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儒教文化研究

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Two Faces of Human Dignity: Mencius and Migrant Workers in East Asia

KIM Myeong-Seok

Abstract

Daniel A. Bell and Nicola Piper have argued that the foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong and Singapore had better not be given equal rights or full citizenship, partly based on the claim that the affective ties analogous to familial love and caring are a more important value than mutual respect between the employer and the employee in the Confucian culture of East Asia. I dispute this claim by providing Confucian arguments emphasizing the importance of respecting other people's dignity in the context of non-familial relationships, while at the same time pointing out the limitations of the Confucian discourse on this matter by discussing the other, less bright dimensions of the Mencian conception of human dignity and respect that could actually be used to support the unequal treatment of migrant workers in East Asia.

Keywords: Mencius, Confucianism, migrant workers, human rights, human dignity, respect

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1. Introduction: Migrant Workers and Human Rights Issues in East Asia

Over the past few decades China has experienced large-scale internal movements of migrant workers, and during the same time East Asia has become a very popular destination for international movements of migrant workers from the other parts of Asia. According to Dorothy Solinger, China's economic liberalization starting in the 1980s led a large number of peasants (estimated to be around sixty million in the mid-1990s)¹ in the countryside to move into the towns and cities to work as drudges.² And, in Japan, during the late 1980s, there was a surge of influx of migrant workers from South, East, and Southeast Asia due to Japan's domestic labor shortages, which were caused by demographic changes not matching a sudden economic boom and a revaluation of the yen. This in turn increased the already considerable gap of income between Japan and other Asian countries.³

However, these migrant workers do not seem to have fared very well in these countries. In China, the "floating population"—the former peasants who had been confined to rural communities for more than two decades by the hereditary household registration system (*hukou* 戶口) and have since the 1980s moved to the cities looking for better jobs and higher earnings—suffered difficulties in getting approval for urban residence and restrictions on acquiring labor permits. Furthermore, those hired by government-owned factories or foreign-funded firms were not effectively protected by trade unions; on the one hand, the unions under the PRC regime were dominated by party officials who were not very keen on protecting the workers' rights, and on the other hand, the foreign companies often neglected the state regulations for the welfare of the laborers altogether. This frequently led to such abuses as sixteen-hour days, no toilet-breaks, kicking, beating, and lock-ins.⁴

¹ According to a more recent study, the rural migrants in China are estimated to be between 120 million and 200 million as of 2008 (see Nielsen and Smyth, *Migration and Social Protection in China*, 3), and they may well be over 300 million now.

² Solinger, "Human Rights Issues in China's Internal Migration," 286 and 296.

³ Solinger, "Human Rights Issues in China's Internal Migration," 293.

⁴ For details, see Solinger, "Human Rights Issues in China's Internal Migration," 295-304. However, more recently there have been some important changes in government policies concerning the issue of social protection of migrant workers in China. For example, the State Council's Document No. 5 (issued in 2006) contains a number of measures for more strictly monitoring the implementation of the minimum wage laws, improving the housing and working conditions for migrants, and giving improved access to urban public services

In Japan, the official policy to outsiders is “to prohibit the entry of the unskilled, and to keep all immigration purely temporary.”⁵ According to Solinger, the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law (1990) is clearly aimed at limiting the inflow of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, there were a number of arrests and forced deportations of illegal residents, and a rotation system was used to reduce the number settling down. Moreover, most of the migrant workers in Japan are residing there illegally, and this makes them vulnerable to various kinds of unfair treatments and abuses from employers, labor brokers, immigration officers, and the police. The Japanese government guarantees all workers rights of social insurance and social security such as medical insurance and accident compensation, but most of the illegal workers do not apply for them fearing arrests and deportation. In addition, it is the general social consensus that the rights to voting, subsistence, education, and work only belong to the citizens.⁶

The situation of the migrant workers in Korea is quite similar to that of these two countries, especially to the case of Japan in many respects. After the 1988 Olympics Korea became one of the major labor-importing countries in Asia, but the Korean government left the issue of migrant labor mostly unattended until when it started the Industrial Trainee System in 1994.⁷ The purpose of this system was mainly to meet the cost-saving needs of the small and medium-sized companies in Korea: foreign unskilled laborers were admitted and assigned to factories to work as “trainees” at low salaries due to their official status as trainees, they were not protected by the Labor

and enlarged social security coverage to the migrants. In addition, in 2007, the National People's Congress passed the Labor Contract and Employment Promotions Law, which requires that employers sign contracts with their workers (including migrants) and that migrant workers be given the same workplace rights as urban workers. See Nielsen and Smyth, *Migration and Social Protection in China*, 4-7. Despite these legal measures and government directives, though, there seems to be little progress on this matter, and discrimination against and exploitation of migrant workers in China still continue to prevail, partly because the central government's policies for labor reforms are not favorably met by the officials and urbanites at local levels. For details, see Davies and Grant, “Righting Wrongs,” 31-48.

⁵ Solinger, “Human Rights Issues in China's Internal Migration,” 293.

⁶ Solinger, “Human Rights Issues in China's Internal Migration,” 293-295. For a more recent study of the structural factors that tend to encourage Vietnamese migrant workers in Japan to breach their contracts and go to the illegal sectors, see Bélanger, et al., “From Foreign Trainees to Unauthorized Workers.”

⁷ A primitive version of this system, the “Trainee System for Overseas Investment Companies,” was started in 1991 following the Japanese footsteps. This system was to train the unskilled workers employed by Korean companies abroad and bring them to Korea for working in small and medium business sectors. See Moon, “Strangers in the Midst of Globalization,” 148-149, cited in Gray, “‘Gyegeup iha-ui gyegeup’-euroseo hanguk-ui iju nodongjadeul,” 102.

Standards Act, not allowed to enroll into the Four Major Insurances (medical insurance, employment insurance, accident compensation, the national pension system), and were denied basic labor rights (such as the rights to make organizations, bargain collectively, and strike). In short, this Industrial Trainee System was an effective means to exploit the migrant workers without acknowledging them to be laborers entitled to a set of rights and benefits.⁸

A great disadvantage to the migrant workers under this system was that they had no freedom to change their employers even when there were troubles or abuses, and this led to a large number of workers fleeing from their worksites and becoming illegal workers. In order to prevent them from fleeing, on the one hand, the employers often relied on such rights-violating means as forcing them to stay in the company dormitories (which was also for the purpose of forcing them to work for longer hours), confiscating passports, withholding salaries, and monitoring against any involvement in labor movement. For those who became illegal residents, on the other hand, the Labor Standards Act was now applicable to them and the pay was slightly better. But they seldom raised their voices in order to improve their working conditions or reported abuses to the government officials, fearing that once their presence was known, they could be arrested and expelled at any time. Ultimately, the Korean government proved their fears to be justified by implementing its three-year rotation system—meant to prevent the migrant workers from settling down permanently—so strictly.⁹

In 2004, the Industrial Trainee System was replaced by the Employment Permit System that included some improvements such as allowing registered workers to change their employers up to three times and enjoy some basic labor rights. However, the workers cannot claim their rights strongly because the employers will not agree to renew their contracts if they make too much trouble from the perspective of the employer. Also, many of these workers tend to overstay their employment permit and become illegal residents vulnerable to the unfair treatments described above. In short, there is still a long way to go before they acquire the full status of laborer and are treated as an integral part of Korean society.¹⁰ The general situation of the migrant workers in East Asia can be summarized as follows: “To get their chance, migrants typically mortgage their human rights. . . . Many countries can’t

⁸ Gray, “‘Gyegeup iha-ui gyegeup’-euroseo hanguk-ui iju nodongjadeul,” 102.

⁹ Gray, “‘Gyegeup iha-ui gyegeup’-euroseo hanguk-ui iju nodongjadeul,” 103-106.

¹⁰ Gray, “‘Gyegeup iha-ui gyegeup’-euroseo hanguk-ui iju nodongjadeul,” 112-114.

live without foreign workers—but don't want to live with them. The message to unskilled migrants is almost always: get the job done and get lost; citizenship is out of the question.”¹¹

To give a preview of the rest of the essay in advance, in Section 2 below I focus on the case of female migrant workers in Hong Kong and Singapore and critically examine Daniel A. Bell and Nicola Piper's claim that the migrant workers in these countries had better not be given equal rights or full citizenship.¹² They argue that the affective ties analogous to familial love and caring are considered as more important values than mutual respect between the employer and the employee in the Confucian culture of East Asia, and that claiming one's rights is not only unnecessary in these “Confucian” countries but also incompatible in general with the purpose of maintaining a good atmosphere among the members of a given society. However, I provide several counterarguments to these claims in order to show that respect for one's rights and maintaining a good atmosphere within society are actually not incompatible, and that the affective bonds among the members of society do not have to be understood, even in the Confucian culture of East Asia, as so important a value as to override the urgent needs of the weaker members of society such as the migrant workers discussed above.

This last point of the importance of the human rights issues in East Asia leads us to raise the question of whether the traditional Confucian culture is theoretically supportive of such concepts as *pingdeng* 平等 (equality), *zunyan* 尊嚴 (dignity) or *renquan* 人權 (human rights), which have apparently not been so much highlighted in the pre-modern Confucian literature. In Section 3, though, drawing on Irene Bloom's and Joseph Chan's insights I provide a number of arguments that traditional Confucianism is not incompatible with human rights thinking and actually has some important conceptual resources to support it. Specifically, I argue that Mencius' recommendation to the rulers of his time not to take an innocent life, even if doing so would enable them to govern the whole world, can be interpreted to acknowledge that every person possesses a kind of intrinsic worth or dignity as an innocent human being. Moreover, in Section 4, I also argue that a proper conception of human dignity provides an important conceptual basis for human rights, and elaborate Bloom's argument that Mencius'

¹¹ Silverman, “Vital and Vulnerable,” 60-61, quoted in Solinger, “Human Rights Issues in China's Internal Migration,” 285.

¹² Bell and Piper, “Justice for Migrant Workers? The Case of Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore.”

concept of natural nobility (*tianjue* 天爵) can be considered as such a conception of human dignity.

However, it seems that there is another, less bright side to this Mencian concept of natural nobility, which is possible to be interpreted as well to support the unequal treatment of the migrant workers in East Asia. As will be discussed below, the concept of natural nobility is compatible with the existence of a hierarchical order of dignities, which correspond to the amount of merits accruing to oneself as a result of one's moral self-cultivation. Therefore, people of lesser merits may be thought to deserve to be treated less honorably than those with greater merits. Now, if the migrant workers had known about the conditions of their contract in advance but had still chosen to accept them in exchange for higher salaries in their host countries, such choices may be considered morally despicable and therefore partly justifying unequal or even abusive treatment of those workers. In the conclusion of this essay, however, I propose that there is an alternative way of interpreting the migrant workers' choices and behaviors that strongly encourages us to try our best to treat them humanely as our equals, despite the worrisome aspect of the Mencian concept of natural nobility.

2. Human Rights in East Asia?

The "United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families" (1990) declares that all kinds of migrant workers, whether properly documented or non-documented, shall receive equal treatment to the nationals of the host country in such areas as labor, education, and social security, and that they may even enjoy some political rights if their host country decides to grant them such rights.¹³ However, not only is the actual situation of the migrant workers in East Asia far from ideal, but there have been made some theoretical claims concerning the discourse on the human rights issues in East Asia that are susceptible to manipulation by those who might be interested in denying the migrants their human rights. For example, some scholars in Chinese philosophy argue that the concept of human rights is alien to the East Asian intellectual tradition which includes Confucianism

¹³ See especially Articles 25, 27, 28, 30, 42, 43, accessed April 20, 2010, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r158.htm>.

as an important component, and this argument sometimes takes the shape that the concept of human rights conflicts with the Confucian ideal of society as an extension of the harmonious and loving family.

Daniel A. Bell and Nicola Piper make a claim of the last kind in their valuable work on the foreign domestic workers (FDWs) in Hong Kong and Singapore. “FDWs” here refer to the migrant women mainly from Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand who engage in housework and/or caring for needy family members of their employers, and Bell and Piper say that due to the nature of the interaction between these workers and their employers which is hidden in the privacy of the home, they often experience abuse and exploitation and may well be the most vulnerable of all migrant workers.¹⁴ For example, they point out that there is no maximum number of work hours specified in the contracts between the FDWs and their employers, and sixteen-hour days are not uncommon for the FDWs in Hong Kong and Singapore. Astonishingly, an urban councilor in Hong Kong even told the press in 1998 that there are complaints from employers about their FDWs who work only from 8 a.m. to 9 p.m. and refuse to work any more, and proposed to change this situation by setting their work hours at what “seems reasonable” to her, namely sixteen hours per day!¹⁵

Interestingly, however, Bell and Piper argue that the practice of hiring FDWs fits well with the Confucian cultural heritage of East Asia, and that it is not always desirable to promote respect for the rights of FDWs because of the Confucian valuation of the affective ties that are supposed to be maintained at all costs in every relationship, including that between the FDWs and their employers. In other words, the very best employers—only a small minority and most of them being Chinese—treat their foreign domestic workers as if they were valued members of their family, and the feeling of being loved and trusted would outweigh any extra burdens (such as asking for work during public holidays) put on the shoulders of these workers.¹⁶ Moreover, Bell and Piper point out that one’s rights tend to motivate one to see the rights of others more as limitations on one’s rights

¹⁴ Bell and Piper, “Justice for Migrant Workers? The Case of Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore,” 198.

¹⁵ Williams, “Workers Starting at 8 am Are Stopping at 9 pm, Grumbles Councilor,” cited in Bell and Piper, “Justice for Migrant Workers? The Case of Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore,” 220.

¹⁶ Bell and Piper, “Justice for Migrant Workers? The Case of Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore,” 216-217.

than as interests one wants to pursue, and in the family-like relationship between the FDW and her employer, claiming one's rights strongly may be inappropriate because it will undermine the affective bonds between the employer and the employee.

So, although having correctly observed the dire situation of the FDWs in terms of their work hours, Bell and Piper seem to make a strange suggestion that the FDWs' work hours had better not be specified and they should not always invoke their right to limited work hours:

From the perspective of the FDW, it might seem preferable to have the right to limited work hours, which can be invoked if need be. If the FDW wants to strengthen affective ties with her employer, then she can waive this right, and the employer would be grateful. In practice, unfortunately, this is not likely to happen. . . . Once the right is formalized, there is a strong tendency to invoke it, even against 'good' employers where it might not be necessary to do so. Moreover, the fact that this right is so difficult to enforce may lead to endless conflicts that could poison the atmosphere in the household.¹⁷

Bell and Piper accept that neither the duties of liberal justice nor Confucian familial ethics should always have the upper hand in every situation; as they see it, the actual decision in particular cases should be based on the examination of such factors as how severe the injustice is and how likely the curbing of rights will promote Confucian family values. However, they also hold that there are cases where agreement is hard to reach, and in such cases the Confucian preference is clearly toward promoting harmony and trust within the family-like society rather than protecting the individual's rights.¹⁸

However, Bell and Piper's presentation of the FDWs' attitudes toward the so-called Confucian values of harmony and love is doubtful, and their view of Confucianism on the relationship between individual rights and Confucian familial ethics is controversial. First of all, they assert that feeling loved and trusted would enable the FDWs to view their employers' excessive demands not as extra burdens but as duties to be voluntarily shared among the "family members," but it is not clear how many FDWs would feel loved and trusted when many of their employers expect them to be on duty sixteen

¹⁷ Bell and Piper, "Justice for Migrant Workers? The Case of Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore," 220-221.

¹⁸ Bell and Piper, "Justice for Migrant Workers? The Case of Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore," 221.

hours per day, lock them up in apartments during the day and confiscate their passports (to prevent them from running away), and the governments do not allow them to bring in dependents or other members of their families (to prevent them from settling down).¹⁹ Unless these practices are fundamentally changed, it would be very difficult for FDWs to feel themselves to be true members of their employers' families except for highly exceptional cases; and there is no doubt about Cheung Tak Sing and Mok Bong Ho's finding that the Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong are generally more satisfied with their Western employers than Chinese ones, because the former are more likely to respect their employees' rights and treat them on equal terms.²⁰

Second, I think that Bell and Piper are misguided to claim that respect for one's rights and maintaining a good atmosphere in a family-like relationship are incompatible. As I see it, if one party's familial care for another is genuine, worries about conflict over rights would not arise. That is, if one really cares about the welfare of another family member (or a maid one considers as invaluable as one's own daughter), then one would be inclined to show respect to all of her rights and do well to help her pursue her interests, and consequently she would feel no need to claim her rights.²¹ On the other hand, if one feels a need to claim one's rights against other family members (or one's employer one lives with in the same house), it is probably because 1) they are getting out of a family relationship (e.g. a husband and a wife whose relationship is getting sour) or because 2) they are essentially not in a familial relationship in the first place (e.g. the FDW and her employer, who are in a market relationship in my view). In either case, then, the relationship between individual rights and affective family ties is not that of mutual incompatibility; it is simply that they can sometimes happily coexist, but on other occasions the decrease in the latter facilitates the increasing assertion of the former.

One might argue, though, that the excessive assertion of one's rights can stifle good atmosphere in the family, and it can be when the FDW claims her rights strongly against her employer that the good, family-like

¹⁹ Bell and Piper, "Justice for Migrant Workers? The Case of Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore," 199 and 200-201.

²⁰ Cheung and Mok, "How Filipina Maids Are Treated in Hong Kong," cited in Bell and Piper, "Justice for Migrant Workers? The Case of Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore," 216.

²¹ Or one might think even more strongly, as an anonymous reviewer of this essay does, that one cannot love people without respecting them as full moral agents who have fundamental rights.

relationship between them is undermined. This should be avoided at all costs, the critique continues, because affective family ties are one of the most important values for Confucian-oriented East Asians.²² This is a partly plausible scenario, I think, but it is not clear to me whether the Confucian tradition considers affective bonds among the members of any given group to be such an over-arching value that the crucial needs of the weaker members of the group, such as the FDWs' need for more humane and reasonable work hours, can be ignored in the name of the extended family. In other words, my view is that affective ties may be far less important than the FDWs' rights if the welfare of the FDWs is seriously in danger as it is now, and any social theory or interpretation of the Confucian culture that overlooks the fundamental importance of their basic rights is either highly confused or driven by an ulterior motive.²³ And it is needless to say that the same point is equally true for the case of similarly disadvantaged migrant workers in other countries of East Asia briefly described above.

3. Human Rights and Early Confucianism

Then, what are my theoretical grounds for emphasizing the importance of the issue of human rights in the context of the East Asian Confucian tradition? If it is not possible to find such words as *pingdeng* 平等, *zunyan* 尊嚴 or *renquan* 人權 in the classical Confucian texts, how could it be justified to talk about such notions as equality, dignity, and human rights in the Confucian tradition? There have been numerous scholars, though, who had the conviction that the concept of human rights can be found invested in diverse traditions taking different shapes but sharing some core vision in significant ways. For example, Irene Bloom says:

[T]here are many whose understanding of the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights], as of other human rights instruments and of human rights ideas more broadly, is informed and energized by religious and moral

²² Henry Rosemont, Jr. expresses a similar worry. According to him, the United States is a highly conflicted society, and its conflicts stem in important ways from the "rights talk" that permeates the moral and political discourse of the United States more thoroughly than in other countries. See Rosemont, Jr., "Human Rights," especially 56 and 60.

