality lies in the fact that new ideas, experimental creation, and directing change in a society only come from individual minds. Individuality thus involves the internal and intellectual workings of mind such as "feeling things, thinking things, and doing things, something which goes into, colors and dyes everything which a person has to do with" (MW 15: 171).

For Dewey, the key to the reconciliation of individuality and communal ideals²¹ is the idea that individuality is in its essence intellectual, i.e., it has to do with "thinking for one's self" (MW 5: 175). While Dewey thinks that the principle of individuality is "having a place and work in the world that no one else can quite do" (MW 15: 171) and that one can develop individuality only in social groups (MW 5: 176), Dewey's individual is not merely a role-player, nor a mere conformist. For Dewey, the individual is someone who is able to make thoughtful considerations, and is made (not given as ready-made) from constant dynamic processes and social interactions. This person may sometimes run into conflict with authority and

of that word, so that an organized, articulate Public comes into being" (LW 2: 350).

21 Within his conception of individual, Dewey claims that neither "social" nor "individual" has any fixed meaning. "Individual" is "a blanket term for the immense variety of specific reactions, habits, dispositions and powers of human nature that are evolved, and confirmed under the influences of associated life" (MW 12: 194). "Society" also "covers all the ways in which be associating together men share their experiences, and build up common interests and aims" (MW 12: 194). The dichotomy between society and the individual is thus unreal, and empty. In fact, what exists is only the conflict, if any, between some individuals and some arrangements in social life, between groups and classes of individuals, between nations and races, and so on, but not between society and the individual.

with established views. In fact, it is through this conflict that the growth of individuality takes place. Thus, in an ideal community, “the more you have of real social unity, the more diversity, the more division of labor, and the more differentiation of operations there is” (MW 15:176). Dewey’s individual is in full control of his or herself in the sense that he or she makes critical judgements about what is happening in their surroundings and considers his or her own action with respect to social changes, though with keen awareness of the fact that all one’s habits, dispositions, and powers are under the influences of associated life (MW 12: 194) and that even one’s self-knowledge is made possible only through the social medium (MW 5: 388). The intellectual aspect of individuality provides the basis on which diversity in a community is made possible as well as the concept of individual as a center of associated life.

As in Confucianism, the internal and intellectual aspect of individuality in Dewey also serves a moral purpose. In Dewey’s thought, self-fulfillment is made possible through the performance of unique social roles and actions based on good judgments predicated upon the needs and possibilities of various situations, whether or not these judgments conform with established values. To very act of considering current matters, consequences, apt choices, and the direction of changes to be made in one’s decision making is already a moral commitment. But morality is not merely of a social nature, as the evolution of life tends toward the struggle for a moral existence. Just as the self-fulfillment of a Confucian self necessarily leads to the Way of Heaven or Nature, so too does Dewey’s individual participate in the process (way) of nature (while the Confucian Heaven or Nature may not be the same as Dewey’s nature, they need not be radically different.) For Dewey, the emergence of a moral existence in nature seems unavoidable as higher forms of life emerge:

With the dawn of higher forms of life, cooperation and sympathy prove stronger forces for progress than ruthless competition. The 'struggle' for any existence that has a claim to moral recognition must be a struggle for more than physical existence or survival of force. It must be a struggle for a *moral* existence, an existence of rational and social beings on terms of mutual sympathy and service as well as of full individuality. (MW 5: 477-78)

Now, with this striking parallel of thought, we may ask, can the Confucian context accommodate democratic ideals of equality and freedom with as much ease as Dewey? If not, why not?

4. Confucian Self: a Net of Graded Relations

To cultivate effectively operative good judgment or taste for intellectual, esthetic, or moral values is, according to Dewey, “the supreme task set to human beings by the incidents of experience” (LW 4: 209). What matters for an individual and in education is the power of thought, the ability to consider matters deliberately, to inquire, to test, and to make judgements about available evidence. Even though this emphasis on intelligence ultimately has the moral purpose of

enhancing the social good by letting one choose the best possible course of action in a society, it contrasts with the Confucian emphasis on self-examination against the mirror of universal moral ideals as ramified in *li* and the conducts of sage-like people: Mencius says, “There is no greater joy than to examine oneself and be sincere.”²²

While Confucius says that “[t]here are those who act without knowing [what is right]”, and he is not one of them, he prefers knowing what is right and wrong by innate knowledge to making empirical inquiries and deliberations based on evidence: “To hear much and select what is good and follow it, to see much and remember it, is the second type of knowledge.”²³ In fact, even the knowledge and the intellectual ability of discerning what is “upright” (*zhi* 直) and what is “crooked” (*wang* 枉)²⁴ is not valued, unless it makes the crooked upright, i.e., unless knowledge becomes practical.²⁵ Practicing moral conducts actively using one’s own body as in performing *li* has primacy over critical intellectual knowledge. The reason why intellectual ability and critical thinking were not much emphasized is that Confucian inquiry is not as open-ended as it is in Dewey’s thought. A Confucian man and woman know where their ultimate destination is, and, in many occasions, believe that they can get there either by following the paths of sage-like people or the ways of *li* that prescribe the ways of conduct proper to one’s role in a family and a society.

Thus, in Confucian texts, we do not find much worry about the problems of decision-making, the freedom of the will, and moral scepticism on moral ideals. What is more important is the problem of identifying the good and the bad in other people whereby one knows what to adopt as a model from them and what to correct in oneself, if one has the same bad qualities as one finds in them.²⁶ For the purpose of self-correction, or edification, one needs self-examination. Identifying the good and the bad in Confucian context is often made easy by Confucian ritualism, as it lays out highly concrete and objective rules of conduct that would manifest the good moral qualities. A Confucian man is not as much worried about decision-making as he is in turning inward to examine whether or not he is not following Confucian values and the rules of propriety: “Tseng-Tzu [i.e. Zengzi] said, ‘Every day I examine myself on three points: whether in counseling others I have not been loyal; whether in intercourse with my friends I have not been faithful; and whether I have not repeated again and again and practiced the instructions of my teacher’.”²⁷ Confucian self-examination sometimes becomes so rigorous that it falls into excessive self-blaming and a kind of constant self-censorship by the rules of propriety (*li*).

However, as Tu Wei-Ming observed, the quest for self-realization or ultimate values to a Confucian self may not be consummated in a social

22 Mencius 7A.4: “反身而誠 樂莫大焉,” tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 79.

23 *Analects* 7.27: “多聞 擇其善者而從之 多見而識之 知之次也.” tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 32-33. Also 16:9.

24 cf. *Analects* 12.23. J. Legge translation of the terms. Cf. Legge, *Confucius*, 261.

25 cf. *Analects* 7.27. Also see 1.6: “When they have energy to spare after the performance of moral duties, they should use it to study literature and the arts,” tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 20.

26 cf. *Analects* 4.17, 5.26, 7.21.

27 *Analects* 1.4: “曾子曰 五日三省五身 為人謨而不忠乎 與朋友交而不信乎 傳不習乎,” tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 20.

context of performing rituals, but has profound psychological and religious implications. He writes:

A distinctive feature of Confucian ritualization is an ever-deepening and broadening awareness of the presence of the other in one's self-cultivation. This is perhaps the single most important reason that the Confucian idea of the self as a center of relationships is an open system. It is only through the continuous opening up of the self to others that the self can maintain a wholesome personal identity.²⁸

Psycho-religious implications notwithstanding, the self-cultivation, self-realization, or self-transformation of a Confucian self, in principle, cannot take place outside of a socio-political context. The same is true even in a Neo-Confucian tradition that adds metaphysical and transcendental layers to the ancient Confucianism. Mere transcendental reflection or meditation will not complete the project of self-cultivation, even if the ultimate aim is to transcend the narrow bound and interest of the self to be one with the universe. Before achieving the Great Unity, the self, like the Hegelian spirit, must traverse "the matrices of human converse"²⁹ by being engaged in the rigorous action and discipline of mind and body, and the constant learning/practicing rules of propriety in everyday lives.

The fact that the matrices a Confucian self must traverse is not a plain, but a faulted field of hierarchical or graded human relations is what makes the Confucian project of self-cultivation a difficult case in regards to democratic ideals, and even brings it to a somewhat sharp dilemma. It is also where Dewey's ideas of individual sharply diverge from the ideas of his Confucian counterparts. On a political, and an economic level, if not necessarily on a philosophical level, modern democratic societies take the individual as a basic unit. Whoever the individual is, and whatever relation this person enjoys with other people, the individual person has, provided they have satisfied a certain minimum condition like being over a certain age, inalienable political and economic rights as well as duties. Individuals are the final locus points where rights and duties take their residence, if not their origins and intents, as Dewey put it.

By contrast, a Confucian individual outside of the relations that are regulated by the ideas of "three bonds" (*sangang* 三綱)³⁰ and five moral formula of basic human relationships (*wulun* 五倫)³¹ finds little significance to his or her existence and has little means to achieve self-

28 Tu, *Confucian Thought*, 114. Tu, in various places, focuses on this aspect of Confucianism, especially when he interprets Confucianism in Mencian and Yang-mingian spirits.

29 Tu, *Confucian Thought*, 83.

30 They are the human relations that were taken to constitute the basic net of society, i.e., the relations of father and son, ruler and minister, husband and wife. We don't find the concept of San-kang in neither Confucius nor Mencius. It is conceived that it appeared in the Han dynasty. cf. Whang, *Yongu Nonchong* 83.2: 93.

31 It is considered to have an origin in *Mencius* 3A:4. It formulates rules or concepts that govern basic human relationships; between father and son, there should be affection [*qin* 親]; between ruler and minister, there should be righteousness [*yi* 義]; between husband and wife, there should be attention to their separate functions [*bie* 別], between old and young, there should be a proper order [*xu* 序]; and between friends, there should be faithfulness [*xin* 信]. Translation from Chan, *A Source Book*, 69-70.

realization. A woman, for instance, must be in a marital state, even as a widow, before she makes any claim to rights and duties, and devotes herself to the task of self-cultivation. One must be in a familial or highly specified kind of relations of acquaintanceship without which one does not know what kind of rights or duty one has. The concept of rights or duty would become vague and empty if sought to be applied to a lone individual. Very often, rights and duties are shared by a group like a family clan, or by a group in the same hierarchical order, and awards or punishments also befall a group as a unit. In a Confucian society, family members sometimes take punishments in other members' stead.³² Rights and duties, however, are not shared evenly by the members in a group. They are graded upon the ordering of the members in terms of age, sex, and the degree of consanguinity.

The reason why the vehement claims on equality in the ability to perform *ren* as the general principle of humanity run into conflicts with democratic ideals in the actual context of Confucian culture is that the concept of *ren* has never been formulated apart from more particularized concepts of *li* and *yi* (righteousness).³³ Despite the difficult problem of accurately translating Confucian concepts into English, *ren*, which has been variously rendered as "benevolence, charity, humanity, love, human-heartedness, and goodness,"³⁴ can be taken to be the highest moral value that the realization of other values like filial piety, loyalty, wisdom, etc., ultimately purports to manifest. While it is most conspicuous in Confucius that *ren* is characterized in terms of propriety, Mencius also maintains that the sincerity, righteousness, and impartial love as what which constitutes the core of *ren* are to be manifested in propriety. In Zhu Xi, *ren*, as the principle of love to produce moral qualities in men, includes *li*. And *li* becomes the principle of Heaven, as *ren* is the character of the mind of Heaven and Earth to produce things. Apart from *li* as the externalization of *ren*, we do not know the conditions or rules under which the concept of *ren* is applied. We only have the fragmentary examples of it evoked by Confucian thinkers evoked.

Ren, as providing the general idea of strongly a humanitarian moral value, is not necessarily confined to the social context of time-bound customs and mores. But *li*, as a concept of social relations, focuses on ritual rules concerning the ceremonies of coming of age, marriage, funeral and ancestral worship (*guan hun sang ji* 冠婚喪祭). It also includes rules regulating everyday conduct toward people related to me such as parent, elder, superior, inferior, ruler, in-laws, friend, guest, and so on as well as ordinary actions like walking, eating, speaking, greeting, and clothing. In Korea, *li* was highly politicized to develop into the law of *li* that prescribed human conduct in nearly every situation to an almost unprecedented degree.

32 In the Joseon Dynasty, the head of a family (father, husband, or first son) was punished when a woman in the family violated laws, like by going outside to meet men outside of family relations the extent of which was fixed by the law. And sometimes a son took punishment in his father's stead, and vice versa.

33 For the discussion of *ren* and its relation to other concepts, see Tu, *Philosophy East and West* 18: 29-39, *Philosophy East and West* 31: 45-54, and Cua, *Understanding the Chinese Mind*, 209-235.

34 Tu, *Philosophy East and West* 18: 31.

The establishment of *lixue* 禮學 in the early 17th century was not a mere contingency.

Obvious as it may be that the intent of following *li* was to pursue, by means of rituals and ideal human relationships, the way to the perfection of humanity and thereby to participate in the order of universe that *li* underlies, its excessive codification (not necessarily from exclusive political intentions) resulted, at least in part, in the suffocation of individual freedom and autonomy. If *li* were absolute, not spatio-temporally bound, truth, as it apparently intended to be, then the whole procedure of following *li* would be a quite efficient way of pursuing a moral life since it would spare individuals the painstaking procedure of decision-making. But *li* is susceptible to change in accordance with changes in the needs and the conditions of a society. Confucius cites the philosopher Yu's saying that to practice *li* is to establish harmony,³⁵ but seems to appeal to a more fundamental principle to determine what to follow when he says,

The linen cap is prescribed by the rules of ceremony (*li*) but nowadays a silk one is worn. It is economical and I follow the common practice. Bowing below the hall is prescribed by the rules of ceremony, but nowadays people bow after ascending the hall. This is arrogant, and I follow the practice of bowing below the hall though that is opposed to the common practice.³⁶

Zhu Xi, in his annotation of the above phrase, cites Chengzi's saying that a superior man is right in following the common practice if it is not detrimental to righteousness (*yi*), and not right if it is.³⁷ However, unless we know that righteousness is determined independently of propriety, and unless we appeal to naive moral intuitionism, it seems gratuitous to appeal to righteousness as a criterion to determine which *li* to follow. Flexibility of the rules of propriety may contribute to preventing Confucianism from falling prey to outmoded ritualism on the one hand, but makes the status of *li* in Confucianism precarious and arbitrary on the other. What is worse is that it accordingly makes the concept of *ren* problematic, because *ren* is so heavily dependent upon *li* and *yi* as to be reciprocally defined in many occasions. In order for Confucianism to be more than a collection of moral customs and norms that can be adjusted upon varying human situations and thus more than a mere situational ethics with absurd metaphysical justifications, there must be some objective principle of *ren* as the principle of morality or humanity by which to determine the right *li* and even further to generate new *li* viable in the modern context.³⁸ Without it, Confucianism would very likely be trivialized as a system of trite old sayings not fit for the modern world.

35 *Analects* 1.12: “禮之用 和爲貴,” tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 21.

36 *Analects* 9.3: “麻冕 禮也 今也純 儉 五從衆 拜下禮也 今拜乎上 泰也 雖違衆 五從下,” tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 35.

37 *Analects/The Doctrine of the Mean*, annotated by Zhu Xi, tr. Han, 192-193: “程子曰 君子處世 事之無害於義者 從俗可也 害於義 則不可從也。”

38 The “ritual disputes” in the 17th century Joseon dramatically shows how far the interpretation of *li* can quickly become arbitrary and contingent upon the whims and interests of the people involved in the absence of determining criteria.

What propriety aims to establish is the distinctions of names (*mingfen* 名分) and (political or non-political) orders in a society. The ruler must behave as a ruler, the subject as a subject, the husband as a husband, the wife as a wife, the father as a father,³⁹ and so on. It purports to determine how close or remote a relationship is, to make clear what is doubtful, to judge between sameness and difference, and to discriminate between right and wrong by laying out different rules and ways of conduct corresponding to fine distinctions in names and social orders. Underlying this is the conception that everything essentially has its own place and function, and that it is *li* which finds and fixes them. Without distinctions and grades in men and their (linguistic and non-linguistic) behavior, it is assumed, a society would become chaotic. Propriety must be practiced out of sincerity and whole-heartedness. One must internalize it so that even one's feeling and emotion be in complete agreement with it and thus one's practicing *li* comes about with as much ease as to appear natural.⁴⁰ Accordingly, not only one's bodily movement, but one's feeling and emotion also are formed in direct proportion to those fine distinctions and grades. In contrast, *ren* as love or benevolence aims to transcend those distinctions and discriminations to be united with the way of Heaven. A man of *ren* is an idealized whole person who is in constant communal experience, and can be fully grown into a free and independent (but not isolated) democratic citizen with egalitarian awareness. Thus, a man of *ren* is put under constant stress in one's pursuit of self-realization, as the only way to achieve self-realization is to traverse the network of human relationships, relationships which are graded, sometimes hierarchically, according to kinship, friendship, and acquaintanceship under the name of *li*. For instance, one cannot be upright, according to Confucius, if one bears witness against one's father who committed misconduct, as one is in special relation of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) with one's parent.⁴¹ But one could not be upright either, if one does not bear witness against the other's father who committed misconduct.

The concept of *li*, insofar as it is grounded in the gradation and the different treatment of people according to age, sex, the closeness of relationships and the degree of affection, is structured in such a way that hampers the achievement of *ren* as a concept of impartiality. Conflicts seem unavoidable, particularly when the two concepts are taken separately. On the other hand, since *li* is considered as regulating all the areas of human activity, private as well as public, in a Confucian culture, there is no way to circumvent *li* to achieve *ren*. Once *ren* is characterized exclusively in terms of *li*, however, conflicts would be avoided, though at the price of the trivialization of Confucianism I mentioned above. It is unlikely that this dilemma can easily be dissolved, not, at least, until there is a creative

39 cf. *Analects* 12.11, tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 39.

40 It is the state of mind Confucius achieved at the age of seventy. Confucius said, "At seventy I could follow my heart's desire without transgressing moral principles" (*Analects* 2.4, tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 22).

41 Cf. *Analects* 13.18, which reads: "The Duke of She told Confucius, 'In my country there is an upright man named Kung. When his father stole a sheep, he bore witness against him.' Confucius said, 'The upright men in my community are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this'." (tr. Chan, *A Source Book*, 41).

reconstruction of the concept of *ren* as the highest principle of morality.

I have examined the Confucian conception of self as a social being in comparison with Dewey's notion of individualism. By considering them in the light of each other, we can better understand both. The concept of Confucian self can be made clearer in Deweyan terms, while the philosophical import of Dewey's concepts can acquire deeper shades when balanced against Confucian terms. But, as I have argued, Confucian thought suffers from inner conflicts which bring about a dilemma and has yet to meet the challenge of making itself compatible with democratic ideals of equality and individual freedom. The ethico-religious aspects of Confucian self-cultivation and self-realization necessarily involve socio-political implications due to the fact that Confucian self-realization needs socio-political context. When Confucianism is considered in the modern socio-political context, the process of self-realization of a Confucian self must therefore be different from that which was employed in a more traditional society. This involves the reconstruction of *li* and *ren*, as the modes of human relationships have changed, and the traditional patriarchal family is no longer considered as a basic unit of a society or a model on which a democratic society can be based. One may advocate, on an ethico-religious level, for the significance of Confucianism in the modern world by championing a set of familial and communal values based on Confucian humanism. But it is not quite certain that even that much significance could be procured, as the private (morals and religions) and the public cannot, in general, be clearly demarcated. Not, at least, until a rational reconstruction of Confucianism has been made.

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關於儒學傳統和杜威思想中的 個人概念的比較研究

金 惠 淑

中文摘要

本論文從比較哲學的觀點論證了儒學傳統和美國實用主義傳統中“個人”所具有的意義和蘊意。儒學傳統中表現出各種思想的多樣化，但在關係和社會((易學)中看“個人”這一點有着相對的統一性。美國的實用主義思想尤其是杜威思想提出了和儒家思想相似的個人概念。本論文集中對這兩種傳統的相遇，分化以及異同點予以考察。本人認為，雖然在將個人看做社會存在這一點上，兩種思想邏輯有着驚人的相同之處，但是儒家在等級秩序(禮的秩序)中強調個人，而杜威在關係中強調的是認識個人自我存在這一理性因素，在此，兩者又有着鮮明的不同之處。儒家通過“仁”這一思想，強調的是為他人考慮、人際關係及社會性，而難以產生民主主義政治體制的原因就在於此。

關鍵詞：個人，社會，儒學，美國實用主義，杜威 (John Dewey)

The Metaphor of the Body and Symbolization of Communication in Wang Yangming

KIM Seseoria

Abstract

This paper offers a new way of reading Wang Yangming's 王陽明 (1472-1528) theory by reinterpreting Wang Yangming's body as a metaphor. It intends to interpret Wang Yangming's model of an ideal body as a symbolization of communication and not in the context of a feudalistic project. This thesis attempts to read the symbolization of communication through Wang's conception of "one body consciousness." It also elaborates *liangzhi* 良知 as a necessary attractor of the metaphor and interprets this as a signification of "resemblance."

This paper is based upon the philosophy of difference. To guarantee communication between people as well as communication between human beings and nature, careful analysis and critical consideration regarding unicity, sameness, and oneness must be involved. Under such circumstances, the philosophy of difference provides particularly valuable insights. Theory that only highlights one body as a symbol for oneness/sameness falls into the danger of emphasizing limited and hierarchical elements. Therefore, this thesis acknowledges differences within universality, and attempts to find the philosophy of differences within Wang's theory.

This paper discusses how Yangming theorizes the relationship between the body and the mind. Then it explains *liangzhi*, which is an important attractor in Yangming's theorization of the body as a metaphor, at the level of "similarity," and redefines Wang's conception of one body as a metaphor. In the end, it offers a reading of *liangzhi* as a symbolization of communication.

Keywords: Wang Yangming, *liangzhi*, metaphor, symbolization, symbol of the body, communication

1. Introduction

This paper aims to investigate how Wang Yangming's 王陽明 (1472-1528) philosophy posits the model of an ideal body by metaphorizing the body as the world, and interprets this in terms of symbolic communication, not in the context of a feudalistic project. Until now, this metaphor has been primarily understood and used as a literary concept, but it has the theoretical potential to clarify and develop some notions which remain unclear in the field of Asian philosophy. In other words, the reason why this thesis focuses on the concept of the metaphor, which has typically been excluded from the field of philosophy (due to its lack of a logical basis), is because the metaphor as a structure of "as" provides an opportunity to reinterpret and reconstruct Wang Yangming's philosophy, particularly in relation to his notion of existence. Through its employment of "as," metaphor becomes a place where sameness and difference simultaneously coexist and conflict, and thus metaphors always generate differences in meaning, breaking familiar concepts and creating new horizons between words and objects.

With such issues in mind, this thesis provides a critical account of the "one body- consciousness" of Wang Yangming's *liangzhi* and in the process attempts to bring to the fore the problematic of communication as the symbolic. In metaphorizing the body as the world, the thesis proposes *liangzhi* as a necessary attractor of metaphor and interprets this as a signification of "resemblance."¹ In order for A to be a metaphor for B or vice versa, a "resemblance" between the two terms needs to be presupposed, but this "resemblance" inevitably presupposes difference as well: two terms yoked by metaphor must be understood as somewhat divergent rather than exactly imitative. Thus, resemblance can be a way of generating difference in the place of a conformity which implicitly prioritizes sameness and represses differences (or one can say that the universal is always accompanied by the particular).

This paper grounds itself on the idea that nature is one as Wang Yangming's suggests, but it does interpret this oneness not in a naturalistic sense but as an image: one body as a symbolic image. This is an attempt to understand the body in an open way, not as something that is closed and isolated. I think that through this infinitely extending meaning of the body, it is possible to develop grounds for the de/construction of borders within ourselves. So though turning to the symbolic meaning of One in Wang Yangming's philosophical account of the body, this thesis fundamentally bases itself upon the philosophy of difference. To guarantee communication between human beings and nature, as well as communication between people, careful analysis and critical consideration regarding unicity, sameness, and identity must be involved and the philosophy of difference becomes an important basis in this circumstance. If we only highlight one

1 An attractor is a set towards which a dynamical system evolves over time. This is also used to denote a topological dynamical system in which an object does not pass the same points twice. I take it to express *liangzhi*'s signification. *Liangzhi* implies infinite dissemination of meanings in a definite boundary or space (particularity within universality or universality within particularity).

body as a symbol for the oneness/sameness or physical unicity, we fall into the trap of emphasizing limited and hierarchical elements. In order for true communication to occur, we need to consider differences in being and at the same time acknowledge universalism to prevent it from elapsing into relativism.

To effectively develop these points, this thesis will first observe the characteristics in Wang Yangming's philosophy regarding the relationship between body and mind, while contemplating the way Wang Yangming metaphorizes the body. Then it will explain *liangzhi*, which is an important attractor in Wang Yangming's study of the metaphor of body, at the level of "similarity" and within the same contextual approach the one body concept of holism of nature at the level of the body's image and consequently prepare grounds for interpreting it as a symbolization of communication.

2. Metaphorizing the Body

In Confucian philosophy, the exemplary person is one who ethically cultivates her own body and experiences oneness with the world by metaphorizing herself as the world. "*Xiujizhiren*" 修己治人 (cultivating oneself and ruling others), "*neisheng waiwang*" 內聖外王 (inner sageliness and outer kingliness) and "*xiushen qijia zhiguo pingtianxia*" 修身齊家治國平天下 (When one's personal life is cultivated, one's family will be regulated and then one's state will be well governed; and when all the states are well governed, there will be peace and harmony throughout the world) show typical processes of forming a desirable body. In Confucian philosophy, the body is not simply an isolated being in the world but its existence continuously establishes relations with the world.² The world cannot be an object but is connected to the body, and the body is understood as something that is always open to and in constant relation with the world. The same applies to Wang Yangming's theory of holism of nature, where the body of the human and the body of the universe and nature are connected as one.

Master Wang said: The great man regards Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things as one body. He regards the world as one family and the country as one person. As to those who make a cleavage between objects and distinguish between the self and others, they are small men. That the great man can regard Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things as one body is not because he deliberately wants to do so, but because it is natural to the humane nature of his mind that he do so.³

While recognizing the world as one body, Wang Yangming symbolized the model or ideal body as one which experiences oneness with the world

2 Kim, "Yuogacheolhak-ui mom-eunyu pangsik eul tonghan yeosung yihae," 148-152. Here Kim asks if female body can be a desirable and ethically complete body in the sense of body as metaphor while discussing the neo-Confucian way of metaphizing human body. Kim also discusses how to understand the meaning of female body in the neo-Confucian conception of desire, according to which the way of forming desirable body is to eliminate desire.

3 Wang Yangming *quanji* 王陽明全集, "*Daxuewen*" 大學問, ch. 26: "大人者 以天地萬物為一體者也。其視天下猶一家，中國猶一人焉。……大人之能以天地萬物為一體也。非意之也，其心之仁本若是，其與天地萬物而為一也。"

through the metaphor of body. However, for Wang Yangming the driving force behind the relationship between the body and world was nothing other than the way the body represents the center of the world; it is not given from the outside of the body but immanent within the relationship. For this reason, he saw the world as a spot that completes our bodies but the momentum of completing the body lies not in the world itself but in us.⁴ Accordingly, Wang Yangming insisted that the process of metaphorizing the body as the world does not allow for one-sided regulation or control from outside. There is no need for *causa prima*, any principles that unify the whole or the intervention of the third instance. This relationship was thus understood as something that could be established only through the mind of the subject. In a similar fashion, Wang Yangming also emphasized that what is decisive in metaphorizing the body is the subject's mind, but he did not address the mind and body in a hierarchical order or understand them as independent of each other. Rather, he understood the mind as something that is closely related to the body: in the process of metaphorizing the body as the world, the subject's mind is discussed as something important and the mind is also explained as something that is connected to the world. For Wang Yangming, the mind does not exist independently of the body, and the body also does not exist separately from the mind. Within this integrated mutual relationship, the body and the mind actively interact with each other. Wang Yangming's conception that where there is no mind there is no body and where there is no body there is no mind clearly demonstrates the intimate relationship enjoyed between the body and mind in his thought (in spite of the argument's circularity).⁵

The Teacher said, "Before you look at these flowers, they and your mind are in the state of silent vacancy. As you come to look at them, their colors at once show up clearly. From this you can know that these flowers are not external to your mind."⁶

In this scenario, the viewer's eyes and themselves are what are watching the flower, and their eyes are clearly part of their body. In this sense the unity of the world and the self seems to be realized through the body. However, it is not the case that all these activities happen regardless of the mind, as Wang Yangming clearly taught that the function of the mind is part of this relationship.⁷

These activities of seeing, listening, speaking, and moving are all of your mind. The sight of your mind emanates through the channel of the eyes, the hearing of your mind through the channel of the ears, the speech of your mind through the channel of the mouth, and the movement of your mind through the channel of your four limbs. If there were no mind, there would be no ears, eyes, mouth, or nose. What is called your mind is not merely that lump of blood and flesh. If it

4 Kim, "Yangmyunghakesoe-ui mom damlon gha gegeot-ui hyundaijeok uimi," 8.

5 *Chuanxilu*, Part 1, 32: "心外無物, 心外無事."

6 *Chuanxilu*, Part 3, 275: "你未看此花時, 此花與汝心同歸於寂; 你來看此花時, 則此花顏色一時明白起來; 便知此花不在你的心外."

7 Jung, "Hyunsanghakjeok yunlihak junglipleul wihan Yangmingcheolhakjeok shiron", 131-153.

were so, why is it that the dead man, whose lump of blood and flesh is still present, cannot see, listen, speak, or move? What is called your mind is that which makes seeing, listening, speaking, and moving possible.⁸

Here Wang Yangming explained that an act of mind is possible through the activity of the body that sees, speaks, and acts, and that the intentionality of the body comes into existence on the basis of the intentionality of the mind. For Wang Yangming, the body is connected to the mind; both functioning concurrently as a subject in the sense that they continuously generate and accommodate meanings in their interaction with the world. The body is always open to the world and the world is formed through the mind-body unity. The mind-body represents a singularity and is at the same time open to the world.

As explained above, for Wang the body itself is not an isolated being and serves to produce meanings through which the subject appears. That is, the subject comes into existence through the interactions of the mind and the body as well as from the ensemble of its relations in the world. In this sense, Wang Yangming's notion of the body is not a simple object but the mind-body subject, and this mind-body subject is conscious of unity with the world and serves as a starting point for actualizing the unity. In other words, for Wang Yangming, the body and the mind are not separate from each other, but are the basis for the formation of a totalistic relationship which is also the mechanism of metaphorizing the world. The unity of the mind/body is completed through coexistence with an awareness of the infinite possibility of the other.

3. *Liangzhi*: The Signification of "Similarity"

When metaphorizing the body as the world, "difference" and "similarity" coexist between the body and world.⁹ For this reason, the metaphor is based upon finding "similarity" despite the fact that there are differences and contradictions between the two. According to Aristotle, a metaphor is "the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy".¹⁰ When metaphorizing A as B, therefore, there must be some "similarity" posited between A and B. Without it, the metaphor does not exist. However, similarity (rather than identity or sameness) implies that two things in comparison are different as well. When a word or symbol or name, displaced from the original referent or meaning, accommodates or receives a new meaning, we call this a metaphor. In this sense, we can account for both universality and difference through the concept of metaphor.¹¹

When we refer to a young girl with a small body as a sparrow by saying "Sun-Hee is a sparrow," it is apparently that this is not literally true.

8 *Chuanxilu*, Part 1, 122.

9 Jung, *Sangjing*, *Eunyu grigo yiyagi*, 72; Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 107-115.

10 Aristotle, (*La*) *Poetique*, 441.

11 Chung, *Sangjing*, *Eunyu grigo yiyagi*, 72.

Sun-Hee does not share a species with a feathered bird. However, this description can still be said in some sense to be correct insofar that it successfully posits a resemblance between girl and bird; in this case its signifying that Sun-Hee speaks in a small but beautiful voice and is slight of stature. In this way, “similarity” can be seen as a base that makes a metaphor possible. However, what really makes a metaphor possible is not “similarity” but “displacement/difference.” The real function of a metaphor lies in creating a new meaning by displacing and substituting. If one only recalled just “sameness” or the plain function of substituting one word to another from “metaphor,” that would miss an important point in the working of a metaphor.

In order to grasp the core ability of metaphor from this perspective, it is necessary to distinguish “similarity” from “sameness.” Sameness presupposes simple changes of positions or one-to-one correspondence between two terms, which is not able to produce the displacement of meaning, the real force of metaphor. So, similarity’s immanence in the use of metaphor should be understood not in terms of ‘sameness’ but in terms of “resemblance.” If metaphor is reduced to “sameness,” it loses sight of differences in every being. Every human being is different. Resemblance distinguishes itself from sameness in that it always reflects differences in being. Let us look at the previous example of “Sun-Hee is a sparrow,” again. Here, the meaning of “Sun-Hee” drifts away from the context of everyday human life to another one, i.e. the world of birds. This metaphoric transition opens up a space in which a new meaning appears to explain Sun-Hee’s identity. The combination of Sun-Hee and sparrow creates a new meaning, which reveals that there is a third area which does not particularly belong to both of them, but subsumes them.

From this context let us return to Wang Yangming’s theory of the unity of everything. Wang Yangming uses *liangzhi* as an attractor of the metaphor and explains it in terms of “resemblance.” In Wang Yangming’s theory of the unity of everything, a human becomes a metaphor by displacing oneself from the human world to a different domain of grass, tree, roof tile, and rock, and in this process *liangzhi* works as an attractor of the metaphor. Wang Yangming shows how things from totally different domains become unified and interact with each other in the process by which the body is metaphorized as the world.

The Teacher said, “The innate knowledge of man is the same as that of plants and trees, tiles and stones. Without the innate knowledge inherent in man, there cannot be plants and trees, tiles and stones. This is not true of them only. Even Heaven and Earth cannot exist without the innate knowledge that is inherent in man. For at bottom Heaven, Earth, the myriad things, and man form one body. The point at which this unity is manifested in its most refined and excellent form is the clear intelligence of the human mind. Wind, rain, dew, thunder, sun and moon, stars, animals and plants, mountains and rivers, earth and stones are essentially of one body with man. It is for this reason that such things as the grains and animals can nourish man and that such things as medicine and minerals can heal diseases. Since they share the same material force, they enter into one another.”¹²

12 *Chuanxilu*, Part3, 274: “先生曰：人的良知，就是草木瓦石的良知。若草木瓦石無人的良知，不

For Wang Yangming, *liangzhi* represents a universality that is inherent in all things and provides a basis for unifying the body and the world.

I said, "The human mind and things form the same body. In the case of one's body, blood and the vital force in fact circulate through it and therefore we can say they form the same body. In the case of men, their bodies are different and differ even more from those of animals and plants. How can they be said to form the same body?"

The Teacher said, "Just look at the matter from the point of view of the subtle incipient activating force of their mutual influence and response. Not only animals and plants, but heaven and earth also, form the same body with me. Spiritual beings also form the same body with me."¹³

Here not just unity but also particularity and difference, which cannot be lumped together as one, are also taken into account. Wang Yangming's conception of "attractor of metaphor" posits *liangzhi* as universality, it does not, however, simply stop at emphasizing the sameness but tries to reveal differences in being. In this way he shows how metaphors can serve to create new things by revealing differences latent in universality: universality is the precondition of the emergence of the particular.

"How does man become mind?" "Clear intelligence and clear intelligence alone."
"We know, then, in all that fills heaven and earth there is but this clear intelligence. It is only because of their physical forms and bodies that men are separated. My clear intelligence is the master of heaven and earth and spiritual beings. If heaven is deprived of my clear intelligence, who is going to look into its height? If earth is deprived of my clear intelligence, who is going to look into its depth? If spiritual beings are deprived of my clear intelligence, who is going to distinguish their good and evil fortune or the calamities and blessings that they will bring? Separated from my clear intelligence, there will be no heaven, earth, spiritual beings, or myriad things, and separated from these, there will not be my clear intelligence. Thus they are all permeated with one material force. How can they be separated?"
I asked further, "Heaven, earth, spiritual beings, and the myriad things have existed from great antiquity. Why should it be that if my clear intelligence is gone, they will all cease to exist?" "Consider the dead man. His spirit has drifted away and dispersed. Where are his heaven and earth and myriad things?"¹⁴

This innate knowledge of the good is what Mencius meant when he said, "The sense of right and wrong is common to all men." The sense of right and wrong requires no deliberation to know, nor does it depend on learning to function. This

可以為草木瓦石矣。豈惟草木瓦石為然，天地無人的良知，亦不可為天地矣……風雨露雷日月星辰禽獸草木山川土石與人原只一體。”

13 *Chuanxilu*, Part3, 336: “問，人心與物同體，如吾身原是血氣流通的，所以謂之同體，若於人便異體了。禽獸草木益遠矣，而何謂之同體？先生曰，你只在感應之幾上看，豈但禽獸草木，雖天地也與我同體的，鬼神也與我同體的。”

14 *Chuanxilu*, Part3, 336: “曰人又甚麼叫做心？對曰 只是一箇靈明。『可如充天塞地中間，只有這箇靈明。人只為形體自間隔了。我的靈明，便是天、地、苞、神的主宰。天沒有我的靈明，誰去仰地高？地沒有我的靈明，誰去俯地深？鬼、神沒有我的靈明，誰去辯他吉、凶、災、祥？天地鬼神萬物，離卻我的靈明，便沒有天地鬼神萬物了。我的靈明，離卻天地鬼神萬物，亦沒有我的靈。』”

is why it is called innate knowledge. It is my nature endowed by Heaven, the original substance of my mind, naturally intelligent, shining, clear, and understanding.¹⁵

Wang Yangming's *liangzhi* aims to constitute the mechanism which encompasses both folding, where resemblance subsumes individual being, and unfolding, where particularity takes priority over universality. In other words, one of his theoretical objectives is to secure both universality and diversity at the same time. Although *liangzhi* involves universality it does not reduce itself to "sameness," which allows us to go beyond the boundaries between human, heaven and earth, spirit, animals, plants, and inanimate objects in Wang Yangming's thought. *Liangzhi*'s epistemological strategy of metaphor exerts an ontological force.

4. Seeking Communication from the Impossibility of Communication: "One Body" and "One Body Image"¹⁶

Communication is possible when one recognizes and embraces differences in one's consideration and hospitality towards others.¹⁷ It is consequently extraordinarily difficult (if not altogether impossible) to locate the possibility of communication in the subjection of each individual into one substantiated entity. In this sense, the work of interpreting the meaning of symbolic communication in Wang Yangming's unity of everything is necessary when trying to make sense of Wang Yangming's metaphorization of body. In fact, the conception of "one body consciousness" prevents one from addressing the problems of individual rights or of being a self-regulating human, and thus from understanding the real meaning of communication or solidarity. How to interpret "one body consciousness," therefore, constitutes an important point in understanding Wang Yangming's conception of symbolic communication.

As discussed previously, Wang Yangming's conception of the unity of everything is derived from the process of metaphorizing the body as the world. That is to say, it is grounded in the idea that the world is a kind of unified body, which is derived from his metaphorical construction of the world as one body. Wang Yangming understood different beings, different species such as birds and animals, trees and life force to be all part of one body. So as to tie or integrate them into one body, Wang Yangming relied upon the principle that the human and its body, plants, inanimate objects all flow through one energy. He argued that because all objects are connected

15 Wang, *Wang Yangming quanji*, "Daxuewen", ch. 26: "良知者孟子所謂是非之心，人皆有之者也，……是乃天命之性，吾心之本體，自然靈昭明覺者也。"

16 In this thesis, the 'one body 'image' borrow from Shilder's concept that the body image is not "fixed by nature or confined to the anatomical 'container,' the skin, and its borders, edges, and contours are 'osmotic.'" The body image as a new terminology mediates the polarization of mind/body, subject/object, as a result of the work of neurologists, psychologists, and psychoanalysts. Grosz, *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism*, 61-85.

17 Agamben, *Means without End: Notes on Politics*, 106.

through *yiqi* 一氣 (one *qi*), all of them can be regarded as one body: the world as the function of energy. It is through their mutual relationship to *qi* that Wang Yangming thought inanimate objects and plants as being capable of feeding or fostering human life or even curing human diseases.¹⁸ His assumption that all beings are made from one energy thus allows us to understand one's experience of the other.

The Teacher said, "The innate knowledge of man is the same as that of plants and trees, tiles and stones. Without the innate knowledge inherent in man, there cannot be plants and trees, tiles and stones. This is not true of them only. Even Heaven and Earth cannot exist without the innate knowledge that is inherent in man. For at bottom Heaven, Earth, the myriad things, and man form one body. The point at which this unity is manifested in its most refined and excellent form is the clear intelligence of the human mind. Wind, rain, dew, thunder, sun and moon, stars, animals and plants, mountains and rivers, earth and stones are essentially of one body with man. It is for this reason that such things as the grains and animals can nourish man and that such things as medicine and minerals can heal diseases. Since they share the same material force, they enter into one another."¹⁹

To recognize all different, diverse beings and objects as one body, there must be an attractor for the metaphor that links my body and objects as part of the body. For Wang Yangming, this attractor was *liangzhi*, such that all objects were seen as capable of interacting and connecting with each other through its mediation. Based upon this supposition, Wang Yangming insisted that one can share feelings such as happiness, pain, sadness, etc., with other beings in different species or different forms of being.

Man is the mind of the universe. At bottom Heaven and Earth and all things are my body. Is there any suffering or bitterness of the great masses that is not disease or pain in my own body?

Those who are not aware of the disease and pain in their own body are people without the sense of right and wrong.²⁰

One crucial step in approaching and understanding other beings is to share in their bodily experiences. Apparently, my body is not the same as (identical with) others' bodies, and it is physically impossible to directly share another body's experience. If one could directly experience what the other is experiencing, that would mean that they are the same body. Wang Yangming dealt with this problem by employing the notion of "sensitivity [sharing and interacting]," which comes from *liangzhi*. For him, people become truly ethical subjects when they have the sense of telling right from wrong (*shifei zhi xin* 是非之心). He also felt that it was important to interact with others and to share others' pain.

18 Kim, Wang Yangming-ui Saenmyung cheolhak, 236.

19 Chuanxilu, Part3, 274: "人的良知，就是草、木、瓦、石的良知：若草、木、瓦、石無人的良知，不可以為草、木、瓦、石矣。豈惟草、木、瓦、石為然，天、地無人的良知，亦不可為天、地矣。蓋天、地、萬物與人原是一體。……風雨露雷日月星辰禽獸草木山川土石與人原只一體。故五穀禽獸之類皆可以責人，藥石之類皆可以療疾，只為同此一氣，故能相通耳。"

20 Chuanxilu, Part2, 179: "夫人者，天地之心，天地萬物本吾一體者也。生民之困苦荼毒，孰非疾痛之切於吾身者乎？不知吾身之疾痛，無是非之心者也。"

Wang Yangming's one-body consciousness grasps humans and nature as one; within his conception they complement each other in an organic relationship. He also thought that it is possible to form a strategy for happy and friendly communication from this mutually integrated relationship between beings.²¹ Stressing that the community is one, and imagining the community of love and end of conflict will help people to constitute harmonious communication within the community. Contrary to the original intention, however, the pursuit of communication through the one-body consciousness may produce adverse effects. For instance, it always risks a totalitarian communication whereby all differences are repressed. However, it should be noted that Wang Yangming's ideal of communication is not achieved through integration into the sameness of the world, but by accepting differences within it.

Thus if we interpret Wang Yangming's oneness (unity=one body)'as "one body" and derive the unity of the one and the other or appersonization from it, we in fact move further away from the problematic of communication intrinsic to Wang Yangming's theory of the unity of everything. Associating *yiti* 一體 with "one body" and emphasizing "sameness" would lead one to confuse the subject and the other; it tends to erase differences in beings, and thus makes it difficult to discover the real meaning of communication. Communication implies not only "closeness" and "intimacy," but also the irreducible sphere of the "in-between."²² We need to consider and respect "space" and "otherness" to avoid the subordination of others to the one, and thus to properly address the singularity of beings. Then the communicative orientation for the one represents only the impossibility of communication.

It is difficult to resolve the matter of communication with what one-body consciousness implies, that is, with oneness and sameness; generalization and unification are not sufficient to account for differences and variations among/within beings. What is required the development of a theoretical framework to consider not only similarity, harmony and communication but also these irreducible differences in being. Wang Yangming's conception of symbolic communication is one such theoretical device to deal with this, one that is designed to accept universality and differences and one which does so not to relativize differences but to maintain relations with others. If we translate the unity of everything into the sameness of everything, we eliminate the possibility of real communication; there will only be the reproduction of existing and dominant meanings. New meanings and their articulation derive from the relations between heterogeneous things and beings, and the function of metaphor is to intervene and create commonalities, not identical oneness.

21 Kim, *Wang Yangming-ui Saenmyung cheolhak*, 180.

22 Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside, Massachusetts Institution of Technology*, 92-93. The in-Between has been a privileged concept for only a short time, for only in the last century or less has it been understood as a space or a positivity at all, as something more than a mere residue or inevitable consequence of other interactions. The space in between things is the space in which things are undone, the space to the side and around, which is the space of subversion and fraying, the edges of any identity's limits.

The body image can shrink or expand; it can give parts to the outside world and can take other parts into itself. When we take a stick in our hands and touch an object with the end of it, we feel a sensation at the end of the stick. The stick has, in fact, become part of the body-image. In order to get the full sensation at the end of the stick must be in a more or less rigid connection with the body. It then becomes part of the bony system of the body, and we may suppose that the rigidity of the bony system is an important part in every body-image.²³

According to Shilder, the meaning of the body (as a symbol or image) is not confined to the physical or anatomical sense of the human body. The body is not the boundary of the self. Besides, the body-image functions in unison by moving in the direction of increasing the subdivision and division from an amorphous state. The body-image distinguishes the body from other things. That is, it distinguishes between the subject and the object, between active and passive relationships, between the internal organs or the outer skin. The body-image does not put its focus on integrating the various parts into one body. Wang Yangming's body as image emphasizes flexibility and infinite differences; the defining moments of the body keep creating new boundaries and formulations in the totalizing process of the body as image. Based upon this perspective, let me explain in detail how we can interpret Wang Yangming's theory of the unity of everything in nature in terms of the body-image.

Therefore when he sees a child about to fall into a well, he cannot help a feeling of alarm and commiseration. This shows that his humanity forms one body with the child. It may be objected that the child belongs to the same species. Again, when he observes the pitiful cries and frightened appearance of birds and animals about to be slaughtered, he cannot help feeling an "inability to bear" their suffering. This shows that his humanity forms one body with birds and animals. It may be objected that birds and animals are sentient beings as he is. But when he sees plants broken and destroyed, he cannot help a feeling of pity. This shows that his humanity forms one body with plants.²⁴

Wang Yangming believes that human beings share and communicate feelings with others, whether they be humans or not, because they are connected with one another. However, this universality does not prevent the existence and emergence of differences. Despite the fact that these are interconnected through one energy, it is simply not possible for them to be classified as identical. For Wang Yangming, there is no universality without difference.²⁵ So, borders among beings are not to be neglected as borders create universality, which in turn prepares other instances of differences or borders. Thus Wang Yangming mentions:

23 Shilder, *The Image and Appearance of the Human Body: Studies in the Constructive Energies of the Psyche*, 202.

24 Wang, *Wang Yangming quanji* 王陽明全集, ch. 26. "Daxuewen": "是故見孺子之入井而 必有怵惕惻隱之心焉。是其仁之與孺子而為一體也。孺子猶同類者也。見鳥獸之哀鳴殫殫而必有不忍之心，是其仁之與鳥獸而為一體也。鳥獸猶有知覺者也。見草木之摧折而必有憫恤之心焉。是其仁之與草木而為一體也。草木猶有生意者也。見瓦石之毀壞而 必有顧惜之心焉。是其仁之與瓦石而為一體也。"

25 Kim, *Wang Yangming-ui Saenmyung cheolhak*, 175.

The Teacher said, "It is because of principles that there necessarily is relative importance. Take for example the body, which is one. If we use the hands and the feet to protect the head, does that mean that we especially treat them as less important? Because of their principles this is what should be done. We love both plants and animals, and yet we can tolerate feeding animals with plants. We love both animals and men, and yet we can tolerate butchering animals to feed our parents, provide for religious sacrifices, and entertain guests."²⁶

According to Wang Yangming's principle of intimacy (*qinqin* 親親), human beings, animals, plants, lifeless beings and the world understand the body in the way they admit and respect irreducible differences. He admits that signification inevitably defines beings, however it also generates differences in them. So, love for all things is not just love (*ren* 仁) between people. Love takes different forms depending on its objects and the relationship which between beings: as for example, in the different manifestations referred to as *ceyin zhi xin* 惻隱之心 (sympathy), *buren zhi xin* 不忍之心 (Heart of compassion and conscience), *minxu zhi xin* 憫恤之心 (Heart to help poor people), and *guxi zhi xin* 顧惜之心 (Heart of regret). So, the unity of everything in Wang Yangming blurs border lines between myself and others, life and lifeless beings, animals and plants, etc., but it does not nullify them. It approaches beings as they are through the symbolic communication of one-body, which is flexible, dynamic, and inclusive of the relationship between one body and another body.

5. Conclusion

According to Wang Yangming's philosophy, the Sage represents an ideal being; not a real entity but an ideal or symbol for a being that is able to communicate with everything by metaphorizing herself as the world. Wang Yangming's theory of the unity of everything likewise functions as a practical symbol for mediating communication between beings, particularly between human beings and others. Metaphor has the potential of narrating and describing things from a new perspective by associating signifiers with the signifier and signified. That is, it works on double referents, and creates the divergence of meaning.