²³ A similar, brilliant, and more theoretically-oriented argument for the compatibility between the individual's rights and the Confucian ideal of society as the family writ large has been presented in Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China," 219-222. My arguments in this and the preceding paragraph are largely indebted to the general framework and insights Chan has provided in his essay.

attitudes much older, more complex, and more diverse. Rather than seeing cultural and religious diversity as, ipso facto, constituting an impediment to (or a counterargument against) the twentieth-century consensus represented by human rights, it seems more fruitful to acknowledge that this diversity may be potentially supportive of human rights thinking—not in every way, but often in very significant respects.²⁴

In Bloom's view, Early Confucianism is one of such traditions: Confucius' saying, "By nature close together, through practice set apart," (*Lunyu* 論語 17.2)²⁵ was chosen by a group of international experts drafting a 1950 UNESCO statement on race as containing a fundamental belief in some significant similarity among human beings. And, in Mencius, human beings are considered to be *equally* endowed with compassion, shame, modesty, and the sense of right and wrong, and these "four sprouts" as a shared moral potential is the ground for a common humanity (*Mengzi* 孟子 2A.6).²⁶ Furthermore, this egalitarian view of human moral potential also provides a basis for the concept of human *dignity* in Mencius, because his notion of natural nobility (*tianjue*) is what every individual has within their mind in the form of moral possibilities, and the realization of one's moral potential creates "good honor" (*lianggui* 良貴) that no one can take away (*Mengzi* 6A.16-17). It can be in order to keep this natural dignity, and by extension to exercise the corresponding *right* not to be maltreated, that Mencius says even a wayfarer or a beggar in a dire situation does not sometimes accept a meal provided in a contemptuous manner (*Mengzi* 6A.10).²⁷

Of course, there have been raised significant worries and strong challenges to this kind of interpretation of Confucianism. According to Joseph Chan's classification, a group of scholars in Chinese philosophy hold that the concept of human rights presupposes that human beings are basically asocial beings or free, autonomous individuals who have a set of entitlements that is independent of and prior to society, and this view of humanity is incompatible with the Confucian view of human beings as contextual beings whose duties and rights, and even self-identities, are determined solely in terms of the web of social relationships.²⁸ In addition, based on the Confucian ideal of society

²⁴ Bloom, "Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements," 97.

²⁵ The book and chapter numbers of the *Lunyu* in this essay are according to Yang, *Lunyu yizhu*.

²⁶ Bloom, "Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements," 96-104. The numbering of the chapters in the *Mengzi* throughout this essay is according to Yang, *Mengzi yizhu*.

²⁷ Bloom, "Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements," 104-108. The complex relationship between dignity in Mencius and human rights will be analyzed and discussed in more detail in the next section.

²⁸ Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China," 216-217.

as modeled on the harmonious and loving family, some scholars also hold that asserting one's rights is not only unnecessary in virtuous relationships but also detrimental to promoting such relationships.²⁹ And finally, it has been sometimes claimed that the hierarchical or paternalistic relationships Confucianism advocates and the Confucian ideal of non-litigious society tend to suppress active assertion of one's rights.³⁰

However, as Chan has effectively argued, the conception of human rights as entitlements that one has in virtue of one's being human and irrespective of such characteristics as gender, race, culture, religion, or nationality does not necessarily presuppose that human beings are asocial beings or free autonomous individuals making choices outside any cultural contexts. Rather, the concept of human rights should be interpreted as asserting a normative claim that one should not be denied a set of basic human rights because of one's gender, race, culture, and so forth. Furthermore, such rights as freedom of expression and freedom of religion endorsed by many international charters of human rights clearly acknowledge that human beings are social and cultural animals that want to communicate with others in a public space and join religious communities to pursue their cultural interests broadly conceived.³¹

However, critics would further ask whether such a concept of human rights is possible in the first place in Confucianism, because human beings are supposed in the Confucian tradition to exist in the web of social relationships such as father-son, husband-wife, ruler-ruled, elder-younger, friend-friend relationships and consequently cannot be considered to assume duties or rights just for the reason that they are humans. In response to this, though, Chan points out that the sites for the realization of the Confucian ethical ideal of humaneness (*ren* 仁) are not confined to these five concrete human relationships. According to him, the *Lunyu* and the *Mengzi* contain passages recommending benevolent treatment of others in general (e.g. *Lunyu* 1.6 and 12.22; *Mengzi* 4B.28 and 7A.46)³² or giving help to those

²⁹ Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China," 219-220.

³⁰ Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China," 222 and 226.

³¹ Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China," 216-217.

³² Chan follows James Legge in interpreting *Lunyu* 12.22 to imply a kind of egalitarianism, but this reading of the passage is based on a problematic view of the character "*ren*" 人 in the *Lunyu*. For besides meaning human beings, "*ren*" in the *Lunyu* often designates persons of the upper social strata who belong to the ruling class in general, and "*ai ren*" 愛人 in the original text of the passage in question, which Legge translates as "to love all men," actually had a more particular sociopolitical sense of taking special care for one's fellow men belonging to the nobility in such a way that qualified ones among them could

in difficulty who are not in a particular relationship with oneself (*Mengzi* 2A.6), and these examples illustrate the way in which Confucianism could be modified so as to accommodate the idea of universal human rights.³³

In my view, Early Confucianism—especially that of Mencius—seems to have richer intellectual resources favorable to the idea of human rights than what Chan provides. For Mencius often recommends the rulers of his time not to take innocent people's lives even if doing so would benefit them greatly. For example, Mencius states that what the ancient sages Bo Yi 伯夷 and Yi Yin 伊尹 shared with Confucius in character was that although they were equally capable of taking possession of the entire world if they had governed only a territory of a hundred Chinese square miles (*li* 里), they would have refused to gain the world if doing so had required them to do a single wrong act or kill one innocent life (*Mengzi* 2A.2). In addition, after commenting on a king's lack of royal dignity Mencius reports that he told the king that the world could be unified by the ruler who does not like killing people (*Mengzi* 1A.6), and Mencius also recommends Prince Dian 墊 of Qi 齊 to follow humaneness (*ren*) and righteousness (*yi* 義), which he codifies respectively as not killing an innocent person and not taking what is not one's own (*Mengzi* 7A.33).³⁴

Mencius' classification of not taking an innocent life to the realm of *ren* 仁 (mainly benevolence or caring in this context) reveals his thinking that the ruler's refraining from taking his people's lives is to be based on his benevolence for his people, and this benevolence could be seen as mono-directional in the sense that whether to treat people benevolently or not is up to the ruler, and that the people have no demand on it. However, this is actually a wrong view, because what is important in Mencius' advice is people's innocence. That is, Mencius' thought underlying his recommendation not to take innocent lives seems to be that the ruler should view people's innocence as a factor making them at least *worthy* of not being killed for no fault, and that the ancient sages' refusal to accept the entire world at the expense of one innocent life shows that these sages considered this factor of people's innocence as imposing some restrictions on their treatment of their people. Now, this protection of people

serve in the government of the country. For a detailed argument for this point, see Kim, "The Meaning of 'Love' (*Ai*) in the *Analects*," 262-265. However, I agree that the other passages Chan cites well support his view that Confucianism is not incompatible with the idea of human rights.

³³ Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China," 217-219.

³⁴ This paragraph and the next are largely based on materials in Kim, "Respect in *Mengzi* as a Concern-Based Construal."

from being killed for no fault of their own is clearly not owing to the duties they perform as the subjects of their rulers. Rather, it should be considered as what they are *entitled* to due to their being innocent human beings, and in my view this comes very close to the conception of human rights as what people are entitled to by virtue of being human.

Now I turn to the next argument summarized above, namely that the Confucian ideal of society is the family writ large based on harmonious and loving relationships, and that asserting one's rights is not only unnecessary but actually detrimental to promoting such an ideal. I have already argued in the last section that the FDWs and their employers are best considered to be in a market relationship rather than a familial one, and that even if the East Asian culture would encourage the members of a given society to maintain affective, family-like relationships, this consideration cannot be so crucial a concern as to override the pressing needs of the weaker members of the society such as the FDWs. Moreover, according to Chan, although rights would not necessarily constitute virtues or contribute to maintaining virtuous relationships based on mutual love and caring, human rights can play an important role of fallback apparatus for the vulnerable to rely on when people's relationships are no longer based on mutual caring, and Confucianism has no reason to object to accepting rights so conceived.³⁵

As for the argument that the hierarchical or paternalistic characteristics of the Confucian tradition hinders Confucianism from being open to the idea and practice of human rights, I concur with Chan that many of the teachings demanding absolute obedience and submission from the younger or weaker sides of the personal relationships—such as *san'gang* 三綱—are ideologies developed during or after Han dynasty China and may not reflect the Confucian spirit correctly. To cite just one example to illustrate this point, Confucius sometimes explains his highest virtue of humaneness (*ren*) in terms of the reciprocity principle (*shu* 恕) that one should not do to others what one would not wish to be done to oneself (e.g. *Lunyu* 12.2 and 15.24), and the author of the *Daxue* 大學 (Great Learning) presents this principle by saying that “Do not treat your inferiors with what you dislike in your superiors, and do not serve your superiors with what you dislike in your inferiors.”³⁶ This implies that the virtuous father or husband would not impose on his son or wife what he would not desire if he were in his son's

³⁵ Chan, “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,” 220-222.

³⁶ Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, 373. Translation modified from Legge's.

or wife's position, and he would also refuse to follow authorities blindly if he finds it conflicting with more important ethical principles.³⁷

Now, finally concerning the argument that claiming one's rights is not a suitable practice in a Confucian society because Confucianism emphasizes concession and compromise rather than competition and self-assertion, Chan correctly points out that although Confucius preferred more peaceful means than litigation in court, he never said that litigation is to be avoided at all costs (cf. *Lunyu* 12.13). Rather, he could be interpreted to be willing to endorse legal means as a last resort people may turn to when they can no longer expect others to treat them with justice and caring, and in such a situation human rights could be considered a useful means to protect one's legitimate interests. Moreover, Confucius recommends that kindness should be returned with kindness and injury with justice (*Lunyu* 14.34), and Chan seems to me to interpret this passage correctly by saying that Confucius would find it appropriate to respond with justice or fairness when one is wronged or unjustly harmed by others.³⁸

4. The Concepts of Dignity and Human Rights in Mencius

Yet another way to defend the compatibility between Confucianism and human rights, in addition to those presented above, is to consider the concept of human rights to be based on or intertwined with the concept of human dignity and try to argue one's way from the latter toward the former, partly based on the grounds that some notion of human dignity can more easily be found in traditional Chinese texts than that of human rights. The idea that human dignity provides conceptual grounds for human rights is reflected in such documents as the International Bill of Rights, which says that human rights arise from "the inherent dignity of the human person."³⁹ And Joel Feinberg, who holds that having rights to certain things is to have the legal power to make claims to those things,⁴⁰ takes human dignity to be equivalent to a recognizable capacity to assert claims. In other words, he thinks that to respect a person, or "to think of him as possessed of human dignity, simply *is* to think of him as a potential maker of claims."⁴¹

³⁷ A more detailed discussion of these points can be found in Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China," 222-224.

³⁸ Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China," 226-227.

³⁹ Quoted in Svensson, *Debating Human Rights in China*, 33.

⁴⁰ Feinberg, *Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty*, 150.

According to Marina Svensson, though, this approach is misguided because it confuses such ideas as dignity or justice with the idea of human rights. That is, she concurs with Jack Donnelly in thinking that while all societies possess the former concepts, the latter only came into being with the development of the modern nation-state.⁴² In Donnelly's terms, certain acts that we would consider to involve violations of human rights may have been also deemed impermissible for one reason or another in traditional societies, but this does not necessarily mean that people in those societies also thought themselves to have human rights. They might have condemned certain acts for being, say, unjust, humiliating, or impious, but it is unlikely for them to have also deemed those acts to be violating human rights, because they probably did not have a concept of human rights.⁴³

Moreover, Svensson proposes that we have to distinguish between intrinsic dignity and extrinsic dignity, which refer respectively to the kind of dignity that every human being has qua human regardless of one's origin or status, and to the kind that is contingent upon one's behavior or status in society and can therefore be considered as a hindrance to conceiving and/or practicing human rights. In Svensson's view, dignity can be guaranteed and promoted by many things other than rights, e.g. religious beliefs about the nature of human beings or ideas about how one should treat others based on their hierarchical status. According to her, it is indeed possible to imagine a society where dignity of the extrinsic kind is respected without its giving rise to a concept of human rights; traditional China, whose ethic is purportedly constituted by the rites (*li* 禮) that define people's different statuses and proper treatment of each other in accordance with them, is one such society.⁴⁴

However, although it might be historically true that the concept of human rights developed in response to the industrialization and the formation of the nation-state in the modern West, this does not necessarily preclude the possibility that people from different intellectual traditions also have indigenous resources that could foster and support human rights thinking. Furthermore, it is not an implausible idea at all to think that a proper conception of human dignity could provide a sufficient theoretical ground for the concept of human rights,⁴⁵ and Irene Bloom, despite Svensson's

⁴¹ Feinberg, *Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty*, 151. Italic is original.

⁴² Svensson, *Debating Human Rights in China*, 34.

⁴³ Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights*, 81.

⁴⁴ Svensson, *Debating Human Rights in China*, 34.

⁴⁵ This point is actually ceded by Svensson herself in her following remarks: "It would thus

underrepresentation of her work,⁴⁶ has already shown how this could be so in the context of the *Mengzi*.⁴⁷ In this section I will emphasize this point by discussing the Mencian conception of natural nobility (*tianjue*) closely, but I also intend to take one step further and raise the theoretical possibility that this notion of natural nobility, which is considered to be possessed by everyone and thus provides grounds for the equal treatment of every individual, can also have an embarrassing aspect which tends to promote the unequal treatment of a certain group of people in society.

Now, let me start by quoting two *Mengzi* passages important for illustrating the concept of natural nobility:

There is the nobility of Heaven [or, natural nobility, *tianjue*] and the nobility of man (*renjue*). Humaneness, rightness, loyalty, and truthfulness—and taking pleasure in doing good, without ever wearying of it—this is the nobility of Heaven. The ranks of duke, minister, or high official—this is the nobility of man. Men of antiquity cultivated the nobility of Heaven, and the nobility of man followed after it. Men of the present day cultivate the nobility of Heaven out of a desire for the nobility of man, and once having obtained the nobility of man, they cast away the nobility of Heaven. Their delusion is extreme, and, in the end, they must lose everything.⁴⁸

In their desire to be honored all human beings are of like mind. And all human beings have within themselves what is honorable. It is only that they do not think about it, that is all. The honor that derives from men is not the good honor. Whom Chief Zhao honors, Chief Zhao can also debase. The *Classic of Odes* says: “We have been plied with wine, and satisfied with virtue.” To “satisfy with virtue” means that one is satisfied with humaneness and rightness, and therefore does not crave the flavors of the meat and grain served by men, and when a good reputation and widespread esteem accrue to one’s person, one does not crave the elegant embroidered garments worn by men.⁴⁹

be useful to distinguish between intrinsic dignity, which pertains to every human being qua human being regardless of his or her behavior and status and is the dignity human rights advocates have in mind, and extrinsic dignity, which is the antithesis of human rights because it is not a general attitude but contingent upon one’s behavior or status in society.” See Svensson, *Debating Human Rights in China*, 34.

⁴⁶ Svensson, *Debating Human Rights in China*, 34.

⁴⁷ Bloom, “Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements.”

⁴⁸ *Mengzi* 6A.16. Translation is Bloom’s, including the words in the brackets. See Bloom, “Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements,” 106.

⁴⁹ *Mengzi* 6A.17. Translation is Bloom’s, with the Romanization of Chinese characters omitted. See Bloom, “Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements,” 107.

In this passage, we see a marked distinction between what Mencius calls the nobility of Heaven and the nobility of man. The nobility of Heaven (*tianjue* 天爵, literally “office given by Heaven”), or the nobility that everyone is born with by nature, refers to moral virtues or their beginnings growing in one’s mind. This type of nobility is sharply contrasted with the positions of high officials (and above) and accompanying accolades, and a crucial difference between them is that whereas the latter can be taken away at any time by the authority who has conferred them, the former type of nobility is invariably within oneself as one’s nature. The relationship between these two is such that in the process of cultivating one’s moral character, the sources of external nobility also usually come to oneself, but those who are genuinely satisfied with the nobleness of morality do not need them.

According to Bloom, Mencius’ view of these two types of nobility can be understood in terms of the distinction between human dignity and aristocratic dignity. What Bloom means by “human dignity” is the minimum dignity that human beings are supposed to have by virtue of their humanity, and one of its crucial characteristics is that it allows no degrees. In contrast, aristocratic dignity is basically what “rulers and elites claim based on their roles in the political and social order,” and it entails the existence of a hierarchical order of dignities corresponding to the different levels of status and amounts of achievements.⁵⁰ Now, there seems to be no difficulty in regarding aristocratic dignity to be basically equivalent to Mencius’ “nobility of man.” And it also seems quite reasonable to think that human dignity nicely matches Mencius’ “natural nobility” or “the nobility of Heaven,” because what makes everyone naturally noble in Mencius is their moral potential, which Heaven has given to every human being to more or less the same degree. Bloom argues that, for Mencius, this minimum dignity is what enables one to protest against unfair or humiliating treatment by claiming the same degree of moral agency as the abuser,⁵¹ and this point can be illustrated in relation to respect as follows:

Just as human moral potential is understood by Mencius to dispose human beings to interact harmoniously with one another, so the Mencian notion of dignity, allied to this understanding, seems to involve a self-consciousness

⁵⁰ Bloom, “Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements,” 105-110. By now it must be clear that Bloom’s distinction between human dignity and aristocratic dignity is basically the same thing as Svensson’s aforementioned distinction between intrinsic dignity and extrinsic dignity.

⁵¹ Bloom, “Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements,” 107.

on the part of human beings that they are both capable and worthy of respect. I would suggest that human dignity in this context involves an appreciation on the part of individuals of their own moral potential, a claim for respect from others, and a corresponding duty and disposition to show respect for others—all in light of the awareness of a common humanity. The degree of respect that is to be shown may vary in accordance with the specific relationships between individuals—depending on kinship ties, gender, age, and social position—and the particular behaviors required vary as well. But always there is a basic respect required from each human being toward every other human being as a condition of their common humanity.⁵²

Against Svensson's and Donnelly's claims, this interpretation of the Mencian notion of natural nobility clearly shows how this idea could support the egalitarian view that migrant workers in East Asia are human beings so much as we are and have a rightful claim to equal treatment, or at the very least have a right to resist abuses. However, while accepting that the Mencian notion of natural nobility can be interpreted this way, I think that the analogy between this concept and that of human dignity is not fully sustainable. In my view, there seem to be two crucial differences between Mencius' natural nobility and human dignity, and the first one is that whereas the latter does not admit of any difference in moral worth among people, the former can admit the possibility of such differences based on how much one realizes one's moral potential. In other words, if human dignity refers to "the minimum dignity which belongs to every human being qua human" and in that sense it "implies the very denial of an aristocratic order of dignities,"⁵³ human moral potential that makes every human being worthy of basic respect in Mencius opens up a new possibility of differing degrees of respect that correspond to the level of one's moral achievement. For example, Mencius tells us the following episode:

Someone asked Zeng Xi, "Between you and Zilu, who is more worthy?" Zeng Xi said uneasily, "[Even my late father] was afraid of him." "Then, who is more worthy between you and Guan Zhong?" Zeng Xi, expressing displeasure [this time], said, "How can you ever compare me to Guan Zhong? Guan Zhong enjoyed his ruler's confidence so exclusively and governed the country for so long, but his achievements are so insignificant. How dare you compare me to this man?"⁵⁴

⁵² Bloom, "Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements," 109.

⁵³ Spiegelberg, "Human Dignity," 56, quoted in Bloom, "Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements," 114.

Zeng Xi 曾西 is the son of Zeng Shen 曾參, a worthy disciple of Confucius' who is even sometimes addressed as "Master Zeng" 曾子 in the *Lunyu*. Zilu 子路, another advanced disciple of Confucius', was much senior to Zeng Shen,⁵⁵ and according to his son (i.e. Zeng Xi), Zeng Shen had great reverence for Zilu, presumably not just for his seniority but, more importantly, for his great moral character. Now, Zeng Xi's uneasiness at the thought of comparing himself to Zilu, whom even his worthy father showed great respect, reveals that he feels greater respect for Zilu than he does for his father. Accordingly, one can imagine how much respect Zeng Xi would feel for Confucius, the great teacher of both Zilu and his father. On the other hand, Zeng Xi's displeasure at the question of who is more worthy, he or Guan Zhong, the famous seventh century minister of the Qi 齊 dukedom, shows his deep-seated disrespect for Guan Zhong. In short, this passage shows that one can feel different degrees of respect (and disrespect) towards different people's corresponding merits, and I think this is one of the things that distinguish Mencius' notion of natural nobility from the modern conception of human dignity.⁵⁶

The second feature that makes natural nobility in Mencius different is that although everyone is endowed with this kind of nobility and it is called "good honor" or "innate honor" (*lianggui* 良貴) because it cannot be taken away by others, Mencius also thinks that one can dishonor oneself by neglecting one's innate nobility and consequently make oneself contemptible. So Mencius says the following:

Among the parts of a person, some are noble or more valuable and some are base or less valuable. Never harm the more valuable for the sake of the less valuable, or the noble for the sake of the base. [For] those who nurture the less valuable become petty men, and those who nurture the more valuable become great men. . . . Suppose there is a gardener, who cares only about [useless] jujube trees or thornbushes, while neglecting [highly valuable] paulownia trees; he would be considered a contemptible (*jian* 賤) gardener. . . . [Likewise,] one who cares only about food and drink is despised by others, and it is because he nurtures the less important while neglecting the more important.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ *Mengzi* 2A.1. Translation is mine.

⁵⁵ According to Qian Mu's 錢穆 calculations, Zilu (542-480 BCE) was thirty seven years older than Zeng Shen (505-436 BCE). See Qian, *Xianqin zhuzi xinian*, 2:615-616.

⁵⁶ Most of this paragraph has once appeared in Kim, "Respect in *Mengzi* as a Concern-Based Construal."

⁵⁷ *Mengzi* 6A.14. Translation is mine.

That is, although everyone has within their mind a kind of natural nobility that enables them to stand up against each other and request basic respect, one deserves only contempt and disapproval from others if one is lured away by one's petty desires and fails to keep one's dignity. Good examples of this in the *Mengzi* are those who would accept ten thousand bushels of grain without considering its appropriateness (*Mengzi* 6A.10), and the husband who fulfills his desire for food and wine by begging for them at other people's funerals but pretends to have dined with noble acquaintances to his family members (*Mengzi* 4B.33).

As I see it, these characteristics of the Mencian view of human nobility could be interpreted to support the unequal treatment of the migrant workers in East Asia. For one thing, the Mencian conception of natural nobility is compatible with the existence of a hierarchical order of dignities corresponding to the amount of one's moral merits accruing to oneself through the cultivation of one's moral potential, and this seems to allow some theoretical room for treating those considered to have lesser merits differently from the other members of society. Moreover, if the migrant workers had known about the conditions of their contract in advance but still have chosen to accept them in exchange for the relatively high salaries they would get in their host countries, one might think that they have voluntarily chosen to expose themselves to unequal or even abusive treatment. Additionally, one might add along the Mencian line that these migrant workers are analogous to those in *Mengzi* 6A.10 who would not accept even a meal offered in a humiliating way in their original frame of mind but often forget about their original mind (*benxin* 本心) and follow their desires, and that they are in that sense both morally despicable.

5. Concluding Remarks

Then, how could a modern interpreter of Mencius, who is concerned about the human rights issues involving migrant workers in East Asia, deal with this charge? One thing worth pointing out is that many of the migrant workers are gladly taking all the humiliations and abuses only to support their family at home. For this reason, they should be considered not to have abandoned their basic human dignity for material gains, but rather to have made a virtuous decision to sacrifice it if necessary for the welfare of their family. But then, what about the others whose main goals were material

gains from the beginning? Shall we consider their too much understandable, but (from a certain perspective) not lofty enough decision to justify what they often get in our territories? For such a case, one could say that even they do not deserve to be treated badly despite their choice to expose themselves to abuses for higher salaries, because their basic human dignity, though neglected by themselves, still resides in their hearts in the form of moral potential that requires all the same degree of respect from us. In addition, for such a case Mencius would have cited Confucius (*Lunyu* 19.19) and said that it is pathetic for them to have failed to keep their natural nobility, but what is more to blame is the global political economy, which leaves them with no other real option but to make such a drastic choice (*Mengzi* 1A.7 and 6A.7). Furthermore, he would have also advised us to feel sympathetic to their situations and try our best to treat them as our equals, thus helping them keep their human dignity.

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尊嚴的兩面 ——孟子與東亞外勞

金明錫

中文摘要

對今日東亞外勞面臨的人權問題，儒學傳統——特別是孔子和孟子——有何提示？人權觀念能否適用於東亞儒家文化仍是學界爭議不休的課題。不過，我認同一些儒家自由主義者的說法，認為各類傳統的人權觀雖有不同形式，卻有一個共同的核心觀點：對人性尊嚴的尊重。本文主張，《孟子》一書中的“良貴”觀包含應分(desert)的觀念，並深入探討這觀念如何深化當今人權問題的儒家論述。Daniel Bell 和 Nicola Piper 教授不久前辯稱，香港和新加坡最好不讓外勞獲得公民的權益或身份。然而，這主張似乎假設一個未經證實的論點：在東亞儒家文化裡，家庭關係的愛與關懷之情比雇主與員工之間的彼此尊重更為重要。我不認同這一點，強調在家庭關係以外仍需尊重人性尊嚴，並指出孟子在這方面的論述有所缺陷。我將探討孟子尊嚴觀的另一層面相。這一層面相可以支持對東亞外勞的不平等待遇。

關鍵詞：孟子，儒學，外勞，人權，尊嚴

Deciphering Zhou Dunyi's "Taijitu" 太極圖

KIM Hak Ze

Abstract

This paper aims to define the characteristics of Zhou Dunyi's (1017-1073) "Taijitu" (Diagram of the Great Ultimate) as a metaphysical cosmology rather than a cosmogony through an examination of the constitution of the Diagram itself, and to overview some derivative problems. It shall be shown that the flowchart of the Diagram has the structure of vertical symmetry and isomorphic repetition, which indicates that Zhou Dunyi's iconology was originally intended as a sort of metaphysics. Zhu Xi also seems to interpret the Diagram as the metaphysical structure of the cosmos rather than a mimetic diagram of the real cosmic generation. This paper regards Yi Hwang (1501-1570) and Jeong Ji-un's (1501-1561) "Cheonmyeong sindo" (New Diagram of the Heavenly Mandate) as one of the best examples to support the following interpretation of Zhou's and Zhu's ideas on the "Taijitu." In conclusion, this paper will suggest that Zhou's *Taijitu shuo* and Zhu Xi's metaphysical interpretation of it initiated the later unfolding of Neo-Confucianism.

Keywords: Zhou Dunyi, "Taijitu," *Taijitu shuo*, Zhu Xi, *Taijitu shuo jie*, Yi Hwang, Jeong Ji-un, "Cheonmyeong sindo"

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1. Traditional Scholarship on Zhou Dunyi's "Taijitu"

Neo-Confucianism is spoken of as systematized Confucianism, in which cosmology and metaphysics are highlighted as theoretically fundamental. As a matter of fact, the metaphysical concepts newly introduced into Neo-Confucianism contributed to the systematization of Confucianism. The metaphysical character of Neo-Confucianism originated from cosmological thought as well as philosophical and moral psychology. It was Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017-1073, Lianxi 濂溪) who introduced cosmological thinking to Confucianism, and he has been duly respected as a genuine predecessor of Neo-Confucianism and the successor of the orthodox Confucian Way after Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) constructed the lineage of the transmission of the Way (*daotong* 道統). Among the various works of Zhou Dunyi, "Taijitu" 太極圖 or the "Diagram of the Great Ultimate" (hereafter, the Diagram) and *Taijitu shuo* 太極圖說 or the *Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (hereafter, the Explanation) have been explicitly regarded as some of the most important and insightful sources from which Neo-Confucian metaphysics began to unfold.¹

However, the Diagram, often referred to as just a part of the Explanation, has been a source of interminable controversies; since the Song onwards, even among Neo-Confucians there has been hardly any consensus of scholarly opinion concerning the nature of the Diagram and the Explanation. Numerous scholars have doubted Zhou Dunyi's authorship of the Diagram, suggesting that it could not have been Zhou but such influential Daoist priests as Chen Tuan 陳搏 (c. 906-989), Chong Fang 种放 (?-1014), and Mu Xiu 穆修 (979-1032) who created the Diagram.² Due to this alleged association with non-Confucian figures, it could be credibly argued that the

¹ As Chen Lai 陳來 already pointed out, Zhu Xi was not the first person who shed light on the Diagram and the Explanation although later scholars were influenced mainly by Zhu Xi. During the period of Emperor Xiaozong 孝宗 (the Qiandao 乾道 era, 1165-1173), Zhou's Diagram and Explanation already called the attention of many scholars. See Chen, *Zhuzi zhexue yanjiu*, 77.

² For a more detailed explanation of this, refer to Lao, *Xinbian Zhongguo zhexueshi*, 3:92-114. According to Lao Siguang 勞思光, modern scholars, including Takeuchi Yoshio 武内義雄 (1886-1966) and Fan Shoukang 范壽康 (1895-1983), have taken for granted Mao Jiling's 毛奇齡 (1623-1716) opinion about the Diagram, believing that the Diagram was transmitted to Zhou from Daoists of the Tang-Song period. Although Lao did not mention, Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 also agrees with Mao. See Lao, *Xinbian Zhongguo zhexueshi*, 3:96-97.

Diagram was not an authentic Confucian source. In fact, such doubt first materialized in the debate between Zhu Xi and the Lu brothers: Lu Jiuyan 陸九淵 (1139-1192, Zijing 子靜 and Xiangshan 象山) and Lu Jiushao 陸九韶 (1128-1205, Zimei 子美). A key point of contention in this debate was the questionable reliability of the Diagram and the Explanation as Confucian sources. Alongside this debate, many scholars applied their own interpretations to the Diagram and the Explanation, for example, Xu Qian 許謙 (1270-1337), Xue Xuan 薛宣 (1398-1464), Wang Shouren 王守仁 (1472-1529), Luo Qinshun 羅欽順 (1465-1547), Wang Tingxiang 王廷相 (1474-1554), and Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619-1692).³ Korean and Japanese scholars also advanced their opinions about this topic.⁴

A possible reason for the rise of various Neo-Confucian interpretations of the Diagram is that Zhou did not adopt such Neo-Confucian concepts as *li* 理 (principle, pattern), *qi* 氣 (material/vital force), *ti* 體 (substance), *yong* 用 (function), *xing* 性 (nature), and *xin* 心 (heart-mind), which would have facilitated later Neo-Confucians' diverse elaborations on Zhou's understanding of the cosmos, the human being, and all myriad things. In other words, the unclear quality of Zhou's Diagram caused later scholars to interpret the Diagram through their own philosophical concepts, which could not but bring controversy.

As a subsequent exploration of Neo-Confucian discussions on the Diagram, this paper aims to understand the characteristics of the Diagram. However, to do justice to Zhou's original work, this paper will not impose such Neo-Confucian concepts as *li/qi* and *ti/yong* on the Diagram. This methodological avoidance of Neo-Confucian philosophical concepts does not mean that Neo-Confucian interpretations of the Diagram were misguided. Rather, it means provisional detachment from the traditional commentaries, i.e., Neo-Confucian interpretations of the Diagram. Nevertheless, the findings of this paper may help us apprehend and re-affirm Neo-Confucian interpretations of the Diagram from a new perspective. As discussed later, Zhu

³ Refer to Zhou, *Zhou Dunyi quanshu*, 74-273. As John B. Henderson points out, although this subject is not so "perennial" or "essential" as other touchstone issues such as "the potential goodness of human nature," "the one principle/diverse particularizations" formula, and "the sixteen-character transmission," scholars never ceased to discuss the Diagram and the Explanation, and the key concept, the Great Ultimate. Refer to Henderson, "Touchstones of Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy," 80.

⁴ In Joseon Korea, the "Mugeuk Taegeuk" 無極太極 debate arose between Yi Eon-jeok 李彦迪 (1491-1553, Hoejae 晦齋) and Jo Han-bo 曹漢輔 (?-?, Manggidang 忘機堂) in 1517. See E. Yi, *Hoejae jip*, 5:5b-25a. In Japan, Yamaga Sokō's 山鹿素行 (1622-1685) criticism of Zhou Dunyi is notable. Refer to Tucker, "Yamaga Sokō's Essential Lexicography of Sagely Confucian Teachings," 71-80.

Xi, the first annotator and commentator of the Diagram, will be re-appreciated from this new perspective. In conjunction with Zhu Xi's case, Joseon Korea's Neo-Confucian, Yi Hwang's 李滉 (1501-1570, Toegye 退溪) reconstruction of the Diagram will be discussed as a compatible interpretation with my position.

2. Modern Scholarship on the Diagram: Two Ways of Interpretation

In order to explain the characteristics of the Diagram, modern scholars have frequently used the term "cosmology" (*yuzhou lun* 宇宙論), and there appears nothing outwardly wrong with this label. What they mean by cosmology, however, is both unclear and inconsistent; they do not define the term properly in their contexts. Generally, cosmology is understood to concern two different fields of study: Cosmogony and Metaphysics. There has been no scholarly consensus in defining the term "cosmology" for their studies of the Diagram; the term is assumed to signify cosmogony by those who attempt to explain the origin of the cosmos and its evolution, whereas it is presumed to mean metaphysics by those who argue for the fundamental structure and the nature of the cosmos.

Although the two fields have often interfered with each other in their intellectual history, the foci of the two spheres are different: cosmogony is materialistic and practical, as it is based upon the assumption that the cosmos has evolved out of the primal physical stuff and event, whereas the metaphysical understanding of the cosmos is more constructive and theoretical than materialistic and practical. Thus, it can precipitate a lapse into confusion if one understands the term cosmology to signify both cosmogony and metaphysics simultaneously in a single context. Accordingly, what needs to be identified in modern studies of the Diagram is whether they regard the Diagram (and the Explanation) as cosmogony or metaphysics.

Although Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 once defined the Diagram as cosmogony (*yuzhou fasheng lun* 宇宙發生論), Feng's elaboration of the Diagram as cosmological speculation bears on metaphysics rather than cosmogony.⁵ When Maruyama Masao 丸山眞男 uses the expression "emanatory tendencies" in the Diagram, he understands the Diagram to be a sort of cosmogony.⁶ J. Needham

⁵ Feng claims that Zhou reinterpreted the Diagram originated from Daoist alchemy. Feng's claim was, however, not a cosmogonic interpretation. The expression "their cosmological speculations" seems closer to Feng's meaning. For this expression, see Fung, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, 407-476.

clearly shows his understanding when he uses such terms as "cosmogony," "evolutionary," and "embryology."⁷ Mou Zongsan's 牟宗三 description of the Diagram as the theory of the original substance (*benti* 本體) belongs to metaphysics.⁸ Yamada Keiji 山田慶兒 uses "ontology" in his study of the Diagram, which is compatible with metaphysics.⁹ Lao Siguang's 勞思光 interpretation is based upon his cosmogonic understanding of the Diagram, despite his use of the term "metaphysics" (*xingershangxue* 形而上學).¹⁰

These examples represent two antithetical viewpoints of the Diagram, i.e., cosmogonic and metaphysical interpretations. Their differences are not only regarding the connotations of the term cosmology, but also regarding scholars' perspectives on the Diagram. Generally, the cosmogonic view considers the Diagram to be a mimetic description of the real process or evolution of the cosmos, whereas the metaphysical view defines the Diagram as the speculative construction of the cosmos.

At this juncture, what should be noted about modern scholarship on the Diagram is that most scholars have tried to explicate the characteristics of the Diagram based on the Explanation. In other words, although they often conveniently refer to both the Diagram and the Explanation as "the Diagram," their focus has been on the Explanation, thereby not discussing the uniqueness of the Diagram *per se*. This tendency may overlook a crucial possibility: Zhou Dunyi might not have used the Diagram if he could have expressed his idea successfully without it. In other words, the Diagram itself may have a certain dimension that cannot be described as a narrative form of words. Given the importance of icons in Chinese philosophy—symbols and diagrams have conventionally been used to deliver abstract ideas that cannot be expressed effectively in words—modern scholarship on the Diagram may have some shortcomings. The two different views of the

⁶ Maruyama holds that it was Zhu Xi who reinterpreted the Diagram in a "rationalistic" way. Maruyama, *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*, 20-27.

⁷ Needham, simply put, wants to find some shoot that could have germinated into modern science. In addition, his cosmogonic reading of Zhou seems to relate to the so-called organic viewpoint of the cosmos. Refer to Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol.2, 465-466.

⁸ Mou claims that the Explanation should be read as "the mystic function of the original substance" to signify "many to the one; the one to many," rather than the literal meaning of a linear process of cosmic generation. Refer to his *Xinti yu xingtí*, 1:305-356.

⁹ Yamada, *Ju-zi jayeonhak*, 129-131.

¹⁰ Lao claims that the Diagram and the Explanation have the features of "cosmology" and "metaphysics," but he concentrates on criticism of Zhu Xi's metaphysical understanding by highlighting the cosmogonic or evolutionary features of the Diagram and Explanation. Lao, *Xinbian Zhongguo zhhexueshi*, 3:74-77.

Diagram, i.e., the cosmogonic and metaphysical perspectives, may need investigation through a careful examination of the Diagram itself, rather than merely depending on the Explanation.

Accordingly, this paper will discuss the nature of the Diagram by analyzing the structure of the Diagram *per se*, although occasional reference to the Explanation is inevitable. Of course, inquiries into the Diagram cannot but involve some philological issues, for example, the striking similarity between Zhou's Diagram and other Daoist diagrams. However, the evidence for a philological argument is always open to converse interpretations, sometimes inconclusive, and susceptible to the philosophical presumptions of the interpreters. Given the marked influences of Zhou Dunyi's work on the history of Chinese thought despite the contentious philological issues, it might be more fruitful to extract the underlying philosophical perspectives from Zhou's work *per se* and later interpretations. Hence, I focus on a philosophical reading of the Diagram rather than the philological issues. Presently, this paper will make full use of the unique features of Zhou's Diagram, i.e. the display, sizes, and captions of symbols in the Diagram.

3. Deciphering the Diagram

My hypothesis is that the Diagram as an icon represents Zhou's metaphysics or metaphysical cosmology; in other words, the Diagram is his speculative reconstruction of the cosmic structure. For convenience, the Diagram has been divided into 5 sections, and English translations of the original captions have been added on the Diagram, as seen in Figure (a).

The division seen in the figure is not arbitrary, but obvious in the Diagram and the Explanation. However, what has to be noted is the fact that Zhou did not employ a caption in zone 1 of his original work; nevertheless, we may borrow the caption, "the Ultimateless and yet the Great Ultimate" (*Wuji er Taiji* 無極而太極) from the first sentence of the Explanation.¹¹ Why did Zhou neglect to use a caption in zone 1? Let us call this question (0) for further examination. Besides this enquiry, one might be tempted to ask a series of questions when attempting to read the Diagram:

¹¹ The Diagram used in this paper is taken from the *Seonghak sipdo* 聖學十圖 (Ten Diagrams of Sagely Learning) edited by Yi Hwang. Despite the absence of a caption in the original work, many modern publications have added a caption to zone 1. For example, Zhou, *Zhou Dunyi quanshu*, 31; Bak, *Geunsa rok*, 27.

The Ultimateless (Ultimate of Non-Being)
and yet the Grate Ultimate




Figure (a)




Figure (b)

- (1) Why does the Diagram use so many circles? or, Why is the Great Ultimate expressed in the form of a circle?
- (2) Why does zone 4 use an undivided white circle, despite the fact that its caption refers to male and female (*qian* 乾 and *kun* 坤)?
- (3) Why does zone 5 also use an undivided white circle, despite the caption, “production and transformation of all things”?