Regarding this double referent, Paul Ricoeur has argued that in order to be a creative metaphor, a metaphor's primary referent goes beyond the first order of signification towards the second order of signification.²⁷ According to Ricoeur, a proper understanding of metaphorical symbolization should not stop at the primary, literal interpretation of meaning.²⁸ The real meaning of metaphor consists in its secondary signification and interpretation. Wang Yangming's entire work is fundamentally based upon this symbolic communication. The metaphor of the body as the world does not literally reflect the world, but denotes the necessity of communication between beings

26 *Chuanxilu*, Part3, 276: "先生曰惟是道理自有厚薄。比如身是一體，把手足捍頭目，豈是隔要薄手足，其道理合如此。禽獸與草木同是愛的，把草木去養禽獸，心又忍得，人與禽獸同是愛的，宰禽獸以養親與供祭祀，燕賓客，心又忍得。"

27 Jung, *Sangjing, Eunyū grigo yiyagi*, 110.

28 On this point see Ricoeur. *Le conflit des interpretations*, 40-42.

through which new forms of being can emerge. The linguistic, practical elements of Wang Yangming's theory are such that his symbolic strategy (the production of subjectification through symbolic communication) is capable of creating an ontological power which not only universalizes being through its notion of "one body" but opens up the emergence of other beings in the incessant processes of metaphorizing.

In terms of question of communication, symbolizing the world as one body can be interpreted in two completely different ways. First, it can be read as stressing oneness as totality and prioritizing the whole over parts by encouraging hierarchy and discrimination. Some negative interpretations of Wang Yangming's philosophy have relied on such an interpretation, branding his thought as connoting a "complete orientation towards the whole" or as implying "total subjection to the whole."²⁹ According to this line of interpretation, Wang Yangming's theory is just a dominant ideology which serves to hide and justify inequality and structural contradictions in medieval society; and as such it does not allow for the possibility of any legitimate communication.

Those with inferior ability were contented with their positions as farmers, artisans, or merchants, all diligent in their various occupations, so as mutually to sustain and support the life of one another without any desire for exalted position or strife for external things. Those with special ability like Kao, K'uei, Chi, and Hsieh, came forward and served with their ability, treating their work as their own family concern, some attending to the provision of clothing and food, some arranging for mutual help, and some providing utensils, planning and working together in order to fulfill their desires of serving their parents above and supporting their wives and children below.³⁰

This can be taken to imply that one should follow and obey what one is supposed to do as parts of the one body. That is, one can only appreciate coercion and subordination from this. In fact, the stress this passage places on obedience and harmony can easily be taken advantage of to hide inequality and maintain dominance. In other words, it is not difficult to read this passage as belonging to a clear discourse of domination.

However, it is possible to try a different kind of interpretation. In such a reading, Wang Yangming's philosophy can be utilized to understand concrete, different situations, as well as the particularity and concreteness of individual beings. What is crucial here is that despite its conservative aspects, Yangming's theory has the potential of communicability, or contains within itself a theory of symbolic communication. As explained above, translating the unity of everything as a metaphor allows us to read into the theory of communication; the metaphorical unity of the body need not subordinate the many to the one, but can both allow for the existence of difference, and stress the importance of communication to form a unity,

29 Kim, "Jungsejeok giwhekeuroseo-ui Nayeopang-ui cheolhaksasang," 197.

30 *Chuanxilu*, Part2, 142: "其才質之下者，則安其農、工、商、賈之分，各勤其業，以相生相養，而無有乎希高慕外之心。其才能之異，若舉、夔、稷、契者，則出而各效其能。若一家之務，或營其衣食，或通其有無，或備其器用，集謀并力，以求遂其仰事俯育之願，惟恐當其事者之或怠而重己之累也。"

whether that unity is achieved through solidarity, sympathy or love. Similarly, Wang Yangming's notion of *liangzhi* can be seen not as sameness, but as resemblance, which is open to difference. This philosophical strategy does not simply express what is given *a priori* in Yangming, but on how we can maximize the potential attributes of his thought. So, we can then take advantage of what remains ambiguous in it.

In my attempt to comprehend *liangzhi* as the principle of difference within universality, the dichotomy of activity/passivity, subject/other is no longer valid. In the metaphor of one-body, which regards the emergence of a moral subject as the consequence of interactions (sharing and communication) between a subject and other beings, individuals still exist, but not in the subject-object relationship as it is commonly conceived. According to Wang Yangming, inter-subjectivity between people also applies to the relationship between human and animals, plants, and lifeless objects. So, it is possible to interpret the unity of everything not as a simple reflection of reality, but as symbol for communication through Wang Yangming's body metaphor.

However, it should be also noted that Wang Yangming's idea of communication does not take into consideration the dimension of gender. So one may wonder if it is really possible to constitute a philosophy of difference and communication from Wang Yangming's philosophy. But it is also true that Wang Yangming's theory of the unity of everything contains intimacy, sharing and giving/receiving between different beings. It starts by asking "Can you feel or share others' pains?" and "Do they have rights, too?", and moves on to the question of "Can they feel pain?"³¹ Here "they" is not confined to human beings. So it stresses the relationship between men and lifeless objects, and does not privilege the rationality of human beings. Although it may not explicitly embrace any sexual difference, the fact that it accepts various types of being paves the way for thinking that accommodating sexual difference is possible.

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31 Singer, *Dongmulhaebang* (Animal Liberation), trans. Kim, 43-47.

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王陽明哲學的身體隱喻與溝通的象徵性

金世緒利亞

中文摘要

將身體隱喻成一個世界，並以理想的身體(聖人)為指向的陽明哲學為中心，本文從溝通的象徵性(而不是封建性的預設)去解讀其含義。為此，本文在身體隱喻成一個世界的過程中，試以王陽明哲學的核心概念-良知作為牽引一些必備隱喻的吸引子(attractor)，把它視為‘相似(similarity)’的意義作用。

此外，本文將萬物一體的‘一體’意義化為‘一體形象’，而不強調結合為一個整體的身體。之所以將萬物一體的‘一體’詮釋為‘一體形象’，就是要解讀其溝通的象徵性，而不要把它只看作為整體性的一個標幟。這樣我們可用開放的方式來理解身體，而不是以封閉而孤立的方式來理解身體，同時我們可從這種無限擴張的身體的意義發展出一種解構邊界的思維。

本文從下列三個階段來論述上述的內容：

第一，通過陽明的身體隱喻方式，探討身體與世界的關係、身體與心的關係中的陽明學特徵。

第二，陽明的身體隱喻說明方式中，良知扮演重要的牽引作用，本文從‘相似’的層面來說明良知。

第三，從身體形象的層面去切入萬物一體的一體概念，找出其中能夠詮釋為溝通的象徵性的一些依據。

關鍵詞：王陽明，良知，隱喻，象徵，身體形象，溝通

Zhuangzi 莊子 on Qi 氣

KIM Doil

Abstract

The ultimate aim of this paper is to show that *qi* 氣 (vital energy) is crucial in Zhuangzi's 莊子 understanding of the *dao* 道 (Way) because it is one of the central concepts that explain the highest epistemic stage of a perfect person (*zhiren* 至人) who successfully embodies the *dao*. In addition, this paper aims to show that *qi* is also central to Zhuangzi's ethical thought, since it is the term that explains how one is capable of acting in accordance with the *dao*. To do this in an interesting way, this paper casts serious doubt on the validity of some recent interpretations of Zhuangzi. Special skepticism is directed towards work produced by certain scholars in the English-speaking world, such as Chad Hansen, P. J. Ivanhoe, and David B. Wong. This paper argues that these interpretations fail to get the gist of Zhuangzi's thought, and that a major reason for the failure is that they do not give enough attention to the fact that *qi*, the concept that Zhuangzi then employed in understanding the deepest layer of human-constitution is a concept that we now have difficulty in grasping. This paper argues that this concept is located at the core of Zhuangzi's understanding of the motivational force of a perfect person as well as the unity of Heaven and humans.

Keywords: Zhuangzi, *qi*, *dao*

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1. Introduction

I will cast serious doubt on some recent interpretations of Zhuangzi 莊子 (c. 369 BCE-c. 286 BCE). My doubt will be directed towards scholars in the English-speaking world, such as Chad Hansen, P. J. Ivanhoe, and David B. Wong. I will argue that their interpretations fail to get the gist of Zhuangzi's thought, and that a major reason for the failure is that they do not give enough attention to the fact that the concept that Zhuangzi *then* employed in understanding the deepest layer of human-constitution is a kind of concept that we *now* have difficulty in grasping. The concept to be brought to a focus is *qi* 氣 (vital energy). I will argue that this concept is located at the core of Zhuangzi's understanding of the motivational force of a perfect person as well as his idea of the unity of Heaven and humans. In this line of thinking, I will also argue that these recent Western commentators' failure to attend to the importance of *qi* has also lead to misunderstanding of the story of Cook Ding in the *Zhuangzi*. While these scholars have understood Zhuangzi as intending to provide examples of various kinds of skillfulness through the story, I will argue instead that he just wants to show how one can approach the deepest layer of human-constitution, namely the level of *qi*, which enables one to be connected directly to the outer world.

On the basis of the above critical review of the recent works on Zhuangzi, I will ultimately attempt to show that an accurate understanding of *qi* is crucial for us to properly grasp another vitally significant concept in Zhuangzi's thought, namely *dao* 道 (Way), particularly since it is the term that explains what the highest epistemic stage of a perfect person is like. Also, I will argue that *qi* is central to Zhuangzi's ethical thought, since it is the term that explains how one is capable of acting in accordance with the *dao*.

2. A Tension Between Two Meanings of *Dao*

Liu Xiaogan points out that the term *dao* is used in different senses throughout the inner chapters of the *Zhuangzi*. More particularly, according to Liu, the *dao* in the "Dazongshi" chapter refers to the metaphysical absolute *or* the cosmological origin that "gave birth to heaven and earth."¹ On the other hand, the same term in the "Qiwulun" chapter has to do with the highest epistemic stage that is attainable by a perfect person (*zhiren* 至人).² Given this observation, Liu worries that if these different meanings are not clearly discerned, confusion between the two may arise and lead to the misunderstanding that the subjective mental stage of a person gives birth to heaven and earth.³ This concern seems to go too far. For any careful reader would not misunderstand the *Zhuangzi* in that way, because there is no other textual evidence that shows that Zhuangzi is such

1 Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 81. Also see Graham, *Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters*, 86. For English translations of the *Zhuangzi* in this paper, I will use Watson's or Graham's translations with some amendments.

2 Liu, *Zhuangzi zhixue ji qi yanbian*, 104

3 Liu, *Zhuangzi zhixue ji qi yanbian*, 117.

a radical idealist who believes that the highest level of our mental state lays the foundation for the actual things and beings over the world.⁴ Still, it is important to note that the following concern may legitimately arise: It is not entirely clear how the two meanings of *dao* are interconnected within Zhuangzi's thought. So, indeed, there is a tension between the two meanings of the term.

The tension might be relieved partly by adopting an appropriate translation of the term. In fact, many parts of the "Dazongshi" chapter are devoted to an explanation of the same topic of the "Qiwulun" chapter. In both chapters, the term *dao* can be translated as "the way the world really is" without any trouble.⁵ The adoption of this translation enables readers to loosen the tension in question in the following sense: A perfect person can accomplish the highest stage of wisdom by acting according to the way the world really is, in that such wisdom is nothing but one's practical ability of responding harmoneously to one's surroundings. In this regard, the term *dao* can be associated with the idea of the best way of living in accordance with the way the world really is. Moreover, the *dao* in the "Qiwulun" chapter is not only used to describe the highest stage of wisdom, but it is also related to the issue of how one can reach such a stage. This issue is practical and ethical. Zhuangzi in the chapter makes strenuous efforts to argue against competing ethical theories proposed by his contemporaries, such as Confucians and Mohists. In doing so, Zhuangzi in fact deals with the question of how one should act. As well known, his answer for that question is that one should act in accordance with the *dao*. In addition, various aspects of the way the world really is might include principles that things and beings in one's surroundings follow in order to be just what they are like. And such principles may include the way the world was initially originated.⁶ The claim can be made then that the two different meanings of *dao* are interrelated in the sense that one can reach the highest level of wisdom by leading one's life in accordance with the way the world really is, namely the *dao*.

The above solution for the tension is merely a conjecture, at least, at this point. In other words, adopting "the way the world really is" as a translation for *dao* enables us merely to guess at a seemingly plausible connection between the different meanings of the term. However, I will show that this guess is not very far from Zhuangzi's thought precisely by revealing the function of the concept of *qi* in his thought.

4 In fact, Liu's understanding of the two conflicting meanings of *dao* in the Zhuangzi reflects a long-term controversy over the term especially among Chinese scholars. Zhang Dainian understands *dao* mainly as the metaphysical absolute, whereas Mou Zhongsan focuses more on the aspect of *dao* as the highest wisdom of a perfect man. Liu seems to attempt to reconcile these two different positions. Note also that the scholars in the English-speaking world, which I will discuss in the following section, tend to understand *dao* in line with the latter position. In addition, Vincent Shen understands the relation of an epistemological subject to the absolute reality in terms of a "hermeneutic circle" in order to reconcile the two meanings of *dao*. See Shen, *Anthology of Vincent Shen*, 410.

5 I borrow this translation from Ivanhoe. See Ivanhoe, "Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?," 197.

6 At this point, it is worthy of mentioning what Herrlee Creel observes: "[*Dao*] at first meant 'road' or 'path'. From this it developed the sense of a method, and of a course of conduct ... And the Confucian [*dao*] was also an entity, since an individual or a state might 'possess the [*dao*]' or 'lack the [*dao*].' But this Confucian [*dao*] was still only a principle; it was never regarded as a substance, like the [*dao*] of the [Daoists]." See Creel, *What is Taoism?*, 2.

3. Reviews on Some Recent Interpretations of Zhuangzi

Chad Hansen attends to the tension that Liu observes. His solution is to make the text consistent by denying the understanding of the concept of *dao* as a metaphysical object. However, he does not offer a consistent interpretation of the “Dazongshi” chapter, and he just pays attention to the “Qiwulun” chapter in his paper.⁷ This makes his position less convincing, since many of the controversial passages in which the term seems to refer to a metaphysical object occur in “Dazongshi” chapter.

Hansen’s own idea is twofold. First, he argues that the term *dao* in the *Zhuangzi* only refers to a linguistic convention, on the basis of which people in a linguistic group share one and the same framework for understanding the world and guiding action. Second, he argues that Zhuangzi equally appreciates many different perspectives or ways of understanding the world and guiding action in the sense that none of them can be regarded as superior to the others without begging the question. Hansen thus claims that Zhuangzi’s *dao* “is a linguistic rather than metaphysical object (roughly equivalent to prescriptive discourse) and ... his doctrine is relativist rather than absolutist; that is, according to [Zhuangzi] there are many [*daos*].”⁸

According to Hansen, Zhuangzi understands the competition between many different schools in early China, such as Confucianism and Mohism, as debates between different linguistic schemes. Building on this understanding, Hansen claims that Zhuangzi takes a relativist stance that each school can be equally right from its own perspective. Hansen also understands Cook Ding in the “Yangshengzhu” chapter as “someone who has perfected a particular [*dao*] until it has become spontaneous or second nature” rather than someone who is “in the harmony with the [*dao*].”⁹ In this line of thinking, Hansen seems to take it that each of many different skillful individuals described in the text, especially in the “Dasheng” Chapter, should be understood as someone who has achieved a distinctive kind of perfection, each of which should be considered to be having its own value.

Note that in fact, Hansen takes a further step than simply rejecting a metaphysical interpretation of *dao*. He also denies its status as the only highest stage of wisdom, according to which a particular way of living can be regarded as superior to any others. Even if we might agree with Hansen that there is no such a concept like absolute reality in the *Zhuangzi*, it does not follow that we also have to agree that there is no valid ground for any ethical position. For this reason, Hansen needs another argument to make this further step. This is the point where Philip J. Ivanhoe’s criticism on Hansen becomes relevant.

Ivanhoe claims that Zhuangzi uses “the Heavenly point of view” in which any claims of ethical positions shrink into insignificance not, as Hansen claims, for the purpose of recommending the strong relativistic position that no ethical stance can be better than another since each position is right from its own perspective, but for a therapeutic purpose that is

7 Hansen, “A Tao of Tao in Chuang-tzu.”

8 Hansen, “A Tao of Tao in Chuang-tzu,” 24.

9 Hansen, “A Tao of Tao in Chuang-tzu,” 51.

merely “designed to curb our terrible tendency toward self-aggrandizement.”¹⁰ According to this view, even if Zhuangzi thinks that a particular way of living becomes superior to others, he still puts emphasis on “the human point of view.” Ivanhoe claims, “We are not to abandon our individual roles but we must play them in light of an understanding of the greater natural pattern.” In making this claim, Ivanhoe seems to attempt to reconcile two different ideas: On the one hand, he argues against Hansen that there is a valid basis for a better way of living in Zhuangzi’s thought, namely, leading a life in accordance with, not just without conflict with, “the greater natural pattern;” on the other hand, Ivanhoe attempts to make room for another claim that each individual can meaningfully pursue her own differing project throughout her life. In this line of thinking, Ivanhoe understands the stories of skillful individuals, including Cook Ding, as describing many different ways of pursuing different life-projects that are still in attunement with “the greater natural pattern”, viz. the *dao*.

Ivanhoe’s attempt at reconciling these conflicting ideas certainly sounds interesting. But I doubt if it belongs to Zhuangzi’s thought. Ivanhoe quotes the opening passage of the “Dazongshi” chapter to make the case for his argument in favor of the distinction between the Heavenly point of view and the human point of view.¹¹ Insofar as the passage is concerned, Zhuangzi gives the impression that he favors such a distinction. Also, as Ivanhoe points out, it seems true to say that Zhuangzi makes use of the distinction in many other places.

However, we have to pay attention to the first phrase in the next passage of Ivanhoe’s quotation. Burton Watson and A.C. Graham both translate it as follows: “However, there is a difficulty (*you huan* 有患).”¹² But, *you huan* actually has a stronger sense than that given by this English rendering, and, therefore, the sentence should be translated as follows: “However, this still has some problem.”¹³ Thus understood, the sentence is intended to mean that the idea described in the previous passage has a defect; that is, the distinction between Heaven and humans is problematic from the perspective of a perfect man. In what follows after this sentence, Zhuangzi devotes himself to explaining a perfect person’s point of view that overcomes the very defect caused by the distinction between the Heavenly point of view and the human point of view. It follows then that Zhuangzi’s position is much stronger than Ivanhoe’s interpretation to the effect that Zhuangzi recommends that one should reach the highest stage of wisdom for a better way of living, rather than that one should pursue one’s own differing life-time-project on condition that it does not conflict with “the greater natural pattern.” This is illuminated by the concluding remark of the related passages that follow the aforementioned quotation by Ivanhoe: “In being one, he was acting as a companion of Heaven. In not being one, he was acting as a companion of man. When man and Heaven do not defeat each other, then we may be said to have the True Man.”¹⁴ Here, Zhuangzi clearly says that a perfect person does not get stuck with the distinction.

10 Ivanhoe, “Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?,” 200.

11 Ivanhoe, “Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?,” 201.

12 Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 77; Graham, *Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters*, 84.

13 See Chen, *Zhuangzi jin zhu jin yi*, 180.

14 Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 80.

If the above criticism of Ivanhoe is reasonable, the story of Cook Ding cannot be used to make the case for the claim that everyone has her own differing project to be achieved. Ivanhoe should not support his position by the appeal to the other stories of skillful individuals that belong to other chapters outside the inner chapters. For given that only the inner chapters are widely regarded as written by the historical figure called Zhuangzi, passages in the other chapters should not be treated as decisive evidence for a certain interpretation of Zhuangzi, particularly in those cases where the interpretation conflicts with another interpretation that is mainly constructed within the context of the inner chapters. I will present such an interpretation below. Then, I will be able to show that the focal point of the story of Cook Ding lies in a completely different place.

Here is another question for Ivanhoe: Suppose that as Ivanhoe argues, Zhuangzi made use of the Heavenly point of view for a therapeutic purpose. Then, how would such a therapy be possible in practice? Even if I make the case for a stronger claim that Zhuangzi in fact recommends the highest stage of wisdom that makes us unified with the whole world, I will show in the following section that Zhuangzi makes it clear how such a mystical stage can be reached in practice.

David B. Wong understands the debate between Hansen and Ivanhoe as a *dilemma* between the skeptic reading of the *Zhuangzi* and the objectivist reading of it; that is, he basically accepts each of the two readings as having its own advantage in interpreting different aspects of Zhuangzi, and he takes them to be in such a relationship that the two can be reconciled by dint of a *dialectic* reading.¹⁵ Wong's reading is something like the followings: One can make the most appropriate judgment in a particular situation, and one can accordingly take the most suitable action for that particular moment. In this sense, we can talk about objectivity in which a certain way is taken to be better than other options available for a certain moment. On the other hand, one must realize that a judgment or an action can be regarded as appropriate merely from a particular perspective that is valid only for a particular moment; thus one must be more flexible in adopting new perspectives according to changing situations. This is the way of opening up opportunities for one to "reveal something genuine [one has] not experienced before".¹⁶ In this respect, Wong claims, "Skeptical questioning of our current perspectives opens us to new perspectives, and in adopting these new perspectives we can make genuine discoveries."¹⁷ Wong's interpretation can sound like an objectivist reading in the sense that it acknowledges the validity of one's favoring a certain perspective in a particular situation; yet, it can also sound like a skeptical reading in the sense that it does not allow a certain perspective to enjoy lasting validity to

15 Wong, "Zhuangzi and the Obsession With Being Right."

16 Wong, "Zhuangzi and the Obsession With Being Right," 98.

17 Wong "Zhuangzi and the Obsession With Being Right," 99. Interestingly, Wong's argument bears resemblance to an argument in the debates of practical reasoning in the context of contemporary Western philosophy. Some scholars like Elijah Millgram attempts to avoid circularity and infinite regress of Humean internalism by reconsidering the concept of pleasure in such a way that one's taking a pleasure in a certain thing is the indication of one's getting a new end that is not based on one's existing motivational set. See Millgram, "Pleasure in Practical Reasoning."

the extent that it blocks “what else is there for [one] to experience.”¹⁸ Wong takes this reading to be dialectic and considers it to be closer to Zhuangzi’s original thought.

Accordingly, Wong’s interpretation of the story of Cook Ding differs from a reading shared by many other commentators.¹⁹ According to the widely accepted view, Cook Ding demonstrates a kind of skill-knowledge, namely ‘knowing-how’, rather than ‘knowing-that’, in that the cook’s skill of cutting the ox is the demonstration of effortlessness; and such a skill can be obtained through a long-term self-training and the process of habituation; and this knowledge can *neither* be transmissible by means of language *nor* be fully conceptualized. This understanding seems to fit very well into the understanding of the attunement with the *dao* as knowing how to lead one’s life in accordance with the way the world really is. In this sense, skill-knowledge is taken to be a primary mode of access to the world, which offers the most complete and direct knowledge of it. Moreover, this seems to make the case for the claim that the term *dao* does not refer to a metaphysical object in the sense that the knowledge of a metaphysical object should be a sort of ‘knowing-that’ rather than ‘knowing-how’. Furthermore, this seems to make sense of other stories of skillful individuals throughout the text. In the case of Hansen, he even claims that ‘knowing-how’ is the only form of knowledge in early China on the basis of his analysis of the term *zhi* 知. According to his analysis, the usage of the term shows that there is no demonstration of propositional knowledge, viz. ‘knowing-that’, in early China.²⁰

Wong challenges this widely appreciated understanding. He understands skill-knowledge not as something inherently different from ‘knowing-that,’ but as a sort of habituation in applying concepts without being conscious of doing thus. For instance, a good musician is someone who applies concepts of instrument and score without awareness of doing so, when she is totally absorbed in playing an instrument; however, if she comes to confront difficult parts of the performance, she would immediately deploy those concepts consciously. In this line of thinking, Wong claims that when the cook encounters the complex part of the ox and slows down in order to be cautious in cutting it up, he should be focusing on the salient feature of the ox by applying some relevant concepts. Thus, according to Wong, the slowing-down of Cook Ding is comparable to the moment in which “concepts are ... moving towards the center of awareness from a place on the periphery.”

However, the above interpretation does not fit into Zhuangzi’s thought for the same reason as mentioned in the case of Ivanhoe’s. The story has nothing to do with skill-knowledge at the outset. For the same reason, the aforementioned widely accepted understanding of Cook Ding, as well as Wong’s understanding, is to be rejected. Wong succeeds in catching where the focal point of the story lies. However, the slowing-down of the cook has

18 Wong, “Zhuangzi and the Obsession With Being Right,” 98.

19 For instance, Graham, *Reason and Spontaneity*, 186; Ivanhoe, “Zhuangzi on Skepticism, Skill, and the Ineffable *Dao*,” Hansen, *Language and Logic in Ancient China*, 64-65; Yearley, “Zhuangzi’s Understanding of Skillfulness and the Ultimate Spiritual State.”

20 See Hansen, “Linguistic Skepticism in the *Lao Tzu*.”

nothing to do with the process of deploying concepts. I will present my interpretation of the story in the below; I will understand the slowing-down as related to gaining access to the deepest layer of human constitution, namely the level of *qi*.

4. Zhuangzi's Rejection of *Xin* 心

To make an exact diagnosis of the shortcomings of the interpretations that were discussed in the previous section, suffice it to say that they miss the point that Zhuangzi considers the dissolution of the concept of self as a result of one's reaching the highest stage of wisdom. This is dramatically described in the following sentence from the "the fasting of the mind" section in the "Renjianshi" chapter: "Before I heard this [the teaching of the fasting of the mind], I was certain that I was Hui. But I have heard it, there is no more Hui."²¹

Such a phenomenon of deconstruction of the self is closely related to the elimination of *hao* and *wu* (pleasure and pain, which may be construed broadly to the extent that these include phenomenological feelings as well as cognitive processes), which are considered by Zhuangzi the most fundamental reactions towards the outer world. This idea is shown in the following conversation between Yan Hui and Confucius in the "Dazongshi" chapter:

"I let organs and members drop away, dismiss eyesight and hearing, part from the body and expel knowledge, and go along with the universal thoroughfare. This is what I mean by 'just sit and forget'".

"If you go along with it, you have no [likes (*hao*)]; if you let yourself transform, you have no more [constancy]! ..."²²

Zhuangzi even thinks that the final result of the extinction of *hao* and *wu* is the extinguishment of the desire for life and the aversion to death: "The True Man of ancient times knew nothing of loving life, knew nothing of hating death."²³

More importantly, Zhuangzi takes it that the dissolution of the self and the extinction of the fundamental ways of responding to one's surroundings, namely *hao* and *wu*, can be achieved by nullifying the function of *xin* (心, heart/mind). In this respect, Zhuangzi writes, "This is what I call not using the mind to repel the [*dao*], not using man to help out Heaven. This is what I call the True Man."²⁴

At this point, it is important to give attention to the usages of the terms *hao*, *wu* and *xin* in other early Chinese texts, such as the *Mencius* and the *Xunzi*. Zhuangzi's contemporary thinkers tended to think of the human body and its parts in terms of two aspects: their capacities and their corresponding

21 Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 58.

22 Graham, *Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters*, 92; Also see Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 90-91.

23 Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 78.

24 Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 78.

tendencies.²⁵ For example, eyes have the capacity of vision, and, at the same time, such a capacity is accompanied by a certain tendency, such as wanting to see colors (*hao se* 好色).²⁶ Such tendencies are referred to either by the terms *yu* 欲 (desire), *hao* 好 (liking), and *ai* 愛 (loving) or in the opposite cases by terms like *wu* 惡 (aversion).

The term *xin* is understood as referring to the heart as an organ as well as the function of the mind which covers human cognitive and affective activities. It is crucial to note that *xin* is also understood in terms of its capacities and its corresponding tendencies. For instance, *xin* has capacities, such as deliberating over problems (*lǚ* 慮), focusing on mental items in one's own mind (*si* 思), and setting its own directions so as to "guide one's life and shape one's [personality] as a whole" (*zhi* 志).²⁷ Moreover, one's forming a judgment of *shifei* 是非 (right and wrong) is considered one of the capacities of *xin*. In this respect, Mencius's *shifei zhi xin* 是非之心 (the starting-point of wisdom that is grounded in the heart/mind) can be understood properly. In addition, *xin* has its own tendencies. Xunzi thinks that the initial tendencies of *xin* are determined mainly in line with self-interested desires.²⁸ In contrast, Mencius takes it that *xin* in itself has morally-imposed tendencies, such as wanting to help another person in fatal danger, namely *ceyin zhi xin* 惻隱之心 (the starting-point for the development of benevolence, which is grounded in the heart/mind). Most importantly, early Chinese thinkers, not to mention Mencius and Xunzi, take self-cultivation to be a matter of one's cultivating *xin* (*yang xin* 養心). In particular, they consider the problem of how to deal with the tendencies of *xin* as the pivotal point of self-cultivation. Mencius thinks that one's becoming a moral person can be achieved through the proper development of particular tendencies of *xin*, while Xunzi objects that it can be accomplished only by means of one's transforming initial tendencies of *xin*.

This intellectual background partially explains why Zhuangzi suggests us to nullify the function of *xin* to eliminate *hao* and *wu*. Zhuangzi criticizes his contemporaries, especially the Confucian thinkers.²⁹ In the "Qiwulun" chapter, Zhuangzi takes a skeptical view of the distinction of *shi* and *fei*; that is, he criticizes that any judgment of right and wrong cannot be decisive or conclusive. This criticism is surely directed towards the claim that one must rely on the *xin*'s capacity of making judgments of *shi* and *fei*. Also, this is aimed to attack on one's relying on *hao* and *wu* as the tendencies of *xin*. For, as Hansen put it, such affective attitudes are closely associated

25 See Shun, "The Person in Confucian Thought," 185.

26 For example: "今人之性，目可以見，耳可以聽。夫可以見之明不離目，可以聽之聰不離耳，目明而耳聰，不可學明矣。" Li Disheng, *Xunzi jishi*, 541. "若夫目好色，耳好聲，口好味，心好利，骨體膚理好愉佚，是皆生於人之情性也，感而自然，不待事而後生之者也。" Li Disheng, *Xunzi jishi*, 544.

27 See Shun, "The Person in Confucian Thought," 185-186.

28 See the second quotation in Note 26.

29 It is likely that Zhuangzi knows Mencius. This possibility will indirectly be shown, in the below, through the contrast between Mencius and Zhuangzi in understanding of *qi*. Their differing understandings of *qi* seems to show that each of them presents his own thought by arguing against the other. Xunzi may be influenced by Zhuangzi. Thus it can be assumed that Zhuangzi and Xunzi share usages of many terms. As for the relationship between Zhuangzi and Xunzi, see Stalnaker, "Aspects of Xunzi's Engagement with Early Daoism," 2003.

with the distinction of *shi* and *fei*.³⁰ In other words, the criticism of the distinction of *shi* and *fei* goes together with the criticism on the malfunction of corresponding affective attitudes, such as *hao*, *wu*, *yu*, and *ai*. In this regards, the following passage from the “Qiwulun” chapter can be more properly understood: “Because right (*shi*) and wrong (*fei*) appeared, the Way was injured, and because the Way was injured, love (*ai*) became complete”.³¹ Here the skeptical view is concerned with the distinction between *shi* and *fei* and the corresponding affective attitude (*ai*) at the same time. To conclude, Zhuangzi opposes to the reliance on the malfunction of *xin*. It is in this sense that he says, “This is what I call not using the mind to repel the [*dao*], ... This is what I call the True Man.”

With the above discussion in mind, I question Wong’s interpretation in the previous section. The claim can reasonably be made that Wong’s dialectic reading of Hansen and Ivanhoe in fact gets stuck with the level of *xin* from Zhuangzi’s own point of view. I wonder how Wong can reconcile his claim that Zhuangzi *at least* appreciates the validity of a certain judgment in a particular situation *with* the fact that Zhuangzi rejects the malfunction of *xin* and, accordingly, recommends the dissolution of the self, not to mention the extinction of affective attitudes. I do not see that Zhuangzi acknowledges some temporal, though valid, roles of concepts and affective attitudes.

In addition, I question Wong’s explanation of Cook Ding. Even if we might agree with him that the form of knowledge in the *Zhuangzi* does not necessarily belong to “knowing-how,” and it includes “knowing-that” or the application of concepts, Zhuangzi would take such forms of knowledge to be malfunction of *xin* and simply reject them. Zhuangzi recommends us to go beyond the level of *xin*.

5. Zhuangzi on *Qi*

The problem is, then, how Zhuangzi understands human agency. More particularly, it is questionable how a person can act after having nullified the function of the mind. On Zhuangzi’s view, it seems impossible to explain how a person is motivated and correspondingly takes an action, given the rejection of the fundamental reactions towards surroundings at the level of the mind and the dissolution of the self. To answer the question, it is required to pay attention to the following passage from the “the fasting of the mind” section:

[Yan Hui said,] “May I ask what the fasting of the mind is?”
Confucius said, “Make your will one! Don’t listen with your ear, listen with your *xin*. No, don’t listen with your *xin*, but listen with your *qi*. ... As for *qi*, it is by dint of emptying [*xin*] that it waits to be roused by other things. Only the *Dao* accumulates in emptiness [of *xin*]. Emptying [*xin*] is the fasting of the mind.”

This translation is the result of some major amendment to Watson’s and Graham’s. The amendment is mainly aimed to clarify the ambiguous

30 Hansen, “A Tao of Tao in Chuang-tzu,” 36.

31 Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 41.

usage of *xu* 虛 (emptiness or emptying). According to their translations, *xu* refers to the characteristic of *qi*. But, in the above translation, *xu* is related to how one should handle and train one's *xin*. This interpretation is not uncontroversial; yet, there are reasons in favor of the above translation: First, though there is no occurrence of the combination of *xu* and *xin*, namely *xu xin* (emptying the heart/mind), in the inner chapters of the *Zhuangzi*, *xu* has been traditionally understood as having to do with *xin*.³² Second, Zhuangzi introduces a story in the “Yingdiwang” chapter in which Liezi's master Huzi demonstrates the stage of the dissolution of the self wherein Huzi claims that it can be accomplished by dint of *xu*. In the next section of the chapter, Zhuangzi gives an explanation of *xu* in terms of how to handle one's own *xin*: “Be empty [*xu*], that is all. The Perfect Man uses his mind (*xin*) like a mirror-going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing.”³³

Third, I understand the sentence, “Only the *Dao* accumulates in emptiness,” as meaning that *xin* can reflect the *dao* only when it is empty—that is, when it is void of any judgments of *shi* and *fei* and any affective attitudes such as *hao* and *wu*. For this seems to share a similar idea of the “Neiye” chapter in the *Guanzi* 管子, even though there are surely major differences between the *Zhuangzi* and the “Neiye” chapter. In the “Neiye” chapter, *xin* is described as a proper place for the *dao* to abide in: “The *dao* ... abides within *xin*.”³⁴ The following expression also occurs in that chapter: “The [*dao*] has no fixed position; it abides within the excellent [*xin*]. When [*xin*] is tranquil (*jing* 靜) and [*qi*] is regular, the [*dao*] can thereby be halted.”³⁵ The idea here is that *xin* can absorb the *dao* through a proper training in handling *xin*, namely the tranquility of *xin*.³⁶ The term *jing* does not occur once in the inner chapters of the *Zhuangzi*, while the term *xu* does not occur in the “Neiye” chapter. But the claim can reasonably be made that the two texts seem to share the idea that *xin* can be related to the *dao* by dint of one's training, viz. either *xu* or *jing*. This might be indirect evidence that supports the above translation.

Fourth, there is a passage in the *Xunzi*, in which *xu* is clearly connected to *xin*. “What does one use to understand the [*dao*]? I say it is [*xin*]. What does [*xin*] use to understand? I say it is emptiness (*xu*), unity (*yi* 一), and tranquility(*jing* 靜).”³⁷ As Aaron Stalnaker argues, this passage seems to show the fact that Xunzi is heavily influenced by the *Zhuangzi* as well as the “Neiye” chapter, in that Xunzi clearly takes *xin* to be connected to the *dao* by means of *xu* and *jing*.³⁸ To sum up: For the above direct and indirect reasons, I can reasonably translate *xu* in connection with *xin*, rather than in connection with *qi*.

In the previously cited passage from the *Zhuangzi*, Zhuangzi suggests that one should concentrate on the level of *qi*, rather than the level of *xin*;

32 See Wang, *Zhuangzi jiao quan*, 131; Chen, *Zhuangzi jin zhu jin yi*, 167.

33 Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 97.

34 See Chen, *Guanzi si pian quan shi*, 93. As for the translation hereafter, I also consult Harold D. Roth's. See Roth, *Original Tao: Inward Training*.

35 Roth, *Original Tao: Inward Training*, 55.

36 I intentionally use the word “absorb,” instead “reflect.” I will explain the reason later.

37 Knoblock, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Work*. Chapter 21, section 5d.

38 See Stalnaker, “Aspects of Xunzi's Engagement with Early Daoism.”

such concentration can be carried out by emptying *xin*, namely using *xin* like a mirror. In other words, *xin* can reflect things and beings in one's surroundings undisguisedly, as they are, only when one is free from the disturbance of any subjective judgments, affective reactions, and even the concept of oneself; only then one can gain access to the level of *qi*, and finally let *qi* respond freely.

At this point, it is worth considering the use of the term *qi* in other early Chinese texts. The term in the *Guoyu* 國語 refers to something that exists everywhere between Heaven and Earth, and the lack of its balance is regarded as causing disorders of nature such as earthquakes.³⁹ In the *Zuozhuan* 左傳, six kinds of *qi* (*liuqi* 六氣) are mentioned in order to explain the interconnection between Heaven and humans; those are taken to be generating five tastes, five colors, five sounds in humans; and one's losing the balance among the six is regarded as an explanation of one's sickness.⁴⁰ It can be said then that *qi* is the kind of stuff that connects humans with the outer world and fills the human body and, therefore, is that which generates various senses.

My interpretation is that in the passage at issue, Zhuangzi looks at the connection between humans and the whole world through the medium of *qi* and the fact that *qi* in itself is responsible for the generation of movement in the natural and human realms. In this sense, the general translation of *qi*, viz. vital energies, fits well into the context of the *Zhuangzi*. Then, it can be further argued that the reason why Zhuangzi suggests us to concentrate on the level of *qi* is that in *qi*, he sees the deepest source of human action, which is directly connected to the source of movement in the outer world. In other words, Zhuangzi thinks that one can be in harmony with the way the world really is through *qi*.

Now I want to suggest further implications of the above passage by comparing it, first, with the *Mencius*, and, second, with the "Neiye" chapter. David S. Nivison points out that the above passage is parallel to the *yang haoran zhi qi* 養浩然之氣 section (2A2) in the *Mencius*.⁴¹ Mencius there understands Gaozi's position as follows: "To obtain righteousness (*yi* 義) from ethical doctrines, impose it on *xin*, and then let it guide *qi*."⁴² Mencius, then, approves of only the part of Gaozi's position that one must let *xin* guide *qi*. If Nivison's understanding of the parallel is acceptable, Zhuangzi's point should be that Mencius falsely takes the function of *xin* to be superior to *qi*.

On the other hand, Mencius thinks that humans are born with some morally-imposed *qi*, viz. flood-like vital energies (*haoran zhi qi*), in the sense that some kinds of *qi* in themselves have a certain direction to make one who has such *qi* behave morally. Mencius seems to think that the cultivation of *xin* is accompanied by the cultivation of *haoran zhi qi*.⁴³ Still,

39 *Guoyu* (Si Bu Bei Yao) vol. 1, 10a. See Huang, *Meng xue si xiang shi lun*, 33. Also see Shun, *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought*, 67-68.

40 Yang, *Chun qiu Zuo zhuan zhu*, 1457; Also see Huang, *Meng xue si xiang shi lun*, 136.

41 Nivison, "Philosophical Voluntarism in Fourth-Century China."

42 As for this understanding, see Shun, *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought*, 119. Note that this understanding is not uncontroversial.

43 Shun presents a careful interpretation of this relationship between *xin* and *qi*. See Shun,

Mencius consistently makes it clear that *xin* guides *qi*. For he emphasizes that the cultivation of *haoran zhi qi* should be guided by *zhi* 志 (the direction of *xin*), namely, one of the capacities of *xin*. Again, this idea is objected by Zhuangzi.

Furthermore, Mencius says that the result of the cultivation of *hao ran zhi qi* is that the *qi* fills the space between Heaven and Earth. As Kwong-loi Shun puts it, this metaphor suggests that self-cultivation has a transformative effect on others; that is, one's moral behaviors can transform others' conducts and behaviors.⁴⁴ It is crucial to note that the direction of influence proceeds *from* the *qi* within a moral person *to* the *qi* in the outer world. This idea reflects the characteristic of Mencius' thought in that the author of the "Neiye" chapter and Zhuangzi do not share the idea.

In the "Neiye" chapter of the *Guanzi*, the relationship between the *dao* and the essence of *qi* (*jingqi* 精氣) is not clearly explained. But it can plausibly be said that the author understands the *dao* as the essence of *qi*; that is, the author takes it that the essence of *qi* amounts to the *dao*.⁴⁵ This interpretation has supporting reasons as follows: First, the author thinks that the essence of *qi* generates all things and beings between Heaven and Earth, and this idea is very similar to the *Laozi* and the *Zhuangzi* where the *dao* is taken to be carrying out the same job. Second, the author takes a sage, who amounts to a perfect man, to be someone who obtains the essence of *qi*: "[All things have the essence of *qi*]. It is this that brings them to life. It generates the five grains below and becomes the constellated stars above. When flowing amid the heavens and the earth, we call it ghostly and numinous. When stored within the chests of human beings, we call them sages."⁴⁶ This idea is parallel to another expression mentioned in the above: "The *dao* ... abides in *xin*." That is to say, the *dao* and the essence of *qi* are equally regarded as something that must stay in the inner part of a perfect man. Now we can see an opposite direction of influence as compared to the *Mencius*. The direction of influence seems to proceed *from* the *qi* in the outer of humans (the essence of *qi*) into the *qi* in the inner of humans. For this reason, the claim can be made that in the context of the "Neiye" chapter, *xin* can absorb the essence of *qi* (the *dao*) through the tranquility of *xin*, as mentioned above.

In contrast, Zhuangzi does not present such an idea that the *dao* can be understood in terms of the essence of *qi*. Rather, Zhuangzi thinks that one should let the inner *qi* freely respond to the outer *qi*. In this respect, it can be said that in the *Zhuangzi*, the direction of influence concerning *qi* differs from the *Mencius* as well as the "Neiye" chapter, in that Zhuangzi thinks that it is bilateral. It is arguable then that on Zhuangzi's view, the malfunction of *xin* and the concept of the self block the bilateral influence between the inner *qi* and the outer *qi*.

The above comparisons are not uncontroversial; yet, it helps at least to reveal the background of Zhuangzi's thought on *qi*. Given that the

Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 158-163.

44 Shun, *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought*, 163.

45 Also see Chen, *Guanzi si pian quan shi*, 50

46 Roth's translation with my amendment. Roth, *Original Tao: Inward Training*, 46. Also see Chen, *Guanzi si pian quan shi*, 88-89.

concept has been widely discussed by his contemporaries, Zhuangzi takes the concept of *qi* very seriously. In fact, what I have argued goes as far as to say that the concept of *qi* is related to one of the focal point of Zhuangzi's thought.

Returning to the criticism of Hansen, Ivanhoe, and Wong, their interpretations miss the point that Zhuangzi suggests us to nullify the function of *xin* and to gain access to the level of *qi*. No matter how it can be reconciled, the debate between Hansen and Ivanhoe still gets stuck with what Zhuangzi would take to be related to the level of *xin* in the sense that any judgments and affective attitudes are the result of the malfunction of *xin*. Instead, Zhuangzi suggests that one must let *qi* freely respond to the outer world via emptying *xin*.

In this respect, the story of Cook Ding is to be understood in a different way. The story should not be considered in relation to the other stories of skillful individuals, since the point of the story has nothing to do with any skillful individuals, such as cooks, carpenters, swimmers, boatmen, and so forth. This connection has caused a lot of misunderstandings. Instead, the story of Cook Ding must be understood in connection with the "the fasting of the mind" section. The slowing-down of the cook in cutting the ox amounts to his concentrating on *qi* via emptying *xin*. The cook slows down his activity of cutting in order to empty his *xin* and let his *qi* freely respond to the surroundings. Hansen, Ivanhoe, and Wong equally miss this core point of the story. As opposed to what Hansen says, Cook Ding is portrayed as someone who is "in harmony with the [*dao*]" rather than "someone who has perfected a particular [*dao*]".

6. Final Remarks

I shall end by suggesting an answer for the tension mentioned in the second section of this essay. The tension that Liu observes is caused by the gap between the *dao* as a metaphysical object and the *dao* related to the highest stage of wisdom. In fact, Hansen, Ivanhoe, and Wong each focus only on the latter meaning of *dao* and consider Zhuangzi's thought to be somewhat similar to the problem of objectivity (broadly construed) in contemporary Western ethics. More specifically, they are primarily concerned with the question of whether it is possible to make sense of claiming that a certain ethical position is better than others by appealing to objective criteria. In this understanding, some controversial passages in the "Dazongshi" chapter, in which the term *dao* refers to something different from a human epistemic state or wisdom, cannot fully be explained.

However, the difficulty does not at all become an issue for Daoists at the outset. In the context of the "Neiye" chapter, the way of living in harmony with the *dao* is understood as one's absorbing the essence of *qi*. Then, the Daoists who wrote the chapter thought that the *dao* could be an object of one's inner experience and embodiment;⁴⁷ and having such an

47 In this respect, Shen pays attention to a passage from the "Zhubeiyou" chapter of the *Zhuangzi*: "He who embodies the Way (*ti dao*) has all the gentlemen of the world flocking to him." Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 242. Though this chapter does not

experience or achieving such an embodiment is proposed as the answer to the question of how one should lead one's life. Moreover, the essence of *qi* is regarded as having to do with the origin of Heaven and Earth in the sense that *qi* is the constituent component of the whole world.

On the other hand, in the context of the *Zhuangzi*, the way of living in harmony with the *dao* is conceived of as letting one's *qi* freely respond to the outer *qi*. Its underlying idea is that *qi* is the fundamental constituent component of the natural and human realms. The claim can be made then that *qi* is not merely the sort of concept by the appeal to which one can think of one's joining with the way the world really is; but also the sort of concept with which one can understand the constitution of the whole world.

To conclude: For early Daoist thinkers, both the *dao* as a metaphysical entity and all things and beings between Heaven and Earth are constituted by *qi*. This constitutive relation is not just applicable to the physical aspect of human beings, but also applicable to the psychological aspect of human beings. It can be said then that one's observing the *qi* inside of oneself is the first step to achieving harmony with the outer world. If the term *dao* is to be understood as a sort of principle of nature, it becomes nothing but the underlying law of vital energies, viz. *qi*; and it follows from this that keeping harmony with this principle can be regarded as the highest stage of wisdom. In this sense, we may understand why some potential issues for us do not at all bother Zhuangzi.

At any rate, we should look at Zhuangzi's thought from his own perspective, and such a perspective can be re-constructible only when the concept of *qi* is brought into focus. This concept is especially foreign to us.

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belong to the inner chapter, it presents the same idea. See Shen, *Anthology of Vincent Shen*, 404. Graham also observes this: "The Way is already an object of inner experience in the [Neiye chapter]...." See Graham, *Disputers of the Tao*, 188.

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莊子的氣概念

金 渡 鎰

中文摘要

本文的宗旨是在说明“氣”是莊子對“道”理解的關鍵，并說明此概念是關於與道成為一體而達到最高境界的人(至人)的核心內容。而且，本文也呈现出“氣”之所以是莊子倫理思想的重点，是爲了以此更好地说明人依“道”而行的概念。本文針對最近英語圈世界的學者們，比如說 Chad Hansen, P. J. Ivanhoe，與 David B. Wong，他們對莊子的解釋，進行了懷疑和分析。本文主要分析他們對莊子核心思想的錯誤解釋以及其主要原因。經分析得出，他們之所以導致對莊子解釋的謬誤，是因為對莊子的氣缺乏充分地注意和了解。莊子的氣，這個概念是以說明構成人體的最高層次的，而人的行為與自我激勵都是能够在氣的維度上實現的。然而，由于如今不再採用莊子氣的本義，所以無法認識到對此概念把握的重要性。本文特別特別強調的是莊子的氣概念，闡發氣概念是莊子對至人與天人合一理解的核心。

關鍵詞：莊子，氣，道

Restructuring Learning (*Xue* 學) on a New Foundation:

Zhu Xi's Reformulation of *Gewu* 格物 and *Zhizhi* 致知

LEE Junghwan

Abstract

This paper aims to shed fresh light on Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130-1200) reformulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*, which he proclaimed was the first and indispensable stage of the sequence of genuine learning, thus revealing the unique characteristics of his scheme of learning. As is well known, he fell back on the authority of the Cheng brothers in interpreting these two key concepts. It remains understudied, however, to what degree, and in what way, Zhu inherited the teaching of the Cheng brothers in interpreting *gewu* and *zhizhi*. In so doing, he directly challenged the authority of the direct disciples of the Cheng brothers. He also selected passages from *Henan Chengshi yishu* in support of his views and modified the Cheng brothers' ideas to make them better fit to his scheme rather than merely comprehensively representing the Cheng brothers' thinking about these concepts. In order to fully illuminate Zhu Xi's reformulations of *gewu* and *zhizhi* without bias, the present paper examines the 'two polarities'—broad learning (*boxue* 博學) and Chan Buddhism-oriented learning—against which he sought to contrast his own views. On the one hand, he criticized the one-sidedness of each of them, and on the other, he synthesized these two polarities into a single system so as to reestablish the authority and validity of the classics and discussions between teachers and colleagues as the source of meaningful knowledge. By doing so, he strove to reverse the tendency of focusing on the inner dimension in the Cheng learning tradition, a tendency which James Liu has called "turning inward." In response to this tendency, Zhu Xi presented a new vision of the integral unity between the inner realms of human nature and the mind and the outer realm of the externals. In this vein, the present paper sheds fresh light on the meaning of "*huoran guangtong*" 豁然貫通 as "the integral unity," that which bridges the division between the inner and the outer realms, instead of a mystic transcendence, a "sudden" "lofty" elevation, or the totality of the whole.