Question (1) will be discussed from a broader cultural perspective in the next section, because the logical or necessary reason for the use of circles cannot be identified within the Diagram itself. Questions (2) and (3) as well as (0) may be answered by examining and speculating on the Diagram. Questions (2) and (3) can be supported by the following assumptions:

Question (2): It would be more intelligible to use some sort of binary or divided circle or even two separate circles in zone 4, because the caption mentions heaven and earth, male and female.

Question (3): It would be more reasonable to use a number of dots or small circles in zone 5, because all things are numerous and countless.

These assumptions, however, may reflect that our questions appear to be directed by certain philosophical suppositions. That is to say, our questions may presume that the Diagram is a mimetic chart or the representation of cosmic generation, namely cosmogony. If the Diagram was viewed as a cosmogonic model, the Ultimateless, the Great Ultimate, *yin* 陰 and *yang* 陽, and the Five Phases would have to be regarded as individual substances respectively.¹² In this case, every icon should stand for a single substance. Only when we subscribe to this way of thinking would the foregoing questions be justified.

However, it is not beneficial or effective when deciphering the Diagram because it cannot explain why the gradual augmentation in complexity and the number of icons suddenly stop at zone 4. This predicament suggests that the Diagram may not be a cosmogonic model, and therefore a different approach is needed. The hypothesis is that the Diagram is a speculative reconstruction of the cosmos, i.e., metaphysics, thereby using the same single circle even at zone 4 and zone 5. The Diagram itself seems to represent Zhou's metaphysical scheme. This hypothesis is supported by the following experiment and reading.

As shown in Figure (b), our reading starts from folding the Diagram vertically into two. Figure (b) tells us that zone 2 overlaps with zone 4, and zone 1 with zone 5. They can perfectly overlap one another because they are equal in both shape and size. This overlapping structure may be called a "vertical decalcomania" or "vertical symmetry."

From the folded diagram, we can see two interesting pairs. First, zone 2 and zone 4 are overlapped, and as expressed in the caption, the former signifies "*yin* and *yang*" and the latter stands for "male and female." Therefore, this overlapped set may imply "*yang* : *yin* = *qian* (male) : *kun* (female)." In other words, this first vertical symmetry draws our attention to binary concepts, or the fundamental dyad system of the cosmos.

Secondly, zone 1 and zone 5 overlap each other. Zone 1 is the Great Ultimate; zone 5 signifies all myriad things. This symmetry seems to emphasize the unity between these two elements. However, what is of note in this overlapping set is that the Great Ultimate as the begetter of all myriad things is now equated with all myriad things. This may indicate that the Great Ultimate is not the cosmogonic origin which is often expressed in such

¹² If we identify the Ultimateless with the Great Ultimate, it would be possible to consider the first circle to stand for both the Ultimateless and the Great Ultimate. Otherwise, the Great Ultimate should be identified with the largest or smallest concentric circle of zone 2.

biological analogies as the seed and shoot. If we assume that the Great Ultimate is first generated, then we would expect that the Great Ultimate exists as either the center or genetic nucleus inside all myriad things. However, this assumption fails to take account of the second overlapping set, which casts light on the identical shape and size of zone 1 and zone 5 in the Diagram. It seems plausible to assume that the Great Ultimate is a sort of totality or the cosmos itself that can encompass all myriad things, although we can still call it begetter as the fundamental basis of the cosmos.




Figure (c)




Figure (d)

Another possible interpretation is that the already folded diagram may be folded again (Figure (c)–A.) since the first and second sets consist of the same sized circles. This newly overlapped set can be interpreted to imply “the Great Ultimate = all myriad things = *yin* and *yang* = male and female.” In fact, zone 3 already overlaps zone 1 in the sense that the lower white small circle of zone 3 stands for zone 1, and encompasses the five phases. Now we may fold the twice folded diagram once again in our mind. (Figure (c)–B.) Consequently, it follows that the Diagram implies “the Great Ultimate = the Five Phases = *yin* and *yang* = *qian* and *kun*, or male and female = all myriad things.” This structure obtained from our last folding can be called isomorphic repetition (Figure (d)).

Each circle has its own quality and significance as referred to in each caption; nevertheless, they still maintain and reiterate the Great Ultimate. The structure of vertical symmetry can be reduced to isomorphic repetition at the last, but each structure has its own focus: the vertical symmetry

emphasizes a binary or dyad system of the cosmos and unity of the one and many, whereas the structure of isomorphic repetition shows the Great Ultimate as both begetter and totality, because the Great Ultimate is engraved in all things as the origin or fundamental basis, encompassing all myriad things and all constituents of the cosmos.

From the preceding commentary, we may infer that the Diagram should be considered to have a metaphysical structure, which is a speculative reconstruction of the cosmos rather than a mimetic picture of the generation. We can further assume that Zhou purposely employed identically sized circles in zone 4 and zone 5 for his metaphysical plan. Question (0) can therefore be answered by the structure of isomorphic repetition: Zhou Dunyi did not require any caption for zone 1 because every zone is nothing but a repetition of the Great Ultimate.

4. Zhu Xi and Yi Hwang on the Diagram

As to what distinctive feature or constitution the Diagram itself has, Zhu Xi also seems to possess similar ideas compatible with the thesis of this paper. As seen in Figure (e), Zhu continues to emphasize the white circle, O. We may say that he is well aware of the structure of isomorphic repetition. It is notable that he picks up two different sized circles from zone 2, which are “this O” (*ci* 此 O, the outermost circle of the *yin-yang* concentric circles) and “central o” (*zhong* 中 o, the innermost circle of the *yin-yang* concentric circles). This is indicative of a possibility that he might have kept in mind two simultaneous meanings of the Great Ultimate, i.e. begetter and totality. This suggestion gains strength from his explanations in the *Taijitu shuo jie* 太極圖說解 (Commentaries on the *Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate*):

Figure (e)¹³

O (zone 4) [stands for the truth that] Heaven and male, Earth and female refer to the transformation of material force, and each thing has its own nature, but all myriad things are reduced to the one Great Ultimate.

O [zone 5] [stands for the truth that] the transformation and creation of all myriad things refer to transformation into corporeality, and each thing has its own nature, but all myriad things are reduced to the one Great Ultimate.¹⁴

Both explanations are compatible with his explanation of zone 2 in Figure (e) in the sense that the above two sentences seem to encompass both concepts of the central small “o” in the form of nature and the big “O” in the form of the Great Ultimate. However, ultimately, both circles are supposed to be identical to each other because every circle in the Diagram refers to the Great Ultimate, as Zhu Xi suggests in his explanation of zone 3:¹⁵

¹³ This image is from *Jin seonghak sipdo cha* 進聖學十圖筌 (1568) in H. Yi, *Toegye jeonse*, 7:10a. In this chart, Zhu Xi's understanding of the Diagram is effectively abridged without distortion.

¹⁴ H. Yi, *Toegye jeonseo*, 7:10a; Zhu Xi's *Taijitu jiyi* 太極圖解義 in Hu, *Xingli daquan*, 1:3a; Zhou, *Zhou Dunyi quanshu*, 31-34: "O 乾男坤女，以氣化者言也，各一其性，而男女一太極也。"; "O 萬物化生，以形化者言也，各一其性，而萬物一太極也。"

¹⁵ This emphasis on the Great Ultimate might raise some questions because the Great Ultimate in Zhu Xi's philosophy is generally regarded as only principle without activity. Scholars such as Feng Youlan and Mou Zongsan suggest that Zhu Xi considered the Great Ultimate "no movement or still." However, Teng Aimin points out that the Great Ultimate still cannot

^w
 ○ [the lowest circle of zone 3] is the reason why the Ultimateless is wondrously synthesized with the five phases, and there is no gap between two.¹⁶

At this juncture, the concept of “time” needs to be discussed because the isomorphic repetition seems to focus more on synchronic structure rather than diachronic generation. Yi Hwang shows a clearer understanding of the isomorphic repetition and synchronicity in the Diagram.




Figure (f)

The “Cheonmyeong sindo” 天命新圖 (New Diagram of Heavenly Mandate, Figure (f)) by Yi Hwang and Jeong Ji-un 鄭之雲 (1501-1561, Chuman 秋巒)¹⁷ can be deemed a new version of Zhou’s diagram, for they claimed that the “Cheonmyeong sindo” was not intended as an amendment of the Diagram, but rather as a new

be proven by both *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 (A Classified Collection of the Conversations of Master Zhu) and *Zhuzi wenji* 朱子文集 (Collected Writings of Master Zhu), although Zhu Xi clearly often referred to the Great Ultimate as “only principle” and “not moving.” Teng, “On Chu Hsi’s Theory of the Great Ultimate,” 96-99.

¹⁶ H. Yi, *Toegye jeonseo*, 7:10a; Zhu Xi’s *Taijitu jieyi* in Hu, *Xingli daquan*, 1:3a; Zhou, *Zhou Dunyi quanshu*, 31-34: “○ 此無極二五所以妙合而無間也。”

¹⁷ H. Yi, “Cheonmyeongdo seol huseo (budo)” 天命圖說後敘(附圖) in *Toegye jeonseo*, 41:11a.

expression of the Diagram according to their divergent focus.¹⁸ Yi Hwang thought that the narrative and flow form of Zhou's Diagram and Explanation is conducive to understanding the origin and mysterious transformation of the cosmos, while his Diagram reveals and highlights the (ontologically) right positions of all beings in the synchronically overlapped structure.¹⁹

However, as Yamada Keiji already pointed out,²⁰ zone 3 of the Diagram shows a generation process likened to diachronicity, and around the circumference of Yi Hwang's diagram, time references which include symbols for the four seasons, i.e. *yuan heng li zhen* 元亨利貞 are written down. Nevertheless, we cannot continue to claim that the Diagrams stand for diachronic generation, because the five phases return to the origin in Zhou's diagram, and time references are circulating in Yi Hwang's diagram. Accordingly, their iconology perhaps has the goal of showing the synchronic structure of the cosmos while taking into consideration the process of cosmic generation or evolution, in which the concept of time or narrative form is inevitably involved.

5. Possible Association with Others

Finally, question (0) has to be answered. It does not make sense to say that a circle is easier to draw than other icons. The image of the circle in Chinese culture at the time was related to the cosmos or the universe. This spherical or circular image of the cosmos had been dominant since Zhang Heng's 張衡 (78-139) "Huntian shuo" 渾天說 (armillary sphere theory) was proposed.²¹ The "Huntian shuo" as an astronomical and calendar theory had been merged with the philosophy of the *Yijing* 易經 (Book of Changes) where the concept of the Great Ultimate emerged.²² As J. Needham points out, the concept

¹⁸ H. Yi, "Cheonmyeongdo seol huseo (budo)" in *Toegye jeonseo*, 41:3a-b.

¹⁹ H. Yi, "Cheonmyeongdo seol huseo (budo)" in *Toegye jeonseo*, 41:1a-10a.

²⁰ Yamada, *Juja-ui jayeonhak*, 129-131.

²¹ Even before the Huntian model came to prevail, the idea of "round heaven and square earth" (*tian yuan di fang* 天圓地方) had been in wide currency. According to Kim Ihill Gwon, this idea was common in the six kinds of astronomical models, although each model defines it distinctly. Refer to his "Dongyang cheonmun-ui beomju-wa geu segyegwanjeogin yeokhal," 43-45. As for a detailed explanation of Zhang Heng's theory, refer to Yamada, *Juja-ui jayeonhak*, 69-196.

²² Kim Ihill Gwon points out the synthesis of the *Yijing* with the calendar and astronomy. In other words, during the Eastern Han period, the symbolological and numerological study of the *Yijing* (*Xiangshu Yixue* 象數易學) incorporated the calendaring system. See Kim, "Dongyang cheonmun-ui beomju-wa geu segyegwanjeogin yeokhal," 47. Nakayama Shigeru 中山茂 has already pointed out that, within the East Asian calendaring or season-granting

of “ultimate” (*ji* 極) is associated with the astronomical pole as well as the ridge-pole.²³ This indicates how the Great Ultimate could relate to astronomical thought.



Figure (g)²⁴



Figure (h)²⁵

The philosophical meanings of the round cosmos are twofold: (1) “totality” in the sense that the cosmos encompasses all myriad things, and all things also constitute the universe. (2) “begetter” in the sense that all myriad things come into existence and live by virtue of the cosmos. Both meanings of the cosmos are the same as those of the Great Ultimate. In addition, we can see how astronomical thinking is synthesized with the concept of the Great Ultimate in Figure (h).²⁶ As seen in Figures (i) and (j), Neo-Confucian interest in the armillary sphere may indicate how “Huntian shuo” influenced Neo-Confucian philosophy.


system, numericism rather than geometry has prevailed. See, Nakayama, “The Digital Revolution and East Asian Science,” 3-13. However, since the Eastern Han period, hexagrams and figures of the *Yijing* had been adopted by many scholars because the figures of the *Yijing* helped them conceptually figure out the movements of nature.

²³ Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, 464.

²⁴ This picture is Su Song’s 蘇頌 armillary sphere, *Xin yixiang fayao* 新儀象法要 in 1092. Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 3, 351.

²⁵ Feng, *Zhouyi sanjituguan*, 134.

²⁶ Although “time” is taken into consideration, it is basically cyclical within the framework. It seems plausible to think that this prevailing image of the cosmos at the time influenced Zhou Dunyi and later scholars’ understanding of the cosmos.

Figure (i)²⁷Figure (j)²⁸

The two meanings of the Great Ultimate seem to provide two directions for deciphering the Diagram. In other words, we have to read the Diagram downward in order to explain the flow or structure in which the one fundamental origin makes all beings exist; upward in order to grasp the idea of unity or totality. As we have seen in the isomorphic repetition of the Diagram and Zhu Xi's understanding of the Diagram, if all myriad things in our world already contain the Great Ultimate or noumenon, and the human being already contains the Great Ultimate, there is no better way than speculating from and within ourselves to understand the metaphysical structure of the cosmos. Zhu Xi and Yi Hwang's understanding of the Diagram can support this assertion.

However, in relation to these directions for reading the Diagram, we cannot but be reminded of Daoist thought. Isabelle Robinet has drawn an interesting comparison between Daoist and Confucian cosmogony when explaining the "Taiyi sheng shui" 太一生水 (The Great One gives birth to water) and Daoist cosmogony. According to Robinet, Daoist cosmogony has both directions of "descending (*shun* 順), or creation" and "ascending (*ni* 逆, returning to the source), or generation of cinnabar (*shengdan* 生丹)," whereas Confucian cosmogony has only the descending direction which

²⁷ This is Yi Hwang's armillary sphere for the education of his students, kept in Okjinkak 玉振閣 in Dosan Seowon 陶山書院 (Dosan Confucian Academy).

²⁸ "Seongi okhyeong do" 璿璣玉衡圖 (Figure of the Jade Armillary Sphere) in "Shundian" 舜典, "Yushu" 虞書 of *Seojeon daejeon jipju* 書傳大全集注 published in Joseon Korea in 1620. The figure was introduced to explain the sentence: "[Shun] took control of the seven directive stars, [i.e. calendric matters] through the jade frame" (在璿璣玉衡, 以齊七政).

leads to the creation of human beings.²⁹ As for the concept of “returning” (*fu* 復), she points out that the Confucian concept of returning in the *Yijing* refers to the resumption of light and movement, but in the Daoist sense, it is returning to the origin.³⁰

However, what we have seen in the Diagram and in later Confucians’ understanding is not the resumption of light and movement, but enlightenment on the origin or totality. This assertion also appears to be supported by the Neo-Confucian notion of “returning to the original (human) nature” (*fixing* 復性) because the concept of nature (*xing*) in Neo-Confucianism is equivalent to the Great Ultimate and principle (*li*), namely the origin, and immediately after returning to the original, universal nature, we become aware of the totality or unity of all myriad things. In other words, the Neo-Confucian notion “*fixing*” is allied with the important theses of Neo-Confucian metaphysics and ethics: “Principle is one, yet its manifestations are many” (*liyi fenshu* 理一分殊), “We are all from the same womb” (*tongbao* 同胞), and the “Unity of all myriad things” (*wanwu yiti* 萬物一體), which can support both the downward and upward reading of the Diagram.

Our understanding of Zhou’s Diagram and Robinet’s understanding of Daoist cosmogony help formulate two hypotheses: (1) Zhou Dunyi’s (and his followers’) metaphysical scheme as seen in the Diagram suggests an upward or ascending reading, based on its metaphysically synchronized thinking model, as opposed to a diachronic cosmogonic model (2) Zhou’s metaphysical cosmology may be a metaphysical reinterpretation of Daoist cosmogony and internal alchemy.³¹ However, these hypotheses do not necessarily imply that Zhou’s Diagram was transmitted from Daoism; rather, it can suggest that Neo-Confucian metaphysics, including Zhou’s thought, were formed in dynamic interaction with other schools of thought including Daoism.

These hypotheses provide a clue to our questions about the formation and unfolding of Neo-Confucianism. For example, “Why did Zhu Xi and other Neo-Confucians study Daoism (including internal alchemy)?”; “How were their interests in Daoism related to their philosophical position?”; “Was Wang Bi 王弼 (226-249), a Daoist metaphysician, only a Daoist philosopher

²⁹ Allan, *The Guodian Laozi*, 167.

³⁰ Robinet, “Lun Taiyi sheng shui,” 332-339.

³¹ As generally known, internal alchemy first incorporated the *Yijing* in the *Zhouyi cantong qi* 周易參同契 (The Seal of the Unity of the Three in Accordance with the *Zhouyi*). In the *Zhouyi cantong qi*, the image of the circle is regarded as the golden elixir, the highest achievement within internal alchemy.

who influenced Neo-Confucianism?"; and "How about Heshang Gong 河上公 (?-?) who provided the prototype of Daoist alchemy?"

Besides, the possibility of an "upward or ascending" reading of the Diagram may be indicative of the germination of the so-called unorthodox streams of Neo-Confucianism, such as *qi*-oriented Neo-Confucianism and the school of the heart-mind (*xinxue* 心學), because they held that any learning regarding the human being and the cosmos must start and extend from what we have now. In other words, they asserted that the ultimate enlightenment should be gained from concrete things, material force, and the heart-mind (*xin*). An understanding of these aspects is tantamount to the upward understanding. For them, this approach was the only way to understand the unity of man and Heaven (the cosmos), and the origin of all creatures. Accordingly, the rise of these unorthodox streams might be regarded as the natural unfolding of Zhou Dunyi's and Zhu Xi's metaphysical thought, because the upward or radically synchronized reading of the Diagram may be considered to have caused this unfolding.

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解密“太極圖”的一個方法

金 學 材

中文摘要

本文旨在通過對周敦頤(1017-1073)的《太極圖說》中圖像本身的結構進行研究,而確定以“太極圖”的特點作為形而上學(存有論)的宇宙論,而不是真正一個生成論的宇宙論(“宇宙發生論”)並概述一些衍生的問題。為確定以“太極圖”的特點作為形而上學的宇宙論,本文顯示,“太極圖”的流程結構具有“垂直對稱(vertical symmetry)”和“同構重複(isomorphic repetition)”的特徵。這中業已暗涵周敦頤的圖像學顯具一種形而上學的特徵。

朱熹(1130-1200)也似乎把“太極圖”解釋為反映宇宙的形而上學結構的圖像,而不是模仿宇宙生長的圖像。本文以朝鮮李滉(1502-1571)和鄭之雲(1509-1561)的《天命新圖》作為支持我們對周敦頤·朱熹的“太極圖”理解的最佳例子之一。

總之,本文提出,周敦頤的“太極圖”和朱熹的形而上學解釋起到新儒家思想後期展開的啟動作用。

關鍵詞：周敦頤, “太極圖”, 《太極圖說》, 朱熹, 《太極圖說解》, 李滉, 鄭之雲, “天命新圖”

The Substance of the Mind and the Immortality of the Self in Zhu Xi: In Relation to the *Guishen-hunpo* Theory

KIM Woo-hyung

Abstract

In this article, I discuss the conceptions of the substance of the mind (*xin*) and the immortality of the self in relation to the *guishen-hunpo* theory in Zhu Xi's philosophy. Zhu Xi interprets *guishen* as the two functions of *qi* and intelligible natural phenomena. He also explains that *hunpo*, or human *guishen*, is the material substance of the mind. *Hunpo* is the most flourishing state of *guishen* and performs the cognitive function. However, in the same way as things composed of *qi*, the mind also experiences birth and death depending on the gathering and scattering of *qi*. In contrast, the original substance of the mind is equivalent to eternal *li* (*xing*) which cannot gather or scatter. Reconstructing the concept of the original substance (*benti*) on the foundation of cosmological *li-qi* dualism, Zhu Xi insists that the original self is immortal as it is the original substance of the mind. Zhu Xi recommends cultivating the self from the universe-centered perspective grounded on this understanding. Justifying sacrificial rites for ancestors in his theory of *li-qi*, Zhu Xi claims that their *hunpo* can reappear in their descendants' minds based on the cosmological principle (*li*); since the cosmological principle contains all the information and history of the ancestors, it can reproduce everything regarding those ancestors. Zhu Xi's view of the immortal self deserves to be evaluated as a creative thought.

Keywords: mind (*xin*), *benti* (original substance), self, immortality, *guishen* (spiritual beings), *hunpo* (human soul), Zhu Xi

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1. Introduction

The aim of this article is to shed light on Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130-1200) thoughts on the substance of the mind (*xin* 心) and the immortality of the self in relation to his theory of *guishen* 鬼神 (spiritual beings, generally translated as "ghosts and spirits") and *hunpo* 魂魄 (human *guishen*, or soul). Although Zhu Xi's conception of the self has hardly been investigated as the primary subject, there have been considerable studies which have illuminated the characteristics of the Confucian self as a whole.¹ For example, the Confucian self tends to stress the ceaseless process of self-cultivation based on the organic unity between body and mind. The Confucian self needs to not only be broadened to include the family, community, country, and world, but also deepened to form one body with Heaven-and-Earth and myriad things through self-cultivation, aiming for the ultimate transformation.² It is also worth noting that the Confucian ideal self, which must be attained through self-cultivation, requires the concept of *benti* 本體 (original substance) as its goal and the underlying basis of self-cultivation.³ The propensity of modern scholars to explain the Confucian conception of the self on the foundation of *benti* can be traced to Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909-1995). He insists that the transcendent self in Confucianism is none other than *benti* as the original substance.⁴

¹ On the Confucian self as a whole, see Hall and Ames, *Thinking from the Han*; Ames, Dissanayake, and Kasulis, *Self as Person in Asian Theory and Practice*; Cheng, "A Theory of Confucian Selfhood," 124-147; Munro, *Individualism and Holism*; and Ames, "Using English to Speak Confucianism," 33-41. Although the previous studies did not distinguish the early Confucian self from the Neo-Confucian conception, the division between the two may be useful for a more accurate understanding.

² Tu, "Embodying the Universe," 177-186.

³ Cheng Chung-ying defines "*benti*" as follows: "it (*benti*) is the source of reality that gives rise to the cosmos, life, and all things in the world, forming and transforming them, ceaselessly sustaining and completing them—hence presenting itself as the ultimate reality of all things." In general, while the conception of *benti* was established in Laozi's *dao* 道, its source could be traced to *Yijing* 易經 (Book of Changes). In relation to the self, Cheng regards *benti* as the underlying unity between mind and body as well as subject and object. See Cheng, "On the Metaphysical Significance of *Ti* (Body-Embodiment) in Chinese Philosophy," 146 and 150. To the question, "what makes the ultimate transformation possible?" Tu Wei-ming will probably agree to posit *benti*. However, since Zhu Xi's usage of the term is for referring to *li* (principle) in *li-qi* dualism, it is distinct from Cheng's monistic explanation. I will further explicate this idea later.

⁴ Mou, *Zhide zhijue yu zhongguo zhexue*, 162-183. He classifies the self into three types: (1) the logical self of apperception in the Kantian sense; (2) the transcendent self as the simple substance known by intellectual intuition; and (3) the phenomenal empirical self felt

The concept of *benti* is efficacious to elucidate some issues on the Confucian self, particularly the eternality of the mind and nature (*xing* 性), which is a substitute for the immortality of the soul in Western thought. However, this concept is controversial due to various interpretations of it, nor is it uniformly applicable to the history of Confucian philosophy. Furthermore, although Zhu Xi himself establishes *benti* as a philosophical concept, he basically criticizes all views that advocate any eternal mind and spirits based on the original substance in the Daoist and Chinese Buddhist senses. As a matter of fact, while granting new meaning to the concept of *benti* in a cosmological context, Zhu Xi argues for the immortality of the self in a unique way which defies the established tradition. That is, he suggests that the mind and self are not a spiritual essence or substance separate from the material world, but are generated from the combination of *qi* 氣 (material force) and *li* 理 (principle), much like all other things in the universe.⁵ On the other hand, interestingly, he asserts that the immortality of the original self is rooted in *li*.

In this paper, I aim to illuminate Zhu Xi's creative thoughts on the substance of the mind and the immortality of the self. The reason for linking the substance of the mind and the immortality of the self to his theory of *guishen* and *hunpo* is that when he says "the mind is the spirit of *qi*" or "the agent of awareness is spiritual *qi*," what he means is nothing but *guishen* and *hunpo*.⁶ Above all, discussing the subject of immortality inevitably involves the theme of *guishen* and *hunpo*. Thus, based on previous studies about Zhu Xi's theory of *guishen* and *hunpo*, I will examine the substance of the mind and the immortality of the self.⁷ The purpose of this paper is

by sensual intuition. Mou insists that the true self is (2) as the original substance, while (3) is temporarily prescribed and constituted by the categories that (1) generates.

⁵ Two explanations are offered concerning the component of the mind in Zhu Xi's philosophy: one regards the mind as something reducible to *qi* while the other considers it as the mixture of *qi* and *li*. The former is influenced by Mou Zongsan who suggests that "since *xin* mentioned by Zhu Xi was empirical mind and mind of spiritual *qi*, it could be regarded only as psychological mind." See Mou, *Xinti yu xingti*, 3:239. On the latter explanation, see Chen, *Zhu Xi zhaxue yanjiu*, 158.

⁶ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 5:85: "心者，氣之精爽，所覺者，心之理也，能覺者，氣之靈也"; *Zhuzi yulei*, 68:1686: "安卿問，心之精爽，是謂魂魄？曰，只是此意"; *Zhuzi yulei*, 2:24: "草木之生自有箇神，它自不能生，在人則心便是，所謂形既生矣，神發知矣，是也。"

⁷ On Zhu Xi's view of *guishen* and *hunpo*, see Gardner, "Ghosts and Spirits in the Sung Neo-Confucian World," 598-611; Miura, *Shushi to ki to shintai*, 83-129; Y. Kim, *The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi*, 91-107 and 223-230; Ching, *The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi*, 54-71; Tillman, "Zhu Xi's Prayers to the Spirit of Confucius and Claim to the Transmission of the Way," 489-513; and W. Kim, "Jujahak-eseo honbaengnon-ui gujo-wa simseongnon-gwaui gwangye," 119-148.

to answer the following questions: When Zhu Xi asserts that the material substance of the mind is the so-called *guishen* and *hunpo* which are composed of the special *qi*, what implication does this assertion have? How does he account for the original substance (*ti* 體) and phenomenal function (*yong* 用) of the mind? Is it possible to expound the immortality of the self on the foundation of *li*? In order to answer these questions, I will first examine Zhu Xi's views on *guishen* and *hunpo* which correspond to the material substance of the mind, and then deal with his reestablishment of the concept of *benti* in relation to the substance and function of the mind. My final elucidation is concerning his argument for the immortality of the self on the basis of *li*, the cosmological principle.

2. *Guishen* and *Hunpo* as the Material Substance of the Mind

Generally speaking, *guishen* refers to all spiritual beings, such as human spirits and natural deities that are venerated in sacrificial rites and foretell in divination, while *hunpo* only refers to human *guishen*. The discourse on *guishen* and *hunpo* has its provenance in the very earliest historical period of Confucianism.⁸ When questioned about serving *guishen*, Kongzi answered "while you are not able to serve people, how can you serve the spirits?" However, he piously performed religious rituals for his ancestors as if they were present.⁹ His basic attitude to *guishen* could be summarized as follows: "Respect *guishen*, but keep them at a distance. This may be called wisdom."¹⁰ However, some texts, which have been regarded as Kongzi's view for a long time, positively explicate *guishen* and *hunpo*. For example, in the "Jiyi" 祭義 (Meaning of Sacrifices) chapter of *Liji* 禮記 (Book of Rites), Kongzi accounts for *hunpo* and *guishen*: human *hunpo* is the flourishing state of natural *guishen*. The active part (*hun*) ascends to the heavens and the static part (*po*) descends to the earth at the moment of death.¹¹

⁸ On the original meaning of *hunpo* in China, see Yu, "'O Soul, Come Back!,'" 363-395.

⁹ *Lunyu* 11.11 and 3.12.

¹⁰ *Lunyu* 6.20: "敬鬼神而遠之，可謂知矣。"

¹¹ *Liji zhushu*, 47:14a-15a: Kongzi states that "*Qi* is the flourishing state of *shen*, and *po* is the flourishing state of *gui*. Therefore, only by explicating *gui* and *shen* together does it become the utmost teaching. All living things inevitably die, and after death they go back to earth. This is called *gui*. Since bones and flesh go down to earth, *yin* becomes the soil of the field. *Qi* sends itself forth upward, emits shine and flavor, and makes the atmosphere sorrowful. This is the entity of myriad things and the appearance of *shen*" (子曰，

If we read Kongzi's explanation in *Liji* as a discussion of the substance of the mind, his account is subtly different from Mengzi, who differentiates the mind from *qi* which constitutes the body. According to Mengzi, since the will of the mind directs *qi*, it should be considered as the "greater substance" and its essential part should be distinguished from *qi*.¹² At any rate, Northern Song Neo-Confucians in the eleventh century, at least regarding the issue of *guishen* and *hunpo*, developed the naturalistic perspective reflected in texts such as "Jiyi" of *Liji* and "Xici" 繫辭 (Appended Remarks) of *Zhouyi* 周易 (Book of Changes). They note as follows: because *guishen* and *hunpo* are included in natural *qi*, they are not supernatural and otherworldly entities, but intelligible and explicable phenomena. For example, while Zhang Zai 張載 (1020-1077) explains that "*guishen* is the inherent functions of two *qi*,"¹³ Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107) considers it "a function of Heaven" and "the trace of natural creation."¹⁴ Those remarks imply that *guishen* is merely the two functions of *yin* 陰 (passive, static force) and *yang* 陽 (positive, active force) that are intrinsic to the cosmological *qi* which forms Heaven-and-Earth and all things in the universe. While the attributes of *yin* cause folding and contraction, the properties of *yang* engender expansion and radiation.¹⁵ Zhu Xi is in favor of Zhang's definition for its clearness. Even so, he supports the essence of their *qi*-based naturalistic perspective. Zhu Xi says:

Guishen is nothing more than the extinction and growth of *yin* and *yang*. The production and nurturing of all creatures, wind blowing, raining, and darkening are all caused by *guishen*. In human beings, *jing* 精 (passive energy) corresponds to *po* which is the flourishing of *gui*, while *qi* (active energy) is allotted to *hun* which is the flourishing of *shen*. Since the combination of *jing* and *qi* produces all things, there is nothing that does not contain *guishen*. As "wandering *hun* causes transformation,"¹⁶ we are able to know that *po* descends when *hun* wanders.¹⁷

氣也者，神之盛也，魄也者，鬼之盛也。合鬼與神，教之至也。衆生必死，死必歸土，此之謂鬼。骨肉斃于下，陰爲野土。其氣發揚于上，爲昭明煇蒿悽愴，此百物之精也，神之著也。In this passage, *qi*, which refers to *hunqi* 魂氣, is used instead of *hun*.

¹² Mengzi, 2A.2, 6A.5, and 7A.21. Mengzi denotes *xin* as *dati* 大體 (greater substance) in comparison with *xiaoti* 小體 (smaller substance) which indicates sense organs and the body. This division seems to posit another original component of the mind other than *qi*.

¹³ Zhang, *Zhang Zai ji*, 9: "鬼神者，二氣之良能也。"

¹⁴ Cheng and Cheng, *Er Cheng ji*, 695: "夫天 . . . 以功用謂之鬼神，以妙用謂之神"; *Er Cheng ji*, 705: "鬼神者，造化之迹也。"

¹⁵ The movement of *qu* 屈 (contraction) by *yin* and the movement of *shen* 伸 (expansion) by *yang* correspond to *gui* and *shen* respectively. Gardner, "Ghosts and Spirits in the Sung Neo-Confucian World," 600-601.

¹⁶ *Zhouyi*, "Xici shang" 繫辭上: "精氣爲物，遊魂爲變，是故知鬼神之情狀。"

Zhu Xi says *guishen* is only the two functions of *qi* which constitute Heaven-and-Earth and myriad things. Therefore, all the formations and transformations in the universe can be regarded as the results of *guishen*. Based on a passage from “Xici” of *Zhouyi*, Zhu Xi explains that human beings also consist of *gui* (*jing*) and *shen* (*qi*). That is, the human mind comprises *po* and *hun*, the most flourishing state of *gui* and *shen* respectively.¹⁸ If *hun* and *po* are separated from each other by *hun*’s ascent and *po*’s descent, a man will come to death.

Meanwhile, *hunpo* as the most prospering form of *guishen* shows itself as the cognitive activity (*zhijue* 知覺) of the mind. Zhu Xi states that “the human being’s ability to think and plan owes to the activity of *hun*, while the capacity to memorize and discriminate is due to the action of *po*.”¹⁹ In other words, cognitive abilities such as perceiving, memorizing, discriminating, thinking, and planning belong to *hunpo*.²⁰ *Hunpo* is the most flourishing state of *guishen* (*jingqi*) in the natural world, and therefore it follows that the material substance of the mind is nothing but *qi*. According to Zhu Xi, as long as all things in the universe are composed of *qi*, they naturally perish without exception. He adds that when one is at death, “along with the exhaustion of *qi* his cognition also gets to be exhausted completely.”²¹ In this vein, he sharply criticizes the view that the mind experiences no birth or death:

The assertion that the mind experiences no birth or death is similar to the Buddhist view of transmigration. When Heaven-and-Earth created myriad things, human beings gained excellent *qi* and became the most spiritual beings. The so-called the mind (*xin*) is an empty and spiritual thing owning cognitive property, just as the ears can hear and the eyes can see. Heaven-and-Earth itself has existed persistently from the past to the present without formation and extinction, whereas human beings and things have

¹⁷ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 3:34: “鬼神不過陰陽消長而已。亨毒化育，風雨晦冥，皆是。在人則精是魄，魄者鬼之盛也。氣是魂，魂者神之盛也。精氣聚而為物，何物而無鬼神！遊魂為變，魂遊則魄之降可知。”

¹⁸ Zhu Xi explains the relationship among *jingqi*, *hunpo*, and *guishen*: “*jingqi* denotes general things and *hunpo* is a term for human beings, while *guishen* refers to something detached from human beings.” (Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 63:1544: “精氣就物而言，魂魄就人而言，鬼神離乎人而言。”) In this regard, *jingqi* is the same as *qizhi* 氣質 (psychophysical matter-energy), and the most flourishing state of *jingqi* or *qizhi* is called as *hunpo*.

¹⁹ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 3:43: “人之能思慮計畫者，魂之為也，能記憶辨別者，魄之為也。”

²⁰ W. Kim, *Ju Hui cheolhak-ui insongnon*, 140.

²¹ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 63:1551: “問，人死時，這知覺便散否？曰，不是散，是盡了，氣盡則知覺亦盡。” Since *qi* cannot come to nonbeing, this “exhaustion” means that *qi* vanishes into the universe. In this respect, Zhu Xi’s interpretation of death is novel and more scientific than the traditional explanation that suggests complete separation of *hunpo*. His interpretation seems to require a principle to control the formation and extinction of a thing.

a beginning and an end as they have a material body. If he knew that *li* is one but its manifestations are many, why would he astound scholars with the theory that the mind experiences no birth or death?²²

In the above quotation, Zhu Xi criticizes Hu Hong 胡宏 (1106-1161), the Hunan 湖南 school's previous leader, who insisted that the mind experiences no birth or death. Zhu Xi insists that since human beings gained the highest optimal *qi*, the mind has the best spiritual function of cognition among all living creatures. Nevertheless, like all things composed of *qi*, the mind also cannot but have a beginning and an end. In contrast to the eternal Heaven-and-Earth, all individual things in the universe come to existence by the condensation of *qi*, and die out by the dispersion of *qi*. The mind has no exception in this law. Hu Hong disregards the material side of the mind, finally establishing the theory of the immortal mind, which seems to be a new version of the Buddhist transmigration theory.

However, Hu's theory of the immortal mind is not the same as the transmigration theory premised on immortal spirits or ghosts. Rather it appears to be a new doctrine influenced by the conception of the original substance in Daoism and Chinese Buddhism represented by Huayan 華嚴 and Chanzong 禪宗. Hu suggests that nature (*xing*) is the fundamental substance that gives rise to Heaven-and-Earth and myriad things, while the mind supervises the manifestations of nature.²³ In other words, nature and mind correspond to the substance (*ti*) and the function (*yong*) respectively, the two aspects of one ultimate reality. Therefore, Hu argues that the mind does not experience birth and death as it is the ontological original substance. In contrast, Zhu Xi considers the mind as the agent of cognition and practice and not as one side of ultimate reality. The material substance of the mind is composed of the empty and spiritual *qi* (*hunpo*) which reveals itself by the cognitive function. The mind can realize the particular principles of things through its cognitive function on the premise that "*li* is one but the manifestations are many." However, insofar as it consists of *qi*, the mind is subject to the law of birth and death. Even so, it does not mean that Zhu Xi entirely denies the conception of the original substance and the immortality of the self. Rejecting the ultimate substance in the Daoist and

²² Zhu, *Zhu Xi ji*, 73:3863: "心無死生，則幾於釋氏輪迴之說矣。天地生物，人得其秀而最靈。所謂心者，乃夫虛靈知覺之性，猶耳目之有聞見耳。在天地則通古今而無成壞，在人物則隨形氣而有始終。知其理一而分殊，則亦何必爲是心無死生之說以駭學者之聽乎？"

²³ Zhu, *Zhu Xi ji*, 73:3862: "知言曰...性也者，天地之所以立也"; *Zhu Xi ji*, 73:3858: "心也者，知天地宰萬物以成性者也。"

Chinese Buddhist senses, he reconstructs the concept of *benti* on the ground of *li-qi* cosmology.²⁴

3. *Xing* and *Li* as the Original Substance of the Mind

In Zhu Xi's philosophy, the *hunpo* theory provides a psychological explanation regarding the functions of the mind. It is worth noting that he mainly concentrates on the cognitive functions of thinking and perception rather than volition and intention. For instance, as mentioned already, "the ability to think and consider is *hun*; on the other hand, the capacity to memorize the past is *po*."²⁵ In this case, *po*'s functions of perception and memorization can be included as part of reception and storage, which are the general functions of *yin*. Meanwhile, *hun*'s functions of thinking and considering are involved in the functions of operation and manifestation of *yang*. Zhu Xi says:

Yin controls reception and storage, while *yang* is in charge of operation. In general, the ability to memorize is *po*'s reception and storage, whereas operation and manifestation belong to *hun*. The two basically cannot be separated from each other. We are able to memorize thanks to *po*, but what is memorized is manifested by *hun*. We are able to perceive owing to *po*, but what is perceived is manifested by *hun*. Although they are divided into *yin* and *yang*, each has *yin* and *yang* inside.²⁶

Since *yin* and *yang* embrace each other, their functions rely on each other. In other words, *po*'s reception and storage require *hun*'s operation and manifestation, and vice versa. Nevertheless, *hun*'s operation and manifestation are more important than the functions of *po*, because the cognitive function cannot work without the operation principle and manifestations of *li*. In this respect, the cognition of the mind results from the combination of *li* and *qi*.²⁷

²⁴ In the development of Zhu Xi's philosophy, the so-called "*zhonghe* 中和 debate" with Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133-1180) implies the rejection of the Daoist and Chinese Buddhist conceptions of the original substance.