Keywords: Zhu Xi, learning (*xue* 學), *gewu* 格物, *zhizhi* 致知, broad learning (*boxue* 博學), Chan Buddhism-oriented learning, the integral unity, *huoran guantong* 豁然貫通

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1. Introduction

In interpreting the *Great Learning* (*Daxue* 大學), Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) ventured to challenge three authorities supporting its would-be canonical status. As is well known, he refused to fully accept the *Great Learning*'s textual authority. He conferred enormous significance on a mere single chapter of the *Liji*, saying that this text preserved the entire scheme of the literati learning in antiquity.¹ However, he had to revise characters in the text, rearrange its sequence, and, above all, interpolate his own "Supplementary Chapter" into it under the ungrounded premise that a chapter on the concepts of *gewu* 格物 and *zhizhi* 致知 must have existed in the original text, but had become lost in the intervening years. Zhu's daring revision of the text stemmed from his conviction that Master Chengs—Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107)—had revealed a previously undiscovered genuine Confucian scheme of learning within this text. In short, Zhu fell back on the authority of the Cheng brothers in carrying out his daring revision. It remains understudied, however, to what degree, and in what way, Zhu inherited the teaching of the Cheng brothers in interpreting *gewu* and *zhizhi*, concepts which he described as comprising the first stage of the proper sequence of learning, and upon which he presented his own scheme of learning to his contemporary literati. The present paper aims to investigate these questions.

It is beyond question that Zhu shaped his own scholarship in line with and under the enormous influence of the Cheng brothers. The teaching of the Cheng brothers was transmitted to Zhu mainly through two routes. One was the remains of their writings, including Cheng Yi's commentary on the *Book of Change* and the recorded conversations (*yulu* 語錄) compiled by the hand of Zhu and collected under the title *Henan Chengshi yishu* 河南程氏遺書. The other route would have been through the followers of the Cheng brothers, including Yang Shi 楊時, Xie Liangzuo 謝良佐, Lü Dalin 呂大臨, and You Zuo 游酢, who comprised a group conventionally called "the four direct disciples of Master Chengs." As his compilation of *Yiluo yanyuan lu* 伊洛淵源錄 indicates, Zhu aspired to substantiate an unbroken intellectual succession from the Cheng brothers to his time.

Nonetheless, Zhu directly and indirectly challenged these two authorities as well, particularly concerning his redefinition of *gewu* and *zhizhi*, as the present paper will elaborate below. Zhu criticized not only Lu Jiuyuan but also the direct disciples of the Master Chengs as being influenced by Buddhism, although all of them publicly devoted themselves

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1 Zhu Xi, "Preface to the Commentary on the Great Learning."

to the anti-Buddhist campaign launched by their masters.² Thus, Zhu refused to inherit the legacy from the disciples as it was, once expressing his discontent like this: “From my point of view, it seems that there is no one [among the disciples of the Cheng brothers] who received the robe and bowl of the two masters (以某觀之.二先生衣鉢.似無傳之者).”³ In addition, when interpreting the concepts of *gewu* and *zhizhi*, Zhu filled the lack of textual ground with a supplementary chapter, which he sought to establish in the words of the Cheng brothers, Cheng Yi in particular. However, concerning *gewu* and *zhizhi*, there exist fundamental discrepancies between the words of Cheng Yi and Zhu’s interpretation, suggesting that Zhu did not simply reflect Cheng Yi’s ideas but altered them to better fit his own view of the legitimate scheme of literati learning. In order to fully understand Zhu’s point of view, it is also indispensable to examine ‘two polarities’—broad learning (*boxue* 博學) and Chan Buddhism-oriented learning—with which he sought to contrast his own view. In so doing, the present paper also sheds fresh light on the meaning of “*huoran guangtong*” 豁然貫通, a concept which Zhu borrowed from Cheng Yi’s writing but which also bears strong Buddhist connotations.

2. Denial of the Succession through the Disciples of the Cheng Brothers

Zhu Xi constructed a triad system for explicating the *Four Books*, consisting of, first, “Collected Commentary” (*jizhu* 集註); second, “Catechistical Sub-Commentary” (*huowen* 或問); and finally, “Anthology of Thus-far Comments.” The first two are also collectively compiled under the titles of *Sishu jizhu* 四書集註 and *Sishu huowen* 四書或問. Zhu’s *Jingyan jiangyi* 經筵講義, which he produced while serving as an imperial tutor in 1194, is comprised of his commentary on the *Great Learning* interpolated with the relevant passages from *Daxue huowen*,⁴ indicating that he designed the commentaries and sub-commentaries to be read simultaneously. A large portion of the sub-commentaries consist of his discussions, critical comments, and appraisal of previous comments, which he compiled into a series of anthologies, indicating that he designed them together as well.

Zhu’s anthologies of thus-far comments are too extensive to enumerate the names of all the authors commented upon here, but while they sometimes included commentaries on Zheng Xuan and Kong Yingda, they mainly concentrated on the Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai, and their direct and indirect followers, including “the four direct disciples of the Cheng brothers.” Overall, Zhu constructed the series of works on the *Four Books* to be read as a system comprised of the main commentaries with the original texts, the sub-commentaries, and the anthologies, which can be named, the triad system of the *Four Books*.

2 Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類, 101.2555-2578.

3 Zhu Xi, *ZZYL*, 101.2556:8.

4 Zhu Xi, “*Jingyan jiangyi*” 經筵講義, *Zhu Xi Ji* 朱熹集, 15.572-596.

Commentary	Catechistical Sub-Commentary	Anthology
<i>Daxue zhangju jizhu</i> 大學章句集註	<i>Daxue huowen</i> 大學或問	X
<i>Lunyu jizhu</i> 論語集註	<i>Luanyu huowen</i> 論語或問	<i>Lun Meng jingyi</i> 論孟精義
<i>Mengzi jizhu</i> 孟子集註	<i>Mengzi huowen</i> 孟子或問	<i>Lun Meng jingyi</i> 論孟精義
<i>Zhongyong zhangju jizhu</i> 中庸章句集註	<i>Zhongyong huowen</i> 中庸或問	<i>Zhongyong jilüe</i> 中庸輯略 (<i>Zhongyong jijie</i>) (中庸集解)

< Chart 1: Zhu Xi's Triad System of the *Four Books* >

The only exception is the *Great Learning*. Zhu completed the anthologies first, and they were published before the commentaries and sub-commentaries: *Lun Meng jingyi* 論孟精義 appeared in 1172 and *Zhongyong jilüe* 中庸輯略 in 1177 (it was made by abridging Shi Dun's *Zhongyong jijue* 中庸集解, a work completed in 1173). His compilation of anthologies on the *Analects*, the *Mencius*, and the *Zhongyong* demonstrates his indebtedness to and trust in the scholarship of the disciples of the Cheng brothers to a large degree. However, he refuted their interpretation only in relation to the *Great Learning*. It was not because the lack of sources. The literary collections and the records of sayings of the four direct disciples include a healthy number of comments about the *Great Learning*, which are systematically incorporated by Wei Shi 衛湜 into his *Liji jishuo* 禮記集說, an early 13th century work which comprehensively collected commentaries and comments on the *Liji*, including those of Zhu's. Lü, in particular, produced two commentaries on the entire *Liji*, (one of which is *Liji jie* 禮記解), which thoroughly cover both the *Great Learning* and the *Zhongyong*.⁵ Accordingly, unlike the other sub-commentaries, Zhu's catechistical sub-commentary to the *Great Learning*, *Daxue huowen*, scarcely contains any discussion or appraisal of the comments made by the followers of the Cheng brothers, but brought in direct utterances of the Cheng brothers almost exclusively. Zhu's refusal to compile an anthology for the *Great Learning* and his reliance upon the statements of the Cheng brothers themselves signifies his hidden intention of overshadowing with his new interpretation the influence that the Cheng brothers' followers had enjoyed upon the interpretation of the *Great Learning* up until then.

In his sub-commentary to the *Great Learning*, Zhu rather outspokenly denied the legitimacy of the disciples of the Cheng brothers in this respect:

[Someone says,] after Master Chengs equated *gewu* with 'exhaustive comprehension of *li*' (*qiongli* 窮理), his disciples transmitted this [teaching] through many routes. They also expound, to a certain degree, the masters' idea [on the investigation of things] and, thereby, give help to later scholars. Is it not true? ... [Zhu replies,] the disciples [of Master Chengs] may well claim that [their ideas] must have stemmed

5 Lü Dalin 呂大臨, *Nantian Lü shi yi zhu ji jiao* 藍田呂氏遺著輯校.

from the masters. However, according to my humble review of [their ideas], I am afraid that none of [the disciples] thoroughly understands [Master Chengs' idea].⁶

Here, Zhu claimed to have found substantial discrepancies between the Cheng brothers' interpretation of *gewu* as *xiongli* and the understanding of the disciples of the Cheng brothers on the same concepts, and in pointing this discrepancy out implicitly proclaims that he has discovered the Cheng brothers' genuine interpretation. He would ascribe the disciples' failure to "thoroughly understand" the Cheng brothers' ideas to their insufficient instruction from the masters as well as to the Cheng brothers' unique pedagogical method of meeting the personal needs of students.⁷

In fact, a strong argument for the legitimacy of Zhu Xi's claim to possess a more accurate understanding of the Cheng brothers' teachings is made by the fact that he was the first comprehensive compiler of the Cheng brothers' *yulu* 語錄 into a single text, *Henan Chengshi yishu*.⁸ Some versions of the records of sayings of the Cheng brothers were circulating during their life-times, but these records contained only small fractions of the whole.⁹ Because of the serious political and academic suppression from 1102, namely, *Yuanyou dangji* 元祐黨籍, their followers could not publicly promote the teaching of their masters until the last years of the Northern Song, by which time the Cheng brothers' teaching had already become widely scattered. A letter Yang Shi sent to You Zuo depicted the situation as follows:

When Master Yichuan was alive, people attributed all kinds of weird (*yu guai* 迂怪) things to him and ridiculed him. Now, time has passed and the number of the literati who trust his learning with admiration is growing beyond count. The records of the sayings of the master have been circulating somewhat widely. [However,] some of the [circulating] records miss the real [teaching of the master,] so I desire to collect them and delete overlapping or suspicious passages [from them]. Fortunately, you are not currently detained by anything urgent, so you might be able to find time to widely search [the records,] I am afraid that some of them are already lost, but I heard that when he was in Luoyang, Instructor Zhu (朱教授, i.e., Zhu Guangting 朱光庭) was circulating [Cheng Yi's *yulus*] in large quantity, and this copy is possessed by Kanghou (Hu Anguo). I will find the right time to send a letter to [Hu Anguo] to ask about this. In the future, we can compare [different records], modify them, and compile them into a book in order to transmit it to the future generations. Unless we do this, there is no way to restore the master's teaching [ever again]. Now, since only two of us are alive, we cannot ignore this responsibility.¹⁰

6 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen* 大學或問, 25-26: "曰自程子以格物爲窮理, 而其學者傳之見於文字多矣. 是亦有以發其師說而有助於後學者耶. ... 若其門人雖曰祖其師說. 然以愚考之. 則恐其皆未足以及此也."

7 Zhu Xi, *ZZYL*, 101.2555-2560.

8 Zhu Xi's postscripts to *Henan Chengshi yishu* (6) and *waishu* (9-10) in Cheng Hao 程顥, Cheng Yi 程頤, *Er Cheng ji* 二程集.

9 Yin Tun 尹焞, "Shi shuo" 師說 (3:4b-5a) and "Ti Yi Chuan xiansheng yulu" 題伊川先生語錄 (3:6a-b) in *Hejing ji* 和靖集.

10 Yang Shi, "Yu You Dingfu ji liu" 與游定夫其六, *Guishan xiansheng quan ji*, 18:826-7: "伊川先生在時. 世人迂怪之論皆歸之以爲訕笑. 今往矣士大夫尊信其學者漸衆殊不可曉也. 先生語錄傳之浸廣. 其間記錄頗有失真者. 某欲收聚刪去重複與其可疑者. 公幸閒居無事. 可更博爲尋訪. 恐有遺失. 聞朱教授在洛中所傳頗多. 康侯皆有之. 候尋便以書詢求. 異時更相校對稍加潤色. 共成一書. 以傳後學. 不爲無補. 先生之門. 所存惟吾二人耳. 不得不任其責也." This letter must have been written

Yang Shi's plan was interrupted by the Jurchen invasion and the subsequent collapse of the Northern Song in 1127. Soon after, however, he asked Hu Anguo for a copy of Zhu's collection of the *Cheng yulus* via letters, and his son, Yang Di 楊迪, later fetched him a copy. Despite these efforts, Yang Shi's death in 1135 further delayed their publication. In 1166, Zhang Shi 張栻, who had connections both with the Hu family and Yang Shi, printed the collection under the title of *Henan Chengshi cuiyu* 河南程氏粹語. However, this version is less than one third the size of *Henan Chengshi yishu* and included only the sayings of Cheng Yi.¹¹ It is a fair conjecture that although he had never directly met the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi's extensive labors as a compiler would tend to support his claim to be the one who got access to the sayings of the Cheng brothers most comprehensively up until then. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Zhu 'comprehensively' incorporated the sayings of the Cheng brothers into his interpretation of the critical concepts of *gewu* and *zhizhi*.

3. Modification and Selection of the Cheng brothers' Words

In his *Daxue huowen*, Zhu Xi proposed an overall scheme of learning on the basis of the eight items in the *Great Learning*. Centering around *gewu* and *zhizhi*, the scheme is organized into three propositions. First, he establishes that *gewu* and *zhizhi* enjoy priority over the six subsequent items in the sequence of learning (格物致知所以當先而不可後之意); second, he describes the conditions needed to properly practice *gewu* and *zhizhi* and details the relationship between these two concepts and other methods of learning such as inner mental attentiveness (*jing* 敬) (格物致知所當用力之地與其次第工程); and lastly, he insists upon the necessity of cultivating the origin (i.e., the mind and human nature) as the basis for *gewu* and *zhizhi* (涵養本原之功. 所以為格物致知之本).¹² In *Daxue huowen*, each proposition is paired with quotations from *Henan Chengshi yishu*, thus showing that his scheme is firmly grounded on the words of the Cheng brothers:¹³ Zhu

before 1123 when You died and probably after 1120 when Xie Liangzuo died.

- 11 In *SKQS*, this is titled as *Er Cheng cui yan* 二程粹言, but from reading Yang Shi's letters addressed to Hu Anguo and Zhang Shi's preface to this text, there is no doubt that this is the record of the words of Cheng Yi alone. For this, see, Yang Shi, "yu you ding fu ji liu 與游定夫其六," *Yang Shi ji*, 18:826-7, and Zhang Shi, "*Henan Chengshi cuiyan xu* 河南程氏粹言序," *Er cheng ji*, 1167. In 1166, Zhu Xi also edited Two Cheng Brothers' *yulu* preserved in the Hunan Hu family (see. Shu Jingnan 東景南, *Zhu xi nian pu chang pian* 朱熹年譜長編, 360 and 364) and was involved in disputes with Zhang Shi, Liu Gong 劉珙, and, ultimately, Hu Dayuan 胡大原, concerning his editing of the writings of the two Cheng brothers, which had been preserved in the Hu family.
- 12 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, 20-22.

- 13 In 1194, Zhu Xi serves as a tutor of Emperor Guangzong 光宗 for a short period. His note for tutorial, "Jingyan jiangyi" 經筵講義, remained in his collected works. Though it stops at the "Sincerity of the Will" chapter (*chengyi* 誠意), this is almost identical with his *Daxue zhangju* 大學章句 and *Daxue huowen* 大學或問, which he might have revised in 1189. Since "Jingyan jiangyi" was for the emperor, he replaced the two paragraphs in which he emphasized the extensive duties of literati with those suitable for the emperor. Except this modification for the sake of the special audience, these two texts almost completely correspond to each other except the part in which Zhu listed the Cheng brothers' words to back up his supplementary chapter to *gewu* and *zhizhi*. More than half of the passages quoted

paired two quotations with the first proposition, nine for the second, and five for the third.

Despite this, it is questionable to what degree Zhu truly fell back on the authority of the Cheng brothers. A comparison of the sixteen passages Zhu cited to those as they appear in *Henan Chengshi yishu* shows that Zhu quoted just one without change, namely: “Nurturing requires inner mental attentiveness; the pursuit of learning depends upon the extension of knowledge”(涵養須用敬。進學則在致知). The other fifteen passages were presented either by combining two or three separate passages into one, by culling out parts instead of whole passages, or by attaching some extraneous phrases or sentences beyond the original passages.

Furthermore, in the process of modification, Zhu frequently altered the seeming intent of the original passages as well. For example, a passage in *Daxue huowen* reads as follows:

The essential in *zhizhi* is to comprehend where the utmost goodness lies. We can take “fathers abide in affection” and “children abide in filial piety” as examples. If one desires to extensively observe the *li* of all the myriad things without putting efforts to these [norms,] I am afraid that this is like that a huge army on campaign sending cavalymen too far away, so they cannot return.¹⁴

In contrast, the original passage in *Henan Chengshi yishu* reads as follows:

Zhizhi is simply to comprehend that [we should] abide in the utmost goodness. [We can take] “fathers abide in affection” and “children abide in filial piety” as examples. [However, this] must not be from outside.¹⁵ If you put effort only into extensively observing the *li* of [external] things, this is just like the case of the wandering cavalymen that cannot return.¹⁶ (Italic added)

Although the literal difference between the two passages quoted above looks trivial, the main points are substantially at odds. The passage from *Daxue huowen* intends to advise that *zhizhi* as a pursuit of knowledge should not aim at endless extension of knowledge and that its main objective lies in the understanding and utmost practice of moral norms. In contrast, as the phrase “must not be from outside” signifies, the passage from *Henan Chengshi yishu* emphasizes the risk of turning attention outwardly at the cost of the significance of moral practices under the cause of extension of knowledge. As is discussed below, this issue is related to Zhu’s strategic criticism against the validity of “broad learning” (*boxue* 博學). The following examples demonstrate the discrepancy more clearly. The following passage comes from *Daxue huowen*.

in the *Daxue huowen* were replaced in “*Jingyan jiangyi*”. Moreover, the first section – the priority of *gewu* and *zhizhi* and the following passages were completely removed. Instead, he added a new section, “the way to practice inner mental attentiveness (所以為敬之方).”

14 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, 22: “致知之要當知至善之所在。如父止於慈。子止於孝之類。若不務此而徒欲汎然以觀萬物之理。則吾恐其如大軍之游騎出太遠而無所歸也。”

15 This sentence also can be translated “This does not need to be done at the outside,” but this would not change the following argument.

16 *Er Cheng ji*, 100.5: “致知但知止於至善。為人子止於孝。為人父止於慈之類。不須外面。只務觀物理汎然。正如遊騎無所歸也。”

From within the self to the *li* of the myriad things, [if you] comprehend [them] to a great extent, you will naturally experience sudden insight.¹⁷

The corresponding full passage in *Henan Chengshi yishu* reads as follows:

If one desires to *zhizhi*, one must *gewu*. “Thing” does not necessarily indicate [external] things and affairs. From within the self to the *li* of the myriad things, [if you] comprehend them to a great extent, then, you will naturally experience sudden insight.¹⁸

In *Daxue huowen*, Zhu Xi’s omission of the preceding sentence in the original passage significantly alters the overall implication. The former passage is inclusive in terms of the target of *gewu*, including both the internal self and the external things. Thus, it signifies the accumulative increase of comprehension of *li* would lead to a mystical experience of sudden insight. In contrast, the latter passage underlines that the focus of *gewu* is not confined to external things but the self is also a legitimate source for comprehension of *li*. Thus, it implies that insofar as one can extend one’s comprehension of *li* to a certain extent, it does not matter whether one focuses attention either to the self or the externals. Taking this idea one step further, one can infer from the latter the possibility that one can achieve a sort of universalistic comprehension of *li* by exclusively concentrating solely on the self. As will be discussed later, however, this type of ‘inwardness’ is one of the two polarities that Zhu Xi characterized as a Chan-oriented learning and purported to replace with his formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*.

In addition to the matter of modification, Zhu Xi’s claim that he discovered the genuine teaching of the Cheng brothers also involves the problem of judgment and choice. *Henan Chengshi yishu* is a compilation of verbal communications recorded by different figures in different times, which implies the high possibility of inconsistency. Concerning *gewu* and *zhizhi*, the compilation contains multiple relevant passages, but some of them seem mutually incompatible, unless additional explications were provided.

The following passage is the record of Cheng Yi’s conversation which Zhu Xi most frequently cited to support his interpretation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*:

Someone asks what the top-priority is in the art of moral cultivation.
Answer: Nothing is prior to rectifying the mind and making the will sincere. The sincerity of the will depends upon *zhizhi*, and *zhizhi* depends upon *gewu*. The word “*ge*” means “to arrive,” as it is used in the saying that “the spirit of imperial progenitors have arrived.” There is *li* in everything, and one must comprehend *li* to the utmost. There are many ways to carry out this. One is to elucidate *li* through reading books and participating in discussions. Another is to distinguish right from wrong in the middle of reassessing people and events of the past and present. Still

17 Zhu Xi, *Ibid.*, 21: “自一身之中，以至萬物之理，理會得多，自當豁然有箇覺處。”

18 *Er Cheng ji*, 181.2: “今人欲致知須要格物，物不必謂事物然後謂之物也，自一身之中，至萬物之理，但理會得多，幾(相)次自然豁然有覺處。”

another way is to handle affairs and settle them in a proper manner. All these are the proper ways to exhaust *li*.

Someone asks: In probing things, is it necessary to probe each and every thing? Or, can one know all myriad *li* by probing only one thing?

Answer: How can one understand everything like this? Even Yanzi would not dare say he could readily understand *li* by probing only one thing. One must probe one item today and another item tomorrow. When one has accumulated much knowledge he will naturally experience a thorough penetration like a sudden release.¹⁹

Apparently, Zhu Xi's supplementary chapter is substantially based on this passage. The fact that *Henan Chengshi cuiyan*, which, as discussed above, is the record of Cheng Yi's sayings, includes a virtually identical passage reaffirms its authenticity.²⁰ Nonetheless, not all of Zhu's contemporaries accepted its authenticity, casting particular doubt on the phrase "probe one item today and another item tomorrow."²¹ It is also precarious to rely so heavily on this single passage as representing Cheng Yi's genuine ideas on *gewu* and *zhizhi* particularly since the *Henan Chengshi yishu* contains no other passages comparable to the one cited. This problem becomes more apparent when we encounter passages which seem inconsistent with the one quoted above. The following passage is a noticeable example:

Question: Do observation of things and self-examination mean looking for [*li*] in the self after observing [them] at external things?

Answer: It is not necessary so. Things and the self are one *li*. If you understand this, you understand that as well. This is the unity of inner and outer. In its magnitude it reaches the height of heaven and the depth of earth, but in its refinement it constitutes the reason of being so of every single thing. The student should appreciate it.

Further question: In the process of *zhizhi*, how about seeking first of all in the Four Beginnings?

Answer: To seek in our own nature and feelings is indeed to be concerned with our own moral life. But every blade of grass and every tree possess *li* and should be examined.²²

Both passages quoted above are included in chapter eighteen of the sayings of Cheng Yi, as recorded by Liu Anjie 安節 from Yongjia 永嘉 between 1090 and 1097, a copy of which Chen Yan 陳淵 obtained from Liu's son.²³ It is therefore beyond our latitude to address the question of which one, between the two, is more authentic in presenting Cheng Yi's

19 *Er Cheng ji*, 188.2: "或問進修之術何先。曰莫先於正心誠意。誠意在致知。致知在格物。格至也。如祖考來格之格。凡一物上有一理。須是窮致其理。窮理亦多端。或讀書講明義理。或論古今人物別其是非。或應事接物而處其當。皆窮理也。或問格物須物物格之。還只格一物而萬理皆知。曰怎生便會通。若只格一物便通衆理。雖顏子亦不敢如此道。須是今日格一件。明日又格一件。積習既多。然後脫然自有貫通處。" The translation is from Chan, *A Source Book*, 560-561 with minor modifications.

20 *Henan Chengshi cuiyan in Er Cheng ji*, 1191:5.

21 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen*, 27.

22 *Er Cheng ji*, 193.1: "問觀物察己。還因見物。反求諸身否。曰不必如此說。物我一理。纔明彼即曉此。合內外之道也。語其大。至天地之高厚。語其小。至一物之所以然。學者皆當理會。又問致知。先求之四端。如何。曰求之性情。固是切於身。然一草一木。皆有理。須(是)察。" For translation, Wing-chit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 563 with minor changes. Also see *Er Cheng ji*, 193:6.

23 *Er Cheng ji*, 4.

actual ideas on *gewu* and *zhizhi*. What is conspicuous, however, is the discrepancy between them.

The first passage Zhu Xi resorted to is based on some underlying premises. First, the requirement of gradual accumulation implies the coexistence of diverse, mutually distinguishable particularities of *li*, which are associated with related things. The sum of such particularities of *li* cannot be reduced to the unity of *li* without losing the unique sense of each particular *li*. The reason that one should “probe one item today and another item tomorrow” can be justified under the premise that the *li* one can comprehend by probing one particular thing should differ from the *li* one can comprehend by probing another thing.

Although human nature is theoretically equal to *li*, the internal dimension of mind and nature is not included in the discussion of the range of things to probe; rather, the focus is turned to externals, such as books. Nor is the relationship between the internal dimension and external things explicated. Such a formulation may lead to a belief that *li* is something that an agent can acquire *from* external things.

The gradual process of *gewu* (i.e., , “*jiu* 久”) seems teleological, aiming for a kind of transcendental “leap” from the accumulation of *li* from particulars to a type of perfect integration of the whole, which is called “sudden penetration or *huoran guantong*.”²⁴ The passage does not provide an explication about how this transcendental leap from particulars to the whole is possible. However, in order to justify this leap solely on the basis of the accumulation of *li* from external things, it implies the premise of an orderly relationship among particular *li*, namely, the comprehension of a coherent higher-order (or highest-order) conception of the arrangement of the human and natural worlds.²⁵ This highest-order picture of the world’s arrangement does not sufficiently explicate the *li* of particulars but embraces them all in terms of order and coherence.

This interpretation brings to light a substantial discrepancy between the two passages quoted above. The gist of the latter passage lies in the unity and ubiquity of *li* crossing the borders not only between external particulars but also between the internal and the external, as represented by the idiomatic phrase of “the unity of inner and outer.” In particular, it appears that the second questioner assumed the internal aspect of the Four Beginnings as the legitimate starting point for the extension of knowledge, and Cheng Yi’s response shows general agreement with this premise. Thus, this passage apparently brings the internal dimension into the range of things for *gewu* and *zhizhi* without making an explicit demand for probing external things. It suggests that the *li* one can comprehend by “self-examination” is equivalent to the *li* one can comprehend from “observation of things.” This idea is predicated upon the hidden presupposition that a single *li* penetrates both the internal and the external, and also signifies that one does not have to accumulate the knowledge of *li* through gradually probing things one by one. In this context, *li* must be something universal

24 On this issue, see Kim Yung Sik, “‘Analogical Extension’ (*leitū*) in Zhu Xi’s Methodology of ‘Investigation of Things’ (*gewu*) and ‘Extension of Knowledge’ (*zhizhi*).”

25 On this, see Kim, *Ibid.*, and Peterson, “Another Look at *Li* 理,” 13-32. Also, see, Peter K. Bol, “Chu His’s Redefinition of Literati Learning,” In *Neo-Confucian Education: The Formative Stage*, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary and John W. Chaffee, 184-185.

and highest-ordered, which cannot be equal to the mere gloss of the *li* of several particulars, since the *li* of particular things must be associated with the unique attributes and/or properties that explain the existence and function of each particular thing. In sum, whereas the former passage requires a diverse range of external things to probe, the latter underrates such a requirement.

The comparative analysis we have performed thus far drives us to reassess Zhu's claim that he discovered the genuine teaching of Master Chengs. Zhu's "Supplementary Chapter" to the *Great Learning*, which is the *locus classicus* for his conceptualization of *gewu* and *zhizhi*, is not entirely grounded on his synthesis of the Cheng brothers' overall ideas on the relevant concepts. Rather, when encountering mutually incompatible passages, he seems to have "opted for" the parts that were better fitted to his objective against those which departed from his conceptualizations. In particular, when one takes into consideration that the two passages quoted above come from the same chapter in *Henan Chengshi yishu*, it is also likely either that the Cheng brothers may have held inconsistent ideas on *gewu* and *zhizhi* or that they promoted an idea which does not fully cohere with that of Zhu. This matter of selective adoptions and reinterpretations leaves us with a question as to what degree Zhu's ideas on *gewu* and *zhizhi*, as well as on the learning in general, really do coincide with those held by the Cheng brothers. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a clear answer to this question, but it is now clear that Zhu's reliance on the authority of the Cheng brothers involves modification and selection, which cannot be counted as merely simple reiteration and reinterpretation.

4. The Two Polarities

Arguably, the most provocative aspect of Zhu's rendering of *gewu* and *zhizhi* consists in the expression of "sudden penetration" or "*huoran guantong*." At the level of appearances, this is because this phrase is reminiscent of "sudden enlightenment" (*dunwu* 頓悟), while his reformulation of *gewu* is also similar with "gradual cultivation" (*jianxiu* 漸修), and, at the philosophical level, this usage is significant because it is his only proposed explication of the transcendental "leap" from particulars to the unity of *li*.

It is hardly difficult to find a phrase in Buddhist texts which seem largely interchangeable with "*huoran guantong*." For example,

If you can comprehend this, this can be called the true repentance. You, sir, already possess the spirit of *dazhangfu*; you must resolutely practice *chan* (contemplation). If you can practice this, then you will definitely experience *sudden* enlightenment.²⁶

Cheng Yi's usage of this expression has a different significance from that of Zhu. Cheng's words are put down by a recorder of the sayings,

26 Dahui Zonggao 大慧宗杲, *Dahui pujue chanshi yulu* 大慧普覺禪師語錄, (Taisho ed.) T47n1998Ap0866b19(05)-20(02): "若能如是見得。是真懺悔。道上座既具大丈夫志氣。決定要參禪。但怎麼參。須是豁然悟去。" Also see, Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹, *Fan wen zheng ji* 范文正集 (SKQS ed.) Bieji 別集 4:2a; and Juefan Huihong 覺範 惠洪, *Shi men wen zi chan* 石門文字禪 (SKQS ed.), 30:2a.

implying the high possibility of rewording by the recorder. To the contrary, Zhu's adoption of this expression is entirely deliberate. From a different angle, however, Zhu's intentional adoption of the expression in the most controversial part of his commentary on the *Great Learning*, namely, the supplementary chapter, also urges us to rethink his ulterior motivation for doing so. As he proclaims in his preface to the *Zhongyong*, the establishment of the genuine learning is largely predicated on the sectarian agenda of how to illuminate the seemingly subtle differences between Daoxue 道學 and Buddhism.

Schematically, Zhu Xi's reformulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* can be approached through identifying "two polarities" which he was eager to avoid from the early stage of his career—broad learning and Chan-type introspective sudden enlightenment.

Then, the learning you propose is not sought in the mind but in the traces; not sought in the internal but in the external. I am afraid that the learning of the sages and worthies is not so superficial (*qianjin* 淺近) or fragmented (*zhili* 支離) as this.²⁷

This straightforward denigration is put forward no other than Zhu Xi himself. In *Daoxue huowen*, this criticism quoted above is appended right next to Zhu's defensive explication of his supplementary chapter on *gewu* and *zhizhi*, suggesting that he was fully aware of the provocative characteristic of his formulation. His explication includes the following account:

The proper method for making an effort is comprised of inspecting it (i.e., *li*) at the emergence of events and actions, examining it at the subtlety of burgeoning thoughts, seeking it in the middle of books and language, and looking into it when being involved in discussions.²⁸

With little doubt, this formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* is a simple reiteration of Cheng Yi's suggestion quoted in the previous chapter. However, Zhu's self-posed criticism signifies that despite the almost sacred authority of Cheng Yi at least in the Daoxue tradition, this method was not congruent with the conventional understanding of *gewu* and *zhizhi*. The harsh criticism quoted above is paired with another self-posed rebuttal, which reads:

If so, how do you differentiate the proposed learning of *gewu* and *zhizhi* from the so-called 'broadly absorbing various things'?²⁹

By posing this question, Zhu intended to defend his formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* from a possible criticism about its resemblance to so-called 'broad learning,' suggesting that for the followers of the Cheng brothers,

27 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen*, 24: "然則子之爲學不求諸心而求諸迹. 不求之內而求之外. 吾恐聖賢之學. 不如是之淺近而支離也."

28 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen*, 23: "若其用力之方. 則或考之事爲之著. 或察之念慮之微. 或求之文字之中. 或索之講論之際."

29 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen*, 28: "然則所謂格物致知之學. 與世之所謂博物洽聞者. 奚以異?"

broad learning is not compatible with genuine learning. Zhu's response reads as follows:

This [learning I propose] takes “look into the self” and “exhaustively comprehend *li*” as its main tasks, but this is necessarily [undertaken] in the way of thoroughly probing the utmost both of the fundamentals and their derivatives and of right and wrong. [In contrast,] that [i.e., broad learning] takes pursuing the externals and boasting of abundance as its business without examining the veracity of the manifest and the hidden or truth and falsehood. Thus, probing to the utmost will make [one's] knowledge (*zhi* 知) wider and, at the same time, the mind brighter, whereas not examining veracity will make [superficial] knowledge (*shi* 識) wider but the mind will be more clogged. This is the very point where [learning] for the self and [learning] for others diverge, so it is necessary to carefully pay attention to this.³⁰

In this comparison, Zhu presented his standards for discerning genuine from pseudo knowledge. In essence, he acknowledged the analogy between his formulation of *gewu* and the conventional practice of broad learning in two senses: knowledge should be broadened or extended, and this qualitative change should be pursued in the connection with external things (*wai* 外). In other words, the extension of knowledge should be in line with the expansion of the range and kinds of external things and affairs that one has examined and comprehended.

Nonetheless, the expansion of the range and kinds must result in the increase of one's genuine knowledge of the things and affairs one has inspected. Such knowledge should illuminate both “the fundamental” and “the derivative,” as well as “the manifest (or common)” and “the hidden (or inner)” aspects of things,³¹ and such illumination should be “thorough” (*ji* 極) and “truthful” (*shi* 實). Additionally, genuine knowledge should be combined with one's judgment on the externals in terms of “morality” and “veracity” (*shifei* 是非 and *zhenwang* 真妄). Therefore, the knowledge thus acquired is not merely ‘about’ the externals but should have something to do with the self by “making the mind brighter.” Put differently, the practice of *gewu* and *zhizhi* should be accompanied by the moral and epistemological judgment of the mind as the genuine agent of the self about these external things, thus being beneficial to, and meaningful for, the moral and rightful management of life of the self (*weiji* 爲己).

In contrast, knowledge acquired through the conventional practice of broad learning tends to be disqualified as genuine knowledge, not only because it does not aim to acquire thorough and truthful knowledge but also because it is merely “about” the externals. Therefore, while it can be expanded endlessly as there is a seemingly infinite diversity of external things, it is not sufficient to providing an agent with meaningful knowledge for his or her life but tends to end up being “fragmented” and “superficial.”

Zhu's confutation of broad learning had significant bearings on the intellectual milieu of the time. For instance, he once aimed this criticism to

30 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huwen*, 28: “此以反身窮理爲主.而必究其本末是非之極至.彼以徇外誇多爲務.而不嚴其表裏真妄之實.然必究其極.是以知愈博而心愈明.不嚴其實.是以識愈多而心愈窒.此正爲己爲人之所以分.不可不察也.”

31 For Zhu's elaboration on these terms, see Zhu Xi, *ZZYL*, 16.322-324.

Lü Zuqian 祖謙, one of his most important partners in the Daoxue camp. He branded Lü's intellectual interests as "miscellaneous" (*boza* 博雜), and took him to task for failing to "return to the essentials" (*yaoyue* 要約) and warned of the danger of "losing one's will while being engrossed by things" (*wanwu sangzhi* 玩物喪志).³² Zhu also classified his contemporary utilitarian statecraft thinkers into the category of broad learning in their lack of the essentials.³³

Despite this outward criticism of broad learning, the most striking characteristic of Zhu's formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* remains its resemblance to broad learning, particularly their shared prescription that one's extension of knowledge should be practiced in relation to the external 'things.' As a consequence, one's view of things is altered from their long-established negative characterization as the main cause for disturbing the self's tranquility and harmony to a consideration of them as beneficial entities which are indispensable for the extension of knowledge. In order to fully understand his ulterior motive for incorporating the feature of broad learning into his interpretation of *gewu*, it is necessary to examine Chan Buddhism, the opposite polarity he set to void in his formulation of the genuine learning.

In his self-defense against the denigration quoted above, Zhu disclosed the reason why he would rather take the risk of predicted serious misinterpretation of his proposal as being superficial and fragmented. It reads:

If [someone], considering this [proposal of learning] superficial and fragmented, then desires to desert the tangible and set up a sort of dimly deep, dazzling, hardly practicable, and transcendent doctrine, thus urging learners to imprudently set their minds beyond books and language, and say that this is the only way to comprehend the Way, this is the worst of the recent wantonly one-sided and viciously concealing form of Buddhist learning, which would like to move [the mind of learners in a wrong direction] and thus disorder the genuine learning (*shixue* 實學) of "luminous Virtue" and "renewing people" in antiquity. It is also wrong.³⁴

The description of searching for the Way outside of books and language unambiguously refers to the key phrases of the Chan Buddhist lexicon: "A special transmission outside the teaching; Not based on the written word. Directly pointing to the human mind; Achieving Buddhahood by seeing one's nature" (*bu li wenzi* 不立文字, *jiaowai biechuan* 教外別傳, *zhizhi renxin* 直指人心, *jianxing chengfo* 見性成佛). Here, Zhu Xi relentlessly disparaged the Chan-based learning as the most spurious form even in Buddhism and as the most serious threat to "the genuine learning," which he sought to revive.

Clarifying the fundamental but elusive difference between Confucianism and Buddhism was arguably the most central issue for Zhu throughout his lifetime.

32 Zhu Xi, *ZXJ*, 31.1310.

33 Zhu Xi, *ZZYL*, 11.188:5.

34 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, 24-5: "今必以是為淺近支離,而欲藏形匿影,別為一種幽深恍惚艱難阻絕之論,務使學者莽然措其心於文字言語之外,而曰道必如此然後可以得之,則是近世佛學詖淫邪遁之尤者而欲移之以亂古人明德新民之實學,其亦誤矣。"

Generally speaking, recent [pursuers of] the learning of the Way (*daoxuezhe* 道學者) have usually slipped into [the pitfall of] excessive loftiness. Reading the Classics and engaging in discussions, [they] take a sudden elevation through shortcut as a standard but are not willing to climb the ladder rung by rung. So, they ignore and desert all the intricate or subtle things which are, in fact, good to ponder over, since they presume these things are too shallow and crumbled to pay attention to. ... [However, when] *li* has not been completely comprehended, doubts tend to arise in the reader's mind. Nevertheless, rather than looking for [*li*] nearby, they are deluded into consulting the doctrines of the heterodox learning. Furthermore, placing [their attention] at the dim and unfathomable realm, they loftily taste meaningless words and wait for [experiencing] *wide-opening* and *sudden enlightenment*. They absolutely do not know that things must be investigated in order to understand [*li*] or that moral norms must be probed in order to exhaustively [realize them].³⁵

This sectarian statement comes from one of Zhu's letters written in 1164, dated rather earlier than the period when he established his distinct philosophical system between the late 1160s and the early 1170s. Nonetheless, the high degree of consistency and continuity between this statement and the quotations from *Daxue huowen* is easily noticeable, suggesting that his reformulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* aimed mainly to challenge the prevailing Chan Buddhist influence over literati learning. Here, Zhu analogized *gewu* ("wu bi ge 物必格") to "climb[ing] the ladder rung by rung," empathizing its gradual characteristic. By "things," he primarily meant "reading the Classics and engaging in discussions," as had been prescribed by Cheng Yi. Zhu claimed that the attention of learners, which were then focused on the lofty, dim, and unfathomable realm beyond the reach of ordinary persons, should be lowered down to the realm of things that are "nearby" (*jin* 近) to those who pursued to learn the Way. The derogatory expression "shallow and crumbled" (*beijin suoxie* 卑近瑣屑) is almost synonymous to the phrase "superficial and fragmented" used in the self-posed rebuttal quoted earlier. With these strong words, Zhu intended to highlight the incompatibility between the legitimate practice of *gewu* and the inappropriate attitude of seeking for "a sudden elevation through shortcut" and "wide-opening and sudden enlightenment." In the same letter, he more unequivocally compared the accumulative aspect ("*jilei* 積累") of *gewu* to "sudden enlightenment" (*dunwu* 頓悟) in the Chan doctrines and encapsulated the overall process of *gewu* and *zhizhi* into the phrase "the procedure of ascent from the lesser learning to the higher achievement" (*xia xue shang da* 下學上達).³⁶

What calls special attention is that Zhu's conception of "the higher achievement" at this early stage was substantially different from that of "sudden penetration" in his mature interpretation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*. Although the expression "wide-opening and sudden enlightenment" (*kuoran er yiwu* 廓然而一悟) in the above quotation is certainly analogous to

35 Zhu Xi, ZXJ, 32.1268-1269: "大抵近世言道學者，失於太高。讀書講義，率常以徑易超絕，不歷階梯為快。而於其間曲折精微正好玩處，例皆忽畧厭棄，以為卑近瑣屑，不足留情。... 理既未盡，而胸中不能無疑，乃不復反求諸近，顧惑於異端之說，益推而置諸冥漠不可測知之域，兀然終日味無義之語，以俟其廓然而一悟，殊不知物必格而後明，倫必察而後盡。"

36 Zhu Xi, "Da wang shang shu" 答汪尚書, ZXJ, 30.1268-9.

“*huoran guangtong*” in its literal meaning, he associated it with the sudden enlightenment of Chan in a negative sense. Furthermore, he described the process and state of the higher achievement as “gradually illuminating and, subsequently, transparent understanding of *li* in its multitude” (*cun jiu jian ming* 存久漸明, *zhong li dong ran* 衆理洞然).³⁷ In both Cheng Yi’s words quoted from *Henan Chengshi yishu* and Zhu’s supplementary chapter, the utmost stage is described as a sudden and fundamental leap from the gradual accumulation of one’s knowledge on the *li* of particulars to the entire integration and penetration of the whole, which transcends the bound of particulars. Therefore, as discussed above, *li* in this utmost stage should be universal and highest-ordered, which, therefore, can be applicable to all but be reducible to nothing particular. In contrast, the term “*zhong li*” here has the connotation of a mere gross totality of multitudinous things which does not lead to such a fundamental and transcendental breakthrough. In this light, this term may also lead one to estimating Zhu’s formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* as only a modified version of broad learning in terms of the pursuit of qualitative extension of knowledge as the main goal, as the self-posing accusation quoted above implies. One may also offer the conjecture that a fundamental change in Zhu’s formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi* occurred in the meanwhile. Nonetheless, there still remains a third way of reinterpretation which may bridge the interpretive gap between these two types understanding of “the higher achievement.”

5. A Synthesis between the Polarities

In articulating his formulation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*, Zhu Xi strategically set the two polarities of broad learning and the Chan Buddhist mode of learning. On the one hand, these polarities are meant to serve as reference posts to mark his distinct position elsewhere. On the other, they also indicate that his formulation shares a certain degree of common features with them. As seen above, Zhu’s self-posed accusation of his proposal as “superficial and fragmented” was necessary since he did incorporate the features of broad learning into his formulation to an apparent degree. As is demonstrated by the expression of *huoran guantong*, his overt and straightforward denial of the Chan mode of learning also does not mean that the separation from it was not the primary purpose of his formulation.

In the following passage quoted from *Daxue huowen*, Zhu presented a further explication of his supplementary chapter. It reads:

I answer, “The main ends of learning are none other than the mind and *li*. The mind is the master of a body (or the self), and [the mind of] empty and numinous substance is self-sufficient to deal with *li* of the world. *Li* is ubiquitous in the myriad things, however, the subtle and delicate manifestations [of *li*], in fact, do not [happen] outside the mind of one person. From the beginning, it is wrong to make an argument on the basis of the division between the inner and the outer, or the fine and the crude. Nevertheless, those who do not know the numinous-ness of the mind cannot

37 Zhu Xi, “*Da wang shang shu*” 答汪尚書, *ZXJ*, 30.1268-9.

preserve it, so their minds will be dim and confused. Nor can they exhaust the subtlety of the myriad *li*. [On the contrary,] those who do not know the subtlety of myriad *li* do not exhaust them, so they will be narrow and stagnant. Nor can they complete the whole of the mind. It is necessarily so.

Therefore, the sages set up teachings, on the one hand, to let people calmly understand the numinous-ness of the mind and, then, preserve it in the state of being solemn, discriminating, and undivided. This is the basis of exhausting *li*. [On the other, the sages] let people realize the existence of the subtlety of myriad *li* and exhaust them while inquiring, studying, thinking, and discriminating, and eventually, extend this to the effect of completely realizing the mind. The huge and the tiny mutually support, the dynamic and the static nurture each other. From the beginning, there is no need to make a choice between the inner and the outer, or the fine and the crude, but, if one sincerely practice these in a long-term, one can achieve “thorough penetration” [between the inner mind and the outer *li*]. Then, one can comprehend the integral unity [of the inner and the outer] and the absurdity of the division of the inner and the outer as well as of the fine and the crude.³⁸

As a supplementary explication of the supplementary chapter, this passage’s content largely overlaps with the supplementary chapter itself, and most is of little additional significance. What attracts our attention, however, are two points which are not as manifest in the supplementary chapter. First, the overall framework of this explication is restructured on the basis of the bipolarity of the mind in the self and the *li* of external things, which also corresponds to the conceptual distinction “between the inner and the outer.” Zhu prescribed preserving the “solemn, discriminating, and undivided” “state” of the numinous mind as the preliminary condition to proceed the practice of *gewu*. In the opposite direction, he also insisted upon the second condition that the complete realization of the mind is predicated on the exhaustive comprehension of *li*, which “is ubiquitous in the myriad things.”

As is clarified by the argument, “no need to make a choice between the inner and the outer,” this bilateral direction of learning explicitly means that the realm either of the inner or the outer alone cannot be a sufficient field of learning. Correspondingly, Zhu indirectly ascribed the two modes of the one-sided method of learning described above to the two polarities he had previously confuted against in *Daoxue huowen*: “Not knowing the numinous-ness of the mind” corresponds to broad learning, which focuses exclusively on the external things, while “Not knowing the subtlety of myriad *li*” indicates the Chan method of introspective contemplation like “Directly pointing to the human mind; Achieving Buddhahood by seeing one’s nature,” which focuses exclusively on the internal realm. Such a mutual dependence is not conceivable without a certain distinction between the inner and outer realms.

38 Zhu Xi, *Daxue huowen*, 24: “曰人之所以爲學。心與理而已矣。心雖主乎一身而其體之虛靈。足以管乎天下之理。理雖散在萬物。而其用之微妙。實不外乎一人之心。初不可以內外精粗而論也。然或不知此心之靈而無以存之。則昏昧雜擾而無以窮衆理之妙。不知衆理之妙而無以窮之。則偏狹固滯而無以盡此心之全。此其理勢之相須。蓋亦有必然者。是以聖人設教使人默識此心之靈而存之於端莊靜一之中。以爲窮理之本。使人知有衆理之妙而窮之於學問思辨之際。以致盡心之功。巨細相涵。動靜交養。初未嘗有內外精粗之擇。及其真積力久而豁然貫通焉。則亦有以知其渾然一致。而果無內外精粗之可言矣。”

Second, the distinction between the inner and outer realms provides us with a clue to a third way of interpreting Zhu's use of "*huoran guantong*." As Zhu rejected "the division between the inner and the outer," we should understand that Zhu's distinction between the two did not mean an unbridgeable gap lying between them for him, but questions remain regarding how we are to bridge them and by what means. Unlike in the supplementary chapter, *huoran guantong* is explained in the passage quoted above with a description of "the integral unity" (*hunran yizhi* 渾然一致) in contrast to "the absurdity of the division of the inner and the outer as well as of the fine and the crude" (*wu neiwai jingcu zhi keyan* 無內外精粗之可言), which can be read as a defense of the unity of the inner and the outer. In the same vein, the overall formulation of learning on the basis of the bipolarity of the mind and the *li* of the external things seems to converge on the point that such a specious division completely dissolves, which Zhu encapsulated into the concept of "the integral unity."