²⁵ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 3:41: "會思量計度底便是魂，會記當去底便是魄。"

²⁶ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 87:2259: "陰主藏受，陽主運用。凡能記憶，皆魄之所藏受也，至於運用發出來是魂。這兩箇物事本不相離。他能記憶底是魄，然發出來底便是魂；能知覺底是魄，然知覺發出來底又是魂。雖各自分屬陰陽，然陰陽中又各自有陰陽也。" The term "*zhijue*" in this passage only means "sense perception." However, the general meaning of "*zhijue*" is equivalent to "cognition." On *zhijue*, see W. Kim, *Ju Hui cheolhak-ui insingnon*, 36-38.

According to Zhu Xi, “the mind is the spirit of *qi*” and it consists of the empty and spiritual *qi* which performs the cognitive function.” This remark presumes that the empty and spiritual *qi* has the operation principle and the manifestations of *li* within.²⁸ In this context, Zhu Xi explains that *xing* (nature), which is identified with *li*, corresponds to the substance of the mind while *qing* 情 (actual condition), which results from cognition, corresponds to the function of the mind.²⁹ Zhu Xi says:

The mind as a thing actually supervises its body. The substance (*ti* 體) contains the *xing* of humaneness (*ren* 仁), righteousness (*yi* 義), propriety (*li* 禮), and wisdom (*zhi* 智); the function (*yong* 用) has *qing*, including the feeling of commiseration, the feelings of shame and dislike, the feelings of modesty and deference, and the feelings of right and wrong. They are mixed into the mind as a whole, and respond to a stimulus. As each of them has an object to supervise its own feeling, they are not disordered.³⁰

In the above passage, “the substance” refers to *xing* (human nature) as the original substance, not the material substance of the mind. Cheng Yi, the predecessor of Zhu Xi, mentions that “the mind is one, but it can indicate the substance or refer to a function in certain situations.”³¹ From that perspective, “*ti*” and “*yong*” respectively stand for the original substance and the phenomenal function. All things in the universe can be analyzed according to these two categories. While the original substance is identified with *li* (noumenal principle), the emergent function corresponds to *xian* 象 (phenomenal affair). Since *li* penetrates all phenomenal affairs which are composed of *qi*, “the substance and function form a unified whole, and there is no gap between the appeared and the concealed.”³²

Following Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi more elaborately develops the substance-function theory based on *li-qi* dualism. In cosmology, while regarding *taiji* 太極 (the supreme ultimate) as *li*, Zhu Xi makes use of the concept of *benti* to explain *taiji*; it is distinct from *qi* of *yin-yang* but must

²⁷ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 5:85: “問，知覺是心之靈固如此，抑氣之爲邪？曰，不專是氣，是先有知覺之理。理未知覺，氣聚成形，理與氣合，便能知覺。”

²⁸ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 60:1425: “此心本來虛靈，萬理具備，事事物物皆所當知。”

²⁹ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 98:2513: “性者，理也。性是體，情是用。性情皆出於心，故心能統之。”

³⁰ Zhu, *Sishu huowen*, 2:527: “心之爲物，實主於身。其體則有仁義禮智之性，其用則有惻隱羞惡恭敬是非之情，渾然在中，隨感而應，各有攸主而不可亂也。”

³¹ Cheng and Cheng, *Er Cheng ji*, 609: “心一也，有指體而言者(寂然不動是也)，有指用而言者(感而遂通天下之故是也)，惟觀其所見如何耳。”

³² Cheng and Cheng, *Er Cheng ji*, 582: “至微者理也，至著者象也。體用一源，顯微無間。”

always be combined with it.³³ *Benti*, the *li* of *taiji*, causes the formation and transformation of things in the universe, but it should be attached to *qi* because it is immaterial like the physical law or principle. Of course, it has a much more crucial implication than the physical law. *Li* of *taiji* even holds a moral meaning. This conception of *benti* implies a serious departure from traditional ontology where the original substance (*ti*) always indicates a monistic, transmoral substance in Daoism and Chinese Buddhism. In the philosophy of the mind, the mind as an object can also be analyzed into substance and function. The substance of the mind is *xing* as human nature while the function of the mind is *qing* as its manifested state, including all emotions and thoughts resulting from cognition. In the following passage, Zhu Xi suggests that the empty and spiritual *qi* must contain *xing* as the original substance of the mind:

Emptiness and spirituality is naturally the *benti* of the mind, not a thing that I can make empty [and spiritual]. The eyes see and the ears hear; the mind enables them to see and hear. How can the mind have any shape or image? However, because of eyes' seeing and ears' hearing, the mind seems to be granted a shape or an image. Nevertheless, how can there be thing-ness in the emptiness and spirituality of the mind?"³⁴

In the above quotation, "*benti* of the mind" can be interpreted as "the original state of the mind" or "the mind in itself."³⁵ However, it is more important to remember that although the empty and spiritual *qi* corresponds to the material substance of the mind, it should include *xing* (*li*) as the original substance. If the original state of the mind is nothing more than *qi* (*humpo*), it must retain some thing-ness. Even if the material aspect of the mind is able to have a shape and an image formed by sense perception, the mind in itself (*benti*) has no shape and image, unlike a phenomenal thing. Likewise, the *benti* of nature (*xing zhi bent* 性之本體) or the original state of nature (*benran zhi xing* 本然之性) only refers to an aspect of *li* in the psychophysical nature (*qizhi zhi xing* 氣質之性).³⁶ The new concept of *benti*

³³ Zhu, *Taijitu shuo jie*, 70: "○此所謂無極而太極也。所以動而陽靜而陰之本體也。然非有以離乎陰陽也，即陰陽而指其本體，不離乎陰陽而為言耳。"

³⁴ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 5:87: "虛靈自是心之本體，非我所能虛也。耳目之視聽，所以視聽者即其心也，豈有形象。然有耳目以視聽之，則猶有形象也。若心之虛靈，何嘗有物!"

³⁵ On the interpretation of this phrase, see Mou, *Xinti yu xingti*, 3:430; Chen, *Zhu Xi zhexue yanjiu*, 155-158; and W. Kim, *Ju Hui cheolhak-ui insingnon*, 138-139.

³⁶ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 95:2430.

founded on *li-qi* dualism is distinguishable from the conception of the original substance in Daoism and Chinese Buddhism.³⁷ Zhu Xi searches for a new way to argue for the immortality of the self on the foundation of *xing (li)* as the original substance of the mind.

4. The Immortality of the Self Based on the Cosmological Principle

In light of Zhu Xi's views on the substance of the mind, we can grasp the key ideas to expound his argument for the immortality of the self. The essential part or original state of the mind and the self is neither *hunpo* nor the original substance in the Daoist and Chinese Buddhist senses. Although Zhu Xi disagrees with Hu Hong's theory that the original substance of the mind experiences no birth or death, he never abandons the concept of the original substance and the immortality of the self. He goes further and reconstructs the concept of *benti* on the grounds of cosmological *li-qi* dualism, and analyzes the mind according to the categories of substance and function.

Zhu Xi's analysis shows that the original substance of the mind is equivalent to *xing*, namely the internal mode of *li* in psychophysical energy, while the phenomenal function of the mind denotes *qing* caused by cognition. As everything composed of *qi* has a beginning and an end, the material aspect of the mind cannot avoid extinction after all. However, since the cosmological nature (*li*) constitutes the original aspect of the mind, it is differentiated from the material aspect of the mind, which is doomed to vanish. That is to say, *xing (li)*, the original substance of the mind, is immortal. The next passage displays his own view on immortality:

Someone says "the nature of Heaven-and-Earth is my own nature, then how can it perish suddenly after death?" This assertion is not yet incorrect. However, I do not know whether the one making this assertion considers Heaven-and-Earth as the center, or the self. If he regards Heaven-and-Earth as the center, then this nature originally belongs to the universal principle existing in Heaven-and-Earth. In that case, there would be no gap between human beings and any other creatures, or this thing and that thing.

³⁷ Zhu, *Zhu Xi ji*, 61:3156: "蓋如吾儒之言，則性之本體，便只是仁義禮智之實。如老佛之言，則先有箇虛空底性，後方旋生此四者出來。" Daoism and Chinese Buddhism insist that one original substance generates all things, even including moral meaning. In opposition to such a monism, Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism reconstructs the concept of *benti* based on *li*, which inherently contains moral meaning and forms the universe in combination with everlasting *qi*.

Likewise, no difference would exist between birth and death, or the past and the present. Although he can say that “despite death, I do not perish,” what he gains privately does not remain. If he regards the self as the center, then he would recognize only the spiritual *hunpo* performing the cognitive function in his own self, and instantly indicate and accept it as his own nature. Adhering to it and indulging in it, he would not throw it away until death. What he says “despite death, I do not perish” is an extremely subjective opinion. How can we discuss with him the doctrine of birth and death, and the principle of nature and mandate?³⁸

In the quoted passage, Zhu Xi criticizes a self-centered perspective in favor of a universe-centered viewpoint. It is worth noting that Zhu Xi never disapproves of the immortality of the self after death. If we search for our original self from the perspective of Heaven-and-Earth, we can understand that *xing*, equivalent to the cosmological principle penetrating the universe as a whole, is the original self. The cosmological principle is universally applied to everything, including human beings, and lasts forever throughout the past and the future. Therefore, from a cosmological perspective, we can say that the original self cannot perish in spite of death. In contrast, if we look for our original self from a self-centered perspective, we realize that *hunpo* is a thing possessing the cognitive function in the self and thus accept it as our true self and everlasting substance. Adhering to it and indulging in it, we might maintain such an attitude as to treat it as our eternal nature and self to the last breath. Even if we say “in spite of death, I do not perish,” this assertion would simply be our subjective opinion. As long as *hunpo* consists of *qi*, it will surely be exhausted and vanish into the universe.

Given that Zhu Xi refutes Hu Hong’s theory of the eternal mind, the theory of the self and the mind founded on one fundamental substance in Daoism and Chinese Buddhism also belongs to a self-centered perspective.³⁹ Not to mention the theory of immortal *hunpo* and Buddhist theory of transmigration, any view that posits one fundamental substance for the self originates from subjectivism. Such a fundamental substance does not exist. In the universe, there exist only *li* and *qi*, or the cosmological principle and

³⁸ Zhu, *Zhu Xi ji*, 41:1900: “所謂天地之性，卽我之性，豈有死而遽亡之理，此說亦未爲非。但不知爲此說者，以天地爲主耶？以我爲主耶？若以天地爲主，則此性卽自是天地間一箇公共道理，更無人物彼此之間，死生古今之別。雖曰死而不亡，然非有我之得私矣。若以我爲主，則只是於自己身上，認得一箇精神魂魄，有知有覺之物，卽便目爲己性，把持作弄，到死不肯放舍，謂之死而不亡，是乃私意之尤者，尙何足與語死生之說，性命之理哉？”

³⁹ Mou Zongsan’s conception of the self also has a self-centered perspective, as shown in *Zhide zhijue yu zhongguo zhexue*, 162-183.

matter-energy. So long as we seek the self from a self-centered perspective, we cannot avoid subjectivist errors. In short, what Zhu Xi recommends is to cultivate the self from a universe-centered perspective. In all likelihood, his recommendation can be endorsed only once we open our minds to scientific cosmology.

Meanwhile, in cultivating the self from a universe-centered perspective, one primary question is raised: how can the existence and continuity of the self be explained? That is, if the self is based on the cosmological principle, what is the way to maintain self-identity? This question is connected to other problems related to the sacrificial rites for late parents and ancestors. If *hunpo*, the object revered in sacrificial rites, is nonexistent after death, why should descendants perform sacrificial rites for their parents and ancestors?⁴⁰ Zhu Xi's answer to this controversial issue is that we have necessity to perform these rituals despite the absence of ancestral *hunpo*. If a person performs a sacrificial rite sincerely, then ancestral *hunpo* will definitely appear in his mind based on the cosmological principle. The conversation below expresses this belief:

Question: *Xing* (nature) is *li* to which one cannot attribute gathering and scattering. The thing that comes into being by gathering and dies out by scattering is only composed of *qi*. The so-called spiritual *hunpo* owning the cognitive function is made up of *qi*. Therefore, it comes into being by gathering, and into nonexistence by scattering. However, since *li* constantly exists throughout the past and the present, it does not gather or scatter, not to mention decline or grow.

Answer: Human beings and myriad things gain *qi* of Heaven-and-Earth and *yin-yang* all together. Through the assembling of *qi* a human being is born, and by dispersing he becomes *guishen*. However, though his *qi* has been scattered already, *li* of Heaven-and-Earth and *yin-yang* would produce and reproduce things endlessly. Even after the ancestors' spiritual *hunpo* was scattered, the descendants' spiritual *hunpo* would have *some continuation* [italics mine] naturally. Therefore, if you fulfill the rituals with utmost sincerity and respect, you can summon ancestral *hunpo*. It is quite difficult to explicate. When you find ancestral *hunpo* once it disperses, it seems

⁴⁰ This issue was controversial in the previous studies. Many scholars insisted that the naturalistic *li-qi* theory is not consistent with Zhu Xi's theory of sacrificial rites, while some scholars interpreted Zhu Xi's explanation as consistent. According to this view, Zhu Xi's explanation on the *hunpo*'s arrival in sacrificial rites is a psychic one. See Gardner, "Ghosts and Spirits in the Sung Neo-Confucian World," 609-700; Azuma, *Shushigaku no shinkenkyu*, 235-238. My view is that Zhu Xi's theories of *li-qi* and *guishen* are consistent, but need to be elucidated a little more. He seemingly intends to discuss this issue beyond a psychological perspective.

to no longer be extant. However, if you execute the rituals with optimum sincerity and respect, you can feel [ancestral *hunpo*] coming back. It is possible *due to li existing here all the time* [italics mine].⁴¹

The gist of the above conversation is that the immortality of the self is grounded in *li*, not *qi*. The two constituent elements in the universe, namely *li* and *qi* of Heaven-and-Earth and *yin-yang*, are permanent beings. Whereas *qi* can gather and scatter as it is matter-energy, *li* does not gather and scatter as it is an immaterial and omnipresent principle and law. Anything in the universe which results from the combination of *li* and *qi* experiences birth and death according to the gathering and scattering of *qi*. Human *hunpo* has no exception. When one dies, his *hunpo* disperses into one unified *qi* as part of the universe just like a river flowing into the ocean. We should pay careful attention to the fact that while supervising the gathering and scattering of *qi*, *li* produces and reproduces various things, making use of new *qi* endlessly. In this regard, although the ancestors' spiritual *hunpo* was scattered completely, their descendants' spiritual *hunpo* can have "some continuation" with the ancestors on the basis of *li*; it can reproduce *qi* of ancestral *hunpo* in the body of descendants.

Even if a descendant inherits some *qi* from his ancestors, such biological *qi* fundamentally cannot ensure the interaction between ancestor and descendant in rituals.⁴² For instance, Zhu Xi suggests two kinds of justification of our feeling about ancestral *hunpo* in rituals. First, in the case of recently deceased ancestors such as parents, the performer of the rituals can feel the arrival of ancestral *hunpo* because their *qi* has not yet dispersed completely. This explanation accords with the traditional justification in Confucianism. Second, since *hunpo* of remote ancestors has dispersed completely, descendants cannot directly feel the ancestors' scattered *qi*. In such cases, the ancestors' *qi* can be felt only when the performer summons their *hunpo* which has been preserved in *li*.⁴³ After all, it is in the mind, which is founded on *li*, where performers can feel ancestral *hunpo*'s return

⁴¹ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 3:46: “問，性卽是理，不可以聚散言。聚而生，散而死者，氣而已。所謂精神魂魄，有知有覺者，氣也，故聚則有，散則無。若理則亘古今常存，不復有聚散消長也。曰，只是這箇天地陰陽之氣，人與萬物皆得之。氣聚則爲人，散則爲鬼。然其氣雖已散，這箇天地陰陽之理生生而不窮。祖考之精神魂魄雖已散，而子孫之精神魂魄自有些小相屬。故祭祀之禮盡其誠敬，便可以致得祖考之魂魄。這箇自是難說。看既散後，一似都無了。能盡其誠敬，便有感格，亦緣是理常只在這裏也。”

⁴² Although the inheritance of *qi* as bloodline can promote the summoning of ancestral *hunpo*, all sacrificial rites need *li* as a “total supervisor” (*zongnaochu* 總腦處) to control the running of *qi*. Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 3:47.

⁴³ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 3:37.

during the rituals.⁴⁴ Such a justification, which relies on the concept of *li*, is Zhu Xi's unique thesis.

In order to explain Zhu Xi's justification of *hunpo*'s arrival in ancestral rites, we need to remind of his assertion that *li* produces and reproduces things ceaselessly. Since *li* contains all principles of Heaven-and-Earth and myriad things, including all the information and history of the ancestors, it has the ability to reproduce all things related to the ancestors under certain conditions. If a descendant performs the rituals sincerely and devoutly and with every possible effort, *li* can reproduce the ancestors' characteristics such as appearance, behavior, voice, and so on in the descendant's mind, and the descendant can feel the advent of ancestral *hunpo*. In other words, the descendant can have an inner sense of the ancestors' psychophysical features only by concentration and imagination.⁴⁵ Therefore, we can summarize Zhu Xi's claim on the advent of *hunpo* in the sacrificial rites as follows: 1) ancestral *hunpo* disperses into the universe and is finally reduced to the unified *qi*, while all the information and history of the self are preserved in *li*; 2) *Hunpo* that appears during the rites does not indicate an external entity but an inner sense inspired in the descendant's mind; and 3) Although *qi* transferred through the bloodline can promote such an inner sense, the feeling of the advent is fundamentally based on *li* which is able to reproduce the ancestors' psychophysical properties.

In a nutshell, the immortality of the self is grounded in *li*, namely the cosmological principle. Since *li* includes all the information and history of human beings, the self of a person can continuously exist in the minds of descendants and ultimately in the cosmological principle. In relation to the problem of *hunpo*, Zhu Xi praises Xie Liangzuo's 謝良佐 (1050-1103) assertion that "the ancestral spirit is my spirit."⁴⁶ Zhu Xi seems to think

44 Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 3:50: "問，祭祀之理，還是有其誠則有其神，無其誠則無其神否？曰，鬼神之理，即是此心之理。"

45 In contrast to the cognition comprising the outer senses, "feeling ancestral *hunpo*'s coming" (*gange* 感格) in sacrificial rites is experienced by an inner sense that internal *li* causes without sense perception.