In this light, *huoran guantong* also should be interpreted in line with this integral unity. This figurative description, I argue, is meant to depict the ultimate state of a complete removal of a certain kind of barrier, depicted with the adjectival phrases of "dim and confused" (*hunmei zarao* 昏昧雜擾) and "narrow and stagnant" (*pianxia guzhi* 偏狹固滯), which lies between the distinctive realms of the mind and the *li* of the externals. Differently put, this phrase illustratively describes the experience of an unobstructed "penetration" between the two virtually divided realms which leads to "the integral unity."

This interpretation of *huoran guantong* in the light of the integral unity between the inner and the outer eliminates the suspicion raised earlier regarding its possible Buddhist origin. This interpretation does not disprove its possible Buddhist origin or its semantic resemblance to its Buddhist counterpart, but brings to light its fundamentally different meaning and significances within this context. The rendering of *huoran guantong* into a sudden and fundamental leap from the gradual accumulation of the *li* of particulars to the entire integration and penetration of the whole derives from the ungrounded postulate on its correspondence to the idea of "the principle is one but the manifestation is many" (*li yi fen shu* 理一分殊) as well as the relationship between the supreme ultimate (*taiji* 太極) and the myriad things (*wanwu* 萬物).

In the previously cited explication, Zhu emphasized two functions of the mind: it's acting as the genuine agent of the self in its relationship with body ("*zhu fu yi shen* 主乎一身") and its faculty of knowing ("*xu ling [zhijue]*" 虛靈[知覺]), but he left out any description of it as a sort of bearer of human nature as the ultimate *li* in the Daoxue scheme, namely, "*xing ji li* 性即理." This deliberate omission was probably made because its inclusion might lead to a counterargument: "Granting that the ultimate *li* is inherent in the mind of all, why then should one outwardly direct attention to the externals in a "superficial and fragmented" manner?", which he believed had caused not only Buddhists but also the followers of the teaching of the Cheng brothers to turn their attention exclusively to the inner realm of

human nature and the mind.³⁹ In response, Zhu strove to restructure literati learning on the firm ground of classics, conversations, and practices, thus turning the attention to the external as well.

6. Conclusion

The intellectual milieu was quite pluralistic in the twelfth century when Zhu presented his proposal for reforming literati learning on the basis of his reinterpretation of the *Great Learning*. The legacies from the Northern Song such as Wang Anshi and Su Shi as well as Buddhism were still competing with the teaching of the Cheng brothers.⁴⁰ More abstractly and strategically, Zhu presupposed the two polarities of learning, which remained relevant to his contemporaries, thus demarcating the border between the polarities and the genuine learning, which he claimed to have discovered directly from the remaining words of the Cheng brothers. Nonetheless, as is analyzed above, he did not confine his mission to providing a legitimate ‘interpretation’ of the teaching of the Cheng brothers. Rather, he modified and selected their teachings to best fit and support his own views.

Historically, the two polarities against which Zhu positioned his own work represent the coexistence of two intellectual trends from the Tang dynasties on—one seeking to preserve the diversely developed moral, cultural, and social traditions from the past, and the other attempting to search out the higher- or highest-order principles with which one was believed to be able to embrace the world of particulars more comprehensively and universally.⁴¹ The Cheng brothers distinguished these two trends and put more emphasis on the latter.⁴² In contrast, Zhu attempted to bring an end to this long-enduring intellectual tension by synthesizing the two polarities into an integral scheme, thus striking a new balance between them. He attempted to reestablish the authority and validity of the classics and discussions between teachers and colleagues as the legitimate source of meaningful knowledge, which he felt had been undervalued by a tendency to focusing exclusively on the inner dimension. He labelled this as Chan Buddhism, which was the most serious denigration in the Cheng learning tradition. In so doing, he refused to recognize the authority of the direct disciples of the Cheng brothers and also even manipulated the words of the Cheng brothers, suggesting the unique features of his interpretation of *gewu* and *zhizhi*.

In restructuring the genuine learning of the Cheng brothers, as is demonstrated in his letters to Wang Yingchen quoted above, Zhu’s main and most persistent concern was focused on the assimilation of literati learning into Chan Buddhism at the era of the real “Golden Age” of Buddhism in Chinese history, when Chan Buddhism permeated the literati more deeply

39 For this, see Junghwan Lee, “Zhang Jiucheng 張九成 as an Eminent Advocate of the Cheng Learning (*Chengxue* 程學) in the Early Southern Song,” 1-26.

40 Bol, “Chu His’s Redefinition of Literati Learning,” 151-185.

41 Bol, *This Culture of Ours*, in specific, 1-3.

42 Bol, “Ch’eng Yi as a Literatus.”

than even before.⁴³ He characterized this tendency, which James Liu has a “turning inward,”⁴⁴ as the exclusive attention to the inner realm. Zhu’s restructuring aimed to reverse it by synthesizing the two polarities, each of which, he contended, was inclined toward one side on the false presumption of the division of the inner and the outer. His expressions of “*huoran guantong*” and “the integral unity” represent this synthesis, bridging the division between the inner and the outer realms in the place of a mystic transcendence, a “sudden” “lofty” elevation, or the totality of the whole.

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43 Gimello, “Marga and culture: learning, letters, and liberation in Northern Sung Ch’an,” 371-437; Gimello, “Changing Shang-ying on Wu-t’ai Shan,” 89-149; Gregory, “The Vitality of Buddhism in the Sung,” 1-20.

44 Liu, *China Turning Inward*.

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在新的基礎上學的重構：朱熹格物、致知新解

李定桓

中文摘要

本文從新的角度對朱熹論學的第一階段，即對“格物、致知”作進行重新解釋，以此闡明朱熹論“學”的結構特徵。眾所周知，朱熹對這兩個概念的解釋源自二程。但到目前為止，對於“格物致知”的解釋朱熹在很大程度上沿襲了二程，仍是一個尚待研究的問題。在對“格物、致知”做重新解釋的過程中，朱熹正面挑戰了二程弟子們的權威，而對《河南程氏遺書》中的相關文字，根據自己的目的做了有選擇的解釋。為了不帶偏見地、全面地審視他對“格物致知”的重新解釋，在本文中，筆者探討了朱熹為了凸顯自己“學”的觀點而設定的作為比照的兩個極端，即博學和禪學。

朱熹一方面批評兩者的偏頗，另一方面，為了重新確立“經傳讀書”與“師友講論”作為知識來源的權威性和妥當性，他又把博學和禪學兩者納入到“學”中。由此，他想要反轉當時被劉子健稱為“內向化”的程學對內在層次關注的潮流。為此，朱熹提出了心、性之內在領域與物之外在領域之間渾然一致的新視角。由此，本文重新探明了朱熹所提出的豁然貫通，不是神秘的超越一切的東西，而是內在領域和外在領域的渾然一致。

關鍵詞：朱熹，學，格物，致知，博學，禪學，渾然一致，豁然貫通

“止於至善”：仁與人性內在關係的哲學證明

曾 振 宇

中文摘要

從孔子“仁者安仁”肇始，儒家仁學開啟了綿延流長的一個文化道統：仁與人性有內在關聯，而人性之善又源自道德形上學。孟子從性命論、形式邏輯和生命經驗三大層次證明“仁”為天之所“命”，落實於人心為善端。“命”意味著無條件性和普遍性，普遍性意味著人性平等，無條件性說明仁是“善”，是“應當”，是自由。在中國哲學史上，二程、朱子“仁學”標誌著以仁為核心的儒家道德形上學達到了前所未有的新高峰。在邏輯上，天理之善屬於絕對性的“元善”，“元善”意味著無條件性、先在性。天理之善是至善，不是與惡對立的善，而是超越了善惡對立的善。換言之，天理“元善”是無條件命令。理善，所以“理之性”善；性善，所以仁善！仁在普遍的人性中是無條件的命令，無條件意味著自由，仁是儒家自由意志視域中的自由。因為天理至善，所以仁善。這一思路與康德有點神似之處。經過二程和朱子的創造性詮釋，儒家仁學廣度和深度上都獲得了重大的提升，理論形態趨向成熟與完備，儒家道德形上學臻於巔峰狀態。尋求至善，是儒家一大思想主題。從倫理學意義上的《大學》“止於至善”出發，經周敦頤太極“純粹至善”，一直到道德形上學意義上的程頤天理至善(元善)思想的誕生，歷代儒家探求至善的哲學步履遞進遞佳。二程朱子“仁善由於天理善”思想的誕生與論證，標誌著儒家仁學成為中國自由主義倫理基礎和文化依託得以可能。


關鍵詞：仁，儒家，自由，至善，人性

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探討與證明“幸福”是西方哲學自古希臘以來的一大哲學傳統。與之相映成趣的是，中國哲學自先秦儒家與道家伊始，就熱衷於討論“樂”，“孔顏樂處”之“樂”就是儒家頗具代表性的幸福觀。“樂”最大特點在於與人性之德有直接關聯。“仁”是儒家標幟性觀念，儒家所追求與證明的生命之樂，往往離不開仁。¹

陳來教授最近撰文指出：“說朱子學總體上是仁學，比說朱子學是理學的習慣說法，也許更能凸顯其儒學體系的整體面貌。”² 陳來教授的這一觀點頗具啟迪意義，有助於我們更加深入分析與評價朱子學乃至程朱理學的特點與本質。此外，近幾年學界對儒家仁學的關注與討論特別多，儒家仁學實際上已形成儒學研究的一熱點。這一學術熱點的出現，除了學術自身原因之外，或許與學人對目前中國社會的現代轉型有所思考緊密相連。本文在梳理儒家仁學源起與演變基礎上，探析歷代儒家如何遞進遞佳地從道德形上學高度證明人性與仁內在關係，由形上本體至善論證儒家之“仁”存在正當性。

一、孔子：“仁者安仁”

在語源學上，“仁”字起源與東夷文化密不可分。羅振玉《殷墟書契前編》2卷19頁的第1片卜辭中收錄一個很像“仁”的字。楊榮國認為，“卜辭中有‘仁’字。”³ 從傳世文獻考證，仁和人、夷，形、音、義皆同，章太炎先生曾經指出：“仁，古文作，與古文夷同，蓋古文仁、夷同字也。”⁴ 王獻唐先生繼而指出，“人和夷是一個字。

1 《宋元學案》中記載了這樣一則故事：程顥、程頤兩兄弟仰慕大儒周敦頤盛名，於是前往求學。周敦頤對前來求學的兩兄弟，劈頭就問：“孔顏樂處，所樂何事？”年少的程顥、程頤兩兄弟不知如何回答這一問題。其實，早在周敦頤青年時代，黃龍南禪師也向周敦頤提出過這一問題。周敦頤思索良久，仍然悟不出其中的道理。無奈之下，他又去求教佛印元禪師。佛印元禪師不作正面回答，只淡淡說了一句“滿目青山一任看。”直到中年，周敦頤與二程兄弟才悟出答案其實只有一個字：“誠”。“誠者，天之道；誠之者，人之道。”誠是精神本體，也是“寂然不動”的生命境界。“寂然不動”是精神作用未發動、無污染的清淨本源狀態，也就是《中庸》所說的“喜怒哀樂之未發謂之中”的狀態，它與道家所講的“道”及其禪宗所談的“真如本性”、“清淨自性”有異曲同工之妙。在有限的生命旅程中，讓受世俗生活污染的精神回歸於這種“未發”、“清淨”狀態，就是“人之道”，只有使精神處於這種無污染的本源狀態，才可以“盡人之性”、“盡物之性”，乃至達到“參贊天地之化育”，並與“天地合參”的境界。這一生命理想境界的人格化載體，就是君子與聖人。既然以追求“誠”為快樂，以成為君子、聖人為孜孜以求的人生目標，人世間的貧富貴賤、得失禍福也就無足繫懷。“孔顏樂處”作為生命的理想境界與真正快樂源泉，在程顥所寫的《春日偶題》中，得到了詩意的表達：“雲淡風輕近午天，傍花隨柳過前川。時人不識予心樂，將謂偷閒學少年。”

2 陳來，《仁學本體論》。

3 楊榮國，《中國古代思想史》，89頁。另參見廖名春，《“仁”字探原》；孟世凱，《甲骨文中“禮”、“德”、“仁”字的問題》；劉文英，《“仁”之觀念的歷史探源》；白奚，《“仁”字古文考辨》。

4 王寧，《章太炎說文解字授課筆記》，329頁。

所謂‘仁道’即是‘人道’，‘人道’又即是‘夷道’，因而秦漢以來，有‘夷人仁’和‘君子國’的記述。”⁵ 龐朴先生觀點與王獻唐類似，他認為從屍從二的古“仁”字，與“屍方”（夷方、人方）文化有關，“古‘仁’字從屍實是從夷，而從夷之所以為‘仁’，當是夷風尚仁，風名從主的緣故。”⁶ 有關“夷風尚仁”、“夷俗仁”的記載，在《論語》、《山海經》、《禮記》、《風俗通》、《世本》、《漢書·地理志》、《說文解字》、鄭玄《儀禮》注等文獻中多有證驗。《後漢書·東夷列傳》雲：“夷者，柢也，言仁而好生，萬物柢地而出。”⁷ 王國維先生嘗言：“故自五帝以來，政治文物所自出之都邑，皆在東方，惟周獨崛起西土。”⁸ 王國維所說的“東方”，就是《後漢書·東夷列傳》所說的“東方曰夷”的“東方”。夏商制度文明不僅多源自東夷，有些核心倫理價值觀（譬如“仁”）也出於東夷。

在儒學史上，孔子貢獻之一在於將“仁”提升為位居諸德之上的上位概念。仁是“全德”，孝、義、忠、信、禮、智等具體德目是仁之精神在不同層面、不同領域的彰顯與證明。在哲學性質上，孔子“仁”之核心為“愛人”。但是，在倫理學與工夫論層面，孔子主張“立愛自親始。”⁹ 孔子仁學進而凸顯出“愛有差等”的根本特徵。“立愛自親始”可從兩大向度解讀：首先，仁愛之心源自何處？歷代儒家對此解釋不一，在孔子思想體系中，仁愛之心源自孝，“孝弟也者，其為仁之本與。”¹⁰ “本”是根、是基，有根才有枝繁葉茂。王弼說：“自然親愛為孝，推愛及物為仁也。”¹¹ 滋生于自然親情之上的孝愛，推而廣之，就呈現為仁愛；其次，“立愛自親始”彰顯出孔子仁學思想體系內在的邏輯方法論：其一，由家至國、家國並舉，家庭倫理放大為社會政治倫理；其二，推己及人。“己所不欲，勿施於人。”¹² 儒家的邏輯方法論可以高度概括為一個“推”字，從己推及他人，從家推及天下。從這一邏輯思維模式出發，家庭倫理自然放大成為社會倫理，對父母親的孝愛自然就擴充為對全社會的仁愛之心。

孔子仁學是“愛有差等”與“愛無差等”的辯證統一。在此基礎上，孔子進一步將仁“向高度提”，¹³ “仁者安仁，知者利仁”¹⁴ 是孔子儒學標幟性命題，是孔子思想所達到的道德形上學最高哲學成就。孔子把“仁”分為“安仁”與“利仁”兩類，《禮記·表記》進而將“仁”細分為三類：“仁有三，與仁同功而異情。與仁同功，其仁未可知也，與仁同過，然後其仁可知也。仁者安仁，知者利仁，畏罪者強仁。”“安仁”也可理解為“樂仁”，《大戴禮記·曾子立事》有“仁者樂道，智者利道”¹⁵ 記載，正好可作佐證。孔子以“仁”為“安”、為“樂”，實質

5 王獻唐，《山東古國考·山東古代的董姓統治集團》，286頁。

6 龐樸，《龐朴文集》二卷，72頁。

7 範曄，《後漢書》卷八十五《東夷列傳》，2807頁。

8 王國維，《殷周制度論》，《觀堂集林》上冊，452頁。

9 《禮記·祭義》，孫希旦，《禮記集解》，1215頁。

10 《論語·學而》

11 王弼，《論語釋疑》，樓宇烈校釋，《王弼集校釋》，621頁。

12 《論語·顏淵》

13 牟宗三，《名家與荀子》三講，133頁。

14 《論語·裡仁》

15 孫希旦，《禮記集解》卷五十一《表記》，1301頁

上是說明仁出自人之普遍本性，仁內在於生命本然，仁不是外在的強制性行為準則。仁是自由意志。正如牟宗三先生所言：孔子之“仁即是性，即是天道。”¹⁶ 仁既然源自普遍人性，就具有普遍性特點，普遍性意味著平等性。人性平等思想，在孔子思想中已有所萌芽。《史記·滑稽列傳》裴駟《集解》雲：“安仁者，性善者也；利仁者，力行者也；強仁者，不得已者也。”¹⁷ 以“仁”為“安”、為“樂”，說明仁是“善”。因為仁善，所以人人安於仁、樂於仁。反求諸己，體悟自性先驗性存有仁心仁德，人性天生有善，無需外假，人生之幸福莫過於此。也正是在這一意義上，君子可以“安仁”、“樂道”。徐復觀先生將孔子人性學說高度概括為“人性仁”，也正是基於這一材料有感而發。既然“仁者安仁”，而非“利仁”，那麼仁就不是手段，而是目的本身。君子行仁，是內在仁心仁德之彰顯，不做作，不虛飾，自然純粹，天然混一。猶如魚不離水，瓜不離秧。“安仁者不知有仁，如帶之忘腰，履之忘足。利仁者是見仁為一物，就之則利，去之則害。”¹⁸ 朱熹的這一訓釋，通俗易懂，切近要害。¹⁹ “上者率其性也，次者利而為之。”²⁰ 盧文弨所說的“率其性”，也就是孟子仁學思想體系中的“由仁義行”。與此相對，“利仁”之仁，是外在於人心的價值規範，“利仁”是孟子思想中的“行仁義”，是朱熹所說的“硬去做。”²¹ “是真個見得這仁愛這一個物事好了，猶甘於芻豢而不甘於粗糲。”²² “利仁”既然是“以仁為利而行之，”²³ 行仁是手段，而非目的，因此智者之仁含有極強的以人為中心的社會功利性。“至若欲有名而為之之類，皆是以為利也。”²⁴ 王夫之“安仁、利人，總是成德境界。”²⁵

二、孟子：仁是“本然之善”

孔子仁學有三大貢獻：其一，把仁提升為位居諸具體德目之上的上位概念，仁是“全德”；其二，仁者“愛人”觀念，涵蓋了人類道德生活的全部範圍，為全人類道德生活提供了普適性原則。恰如牟宗三先生所言，“仁是可以在我們眼前真實的生命裡頭具體呈現的。”²⁶ 仁不離人，仁不離日常之“在”，這恰恰正是儒家仁學具有永恆生命力之奧秘；其三，孔子“仁者安仁”之論，實屬空谷足音，發前

16 牟宗三，《名家與荀子》三講，135頁。

17 司馬遷，《史記》卷一百二十六《滑稽列傳》，3214頁。

18 黎靖德，《朱子語類》卷二十六。

19 朱熹這一表述或受莊子影響，《莊子·達生》篇云：“忘足，履之適也；忘腰，帶之適也；忘是非，心之適也。”

20 王聘珍，《大戴禮記解詁·曾子立事》，77頁。

21 黎靖德，《朱子語類》卷二十六。

22 黎靖德，《朱子語類》卷二十六。

23 程顥、程頤，《二程集·河南程氏外書》卷六，381頁。

24 程顥、程頤，《二程集·河南程氏外書》卷六，381頁。

25 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》卷四，《船山全書》6冊，624頁。

26 牟宗三，《中國哲學十九講》二講，31頁。

人之未發，孔子仁學進而上升到了一個前所未有的道德形上學高度。因為“仁者安仁”命題已經觸及到了一個前人未曾涉及的理論領域：“安仁”何以可能？美中不足的是，孔子雖然已有人性平等思想之萌芽，但對人性平等與“仁者安仁”並未詳細論證。儒學史是一部遞深遞佳往前發展的學說史，孔子沒有完成的哲學問題，留給了“吾所願，乃學孔子”的亞聖。孟子接過思想“接力棒”，從心性論高度深入論證了人性平等與仁存在之正當性，也就是仁者何以“安仁”？通而論之，孟子從三大維度證明“仁”存在之正當性：

（一）證諸人類普遍情感經驗

韋政通對孟子的論證方式評論說：“孟子的性善論，不是經由知識上曲折的論證的過程，所得到的結果，他是直接就當下流露在具體生活中的惻隱、羞惡的德性的表現，而印證到人性普遍價值的存在。”²⁷ 這種“具體的普遍”的例子比較多，我們主要分析其中的一個事例——“孺子入井”：“所以謂人皆有不忍人之心者，今人乍見孺子將入于井，皆有怵惕惻隱之心。非所以內交于孺子之父母也，非所以要譽于鄉黨朋友也，非惡其聲而然也。由是觀之，無惻隱之心，非人也；無羞惡之心，非人也；無辭讓之心，非人也；無是非之心，非人也。惻隱之心，仁之端也；羞惡之心，義之端也；辭讓之心，禮之端也；是非之心，智之端也。”²⁸ 既然“乍見孺子將入于井”，皆會“誘發”“怵惕惻隱之心”，證明“四心”如同人之“四體”，皆是先驗的存有，與後天人文教化無涉，甚至與知識論也無關。這種形式邏輯上的枚舉推理，其結論真實可靠嗎？王夫之對此提出疑問：“且如乍見孺子將入于井，便有怵惕惻隱之心，及到少間，聞知此孺子之父母卻與我不共戴天之仇，則救之為逆，不救為順，即此豈不須商量？”²⁹ 王夫之的這一反駁失之偏頗。如果因不共戴天之仇而棄孺子入井于不顧，這已經是由後天的倫理價值觀支配其行為。但是，孟子在此力圖要證明的是：人之仁義禮智“四心”，超越後天人文教化與知識。不是“乍見孺子將入于井”會滋生出我的惻隱之心，而是惻隱之心本來就存在於我人性中，孺子入井只不過是觸動、引發了我內在的惻隱之心而已。“稍涉安排商量，便非本心。”³⁰

（二）形式邏輯證明

以杞柳與杯棬之辨為例分析，“告子曰：‘性，猶杞柳也；義，猶杯棬也。以人性為仁義，猶以杞柳為杯棬。’孟子曰：‘子能順杞柳之性而以為杯棬乎？將戕賊杞柳而後以枤棬也？如將戕賊杞柳而以為枤棬，則亦將戕賊人以為仁義與？率天下之人而禍仁義者，必

27 韋政通，《中國思想史》，185頁。

28 《孟子·公孫醜上》

29 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》卷八《孟子》，《船山全書》，943頁。

30 王夫之，《讀四書大全說》卷八《孟子》，《船山全書》，943頁。

子之言夫！”³¹在這一場辯論中，孟子的論點可從兩方面解讀：其一，告子認為，仁義等善端源自後天教化，屬於荀子哲學意義上之“偽”。告子並未討論以杞柳加工成柶棬是否戕賊人性，孟子巧妙地將辯論的主題轉換為因順抑或戕賊杞柳之性而為柶棬。在事實層面上，因循杞柳之性而為，只能是杞柳，而非柶棬。在邏輯意義上，順杞柳之性而為柶棬，恰恰證明告子仁義後出觀點是正確的。實際上，孟子理應從類比推理角度，指明告子以杞柳、柶棬論證人性與仁義犯了“異類不比”的邏輯錯誤。其二，告子並未主張戕賊杞柳之性才能編織柶棬、戕賊人性而成仁義。從前後辯論語境分析，告子的觀點當是順杞柳之性而為柶棬。但是孟子虛設論敵，³²認為告子倡言戕賊杞柳之性而為柶棬，批評告子所言將禍害天下。朱熹曾經一針見血地揭明孟子的內心焦慮：“言如此，則天下之人皆以仁義為害性而不肯為，是因數之言而為仁義之禍也。”³³孟子擔憂告子之言一出，天下人勢必以為仁義本非人性所有、因循仁義有違於人性，芸芸眾生因而棄仁義於不顧，恣意妄為。正因為如此，孟子才會如此猛烈抨擊告子之說。從《孟子》文本保留的幾大邏輯論辯可以看出一大特點：孟子人性學說立論方式在形式邏輯層面確實存在一些不周延之處。有的學者因此指出，孟子論性善並不是主要通過形式邏輯來證明，“而主要是通過生命體驗啟發人們對於自己良心本心的體悟，只要體悟到了自己有良心本心，就會相信良心本心是人所固有的，就會對性善論堅信不疑。”³⁴這使人非常容易地想到格勞秀斯的自然法，自然法的證明有兩種途徑，其中之一就是證諸人之普遍本性。一個普遍的結果往往需要一個普遍的原因，這種原因往往代表了人類的常識。孟子性善說儘管在形式邏輯上不盡完善，但在人類常識意義上卻無法被否認。楊澤波甚至認為，“僅僅依靠形式邏輯是讀不懂性善論的。”³⁵

（三）從“即心言性”到“即天言性”

唐君毅認為，孟子學的本質是心學，孟子人性論特點是“即心言性。”³⁶徐復觀也認為，“性善”兩字，到孟子才明白清楚地說出，“由人心之善，以言性善。”³⁷牟宗三進而認為，中國學術思想可大約稱之為“心性之學”，此“心”代表“道德的主體性。”³⁸孟子“即心言性”目的之一，在於從道德形上學探尋仁義禮智諸善端的源起與正當性。“盡其心者，知其性也。知其性，則知天矣。”³⁹此處之“心”

31 《孟子·告子上》

32 參見楊澤波，《孟子評傳》八章，399頁。

33 朱熹，《孟子集注》卷十一，325頁。

34 楊澤波，《孟子與中國文化》四部分，199-200頁。

35 楊澤波，《孟子與中國文化》四部分，199-200頁。

36 唐君毅，《中國哲學原論·原性篇》一章，14頁。

37 徐復觀，《中國人性論史》六章，99-100頁。

38 牟宗三，《中國哲學的特質》，69頁。

39 《孟子·盡心上》，349頁。

不是認知之心，而是德性之心，“是價值意識的創發者。”⁴⁰ “心”有其具體內涵：“仁義禮智，非由外鑠我也，我固有之也，弗思耳矣。”⁴¹ 仁義禮智作為心之具體內涵，是先驗的存有，是生命的內在自然屬性，所以孟子一再強調“仁義禮智根於心。”⁴² 既然仁義禮智“根於心”，也就證明仁義禮智是“在我者”，而非“在外者。”⁴³ 沿著孟子人性論這一運思路向，我們可以真正讀懂何謂“萬物皆備於我。”⁴⁴ 《經籍纂詁》釋“備”為“豐足。”⁴⁵ 《荀子·禮論》雲：“故雖備家，必踰日然後能殯，三日成服。”“萬物皆備於我”並不是知識論意義上的命題，而是境界論與形而上學意義上的命題。“萬物皆備於我”之“我”，近似於莊子“吾喪我”之“吾”，“吾”是“以道觀之”的“大我”，而非拘泥於主客體認識框架的“小我。”⁴⁶ 陸象山把“萬物皆備於我”解釋為萬物皆備於“吾之本心，”⁴⁷ 是作心學向度的發揮。實際上，孟子“萬物皆備於我”命題旨在表明：君子“所性”源自心，“自我立法，”⁴⁸ 無需外假。尤其值得注意的是，性之善不僅僅是一道德精神，而且也是人生之幸福與快樂，“反身而誠，樂莫大焉。”章太炎評論道：“反觀身心，覺萬物確然皆備於我，故為可樂。”⁴⁹ 善是樂，善是幸福。這一思想與康得哲學深相契合。康德實踐理性中的“善”蘊涵幸福，善不僅僅是道德律，有幸福才是至善。

“心善是否可能？”這一疑問已通過上述“乍見孺子將入于井”等生命體驗與邏輯論辯進行證明。接下來的問題在於：心善何以可能？孟子的回答為“心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。”⁵⁰ “思”即“省察”，“省察”之樞要在於“慎獨”，“慎獨”之義即陸象山所言“不自欺。”⁵¹ 因此，孟子的觀點可梳理為：心能思，“自明誠”，所以心善。天道為“誠”，既真且善；人道當為“誠”，但人需“思”，也就是“誠之”，才能臻至“誠”的理想生命境界，這一境界也就是真善美境界。“大人者，不失其赤子之心者也。”⁵² 赤子之心“純一無偽”⁵³，赤子之心即“誠”。因此，天人在“誠”這一境界維度上，有望通過“思”而臻于合一。東漢趙岐對心善何以可能的探究基本上延續了孟子的思路：“性有仁義禮智，心以制之，惟心為正，人能盡極其心，以思行善，則可謂知其性矣。知其性，則知天道之貴善者也。”⁵⁴

40 黃俊傑，《中國孟學詮釋史論》三章，109頁。

41 《孟子·告子上》，328頁。

42 《孟子·盡心上》，355頁。

43 《孟子·盡心上》，351頁。

44 《孟子·盡心上》，350頁。

45 阮元，《經籍纂詁》卷六十三，1378頁。

46 參見何中華，《孟子“萬物皆備于我”章臆解》。

47 陸九淵，鐘哲點校，《陸九淵集》卷一《書》，5頁。

48 黃俊傑，《中國孟學詮釋史論》三章，109頁。

49 章太炎，《國學講演錄·諸子略說》，175頁。

50 《孟子·告子上》，467頁。

51 陸九淵，鐘哲點校，《陸九淵集》卷三十四《語錄上》，418頁。

52 《孟子·離婁下》，292頁。

53 朱熹，《孟子集注》卷八，292頁。

54 焦循，《孟子正義·盡心上》，517頁。

但是，如果斷言孟子人性論只是“即心言性”，可能陷於偏曲之論。實際上，孟子並沒有停留在“以心言性”的思維階段，而是百尺竿頭更進一步，以“天”論性、“即天言性”，這恰恰正是孟子人性思想卓然高標之處。馮友蘭指出：“孟子因人皆有仁、義、禮、智之四端而言性善。人之所以有此四端，性之所以善，正因性乃‘天之所與我者’，人之所得於天者。此性善說之形而上的根據也。”⁵⁵ 在“盡心—知性—知天”邏輯框架中，天無疑是位格最高的哲學本體。在孟子思想體系中，“天”範疇的含義比較繁複，既有自然之天的表述，也有主宰之天、運命之天和義理之天的成分，但分量最重的還是義理之天。牟宗三認為，荀子之天“乃自然的，亦即科學中‘是其所是’之天”，而孔孟之天是“形而上的天，德化的天。”⁵⁶ “有天爵者，有人爵者。仁義忠信，樂善不倦，此天爵也；公卿大夫，此人爵也。”⁵⁷ 仁義忠信是“天爵”，源自天，“天爵以德，人爵以祿。”⁵⁸ 既然仁義忠信出乎天，孟子進而認為“人人有貴於己者。”⁵⁹ “貴”有“良貴”與“非良貴”之別，公卿大夫是“非良貴”，仁義忠信是“良貴”，“良者，本然之善也。”⁶⁰ 本然之善的仁義忠信，人人皆備，所以孟子說“飽乎仁義。”⁶¹

談及“天”，自然涉及“命”，二者在孟子思想中密不可分。“莫之致而致者，命也。”⁶² 徐復觀認為，此“命”是“法則性質的天命”，有別於“人格神性質的天命。”⁶³ 儒家自孔子“為仁由己”開始，已將命與性相牽扯，“不知命，無以為君子也。”⁶⁴ 繼而演進至楚簡《性自命出》和《中庸》“天命之謂性”等哲學命題的出現，期間已經歷幾代人的哲學思考與努力，孟子性命觀正處於孔子與《性自命出》、《中庸》之間的位置。如果仔細揣摩，我們發現《孟子·萬章》之“命”表面上是“人格神性質的天命”，但孟子要闡釋的一個核心思想為“天與之，人與之。”在“天視”、“天聽”背後，隱藏的是人心。因此，孟子之“命”蘊涵“法則性質的天命”之義項。不僅如此，還需揭示的一點在於：徐復觀的論斷可能也不盡完善，如果把孟子之“命”單純界定為“法則性質的天命”，性善只是外在的“命”。實際上，孟子的“命”與“心”相結合，哲學意涵已經出現了新氣象。“存其心，養其性，所以事天也。夭壽不貳，修身以俟之，所以立命也。”⁶⁵ “事”之含義為“奉承而不違”，⁶⁶“立命”指“全其天之所付，不以人為

55 馮友蘭，《中國哲學史》六章，101頁。

56 牟宗三，《歷史哲學》，113頁。

57 《孟子·告子上》，336頁。

58 焦循，《孟子正義·告子上》，469頁。

59 《孟子·告子上》，337頁。

60 朱熹，《孟子集注》卷十一，336頁。

61 《孟子·告子上》，336頁。

62 《孟子·萬章上》，308頁。

63 徐復觀，《中國人性論史》，98-100頁。

64 《論語·堯曰》

65 《孟子·盡心上》，349頁。

66 朱熹，《孟子集注》卷十三，349頁。

害之。”⁶⁷ 存諸心之性是天之所命，當因循而不違。全性而生，順命而行，方是“立命”。命已不能簡單理解為“法則性質的天命”，命已內化為生命內在訴求。命是內在的生命本然，而非外在的強制規範。正因如此，在孟子思想中，有“行仁義”與“由仁義行”之區別。韓嬰對孟子人性學說的理解，可謂入木三分：“子曰：‘不知命，無以為君子。’言天之所生，皆有仁義禮智順善之心。不知天之所以命生，則無仁義禮智順善之心。無仁義禮智順善之心，謂之小人。”⁶⁸ 這段話中出現了天、命、心、性四個概念，仁義禮智是天之所“命”，因而具備無條件性、普遍性、絕對性特點。仁義禮智存諸心而顯現為性與情。不知命則不識心，命與心相印證，恰恰正是孟子人性學說精髓之所在。命意味著絕對性，心意味著普遍性。領悟了命與心性的內在關係，才能理解孟子“人皆可以為堯舜”的命題。何以人“為”則可以成為堯舜？趙岐作了很好的詮釋：“言人皆有仁義之心，堯舜行仁義而已。”⁶⁹ “人皆可以為堯舜”的道德與邏輯基礎在於人皆有此“心”，順心而“為”，猶如“掘井”。半途而廢，“猶為棄井。”⁷⁰ 持之以恆，方可見湧泉。具體就孟子本人而言，“四十不動心。”⁷¹ “不動心”方能“養浩然之氣”，作為生命理想境界的“浩然之氣”，“配義與道”于心，方能彰顯這一生生命氣象。仁義內在於人心而成命，仁義不是外在的強制規範。郭店楚簡《五行》有“義形於內謂之德之行，不形於內謂之行”記載，正與孟子“仁義內在”相印證。⁷²

孟子無論是證諸人類普遍情感經驗和邏輯，抑或“以心言性”、“即天言性”，皆旨在闡明一個真理：人性有“善端”。善端即善質，善質不同於善。善端與善質是“未發”，善是“已發”。孟子人性之“善”來源於天，落實於心為命，此命在人性上顯現為“四端”。人性平等觀念，經過孟子的證明，由此躍上一個新臺階。王夫之曾經評論說：“天是神化之總名，四時百物不相悖害之理，吾性亦在其中。”⁷³ 就“盡心—知性—知天”這一運思路向和思想架構而言，天是理論預設，而人性有善端則是真理。需辨明的一點是：孟子人性學說中的“善”是與善惡相對之善？還是絕對之善？宋代程顥的論述值得我們深思：“‘生之謂性’，性即氣，氣即性，生之謂也。人生氣稟，理有善惡，然不是性中元有此兩物相對而生也。有自幼而善，有自幼而惡，是氣稟有然也。善固性也，然惡亦不可不謂之性也。蓋‘生之謂性’，‘人生而靜’以上不容說，才說性時，便已不是性也。”⁷⁴ 對這段話應作兩方面解讀：其一，在“生之謂性”層面，“性即氣，氣即性，由於氣稟之差異，人有善有惡，善惡皆謂之性。善是道德

67 朱熹，《孟子集注》卷十三，349頁。

68 韓嬰，《韓詩外傳》卷六，219頁。

69 焦循，《孟子正義·告子下》，諸子集成本，477頁。

70 《孟子·盡心上》，358頁。

71 《孟子·公孫醜上》，229頁。

72 劉釗，《郭店楚簡校釋·五行》，69頁。與此觀點相左的記載，可參閱《管子·戒》“仁從中出，義從外作”。

73 王夫之，《四書箋解》卷八，《船山全書》，359頁。

74 程顥、程頤，《河南程氏遺書》卷一，《二程集》，10頁。

之善，善即正當性，善是相對於惡而言之善，善是包涵具體內涵之善；其二，在“人生而靜”層面，乃性之本體。性之本體沒有善惡二物相對而生，“不是性中元有此兩物相對而生”。天命之性為善，善已不蘊涵具體的內涵。對於不合氣而言，更非與惡相對之善。此“善”已是絕對之善，不可以善惡言之善。程顥認為，孟子所說的性是性之本體，告子所言性是氣質之性。因此，孟子之善是絕對之善，是不可以善惡言之善。其後張九成進一步發揮道：“夫孟子之所論性善者，乃指性之本體而言。非與惡對立之善也。”⁷⁵ 宋代學者的這一觀點，很容易使人聯想起柏拉圖的“善”。柏拉圖所謂的“善”不只是一個倫理原則，善作為最普遍的本質是存在之源，因而高於存在，善既超越世間萬物又內在於它們之中。二程和張九成等人論“善”之思想，從形而上高度大大深化了孟子性善說，在儒學史上是一大進步。但是，我們也需指出，二程和張九成等人採用“六經注我”方式得出的觀點，反映的只是宋學的理論高度，並不意味著孟子哲學中的“善”已是絕對之善，已是不與惡相對之善。實際上，孟子人性學說中的“善”還只是一包含具體內容的倫理精神，“善”是與惡相對而言之善，善是道德之善。

孟子的“四心”、“四端”說及其證明方式，從心性論高度證明仁出於天，因而具有“命”之絕對性。仁是善，又具有正當性特點，仁是善與正當性的完美統一。孟子仁論與天、命、心、性相結合，論證了仁的來源和正當性，證明了人性何以平等，在人性平等基礎上進而證明“仁者安仁”是否可能？孔子開創的仁學演進至孟子，以仁為核心的道德形上學基本建立，這是孟子在思想史上所建立的“豐功偉業”。朱熹對此評論說：“孟子發明四端，乃孔子所未發。人只道孟子有辟楊、墨之功，殊不知他就仁心上發明大功如此。看來此說那時若行，楊、墨亦不攻而自退。辟楊、墨，是捍邊境之功；發明四端，是安社稷之功。”⁷⁶ 馮友蘭先生也說：“孟子言義理之天，以性為天之部分，此孟子言性善之形上學的根據也。”⁷⁷ 朱熹、馮友蘭之論，確乎不謬！

三、二程，朱熹：仁善由於天理善

在中國思想史上，真正有獨創性的思想家必定有幾個獨特的範疇。二程兄弟“自家體貼出來”的“天理”，就是“伊洛之學”最具標誌性的範疇。天理是位階最高的哲學範疇，理與氣不再“滾在一起”，⁷⁸ 氣已經從理（天理）這一本體中徹底剝離。在氣漸行漸遠的同時，“性”卻離天理越來越近。“性即理也，所謂理，性是也。”⁷⁹ “性即理”

75 張九成，《孟子傳》卷二十六，文淵閣四庫全書本，484頁下。

76 黎靖德，《朱子語類》卷五十三，1290頁。

77 馮友蘭，《中國哲學史》十二章，217頁。

78 牟宗三，《心體與性體》二冊，164頁。

79 《河南程氏遺書》卷二十二上，程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，292頁。

之“即”不是謂詞“是”，而是“若即若離”之“即”，含有“融和”之義。從人與本體關係視域立論，性是天理在人之彰顯與落實。人作為認識主體，理“夯實”為性理，理才具有活潑潑的意義。由此而來，性自然而然具有“善”的品格：

氣有善不善，性則無不善。人之所以不知善者，氣昏而塞之耳。⁸⁰

自理言之謂之天，自稟受言之謂之性，自存諸人言之謂之心。⁸¹

性，即理也。天以陰陽五行化生萬物，氣以成形，而理亦賦焉，猶命令也。於是人物之生，因各得其所賦之理，以為健順五常之德，所謂性也。⁸²

程頤、朱熹皆認為性是天理本質在人之實現，“性者，渾然天理而已。”⁸³ 在朱熹哲學邏輯結構中，有“理之性”和“氣質之性”之分，“理之性”先驗蘊涵“健順五常之德”。具體而言，仁義禮智信忠孝廉恥都是性之固有內涵。“父止於慈，子止於孝，君止於仁，臣止於敬。”⁸⁴ “仁、義、禮、智、信五者，性也。”⁸⁵ “須知天理只是仁、義、禮、智之總名，仁、義、禮、智便是天理之件數。”⁸⁶ 天理渾然不可分，天理與仁義禮智信“五常”的關係不是本體與派生物之間的關係，而是本體與屬性之間的關係。仁義禮智並非由理“旋次生出”，理是人倫道德的“總名”，仁義禮智信則是天理之“件數”。父慈子孝、長幼有序、夫婦有別、兄友弟悌，各有所止，當止其所止則安，失其所止則亂。在社會倫理諸德目中，仁的地位最高，仁是“體”或“全體”，義、禮、智是“支”：“仁者，全體；四者，四支。仁，體也。義，宜也。禮，別也。智，知也。信，實也。”⁸⁷ 在社會倫理體系層面，仁是集合概念，義、禮、智、信、忠、孝、廉、恥等是仁之精神在各個社會關係準則中的具體表現。“學者須先識仁。仁者，渾然與物同體。義、禮、知、信皆仁也。識得此理，以誠敬存之而已，不須防檢，不須窮索。”⁸⁸ “仁，渾淪言，則渾淪都是一個生意，義禮智都是仁；對言，則仁義禮智一般程朱哲學中之“仁”，⁸⁹ 猶如周敦頤哲學思想中之“誠”。誠是太極之德，貫通天人上下。仁是“理之性”之德，因此，仁有“公”之品格，“又問‘如何是仁？’曰：‘只是一個公字。學者問仁，則常教他將公字思量。’”⁹⁰ “仁之道，要之只消道一

80 《河南程氏遺書》卷二十一下，程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，274頁。

81 《河南程氏遺書》卷二十二上，程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，296-297頁。

82 朱熹，《四書章句集注》（中庸章句），17頁。

83 《朱子語類》卷九十五，2427頁。

84 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《周易程氏傳》卷四，968頁。

85 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷二上，14頁。

86 朱熹，《答何叔京》，《朱熹集》卷四十，1885頁。

87 《河南程氏遺書》卷二上，程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，14頁。

88 《河南程氏遺書》卷二十二上，程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，16-17頁。

89 《朱子語類》卷六，107頁。

90 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷二十二上，285頁。

公字。”⁹¹ “公”是仁內含之天理，仁是“公”之具體實現。朱熹對此詮釋說：“要識仁之意思，是一個渾然溫和之氣，其氣則天地陽春之氣，其理則天地生物之心。……這不是待人旋安排，自是合下都有這個渾全流行物事。此意思才無私意間隔，便自見得人與己一，物與己一，公道自流行。”⁹² 天地之理是“公道”，“公道”在人心彰顯為仁。公與私相對，私是人欲、“客氣”，公的基本特點是“克盡己私”，⁹³ 也就是平等、公平、公正，克盡己私方能彰顯天理之中正公平特性。仁是“公”，自然意味著仁是善，仁善的根據來自“至善之源”的性：⁹⁴ “蓋本然之性，只是至善。”⁹⁵

由此而來，性善何以可能？已是水到渠成之勢。“如天理底意思，誠只是誠此者也，敬只是敬此者也，非是別有一個誠，更有一個敬也。天理雲者，這一個道理，更有甚窮己？不為堯存，不為桀亡。人得之者，故大行不加，窮居不損。這上頭來，更怎生說得存亡加減？是佗元無少欠，百理具備。”⁹⁶ 天理是天地萬物“所以陰陽者”，是“事物之所由成為事物者。”⁹⁷ 既是天地自然存在之最終依據，又是人類社會應然法則，所以稱之為“百里具備”。不僅如此，天理還是人性善何以可能之形而上學根據：“天下之理，原其所自，未有不善。”⁹⁸ “蓋天道運行，賦與萬物，莫非至善無妄之理而不已焉，是則所謂天命者也。”⁹⁹ 天理“至善”！程頤、朱熹這一觀點，在中國哲學史上非常重要。尋找並證明“至善”，是自孔子以來歷代儒家孜孜以求的哲學使命。《大學》“止於至善”，還停留在生活倫理的視域論證，尚未上升到形上學的本體論高度證明。周敦頤以誠論太極之德，太極本體已蘊涵“純粹至善”的超越德性，但尚處於發軔時期。一直到程明道、程伊川和朱晦庵，才系統、深入地從哲學形上學高度證明“至善”何以可能。

緣此，程朱是如何從形上學層面證明“天理”至善的呢？粗略分析，似乎可分為兩個層面：

其一，從天理“生生之德”意義上立論。在程頤、朱熹思想邏輯結構中，對“天理至善”何以可能的證明，首先從《易傳》“一陰一陽之謂道，繼之者善也，成之者性也”論斷中尋求理論資源。“‘生生之謂易’，是天之所以為道也。天只是以生為道，繼此生理者，即是善也。善便有一個元底意思。‘元者善之長’，萬物皆有春意，便是‘繼之者善也’。”¹⁰⁰ “造化所以發育萬物者，為‘繼之者善’，‘各正其性命’者，為‘成之者性’。”¹⁰¹ 《易傳》作者所言“生生”之德，是

91 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷十五，153頁。

92 《朱子語類》卷六，111頁。

93 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷二十二上，286頁。

94 《朱子語類》卷五十九，1388頁。

95 《朱子語類》卷五十九，1387-1388頁。

96 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷二上，31頁。

97 亞里斯多德《形而上學》，88-89頁。

98 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷二十二上，292頁。

99 朱熹，《朱子四書或問》，《論語或問》卷三，《朱子全書》，641頁。

100 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷二上，29頁。

101 《朱子語類》卷七十四，1897頁。

從宇宙生成論視域立論，“天地之大德曰生”。宇宙本原化生萬物，宇宙之間一片春意盎然。雲卷雲舒、花開花落，每一種物體都按照其本性自由自在生長。但宇宙本原從不居功自傲，宇宙本原有“生生”之德，“生生”之德即是善。在傳統思想資源意義上，除了《易傳》之外，程頤、朱熹思想與老子“道”論有幾分相通之處。老子“道法自然”即“道不違自然”。道生成萬物，但道“生而不有，為而不恃，長而不宰”(《老子》十章)，道並不居功自傲，也不干預天下萬物，而是遵循萬物之本性(自然)，讓天地萬物自身如其自身地存在與變化。道不僅是宇宙本原，而且道有大德。換言之，道是價值本源與根據。嚴靈峰認為老子之道有四重義項，其中之一就是道乃人生修身養性之應然法則。¹⁰²唐君毅也認為，老子之道蘊涵“同於德之義”：“道之義亦未嘗不可同於德之義。蓋謂物有得於道者為德，則此德之內容，亦只是其所得於道者；此其所得於道者，固亦只是道而已。”¹⁰³

其二，進一步從超越的意義層面立論。周敦頤《通書》云：“‘大哉乾元，萬物資始’，誠之源也。‘乾道變化，各正性命’，誠斯立焉。純粹至善者也。”周敦頤以“誠”貫通天人，以宇宙本體之誠，論證人之心性之誠何以可能。宇宙本體已蘊涵“純粹至善”的先在德性。二程思想中“善便有一個元底意思”，應當是對周敦頤思想的“接著講”：

‘一陰一陽之謂道’，道非陰陽也，所以一陰一陽道也。如一闔一辟謂之變。¹⁰⁴

離了陰陽更無道，所以陰陽者是道也。陰陽，氣也。氣是形而下者，道是形而上者。形而上者則是密也。¹⁰⁵

理則一而已，其形者則謂之器，其不形者則謂之道。然而道非器不形，器非道不立。蓋陰陽亦器也，而所以陰陽者道也。是以一陰一陽，往來不息，而聖人指是以明道之全體也。¹⁰⁶

程頤、朱熹在運思路向與觀點上，顯然與《易傳》作者大異其趣：一是以“天理”範疇取代了陰陽氣論，氣是形而下，理是“所以陰陽者”；二是不再局限于從宇宙生成論角度立論，而是從哲學本體論高度證明。¹⁰⁷程朱哲學中的天理或理範疇，與莊子哲學體系中的“道”

102 嚴靈峰《老莊研究》，378頁。

103 唐君毅《中國哲學原論導論篇·原道上》，老子言道之六義，230頁。

104 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校《河南程氏遺書》卷三，67頁。

105 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷十五，162頁。

106 《朱熹集》卷四十五，2147頁。

107 本文所用“本體論”一詞，實際上應稱之為“中國哲學的本體論”，而不是西方“本體論(Ontology)”。這是因為西方自柏拉圖以來的ontology，在中國哲學史上嚴格來說並不存在。中國傳統哲學與西方哲學本是兩個性質完全不同的文化形態。西方哲學自柏拉圖以來存在著兩個世界，一個是感性的、現象的、經驗的世界，另一個是非感性的、本質的、邏輯的世界。本體論(ontology)是對邏輯世界的描述，它只存在於邏輯世界之中。從柏拉圖到黑格爾，西方哲學形態一直表現為邏輯世界與經驗世界的兩離性。由於西方哲學劃分出經驗和經驗之外兩大分離的領域，從而產生了本體論(ontology)以及本體論所表述的理性與純粹原理範疇。本體論(ontology)是西方哲學特有的一種哲學形態，其中包含著中國傳統哲學中所沒有的思維方式與敘述模式。中國傳統哲學從來就沒有所謂