46 Xie, *Shangcai yulu*, 1:16: "祖考精神，便是自家精神。" Xie also says that "if you want it to be, then it exists. If you want it not to be, then it does not exist." (*Shangcai yulu*, 1:30: "若有時，便有，若無時，便無。") Zhu Xi comments as follows. Chen Houzhi's question: Although ancestors belong to the unified *qi* of Heaven-and-Earth, can it be gathered and scattered because of descendants' sacrificial rites? Answer: This is the meaning of Shangcai's assertion that "if you want it to be, then it exists. If you want it not to be, then it does not exist." It is entirely dependent on human beings. *Guishen* is originally an extant thing. (*Zhuzi yulei*, 3:47: "陳後之問，祖宗是天地間一箇統氣，因子孫祭享而聚散？曰，這便是上蔡所謂，若要有時，便有，若要無時，便無，是皆由乎人矣。鬼神是自有底物事。") Given that

that Xie's saying is in accord with his own thoughts regarding the problem of ancestral *hunpo*'s arrival in sacrificial rites. However, Zhu Xi's thoughts on the advent of *hunpo* are particularly unique in that he sees cosmological *li* as the foundation of the immortality of the self. He likely intends to extend the significance of moral self-cultivation to a cosmological dimension.⁴⁷ Though the conception of the immortal self based on *li* retains some vagueness, Zhu Xi's new insight and perspective is worth noting.⁴⁸

5. Conclusion

I have tried to shed light on the substance of the mind and the immortal self in relation to Zhu Xi's *guishen-hunpo* theory. Under the influence of naturalistic trends in the Song dynasty, Zhu Xi interprets *guishen* as intelligible natural phenomena resulting from the two functions of *qi*. *Hunpo* or *guishen* of the human being is no more than the most flourishing state of *jingqi* (*guishen*). As the material substance of the mind comprised of *qi*, *hunpo* reveals itself through the performance of the cognitive function. Zhu Xi divides the function of *hunpo* into two: the ability to think and consider is *hun* and the capacity to memorize and discriminate is *po*. Since everything composed of *qi* has a beginning and an end depending on the gathering and scattering of *qi*, the mind also inevitably experiences birth and death.

However, the essential part or the original state of the mind is neither *hunpo* nor the original substance advocated in Daoism and Chinese Buddhism. Zhu Xi criticizes Hu Hong's theory that the mind experiences no birth or death for the reason that the mind is the functional aspect of

hunpo's existence depends on human beings, Zhu Xi seems to postulate *li* for the sake of the immortality of the self, which bears an interesting similarity to Kant's religious postulation.

⁴⁷ Interestingly, at the age of 67, Zhu Xi was immersed in the study of *Zhouyi chantongqi* 周易參同契 (The Seal of the Unity of the Three in Accordance with the *Zhouyi*), a book related to *xian* 仙 immortals. However, although Zhu Xi was very interested in the method of *liandan* 煉丹 by which Daoists could transform their body into a very refined state of *qi*, Zhu Xi ultimately denied this method. Until he died, he conceded the immortality of the self based only on *li*. On the relationship between the concept of *hunpo* and *xian* immortals, see Yu, "'O Soul, Come Back!,'" 386-395.

⁴⁸ Zhu Xi's conception of the immortal self is distinct from selflessness in that it is based on *li*, in which all the information and history of a person will be memorized eternally. However, it is not a permanent individual substance like the soul, but rather a principle containing all the information in the universe. Therefore, it is unclear whether this cosmological principle could be regarded as the "self" maintaining self-identity after death.

the original substance as an ultimate reality, yet he never abandons the concept of the original substance and the immortality of the self. He reconstructs the concept of *benti* on the foundation of cosmological *li-qi* dualism, and then analyzes the mind according to the categories of original substance and phenomenal function. All things can be analyzed into substance and function, respectively indicating *li* (cosmological principle) and *xiang* (phenomenal affairs). Whereas *xiang* occurs through the combination of both *li* and *qi*, substance only refers to *li*. In the same way, the mind can also be categorized into substance and function, respectively corresponding to *xing* (human nature) and *qing* (actual condition). *Xing* is equivalent to *li*, and *qing* is generated by the cognitive function.

Since all things composed of *qi* have a beginning and an end, the material aspect of the mind cannot but perish someday. In contrast, since the original aspect of the mind or the mind in itself (*benti*) is the cosmological nature (*li*), the original self is not mortal. *Hunpo* is mortal but *xing* (*li*) is immortal, as it is the original substance of the mind. Grounded on such an insight, Zhu Xi recommends that people should cultivate the self from a universe-centered perspective. While justifying sacrificial rites for ancestors based on his theory of *li-qi*, Zhu Xi claims that a performer of rites could feel the advent of ancestral *hunpo* if he shows the utmost sincerity and respect to them. It does not imply that ancestral *hunpo* return during the ancestral rituals as an external entity, but instead that they appear in the descendants' minds, relying on *li*.

Since *li* contains all the information and history of the ancestors as well as things and affairs in the universe, it can reproduce everything related to the ancestors in a descendant's mind. Ancestors' arrival in rituals depends on their descendants, and becomes feasible with a reliance on *li*, which is the total supervisor of the universe. Questions such as "what is the ultimate existence?" and "who am I?" belong to perhaps the most crucial philosophical motif. Despite some vagueness, Zhu Xi's conception of the immortal self can be regarded as a unique and creative perspective which probes those two questions.

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朱熹哲學中之心的本體與自我不朽 ——關於鬼神魂魄理論

金 祐 瑩

中文摘要

這篇文章旨在,處理朱熹哲學鬼神魂魄觀念所涉及的心的本體與自我不朽的問題。朱熹將鬼神理解為陰陽二氣的功能和自然造化現象,而將魂魄——它相當於人的鬼神——則理解為心之物質(氣的)形態。魂魄是鬼神最為旺盛的狀態,也具認知功能。然而,它又如同以氣組成的事物相類,根據氣的聚集和分散,心之物質性顯現也有出生與死亡。與此相反,心的本體是永恆的理(性),不能被描述為聚集和分散。朱熹通過一個本體觀念,並從宇宙論的基礎上,重新構成理氣二元論,依此堅持認為,自我作為心的本體是不朽的。由此可知,朱熹的建議是從以宇宙論為中心的立場去探索自我。朱熹扣緊祖先的祭祀儀式而重構理氣論,進而主張祖先的魂魄能夠在宇宙原理(理)的基礎上重新出現。由於宇宙原理包含有關祖先的所有信息與歷史,所以理能夠在子孫的心中重現祖先的一切。朱熹對不朽自我的見解,可視之為具創意的觀點。

關鍵詞：心, 本體, 自我不朽, 鬼神, 魂魄, 朱熹

A Composite Centrality: Interpreting Centrality within Zhu Xi's *Zhongyong*

Joep SMORENBURG

Abstract

Considered to be one of the most central concepts within the *Zhongyong* 中庸, the notion of the “Mean” or “centrality” (*zhong* 中) occupies a key position within Zhu Xi’s psychological and ethical thought. The term occurs several times in the opening lines of the work, presented alternately as part of the semantic compounds *zhonghe* 中和 and *shizhong* 時中. Despite the distinct differences between the two instances of *zhong* as they functioned within Zhu Xi’s reading of the text, recent approaches have failed to provide a complete account of their relation, thereby hindering a full understanding of the role of centrality within Zhu Xi’s psychological thought. It is the aim of the current paper to elaborate upon and address this issue. In the first section, I examine Zhu Xi’s reading of the phrase *shizhong*, providing evidence to support Daniel Gardner’s recent suggestion that Zhu interpreted this instance of *zhong* as an explicitly situational balancing of one’s emotional state. In the second section, I address the relationship between *zhong* and *he*, demonstrating that Zhu instead framed this instance of *zhong* as a primarily *hypothetical* ideal informed by one’s inborn nature (*xing* 性), existing only prior to actual concrete practice. In the third section, I argue that Zhu Xi maintained a strong thematic and perspectival boundary between the two instances of *zhong*, in contrast with recent interpretations of the term. While *zhonghe* was adopted to describe the hypothetical initial state or “substance” (*ti* 體) of one’s psychology in an abstract ontological sense, *shizhong* reflected its application or “function” (*yong* 用) within the concrete social world.

Keywords: Zhu Xi, centrality, the Mean, inborn nature, moral psychology

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1. Introduction

As the last of the Four Books (*Sishu* 四書) selected by Southern Song 南宋 era (1127-1279) scholar Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), the *Zhongyong* 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean) plays an important role in the exposition of Zhu's thought, with particularly close attention paid to the relation between Principle (*li* 理) and human nature (*xing* 性), and their harmonious expression in daily practice. Crucial to our understanding of this relationship is the concept of *zhong* 中, variously translatable as "central" or "perfect balance" and referring generally to a psychological state of emotional equilibrium.¹ One of the textual passages most central to our understanding of the term is found in *Zhongyong* section 2, which describes the attainment of *zhong* by the gentleman (*junzi* 君子) and introduces a certain temporal aspect to this practice by including the modifier *shi* 時.² Within this context, *shi* can impart two closely related but ultimately distinct meanings. The first may be translated as "always" or "at all times," implying that the word it modifies (in our case *zhong*) possesses some durative or continuous characteristics. The second possibility suggests a situational or timely aspect, usually translated as "timely" or "according to circumstances." While both Daniel Gardner, and Johnston and Wang, cited above, have claimed to represent specifically Zhu Xi's interpretation, they translate *shi* rather differently. Johnston and Wang provide a durative rendering: "The noble man's central and constant is his being a noble man and at all times central."³ Gardner, in contrast, opts for the situational reading: "The superior man . . . accords with circumstances in finding the perfect balance."⁴

We can reconcile the two interpretations either by positing that Johnston and Wang's "central" in itself already possesses the characteristic of timeliness, or by assuming that Gardner's "according with circumstances" must be achieved at all times. However, Johnston and Wang have explicitly denied this possibility.⁵ Furthermore, this approach conflicts with other

¹ These particular translations have been suggested in Gardner, *Four Books*; Johnston and Wang, *Daxue & Zhongyong*.

² Zhu, *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, 18-19.

³ Johnston and Wang, *Daxue & Zhongyong*, 413: "君子之中庸也，君子而時中。"

⁴ Gardner, *The Four Books*, 113.

⁵ Johnston and Wang, *Daxue & Zhongyong*, 412.

instances of *zhong* found in surrounding sections. The primary example of this conflict is found in the preceding *Zhongyong* section 1, where *zhong* is described in direct conjunction with “harmony” (*he* 和).⁶ Gardner translates: “Before pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy have arisen—this we call perfect balance. After they have arisen and attained due proportion—this we call harmony.”⁷ Johnston and Wang do not depart significantly from this interpretation apart from rendering *zhong* as “the center.”⁸ Such a psychological state, simply by virtue of it lacking any emotional expression, must logically be static and unchanging until at least one emotion is expressed to any degree. As such, this reading stands in clear conflict with the situational aspect of *zhong* presented by Gardner in *Zhongyong* section 2.

The aim of this paper is to determine how Zhu Xi interpreted the phrase *shizhong* 時中, introduced in *Zhongyong* section 2, and its place within the moral framework delineated in the text as a whole. To this end, I shall firstly address the notion of *shi*, arguing that Zhu interpreted it as imparting a timely characteristic upon *zhong* as a situational balancing of one’s emotions. In the second section, I shall address the relationship between *zhong* and *he* as they occur specifically in the preceding *Zhongyong* section 1, demonstrating that Zhu framed this instance of *zhong* as a hypothetical ideal informed by one’s inborn nature (*xing* 性), existing only *prior* to actual concrete practice. In the third section, I shall contrast these two readings of *zhong* through a discussion of Zhu Xi’s theory on substance (*ti* 體) and function (*yong* 用), ultimately arguing for a composite interpretation of *zhong*; while the *zhong* in *Zhongyong* section 1 (as *zhonghe*) describes the hypothetical initial state or “substance” of one’s psychology in an abstract ontological sense, the second instance of *zhong* (as *shizhong*) instead describes its application or “function” within the concrete social world. Throughout the paper, I shall base myself primarily on Zhu Xi’s interlinear commentary on the Four Books and the record of conversations between Zhu and his disciples, entitled *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 (A Classified Collection of the Conversations of Master Zhu).

⁶ Zhu, *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, 18.

⁷ Gardner, *The Four Books*, 111: “喜怒哀樂之未發，謂之中，發而皆中節，謂之和。”

⁸ Johnston and Wang, *Daxue & Zhongyong*, 407.

2. *Zhong* as a Situational, Social Balance

As the most explicit point of contention between the available English-language translations of the phrase *shizhong*, the modifier *shi* presents a suitable point of departure for our inquiry. Apart from the two renderings of the phrase by Johnston and Wang, and Gardner, cited previously, both of whom claim to represent specifically Zhu Xi's interpretation of the text, virtually all other English-language translations of the *Zhongyong* indicate a preference for Johnston and Wang's durative interpretation of *shi*, although it must be noted that none of these claim to represent Zhu. James Legge, for example, has translated *shi* as "always,"⁹ Wing-tsit Chan as "at any time,"¹⁰ Ames and Hall as "constantly,"¹¹ and Andrew Plaks writes "at all times."¹² While Plaks has rightfully noted the importance of a correct understanding of the term *shi*, his insistence that a "significant number of modern commentators" oppose the durative interpretation remains unsubstantiated;¹³ among previously published translations, besides that of Gardner, only Jeffrey Riegel has opted for the situational reading by translating the term as "timely."¹⁴ Indeed, Gardner correctly makes the exact opposite claim: the durative translation "at all times" is the most popular choice among recent publications.¹⁵ It is perhaps because of the commonality of this interpretation that Johnston and Wang assert that "Zhu Xi clearly takes *shi* 時 to indicate 'at all times' rather than 'in a timely way,'" without offering any further substantiation of this claim, other than the content of the translation itself.¹⁶

At this point we may turn to other traditional commentators of the *Zhongyong*, among which arguably the most notable are the works by Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127-200) and Kong Yingda 孔穎達 (574-648), both recorded in the Qing 清 era (1644-1911) collection *Shisanjing zhushu* 十三經注疏 (Annotations and Interpretations on the Thirteen Classics) and fully translated by Johnston and Wang.¹⁷ They have rendered Kong Yingda's

⁹ Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, 386.

¹⁰ Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 99.

¹¹ Ames and Hall, *Focusing the Familiar*, 90.

¹² Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 26.

¹³ Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 82 n2.

¹⁴ Riegel, "The Four 'Tzu Ssu' Chapters of the *Li Chi*," 210.

¹⁵ Gardner, *The Four Books*, 113.

¹⁶ Johnston and Wang, *Daxue & Zhongyong*, 412.

comments as follows: “[H]is mind acts and at all times is in the center. That is to say, neither in joy nor in anger does he go beyond moderation. Therefore, it says ‘he is a noble man and at all times in the center.’”¹⁸ Translating *shi* as “at all times,” this rendering is identical to their translation of Zhu’s reading cited above. However, seemingly refuting this observation, they note in their accompanying comments that Kong Yingda here instead proposed a *situational* reading of *shi*, described alternatively as “at the proper time.”¹⁹ It is therefore puzzling that they maintain the same translation for both Kong Yingda and Zhu Xi, despite the supposed differences between them. Fortunately, we can deduce from Kong’s other commentaries that he indeed maintained a situational reading of *shi*. For example, commenting on the identical phrase *shizhong* 時中 used in connection with the hexagram *meng* 蒙 in the *Zhouyi* 周易 (Changes of the Zhou), Kong states: “If you practice the way of progress at the proper time, then you will attain the Mean. This is why it reads *shizhong*.”²⁰ In this passage, the phrase *yushi* 于時 unambiguously refers to a specific, situationally defined point in time. As such, Kong Yingda presents a clear commentarial precedent for a situational reading of *shi*.

That the translations of Gardner, and Johnston and Wang, provide such conflicting interpretations of *shi*, is in no small part due to the ambiguity of the language found in Zhu Xi’s interlinear commentary on *Zhongyong* section 2. Essentially reproducing the main text phrase but with more elaborate wording, Zhu states:

The reason why the gentleman can practice the Constant Mean is because he possesses the virtues of a gentleman, and he is furthermore capable of *suishi* 隨時 resting in [the state of] the Mean.²¹

The main source of ambiguity lies in Zhu’s choice to reproduce the main text character *shi* 時 using *suishi* 隨時 which, although more elaborate, also shares the original’s ambiguity and can either mean “at all times” or “as times or circumstances dictate.”

¹⁷ For the source text, see Kong, *Liji zhengyi*, 52:1422-1424.

¹⁸ Johnston and Wang, *Daxue & Zhongyong*, 227: “心行而時節其中，謂喜怒不過節也，故云君子而時中。”

¹⁹ Johnston and Wang, *Daxue & Zhongyong*, 224.

²⁰ Kong, *Zhouyi zhengyi*, 1:38: “若以亨道行之于時，則得中也。故云時中也。”

²¹ Zhu, *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, 19: “君子之所以為中庸者，以其有君子之德，而又能隨時以處中也。”

One clue for the proper translation of *suishi* can be found in connection with Zhu Xi's commentary on *Mengzi* 孟子 5B.1, where Mencius states that "Confucius was the *shi* one among the sages."²² In his interlinear comments on this section, Zhu emphasized the situationally appropriate or timely nature of Confucius' social behavior, suggesting a distinctly situational reading of *shi*: "Confucius took up office, stopped, took his time, or hurried forth; in each case it was as it should be."²³ Particularly significant for our present purposes is that Zhu explicitly connected this situational instance of *shi* to the usage of *suishi* in his *Zhongyong* commentary, in an exchange with an unnamed disciple recorded in the section of the *Zhuzi yulei* dedicated to passage 5B.1 of the *Mengzi*. The exchange goes as follows: "Someone asked: 'That Confucius attained the Mean in a *shi* fashion, is this what is meant by 'to *suishi* attain the Mean'?' [Zhu Xi] said: 'It is.'"²⁴ Zhu's affirmation, together with the preceding observation that this instance of *shi* is indeed used in a situational sense, explicitly demonstrates a similarly situational reading of *shi* and *suishi* in *Zhongyong* section 2 and its commentary respectively.²⁵ By extension, it follows that *zhong* is something that can change according to circumstances.

One final challenge to this interpretation is the combination of *zhong* with *yong* 庸 into the compound term *zhongyong*, mentioned in the same sentence as *shizhong* in *Zhongyong* section 2 and rendered as "Constant Mean" in the translation cited earlier. Commenting on the term, Zhu cites his predecessor Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107): "To be unchanging is called *yong*."²⁶ If *yong* imparts on *zhong* the characteristic of "unchanging," then this directly supports the durative reading of *shizhong* and discredits the situational interpretation. In the first analysis, this view is supported by Zhu's subsequent interpretation of *yong* as "regular" (*pingchang* 平常): "The *yong* of *zhongyong* means 'regular.' What is meant by 'regular' is how the Principle of things should be without peculiarities."²⁷ However, what Zhu

²² Zhu, *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, 315: "孔子聖之時者也。"

²³ Zhu, *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, 315: "孔子仕止久速，各當其可。"

²⁴ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 58:1366: "問，孔子時中，所謂隨時而中否？曰，然。"

²⁵ One further piece of evidence for this reading is provided in a letter dated 1168 which was addressed to Fan Bochong 范伯崇, where Zhu Xi noted: "When we speak of something from the perspective of its passing vicissitudes and impermanent nature, we say it is *shi*" (自其推遷無常而言之，則謂之時). See Zhu, *Huian xiansheng Zhu wengong wenji* (hereafter *Wenji*), 39:1773. As I note further below, while it remains plausible that Zhu Xi meant that these changes should *always* be observed, this was not his main point.

²⁶ Zhu, *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, 17. See also Cheng and Cheng, *Er Cheng ji*, 100: "不易之謂庸。"

²⁷ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 62:1484: "中庸之庸，平常也。所謂平常者，事理當然而無詭異也。"

here proposes is not that a behavior is “regular” or unchanging in itself, but rather the *ideal* or Principle (*li* 理) that informs it.

Accordingly, directly following the preceding statement, Zhu qualifies his understanding of *pingchang* by citing the occasionally deviant yet ideal behavior of the sage kings: “Yao abdicated and Shun accepted the throne, and Tang banished [King Jie] and Wu attacked [King Zhou]; although these were abnormal events, they were precisely as they should have been.”²⁸ In other words, *yong* refers not to the unchanging or durative nature of a behavior in itself, but rather to its correspondence with a predetermined ideal. This ideal is itself unchanging, but allows for situationally changing attitudes when expressed in the real world. I shall examine this predetermined ideal or *Principle* more closely in the next section; for now it suffices to note that this use of *yong* supports a situational reading of *shizhong*. Furthermore, Zhu Xi’s repeated emphasis on the concrete, real interactions of individuals within the social world suggests that he conceptualized *shizhong* chiefly in terms of personal interaction.²⁹ It is on this point that his interpretation of the term *shizhong* contrasts sharply with that of the related notion of *zhonghe*, which he instead approaches through the lens of natural psychology. I will discuss this more closely in the next section.