有近似之處。理與道都不是對象性存在。在莊子思想體系中，道是“未始有物”的終極存在，道沒有“物”所應具有的空間特性，“道不可聞，聞而非也；道不可見，見而非也；道不可言，言而非也。知形形之不形乎！道不當名。”¹⁰⁸ 道是“形形”者，所以具有“不形”之特徵。道之“不形”，在《知北遊》中又表述為“物物者非物”。道通過天地萬物的生滅變化，證明其自身作為萬物存在何以可能的終極根據而確實存在。在程朱哲學中，“無形”¹⁰⁹ 是天理本質的規定。“未有天地之先，畢竟也只是理。”¹¹⁰ 理不僅邏輯在先，也是時間在先。作為非對象性存有的天理，其自身之善天然具有“元”的特性。“善便有一個元底意思”。天理之善是“元善”，“元善”之善屬於至善，“元善”不是與惡對立的善，而是超越了善惡對立的善。天地萬物“無獨必有對”，皆是對象性存在。但是，天理是“獨”，“獨”也就是“元”，“元者物之先也。物之先，未有不善者。”¹¹¹ 如果說“未有不善”還屬於正言反說，以否定句形式表述天理至善（元善）的正面含義，那麼以下師生之間的問答已跨越倫理學高度，直接從本體論視域討論天理何以至善：“或曰：‘《大學》在止於至善，敢問何謂至善？’子曰：‘理義精微，不可得而名言也，姑以至善目之，默識可也。’”¹¹² 《大學》中的“止於至善”還只是倫理學層面的概念，與生命理想境界相牽連。但是，二程於此所回答的顯然已不是倫理學意義上的“至善”，而是本體世界層面的“至善”。天理至善不可以概念、範疇界定，也不可以語言表述與界說，只可以“目之”與“默識”。或許這正是東西方舊形而上學共同面臨的一道哲學之“坎”，所以康得會為人類理性劃定一範圍。人類雖不能認識與證明，但可以信仰。信仰雖不能證明，但可以相信。“目之”與“默識”，既有求諸普遍證明的特點，也蘊含信仰的成分。也正是在這一意義上，天理至善（元善）也是“命”。“理也，性也，命也，三者未嘗有異。窮理則盡性，盡性則知天命矣。”¹¹³ 理是“命”，天理元善也是“命”，這是程朱哲學上接孟子思想的一大命題。此處之“命”，蘊涵兩層義旨：

其一，命意味著普遍性、平等性。“人之於性，猶器之受光於日，日本不動之物。”¹¹⁴ “犬、牛、人，知所去就，其性本同，但限於形，故不可更。如隙中日光，方圓不移，其光一也。”¹¹⁵ 天、理、性、命在朱熹哲學體系中，環環相扣、相互說明。“問：‘天與命，性與理，四者之別：天則就其自然者言之，命則就其流行而賦於物者言之，性則就其全體而萬物所得以為生者言之，理則就其事物物

經驗世界之外還存在著一個相對獨立的邏輯世界的觀點。恰恰相反，在中國傳統哲學形態中，邏輯世界、原理世界是與經驗世界、現象世界不可分割地包容於一體的，用中國哲學固有的命題來表述，就叫“道不離器”、“氣兼有無”。無論“道”學、“理”學，抑或“氣”學，都不是西方哲學意義上的那種在現象世界之外獨立存在的邏輯世界。為避免反向格義帶來的對中國哲學的誤讀與誤解，特別加以說明。

108 《莊子·知北遊》

109 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷二十一下，271頁。

110 《朱子語類》卷一，1-2頁。

111 程顥、程頤，《二程集》下，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏粹言》卷二，1268頁。

112 程顥、程頤，《二程集》下，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏粹言》卷一，1208頁。

113 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷二十一下，274頁。

114 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷三，67頁。

115 程顥、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷二十四，312頁。

各有其則者言之。到得合而言之，則天即理也，命即性也，性即理也，是如此否？’曰：‘然。’¹¹⁶ 分而言之，各各不同，在天為命，理落實於人心為性，已發為情。因此，命強調的是天理的“流行”。儒家自孔子“仁者安仁”、孟子“四端之心”肇始，就開啟了人性平等之先河。程頤、朱熹起而踵之，從天理高度論證人性源出於天理，因此天地萬物和人類皆在性理層面存有共同的性，“天命之謂性”，此言性之理也。”¹¹⁷ 自堯舜以至平民百姓，皆本來就具有共同的性理，皆擁有生命的尊嚴，皆具備內在自我超越的道德生命

其二，“命”意味著無條件性、絕對性。“天之賦與謂之命，稟之在我謂之性，見於事業謂之理。”¹¹⁸ “在天曰命，在人曰性。”¹¹⁹ “天所賦為命，物所受為性。”¹²⁰ 程頤、朱熹用性溝通天人，貫通形而上、形而下。在性理意義上，性源自天理，所以又稱之為性命。性命觀念表明：作為“天之賦與”的性命，在本體層面與天理無二，只是在實踐理性領域有本與用的區分。天理與性理恒常自存而遍在，先天地而獨立，即使天地山河塌陷，理、性、命仍然“顛撲不破”。理善不與惡對，善是超越性的、獨立的、固有的、先在性的“元善”。

程朱道德形上學中預設天理至善是極其必要的，因為天理至善的無條件存在，才獲得性善、仁善等觀念存在的正當性。天理至善，在整個程朱理學體系中，無疑起著一個十分重要的“拱心石”的作用。程頤關於天理至善(元善)的思想，後來對胡宏思想產生了深刻影響。“宏聞之先君子曰：‘孟子所以獨出諸儒之表者，以其知性也。’宏請曰：‘何謂也？’先君子曰：‘孟子道性善雲者，歎美之辭也，不與惡對。’¹²¹” 胡宏認為，孟子性善的含義並非指“人性善”或“性是善的”，“善”只是一形容詞，讚歎“性無限美好”，“善”已不能對“性”作任何限定，也非與“惡”相對之“善”。“或問性，曰：‘性也者，天地之所以立也。’曰：‘然則孟軻氏、荀卿氏、揚雄氏之以善惡言性也，非歟？’曰：‘性也者，天地鬼神之奧也，善不足以言之，況惡乎？’¹²²” “性”作為天理在人之落實，善不足以概括、描述性之特質，惡更無從表徵與形容之。性理層面的性已超越善惡對立，因為善惡只能評判後天的“已發”，發而中節則為善，發而不中節則為惡。但本然之性屬於“未發”層面，遠遠超出了善惡能夠評判的畛域。胡宏的善惡“不足以言”性論，通過對孟子人性論的闡發，對程頤天理至善思想有所推進。

緣此，我們不禁要問：惡有獨立的形上來源嗎？程頤、朱熹的回答是：惡不存在形上學的根據，惡與天理本體無關，惡與性命無涉，惡只與氣有關。“氣有善不善，性則無不善。”¹²³ “壽夭乃是善惡之氣所致。仁則善氣也，所感者亦善。善氣所生，安得不壽？鄙

116 《朱子語類》卷五，82頁。

117 程頤、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷二十四，313頁。

118 黃宗義，《宋元學案》卷十五，630頁。

119 程頤、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏文集》卷九，606頁。

120 《朱子語類》卷五，82頁。

121 胡宏，《胡宏集》附錄一《宋朱熹胡子知言疑義》，333頁。

122 胡宏，《胡宏集》附錄一《宋朱熹胡子知言疑義》，333頁。

123 程頤、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷二十一，274頁。

則惡氣也，所感者亦惡。惡氣所生，安得不夭？”¹²⁴ 在程頤與朱熹思想體系中，氣只是質料而已，已不是張載哲學意義上的“氣本”。天理是至善無惡，氣有善有惡。惡不存在一個超越經驗世界的形上根源，天理無需對惡負責。“惡專是氣稟，不幹性事”¹²⁵ 惡“不幹性事”，自然更“不幹”天理事。理與氣已經截然相分，氣需對惡負責，惡源自惡氣。純善無惡之天理與有善有惡之氣，成為程頤、朱熹哲學一大主題。

四、結語

從孔子“仁者安仁”肇始，儒家仁學開啟了綿延流長的一個文化道統：仁與人性有內在關聯。孟子“即心言性”、“即天論性”，從性命論、形式邏輯和生命經驗三大層次證明仁為天之所“命”，落實於人心為善端。“命”意味著無條件性和普遍性，普遍性意味著人性平等，無條件性說明仁是“善”，是“應當”，是自由。在中國哲學史上，二程、朱子“仁學”標誌著以仁為核心的儒家道德形上學達到了前所未有的新高峰。陳北溪嘗言：“自孔門後，人都不識仁。”¹²⁶ 陳淳認為二程、朱子以天理論仁，從形上學而非倫理學層面界說仁，才真正抉發出孔孟仁學的內在精神。“人倫者，天理也。”在邏輯上，程朱可能受到了周敦頤思想的影響。“善便有一個元底意思”，天理之善屬於絕對性的“元善”，“元善”意味著無條件性、先在性。天理之善是至善，不是與惡對立的善，而是超越了善惡對立的善。換言之，天理“元善”是無條件命令。理善，所以“理之性”善；性善，所以仁善！仁在普遍的人性中是無條件的命令，無條件意味著自由，仁是儒家自由意志視域中的自由。程朱從倫理學入手（而非知識論）證明：因為天理至善，所以仁善。這一思路與康德有點神似之處。應該說這是儒家哲學一大躍進！二程和朱熹以“天理”論仁，以體用言仁，以生生之意喻仁。通過引入體用、性情、動靜、已發未發等範疇與理論深入探討與開拓儒家仁學新內涵、新境界，而且也使孔、孟仁學中某些模糊不清的概念與表述逐漸明晰、豐富與精確。經過二程和朱子的創造性詮釋，儒家仁學廣度和深度上都獲得了重大的提升，理論形態趨向成熟與完備，儒家道德形上學臻於巔峰狀態。尋求至善，是儒家一大思想主題。從倫理學意義上的《大學》“止於至善”出發，經周敦頤太極“純粹至善”，一直到道德形上學意義上的程頤天理至善(元善)思想的誕生，歷代儒家探求至善的哲學步履遞進遞佳。二程朱子“仁善由於天理善”思想的誕生與論證，標誌著儒家仁學將得以成為中國自由主義倫理基礎。¹²⁷

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124 程頤、程頤，《二程集》上，王孝魚點校，《河南程氏遺書》卷十八，224頁。

125 《朱子語類》卷九十五，2429頁。

126 陳淳，《北溪字義》卷上，25頁。

127 由此我想起現代新儒家徐復觀的一大觀點，儒家之“仁”是中國自由主義的倫理基礎。這是“儒家自由主義”代表人物非常重要的一大學術觀點，時至今日，其重要性越來越凸顯。儒家仁學成為中國自由主義倫理基礎是否可能？何以可能？這是學界需從理論高度深入探討的一大課題。

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“Reaching at Supreme Goodness”: Philosophical Analysis of the Intrinsic Relation between Benevolence and Human Nature

ZENG Zhenyu

Abstract

Ever since Confucius claimed that “the benevolent is always content with benevolence”, the concept of benevolence has enjoyed a long-standing importance within the Confucian philosophical and cultural tradition. Within Confucian thought, as seen in the writings of Mencius, for example, benevolence is believed to have an intrinsic connection with human nature, as goodness comes from human nature and enjoys an intrinsic connection with moral metaphysics.

Despite its baseline significance, this paper argues that benevolence reached its peak position as the core of a Confucian moral metaphysics in the thought of the Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi., who argued that benevolence belongs to the Heavenly principle and is a unconditional impulse shared in common by all humanity.

Following the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi's creative interpretations, Confucian theories of benevolence have enjoyed significant interest, and seeking for goodness has become one of the great themes of Confucian thought. This article contends that it is largely the Cheng brothers' and Zhu Xi's view of benevolence as “com[ing] from the heavenly principle” which has laid the foundation for the subsequent development of Confucian liberalism and its ethical base.

Keywords: benevolence, Confucianism, freedom, supreme goodness, human nature

荀子性惡論的四重辨析

魏義霞

中文提要

早在先秦，人性問題就成為中國哲學家津津樂道的熱門話題，荀子便在其中。荀子主張人性惡，並從概念範疇、人之本能、立論標準等不同角度將善從人性中剔除。荀子的性惡論透射出荀子對人性的思考有別於孟子等人。本文擬從人性論證、荀學風采、儒家神韻和先秦特質等四個不同維度辨析荀子的性惡論，進而透視先秦性學說以及中國人性學說的特徵。

關鍵詞：荀子，孟子，人性論，儒家，先秦

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早在先秦，人性問題就成為中國哲學家津津樂道的熱門話題，荀子便在其中。荀子主張人性惡，並從概念範疇、人之本能、立論標準等不同角度將善從人性中剔除。性惡論是荀子關於人性的基本看法，同時透射出對人性有別於孟子等人的思考。由此，人性論證、荀學風采、儒家神韻和先秦特質便構成了“人之性惡明矣”的四重視界。

一

人性問題是中國哲學的熱門話題，早在先秦就備受關注。在這方面，荀子宣稱：“人之性惡明矣，其善者偽也。”¹ 這個命題不僅開宗明義地發出了人性惡的判斷，而且旗幟鮮明地反對性善說。問題的關鍵是，面對各種人性理論的先聲奪人——特別是孟子性善說的巨大影響，荀子對人性惡的論證顯得尤為必要和緊迫。

(一) 概念之正名

荀子對“人之性惡明矣”的論證擁有堅實的邏輯支援，不僅與正名一脈相承，而且本身就是正名思想的一部分。這是因為，荀子對人性的論證始於概念上對性與偽、善與惡兩對概念的界定。

荀子給性與偽所下的定義是：“生之所以然者謂之性。性之和所生、精合感應、不事而自然謂之性。性之好、惡、喜、怒、哀、樂謂之情。情然而心為之擇謂之慮。心慮而能為之動謂之偽。慮積焉、能習焉而後成謂之偽。”² 在荀子的視界中，性是生而自然、與生俱來的，屬於先天的範疇；偽是人心思慮、選擇和作為的結果，屬於後天的範疇。性出於自然之本能，偽出於後天之積習。這表明，性與偽是兩個不同的概念，是不容混淆的。

荀子給善與惡所下的定義是：“凡古今天下之所謂善者，正理平治也；所謂惡者，偏險悖亂也。是善惡之分也已……今當試去君上之勢，無禮義之化，去法正之治，無刑罰之禁，倚而觀天下民人之相與也；若是，則夫強者害弱而奪之，眾者暴寡而噬之，天下之悖亂而相亡不待頃矣。用此觀之，然則人之性惡明矣，其善者偽也。”³ 依照荀子的界定，善是符合禮義法度，維護社會安定；惡是違背禮義法度，危害社會安定。

荀子不僅分別對性與偽、善與惡進行界定，而且以這兩對概念的定義為標準，通過對性與偽、善與惡的逐一比對，得出了善與性沒有交叉，人性中沒有善的結論。在他看來，善只是人為，不屬於人性的範疇。這就是說，通過給性與偽、善與惡等概念下定義，荀子不僅證明了善是為，不屬於人性範疇，而且使人性惡成為定局。

1 《荀子·性惡》

2 《荀子·正名》

3 《荀子·性惡》

(二) 行為本能之挖掘

循著生而自然謂之性的思路，荀子從人之行為本能入手挖掘、闡釋人性的具體內容，為“人之性惡明矣”提供證明。對於人生而自然的東西是什麼，他如是說：“饑而欲食，寒而欲暖，勞而欲息，好利而惡害，是人之所生而有也，是無待而然者也，是禹、桀之所同也。”⁴ 依照這個分析，饑食渴飲的各種欲望是人與生俱來的本性，“好利而惡害”是人性所固有。這表明，生理欲望和好利是人性的具體內容。如果對人性中先天固有的這些欲望和本能任其自然、不加節制的話，勢必帶來分爭，影響社會治安。這足以證明人性中先天具有為惡的萌芽，故曰人之性惡。

上述分析促使荀子得出結論：從具體內容來看，人性中先天包含欲、利成分；如果不對之加以節制的話，不僅會給禮義法度之善帶來衝擊，而且會給整個社會造成危害。沿著這一思路，他從各個角度反復論證了性惡這一主題，旨在強調惡不僅為人的先天本性，而且表現為人的行為追求。荀子指出，相反相求，人對禮義的追求不僅不能證明人有向善的本能，反而恰好證明了人性中沒有這些東西。他論證並解釋說：“凡人之欲為善者，為性惡也。夫薄願厚，惡願美，狹願廣，貧願富，賤願貴，苟無之中者，必求於外；故富而不願財，貴而不願勢，苟有之中者，必不及於外。用此觀之，人之欲為善者，為性惡也。今人之性，固無禮義，故強學而求有之也；性不知禮義，故思慮而求知之也。然則性而已，則人無禮義，不知禮義。人無禮義則亂，不知禮義則悖。然則性而已，則悖亂在己。用此觀之，人之性惡明矣，其善者偽也。”⁵

循著相反相求的邏輯，荀子篤信，正如“薄願厚，惡願美，狹願廣，貧願富，賤願貴”一樣，人喜歡追求自己所沒有的東西。富者的最大願望不是斂財，貴者的最大願望不是高升。總之，人們夢寐以求的都是自己未嘗擁有的東西。以此推之，人們對禮義孜孜以求，恰好證明了禮義之善不在人性之中。這就是說，從人的後天追求來看，並不能證明禮義為人性所有，倒是使人之性惡昭然若揭。

荀子的上述議論使人越來越疑竇叢生：既然人性中沒有向善的因素，那麼，禮義法度從何而來？如果承認禮義法度存在，如果承認禮義法度是善，也就等於承認或證明了制定禮義法度之善的聖人性善。既然禮義法度之善不在人性之中，那麼，善從何而來？善與聖人之性是何關係？對此，荀子的回答是：儘管禮義法度出於聖人，儘管禮義法度是善，然而，這些並不能證明聖人性善。秘密在於，善源於聖人之偽而非出自聖人之性，也就是說，禮義法度之善是聖人後天人為的結果，屬於偽的範疇。為了闡明這個道理，徹底堵塞性善的可能性，荀子將善從聖人之性中排除，將聖人制定禮義法度等同於各種工匠製造器皿一樣。因此，對於善與聖人之間的關係，他以陶匠、木匠製造器皿的例子解釋說：

4 《荀子·榮辱》

5 《荀子·性惡》

夫陶人埴埴而生瓦，然則瓦埴豈陶人之性也哉？工人斲木而生器，然則器木豈工人之性也哉？夫聖人之于禮義也，辟亦陶埴而生之也，然則禮義積偽者，豈人之本性也哉？……然則聖人之于禮義積偽也，亦猶陶埴而生之也。用此觀之，然則禮義積偽者，豈人之性也哉？……故人之性惡明矣，其善者偽也。⁶

(三) 言論之標準

荀子從言論必有辨合、符驗的角度論證人性，使“人之性惡明矣”擁有了認識論、真理觀的意蘊和維度。按照他的說法，一種思想或言論要成為真理，不僅要在邏輯上講得通，能夠自圓其說；而且要有現實依據，能够在實踐中可行。在這個前提下，荀子強調，從現實存在來看，聖王、禮義是為了矯正人性之惡的，它們的存在本身就已經證明人性中包含為惡的可能性。他寫道：“直木不待櫟栝而直者，其性直也。枸木必將待櫟栝烝（蒸——引者注）矯然後直者，以其性不直也。今人之性惡，必將待聖王之治、禮義之化，然後皆出於治、合於善也。用此觀之，然則人之性惡明矣，其善者偽也。”⁷ 這就是說，櫟栝的產生是由於枸木的存在，繩墨的出現是由於曲線的存在；同樣的道理，君上、師傅和禮義法度的存在是由於人之性惡。這樣說來，正如枸木、曲線證明了櫟栝、繩墨的價值一樣，君上、師傅和禮義法度的價值恰恰在於人之性惡。循著這個邏輯，荀子反問道：如果人性真的如孟子所說的那樣先天就有仁、義、禮、智之善端，能夠自覺地從善如流的話，那麼，聖王、禮義對於這樣的人性又何以複加呢？可見，性善說與現實存在的狀況不符，當然，取消聖王、禮義法度的存在對於荀子來說顯然是無法接受和容忍的。要走出這一困境，必須放棄人性善而主張人性惡；如果承認了人性惡，也就等於證明了聖王和禮義法度的必要性。於是，他反復宣稱：

故善言古者，必有節於今；善言天者，必有征於人。凡論者，貴其有辨合、有符驗。故坐而言之，起而可設，張而可施行。今孟子曰“人之性善”，無辨合符驗，坐而言之，起而不可設，張而不可施行，豈不過甚矣哉？故性善，則去聖王、息禮義矣；性惡，則與聖王、貴禮義矣。故櫟栝之生，為枸木也；繩墨之起，為不直也；立君上，明禮義，為性惡也。⁸

今誠以人之性固正理平治邪，則有惡用聖王、惡用禮義矣哉？雖有聖王禮義，將曷加于正理平治也哉？今不然，人之性惡。故古者聖人以人之性惡，以為偏險而不正、悖亂而不治，故為之立君上之勢以臨之，明禮義以化之，起法正以治之，重刑罰以禁之，使天下皆出於治、合於善也。是聖王之治而禮義之化也。⁹

6 《荀子·性惡》

7 《荀子·性惡》

8 《荀子·性惡》

9 《荀子·性惡》

議論至此，荀子的論證層層遞進，在一步步加固性惡觀點的同時，最終排除了有善存在於人性之中的可能性。由於把善從人性中完全剔除，因此“人之性惡明矣”成為鐵案。

二

事實上，人性惡不僅集中體現了荀子的人性主張，而且盡顯荀子思想的風采。拿儒家的思想來說，孟子“道性善”，認定“人之性惡明矣”的荀子主性惡，由此拉開了人性的善惡之爭。正因為如此，“人之性惡明矣”的每次出現，後面緊接著“其善者偽也”。荀子之所以在論證人性惡的同時強調善是人為，目的很明確，那就是：與堅守人性惡一樣，為了反駁孟子的性善說。對於荀子來說，善是人為，可以理解為對人性惡的補充說明。換言之，“人之性惡明矣”不僅表明了荀子對人性有別於告子、孟子等人的判斷，而且是針對孟子的性善說有感而發的，甚至可以說是為了通過駁斥或為了反駁孟子的性善說構建起來的，故而呈現出與孟子人性思想的種種差異。

(一) 側重人之自然屬性

荀子之所以判定人性惡，是由於側重人之自然屬性；基於人生而具有各種欲望，故而聲稱人性中隱藏著作惡的可能性。因此，荀子給性下的定義和對人性的論證都是截取人的自然屬性進行的，把人性限制在自然屬性之內是他的一貫做法。例如，荀子宣稱：“若夫目好色，耳好聲，口好味，心好利，骨體膚理好愉佚，是皆生於人之情性者也，感而自然、不待事而後生之者也。”¹⁰ 在此，他把目耳口心肢體和由此而來的物質欲望視為人生而具有的東西，並歸為性之範疇。尤為值得一提的是，荀子將心說成是“好利”的，與對人性的界定著眼於人的自然屬性一脈相承，並與孟子所講的“理義之悅我心，猶芻豢之悅我口”¹¹形成鮮明對照。正由於荀子對人的自然屬性和生理欲望的選取，利和欲成為人性的主要內容：第一，對於人性之利的成分，他宣稱：“今人之性，生而有好利焉。”¹² 這表明，人生來就有好利的本能，對利的追逐是人性的重要方面。第二，對於人性之欲的成分，荀子斷言：“今人之性，饑而欲飽，寒而欲暖，勞而欲休，此人之情性也。”¹³ 在此，他把貪圖物利、饑食渴飲和好逸惡勞說成是人性的基本內容，致使貪利和欲望成為人性的兩個重要方面。

《孟子》書曰：“孟子道性善，言必稱堯舜。”¹⁴ 這表明，與荀子不同，孟子主張性善。性善是孟子對人性的基本判斷和總體看法。對於這一主張，他從兩方面進行了論證：第一，在邏輯推理上，孟

10 《荀子·性惡》

11 《孟子·告子上》

12 《荀子·性惡》

13 《荀子·性惡》

14 《孟子·滕文公上》

子以同類的東西具有相似性為前提，推出了理義之善為人心所固有的結論。在他看來，正如天下人之口、耳、目具有相同的嗜好一樣，理義是天下人之心的共同嗜好。天下人之心都嗜好理義表明，人心都有向善的本能，人性是善的。第二，在行為經驗上，孟子通過“今人乍見孺子將入于井”、“舜之居深山之中”等具體例子證明善出自人的先天本能，為人心所固有。

由此可見，荀子由於側重人的自然屬性，得出了性惡的結論；孟子得出性善的結論，是由於側重人的社會屬性。正是由於切入的視角不同，所以兩人對人性得出了不同的判斷和認定。

(二) 大聲疾呼化性起偽

人性是什麼的回答奠定了對人性做什麼的基礎，甚至可以說，人性是什麼本身就包含著對人性能做什麼、應該做什麼的回答。同時，如果說對人性是什麼的判斷和選取尚屬於理論層面的話，那麼，對人性的態度和作為則落實到了操作層面。因此，後者具有前者沒有的實踐意義。就荀子來說，對人性惡的判斷奠定乃至決定了對待人性的態度和作為，那就是：變化人性。於是，“化性而起偽”，積習臻善成為對待人性的基本要求和主要作為。

孟子宣稱仁、義、禮、智四端與生俱來，並且諄諄教導人盡心養性；與此有別，荀子一再動員人改變本性，對性加以後天的人為：第一，荀子揭示了人性自身的缺陷，在給人性所下的定義中已經包含著利、欲的成分和犯上作亂的可能性。第二，通過論證性偽關係，在性與偽的相互作用中突出“化性而起偽”的重要性。正是在這個意義上，荀子指出：“性者，本始材樸也；偽者，文理隆盛也。無性，則偽之無所加；無偽，則性不能自美。性、偽合，然後成聖人之名，一天下之功於是就也。故曰：天地合而萬物生，陰陽接而變化起，性偽合而天下治。”¹⁵ 在荀子看來，天然的人性是樸素的資質，後天的人為是美麗的華彩；二者既相互區別、不容混淆，又相互聯繫、缺一不可。正如離開人性，人為由於沒有加工的原料而失去用武之地一樣，離開人為，人性便不能自行完美。正是在樸素的人性與華美的人為的相互結合中，成就了聖人。這就是說，在他的視界中，人性自身的欠缺與性偽關係共同指向了改變人性的必要性、迫切性和正當性。

在確定了對待人性的原則之後，荀子進一步闡明了對待人性的具體辦法，那可以歸結為一個字——化，也就是改變人性的本來面目。對人性惡的認定加劇了荀子改變人性的迫切心情，“化性而起偽”的思路和做法更是使後天的人為具有了不容置疑的重要性。他所講的人為，一項重要的內容便是學習。荀子告誡人一刻也不可以停止學習，目的就是以後天的學習改變先天的性惡。《荀子》一書始於《勸學》篇，該篇的第一句話便是“學不可以已”。學的主要內容是義，旨在讓人通過對儒家經典和做人道理的學習，日臻完善，

¹⁵ 《荀子·禮論》

成為聖人。這用荀子本人的話說便是：“故學數有終，若其義則不可須臾舍也。為之，人也；舍之，禽獸也。”¹⁶ 荀子不否認學習的主觀自覺性，同時重視外部環境對人的影響和薰染。因此，他建議，在良師益友的影響和熏習下“化性而起偽”。與此同時，荀子指出：“人之生，固小人，無師、無法，則唯利之見耳。”¹⁷ 這表明，他重視師法的作用，將學習視為一面在良師益友的幫助、影響下、一面在禮法的威懾下不斷“化性而起偽”，遠離禽獸而完善人格的過程。荀子在對待人性的態度上，是不排除主觀自覺的。總的說來，荀子不像孟子那樣注重內求，而是崇尚外力。

(三) 凸顯禮法的必要性

荀子聲稱“人之性惡明矣”，這凸顯禮法的必要性，體現在統治方案和行政路線上具有崇尚外在強制的特點。在具體貫徹和實際操作的層面上，性惡論著眼於受眾作惡的可能性，信憑外在的威懾——在荀子的“化性而起偽”中，無論是君上、師傅還是禮法都有強制因素。從社會效果和實際功用來看，“人之性惡明矣”不僅使受眾接受教育和統治擁有了十足的必要性，而且使師法成為必不可少的。對於性善說與性惡論對於統治秩序的可行性與必要性的不同側重，荀子本人具有清醒的認識和理解。眾所周知，正如孟子“道性善”是針對告子的人性可善可不善有感而發一樣，荀子堅持“人之性惡明矣”是為了反駁孟子的性善說。荀子之所以堅決反對孟子“道性善”，一個主要理由就是性善說會導致“去聖王，息禮義”的後果——不僅聖王、禮法變成了多餘的，而且淡化百姓接受統治的必要性和迫切性，由此造成不良的社會影響。

三

問題到此並沒有結束，因為儒家對人性論的熱衷與治國平天下的理想息息相關，與此同時，荀子的“人之性惡明矣”與孟子的“道性善”也不例外。荀子與孟子的不同只是由於對人性的不同切入而對人性作出了不同的判斷。因此，兩人關於人性的善惡之爭是就治國平天下的具體方案而言的，背後隱藏著相同的價值理念和訴求。正因為如此，“人之性惡明矣”不僅帶有荀學的個性風采，而且擁有與孟子的性善說一致的儒家神韻。

(一) 對人性的價值判斷

儘管荀子與孟子對人性的看法存在差異，荀子的“人之性惡明矣”與孟子的“道性善”甚至針鋒相對，截然相反，然而，不可否認

16 《荀子·勸學》

17 《荀子·榮辱》

的是，二者都對人性進行價值判斷而非事實判斷。事實層面的探討圍繞人性如何展開，對客觀性情有獨鍾；價值層面的探討圍繞人性為何展開，關心善惡之價值。荀子的“人之性惡明矣”與孟子的“道性善”一樣側重對人性的價值判斷，無論是對人性的鑒定還是對待都圍繞著善惡而展開：第一，在對人性的認定和判斷上，在說明人性是什麼的同時，更熱衷於對人性的善惡判斷。正如《孟子》書中明確記載“孟子道性善”，把性與善聯繫在一起一樣，荀子明確宣佈人性惡，致使“人之性惡明矣”成為名言名句。這表明，兩人對人性的認定和探討屬於價值判斷而非事實判斷。第二，在理論側重和言說方式上，對人性的闡釋始終圍繞著善惡展開。孟子和荀子都有對人性究竟是善還是惡的證明，不僅使性善、性惡成為明確的觀點或著名的命題，而且對之傾注了極大的熱情。孟子對性善的論證邏輯推理和行為經驗同時進行，兩個方面的結論相互印證，可謂用心良苦。荀子對性惡的論證始於對性與偽、善與惡兩對概念的界定，接著又對人性的本然狀態、後天追求進行探究，此外還有聖凡比較等，可謂論證縝密。與對性善、性惡的過分關注和熱衷相對應，兩人對人性具體內容的說明顯得單薄，並且很多時候是作為性善或性惡的證明材料出現的，而不是關注的焦點。第三，不是停留在人性是什麼上，而是對人“應是”什麼上充滿期待。通過對人性的作為而成為道德完善的聖人是孟子和荀子探討人性的初衷，也是兩人的共同理想。

接下來的問題是，由於孟子和荀子對人性進行的是價值判斷，所以兩人或者把人性或者歸於善，或者歸於惡。其實，對人性予以價值判斷是兩人的共識，也代表了儒家的一貫做法，故而與韓非代表的法家呈現出本質區別。例如，在對人性是什麼的認定上，韓非與荀子把饑食渴飲之欲和好利視為人與生俱來的本性，並且每每指出：

好利惡害，夫人之所有也。……喜利畏罪，人莫不然。¹⁸

夫安利者就之，危害者去之，此人之情也。……人焉能去安利之道而就危害之處哉？¹⁹

這些言論出自韓非，不需要太多思考即可發現，它們與荀子的思想別無二致，甚至連話語結構都如出一轍。這就是說，在把人性的具體內容歸結為自然屬性上，荀子和韓非同道，與孟子相去甚遠。然而，由於對人性進行的是價值而非事實判斷，荀子並沒有停留在人性是什麼的層面上，更沒有像韓非那樣放縱人性；而是及時地用惡去判斷人性，接著大聲疾呼通過後天的人為改變人性。荀子的這一做法與韓非南轅北轍，在本質上與孟子相契合。荀子與孟子的一致性共同彰顯了儒家的道德追求。正是受制於這一共同的理論初衷

18 《韓非子·二難》

19 《韓非子·奸劫弑臣》

和價值訴求，兩人在對人性進行價值判斷的基礎上將揚善除惡奉為對待人性的基本原則和人生的奮鬥目標。

(二) 以儒家善惡為判斷標準

荀子的“人之性惡明矣”與孟子的“道性善”用以判斷、匡定人性的善惡標準是一致的。在孟子和荀子對人性的闡發中，善惡比真偽更引人注目，用善惡標準去衡量人性也由此成為兩人的相同之處。事實上，孟子和荀子用善惡來衡量人性、對人性進行價值判斷的做法相同，對善惡的認定、理解也相同。換言之，被孟子和荀子用以判斷人性的善惡標準是一樣的，皆指儒家的仁、義、禮、智之善。

事實上，孟子、荀子不僅同樣秉持儒家的善惡標準，而且用這一共同標準對人性進行善惡判斷。這一致思方向早在兩人對人性的論證中就已經初露端倪：孟子之所以斷言人性善，理由是良知、良能與生俱來，人性中包含仁、義、禮、智之萌芽；反過來，理義的與生俱來本身即證明人性是善的。這表明，孟子所講的善指仁、義、禮、智之道德或符合道德的行為。在荀子對善、惡的界定中，善即正理平治，仁、義、禮、智之道德或符合禮義法度的行為為善；惡即偏險悖亂，利、欲導致的違背禮義法度或不利於社會安定的觀念和行為為惡。可見，在對善、惡的理解上，孟子和荀子的看法一致——善指仁義道德，欲、利則與惡如影隨形。

(三) 聖人情結

荀子與孟子的人性論具有共同的價值訴求和人格理想，那就是：去惡揚善，成為聖人。其實，對人性進行價值而非事實判斷本身就意味著兩人的關注點不在人是什麼上，而是飽含著對人“應是”什麼的渴望和期盼上，目標完全相同：使人臻於善而遠離惡，最後成為聖人。

宣稱人性善的孟子對待人性的根本態度和主要做法是保養本心之善，具體途徑就是擯棄物質欲望、遠離物利。他強調，人心的最大敵人是欲望，養心就應該減少物質欲望，進而得出了“養心莫善於寡欲”的結論。對此，孟子如是說：“養心莫善於寡欲。其為人也寡欲，雖有不存焉者，寡矣；其為人也多欲，雖有存焉者寡矣。”²⁰這從一個側面表明，他之所以提倡養心，是為了用道德來約束人的生理欲望，以免人心被物欲所蒙蔽而喪失善良本性。孟子對人性的論述是始終強化人與動物的界限，這使完善人性還原為遠離人的自然本性，通過修身養性而成為聖人的過程。正是在這個意義上，他反復指出：

20 《孟子·盡心下》

形色，天性也；惟聖人然後可以踐形。²¹

從其大體為大人，從其小體為小人。……耳目之官不思，而蔽於物。物交物，則引之而已矣。心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。此天之所與我者。先立乎其大者，則其小者弗能奪也。此為大人而已矣。²²

在孟子看來，人的四肢(孟子稱之為“四體”、“小體”)與四心(孟子稱之為“四端”、“大體”)雖然都與生俱來，但是，它們的功能和作用截然不同。因此，人不可以對四肢與四心等量齊觀，而應該對二者嚴格區別，慎重對待。正是在或為義或為利、或盡心或縱體的作為中，人有了君子與小人之分。面對這兩種迥然懸殊的後果，他讓人“先立乎其大者”，在盡心、知性中成就聖人事業。

荀子之所以斷言人性惡，是因為認定人性中生來具有欲、利等成分。在通常情況下，天然性往往代表著正當性和合理性，荀子卻在宣稱利、欲為人性所固有的同時，不是對欲、利順其自然或予以滿足，而是一面以死而後已的不倦學習改變人性，一面對利、欲加以道德引導和節制。對於欲，荀子指出：“故雖為守門，欲不可去，性之具也。”²³ 欲的與生俱來沒有作為縱欲的藉口，反而促使他對性加以提防。為此，荀子呼籲用禮來節制和引導——以禮“養人之欲，給人之求”。荀子主張“化性而起偽”，就是為了引導人去惡為善，將人生目標鎖定在為聖人上。他這樣為人指點迷津：“學惡乎始？惡乎終？曰：其數則始乎誦經，終乎讀《禮》；其義則始乎為士，終乎為聖人。”²⁴ 可見，荀子振臂高呼學習的至關重要，是因為學習是“化性而起偽”的主要手段，也是通往聖人之途。這表明，與其說荀子高呼“學不可以已”是對學習如饑似渴，不如說是對朝聖真情真意切。

至此可見，價值判斷、善惡標準、去惡為善而學為聖人，構成了荀子的“人之性惡明矣”與孟子的“道性善”之間的一致性，也是儒家的道德理想和人生追求在人性領域的具體反映。這表明，兩人的性善惡之爭不僅具有差異的一面，而且具有互補、相通的一面，可謂是殊途而同歸。

四

荀子主張人性惡，在這方面，他聲稱“人之性惡明矣”。這個命題既展示了荀子思想的鮮明特性，又流露出儒家的精神旨趣；前者表現為與孟子性善說的差異性，後者則體現為兩人人性思想的一致性。除此之外，“人之性惡明矣”帶有鮮明的時代烙印，再現了先秦

21 《孟子·盡心上》

22 《孟子·告子上》

23 《荀子·正名》

24 《荀子·勸學》

時期人性學說的思維水準，那就是：認定人在本性或本能上是平等的，人與人之間的所有差別都是後天的作為和引導造成的。

荀子的性惡論屬全稱判斷，發出“人之性惡明矣”的判斷意味著他認為所有人對於性惡概莫能外，人與人在本性上並無不同。為了突出人在本性上是一樣的，荀子宣稱人人性惡——普通人如此，聖人也不例外。對此，他不止一次地強調：

凡人之性者，堯、舜之與桀、蹠，其性一也；君子之與小人，其性一也。²⁵

材性知能，君子、小人也。好榮惡辱，好利惡害，是君子、小人之所同也。²⁶

由此可見，既然荀子斷言“人之性惡明矣”，那麼，他便認定人與人在性惡上是一樣的：第一，君子與小人在生理素質和知識能力等各方面都是一樣的，君子也有與小人一樣的欲望。第二，即便是聖人之性也含有與常人一樣的惡的傾向。聖人與凡人一樣，生來就具有對欲和利的追求，與凡人在本性上完全相同；反過來，凡人生來就具有與聖人一樣的耳目口鼻身體器官及認知能力。至此，荀子總結說，人與人是生而平等的，絕無任何差異。為了凸顯人在本性上的平等，他用“一”、“同”來概括、表述君子與小人、聖人與凡人的本性。

沿著這一思路可以想像，既然人人在本性上生而平等是先秦人性論的共同特徵，那麼，這一觀點便不可能只限于荀子一個人，其他人對這一問題的認識亦應如此。被荀子批判的孟子堅信，人在本性上天然平等。在孟子那裡，作為人生而性善的根據和內容，惻隱之心(又稱不忍人之心)、羞惡之心、辭讓之心(又稱恭敬之心)和是非之心人人同具，無有不同；在人生來就有四端、四心上，人人相同，無一例外。同時，為了強調人在本性上是一樣的，孟子特意指出，人的一切差異都是後天形成的，與先天的本性無關。這用他本人的話說便是：“富歲，子弟多賴；凶歲，子弟多暴。非天之降才爾殊也，其所以陷溺其心者然也。”²⁷ 同樣，被孟子作為批判靶子的告子也秉持人性生而平等的原則，並由“食色性也”出發，得出了人性可以為善也可以為不善的結論。值得注意的是，告子用以論證人性可善可不善的證據是“水之就下”，孟子反駁告子，用以證明性善的證據也是“水之就下”。在這裡，論證者和反駁者不約而同地以“水之就下”論證人性，結果卻是一個得出人性可善可不善的結論，一個卻得出人性善的結論。這與其說表明了以“水之就下”論證人性善惡存在致命漏洞，毋寧說雙方選擇“水之就下”論證人性，就是為了凸顯人在本性上猶如“水”一樣“平”。據《孟子》記載：

25 《荀子·性惡》

26 《荀子·榮辱》

27 《孟子·告子上》

告子曰：“性猶湍水也，決諸東方則東流，決諸西方則西流。人性之無分於善不善也，猶水之無分於東西也。”孟子曰：“水信無分於東西，無分於上下乎？人性之善也，猶水之就下也。人無有不善，水無有不下。今夫水，搏而躍之，可使過顙；激而行之，可使在山。是豈水之性哉？其勢則然也。人之可使為不善，其性亦猶是也。”²⁸

在中國文化的語境中，法有準則、水準之義，法家崇尚法便意味著對人性的整齊劃一。事實上，認定人皆自為是法家的傳統，也意味著認為人性自私自利是法家的共識。對於法家而言，在自私這一點上，人性是一樣的。饒有趣味的是，商鞅為了說明人與生俱來的本能無有不同，同樣以“水之於下”為喻，“民之於利也，若水之於下也”²⁹頗有對人性整齊劃一的味道。商鞅的“水之於下”不禁使人聯想到告子、孟子的“水之就下”，所不同的是，由人性之平等引向了對水準之法的敬畏。

綜上所述，荀子的“人之性惡明矣”折射出先秦人性哲學對人性整齊劃一的時代特質，這一特質在與秦後人性哲學的比較中則看得更加清楚、明白：漢唐人性哲學的特點是性分品級，以西漢董仲舒的性分三品為開端，性分品級與人類社會中長幼尊卑的宗法等級相對應，中經南朝黃侃的性分九品，對人性等級愈分愈細；到了唐代，情亦分品級，韓愈、李翱則將對人之性情品級的論證發揮到了極致。宋明理學人性哲學的特徵是人性雙重，儘管作為共性的天地之性（張載）或天命之性（朱熹）人人相同乃至人物相同，然而，一個不爭的事實是，將人與人、人與物區分開來的氣質之性各不相同，並且註定了人與人之間的智愚、聖凡、賢不肖之別。這等於將宗法等級下的名分歸結為人的先天宿命，說成是人與生俱來、不可更改的先天性命。與漢唐、宋明人性學說旨在突出人性之等級迥異其趣，先秦人性哲學包括對漢唐、宋明影響巨大的孟子和荀子主張，人在本性上是相同的，人與人之間之所以有差別都是後天形成的。

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28 《孟子·告子上》

29 《商君書·君臣》

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A Four Dimensional Analysis of Xunzi's Views on Human Nature

WEI Yixia

Abstract

In the Pre-Qin period, the theory of human nature was a key subject addressed by Chinese philosophers, including Xunzi. Xunzi's theory of human nature showed clear differences from the views held by Mengzi. Xunzi believed that human nature is evil, and draining good from human nature by accepting human instinct and correct standards. The essay will discuss Xunzi's theory of *xingelun* in greater detail, analyzing it in four crucial dimensions, and will also place his views within the larger context of other Pre-Qin Chinese theories of human nature.

Keywords: Xunzi, Mengzi, human nature, the Confucianists, pre-Qin period

從郭店簡《成之聞之》看先秦儒家教化思想

邢 起 龍

中文提要

教化思想是先秦儒家政治理論中一個核心問題。先秦儒家在理論上構建了一套教化理論體系，在實踐中通過太學、鄉校等實施教化理念。《成之聞之》是從人性和人倫角度談君子教化思想和方法，其中對教化主體和教化的途徑有新的概括和認識，它既堅持先秦儒家的教化思想，又打上郭店簡性情論的特色的儒家文獻。本文從《成之聞之》中有關教化的思想出發，結合先秦其他有關教化思想的文獻，對先秦儒家教化思想中的某些問題進行反思和批判，從而找到儒家教化思想的源流。

關鍵詞：教化，先秦儒家政治，成之聞之，郭店簡

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** 該專案為國家社科基金重大專案《出土簡帛文獻與古代中國哲學新發展綜合研究》(項目編號：11&ZD086)階段性成果；湖北省教育廳人文社科專案《楚地出土文獻中的先秦儒家心靈哲學研究》(專案編號：15Q070)成果。

1993年郭店發現的十四篇儒家的文獻中，有一篇名叫《成之聞之》的竹簡就談到君子教化民眾的理論和方法，在今天看來仍然有著重大的現實意義和價值。郭店簡《成之聞之》共有竹簡枚40枚，簡長32.5釐米許，兩道編繩。該簡文排序包括題目的命名在學者間雖存在的爭議很大，但是關於教化的思想亦然很明顯。在先秦儒家眼中，教化本身就是政治。《成之聞之》從人性、人倫的角度論述君子教化民眾的理論和方法，深深打上郭店簡所具有的性情思想特色。其中簡4-7關於君子教化思想具有很高的研究價值，為方便論述特將簡文移錄如下：¹

君子之於教也，其導民也不浸，則其淳也弗深矣。是故亡乎其身而(簡4)存乎其詞，雖厚其命，民弗從之矣。是故威服刑罰之履行也，(簡5)由上之弗身也。昔者君子有言曰：戰與刑人，君子之墜德也。是故(簡6)上苟身服之，則民必有甚焉者。(簡7)

譯文：君子之于教化，就是要引導民眾從事善道，這個過程就像以水澆地，如果不循序漸進就難得澆深。君子要引導民眾從事善道，他本人必須具備德行並從事於善道。否則，如果善道只存在於外在言語之中，而不身體力行，那麼，雖然你強調你的命令和言辭如何重要，民眾也不會服從你的。因此，之所以經常實施威服刑罰，那是因為在上者沒有身體力行善道之故。這正如過去君子所言，戰爭與刑罰是人君喪失德性的表現。所以，如果在上者身體力行於善道，那麼人民一定會做得更好！簡文認為君子自須作表率，然後才能引導人民從事善道，如果自己本身不正，民眾也不會服從。這種精神與《論語》等先秦文獻多對政者的要求具有一致性，筆者特就《成之聞之》中的教化思想談談自己拙見以求方家指正！

一、從人性、人倫角度反思教化

《成之聞之》是從人性論角度談教化思想和方法，而且也與郭店簡的性情論特色相吻合。人性論是先秦儒家人倫的基礎，儒家通過對人性的探討回答人為什麼有道德的形而上學性即道德的根源性問題。孔子雲：“性相近，習相遠也”，但是並未有展開解釋。孟子接著談人性問題，“性無善無不善”，“性可以為善，可以為不善”，“有性善，有性不善”。(《孟子告子上》)，下面這段對話對性的界定可以全面反映孟子人性論：

告子曰：“生之謂性。”

孟子曰：“生之謂性也，猶白之謂白與？”

曰：“然。”

“白羽之白也，猶白雪之白；白雪之白，猶白玉之白與？”

1 文中所引簡文皆來源於陳偉《楚地出土戰國簡冊（十四種）》。

曰：“然。”

“然則犬之性，猶牛之性，牛之性猶人之性與？”

郭店楚簡中的文獻有一個基本特點就是特別重視從心性層面找教化的根據，其中《性自命出》是目前所見比較集中探討人性論的經典。大多學者認為，《性自命出》是孔子到《中庸》、《孟子》性情論的中間環節。筆者認為，《性自命出》論證性情生髮於天命，天命賦予人之性，人性具有先天性，每個人在天命面前皆應真誠。喜樂哀怒之謂情，這是後天的，需要教化來涵養性情，複歸天性。這就是涉及到下文要談及的教化之作用，此處不展開論述。

先秦儒家所謂人倫是指君臣、父子、夫婦、兄弟等基本人際關係。在當時宗法制社會中，人都處於一定的等級層次之中，在此等級之中每個人的言與行都應該符合身份要求。人倫是維繫當時宗法制社會基本的紐帶，它是當時社會和諧穩定數百年之久的根本性因素。《成之聞之》也繼承了先秦儒家關於人倫的基本觀點，並談到人倫的社會作用：

天降大常，以理人倫。制為君臣之義，圖為父子之親，分為夫婦之辨，是故，小人亂天常以逆大道，君子治人倫以順天德。”(32簡)

昔者君子有言曰：聖人天德，蓋言慎求之於己，而可以至順天常矣。(簡37-38)

是故君子慎六位以祀天常。(40簡)

“天常”與《樂記》“大當”之說意同，“當”與“常”古為通假字。²“六位”就是“夫婦、父子、君臣”，又見於《六德》之中，而且《六德》更進一步談到六位、六職、六德之間的關係：

生民口六位也，有率人者，有從人者，有使人者，有事人者，有教人者，有學者，此六職也。有夫六位也，以任此六職也，六職既分，以 六德。(《六德》簡7、8、9)

何謂六德？聖智也，仁義也，忠信也。(《六德》簡1)

《六德》簡文中“六位”也是君臣、父子、夫婦基本關係。揆諸此篇以及郭店楚簡《六德》，六倫是“君臣、父子、夫婦”基本人際關係，它來源於“天常”，正確處理“六位”之間的關係就是遵循“天常”的表現。其存在具有宗教性意義。六位關係設定的依據是什麼？它何以可能維繫社會關係穩定？《成之聞之》認為“天降大常”是為“理人倫”，依靠“君臣、父子、夫婦”來治人倫、定天下。筆者認為“是故君子慎六位以祀天常”(40簡)中隱含著先民的神秘宗教觀，“慎

2 高亨、董治安，《古字通假會例》，299頁。

六位”與“祀天常”之間存在某種聯繫，只能從先民的祭祀文化和宗教觀中找到合理解釋。《成之聞之》表達的“慎六位以祀天常”的觀點只不過是那個時代的社會意識的反映。

當然，“六位”關係的設定也有人性需要的原因。先秦儒家看問題的視角一般從“親親”開始展開，按照親疏關係向外推及。故而，教化應該從人性和人倫角度出發。

二、從政和德政的關係

先秦儒家把從政與道德統一起來，非常重視道德的作用。先秦儒家之所以強調道德的社會作用，一方面是由於當時宗法制社會主要依靠道德力量來維繫社會穩定；二是基於他們對道德作用的認識。孔子認為“道之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格。”（《論語為政》）道德的社會作用可以達到民心自我格正的效果，而事實上常有“上不以其道，民之從之也難”（簡15）的社會現象。那麼，從政和道德之間究竟有什麼關係？

第一，從政者德行具足可以影響社會，這也屬於隱性政治。孔子在《論語為政》開篇之首就針對從政者提出了一個基本綱領：“子曰：‘為政以德，譬如北辰居其所而眾星共之。’”從政者德性具足才會得到民眾的真正擁護。那麼，德性是如何養成的呢？孔子認為“正身”，首先要從自己做起，“不能正其身，如正人何？”季康子問政於孔子。孔子對曰：政者，正也。子帥以正，孰敢不正？《論語·顏淵》“其身正，不令而行；其身不正，雖令不從。”（《論語·子路》）季康子問政於孔子曰：如殺無道，以就有道，何如？孔子對曰：子為政，焉用殺？子欲善而民善矣。君子之德風，小人之德草，草上之風，必偃。”《論語·顏淵》季康子和孔子治國之道迥然不同，根源於道德域的大小有別。《成之聞之》：“君子之於教也，其導民也不口，則其淳也弗深矣。（簡4）”“其導民也不浸”之“導”，原作“道”。裘按：“口”，疑當讀為“浸”，裘錫圭先生引《尚書正義》，認為，“浸”為“漸進之名。”反言之，君子要引導民眾“守死善道”，他本人就必須具備德性並從事於善道。君子的教化就是要引導人民從事善道，那麼他自己就須具足完滿的善，如此才能起到“風過必偃”的社會作用，也只有從政者的力量才能實現。孔子說“上好禮，則民莫敢不敬，上好義，則民莫敢不服，上好信，則民莫敢不用情。夫如是，則，焉用稼。”（《論語·子路》）君子以“禮、義、信”正身自己、管理社會，如果這樣“四方之民，罔負其子而至矣”，這就是最好的為政。其次，從政者也要使其他人身正，從政者要善於提拔正直的人，這種社會管理也與從政者的德性有關係。“舉直措諸枉，能使枉者直。《論語·顏淵》”“舉善而教不能則勸。”《論語·為政》

第二，從政者要言行一致，這屬於政治方向問題。先秦儒家對從政者的言行也有看法，認為言行不一致會導致人格受到影響，更

會影響人民對政治方向的錯誤判斷。“君子名之必可言也，言之必可行也。君子於其言，無所苟而已矣。”（《論語·子路》）“有大人者，正己而物正者也。”（《孟子·盡心上》）史記索隱引向秀易乾卦注云：聖人在位，謂之大人。《成之聞之》簡13“士成言不行，名弗得也”，意為：訂約而不履行，成議而不實行，這樣就會失信於人。成言，李零讀為：盛言。廖名春認為“盛言”屢見於先秦典籍，意為訂約、成議。《楚辭·離騷》：“初既與余成言兮，後悔遁而有他。”朱熹注：“成言，謂其要約之言也。”《左傳·襄公二十七年》：“壬戌，楚公子黑肱先至，成言于晉。丁卯，宋向戌如陳，從子木成言于楚。”楊伯峻注：“與晉相約”，“共同約定弭兵之會有關楚之諾言”。

三、教化之途徑和方法

從先秦典籍看，教化的主體應該是“君子”。君子的稱謂在《論語》等先秦文獻有所指，“《論語》的君子有時指‘有德者’，有時指‘有位者’”。³孔子認為實現“有道之世”的途徑就是冀望於“君子”推行教化。“教者，何謂也？教者，效也。上為之，下效之。民有質樸，不教不成。”（《白虎通·三教》）質言之，教化就是“以教導民”、“以教化民”。西漢陸賈曰：“民者，諸侯之本也。教者，政之本也。道者，教之本也。有道，然後教也。有教，然後政治。”（《新語·大政下》）《禮記·學記》認為“君子如欲化民成俗，其必由學乎！”通過教育來轉移社會的習俗風尚，目的就是“化民成俗”。

孔子主張“以教導民”管理社會，使民安其位。孟子說：“不教民而用之，謂之殃民。殃民者，不容於堯、舜之世。”（《仲弓》簡7記載：“老老，慈幼，先又（有）司，舉賢才，或（改）過舉罪。”）（《孟子·盡心上》）“不教民而用之，謂之殃民。”（告子下）“謹庠序之教，申之以孝弟之義。”（孟子·梁惠王上）“子適衛，冉有僕。子曰：‘庶矣哉！’冉有曰：‘既庶矣。又何加焉？’曰：‘富之。’曰：‘既富矣，又何加焉？’曰：‘教之。’”（《論語·子路》）

《禮記·學記》載：先王制樂“本之性情，稽之度數，制之禮義，合生氣之和，道無常之行，使之陽而不散，陰而不密，剛氣不怒，柔氣不攝，四暢交於中，而發作於外，皆安其位而不相奪也。然後立之學等，廣其節奏，省其文采，以繩德厚，律小大之稱，比終始之序，以象事行，使親疏貴賤長幼男女之理，皆形見於樂。”樂具有的陰陽之和的功能，使得它能夠成為教化的手段。禮樂配合可以調節人心的和諧，更可以達到修身的效果。但是，樂在不同場合皆具有和諧作用。“樂在你宗廟之中，君臣上下同聽之則莫不和敬；在族鄉里之中，長幼同聽之則莫不和順；在閨門之中，父子兄弟同聽之則莫不和親。故樂者，審一以定和，比物以節飾，節奏合以成文，所以合和父子君臣，附親萬民也。是先王立樂之方也。”

由此可見，教化屬於政治範疇。先秦儒家對教化之途徑和方法也有所要求和規定的：

3 楊伯峻，《論語譯注》，2頁。

第一，教民以人倫。當時，人倫關係顛倒是普遍的社會現象，君子的社會責任就是使人倫歸位，正本清源。孔子曾說“必也正名”，“君君、臣臣、父父、子子”名分各得其所，他認為這是當時最大的政治，所以，先秦儒家都很重視教民以人倫，前文已說過人倫的重要性，在此，接著談教民人倫的途徑以及何以實現的問題。

天降大常，以理人倫。⁴ 制為君臣之義，圖為父子之親，分(簡31)為夫婦之辨。是故小人亂天常，以逆大道，君子治人倫以順(簡32)天德。

該簡文談到君子和小人在人倫方面的不同表現：君子治人倫以順天德；小人亂天常以逆大道。筆者認為，此處“大道”是指符合聖人之道的“人倫”。

“人倫”是先秦儒家教化思想中很重要的一個內容，如《中庸》：“君臣也，父子也，夫婦也，兄弟也，朋友之交也。”先秦很多典籍都記載聖人教民以人倫的思想：

設為庠序學校以教之。庠者，養也；校者，教也；序者，射也。夏曰校，殷曰序，周曰庠，學則三代共之，皆所以明人倫也。
《孟子·滕文公上》

後稷教民稼穡，樹藝五穀，五穀熟而民人育。民之有道也，飽食暖衣，逸居而無教，則近於禽獸。聖人有憂之，使契為司徒，教以人倫：父子有親，君臣有義，夫婦有別，長幼有序，朋友有信。
《孟子·滕文公上》

趙岐注：“人倫者，人事也”。孟子認為學校是教化之場所，教以明人倫：父子有親，君臣有義，夫婦有別，長幼有序，朋友有信。《唐虞之道》也載：“夫聖人上事天，教民有尊也；下事地，教民有親也；時事山川，教民有敬也；親事祖廟，教民孝也；大學之中，天子親齒，教民弟也。先聖與後聖，考後而甄先，教民大順之道也”先秦儒家一般都把“人倫”作為教化核心內容，可以相互參照理解。其實，馬克思對人的本質的界定“在其現實性上，人的本質是一切社會關係的總和。”如果結合先秦儒家的對人倫的理解就很容易解讀馬克思這段深刻思想。

第二，教民以禮樂。眾所周知，先秦儒家極其重視“樂”教，楚簡明確地把禮樂作為道德倫理之教化的主要實現途徑教民以禮樂這個傳統在郭店簡得到再次的印證，如在《性自命出》和《五行》中就具體談到樂論的真諦，樂教來源於古老的宗教性，這種合法性即天性，也就是說禮樂也來源於天，人在樂之中可以達到與天地溝通。

孔子一直把禮樂作為道德倫理之教化的主要實現途徑。“若藏武仲之知，公綽之不欲，卞莊子之勇，冉求之藝，文之于禮樂，亦

4 “天”下一字，陳偉釋為“降”。源於古書中常見“天降”某某之說。李零也疑為“降”字之誤寫。

可以為成人矣。”（《論語·憲問》）子曰：“興于詩，立于禮，成于樂。”（《論語·泰伯》）可見，人在社會之中如果不明禮就難以立足，一個人要達到完整的君子人格不懂得音樂也是不可能的。孔子也仍然沒有解釋其中的原因。但是，《性自命出》從性情論角度給出了解釋和回答：“《詩》、《書》、《禮》、《樂》，其始出皆生於人。《詩》，有為為之也。《書》，有為言之也。《禮》、《樂》，有為舉之也。聖人比其類而論會之，觀其先後而逆訓之，體其義而即度之，理其情而出入之，然後複以教。教，所以生德於中者也。”從政者要採取潤雨細無聲的方法對民眾施以道德教化。“教所以生德於中者也”強調禮樂之教的目的是在於說明人們把道德立于人心，即培育人內在的道德修養。

《性自命出》強調了用《詩》、《書》、禮樂進行教化，認為教化人應從真性情處著手，其主旨在於以樂和情，以樂熏心，禮樂是調整“心”的最好方法，如此，才能使得真性情的自然流露。郭齊勇先生說：“在該篇作者看來，聖人制禮作樂以調節人間秩序、倫序等級，禮樂是聖人有意為端正人們的行為舉止而制定的。這就要節制人們情氣的發用，使之合宜，理順人們的情感、情緒，然後加以教化，使道德慢慢地內在化，即‘生德於中’。這裡的重心是以禮樂來調節情氣，養性培情，修身修心。”郭齊勇先生說《性自命出》“集中討論禮教、樂教的功能。概而言之，以禮教修外（形、身），以樂教治內（心），禮教端正身形，樂教陶冶心靈。但禮教、樂教都要促成身心的一致，聲、情、氣、性、形、神之合一。”⁵“詩、書、禮、樂是價值的根源，它們都是聖人“有為”而作的產物，它們被創造出來後，即成為道的具體內涵。”⁶李零先生認為“‘詩書禮樂，皆始出於人。詩，有為為之也。書，有為言之也。禮樂，有為舉之也’這幾句話是連上文的‘心術’，合起來講上文的‘道四術’”。⁷

善者民必福，福未必和，不和不安，不安不樂。（簡27）善者民必眾，眾未必治，不治不順，不順不平。是以為政者教導之取先。教以禮，則民果以莖；教以樂，則民口德清；教以辯說，則民藝口口貴以忘；教以藝，則野以爭；教以口，則民少以吝；教以言，則民於以寡信；教以事，則民力蓄以湏利；教以權謀，則民口口，遠禮亡親仁。先人以德，則民進善焉。（簡12-16）（《尊德義》）

《尊德義》也具體談到教化的內容：教以禮、教以樂、教以辯說、教以藝、教以口、教以言、教以事、教以權謀。這些內容大多見之於孔子之觀點，其中唯獨“教以權謀”似乎屬於道家的思想。

孔子說：“有教無類。”就是說到不同層次的教育物件在他哪兒都得到不同的教育方法，他也承認教化物件智力是有層次的。孔子曰：“生而知之者，上也；學而知之者，次也；困而學之，又其次也。困而不學，民斯為下矣！”《成之聞之》第26至29簡也有類似

5 郭齊勇郭店楚簡《性自命出》的心術觀。

6 楊儒賓，《子思學派試探（上）》。

7 李零，《郭店楚簡校讀記》，144頁。

觀點，把人分為“聖人之性”與“中人之性”。聖人之性是天生的具有善根，皆承於天命，無須教化；中人之性需要教化。孔子也說：“唯上智與下愚不移”(《論語陽貨》)，教化對於上等智的人和下等智的人都沒有用。《成之聞之》強調人性修養之重要，強調教化對“中人之性”是有效的，值得再反思和批判。但是，即使對中人和中人之下的人也不能實行愚民教育，要按照“民可敬導也，而不可掩也；可禦也，而不可牽也”的原則來實施教化。

四、教化與刑罰的關係

西周周公“明德慎刑”思想，經過先秦儒家進一步豐富和詮釋就成為儒家“刑德關係”的基本原則。孔子認為道德教化比刑罰還要重要，主張從政要遵循“道之以德，齊之以禮”的原則，反對“不教而殺謂之虐”。但是教化顯得很無助的時候，他也主張將刑法作為教化的輔助手段。孟子說：“徒善不足以為政，徒法不能以自行。”(《孟子·離婁上》)說明，以道德內容為主的教化和以懲治為主要內容的刑罰是互為使用。為了說明教化與刑罰的關係，特將有關表述的文獻摘錄如下：

君子之於教也，其導民也不浸，則其淳也弗深矣。是故亡乎其身而(簡4)

存乎其詞，雖厚其命，民弗從之矣。是故威服刑罰之履行也，(簡5)

由上之弗身也。昔者君子有言曰：戰與刑人，君子之墜德也。是故(簡6)

上苟身服之，則民必有甚焉者。(簡7)

教之以刑則逐。(《從政》簡3)亂用刑罰則會遭致放逐。

從政有七機，獄則興，威則民不道，□則失眾，柄則亡親，罰則民逃，好□(《從政》簡8)

則民作亂，凡此七者，政所治也。(《從政》簡9)

威服刑罰之履行也，由上之弗身也。(《成之聞之》)

不教而誅，則刑繁而邪不勝；教而不誅，則奸民不懲；誅而不賞，則勤屬之民不勸；誅賞而不類，則下疑俗儉而百姓不一。故先王明禮義以壹之，致忠信以愛之，賞賢使能以次之，爵服慶賞以申重之，時其事、輕其任以調齊之。潢然兼覆之，養長之，如保赤子。若是，故奸邪不作，盜賊不起，而化善者勸勉矣。”(《荀子·富國》)

以上文獻都說明一個道理：先秦儒家的原則是“尚德不尚刑”。從政者只有在盡了自己的社會職責(教化)之後，仍不能使之“有恥且格”，此時才能實施刑罰，簡言之，“言必教而後刑”。

第一，教化為主。先秦儒家強調“以德導民”，認為從政根本在於“教化”，其目的在於得民心。

仁言不如仁聲之入人深也，善政不如善教值得民也。善政，民畏之；善教，民愛之。善政得民財，善教得民心。(盡心上)

孟子認為，每個人都是有善端的，通過教化使善端突顯，強調教在治理中的作用。孟子認為統治者要得到民心，就應該“所欲與之聚之，所惡勿施爾也。”(離婁上)“民不求其所欲而得之，謂之信”(禮記經解)荀子：孟子也認為教化乃為政的根本，在於“以斯道覺斯人”，繼承孔子“富而可教”的思想。

古代所謂君子之教就是“導民”，要循序漸進，方能入人也深。如，“君子之於教也，其導民也不浸，則其淳也弗深矣。是故亡乎其身而(簡4)存乎其詞”，反映了儒家強調“身教”重於“言教”，教化方式要循循漸進，反對君主“亡乎其身而存乎其詞”甚至憑藉“威服刑罰”，強迫老百姓向善的思想。董仲舒也強調：“古之王者……南面而治理天下，莫不以教化為大務。立太學以教于國，設庠序以化於邑，漸民以仁，摩民以誼，節民以禮，故其罰刑甚輕而禁不犯者，教化行而習俗美也。”古代設立太學用禮義教化人民以美俗鄉里，百姓才不至於觸犯國家法律，一方面說明學校教育的重要作用，另一方面說明學校以禮義教化為重要導向。

第二，德刑並舉。先秦時期認識到社會生活管理需要道德和法律各自發揮作用，不可偏廢其一，刑罰在社會管理中是不得已才用之，堅持“德主刑輔”原則。《六德》雲“作禮樂，制刑法，教此民爾，使之有向也。”郭店簡《緇衣》：“子曰：‘長民者教之德，齊之以禮，則民有勸心；教之以政，齊之以刑，則民有免心。故慈以愛之，則民有親；信以結之，則民不倍，恭以蒞之，則民有遜心。’”(簡23-27)在對待“德治”和“刑罰”關係問題上，究竟採取“寬”還是“猛”的取向，孔子堅持“寬則得眾”(《論語·堯曰》)，同時也認識到“猛政”的作用。《左傳》記載鄭國子產病重告誡執政大叔：我死後，你來治理國家。在治理國家中要以寬政善待百姓，使百姓歸服；其次就是刑罰。但是，大叔執政時候，對百姓很仁厚，不忍心實施刑罰，鄭國盜賊群聚，禍亂百姓，大叔後悔沒有聽從子產的話。孔子就此提出：“政寬則民慢。慢則糾之以猛，猛則民殘，殘則施之以寬。寬以濟猛，猛以濟寬，政是以和。”(《左傳·昭公二十年》)雖然“寬則得眾”，但是一味“寬”反而使“民慢”，“猛則失眾”，最好是“寬”與“猛”相濟。孔子強調“聖人之治化也，必刑政相參焉”，“以德教民，而以禮齊之；其次以政事道民，以刑禁之。化之弗變，導致弗從，傷義而敗俗，於是乎用刑矣”。(《孔子家語·刑政》)在孟子看來，從政者不要輕易使用刑罰，他認為刑罰不如德治。

孔子一生積極參與政治，其目的在於試圖恢復周公時代的“禮樂”制度，“如有用我者，吾其為東周乎！”(陽貨)東游列國時，“至於是邦，必聞其政”(學而)，他提出“為政以德”的政治理念值得後世反思和重視。在社會管理中如何看待教化與刑罰的關係是一個常見常新的政治現象，先秦儒家的政治思想資源，尤其地下出土的文獻資料對今天社會管理有著諸多啟示。

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On the Confucian Enlightenment Thought in Pre-Qin Period in “Cheng zhi wen zhi” of the Guodian Bamboo Slips

XING Qilong

Abstract

Ideas about education and culture form the core of pre-Qin Confucian political theory, as the Confucian thinkers of the era both constructed a system of educational theory and implemented their ideas via the Imperial College, the Xiang school, and elsewhere in a quest to produce enlightenment. From the perspective of human nature and human relations, “Cheng zhi wen zhi” discusses educational ideals and methods, and this essay seeks to enhance our understanding of its views on the subject of education and culture. Not only does the “Cheng zhi wen zhi” adhere to pre-Qin Confucian educational thinking, it also bears many of characteristics of Guodian bamboo slips disposition theory. This article reflects upon some problems in pre-Qin Confucian thought regarding education and culture in “Cheng zhi wen zhi” in order to find the origin of Confucian thinking on the subject.

Keywords: Education and culture, pre-Qin Confucian politics, “Cheng zhi wen zhi,” Guodian bamboo slips

從“自律”觀點論易經哲學之現代意義

金 聖 基

中文提要

本文旨是採取“自律”的觀點，以探討易經思想之現代意義。這裡首先要從二方面進行釐清。第一是，先釐清一下本文所謂的“自律”觀念。第二是，要說明這種自律性觀念如何適用於分析易經哲學內涵。據本人所了解，易經思想的整個系統皆可以以“自律性”觀念詮釋。因為儒家“人”的最高善及其實現途徑以及所要實現的大同世界皆符合自律的觀點。因此，本人以“人自律擴大過程”作為本論文的主題。在本論文中，所謂的“自律性”概念，係由康德(I. Kant)哲學的“自律”觀念而來，因為後人任何形態的“自律”概念都包含康德“自律”概念的內涵，所以將其作為本論文中“自律性”概念的理論核心。然而，儒家思想具有其獨特性。雖然儒家經典中未提出“自律性”概念，但其思想蘊含著很豐富的自律觀念。本論文的目的在於闡述易經哲學中人如何達到自律人的境界以及如何脫離外來法則之約束。並且告知人們易經哲學中人觀的終極目的就是自由人。最後，將通過對於儒家自然觀以及中庸，易傳哲學中的“法天地”與“感應”的含義，來進一步探討人自律性的意義。

關鍵詞：自律，自由，易經，君子，大人

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一、緒言

時代已進入二十一世紀之初，人類面對著的問題實在很錯綜複雜。一個在基本上把儒家思想當作終極關懷的人，如何面對世變，對於儒家思想又要進行如何的反思呢？

在我看來，儒家思想的時代課題，一方面是如何對其內部理論結構進行詮釋的問題，另一方面是，如何面對現代化的諸問題。本文雖然是旨在探索易經思想的現代意義。但是我想為了方便詮釋儒家思想，需要先了解西歐思想之主要哲學課題和最近動向。因為儒家與西歐思想是兩個源遠長流的傳統文化。並且在世界已成為地球村的現在，儒家與西歐哲學之間的互相交流和競爭是不可避免的。所以本文採取“自律”觀點，以探討易經思想之現代意義。

那麼，本文將如何從自律性觀點探討易經哲學中人的含義呢？既然本文要採用“自律”觀點來探討易經哲學中人之含義，那麼，需要對於以下兩方面內容進行說明。第一，先說明一下本文所謂“自律”的觀念。第二，要說明這種自律性觀念如何適用分析易經哲學內涵。

二、“自律”的含義

在這裡先把“自律性”概念釐清一下。

“自律”(autonomy)是康德(I. Kant)道德哲學的主要概念。康德的自律概念是從反對幸福主義、基督教(西方中世紀以來的“天啟宗教”)而來的。

然而，“自律”一詞本是政治學術語，意指一個政治團體或國家為自己制定法律並依法律行動的權利。所謂“自己制定法律”是屬“自由”的領域，而所謂“依法律行動”是屬“服從”的領域。自由與服從，這兩個概念從表面上來看是相互矛盾的，因而產生了這樣一個問題：我們在一個政治團體中如何能既服從法律，而同時又能保有自由呢？然而，對於這個問題，盧梭的“社會契約論”提出了一個極有意義的答案：一個共和國的法律建立在社會契約上，意味著我們每個人都以其自身及其全部力量共同置於“共同意志”的最高指導之下，並且我們在共同體中接納每個成員作為全體之不可分割的一部分。¹ 在此一意義之下，共和國中的每一成員都有雙重身分：“對於個人，他是主權者的一個成員；而對於主權者，他是國家的一個成員。”² 因此，在盧梭的共和國中，每一成員都有義務以臣民的身分服從法律。但就他透過社會契約而成為主權者的一分子而言，他同時也是立法者。簡言之，共和國中的立法乃是其公民之自我立法，他們只服從自己所制定的法則。在此一意義之下，他們都是自由的，因為他們並未受到外來意志之限制。

1 參見盧梭著，《社會契約論》，25頁。

2 盧梭著，《社會契約論》，29頁。

康德借用盧梭“共和國”的模式，首度將“自律”概念引入倫理學中，用以說明道德之本質。因此，“自由”已成為康德道德哲學的根本概念。在“道德的形上學之基礎”第一、二章中，康德分析了我們一般人的道德意識。康德發現：我們的道德意識中包含了自然之善與道德之善的區別。道德之善是絕對的、無條件的善，它的價值就在其自身，而不在於它之所能實現或助成的目的。換言之，它具有內在價值，而不只是工具價值。反之，一般意義的善只是自然之善，均是有條件的善，只具有工具價值，我們通常歸諸“幸福”概念之下者，均屬此類。因此，判斷一行為是否有道德價值，並非根據它所達成的目的，而是根據它的格律(Mexime)。換言之，並非因為它有助於實現某一對象，而是因為它的存在本身就是善的。因此，一個道德行為並非只是合乎義務，而是必須出自義務，否則它只有合法性，而無道德性。這決定了康德倫理學之基本性格。

由以上康德善的概念，康德進一步決定了道德法則的概念。一切實踐的法則對現實我們人類的意志而言，均表示一種限制或“應當”(sollen)，因為我們的意志受到感性生命之牽制，所以不一定要遵守法則。因此，實踐法則對人類而言，是一種命令，表達這種命令的程式稱為令式(Imperative)。既然道德之善並不建立在手段對目的之關係上，道德法則只能以“斷言令式”(Categorical Imperative)、而非“假言令式”(Hypothetical Imperative)來表達，因為“假言令式”只表示：如果你要達到某一目的，就應當如此去做。一個行為所依據的法則若可以用這種令式來表達，則它必須以所設定的目的為條件，因此沒有真正的道德價值。唯有“斷言令式”能表達道德法則之絕對性(無條件性)。康德分析“斷言令式”的內容，發現“斷言令式”包含三個原理：第一是形式的原理，第二是目的原理，第三是自律的原理。最後一個原理是由前面二者綜合而成。所以我們為了解自律的原理，先要瞭解第一、第二原理。

“斷言令式”的第一原理—形式的原理，是說這種令式決定人的意志時，不受外來任何感性愛好欲望對象的決定，而純憑命令的形式以決定意志。換言之，道德法則不預設任何特定的目的，而只包含一形式的要求：普遍化。於此康德得到斷言令式的第一型式：“只依照你能夠立意要它成為普通定律的那個格律去行為”。³ “斷言令式”的第二個原理—目的原理，是說這種令式雖然不受任何感性愛好欲望對象的決定，但不能說是毫無目的的，而卻是另有目的的。康德進一步分析道德法則的概念，確定它是個理性原則，因為普遍性是理性原則的一項特徵；而實踐的理性原則也就是對一切有理性者均適用的原則。因此，在道德法則的意識中已涵蘊著“有理性者”的概念，因為有理性者是道德法則之根據(主體)。就此而論，每一個有理性者—即我們通常所謂的“人格”(person)—均有其無可替代的價值，亦即尊嚴。由於人格之尊嚴，它不能只被當作工具來使用，所以，其存在自身必須就是目的。因此，康德把人格稱為“目的自

3 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, 89.

身”(an end in itself)。⁴ 由此康德得到斷言令式的第二個程式：“你要這樣行為，做到你對於人，包括在你自己的人格中，以及一切其他的人的人格中的人，任何時候都應當作目的，而不可只作工具來使用。”⁵ 這表示“斷言令式”是以普遍的“人格”作目的的。“斷言令式”的第三個原理，是把上面兩個原理綜合起來的結果。依照第一個原理，有理性者一人的意志，不受任何外來欲望對象的決定(道德法則之普遍性)。依照第二個原理，康德指出這種普遍法則的主體是有理性者。即有理性者以自身為目的，以自身為目的之令式，便是自己所頒佈之令式，有理性者服從“斷言令式”，便是服從自己頒佈的令式。康德綜合這兩點而提出了“自律”的概念。康德建立的“斷言令式”第三個原理中說道：

“你的行為要做到使你的意志通過它的格律，可以同時認為它自己就是普遍定律的頒佈者。”⁶ 在此康德得到了一個足以說明道德的本質的理念，即“每個有理性者的意志的觀念都是普遍立法意志的觀念”之理念，這就是“自律”的理念。⁷ 雖然康德用斷言令式的形式提出了“自律”的理念，但他另外用一個“目的王國”(The kingdom of Ends)的形式來再表達“自律”的理念。那麼，接下來本文將就“目的王國”進一步說明“自律”的含義。自然世界的事物，受自然定律的支配，形成自然世界；而有理性者一人類不受自然定律支配，卻依“自律”而行為，便必然形成一個“自律”的團體，一個以自身為目的之團體，這個團體便是“目的王國。” 康德說：“每一位有理性者，必須通過一切他的意志的格律，認為自己就是普遍定律的頒佈者，並依此觀點來判斷他自己及他自身的行為，則這樣的有理性者的概念，被引向一個附屬而豐富的概念，即『目的王國』是也。”⁸ 所謂“目的王國”是指“不同的有理性者透過共同的客觀法則而產生的一個有系統的結合。現在，由於定律決定了目的之普遍有效性，那麼，當我們把有理性者彼此間的個人差異，以及他們的私有目的內容撇開，我們就可以設想一個包含一切目的：之有系統結合之全體，即目的王國是也。”⁹ 在這個王國中，每一成員(有理性者)均是普遍法則的制定者，但同時自己也服從這些法則。由此可知，康德由“自律”的道德原理，引出了“目的王國”的概念，這“目的王國”是眾有理性者依照“自律”原理所組成的集團。

康德進而把這個“目的王國”理解成“知性世界”，而把“自律”學說與其“雙重世界”和“人的雙重身分”的理論連結起來。在“道德的形上學之基礎”第三章中，康德便透過這雙重身分來說明自律之可能性。如上述中所提到的，康德道德哲學的基本概念是“自由”的概念，也就是說真正的道德行為是出自人的自由意志的行為。為了證明人具有自由的意志，康德闡明人是具有雙重身份而存在的觀點，即一方面作為“感性世界”的一份子而存在，另一方面又作為“知性世界”的

4 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, 95.

5 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, 96.

6 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, 98.

7 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, 98.

8 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, 100.

9 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, 100-101.

一份子而存在。作為“感性世界”一份子而存在的人，受自然律的支配，因為人有愛好和欲望，所以受制于自然律；但作為“知性世界”一份子而存在的人，則是自由的，他們不受愛好欲望的支配，而是服從道德律。¹⁰所以，存在於感性世界(也就是現實世界)的人類，必須服從和尊敬後者。所謂前者必須服從和尊敬後者，乃指前者必須以實現後者為目的而言。後者即是指“人格”，此“人格”即是“道德人格。”所以存在於感性世界的人類，必須以實現“道德人格”為目的。¹¹如此，我們才能理解自律的可能性。由此，也就是作為現象的我服從作為物自身的我所頒佈的法則，我自己一方面是立法者，另一方面又是服從者，故自我立法、自我服從。在此意義之下，我們仍是自由的，因為我們並未受到外來法則之約束。

三、易經思想中自律含意

現在問題是本文應如何運用“自律性”觀點詮釋易經哲學之含義呢？本文採取“自律性”觀點的原因主要有兩點，第一是“自律性”概念最符合于易經思想的理論。

第二是“自律性”觀念雖然是由康德哲學產生出來的，而到今日已成為哲學家、宗教思想家常談的熱門主題。

據本人所了解，易經思想的整個系統皆可以以“自律性”觀念詮釋。因為儒家“人”的最高善與其實現途徑以及要實現的大同世界皆符合自律觀點。因此，本人以“人自律擴大過程”作為本論文的主題。本論文中所謂“自律性”概念，係由康德哲學的“自律”觀念而來，因為後人任何型態的“自律”概念都包含康德“自律”概念的內涵，作為一其作為理論之核心。然而，儒家思想有其獨特性。雖然儒家經典中未提出“自律性”概念，但其思想蘊含著很豐富的自律觀念。在這裡，不妨引用幾個例子來說明儒家思想的自律意義。

儒家開宗於孔子，孔子思想中已涵著豐富的自律意義。“顏淵問仁。子曰：克己復禮為仁，一日克己復禮，天下歸仁焉。為仁由己，而由人乎哉？”(《論語》《憲問》)“仁”是儒家哲學的根本概念，也是儒家思想的最高理想。對“仁”的詞義黃振華先生做了詳細的分析，闡釋了其真正含義，即“仁”是“合二心為一心”之意。¹²所謂“合二心為一心”即、“仁”是指人具有二種心一“感性心”和“道德心”。¹³而且“合二心為一心”意味當人克制感性世界的愛好欲望而服從道德律時，則是人克服“感性心”而服從“道德心”，這就是“克己復禮”，也就是“自律”，“仁”的意義便是“自律。”¹⁴就“克己復禮”意義而言，“克己”指克制個人的感性愛好欲望，“復禮”指實踐“仁”的規範，而

10 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, 118-121.

11 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, 120.

12 參見黃振華，〈康德與儒家哲學〉，2-3頁。

13 參見黃振華，〈康德與儒家哲學〉，5頁。

14 參見黃振華，〈康德與儒家哲學〉，5頁。

其深意在於：不“克己”無以“復禮”，“克己復禮”的最後根源是“人格”的尊嚴，“人格”就是“道德人格”，而“道德人格”即是儒家的“仁。”¹⁵也就是“至善”(最高善)。作為感性世界的一份子而存在的人，必須以實現“道德”人格為目的，這正表示了“克己復禮”以實現“仁”為目的。¹⁶道德法則既然建立在自律原則之上，而為意志之自我立法，則遵行道德法是意志自身的力量。孔子說：“仁遠乎哉，我欲仁，斯仁至矣”(《論語》〈述而〉)：“求則得之，舍則失之；是求有益於得也，求在我者也。”¹⁷這兩段話表示求“仁”是意志自身的力量，亦即“自律”是意志力量範圍之內的事。

總之，儒家思想的基本原則是自律。儒家的“自律”與康德的自律雖是由不同文化、思想系統產生出來的，但其指向自律倫理的原理則相同。

那麼，本文如何運用“自律擴大”觀點詮釋易經及儒家哲學人之含義呢？這裡先要釐清本文所採用的“自律”意義。本文所採用的自律含義大概包括如下幾點。第一，道德法則根源之探討。這裡所說的道德根源就是道德的由來或者道德法則之來源。如果道德法則只不過是從外在來的宿命論性質的理論的話，那麼其還是他律道德系統。因為宿命論是指認為世界上一切事物的存在和發展都是由命運這種不可抗拒的力量決定的宗教或者類似宗教理論。就像一般認為基督教的道德根源是上帝，人只能信仰上帝的命令，上帝即為吉凶禍福的主宰者，因此基督教不能不可避免地屬他律道德。然而，通過對儒家哲學中的天神觀念、吉凶觀念是否是宿命論的判斷，這亦可對儒家哲學人觀之自律性與否提供判斷。第二接著要注意的是，人道的原理發現過程是否符合于自律原理。

這裡不妨回頭看康德的“自律”理念。即說“每個有理性者的意志的觀念都是普遍立法意志的觀念”之理念。如果注意到康德的自律理念，那麼筆者再探討儒家哲學中人道發現過程中人自律的意義。換句話說這須探討易道，人道發現過程中人是如何發揮“制定普遍法則的意志”來發現易道、人道的。這一討論中亦可發現儒家哲學中的人自律擴大。第三，既然易經哲學中人要達成自律人，那麼其途徑如何？其是否符合於自律理念？如文中所述，自律人必須從感性世界脫離，要以實現“道德人格”為目的。儒家哲學的人觀亦表示一個人如何可以達到君子，大人的境界。這種意義之下，易經哲學人觀是指導一個人如何體悟自己立法的易道、人道，從而達成與天地合其德，與日月合其明，與鬼神合其吉凶的大人境界。這時候人一方面是立法者，另一方面是追求合一於其道順應其道者，達到如此境界之人，就可稱之為完成自律的人。

總之，本論文的目的在於闡述易經哲學中人如何完成自律人的境界，如何脫離外來法則之約束，並且進一步要明白易經哲學中人觀的終極目的就是自由人。

15 黃振華，〈康德與儒家哲學〉，13頁。

16 黃振華，〈康德與儒家哲學〉，15頁。

17 《孟子·盡心上》

四、易經吉凶觀念與自律之終極關懷

本文既然以自律性擴大觀點探討易經哲學含義，那麼在論述上自然是根據所提出的“自律性”觀點而展開探討。首先是探討易經哲學中價值根源之奠定過程，其次是探討從自律力量把握天地宇宙的根本原理以及其律則化過程，即易經思惟成立與人道成立過程中人自律性之意義。然後再就人、儒家自然觀以及中庸，易傳哲學中“法天地”與“感應”意義來探討人自律性之意義。通過以上的探討，我們可以把握邁向自律性人的途徑，進一步達到“成人、成物”的境界。筆者認為儒家思想已包括這種理論結構。以下將簡單地說明主要大旨，以結束此次探討。

在此，本文只以易經哲學中吉凶觀念來探討人之自律意義。

《易經》哲學中，“吉、凶、悔、吝、無咎”等概念代表著它的現實價值觀念。而這些概念雖然當初是在占筮中產生，但其本質是哲學生命，而不是算命中的命定概念。

變動以利言，吉凶以情遷，是故愛惡相攻而吉凶生，遠近相取而悔吝生，情為相感而利害生。凡易之情，近而不相得則凶；或害之，悔且吝。¹⁸

上文即謂吉、凶等反映了個體與環境之和諧狀態。換句話說，這一節表示“吉、凶、悔、吝、無咎”概念，就是一個人如何與其情境和諧及其如何反應的結果。¹⁹在此，情境的吉凶概念是可以轉變的。如這些吉凶概念可以轉變的話，其要領是什麼？〈繫辭上傳〉云：

君子居則觀其象而玩其辭，動則觀其變而玩其占是以自天祐之，吉無不利。²⁰

這句提出了《易傳》趨吉避凶之道。即說，我們通過對於卦的意義之了解，對自己的生命作更好的適應、對自己的行為作更好的抉擇，而且修己達善，最終實現趨吉避凶。²¹上文是說，君子居家則觀象卦象，玩味爻辭，行動時則觀象卦爻的變化而玩味其占語。而觀象、玩辭、象變都是指學習《易經》，也就是說，平時對《周易》有所領會，按其所說而行動，自然吉利。²²關於《易傳》也有聖人之學習內容。〈繫辭傳〉又說：

夫易，聖人之所以極深而研幾也。唯深也，故能通天下之志。唯幾也，故能成天下之務。唯神也，故不疾而速，不行而至。²³

18 《繫辭下傳》十二章。

19 成中英，《易經之理想系統》，77頁。

20 《繫辭下傳》二章。

21 成中英，《易經之理想系統》，78頁。

22 朱伯崑，《易學哲學史》，65頁。

23 《繫辭上傳》十章。

這是說，《易》蘊藏著事物深遠的道理，聖人以此通天下人的志向；顯示事物變化的苗頭，聖人以此成就天下之事業。有求必應，非常神速，聖人以此教化天下百姓。²⁴ 如此，《易傳》是如何透過聖人的努力而啟發人對命之慧解並促其修德向善的呢？

在易經哲學這種指導之下，人逐漸沖淡以前“吉凶”觀念的迷信成份。其最大成就如下兩點：第一是人可以獨立於命（命定之限制）而實現其性—即自我實現與自我完成的自力道德。其二是人在長期的努力之下道德是產生與保證世界和諧與秩序的路徑。

《論語》中，孔子已將豫知未來、操縱人類吉凶禍福、具有宗教性格的占筮觀念慢慢轉化，而使人從未來不可知的恐懼、懷疑而產生的迷信觀念中超脫出來，轉而反求諸人應具有自己的道德實踐力量。我們可稱之謂“以德代占”思想。並且在《論語》裡引證了孔子的話：

子曰：“南人有言曰：‘人而無恆，不可以作巫醫。’善夫！‘不恆其德，或承之羞。’”

子曰：“不占而已矣。”²⁵

可見“不占”和前段話的“恆”字是有關聯的。“不恆其德，或承之羞”是恆卦九三爻辭，意思是“不能堅守德性，便會有恥辱。”而孔子“不占”的意思就是說：“一個人如能堅守德性，也就不需要占卜了。反之，一個人如不能堅守德性，即使占卜也沒有什麼用處。”²⁶

《論語》〈述而〉篇還有一例：

子疾病，于路請禱，子曰：有諸？子路對曰：『有之，誄曰：“禱爾於上下神祇”』子曰：丘之禱久矣。²⁷

“丘之禱久矣”意思，按《困學紀》引《太平禦覽》中所載莊子的一段話進行說明：

孔子疾，子貢出蔔，孔子曰：子待也！吾坐席不敢先，居處若齊，食飲若祭，吾蔔之久矣。²⁸

這一段話非常明顯地表示出孔子以自己的行為合乎實踐道德原理來代替卜筮、祈禱的儀式。所以《荀子·大略》中提到：

以賢易不肖，不待卜而後知告。：善為易者不占。²⁹

依據以上幾段話，我們可知孔子以後原有的蔔筮性質的道德轉化。所以吉凶是依照道德價值體系所決定的判斷概念，而且吉凶是

24 朱伯崑，《易學哲學史》，65-66頁。

25 《論語·子路》

26 吳怡，《易經繫辭傳解義》，20頁。

27 《論語·述而》

28 《困學紀》卷七，〈公羊〉。

29 《荀子·大略》

由人而發生的，人要自己負責而非命定的。我們再進一步解釋下一句，《易傳》中說到：

自天祐之，吉無不利。³⁰

這裡“天”是指儒家道德的天而言，“吉”是指道德人格之無損或完成。所以“自天祐之，吉無不利”並非意味現世上上帝賦與的禍福。所以《繫辭傳》云：

易曰：自天祐之，吉無不利。子曰：祐者，助也。天之所助者，順也；人之所助者，信也。履信思乎順，又以尚賢也。是以自天祐之，吉無不利也。³¹

“信”者可用孟子所語“有諸己之謂信”來解釋，要得到天祐之吉，就要順天命、有諸己，而這些都是要自己去實踐的。所以，所謂的“自天祐之，吉無不利”最終決定於“人之所助。”

總之，儒家哲學的吉凶觀念最終從“命定”的禍福概念之迷解中脫離出來。

五、結論

人生於激變的現代社會中，不能沒有對人類處境的關懷。如果我們同意哲學不能忽視人生存的現實，那麼站在現代與二十一世紀初入之際，尤其是一個在基本上把儒家思想當作終極關懷的人，怎能忽視對現代與後現代的思想反思呢？

人類當今面對的情況愈來愈艱難嚴重，致使人已造成了非人化的現象。因而人類社會便難以安定了。

在現代社會正如莊子所言，看不到天地之純，自然之真，在物質享受，經濟消費的導向下，形成了科技價值的膨脹與獨斷，這種以科技為中心的世界觀，僅視自然界為提供工業生產和消費的物質能量場。另外，如果人類宣稱他的理性高過“無言的、外在的”客觀世界，那麼科技的發展將脫離自然原有的秩序，最終反過來傷害人類的生存。在科技文化的形態中，人類為了自身利益而毫無節制的支配、開採自然，最終破壞了人和自然的和諧狀態。

到底這種現代社會帶來的整體性的混亂以及非人化現象是從何而起的？本人認為要想弄明白這種現象的由來，先應檢討價值觀念的根源。與此同時，時代已經從根本上開始要求價值根源的妥當性。

眾所周知，西方文化的根源之一是基督教。而基督教近代以後所面臨的困境很值得思考。在現代社會中，基督教所面臨的最大事件主要是“非神話化”、喪失“絕對的他者”或者“神的死亡”等。西方

30 《繫辭上傳》十二章。

31 《繫辭上傳》十二章。

人以為人已經成熟，因此他們宣佈了成人時代。然而，西方人的“人自律宣佈”使我們意識到了自律省思的必要性。他們的“成熟”意味著什麼？他們認為的完成的自律性又蘊含著什麼？本論文認為，基督教崩潰的根本原因，主要在於其內部因素。其次，基督教傳統神學的困難皆是由錯置具體性的謬誤(The Fallacy of misplaced concreteness)引起的。錯置具體性的謬誤恰是儒家對基督教的補益之處。因為儒家在先秦時代已實現了脫咒術化。

接下來將要闡述儒家哲學的人觀的研究目的。依照本人意見，儒家哲學最卓越的慧眼就在於擺脫錯置具體性的謬誤。易經哲學的始點也不曾犯這種基督教式的二分法思考的謬誤。天不是“人格性”的上帝。儒家哲學的“天”已經經過解咒過程，完成了“創造生命的真幾”的奠定。儒家哲學的出發點在現代社會並不能成為解體的對象。因為，易本體已經脫中心、脫根本的變化上建立的。〈繫辭上傳〉云：

乾以易知，坤以簡能，易則易知，簡則易從。易如則有親，易從則有功，有親則可久，有功則可大。：易簡而天下之理得矣。³²

這種思考方式在現代西方宗教、神學立場看，是很難實現的。已經脫離“人格神”的易經哲學，重新確立了其價值觀念。這就是“生生之謂易。”這種觀念對西方基督教神學而言，“現代神學”在“過程神學”中才可以發現。這時候的價值觀念不是由上帝賦予的、而是人在自己的努力之下創造的價值主角。人已經擔當“吉凶由人”的真正主角。我們在對古代到先秦儒家“天”、“吉凶”觀念變化過程研究當中，發現了“人的自律性”的真正意義。而且在進一步研究“和諧的宇宙論”中得到了儒家哲學所提示的人道的來源與其和諧性。儒家哲學將宇宙與人看作一個和諧的存在系統，但並沒有說人是宇宙內的獨存，而是強調人與自然的共存與和諧。人先觀察宇宙的普遍原理與奧妙之理，最終成就了易之律則化。從八卦形成到六十四卦以及易傳成立，這個過程亦是人自律性的真正擴大過程。

更不能忽視的是，人雖然成就了天、地、人三才之道，但一刻也不能懈怠，只有這樣，人與宇宙、人與萬物、人與人才能感應。感應、法天地既不是基督教方式的“信仰 - 服從”的關係，亦不是神與人的不平等關係。而是你 - 我的真正關係的形成基礎。實現“感應”的同時，天、物、人、宇宙已經不再是征服的對象，與此相反，將會給予人類豐富的生存智慧。因此君子不但努力與他物感應，而且更加努力地于天地人合一之道。這就是法天地。

如果人不斷地致力於法天地與感應萬物，那麼他的理想就不僅限於自我發展、完成之階段，而是擴展到立人、立物，成人、成物之境界。易經哲學人觀顯示，人一方面必須傾注於修身以進德，另一方面須實現他人之“立己”、“參贊天地之化育。”

作為完全實現自我的“大人”，不能只局限於自身，還應通過自己的真實本性而能認識其他人之“性”及整個宇宙自然之最高善。

32 《繫辭上傳》一章。

若忠於易經及儒學哲學的人能夠完成“人自律”的境界，實現自身的自律，那麼他就實現了“從心所欲不逾矩”的階段。

夫大人者，與天地合其德，與日月合其明，與四時合其序，與鬼神合其吉凶，先天而天弗違，後天而奉天時，天且弗違，而況於人乎？況於鬼神乎？

大人不拘于天地、日月、因時、鬼神之約束，其行動原理不拘於“先天”、“後天”之原理，因此他已經實現了自律。大人就是自律人，也就是自由人。

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The Modern Significance of the *Yijing* in Terms of “Autonomy”

KIM Sung-kee

Abstract

This paper studies the contemporary significance of the *Yijing* 易經 by analyzing the perspective of “autonomy (*zili* 自律)” in the *Yijing*. To do this, this paper examines both the meaning of “autonomy” as a philosophical term and how the concept of autonomy is used in the *Yijing*. The essay proposes that the whole philosophical system of the *Yijing* can be understood by the idea of “autonomy”. This is because its views on the highest good of human beings, the process of its realization, and the world of grand unity (*datongshijie* 大同世界) as the ultimate state of affairs all accord with the perspective of autonomy. Hence, I focus on the process of extending human autonomy in order to explore the philosophical system and contemporary meaning of the *Yijing*. This paper’s concept of “autonomy” has been developed from come from Kant’s notion of “autonomy,” an idea which has been recognized as the core concept of his thinking, and the basis of most subsequent conceptions of autonomy. Despite the importance of Kant’s thought in Western philosophy, Confucian thought has its own unique perspective on the concept of autonomy. Although the Confucian classics did not directly present a fully developed notion of autonomy, certain key components of the fuller concept of autonomy are inherent in Confucian thought. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the *Yijing*’s ideas regarding how humans can become free from the bondage of external rules and reach the acme of being an autonomous person (*ziliuren* 自律人). Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that the ultimate goal of human beings in the *Yijing* is to be free men (*ziyouren* 自由人). This paper also explores the significance of human autonomy by analyzing the meaning of “emulating Heaven and Earth (*fatiandi* 法天地)” and “corresponding (*ganying* 感應)” in Confucian thought on humans, nature, and *zhongyong* 中庸.

Keywords: autonomy, freedom, *Yijing*, *junzi*, *daren*

黃震《讀論語》的學術特色

唐明貴

中文摘要

黃震在《讀論語》中，一方面極力推崇朱子《論語集注》，為其疏通發明，既注重名物訓詁，又注重闡明文意；對於其中存在的個別問題，能夠做到是者是之、非者非之，絕不盲從，反映了作者務求實論而不尚空言的治學態度。另一方面，他不畏權威，敢於直面時弊，發表己見，充分表現了追求“自得”的學術風格。

關鍵詞：黃震，讀論語，朱熹，論語集注，學術特色

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黃震(1213-1280)，字東發，南宋慈溪古窯人(今浙江慈溪市掌起鎮戎家村)，曆官吳縣尉、史館校閱、廣德郡通判、撫州知州、江西提點刑獄、浙東提舉等職。著有《黃氏日鈔》、《古今紀要》、《古今紀要逸編》、《戊辰修史傳》、《讀書一得》、《禮記集解》、《春秋集解》等。

學界對黃震的研究主要集中在：一是黃震的哲學思想研究，如侯外廬先生主編的《中國思想通史》(人民出版社1963年版)第四卷下冊第十八章和《宋明理學史》(人民出版社1984年版)上冊第二十二章。二是黃震的史學思想研究，如張偉的《黃震史學探微》(《史學史研究》1997年第3期)、盧萍的《黃震的史學思想研究》(四川大學中國古代史專業碩士論文，2003年)、蔡忠道的《黃震史記學析論》(《秦漢研究》，2014年)。三是黃震墓誌研究，如倪士毅及翁福清的《貞珣可珍——從〈黃震墓誌〉補正〈宋史〉與〈宋元學案〉之誤》(《浙江師範大學學報》1987年第1期)、日本學者近藤一成的《黃震墓誌》(《史滴》第30期，2008年)及《從黃震墓誌和王應麟墓道談起——宋元轉換期的慶元士人社會》(《國際南宋史研討會論文集》，人民出版社2009年版)。四是黃震的學術思想研究，如臺灣學者錢穆的《黃東發學述》(《故宮圖書季刊》1971年第1卷第3期)、林政華的《黃東發的生平與經學》(《孔孟月刊》1973年第4期)及《黃東發對於前朝理學家之評述》(《書目季刊》1977年第3期)、樊克政的《黃震對程朱理學的繼承與修正》(《中國史研究》1984年第1期)、吳懷祺的《宋代學術史著作和黃震對理學的總結》(《史學史研究》1991年第2期)、隋金波的《黃震實學思想研究》(湘潭大學哲學專業碩士論文，2008年)及《黃震對朱熹“理”論的修正及其“實理”論》(《社會科學家》2014年第6期)、何忠禮的《略論黃震的學術思想和仕履活動——兼論科舉制度對他的影響》(《國際社會科學雜誌》2009年第3期)、耿振東的《黃震〈管子〉研究略論》(《管子學刊》2010年第2期)和蔡軍的《黃震文學理論研究》(華東師範大學中國古代文學專業碩士論文，2014年)等。五是《黃氏日鈔》研究，如葛曉愛的《從〈黃氏日鈔〉看黃震的注釋學》(北京師範大學歷史文獻學專業碩士論文，2001年)及《〈黃氏日鈔〉研究》(北京師範大學歷史文獻學專業博士論文，2004年)、馬志林及劉生良的《〈黃氏日鈔〉中的〈詩經〉研究》(《齊魯學刊》2013年第5期)等。通觀以上成果，我們發現雖然學者們圍繞黃震已經開展了多方面的研究，但卻沒有對黃震《黃氏日鈔》中《讀論語》的研究。基於此，本文擬探討黃氏《讀論語》的學術特色。

一、宗主朱學

黃震是南宋四明朱學主要傳人，全祖望指出：“四明之專宗朱氏者，東發為最。《日鈔》百卷，躬行自得之言也，淵源出於輔氏。晦翁生平不喜浙學，而端平以後，閩中、江右諸弟子，支離、舛戾、固陋無不有之，其能中振之者，北山師弟為一支，東發為一支，皆

浙產也。”¹ 由於這樣的特殊身份，所以他極力推崇朱子，以之與孔子並列，指出，朱熹“究孔孟之正傳，為千萬世道學之宗主，雖使先生出將入相，功著一時，以彼易此，孰得孰失耶？故愚嘗妄謂：孔子窮而在下者也，故能集堯、舜以來列聖之大成；晦翁鬱而不伸者也，故能集伊、洛以來諸儒之大成。似皆有造物者司其數於間，而窮者乃所以為達，嗚呼盛哉！”² 因為推崇朱子，故黃震對朱子的《論語集注》青睞有加。在他看來，“漢唐諸儒不過詁訓以釋文義，而未嘗敢贊一辭”，而宋儒“講明理學，脫去詁訓，其說雖遠過漢唐，而不善學者求之過高，從而增衍新說，不特意味反淺，而失之遠者或有矣”，惟有朱熹《論語集注》融詁訓與義理於一身，“至晦庵為《集注》，複祖詁訓，先明字義使本文坦然，而後擇先儒議論之精者一二語附之，以發其指要”，成為詮釋《論語》之佼佼者。他引用乃師王宗淪之說，對《論語集注》予以了高度評價：“晦庵讀盡古今注解，自音而訓，自訓而義，自一字而一句，自一句而一章，以至言外之意，透徹無礙，瑩然在心，如琉璃然，方敢下筆，一字未透，即雲未詳。”³ 這就是說，朱熹的《論語集注》集漢唐諸儒和宋朝諸儒《論語》詮釋之大成，不僅通過詁訓以明字義，而且抉發了其中蘊含的微言大義，達到了“自音而訓，自訓而義，自一字而一句，自一句而一章，以至言外之意，透徹無礙”的境地。

由此出發，黃震主要做了以下幾方面的工作：

一是對於不尊信朱子的《論語》解釋予以駁斥。如《學而篇》“學而時習”章，黃震雲：

近世有石賡，學于晦庵門人李閔祖，作《四書疑義》，謂晦庵此章“學之為言效也，人性皆善，而覺有先後”為有病，必言“氣稟有清濁，故質有昏明，而覺有先後”。愚謂此與文字上生枝節，實則覺有先後，則清濁昏明者已在其中矣。晦庵折衷諸家而歸之簡淨。讀《集注》者，何必更以求多為哉？若陸象山嘗謂“《論語》有無頭柄底說話，如‘學而時習之’，不知時習者何事”。及其門人楊慈湖，又改“時習”為“不習”。其說不知何如。要之，學者且當尊信吾聖人之訓。⁴

對於他人對《論語》的質疑和對朱注的不尊信，黃震予以辯駁，極力維護《集注》的權威性。

二是對於《集注》予以疏通發明。黃震一方面對於《集注》中論說粗略處予以補充說明，如《憲問篇》“霸諸侯”下，他說：

《注》雲：“霸與伯同，長也。”愚意天下之主謂之王，諸侯之長謂之伯，此指其定位而名也。以德方興而為天下所歸則王（平聲），聲轉而為王（去聲）。王政不綱，而諸侯之長自整齊，其諸侯則伯，聲轉而為霸，皆有為之稱也。正音為靜字，聲轉為動字。⁵

1 黃宗義、全祖望，《宋元學案》卷八十六《東發學案》，2884頁。

2 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷三十八《晦庵先生語類二》。

3 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

4 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

5 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

對於為什麼“霸與伯同”，及其讀音，進行了較為詳細的疏解。

又，《顏淵篇》“顏淵問仁”章下，朱注中有這樣一句注釋：“為仁者，所以全其心之德也。”⁶ 在黃氏看來，朱注指向不明確：“此章前曰‘克己復禮為仁’，後曰‘為仁由己’，此注恐指‘為仁由己’之‘為仁’耳。蓋以語脈而詳之。‘克己復禮為仁’云克己復禮即所為仁，‘為’非用力之字；若‘為仁由己’，則‘為’乃用力之字。語雖相似，而脈則不同也。要之，為仁之工夫，即是上文克己復禮，盍更詳之。”對於注文中的“為仁”從語脈上確定了其詮釋所指。

另一方面，對於《集注》中的注釋不太好理解處，再進行解說。如《學而篇》“因不失其親”章，黃震雲：

《集注》以為“所依者不失其可親之人，則亦可宗而主之矣”是一章三節，各自為義也。《或問》以為“因上二者而不失其所親則為可宗，則下一節承上二節而言也”。恐不若《集注》為徑。然此一節終覺未易曉。先師王宗論貫道嘗講此章云：“宗者，人所取為宗師，宜超然卓立之人也。因者，因仍于古而非自立者也。惟因而不失其可親之人，則源流既正，亦可宗之也。”此語似於《集注》有發。⁷

引用其師之解說，進一步深化了朱子的解說。

三是疏通《集注》與《或問》。對於《集注》與《或問》相抵牾處，黃震進行了疏通。如《八佾篇》“三歸”下，《集注》與《或問》所載舊說不同，黃氏對此予以了解說：

《集注》云：“三歸，台名。事見《說苑》。”而《或問》載舊說“婦人謂嫁曰歸。三歸者，一娶三姓而備九女，如諸侯之制也”。愚按：《說苑》謂管氏避得民而作三台，殆如蕭何田宅自汙之類，想大為之台，故言非儉。而台以處三歸之婦人，故以為名歟。⁸

又，《為政篇》“民免無恥”章，黃震雲：

《集注》謂“苟免刑罰而無所羞恥”，《或問》謂“范、呂、謝、尹氏皆以苟免為言，殊失文意。蓋所謂免，正以其革面而不敢為非，真有免為罪戾耳，豈冒犯不義，以至於犯上作亂，而脫漏憲綱，以倖免于刑誅之謂哉”？愚按：二說似微不同，實則經文惟言“免”字，晦庵言“苟”字以發之，恐後學看苟字粗淺，故於《或問》再發以足之。⁹

經過黃震的解釋，原本自相乖戾的兩說變成了意義相一致的說法，而《或問》之說成了《集注》之說的補充與完善。

雖然黃震對於《集注》非常推崇，但它卻並不是盲目崇拜，對於其中的不足，他也毫不諱言。

6 朱熹，《四書章句集注》，131頁。

7 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

8 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

9 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

一是《集注》中的注釋有不當之處。如《里仁篇》“里仁為美”章，黃氏曰：“《注》以‘焉得知’為失其是非之本心，理故如此，但本文自明白，此語恐覺微重耳。”¹⁰認為朱注判語有些重。《衛靈公篇》“有教無類”下，他說：“《注》專主變化氣質類，愚恐夫子與進互童子、孟子來著不拒之意，皆在其中也。”¹¹認為朱注有些內容沒包括進去。《雍也篇》“祝鮀宋朝”章，他說：“範氏說‘無鮀之佞，而獨有朝之美，協於不有至而有’之文，晦庵以巧言令色不得分輕重而去其說，且以‘無虐惇獨而畏高明’比此句之句法。然《書》雲無者總為禁止之辭，‘無虐惇獨而畏高明’是一句而平下兩事。兩事相比也，此句‘不有祝鮀之佞，而有宋朝之美’，相反者是一句而兼下兩事。兩事相反也，句法似亦不類。如以辨佞為尤足以苟免亂世，而宋朝之美色與人為之令色亦不同，則範氏分輕重之說，恐亦自通。學者更詳之。”¹²黃氏認為朱子對範氏之說的評價不確切。又，《集注》中還收錄有不恰當解釋，如《里仁篇》“無適無莫”章，黃氏指出：“君子于天下，無必欲為之心，亦無必不為之心，惟義是從而已，此本旨也。無此兩者，惟有義耳。謝氏謂：‘於無可無不可之間，有義存焉。’則於兩者之間，參酌其義，又是一意，與經旨微不同。”¹³謝氏注釋與經旨有違，但仍被收入。

二是《集注》中有贅言。如《憲問篇》“孔子沐浴而朝”章，黃氏曰：“胡氏曰：‘仲尼此舉先發後聞可也。’愚謂孔子於義盡矣。此事果可先發後聞，則夫子亦為之矣，不待胡氏發其所不及也。此言不必附《集注》。”¹⁴黃氏認為《集注》收錄胡氏之說乃畫蛇添足。《子路篇》“仲公問政”章，朱子在《集注》中援引了范祖禹之說，其中有“失此三者，不可以為季氏宰，況天下乎”句，黃氏認為該句“恐亦衍文”。¹⁵

三是《集注》中收錄有異端之學。《學而篇》“曾子三省”章，黃震雲：“《集注》首載尹氏曰：‘曾子守約，故動必求諸身。’語意已足矣。次載謝氏曰：‘諸子之學，皆出於聖人，其後愈遠而愈失其真。獨曾子之學，專用心於內，惜其嘉言善行不盡傳。’竊意用心於內者無形動，求諸身，躬行也，其所指之，一虛一實，已不同。蓋心所以具萬理而應萬事，正其心者，正欲施之治國平天下。孔門未有專用心於內之說也。用心于內，近世禪學之說耳。後有象山因謂曾子之學是里面出來，其學不傳；諸子是外面入去。今傳於世皆外入之學，非孔子之真，遂於《論語》之外自稱得不傳之學。凡皆源于謝氏之說。此說今視晦庵殊不侔，使晦庵《集注》於今日，謝氏之說不知亦收藏否。二說雖《集注》所並收，然不可不考其異。”¹⁶在他看來，謝良佐之說夾雜有禪學成分，甚至影響到了象山

10 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

11 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

12 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

13 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

14 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

15 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

16 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

學派的解說，理應刪去。又，《里仁篇》“仁者安仁，知者利仁”下，《集注》引謝氏曰：“仁者心無內外遠近精粗之間，非有所存而自不亡，非有所理而自不亂，如目視而耳聽，手持而足行也。知者謂之有所見則可，謂之有所得則未可。有所存斯不亡，有所理斯不亂，未能無意也。安仁則一，利仁則二。安仁者非顏、閔以上，去聖人為不遠，不知此味也。諸子雖有卓越之才，謂之見道不惑則可，然未免於利之也。”¹⁷ 黃震認為，謝良佐之詮釋多有異端之說，如其中的“仁者心無內外遠近精粗之間，非有所存而自不亡”之說，“此佛氏心學之說。若夫子本旨，不過謂‘仁者安仁’與仁為一耳”；其中的知者“未能無意”，“竊疑此亦佛氏絕意念之說。若夫子本意，不過謂‘知者知仁’之為美，慕而行之耳。”指出：“異端之說，皆從莊子寓言死灰其心一語來，近世諸儒或慕其高而言之。然人決不能無心，心決不能無意。心是活物，凡動處皆是意，特意有美惡耳。雖仁者安仁，此心亦何嘗不流行哉。于吾夫子‘七十而從心所欲不逾矩’可知矣。”¹⁸ 在詮釋過程中，黃氏不僅指出了謝注中存在的問題，而且點出了經文的本意，分析了成因。

四是《集注》中有些注釋不如《或問》。對於《或問》優於《集注》的，他一方面主張用《或問》來補充《集注》，如《學而篇》“有子孝弟”章下，黃氏曰：“晦庵《或問》中雲：‘孝弟，則固仁之發而最親者。’此語為婉而切，似當收置《集注》，使學者知孝即仁之事，而仁即性之有可也。”¹⁹ 《子罕篇》“鄙夫空空”章下，黃氏注曰：“《或問》謂：‘空空，指鄙夫而言。’此語合入《集注》。蓋《集注》未嘗明言空空指誰。”又，《子罕篇》“子罕言利”章下，黃氏指出：

《集注》惟載程氏之言曰：“計利則害義，命之理微，仁之道大，故皆罕言。”愚按：自孟子不言利，世以利謂不美字，而此章以利與命、仁並言，故世疑之。惟《或問》中晦庵言“利者，義之和，全於義則利自至。若多言利則人不知義，而反害於利矣。命者，天之令，修己以俟，然後可以立命。若多言命，則人事不修，而反害於命矣。仁者，性之德，必忠信篤敬、克己復禮，然後能至。若多言仁，則學者憑虛躐等，而反害於仁矣。三者皆理之正，不可以不言，而憂深慮遠，又不可多言也。”此言合入《集注》，可免世俗分輕重美惡之疑。

另一方面，黃震主張棄《集注》從《或問》。如《公冶長篇》“乘桴浮海”章，黃氏解曰：“程子謂：‘浮海之歎，傷天下之無賢君。’晦庵於《集注》錄之，於《或問》言其未盡善。因知經旨之本明白者，不必贅辭也。當從《或問》。”又，《雍也篇》“居敬行簡”章，他說：“《集注》雲：‘伯子，蓋太簡者。’而仲弓疑夫子之過許，蓋未喻夫子可字之意，而其所言之理有默契焉者，故夫子然之。《或問》雲：‘夫子雖不正言其居簡之失，而所謂可者，固有未盡

17 朱熹，《四書章句集注》，69頁。

18 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

19 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

善之意矣。仲弓乃能默契聖人之微旨，而分別夫居敬居簡之不同，夫子所以深許之也。’愚按：二說皆出晦庵而不同，恐當從《或問》之說。”²⁰又，《季氏篇》“季氏將伐顓臾”章，黃氏說：“《集注》雲：‘遠人，謂顓臾。分崩離析，謂四分公室，家臣屢叛。’《或問》載蘇氏考究，定公十年，子路為季氏宰。哀公十一年，冉求為季氏宰，則伐顓臾在季康子之世。哀公七年，季康子伐邾，以召吳寇，故曰：‘遠人不服，而不能來也。’十五年，公孫宿以成叛，故曰：‘邾分崩離析，而不能守也。’恐當以《或問》所載為正。蓋顓臾在邾域之中，難指其為遠人，而夫子此語正因季氏將伐顓臾而概及當時之國事，謂他有當理者尚多也。所謂遠人，非正指將伐之顓臾也。”²¹

對於《集注》與《或問》各有優長的，一方面他主張二者並存，如《堯曰篇》“雖有周親，不如仁人”下，黃氏注曰：“《集注》載孔氏曰：‘周，至也。言紂至親雖多，不如周家之多仁人。’《或問》則曰：‘范氏之說因上文而以“周親”為“周室之親”亦善，但于書文不協。’愚意于書文雖不協，于本文則協；且免得添‘紂’字與‘多’字，又免得改‘周’字為‘至’字，似當兩存耳。”²²另一方面，他主張《集注》與《或問》合參，如《雍也篇》“孟子反不伐”章，黃氏注曰：“《集注》載謝氏稱孟子反無欲上人之心，及孟子反可法之語。《或問》以謝氏為過，且雲‘恐非夫子之意’。夫釋經亦順其本旨而已，合參《或問》之說。”²³同章“何莫由斯道”章，黃氏解曰：“洪氏將‘何’字少歇，而以人莫能由斯道，晦庵獨取之，蓋雲世之不由於道者不少也。程氏等說謂人何能不由斯道，若曰日常常行者皆道也。蓋眾說說得‘道’字輕，指天下之道也，故以為莫不由之；洪說說得‘道’字重，指道之踐履於身者也，故以為莫能由之。恐合參考。”²⁴

總之，黃震抱著揚棄的態度，對於朱注中存在的個別問題，能夠做到是者是之、非者非之，絕不盲從，反映了作者獨立思考的精神和嚴謹的治學態度。錢穆先生就此評論曰：“蓋黃東發之學，尊崇朱子，其學博，即承自朱子之教而來；其于朱子成說亦時有糾正，不泥捉姝姝務墨守。……朱子論學極尊二程，亦時于二程有所糾正。東發之能糾正朱子，乃正見其善學也。”²⁵誠哉斯言！

二、務求本意

黃震治經力求經文本意，他說：“夫釋經亦順其本旨而已。”²⁶因此，在對《論語》進行解釋時，他一方面注重名物典制考證，一方面主張求本意的注釋原則。

第一，注重學求其是。黃震比較注釋考證，舉凡《集注》中涉及到的字詞、人物、史實、名物解釋不明者、有異議者，他大都予以了說明。

20 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

21 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

22 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

23 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

24 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

25 錢穆，〈黃東發學述〉，《故宮圖書季刊》1971年第1卷第3期。

26 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

一是字詞考證。如《為政篇》“舉直措枉”章中的“諸”字，朱注與他說不同，他分析說：“舉直措枉而民服，詞義曉然，自不待注。所不可曉者，‘諸’字耳。兩語交互，歸宿正在‘諸’字。若單雲舉直措枉，舍‘諸’字不言，則不可耳。今《集注》以‘諸’字作‘眾’字，說如諸侯之諸，是雲眾枉眾直也。然晚學亦未易曉，或疑諸者助辭，即之於二字連聲。錯者，置也，如賈誼‘置諸安處則安’之類。錯諸者，猶雲舉而加之也，舉直者而置之於枉者之上，是君子在位、小人在野，此民所以服。或舉枉者而置之於直者之上，是小人得志、君子失位，此民所以不服。庶幾此章兩下相形之意方明，未知然否。若如舊說，則舉者用也，錯者不用也，二字相背；若如今說，則舉者舉斯加彼之舉也，錯者置之於此之名也，二字相因，其義訓皆不同也。”²⁷ 在他看來，兩說可以並存，不能因朱說而廢他說。

二是人物考證。如《微子篇》“虞仲”下，黃氏說：“《注》雲：‘虞仲即仲雍，與泰伯同竄荊蠻者。’愚按：仲雍嘗治吳為君，恐不可言逸民，亦無隱居放言之事。兼仲雍生伯夷、叔齊之前，使虞仲果仲雍也，亦何為反序次於夷齊之後？恐先儒自有所據耳。”²⁸ 《集注》將“虞仲”視為“仲雍”，與史實有違。

三是考證名物典制。如《八佾篇》“使民戰慄”章，其中有關於“社”的記載，“胡氏因郊社之文，以社為祭地之禮”，朱子則認為“未可知也”，黃氏則指出：“然其言有據，存而考之可也。愚謂社固祭地也，然所祭指吐生百穀之土，與稷為比，則舉地之一而言之，自王社以下皆然，故春祈秋報皆於社焉。若王者父天母地之大祭，全舉地而言，恐又不止於此社而已。”²⁹ 通過黃氏的解釋，我們對這一禮儀形式有了新的瞭解，同時也補充了朱說的不足。又，《八佾篇》“反坫”章，黃氏對此予以了詳細的解說：

鄭《注》謂：“坫在兩楹之間，反爵其上。”按：今世釋奠反爵，乃以四方板而圓坎其中，或雲此反坫之餘制。然坫字從土，而雲在兩楹間，豈常設之者歟？按：《郊特牲》“台門而旅樹反坫”，《雜記》“旅樹而反坫”，鄭氏亦以樹為屏，以反坫為反爵之地。然《內則》載閤食之制雲：“土於坫。”《明堂位》載朝會之制雲：“反坫出尊，崇坫康圭。”《士虞禮》載苴茅之制雲：“僎於西坫土。”是則累土而為之者，皆可名坫，而坫亦有高卑東西之不同，非必反爵之處也。如“台門而旅樹反坫”，當是立反坫於台門之內，如今行在所之驤驥院、牛羊司與凡營壘，多於台門內立土牆之類歟。鄭氏之事，皆本《論語》，其指坫為反爵，皆本好之一字意，兩君之好為飲酒，故雲耳。然以坫之反為爵之反，似異於經文。又按，《汲冢周書》雲：“乃立五宮，咸有四阿反坫。”注雲：“反坫，外向室也。”則反坫又非反爵之地，反主坫言非主爵言也。反坫，向外之名。坫，殆別設大門屏之名。豈兩君之好，必欲容其儀衛之眾，而為此向外之室歟？世遠不可知。若據《郊特牲》，

27 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

28 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

29 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

以反坫與台門相聯，《汲冢書》以反坫與四阿相聯，則《論語》以反坫與樹塞門相聯，恐均為公室僭侈之事。³⁰

通過考證，黃氏在評說前人注釋的基礎上，運用書證、理證參伍錯綜的考證方法，對“反坫”予以了說明，糾正了朱注的不足。

四是對考辨史實。如《泰伯篇》“泰伯至德”章，黃氏曰：

《或問》有疑泰伯父死不赴、傷毀髮膚，皆非賢者之事。晦庵辨乙太王之欲立賢子聖孫，為其道足以濟天下，而非有憎愛之間、利欲之私也，是以泰伯去之而不為狷，王季受之而不為貪。父死不赴，傷毀髮膚而不為不孝。使泰伯而不有以深自絕焉，則亦何以必致國于王季，而安其位哉？愚按：王充《論衡》謂：“泰伯知太王欲立王季，入吳采藥，斷髮文身，以隨吳俗。太王薨，泰伯還，王季再讓。泰伯不聽，三讓，曰：‘吾之吳越，吳越之俗，斷髮文身。吾刑餘之人，不可為宗廟社稷主。’王季始知其不可而受之。”此其所載頗詳，且與吾夫子三以天下讓之說合，可以破或者信史書言泰伯父死不赴之疑。《或問》又載蘇黃門謂子夏言泰伯端委以治吳，則未嘗斷髮文身。愚按：黃門作古史，專據《左傳》，以辟《史記》。然世遠，安知此是而彼非耶？今其主《左傳》，謂仲雍而後斷髮文身則惑矣。泰伯、仲雍始入吳，而斷髮文身者，隨其俗也。泰伯果端委於其先矣。仲雍繼之為君而斷髮文身，豈人情也？且斷髮文身者，始入吳之事也；端委而治者，吳人尊信之後，泰伯君吳之事也。發雖嘗斷，何妨複長；身雖嘗紋，何妨被衣，兩義固不相害也。其始隨俗，及得位，則臨之以禮，理固然也。若謂泰伯端委，至仲雍繼位，而後斷髮文身，是謂仲雍不肖也。為君而不肖者有矣，未有不肖而為君者也。且時仲雍已老矣，發星星，何可斷身？黑者，何可文耶？³¹

在黃氏看來，《或問》中記載的有人懷疑“泰伯父死不赴、傷毀髮膚，皆非賢者之事”，朱子雖對此有所辯解，但不如王充《論衡》所載之史實具有說服力。對於蘇轍所說“泰伯端委以治吳，仲雍而後斷髮文身”之說提出了質疑，認為此說不合人情，與史不符。

第二，注重唯求本意。黃震反對文外求意、反對以後事釋經、反對過高之論、反對務新奇、反對以己意注經，體現出求本意的注釋原則。

一是反對過度詮釋，即“求多於本文之外”。按照詮釋學的理論，人們對經文的解釋是有邊界的，也即需在一定的範圍內進行，超過了這一邊界，就會造成過度解釋。如《學而篇》“有子孝弟”章，黃氏曰：“按：《論語》首章言學，次章即言孝弟。聖門之教人，莫切于孝弟矣。此章象山斥其為支離，固不可知。程子言‘為仁以孝弟為本，論性則以仁為孝弟之本。性中只有仁義禮智，曷嘗有孝弟來？’其說‘性中曷嘗有孝弟’之語，後覺乍見亦以為疑，蓋實則父子之道天性，而其說微覺求多於本文之外也。晦庵《或問》中雲‘孝弟，則固仁之發而最親者’，此語為婉而切，似當收置《集注》，

30 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

31 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

使學者知孝即仁之事，而仁即性之有，可也。”³² 在他看來，程子之說增加了本文沒有的內容，不如朱子《或問》中所言恰當。又，《述而篇》“子所雅言”章，黃氏曰：“程曰：‘若性與天道，則有不可得而聞者，要在默而識之也。’愚按：本文未嘗及此。”³³ 《子路篇》“仲弓問政”章，黃氏曰：“範氏曰：‘失此一者，不可以為季氏宰，況天下乎！’恐亦衍義。”³⁴ 《學而篇》“知和而和”章，黃氏曰：“本意不過禮以和為貴，和又當以禮節之耳。範氏以知和而和屬之樂，而晦庵取焉。禮樂雖相關，但恐于本文有添。”³⁵ 《先進篇》“先進于禮樂”章，黃氏曰：“晦庵以先進為前輩，野人為郊外之民；後進為後輩，君子為士大夫。此甚平實。引程子曰：‘先進于禮樂，文質得宜，今反謂之質樸，而以為野人。’愚謂若以先進為朝廷邦國行禮樂之人，則宜如程子宛轉其說；若泛言前一輩人，而于禮樂亦止泛言禮樂之事，則程子之說視本文為有添矣。或止雲‘先輩質樸，故于禮樂之事猶野人也’，則與晦庵葉。”³⁶ 這幾章的解說，黃震認為都犯了詮釋過度的錯誤，都是在脫離本文而自顧自說。

二是反對以後事釋經。黃震認為，釋經者應具有歷史的眼光，不應苛求古人。《為政篇》“攻乎異端”章，黃震雲：“孔子本意似不過戒學者它用其心耳。後有孟子，辟楊、墨為異端，而近世佛氏之害尤甚，世亦以異端目之，凡程門之為佛學者，遂陰諱其說，而曲為回護，至以攻為攻擊，而以孔子為不攻異端。然孔子時，未有此議，論說者自不必以後世之事，反上釋古人之言。諸君子又何必因異端之字與今偶同，而回護至此耶？”³⁷ 在黃震看來，孔子之時，既沒有楊墨之學，也沒有佛氏之學，而崇信佛學之部分程氏弟子，在解說這段文字時，極盡回護之能事，不惜曲為解說，將“攻”釋為“攻擊”，認為孔子不攻異端，這實際上就犯了“以後世之事，反上釋古人之言”的錯誤。

三是反對過高之論。在黃震看來，解說立言不醇正篤實，不切於人情，不近於事理，迂闊難行，即謂過高之論。如《八佾篇》“君子無爭”章，黃氏曰：“辭意曉然，本無可注。近世立高論者回護爭字，其說雜然。晦庵本注疏舊說射禮為證，其說始平。”³⁸ 為了拔高孔子，釋經者不遺餘力地回護“爭”字，以凸顯聖人形象。又，《先進篇》“子路曾皙冉有公西華侍坐”章，黃氏曰：“後世談虛好高之習勝，不原夫子謂歎之本旨，不詳本章所載之始末，但摭與點數語而張黃之，遺落世事，指為道妙，甚至謝上蔡以曾皙想像之言為實有，暮春浴沂之事雲為曾皙獨對春風，冷眼看破，但欲推之使高，而不知陷於談禪。是蓋學于程子而失之者也。程子曰：‘子路、冉有、公西赤言志自是實事。’此正論也。又曰：‘孔子與點，蓋與

32 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

33 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

34 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

35 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

36 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

37 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

38 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

聖人之志同，便是堯舜氣象。’此語微過於形容，上蔡因之而遂失也。曾皙豈能與堯舜易地皆然哉？至若謂曾皙狂者也，未必能為聖人之事，而能知夫子之志，遂以浴沂詠歸之樂指為老安少懷之志，曾皙又豈若是其班哉？竊意他日使二三子盍各言其志，此泛言所志，非指出仕之事也。今此四子侍坐，而告以如或知爾則何以哉，此專指出仕之事，而非泛使之言志也。老安少懷之志，天覆地載之心也。適人之適者也，浴沂詠歸之樂、吟風弄月之趣也。自適其適者也，曾皙固未得與堯舜比，豈得與夫子比？而形容之過如此，亦合於其分量而審之矣。”³⁹ 僅僅因為孔子所言“吾與點也”，後人便將曾皙提高到可與堯舜比肩，與孔子同列，實為過高之論。

四是反對務新奇。黃震反對釋經追求新鮮奇特，罔顧事實和經文。在講解《八佾篇》“使民戰慄”章時，他指出：“蘇氏謂‘公與宰我謀誅三桓，而為隱辭以相語’。有以問尹氏者，尹氏艴然曰：‘說經而欲新奇，何所不至矣！’此論最于說經有益，聞者當戒。”⁴⁰ 借助尹氏之口，表明了自己的治經態度。又，《公冶長篇》“性與天道”章，黃氏指出：“子貢明言不可得而聞，諸儒反謂其得聞而歎美，豈本朝專言性與天道，故自主其說如此耶？要之，子貢之言，今日學者所當退而自省也。”⁴¹ 為求新，不惜有意誤讀經文。

綜上所述，黃震通過對字詞注釋、歷史人物、名物典制的考證，進一步厘清了《論語》注釋中存在的一些模糊認識，做到了訓詁、考證和義理辨析相結合，具有考論結合的特點。同時，黃震反對文外求意、反對以後事釋經、反對過高之論、反對務新奇的做法，旗幟鮮明地擺明瞭自己求本意的注釋原則，體現了求真的精神。四庫館臣曾評價說：“蓋震之學朱，一如朱之學程，反復發明，務求其是，非中無所得而徒假借聲價者也。”⁴² 誠非虛言。

三、斷以己意

黃震在《讀論語》中，也時常在臚列《集注》《或問》之說的基礎上，綜合諸說，斷以己意。這也正是他有功于朱學之處。對此，全祖望在《澤山書院記》中曾有所評論：“朱徽公之學統，累傳至雙峰北溪諸子，流入訓詁派。迨至鹹淳而後，北山、魯齋起於婺（金華），先生起于明（四明），所造博大精深，徽公瓣香為之重整。婺學出於長樂黃氏（黃勉齋），建安（謂朱喜）心法之所歸，其淵源固極盛。先生則獨得之遺籍，默識而冥搜，其功尤巨。試讀其《日鈔》，諸經說間，或不盡主建安舊講，大抵求其心之所安而止，此其所以為功臣也。”⁴³ 黃震之所以成為朱學之功臣，正由於他能突破朱子之說，而“求其心之所安”。

39 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

40 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

41 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

42 永瑤等，《四庫全書總目》，786-787頁。

43 黃宗羲、全祖望，《宋元學案》卷八十六《東發學案》，2886頁。

如《公冶長篇》“非爾所及”章，黃氏注曰：“諸說以仁字總罩一章之意，因而說仁、恕不同，于本文似不曾解。竊意理雖一定，而人情不齊，在己者可勉，在人者不可強；我欲無加諸人可能也，欲人之無加諸我不可必也，故以為‘非爾所及’耳。故夫子言‘已所不欲，勿施於人’，盡其在己而已。《大學》言：‘所惡於上，勿施於下，以至左右前後皆然。’亦盡其在己而已。必欲強人之我若，而彼此皆平，則豈可得哉！”⁴⁴ 在評價諸說的基礎上，黃氏提出了自己的見解，從理一情異的視角，提出了“在己者可勉，在人者不可強”的觀點，指出人生在世，應“盡其在己”。

又，《陽貨篇》“性相近”章，《集注》曰：“此所謂性，兼氣質而言者也。氣質之性，固有美惡之不同矣。然以其初而言，則皆不甚相遠也。但習於善則善，習於惡則惡，於是始相遠耳。程子曰：‘此言氣質之性。非言性之本也。若言其本，則性即是理，理無不善，孟子之言性善是也。何相近之有哉？’”⁴⁵ 黃氏就此發表了了解說。他說：“性者，此理素具於此心，人得之於天以生者也。自一陰一陽之謂道，而繼之者善，于以賦予於萬物。人為萬物之靈，其性之所自來固無有不善，而既屬於人，則不能以盡同，故夫子一言以蔽之曰‘性相近也’。”人性緣自天賦，具有先天之善，但卻因人而異，所以孔子說“性相近”。而孟子之所以專言性善，乃時代使然。他說：“至孟子，當人欲橫流之時，特推其所本然者以曉當世，故專以性善為說，自此言性者紛紛矣。”接著，黃氏又結合古往今來聖賢眾庶的例子，指出：“由今觀之，謂性為相近，則驗之身，稽之人，參之往古，考之當今，上探之聖賢，下察之眾庶，無一不合，信乎其為相近也。謂性為皆善，則自己而人，自古而今，自聖賢而眾庶，皆不能不少殊，推禹、湯、文、武之聖，亦未見其盡與堯舜為一。孟子蓋獨推其所本然者以曉人也。”孟子之性善說從本然的角度出發，而落實到每個人身上則有不妥；而孔子之性相近說，從實然的角度立論，能夠很好地解釋人性稟賦於天而又有個性差異的事實。在黃震看來，宋儒所言“天地之性”與“氣質之性”只不過是對孟子“性善論”的一種豐富完善而已，他說：“言性之說，至本朝而精，以善者為天地之性，以不能盡善者為氣質之性。此說既出，始足以完孟子性善之說。世之學者乃因此陰陋吾夫子之說，而不敢明言其為非，則曰性相近是指氣質而言，若曲為之回護者。然則孟子之言性何其精，而夫子之言性何其粗耶！竊意‘天命之謂性’，所謂‘天地之性’，是指推天命流行之初而言也，推性之所從來也。所謂‘氣質之性’，是指既屬諸人而言也，斯其謂之性者也。夫子之言性，亦指此而已耳。本朝之言性，特因孟子性善之說，揆之人而不能盡合，故推測其已上者以完其義耳。”以性為天地之性、氣質之性，也只不過是說清了性善論。在此基礎上，黃震指出，孔子的“性相近”說是完整無缺的，學者們毋庸多言，回歸孔子即可。“言性豈有加于夫子之一語哉？且天下之生，凡同類者無有不同，而纖悉則不

44 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

45 朱熹，《四書章句集注》，175-176頁。

能盡同，此其所以為造化之妙。如桐梓之生一也，而枝條花葉之橫斜疏密則無一同。然要其所以為桐梓者，終相若也。此相近之說也，而可以知人矣。人之形體一也，而耳目口鼻之位置美惡則無一同，然要其所以為人者終相若也。此相近之說也，而可以知其無形者矣。人之能言一也，而其聲音之清濁高下則無一同，然要其所以為人聲者終相若也。此相近之說也，而可以推人之性矣。其賦自天，何有不善？自陰陽雜揉，屬之人而謂之性，宜不能粹，然而皆善，此相近之說也。奈何獨主性善之說，而遂廢性相近之說耶？故嘗謂夫子言性相近，惟指其實然者，故他日言中人以上、中人以下、生而知、學而知、人品節節不同，皆與相近之言無戾。孟子專言性善，惟推其本然者，故他日言二之中四之下性之反之先覺後覺人品亦各各不同，終歸于夫子相近之說。學者亦學夫子而已。夫子未嘗言性，言性止此一語，何今世學者言性之多也？無亦知其性之相近，而戒其習之相遠，可乎？”⁴⁶ 認為論性無出於孔子者矣，後世各種性論都不出孔子所言範圍。

由上可見，黃震敢於直面批判前人所說，尤其是其尊崇的程朱之學，充分表現了自己追求“自得”的學術風格。黃宗羲就此評論曰：“學問之道，蓋難言哉。無師授者，則有多歧亡羊之歎；非自得者，則有買櫝還珠之誚，所以哲人代興，因時補救，視其已甚者而為之一變。當宋季之時，吾東浙狂慧充斥，慈湖之流弊極矣，果齋（魏文翁之號）、文潔（黃震之諡號）不得不起而救之。然果齋之氣魄，不能及于文潔，而《日鈔》之作，折衷諸儒，即於考亭亦不肯苟同，其所自得者深也。今但言文潔之上接考亭，豈知言哉！”⁴⁷ 同時，黃震對朱注的修正，也對明清之際的學者產生了一定的影響，“就思想發展的流變來看，……黃震對程朱理學的修正，是與明清之際批判理學的思潮脈絡相通的。”⁴⁸

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46 黃震，《黃氏日鈔》卷二《讀論語》。

47 黃宗羲、全祖望，《宋元學案》卷八十六《東發學案》，2886頁。

48 樊克政，〈黃震對程朱理學的繼承與修正〉，《中國史研究》1984年第1期。

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Some Academic Characteristics of Huang Zhen's Interpretation of the *Du Lunyu* 讀論語

TANG Minggui

Abstract

In his *Du Lunyu* 讀論語, Huang Zhen's highly praised Zhu Xi's *Lunyu jizhu* 論語集注, which pays attention to explaining key concepts and teachings, and laid emphasis on clarifying the meaning with regard to a few problems. Huang's text reflected the scholarly attitude of its author, as well as his determination to seek the truth in facts without empty words. Furthermore, Huang was not afraid of authority, and boldly dared to address what he perceived to be his contemporaries' failings and publish his own opinions, and in so doing performed the academic style of troubling the complacent.

Keywords: Huang Zhen, Zhu Xi, *Du Lunyu* 讀論語, *Lunyu jizhu* 論語集注, academic characteristics

儒家思想西傳歐洲的奠基性著作

《中國哲學家孔子》

張 西 平

中文提要

《中國哲學家孔子》是儒學西傳歐洲的奠基性著作，本文對這部翻譯著作的出版歷史背景，書的基本內容做了研究。進而說明，這部著作是當時禮儀之爭的一個結果，也是來華的耶穌會士為說明自己的“合儒”傳教路線所做的努力成果。同時，這部書的出版使東亞的儒學思想首次進入了歐洲近代思想的發展歷程，儒家思想開始實際地影響了歐洲近代思想的形成，從而說明了儒家思想的世界性意義。

關鍵詞：孔子，儒家，禮儀之爭，四書，耶穌會士

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
明清之際正是在來華耶穌會的努力之下，在“禮儀之爭”的推動下，儒家思想開始傳播到歐洲，儒家的經典著作《四書》開始被翻譯成拉丁文，中國人的精神世界開始展現在歐洲人的面前。儒家思想西傳歐洲的奠基性著作就是《中國哲學家孔子》。本文試圖對這本書在歐洲的出版做一初步的探討。¹

一、《中國哲學家孔子》簡介

方豪先生在《十七八世紀來華西人對我國經籍之研究》一文中指出：“西人之研究我國經籍，雖始於十六世紀，但研究而稍有眉目，當在十七世紀初；翻譯初具規模，乃更遲至十七世紀末；在歐洲發生影響，則尤為十八世紀之盛事。故我國文化之西被，要以十七八兩世紀為重要關鍵。”² 中國典籍西譯最重要的就是《中國哲學家孔子》這本書。

《中國哲學家孔子》於1687年在巴黎的最終出版是由比利时传教士柏應理完成的。当时，柏應理在“羅馬學院”(Collegium Romanum)找到了基歇爾死後留下的《中國哲學孔子》部分譯稿，這些譯稿是殷鐸澤返回歐洲時所帶回的，他交給了基歇爾。法國皇家圖書館館長(Melchisédech Thévenot)得知這部書稿的情況後，提出要出版這本書。這樣，柏應理在書稿中加上自己寫的序言和他早在中國寫好的《中國年表》(Tabula Chronologica Monarchiae Sinicae)，書很快進入了出版程序，並於1687年在巴黎順利出版。書的標題為：《中國哲學家孔夫子，或者中國知識，用拉丁文表述，通過殷鐸澤、恩理格、魯日滿和柏應理的努力》(Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, sive Scientia Sinensis latine exposita studio et opera Prosperi Intorcetta, Christiani Herdtrich, Francisci Rougemont, Philippi Couplet)。

這本書的最終的完成者是柏應理，但實際上來華耶穌會士對《四書》的翻譯經歷了一個漫長的過程，按照美國漢學家孟德衛的看法，來華耶穌會士對《四書》的翻譯時從羅明堅和利瑪竇時代就開始了。³



1 參閱梅謙立《〈孔夫子〉：最初西文翻譯的儒家經典》；梅謙立《〈論語〉在西方的第一個譯本》；羅肇，《〈中國哲學家孔子〉成書過程芻議》。

2 方豪，《方豪六十自定稿》，186頁。

3 孟德衛，《奇異的國度：耶穌會的適應政策及漢學的興起》，第271頁；梅謙立，《〈孔夫子〉：最初西文翻譯的儒家經典》。但梅謙立認為羅明堅的中文水準不高，回羅馬後也沒有繼續做《四書》的翻譯。顯然，上面我們的研究證明這種流行的看法是值得推敲的。

在《中國哲學孔子》形成的歷史中最重要的人物是殷鐸澤，最重要的事件是“禮儀之爭”。殷鐸澤是首先開始翻譯《中庸》，將其譯為《中國政治道德學說》的人，而且耶穌會士在華共同翻譯的《大學》、《論語》的譯稿也是他帶到羅馬的，他對《中國哲學孔子》這本書的貢獻不亞于柏應理。⁴

“禮儀之爭”無疑是推動這本書形成的最重要的外在因素，也是理解和解釋耶穌會士們的翻譯策略和文本解釋原則的重要角度。

《中國哲學家孔子》形成于楊光先教難時期，當時在華的傳教士全部被集中在廣州，這時耶穌會通過楊光先教難更感受到堅持利瑪竇路線的重要性，於是利用所有傳教士在廣州的機會，集中力量對儒家的主要文本進行翻譯。而廣州會議期間各修會間的爭論對傳教士們如何理解、翻譯這些儒家著作產生了重大的影響。我們已經談到的龍華民反對利瑪竇的文章、方濟各傳教士利安當批評耶穌會傳教政策的文章《關於中國傳教的幾個問題》都是從外部促使耶穌會必須回答關於儒家的性質、回答中國文化的基本特徵，這些爭論自然推動了耶穌會士對中國儒家經典《四書》的翻譯和研究。這樣，在華的耶穌會于廣州會議期間的一個重要成果就是將《四書》中的三部翻譯成了拉丁文。⁵

二、《中國哲學家孔子》與禮儀之爭

筆者認為理解《中國哲學家孔子》的最重要維度是禮儀之爭，如果不把握住這個維度，該書則很難理解。

在如何看待入教儒生的祭祖、祭孔的風俗和Deus譯名理解上的分歧最早起源於耶穌會內部。對利瑪竇的適應政策第一個發難者就是龍華民(Nicolas Longobardi 1559—1654)，由此才有耶穌會的嘉定會議。“來嘉定開會的耶穌會士共有9人或10人；會中討論的問題，共30項，大半關於中國敬孔敬祖以及譯名問題。討論結果，對於敬孔敬祖等問題，沿用利瑪竇的方案，不以這種敬禮為宗教上的迷信；對於譯名，則採用龍華民一派的意見。……視察員Palmeiro 在1629年出命：以後耶穌會士不許用‘天’和‘上帝’。”⁶ 四年後從菲律賓入華的兩名托鉢修會傳教士在入華不久就挑起了與耶穌會傳教路線的爭論，從而將如何看待中國禮儀的問題由耶穌會內部擴大到了來華各修會之間的爭論。他們是多明我會的黎玉範(Dominican Juan

4 羅瑩，《儒學在西方的傳播：殷鐸澤及其〈中國政治學說〉》，485-468頁。Albrecht, Michael, *Oratio de Sinarum Philosophia Practica Rede über die praktische Philosophie der Chinesen*; Ching, Julia & Willard J. Oxtoby, *Moral Enlightenment: Leibniz and Wall on China*。

5 梅謙立，《〈孔夫子〉：最初西文翻譯的儒家經典》；羅瑩，《〈中國哲學家孔子〉成書過程芻議》；參見李文潮，《龍華民及其〈論中國宗教的幾個問題〉》，159-184頁；參見J.S. Cummins, *A Question of Rites*, Friar Domingo Navarrete and the Jesuits in China; Jerome Heyndrickx (ed) Philippe Couplet, S.J. (1623-1693), *The Man who Brought China to Europe*。

6 羅光，《教廷與中國使節史》，89頁。

Bautista de Morales)和方濟各會的利安當(Antpine de Sainte-Marie)。黎玉範於1643年返回羅馬後向傳信部所提出的報告，最終導致了教宗英諾森十世(Innocent X)1645年9月12日所批准的聖諭，⁷ 禁止中國教徒施行中國禮儀，而利安當在看到當年龍華民所寫的《論中國宗教的幾個問題》(Traité sur quelques points de la religion des chinois)後，也寫下了《論中國傳教事業的幾個問題》(Traité sur quelques points importants de la mission de la chine)這兩份文件後來成為廣州會議時討論的重要內容。

為回應多明我會來華傳教士黎玉範的挑戰，1654年來華耶穌會士衛匡國(Martin Martini ,1614-1661)返回羅馬後提交了針對黎玉範的耶穌會的報告。2年後，1656年3月23日亞歷山大七世(Alexander VII)頒佈了《羅馬教廷聖職部給中國傳教士的部令》，⁸ 在沒有否定1645年聖諭的前提下，也認可了在華耶穌會的傳教策略。

面對兩個不同的決定，在遠東的傳教士不知如何執行羅馬的決定，由此，1659年和1669年11月13日羅馬的聖職部分別下達了關於靈活執行1645年和1656年兩個決定的決議。⁹

《中國哲學家孔子》初步形成書稿是在廣州會議，正如梅謙立所說：1667年12月——1668年1月，此前因楊光先所起教案而被流放廣州的二十三位來華傳教士集體召開了“廣州會議”。¹⁰ 會議前後，殷鐸澤被選為中華耶穌會傳教區代表，前往羅馬彙報中國傳教區的悲慘現狀並請求迫切的物質援助。殷鐸澤走後，《四書》的翻譯工作仍在廣州繼續進行。尤其是此時，面對方濟各會士利安當(Antonio de Santa Maria Caballero, 1602-1669)、多明我會士閔明我(Domingo Navarrete, 1618-1686)以及利瑪竇繼任者龍華民等先後在各自的著作中對耶穌會在華傳教策略提出嚴厲批評，經過“廣州會議”的激烈討論，奧地利耶穌會神父恩理格和兩位弗萊芒神父魯日滿、柏應理開始在原先“四書”簡略直譯的基礎上，重新進行了校對和注釋。尤其針對其中譯名的敏感之處以及耶穌會當時所受到的批評，引用中國古籍在譯文中提出反駁，這項工作大概在1670-1672年間完成。¹¹

此時離開中國的殷鐸澤(Prospero Intorcetta, 1626-1696)已經於1667年先後在廣州和印度的果阿出版了由他翻譯的《中庸》，即《中國政治道德學說》。而從廣州會議上溜回歐洲的多明我會的傳教士閔明我在歐洲出版了他的《中華帝國歷史、政治、倫理及宗教

7 (美)蘇爾，諾爾編，《中國禮儀之爭西文文獻100篇》，1-8頁。

8 (美)蘇爾，諾爾編，《中國禮儀之爭西文文獻100篇》，8-11頁。

9 (美)蘇爾，諾爾編，《中國禮儀之爭西文文獻100篇》，11-13頁。

10 關於軟禁在廣州的二十三位傳教士的名單，參見Josef Metzler, *Die Synoden in China, Japan und Korea 1570-1931*, 23；另有一說認為當時共有二十五位傳教士被軟禁在廣州，其中包括二十一個耶穌會士、四個多名我會士和一個方濟各會士，參見Albert Chan, S.J., “Towards a Chinese Church: the Contribution of Philippe Couplet S.J. (1622-1693)”, in *Philippe Couplet, S.J. (1623-1693): The Man Who Brought China to Europe*, 60。

11 Minamö, *The Chinese Rites Controversy: From Its Beginning to Modern Times*。

概述》(Tratados historicos ,ethicosy religiosoa de la monarchia de China)在這部書中他公佈了來華傳教士在中國禮儀上的分歧，並把龍華民批評利瑪竇的論文作為書的附件發表。由此，禮儀之爭開始從教會內部擴大到了歐洲本土。¹²

1682年由教宗直接委派的福建宗座代牧閻當(Charles Maigrot, 1632-1730)再次挑起關於中國禮儀的爭論，其最後的結果是，使這個原本是來華各天主教修會之間的爭論演化為中國和梵蒂岡之間的爭論。結果導致了1704年11月20日的克萊孟十一世的敕令¹³和康熙皇帝做出了來華傳教士必須領票的規定。期間教宗雖兩度派來特使，但在梵蒂岡立場未改變的情況下，這些外交手段均以失敗而告終。

從“禮儀之爭”的歷史簡述中我們可以看到，《中國哲學家孔子》成書的過程就發生在禮儀之爭期間，書的初步成形是在廣州會議，這是來華的各天主教修會關於中國禮儀討論的會議。作為該書一部分的《中庸》，即殷鐸澤的《中國政治道德學說》和批評耶穌會著作的多明我會傳教士閔明我的《中華帝國歷史、政治、倫理及宗教概述》先後發表在禮儀之爭中，從而擴大了爭論的範圍。柏應理1685年回到歐洲，並於1687年出版《中國哲學家孔子，或者說是用拉丁文來展現中國的智慧》(Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, sive Scientia Sinensis Latine Exposita)，此時羅馬教廷正在調查關於禮儀之爭事件，書出版後也被閻當作為其批判的物件上報在給教廷的材料中。¹⁴

所以，如果要很好的理解這本書，特別是理解柏應理為這本書所寫的前言，那麼需要對這本書的成書背景，以及中國禮儀之爭有一個很好的瞭解。可以這樣說，歷史的維度是解開這本書的出發點。

三、《中國哲學家孔子》的跨文化特點

柏應理前言的中心是為利瑪竇的傳教路線辯護，利瑪竇的傳教路線就是“合儒易佛”，如他在《中國傳教史》一書中所說的：“每月之月初及月圓，當地官員與秀才們都到孔廟行禮，叩叩頭，燃蠟燭在祭壇前面的大香爐中焚香。在孔子誕辰時，及一年某些季節，則以極隆重的禮節，向他獻死動物及其食物，為感謝他在書中傳下來的崇高學說……使這些人能得到功名和官職；他們不念什麼祈禱文，也不向孔子求什麼，就像祭祖一樣……關於來生的事，他們不命令也不禁止人們相信什麼，許多人除了儒教外，同時也相信另外兩種宗教。所以，我們可以說，儒教不是正式的宗教，只是一種學

12 參閱閔明我，《上帝許給的土地：閔明我行紀和禮儀之爭》。

13 (美)蘇爾，諾爾編，《中國禮儀之爭西文文獻100篇》，14-48頁。Malatesta, “A Fatal Clash of Wills: The Condemnation of the Chinese Rites by the Papal Legate Carlo Tommasso Mail lard de Toumon,” 210-245.

14 (美)蘇爾，諾爾編，《中國禮儀之爭西文文獻100篇》，31頁。

派，是為了齊家治國而設立的。因此，他們可以屬於這種派，又成為基督徒，因為在原則上，沒有違反天主教之基本道理的地方。”¹⁵從宗教性上利瑪竇判斷“孔子不是神。”¹⁶這是說給西方人聽的，從歷史性上利瑪竇強調儒耶相同，通過肯定原儒，批評新儒家，說明儒耶在源頭上的一致性，這是說給中國士人聽的。如他在《天主實義》中所說“吾天主乃古經所稱上帝也”。

但龍華民和利安當並不認同利瑪竇這套道理。他在《論中國宗教的幾個問題》一文中開宗明義就說：“中國的‘上帝’(天上的皇帝)這個稱呼就開始讓我覺得有些不妥，因為我到了中國，按照我們耶穌會的習慣讀過儒家的四書之後，發現那些評注者對‘上帝’一詞所下的定義是與神性相違背的。”¹⁷他認為通過自己對儒家經典的研究得出的結論是：“在儒教裡，除了所有儒教徒都瞭解的庸俗化的表面教義以外，還有一個專屬於儒教大師的隱性教義。第二個結論：孔子之所以盡可能避免明白清晰地談論鬼神、理性靈魂與死後世界，是因為擔心公眾完全瞭解自己哲學會導致自己哲學的毀滅，會引起國家的混亂。第三個結論：孔子的上述觀點導致了人心墮落，也抹煞了中國學者的智慧，將它們的智慧局限於可見可觸的領域。第四個結論：由於同樣原因，中國學者陷入了最嚴重的邪惡，即無神論之中。就我個人而言，我認為古代的中國哲學家也都是無神論者。”¹⁸

利安當在《論中國傳教事業的幾個問題》中和龍華民持一樣的觀點，而且他的文章寫於禮儀之爭之中，因此許多處是直接針對耶穌會的相關文獻的，例如衛匡國給教宗的報告，殷鐸澤的《中國的智慧》一書等。他說：“1656年衛匡國神父在向羅馬方面做報告時說，中國祭孔活動中沒有祭司或是偶像崇拜巫師的介入，也沒有任何偶像崇拜者宣導的內容。而僅僅是學者和哲學家集合在一起，不帶任何其他目的，按照他們的學派通過純粹世俗的政治儀式表達他們對老師孔子的尊敬之情。”他根據自己在山東傳教的實踐，認為“中國人通過類似的祭祀祈求天、地、祖先等神靈。然而，即使這種崇拜當時僅僅是世俗性的，依然可能因為2000多年間的道德敗壞和新入風俗，在實踐中卻退化成迷信和偶像崇拜。”這樣他通過自己的考察，得出明確的結論：“由此我們可以很容易地得出以下結論：孔子以及古今所有的中國人都不曾對真神上帝Dieu有任何認知，他們所知道的都是諸多偽神。他們之所以祭拜這些鬼神，僅僅是為了得到他們的恩惠。官員和平民全都祭祀自己的祖先。中國人根據自己的不同地位分別將這些鬼神中的不同個體視為自己的保護神。每個家族的保護者都是他們的先祖。而孔子則是中國一切學者的保護神與捍衛者。很顯然，中國人相信這些祭禮都是正確的、虔誠的，

15 利瑪竇 譯，《中國傳教史》，85-87頁。

16 利瑪竇 譯，《中國傳教史》，25頁。

17 龍華民 譯，《論中國宗教的幾個問題》(Traité sur quelques points de la religion des chinois)，法文原文載Wenchao Li 李文潮 und Hans Poser所編的“Discours sur la theologie naturelle des chinois”一書，在此感謝李文潮先生所贈送此書和楊紫煙所提供的抽樣本。

18 龍華民 譯，《論中國宗教的幾個問題》。

都是對他們死去親人的宗教禮儀。因此，在他們看來這種崇拜完全是宗教性而非純世俗性、政治性的行為。”¹⁹

當我們瞭解到龍華民和利安當的這些論述後，我們才會理解柏應理在前言中所展開的論述。

柏應理首先肯定利瑪竇的傳教策略，這種策略猶如聖保祿在西方傳教時的策略是極其相似的。這就是他所說的：“利瑪竇謹記自己是個外國人，在這些中國人眼中，是個野蠻人。他謹記他所要推廣的宗教信仰在這裡是聞所未聞的，而且是從一個陌生的國度帶來的。確實，任何外來的名字都被輕視，或任何新鮮事物都被懷疑擾亂公共秩序，有些東西在一個如此堅持他們祖先的法律和習俗的政治國家總是不受歡迎的。另一方面，如果統治者的高官和顧問們主張，除他們自己的文人教派外的每一個宗教和教派，都必須永遠徹底廢除，那麼所有的統治者就會用劍與火來暴力反對這些教派的追隨者們——這些教派曾因一些皇帝的迷信而得以大力發展和加強。那麼，有一位人一神，他被釘在十字架上，這樣的訊息如此新奇，與這個溫和而傲慢的民族性……因此現在，如果我們要效仿聖保祿——當他在阿雷奧帕古斯傳道時，他毫不猶豫地從詩人們晦澀的作品中繪出一縷黎明的曙光，那麼同樣，讓我們從中國哲學更古老的記載中為那喜悅的黎明和正義的太陽[即基督]尋找一線曙光吧。確實足以看出他們的古籍如此豐富。似乎，書籍離真理的起源越遠，他們越能清晰和透徹地討論真理。如此相悖，那麼難以相信，還能抱什麼希望呢？”

在對待中國文化的態度上，柏應理繼承利瑪竇的將原儒與後儒相區別的做法，認為在中國文化的源頭，儒耶是相通的。“瑪竇希望通過新的熱情和努力，與這些擁有最高榮譽的博士們一起，與這些支持者和領導者一起，去更徹底地探索一切，去接近中國學說的源泉。”

由此，他不同意龍華民和利安當對利瑪竇的批評，在中國用“上帝”這是一個悠久的傳統。“因此，不是一個不分青紅皂白的誹謗、或者孩子的一個錯誤、或者別人歪曲的解釋的錯誤、或者因為時間流逝的濫用，就可以阻止信仰的使者使用‘上帝’這個古老的名稱。”這樣，在他的前言中結論是十分清楚的，毫不含糊的，這就是他所說的：“從大洪水時代開始——不管你用《七十子聖經》或《通俗本聖經》，中國的先民就已經認識到真神，並且以‘上帝’即‘至上的皇帝’，或者‘天’來命名。”“儒家的敬拜和禮節無疑是民間性的。”

從這裡我們看到柏應理的《前言》的論戰性是很強的，其耶穌會的立場也很鮮明。

如何看待在《中國哲學家孔子》一書中所表現出來的爭論，或者更為直接地說，如何看待當年的禮儀之爭。如果我們站在一個多元文化的立場，從跨文化的角度來重新審視這場爭論，筆者認為，

19 利安當，楊紫煙譯，《論中國傳教事業的幾個問題》。法文原文載Wenchao Li 李文潮und Hans Poser所編的 *Discours sur la theologie naturelle des chinois* 一書。

多明我會和方濟各會等托鉢修會基本是基督教原教旨主義者，缺乏文化之間的理解。但他們在兩點上是有價值的：其一，他們揭示出了中國文化的多維度特點，特別是看到了大傳統與小傳統的不同形態，儘管他們無法從中國文化的本質特點上把握這兩種傳統的內在聯繫。其二，他們揭示了中國文化在其本質形態上和基督教文明的區別。在一定的意義上法國漢學家謝和耐說得不錯，這場爭論“揭示了兩種倫理世界的基本差異”。²⁰

利瑪竇所代表的耶穌會路線代表了“求同存異”的跨文化立場，儘管在思想的本質上利瑪竇仍是為了“中華歸主”這個目標（從宗教學上這也無可指責），但他也在尋求兩種文化的共同點。基於這樣的跨文化立場，以利瑪竇為代表的耶穌會開啟了中國文明和歐洲文明首次精神上的對話。當然，從理論的角度，利瑪竇所採取的合原儒批新儒的辦法並未從根本上解決兩大文化的分歧，而且這個立場實際上是一個隱蔽的索隱派立場，後來以白晉為代表的索隱派從根源上可以追溯到利瑪竇那裡。

以利瑪竇為代表的基督教來華已經有了四百年的歷史，這段歷史已經從實踐上給予禮儀之爭一個裁判。

第一，不因中西兩種文化在哲學、宗教上的基本原則的差異就從根本否認中西文化會通的可能性。利瑪竇開啟的中西文化會通已經成為現實，中國基督教現實存在的四百年就足以回答這個問題。四百年的歷史說明，基督教可以成為中國現存文化的一支，或者說成為一種“亞文化”或“邊緣文化”，但始終未成為中國文化的主流，也不可能達到佛教在中國的歷史地位。

第二，在一個沒有人格神的中國文化系統中，像多明我會和方濟各會那樣，希望原汁原味地將西方基督教的理論與實踐搬到中國是不可能的。同樣，無論是耶穌會還是其他托鉢修會，試圖用基督教的歷史觀來解釋中國的歷史，將中國歷史納入聖經歷史之中的想法都是基督教一元史觀的表現，這已經證明是錯誤的。對中國知識份子的基督信仰來說，無論是明末的“三大柱石”還是近代著名的教內知識份子，從馬相伯到于斌，他們總是將基督教的思想與中國傳統思想相融合。

第三，我們必須承認入華傳教士們實踐着一項非常艱巨的事業，他們是人類文化交流史上第一批試圖打通中西文化的先行者，他們真正的價值恐怕在於第一次如此深刻地觸及到中西文化的內核。他們留給我們的困境就是他們的貢獻。

第四，《中國哲學家孔子》的基本內容。這本書有導言部分和《大學》(Liber Primus)、《中庸》(Liber Secundus)、《論語》(Liber Tertius)三部書的拉丁文全譯本以及一些附錄組成。導言部分由柏應理所寫的致法王路易十四的一封信《致最信奉基督的國王——偉大的路易十四的書信》和分別由殷鐸澤和柏應理所寫的兩部分的導言。²¹ 殷鐸澤的序言主要介紹了中國的儒家、道教、佛教以及宋明理

20 Rule Paul, *K'ung-tzu or Confucius? The Jesuit Interpretation of Confucianism*.

21 孟德衛認為“序言性說明(Proëmialis Declaratio)，署名是柏應理，但顯然不是完

學所重視的《易經》，對他們將翻譯的《四書》從思想文化上做了總體性的介紹和鋪墊，從而使歐洲學者來理解這本書。序言的第二部分是柏應理所寫的，這一部分明顯的帶有回應“禮儀之爭”的特色，從西方的基督教世界觀出發，來解釋中華文明的合理性以及它和基督教文明之間的關係，說明中國古代文明與基督教文明的一致性，無論是從歷史上還是從人種上都是如此，以此來向西方社會證明在中國傳教的價值和意義。他特別對耶穌會所採取的合儒路線給予了充分的說明。從這一部分的論述中，我們可以看到原來在利瑪竇那裡隱含着的索隱派思想，在這裡已經完全彰顯出來，中國文明成為基督教文明的一個自然延續。關於中國文明的起源是當時來華的耶穌會士很難加以解釋的一個核心問題，柏應理的解釋，顯然是面對歐洲的聽眾來說的。《大學》、《中庸》、《論語》的翻譯之後是殷鐸澤所作《孔子傳》(Confucii Vita)，這裡最引人注意的就是在第一頁的一幅孔子像。在這個畫中孔子身著中國古代傳統服裝，手中拿一牌。畫像的背景綜合了孔廟和西方圖書館的風格。孔子身後的兩側是排滿了中國經典的書架。左側的第一排從上至下寫明《書經》、《春秋》、《大學》、《中庸》和《論語》；右側從上至下依次是《禮記》、《易經》、《繫辭》、《詩經》和《孟子》。書架最底層是孔子門徒的牌位，左右各九人。左側從外向內依次可辨是“曾子、孟子、子貢、子張、閔子虔”等等；右側是“顏回、子思、子路”等等。孔子身後的廟宇式的門上寫著“國學”(應該來自“國子學”或“國子監”)二字，下方寫著“仲尼”二字，右側和左側的字連起來是“天下先師”。這是畫給歐洲人看的孔子。“孔子站在一座糅合了孔廟和圖書館特徵的建築前，顯得比實際比例要大。雖然孔子的形象描繪得令人肅然起敬，但肖像和匾牌的背景可能讓歐洲讀者感到吃驚，因為看起來不像一座廟，倒像一座圖書館，書架上排滿了書，雖然圖書陳列的方式是歐式的，並不是17世紀中國式的。



《孔子傳》後是柏應理所作的《中華君主統治歷史年表》(Tabula Chronologica Monarchiae Sinicae)這是繼衛匡國後，在西方出版的第二份中國年表，是一份在歐洲產生重要影響的中國歷史年表，這個年表的編制同樣是為了說明“禮儀之爭”的耶穌會的路線，關於這點學界也得到了很好的研究進展，這裡將不做展開。²² 書的最後是《中華帝國及其大事紀》(Imperii Sinarum et Rerum in Eo Notabilium Synopsis)，並附柏應理繪製的中國地圖。²³

全由他一個人完成的。龍伯格先生對巴黎國家圖書館中《中國哲學家孔子》的原稿進行了研究，發現序言中有兩個人的不同筆跡，後半部分很可能是伯應理的筆跡。”《奇異的國度：耶穌會適應政策及漢學的興起》，282頁。梅謙立認為，“《前言》包括兩個部分，第一部分主要由殷鐸澤寫成。在利瑪竇的《論耶穌會與基督宗傳入中國》第一卷第十章的基礎上，殷鐸澤更細緻、更系統地描述了中國的三個教派(儒釋道)。第二部分主要由柏應理寫成，他提供了宏大的歷史敘述，說明了中國與全人類歷史的關係。”見梅謙立、汪聶才、陳崗、齊飛智等譯《〈中國哲學家孔子〉前言》抽樣本，在此感謝梅謙立教授所提供給我的翻譯抽樣本，參閱梅謙立英文著作，Thierry Meynard S.J. *Confucius Sinarum Philosophus* (1687): *The First Translation of the Confucian Classics*.

22 參閱吳荊華，《當諾亞方舟遭遇伏羲神農：啟蒙時代歐洲的中國上古史爭論》。

23 參閱羅瑩，《〈中國哲學家孔子〉成書過程芻議》。

四、《中國哲學家孔子》的世界文化史意義

儘管在《中國哲學家孔子》以前已經有來華耶穌會士翻譯了部分儒家經典在歐洲出版，如羅明堅對《大學》片段的翻譯，但“《中國哲學家孔子》是耶穌會適應政策下產生的最高學術成果”。今天如果從中西文化交流史的角度來重新審視這本書，它是一本具有世界文化史意義的重要著作。

首先，這本書深深地捲入了歐洲近代思想的變遷之中，它“是1600-1700年間耶穌會在文化適應方面最前沿的思想全面展現給歐洲公眾的最後幾個例證之一”。這本書出版後在歐洲所產生的影響，學術界已經做了很深入的研究，這些研究說明：歐洲近代思想的形成並不是在單一的歐洲思想內部產生的，大航海後歐洲人走出了地中海，這不僅是為他們早期的殖民擴張奠定了基礎，也使他們開始接觸歐洲以外的文化，對其影響最大的莫過於中國文化。甚至有些學者說，歐洲人在北美發現的是土地，在東方發現的是文明，一個不亞於歐洲文明，甚至發展程度高於歐洲文明的中國文明。正是通過耶穌會士的一系列漢學著作，使中國文明的內在精神性價值展現現在歐洲人面前。²⁴

“中國對於這個時代歐洲的思想、政治和科學思想的變化絕非置身事外。中國的政治制度、經濟、占統治地位的哲學觀念及其技術的例證強有力地影響了歐洲，向它提供了一種寶貴的貢獻。”《中國哲學家孔子》、《耶穌會士中國書簡集》為代表的這些早期傳教士漢學的翻譯和著作“在整整一個世紀間吸引了知識界，不僅僅向他們提供了一些具有異國情調的冒險活動，而且還提供了一種形象和思想庫。歐洲發現了它不是世界的中心……耶穌會士書簡就如同其他許多遊記一樣，廣泛地推動了舊制度的崩潰，在西方那已處於危機的思想中發展了相對的意義。”²⁵

其次，這本書標誌着由此而激化的中國禮儀之爭，也成為中國近代歷史上的一個重要事件。長期以來，學術界都認為禮儀之爭在本質上是一個歐洲文化史的事件，但應看到，禮儀之爭同時也是一個中國歷史重大事件。這個事件表明從晚明開始，中國已經捲入第一輪的全球化歷程，對中國歷史思想的研究已經不能單純局限在中國本身來展開，禮儀之爭就是中國從思想上捲入世界文化歷史的一個轉捩點。李天剛說得好：“‘中國禮儀之爭’是近代中西關係史上首次高級別的衝突。另外，它是中西雙方的第一次也是最後一次單純的文化衝突。”

最後，這本書是歐洲歷史上第一次最為系統的對儒家經典的翻譯，它標誌著對儒家思想的解釋已經開始在更廣闊的範圍內展開。

24 有學者認為：“三百年間，歐洲先後出現了三種中國‘知識型’，首先是表述財富與君權的‘大汗的大陸’，然後是表述制度與文明的‘大中華帝國’，最後是表述思想與文化價值的‘孔夫子的中國’”，參閱周甯《歐洲形成中的亞洲》總譯序，這個劃分過於簡單化了，因為第二階段和第三個階段在時間上是不可以分開的，但這個觀點至少有一點是正確的，它揭示了《中國哲學家孔子》對歐洲中國認識的思想和歷史意義。

25 關於這方面，我在文章《中國古代文化經典在16-18世紀歐洲的影響》中已展開。

在《中國哲學家孔子·序言》中附有的一個關於孔子的簡介，這是歐洲所知道的最早的一個，也是最為詳細的一個孔子簡介。這樣我們將會看到傳教士們對儒家經典著作的翻譯和理解，以及中國本土思想和歐洲哲學宗教思想的交流與碰觸。可以說，《中國哲學家孔子》拉開了在世界範圍內展開中國思想翻譯與研究的序幕，以後的衛方濟(Francois Noel)、馬禮遜(Robert Morrison)、理雅格(James Legge)、衛禮賢(Richard Wilhelm)等儒家翻譯的漢學家都是由此開始自己的翻譯事業的。從這個角度看，這本書在中國典籍外譯歷史上具有奠基性的意義和價值。

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The Groundbreaking Book in the Dissemination of Confucianism to Europe, *Chinese Philosopher Confucius*

ZHANG Xiping

Abstract

The *Chinese Philosopher Confucius* was a groundbreaking book in Confucianism's dissemination to Europe. This article presents research on the background and contents of the book, concluding that this great work largely emerged from the Chinese Rites Controversy in the 17th and 18th centuries, and was particularly influenced by the Jesuit argument that these Chinese rites were secular rituals that were compatible with Christianity, within certain limits, and should thus be tolerated. At the same time, the publishing of this book marked the first time in history that Confucianism from Eastern Asia became available to European philosophers, and its publication and distribution properly marks the beginning of the influence Confucianism exerted on modern European ideology, as well as an important moment in the development of Confucianism's worldwide influence.

Keywords: Confucius, Confucianism, the Chinese Rite controversy, *Four Books*, the Jesuits.

Regulations of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

I. General Regulations

1. (Name) The official name for the institute is “Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture” (ICPC, hereafter), which is an organization that belongs to the Academy of East Asian Studies (AEAS, hereafter) at Sungkyunkwan University.
2. (Objective) ICPC primarily conducts research mainly in the field of Confucian thought. It also covers general Confucian culture, as well as its development and modernization, in an attempt to guide fundamental principles for humanity in a rapidly developing society.

II. Organization

3. (Constitution) ICPC is constituted of the following: 1) the director, 2) the management committee, and 3) an editorial board.
4. (Director)
 - 1) The director must be a full-time professor of Sungkyunkwan University, with a specialization that conforms to the objective outlined in article I of this document. The director must be nominated by the university president and appointed by the chairman of the board.
 - 2) The director, representing ICPC, controls the general affairs of ICPC.
 - 3) The basic term for the director is 2 years, which is extendable.
5. (Assistant Director)
 - 1) The director may appoint (an) assistant director(s) to assist director’s various tasks.
 - 2) Assistant director(s) must be a research member of ICPC, nominated by the director of ICPC and appointed by the director of AEAS.
 - 3) The basic term for the assistant director is 2 years, which is extendable.
6. (Office)
 - 1) ICPC may assign (an) office(s) according to different research area.
 - 2) The head of the office must hold a position equivalent to or greater than that of a research professor. The head must be nominated by the director of ICPC, approved by the management committee, and appointed by the director of AEAS.

III. Management Committee

7. (Constitution)

- 1) ICPC may establish a management committee, in order to discuss and make important decisions regarding general management.
- 2) The management committee shall be no larger than 10 persons. The director will serve as the head of the management committee.
- 3) Members of the management committee must be research members of the ICPC, nominated by the director and appointed by the director of AEAS.

8. (Agenda) The agenda for the management committee includes:

- 1) Establishing basic plans for management and research.
- 2) Declaring and eliminating various rules and regulation.
- 3) Settling the budget and accounts.
- 4) Other relevant management

9. (Call for Meeting)

- 1) The director must call for any meetings of the management committee.
- 2) Meetings are valid only when more than half of all members are present. In order to settle an agenda, more than half of all members present at a meeting must agree to any decision or action.

IV. Editorial Board

10. (Constitution)

- 1) ICPC includes an editorial board which discusses and makes decisions regarding ICPC publications.
- 2) The editorial board includes the editor-in-chief and noted scholars both in Korea and abroad. The editor-in-chief is the director of ICPC.
- 3) Each editorial board must be appointed by the director. The basic term is 2 years.
- 4) Each year, the editorial board will publish the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*. Rules and dates for publication are established separately.

11. (Call for Meeting)

More than half of the editorial board members present at the meeting must agree in order to settle an agenda.

* The above regulations take effect from March 1st, 2000.

The Code of Management for the Editorial Board of the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

I. General Regulations

1. (Objective)

This regulation is established according to article IV-10-4 of the Regulations for The Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (ICPC, hereafter). It comprises the regulatory guidelines for publishing the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*. (JCPC, hereafter).

2. (Mission)

- 1) To supervise publication of JCPC and the related affairs of acceptance, review, editing, and so on.
- 2) To set up rules and regulations for publishing JCPC.

II. Organization of Editorial Board

3. (Constitution)

The editorial board is comprised of editorial advisors, editorial councils, the chief manager (the director), the editor-in-chief, the head of the editing team, and other editing team members.

4. (Appointment of Editorial Advisors and Members)

The director of ICPC appoints editorial advisors and members among noted scholars of highest achievement, both in Korea and abroad.

5. (Terms)

The basic term for editorial board members is 2 years, extendable when necessary. The editor-in-chief is tenured by principle, in order for the journal to maintain its congruity.

6. (Chief Manager)

The director of ICPC is also the chief manger and supervises the editorial board.

7. (Editor-in-chief)

The editor-in-chief is appointed by the director of ICPC and is responsible for all editorial issues.

8. (Head of Editing Team, Editing Team)

The head of the editing team and the editing team's other members are appointed by the director of ICPC. The head of the editing team is responsible for general issues concerning editing, and the assistant head is responsible for assisting with related editorial matters.

III. Publication of JCPC

9. (Numbers and Dates of Publication)

JCPC is published twice in a year: on August 31 and February 28.

10. (Circulation)

The size of circulation for JCPC is determined by the editorial board.

11. (Size)

The standard size for JCPC is 176mm x 248mm.

12. (Editorial System)

- 1) Academic articles written in either Chinese or English.
- 2) Academic articles includes: title, abstract, keywords, contents, bibliography, an abstract written in Chinese or English, keywords written in Chinese or English.
- 3) The English title and name of the author must be specified.
- 4) The affiliation of the author must be specified.
- 5) Regulations, bulletins, and material other than academic articles may be included according to the decision of the editorial board.

IV. Submission of Articles and Management

13. (Subject and Character of the Submitted Article)

The subject of article includes

- 1) Confucian thought and culture in Korea and abroad.
- 2) Reviews on books, translations, or research articles on related subjects published in Korea or abroad. It may include dissertations.
- 3) Critical reviews on academic trends, mainly in the arts and humanities, related to Confucianism and East Asian studies.

No certain qualification for submission is required.

14. (Number of Words)

- 1) The number of words for each article is limited to 10000 words for Chinese, 6000 words for English, including abstract, footnotes, bibliography, etc. Reviews are limited to 4000 words for Chinese, and 2500 words for English.
- 2) The number of words permitted for material other than academic articles and reviews are to be determined by the editorial board.

15. (Submission Guidelines)

- 1) A general call for papers is always extended, but only articles submitted at least 3 months prior to the publication date are subjected to the review process for a specific issue.
- 2) Digital texts must be submitted for articles written in Chinese or English.
- 3) Abstracts in Chinese or English must include 5 or more keywords.
- 4) If written jointly, the first (main) author and the second (joint) author,

as well as their respective name, affiliation, area of research, part(s) of writing, must be noted.

- 5) E-mail address(es) and phone number(es) must be provided for all authors.

16. (Control of Submitted Articles)

- 1) Submitted articles are, as they arrive, subject to a controlled process.
- 2) Submitted articles are not returned, and copyright for published articles belongs to ICPC.

V. Reviewing Submitted Articles

17. (Obligation to Review)

All published articles must pass the reviewing process.

18. (Regulations for Reviewing Board)

- 1) For each submitted article, the editorial board will select 3 reviewers and commission them to evaluate the article. At least two of the reviewers must agree in order for the article to be published.
- 2) In principle, the board of reviewers must maintain a just and fair attitude, and should not review articles written by scholars with whom they are personally affiliated.
- 3) For the sake of fairness, the review process will remain anonymous.

19. (Standard of Review)

- 1) Articles will be reviewed for basic format (20%), originality (20%), clarity of subject (20%), logic (20%), and congruity (20%)
- 2) The result will divide the articles into two groups: publishable and not publishable.
- 3) Articles evaluated as not publishable cannot be re-submitted with the same title.

20. (Feedback time)

Reviewers must submit their feedback on each article to the editorial board within two week from it being assigned to them.

21. (Reporting Back the Result)

The editorial board must report back to the author(s) as soon as the results of the reviewing process have been received.

VI. Revision of Regulations

22. (Principle)

This code of management is subject to change when 2/3 of the editorial board agrees, provided that more than half of the editorial board's members are present at the time of voting.

*** Other Regulations**

23. (Others)

- 1) Other issues not written in this code will be treated following customary practices.
- 2) The above regulations take effect from December 20th, 2006.
- 3) The editorial board will determine and deal with all other details concerning the above regulations.

The Code of Ethics and Management for the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

I. General Regulations

1. (Objective) This regulation is established in order to define the ethical principles and standard of management of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (ICPC, hereafter).
2. (Application) This regulation is applied to prevent any unjust act within academic agenda of ICPC, and to provide a framework for systematic investigation, management, and resolution if an unjust actions occur. At the same time, it is geared toward protecting the creativity of academic research and strengthening an ethical spirit within academia.

II. Research Ethics

3. (Ethical Code for Authors)
 - 1) All authors who submit their articles to the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (JCPC, hereafter) must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) All research outcomes that are mainly based on faked or fraudulent research or upon already published work without providing any new insight are regarded as forged.
 - 3) Any close imitation of another author's ideas and arguments without giving explicit and objective credit to that author is regarded as plagiarism.
 - 4) Submission of one's own work that has already been presented and published elsewhere as the first research outcome is regarded as duplication or self-plagiarism.
 - 5) Sponsored articles must follow the regulations of the sponsor before submission.
 - 6) Authors must take full responsibility for their presented articles.
 - 7) Co-authors must make it clear which parts of the essay each author has contributed to, and take responsibility for those parts of the essay.
4. (Ethical Code for the Editorial Board)
 - 1) The editorial board members of JCPC must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) Editorial board members must participate in editorial meetings and assume responsibility for receiving articles, the election of reviewers, and the selection of articles for publication,

- 3) Editorial board members must be silent about any personal information of all authors submitting articles. Otherwise, it will be regarded as a misuse of their rights.
 - 4) Editorial board members must strictly follow regulations in confirming submissions and selecting reviewers, etc., lest it should arouse any conflict between reviewers and general board members.
 - 5) If any doubt or questions concerning ethical matters arise, the editorial board must immediately call for an investigation by the ethics committee.
5. (Ethical Code for the Reviewing Committee)
- 1) Members of reviewing committee of JCPC must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) Reviewers must follow the established regulations for providing an objective and fair review of the submitted article, and provide their honest feedback to the editorial board. If a reviewer feels that they cannot review an article assigned to them for an objective reason, they must promptly notify the editorial board.
 - 3) Reviewers must rely on academic standards and their own conscience in reviewing submitted articles. Reviewers cannot reject an article based on their own personal standpoints without sufficient basis, and cannot conclude the review without scrupulously reading the whole article.
 - 4) Reviewers must keep the author's personal information as well as the content of the article confidential throughout the process of review.

III. Establishment and Management of Ethics Committee

6. (Ethics Enforcement)
- This regulation is established according to the general regulation, and is already in effect. The director will decide on establishing specific rules to applying these regulations.
7. (Constitution of Ethics Committee)
- The Ethics Committee is constituted of the director of Ethics Committee, the editor-in-chief, and up to five members of the editorial board. The director of ICPC is also the director of the Ethics Committee
8. (Function of Ethics Committee)
- 1) Upon a suspected violation of the ethical code, the ethics committee will proceed to conduct an investigation and issue a decision, notifying the accused of the opinion of the committee. It will also report the issue to the editorial board.

- 2) When investigating the violation, the ethics committee must secure sufficient evidence and keep the whole process confidential.
9. (Accusation of Violation)
 - 1) An accuser must secure specific evidence when reporting an act of violation. Even if the report turns out to be false, the ethics committee can continue an investigation if other evidence is discovered.
 - 2) The same process of accusation applies to both editorial board members and reviewers.
10. (Investigation and Decision)
 - 1) If accused of violating the ethical code, the accused must comply with the investigation conducted by the ethics committee. Noncompliance is regarded as acknowledging the accused violation.
 - 2) All articles under investigation will be postponed for publication until the investigation has been completed and a report issued to the editorial board. Investigations are to be completed before the next term for publication.
11. (Chance of Defense)

The accused has right to defend their article. Their defense can be made before the general members of the editorial board, if the accused wishes to do so.
12. (Forms of Penalty)

Penalties which the ethics committee can impose include warnings, submission restrictions, and expulsion from membership. Already published articles can be deferred or pulled out completely. Sponsored articles, when used unfairly or warned by the sponsor, may also be subject to penalty.
13. (Revision of Regulations)

Any revisions made to this regulations must follow ICPC's revision principles.
14. (Others)

Regulations not written in the above will follow customary practices.

*** Other Regulations**

This regulation is established according to the article 21 of ICPC. It is agreed by the editorial board (Oct. 20th, 2007), and is in force since Jan. 1st, 2008.

Submission Requirements for Contributors

I. Submission

1. Manuscripts should be done in docx file and are to be submitted as an email attachment to jicpc@skku.edu.
2. Type in "Author's Contact Information" on top of the title of your manuscript, which includes your academic title, affiliation, e-mail address, telephone number(s), and mailing address.
3. On the first page of the body text, make an abstract of about 300 words (including 5 key words or more)
4. Unless specially invited, a length of each manuscript (including footnotes) should not exceed 10,000 words. (font: Times New Roman, font size: 12 pt., line space: double).

II. Style Guidelines

1. In general, we follow the editorial guidelines established in the 16th edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Please consult the online information of it at www.chicagomanualofstyle.org.
2. The citation style required by the Journal is short references in footnotes and complete citation data in the REFERENCES section. Short references contain only the author's last name, title of work (shortened if necessary), and page number(s) as in the following example: (Fingarette, *Confucius*, 15-16).
3. Imagine that the readers of your article have little understanding of Asian philosophical and cultural background. Provide explanations for technical terms as well as any words or concepts which are essential to a clear understanding of your article.
4. When romanizing Chinese terms, use pinyin or Wade-Giles systems.
 4. 1. Terms in Korean should be romanized according to the romanization system established in 2000 by the Korean government. For Japanese terms, follow the Hepburn romanization system.
5. When historic figure(s) and state(s) are first mentioned, provide their dates in parenthesis as follows: Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), Han 漢 (206 b.c.e-220 c.e.).
6. When you quote a passage in pre-modern Chinese texts, put the English translation in the body and the original Chinese text in the footnote.

* For a more detailed submission guideline, please contact at jicpc@skku.edu

儒教文化研究所章程

第一章 總則

第一條（名稱）本研究所的正式名稱爲“儒教文化研究所”（以下簡稱“研究所”），是成均館大學東亞學術院的下設機關。

第二條（目的）本研究所以研究儒學思想爲主，同時兼顧整個東亞的儒學文化研究，並對儒學的傳統進行現代化的解釋和發展，使之成爲指引人類發展的基本理念。

第二章 組織

第三條（機構）研究所的機構如下設置：1. 所長，2. 運營委員會，3. 編輯委員會。

第四條（所長）

1. 所長必須由與第一章規定中的目的相符合的專業的本校教授擔任，由學校校長提請理事長任命。
2. 所長代表研究所，總體掌管研究所的事務。
3. 所長的任期爲2年，可以連任。

第五條（部長）

1. 爲了輔佐所長，並分擔所長的一部分業務，所長下面可以設置部長。
2. 部長由研究委員中產生，所長提請學術院院長任命。
3. 任期爲2年，可以連任。

第六條（研究室）

1. 研究所可以根據研究領域的不同而設置研究室。
2. 研究室長由研究教授以上的人擔任，須經運營委員會的審議通過，再由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第三章 運營委員會

第七條（構成）

1. 爲了便於審議和決定與研究所運營相關聯的重要事項，研究所可以設置運營委員會。

2. 運營委員會由所長和10人以內的委員構成，委員長是所長。
3. 委員由研究所的研究委員中產生，由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第八條（審議事項）運營委員會主要審議以下事項：

1. 基本運營計劃的確立以及與研究計劃相關的事項。
2. 研究所諸規定的制定與廢除問題。
3. 預算以及結算等諸問題。
4. 其他與研究所運營相關的事項。

第九條（會議）

1. 會議由委員長召集。
2. 會議要有在職委員過半數以上的出席才可以召開，出席委員過半數同意才可以決議。

第四章 編輯委員會

第十條（構成）

1. 爲了審議決定研究所刊行的出版物的編輯事宜，故設立編輯委員會。
2. 編輯委員會由委員長和國內外的知名學者構成，委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員由所長任命，任期2年。
4. 編輯委員會每年刊行《儒教文化研究》，論文的刊行原則以及刊行日期等規定另外制定。

第十一條（會議）編輯委員會會議要有出席編輯委員的過半數同意才可以決議。

附則（施行日）本規定自2000年3月1日起施行。

《儒教文化研究》編輯委員會運營章程

第一章 總則

第一條（目的）本規定是根據儒教文化研究所文件中第4節編輯委員會（以下簡稱委員會）第27條第1項研究所刊行物的出版條目中《儒教文化研究》的相關規定而制定的。

第二條（任務）

1. 主管《儒教文化研究》的發刊和相關論文的策劃、接收、評審、編輯等工作。
2. 制定與《儒教文化研究》的發刊相關聯的一系列規定。

第二章 編輯委員會構成

第三條（構成）委員會由編輯顧問、編輯委員、主任（委員長）、主編、編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯構成。

第四條（編輯顧問和委員的選任）編輯顧問和編輯委員由儒教文化研究所所長在世界各國中有卓越研究業績的權威學者中選擇並任命。

第五條（委員的任期）委員任期為2年，必要時可以連任。但為了保證學術雜誌的長期穩定性，主編原則是連任的。

第六條（主任）主任（委員長）由儒教文化研究所長兼任，主管編輯委員會。

第七條（主編）主編由研究所所長任命，總體負責所有的編輯事務。

第八條（編輯部主任、編輯）編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯由研究所所長任命。編輯部主任全面負責編輯事務，編輯輔助室長處理相關的編輯事務。

第三章 《儒教文化研究》的發刊

第七條（發行的次數和日期）《儒教文化研究》每年刊行兩次，出版日期為8月31日和2月28日。

第八條（發行數量）《儒教文化研究》的發行數量由委員會決定。

第九條（開本）實行176mm×248mm開本。

第十條（編輯體制）

1. 學術論文使用中文或英文制作。
2. 學術論文的編輯順序原則上分爲論文題目、提要、關鍵詞、正文、參考文獻、中英文抄錄、中英文關鍵詞。
3. 必須注明學術論文的英文題目和作者姓名。
4. 必須注明作者的所屬單位、職務和具體的聯系方式。
5. 學術論文以外的各種文章以及會則、會報的刊載與否由委員會決定。

第四章 論文的投稿和管理

第十一條（投稿論文主題和資格）

1. 投稿範圍是以儒學思想爲中心的世界各國的儒學文化。
2. 對國內外刊行的相關儒學著作、翻譯著作以及研究類刊物的書評。
3. 對國內外的儒學和東亞學等人文科學類相關論文（包括學位論文）的論評和研究動向。
4. 不限論文投稿資格。

第十二條（原稿字數）

1. 一般情況下按照中英文10000字/6000words 左右（包括腳注、參考文獻、抄錄等），書評4000字/2500words 左右的標準。
2. 論文和書評以外的原稿字數由委員會決定。

第十三條（論文投稿要領）

1. 隨時可以提交論文，但以本刊出版前3個月到達的論文作爲該版的審查對象。
2. 論文使用中文或英文格式，投稿時須提交電子版。
3. 中英文的抄錄需各附5個以上的關鍵詞。
4. 如果是共同研究的論文，需要分別標出責任研究員和共同研究員，並且須分別注明姓名和所屬單位、研究領域、執筆範圍和分擔的領域。
5. 來稿須注明作者的電子郵件地址以及聯絡電話。

第十四條（投稿論文的管理）

1. 投稿論文按照來稿順序，建立文檔進行統一有序的管理。
2. 來稿論文概不退還，所刊載論文的著作權歸研究所。

第五章 投稿論文的審查

第十五條（審查義務）刊載的論文必須經過審查。

第十六條（審查委員規定）

1. 對於投稿的每篇論文，編輯委員會將選定3名評審委員，並委託給他們評審。論文必須經過審查委員2/3以上的贊成才可刊登。
2. 原則上，審查委員應堅持公正、公平的作風。而且不得審查與自己同一單位的投稿者的文章。
3. 爲了審查的公正性，審查全部採取匿名制。

第十七條（審查標準）

1. 審查按照基本格式（20%）、獨創性（20%）、主題明確性（20%）、邏輯性（20%）、完整性（20%）來進行綜合評定。
2. 審查結果分爲刊載可、否兩類。
3. 被評爲不可刊載的論文，不得再以同一題目向本會投稿。

第十八條（審查結果報告） 審查委員從收到評審論文之日起，應於2周內將審查結果報告給委員會。

第十九條（審查結果通告） 委員會收到審查結果報告書後，須立即告知投稿者。

第二十條（稿費支付） 對於刊載文章，支付給作者一定的稿費。

第六章 章程的修訂

第二十一條（原則） 本章程的修訂要有過半數編輯委員參加，並且經參加人員2/3以上的同意方可實行。

附 則

第二十二條（其他）

1. 以上沒有列入章程的事宜按照慣例處理。
2. 本規定自2006年12月20日起生效並施行。
3. 本規定在施行過程中發生的詳細事項由委員會來決定並處理。

《儒教文化研究》研究倫理及運營規定

第一章 總則

第一條（目的）本規定的目的在於闡明儒教文化研究所（以下簡稱“本研究所”）學術研究活動的研究倫理和運營基準。

第二條（作用）本規定的作用在於抵制研究活動中的不正當行為，以及不正當行為發生後體系性的追查，並且保護有創意性的學術研究，提高學問的倫理性。

第二章 研究倫理

第三條（作者倫理）

1. 凡是向本研究所刊行的《儒教文化研究》投稿的作者都應該遵守運營規定。
2. 虛造研究成果或將以前的研究成果刪改變用的一律視為偽造、編造。
3. 對他人的觀點或主張缺乏客觀分析而直接拿來用作自己的觀點時，一律視為剽竊。
4. 將自己已經發表的研究成果拿來用作首次發表，此種行為視為重複刊載或自我剽竊。
5. 受研究經費資助的論文只有遵守資助單位的管理規定才可投稿。
6. 對於自己正式發表的論文，作者要負全面責任。
7. 共同研究的情況要注明每個人分擔的部分，以此來各負責任。

第四條（編輯委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的編輯委員應該遵守運營規定。
2. 編輯委員要積極參與編輯會議，要對論文的接收、選定評委以及刊載與否負責任。
3. 編輯委員對於投稿者的個人信息要保密，不得利用私權。
4. 編輯委員要嚴格按照既定的標準來確認論文的投稿以及評審情況等，注意不要引發審評者以及一般會員間的是非。
5. 編輯委員會一旦發現研究倫理上的問題要立即通報倫理委員會。

第五條（審查委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的論文審查委員應該遵守審查規定。
2. 審查委員要根據所定的審查規定來對投稿論文進行客觀、公正的審查，並將審查結果通報給編輯委員會。若自己因客觀情況不能審

查，則應及時通報編輯委員會。

3. 審查委員要根據學者的良心和學問的客觀基準來審查論文。在缺乏充分根據的情況下，不能一味的依據自己的學術觀點來判定“不可刊載”，也不能不仔細通讀全文就擅作審查。
4. 審查委員對於審查過程中所知道的作者的個人情況要進行保密，不能私自公開或利用審查論文的内容。

第三章 倫理委員會設置以及運營

第六條（倫理規定的遵守）本規定依據本會的會則制定，一經施行，立即生效。只是與此相適應的施行細則由委員長決定。

第七條（倫理委員會的構成）倫理委員會由所長、主編和編輯委員（5人左右）組成，所長兼任委員長。

第八條（倫理委員會的職能）

1. 對於違反本規定的行為，倫理委員會要進行調查和議決，並將相關意見通告給當事人，然後報告給編輯委員會。
2. 在審議違反規定的行為時，要確保能夠充分掌握證據並對事情的經過保密，不到最後時刻不能公開審議意見。

第九條（違反倫理規定行為的揭發）

1. 若有違反倫理規定的事實，揭發者可以持具體的事實證據向倫理委員會揭發。若揭發的事實是虛偽的，倫理委員會可以繼續維持決議。
2. 編輯委員或審查委員在評審過程中若發現有違反倫理規定的事實也依據如上方法揭發。

第十條（調查以及審議）

1. 會員若被揭發有違反本研究所倫理規定的行為，則應積極配合倫理委員會的調查，若不配合，其行為則視為違反倫理規定。
2. 對於被揭發的有違反倫理規定的論文，在事實查清以前應采取保留措施。調查審議應在下一期學術期刊發行前結束。

第十一條（解釋的機會）對於被揭發有違反倫理規定實施的會員，要給與其充分的解釋機會。解釋的方式可依據當事者的意願公開。

第十二條（處罰的類型）倫理委員會的處罰類型有警告、限制投稿、解除委任等。對於已經投稿或刊載的論文可以采取保留或撤銷的措施。對於接受研究經費資助的論文，若因不正當的使用而受到資助機關的警告，也屬於處罰對象之列。

第十三條（規定的修改）此規定的修改要遵守本研究所的修改原則。

第十四條（其他）以上規定中沒有涉及的事宜依據慣例處理。

附則

本規定依據本研究所會則第21條制定，並經過編輯委員會（2007年10月20日）的審議，於2008年1月1日起施行。

投稿須知

1. 本刊實行176mm×248mm 開本，來稿一律使用中文（或英文）制作，請提交電子版。中文一律使用繁體，英文按照一般慣例。
2. 論文的格式順序原則上依次分為論文題目、中文提要（300-400字）、中文關鍵詞（5個以上）、正文、參考文獻、英文題目、英文摘要（300 words）、英文關鍵詞（5個以上）等。
3. 作者簡介可置於文章的最後，須注明作者的性別、所屬單位、職務、E-MAIL、聯系地址以及具體的電話聯系方式，以便編輯部聯絡。必要時可附上自己的簡歷。
4. 正文內容請用10.5號字，行間距為1，文章字數以10000字為宜，可以適當的增減。但最好不要超過15000字。
5. 文章的章節可以用“一、二、三……”來表示，若還要細分，則請用“（一）、（二）、（三）……”來表示。章節題目一律左側對齊，使用黑體加粗字體。
6. 文章內提到的一切書籍，都要在正文後的“參考文獻”內注明。參考文獻標記序次如下：作者，《書名》，出版地：出版社，出版年度。
如：楊伯峻，《春秋左傳注》，北京：中華書局，1981。
- 6.1. 需要標記編者或譯者時：作者，〈章節/論文〉，編者/譯者編/譯《書名》，頁碼，出版地：出版社，出版年度。
如：張立文，〈程朱思想的時代精神〉，楊曉塘編《程朱思想新論》，1-8頁，北京：人民出版社，1999。
- 6.2. 引用期刊內容時，請依次注明：作者，文章名，刊物名（包括期數），文章所在頁碼。如：蒙培元，〈儒學是宗教嗎？〉，《孔子研究》，2002年第2期，39-46頁。
7. 文章正文的引用文，採用簡式腳注標記。腳注標記方式如下：作者，論文名稱/書名，引文所在頁碼。
如：楊伯峻，《春秋左傳注》，56頁。
張立文，〈程朱思想的時代精神〉，7頁。
蒙培元，〈儒學是宗教嗎？〉，42頁。
8. 若作者本人有對文章題目、文章內容的解釋性說明，請放在當頁用腳注表示。
9. 來稿一經採用，即付稿酬。不採用的稿件，一律不退，也不奉告評審意見。三個月內未接到採用通知的，作者可自行處理。
10. 本刊對採用的稿件有刪改權，不同意刪改者，請在來稿中申明。
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