These observations deviate not only from the durative translations presented by Johnston and Wang, but also from the findings of, for example, Cheng Chung-ying and Julia Ching, who have discussed the term *exclusively* as a constant, unexpressed state of emotional equilibrium.³⁰ Contrarily, it appears to me that Gardner’s interpretation of the phrase *shizhong* as “he accords with circumstances in finding the perfect balance” is most consistent with Zhu Xi’s views. While one could still rightly maintain that this

²⁸ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 62:1484: “堯舜禪授，湯武放伐，雖事異常，然皆是合當如此。”

²⁹ This chiefly practice-oriented or “social” approach toward *shizhong* is corroborated in several personal letters composed by Zhu Xi. In an undated letter addressed to Cheng Yunfu 程允夫, for example, Zhu noted: “What is meant by ‘undertaking affairs’ is to order oneself inwardly and to respond to things externally; only when inner and outer are both accounted for to the fullest extent, can one be without regret. This is precisely why the ancients valued *shizhong*” (所謂行事者，內以處己，外以應物，內外俱盡，乃可無悔。古人所貴於時中者，此也). See Zhu, *Wenji*, 41:1861, 22:1774, and 54:2583.

³⁰ To be clear, I do not aim to contest these particular readings in full; as I will demonstrate in the following section, these interpretations are certainly applicable to the case of *zhong* and *he* (“harmony”) in *Zhongyong* section 1. However, in juxtaposition with the timely *shi* of *Zhongyong* section 2, the durative reading of *zhong* does not hold. My argument, then, is that Zhu Xi distinguished carefully between the two instances of *zhong*. It must be noted that Cheng Chung-ying does not claim to represent Zhu Xi’s views. See Cheng, *New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-Confucian Philosophy*, 246-249; Ching, “Chu His on Personal Cultivation,” 276-279.

emotional balance should *at all times* be adjusted to one's circumstances, this was not Zhu's main point. His primary emphasis lay instead on the situational sense conveyed by *shi*. As such, despite their insistence to the contrary, Johnston and Wang's rendering of the phrase as "at all times central" misses the main point.

3. *Zhong* as Durative, Latent Balance

As I have already mentioned in the introduction, the interpretation of terms such as *zhong* is heavily dependent on context and contradictions may therefore arise between various instances of a term even within a single text. Indeed, the implications of the preceding discussion, namely that *zhong* possesses a certain timely or situational characteristic, are challenged by statements found in *Zhongyong* section 1. The relevant portion of the main text reads:

When [the four emotions of] pleasure, anger, grief, and joy are not yet stirred, this is called the Mean (*zhong* 中). When [these emotions] are stirred to exactly the right degree (*zhongjie* 中節), this is called harmony (*he* 和).³¹

This section explicitly distinguishes between two separate emotional states and implies a third one. The first emotional state, labeled *zhong*, is characterized by the absence of any emotional stirring or expression. As I have mentioned in the introduction, such a psychological state must logically be static and durative until at least one emotion is expressed to any degree. When this is done to "exactly the right degree," one attains the second emotional state labeled "harmony" (*he*). The third emotional state, wherein one's emotions are expressed but not to the correct degree, is only implied and remains unelaborated.³² In the first analysis, this reading of *zhong* (as *zhonghe*) as a static and unchanging emotional state stands in clear conflict with the situational *zhong* (as *shizhong*), as introduced in *Zhongyong* section 2. Whereas the latter *zhong* allows for timely change in accordance with one's circumstances, the preceding section 1 states that such dynamism is reserved for the emotional state of *he* and an undisclosed third state.

³¹ Zhu, *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, 18: "喜怒哀樂之未發，謂之中，發而皆中節，謂之和。"

³² Zhu Xi discussed the specifics of this third state in a letter addressed to Xu Yanzhang 徐彥章 in 1191. See Zhu, *Wenji*, 54:2583.

In light of their earlier disagreement with regards to *shizhong* in *Zhongyong* section 2, it is interesting to note that both Gardner, and Johnston and Wang, offer very similar translations of *Zhongyong* section 1, and in their comments on this section they both explicitly refer to *zhong* and *he* as different emotional states.³³ Regarding these two states, they seem to agree that *zhong* denotes the (logically unchanging) state of emotionlessness. Furthermore, although one might suggest that this *zhong* might actually be a completely different term from *shizhong* discussed earlier, this is not reflected in their translation. Gardner maintains “perfect balance” for both instances of the term, while Johnston and Wang use the nominal variant “the center” for the first instance and the adjectival “central” for the second. The result is an uneasy tension in both translations. Johnston and Wang’s durative translation of both instances of *zhong* is internally consistent, but appears irreconcilable with Zhu Xi’s theory on emotional expression. For example, criticizing the Tang 唐 era (618-907) Buddhist-inspired scholar Li Ao 李翱 (772-841) Zhu noted: “When Li Ao spoke about ‘returning to one’s nature,’ he was correct; but when he said to ‘*extinguish one’s emotions* [italics mine] to return to one’s nature,’ he was incorrect. How could one extinguish one’s emotions!”³⁴ In the case of Gardner, the tension is instead internal to the text. While his comments state explicitly that he reads the *zhong* in section 1 in a durative sense and the *zhong* of section 2 in a situational sense, he does not address the nature of the contrast between them.

Unlike the internally consistent translation of Johnston and Wang, Zhu Xi explicitly recognized a distinction between the two kinds of *zhong*: “*Zhong* contains two meanings. There is the *zhong* that is not yet expressed, and there is the *zhong* that changes according to the circumstances.”³⁵ To paraphrase, Zhu Xi saw a critical difference between the durative *zhong* of *Zhongyong* section 1 and the situational *zhong* of section 2, while simultaneously suggesting a relation between the two terms as parts of a broader, composite term. In order to further understand this relationship, we

³³ Gardner, *The Four Books*, 111; Johnston and Wang, *Daxue & Zhongyong*, 407.

³⁴ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 59:1381: “李翱復性則是，云滅情以復性，則非。情如何可滅。” Zhu Xi made note on several occasions of his opposition to what he considered the Buddhist approach to emotional expression. In a letter addressed to Xu Yanzhang 徐彥章 in 1191, he noted: “To act when you should act, and to attain *zhong* to precisely the right degree when doing so, this is simply not the same as the ‘constant stillness’ prioritized by [the Buddha] Sakyamuni” (當動而動，動必中節，非如釋氏之務於常寂耳). See Zhu, *Wenji*, 54:2583.

³⁵ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 62:1480: “中含二義，有未發之中，有隨時之中。”

must first examine the “*zhong* that is not yet expressed” as it occurs together with *he* in *Zhongyong* section 1. Zhu commented:

Pleasure, anger, grief, and joy are emotions. When these are not yet expressed, then it regards inborn nature, which does not deviate or tend towards any specific direction; this is why we call this *zhong*. When [the emotions] are expressed and they all attain their due degree, then they are correct and they are completely free from any perversions; this is why we call this *he*.³⁶

Providing a compact account of man’s psychological condition, Zhu Xi described *zhong* and *he* using two separate but closely interrelated pairs of keywords, namely inborn nature (*xing* 性) and human emotions (*qing* 情), and “not yet expressed” (*weifa* 未發) and “already expressed” (*fa* 發 or *yifa* 已發). According to Zhu, *xing* is inextricably linked to the notion of Principle (*li* 理). In his *Zhongyong* commentary, Zhu described Principle as the universal pattern underlying all things: “Heaven transforms and creates all the ten-thousand things through *yin* and *yang* and the five phases, using vital energy to give shape to form, and Principle is also bestowed on all things; it is like an order or an instruction.”³⁷ Serving as a directive from Heaven, Principle normatively determines the way things should ideally run their course, and so represents the source of the chief virtues of benevolence (*ren* 仁), righteousness (*yi* 義), propriety (*li* 禮), and wisdom (*zhi* 智) in humankind. When this Principle is applied to human beings, it is alternatively referred to as *xing* 性. As Qian Mu 錢穆 has rightly pointed out, this is a distinction in name only; for Zhu, the emphasis lay chiefly on their identical function as ideal patterns of how individuals should compose themselves.³⁸

As an ideal pattern of behavior imparting solely the *possibility* of virtuous conduct, *xing* lacks the active capacity of exercising virtue in itself; its mode of expression is through the emotions or *qing*. In order to distinguish between the latent and ideal character of *xing* and the active and necessarily situational character of *qing*, Zhu categorized them as the potential “not yet expressed” (*weifa*) and the situational “already expressed” (*yifa*) respectively,

³⁶ Zhu, *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, 18: “喜怒哀樂，情也。其未發，則性也，無所偏倚，故謂之中。發皆中節，情之正也，無所乖戾，故謂之和。”

³⁷ Zhu, *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, 17: “天以陰陽五行化生萬物，氣以成形，而理亦賦焉，猶命令也。”

³⁸ Qian, *Zhuzi xin xuean*, 2:31.

while simultaneously stressing their inextricable relationship: “Benevolence pertains to nature, while love is its emotion. The emotion, then, is when it is expressed in practical use; nature refers to when it is not yet expressed.”³⁹ As Thompson has similarly argued, this *xing-qing* system is characterized by opposition as well as inextricable complementarity: *xing* requires *qing* to be expressed in the real world, while *qing* derives its content and direction from *xing*.⁴⁰ However, because actual emotional expression is not always perfect, the system requires a third factor to guarantee the proper complementarity between *xing* and *qing*, namely the heart-mind (*xin* 心). It is on this point that Zhu Xi declared his indebtedness to Zhang Zai 張載 (1020-1077), whom he understood to have proposed that “the heart-mind unites inborn nature and emotions.”⁴¹ Emotional expression is supposed to be tailored to one’s circumstances, and it is up to the heart-mind, representing man’s conscious and intelligent faculties, to properly assess the requirements of each situation.

Unfortunately, Zhu Xi did not clarify what such a proper measure actually entailed. When someone asked about *he* or “harmony,” Zhu responded rather cryptically: “Suppose something requires me to be five parts happy, yet I am seven or eight parts happy, then I transgress the proper measure; yet if I am three or four parts happy, then I fall short.”⁴² What is clear, however, is that Zhu analyzed the conjunction of *zhong* and *he* in section 2 primarily from the perspective of human psychology, discussing *zhong* in terms of latent inborn nature and *he* in terms of situationally adjusted emotionality.⁴³ This is in stark contrast with our preceding discussion of *shizhong*, which Zhu approached using decidedly more concrete examples of interpersonal social interaction, citing for example the actions of Confucius and the sage kings. I will address this contrast more closely in the following section.

³⁹ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 20:464: “仁性也，愛是情。情則發於用，性者指其未發。”

⁴⁰ Thompson, “Opposition and Complementarity in Zhu Xi’s Thought,” 159-161.

⁴¹ Zhang, *Zhang Zai ji*, 374: “心統性情者也。” For the reverberation of this maxim in Zhu’s own phraseology, see Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 4:67: “心統性情。”

⁴² Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 62:1516: “如這事合喜五分，自家喜七八分，便是過其節，喜三四分，便是不及其節。”

⁴³ This markedly “naturalist” perspective, characterized by Zhu Xi’s choice to address the conjunction of *zhong* and *he* almost exclusively in terms of inborn nature and emotions, can similarly be observed in his other writings. In a letter addressed to Hu Guangzhong 胡廣仲 in 1172, for example, Zhu explained: “Now, ‘the Mean’ (*zhong*) is used to describe the virtue of inborn nature (*xing*) and to picture the essence of the Way. [Contrarily], ‘harmony’ (*he*) is used to articulate the correct state of the emotions (*qing*) and to make manifest the function of the Way” (蓋中者，所以狀性之德而形道之體。和者，所以語情之正而顯道之用). See Zhu, *Wenji*, 42:1903. Similar examples can be found in Zhu, *Wenji*, 32:1418-1421 and 40:1843-1844.

One final point worthy of note is that when Zhu discussed *zhong* and *he* in the context of *Zhongyong* section 1, there appears to be a correlation between the situational *he* of section 1 and the similarly situational *shizhong* of section 2, to the point that one might suggest that they are synonymous. Zhu indeed appears to have read both terms equally as a situationally determined balancing of one's emotional state. Chen Chun 陳淳 (1159-1223), Zhu's occasional disciple, unambiguously supported this claim: "There is the *zhong* that is already expressed. . . . This *zhong* is precisely what is called *he*."⁴⁴ Zhu Xi himself used the identical phrase "the *zhong* that is already expressed" in a description of the situational *shizhong* of section 2: "The *zhong* that is already expressed is *shizhong*; it is what is meant by 'to exactly the right degree'."⁴⁵ The final phrase is crucial: although Zhu did not explicitly mention *he*, the phrase "to exactly the right degree" refers directly to the definition of *he* found in *Zhongyong* section 1. This is not an entirely novel insight, as Johnston and Wang made a similar suggestion in their appendix entitled "Terminology."⁴⁶ However, they failed to explain how this *zhong-he* relation functioned within Zhu Xi's broader philosophical framework. Even more puzzling is the contradiction thereby created within their own translation, considering they originally insisted on translating the *shizhong* of section 2 in a durative and thus static sense; it remains unclear how the situational *he* of section 1 can be directly equated with the (as they claim) durative *zhong* of section 2. In the following section, I shall further examine the precise relation between sections 1 and 2 of the *Zhongyong*, arguing that Zhu did not actually see *he* and *shizhong* as interchangeable synonyms, but rather as thematically related yet functionally distinct terms, each applied to different contexts.

4. A Composite *Zhong*

One way of understanding Zhu Xi's views on *Zhongyong* section 1, which introduced the latent "not yet expressed" variant of *zhong* and its "already expressed" counterpart *he*, is to rely on his theory of "substance" (*ti* 體) and "function" (*yong* 用). In his exposition of the terms, Stanislaus Lokuang has pointed out that substance and function played essential roles in Zhu's theory

⁴⁴ C. Chen, *Beixi ziyi*, 2:48: "已發之中. . . . 此中即所謂和也."

⁴⁵ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 62:1510: "已發之中, 即時中也, 中節之謂也."

⁴⁶ Johnston and Wang, *Daxue & Zhongyong*, 546-547.

of metaphysical structure, utilized to account for the relationship between Principle, or “things as they *should* be,” and their actual functioning after their manifestation in the material world.⁴⁷ As such, the commonly used translation of “substance” for *ti* can be misleading, for its primary emphasis lies not on the substantial or physical nature of a thing but rather on the predetermined *possibility* of its manifestation in a specific way. Complementarily, the way in which a thing is *actually* manifested or utilized, then, pertains to function. Substance and function are inextricably related: substance can only be meaningfully manifested in the real world through its related function, while function in turn requires substance for its content and direction. Zhu himself used the example of the virtue of benevolence (*ren* 仁) and its accompanying emotion of compassion (*ceyin* 惻隱) to illustrate this: “Benevolence is inborn nature, while compassion is emotion. . . . Inborn nature is substance, while emotion is function.”⁴⁸ In the *Zhuzi yulei*, Zhu explicitly linked this to our preceding discussion of *zhong* and *he*, which we similarly interpreted in terms of inborn nature and emotional expression: “Speaking of *zhong* in relation to *he*, then *zhong* is substance while *he* is function.”⁴⁹ While *zhong* refers to the substance or latent potential of perfectly balanced emotional expression, its application in the real world, to the level of *he* or perfect harmony based on one’s circumstances, pertains to function only. Although both terms are inextricably linked through a shared theme, in application they are divided and restricted to the metaphysical and the concrete world respectively.

This is not a novel way of accounting for *zhong* and *he* in section 1; it has indeed been suggested, although not so elaborately, by both Gardner, and Johnston and Wang.⁵⁰ What has remained undiscussed, however, is that the application of Zhu’s substance-function framework is not limited to *Zhongyong* section 1, but can similarly be applied within section 2, and, as I will demonstrate later, more generally between the two sections in their entirety. As Zhu himself noted, the substance-function relation is quite different when applied to the *shizhong* of section 2. Discussing this section in terms of *zhong* and *yong* 庸 (not to be confused with *yong* 用 “function”), which we described in our first section as referring to constant Principle, he stated:

⁴⁷ Lokuang, “Chu Hsi’s Theory of Metaphysical Structure,” 61-64.

⁴⁸ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 5:91: “仁性也，惻隱情也。 . . . 性是體，情是用。”

⁴⁹ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 63:1522: “以中對和而言，則中者體，和者用。”

⁵⁰ Gardner, *The Four Books*, 111; Johnston and Wang, *Daxue & Zhongyong*, 546. The same observation, with largely equal elaboration, has furthermore been made by some scholars. See Chan, *Chu Hsi: New Studies*, 412; L. Chen, “Zhu Xi *Zhongyong zhangju ji qi xuxue sixiang*,” 6-7; and Ching, “Chu Hsi on Personal Cultivation,” 279.

Speaking of *zhong* in relation to *yong*, then the situation is reversed again, so that *yong* is substance and *zhong* is function. This is what was meant when Yichuan [Cheng Yi] said: “*Zhong* is the proper Way of the realm, while *yong* is the established Principle of the realm.” This *zhong*, then, is *shizhong*.⁵¹

In contrast with the durative *zhong* of *zhonghe*, which Zhu labeled substance, the situational *zhong* of *zhongyong* (and, by extension, *shizhong*) is instead labeled function. Put differently, whereas in *Zhongyong* section 1, *zhong* served as a referent to the initial, potential substance of one’s inborn nature, section 2 instead focuses primarily on the functional application of this emotional potential to one’s ever-changing social circumstances. In the first analysis, this appears to corroborate Chen Chun’s aforementioned claim that the term “harmony” (*he*) used in section 1, interpreted as a functional expression of a potential substance, is in fact identical to the phrase *shizhong* used in section 2. The direct follow-up in the *Zhuzi yulei* passage cited above, however, indicates that the terms were related in theme only: the contexts to which they may be applied appear to be strictly separated. Zhu explained:

Speaking of it in terms of inborn nature and emotions, then we call it *zhonghe*. Speaking of it in terms of ritual and rightness, then we call it *zhongyong*. Their essence is one and the same. . . . Speaking of *zhongyong* in relation to *zhonghe*, then *zhonghe* furthermore serves as the substance while *zhongyong* is function.⁵²

It has become clear that “*zhong* contains two meanings,”⁵³ functioning as a composite term of which both halves refer to a similar “essence” (*shi* 實), namely the implication of inborn potential and its situational manifestation. However, Zhu interpreted the two *Zhongyong* sections that introduced these two meanings from substantially distinct perspectives, relating each to different aspects of his overarching metaphysical and psychological framework. What the above citation suggests is that while Zhu indeed applied the substance-function dichotomy separately within both sections, in each section he ultimately emphasized only one specific side. With regards to *zhonghe* as introduced in

⁵¹ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 63:1522: “以中對庸而言，則又折轉來，庸是體，中是用。如伊川云，‘中者天下之正道，庸者天下之定理，’是也。此中卻是時中。”

⁵² Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 63:1522: “以性情言之，謂之中和。以禮義言之，謂之中庸，其實一也。 . . . 以中和對中庸而言，則中和又是體，中庸又是用。”

⁵³ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 62:1480: “中含二義。”

section 1, Zhu referenced substance-function to distinguish between latent *xing* and applied *qing*. However, by classifying the section *in its entirety* as latent substance, Zhu's implied argument seems to be that both inborn nature and the emotions pertain first and foremost to the natural psychological capacities innate to the individual. Put differently, Zhu appears to have argued that the conjunction of *zhong* with *he* in section 1 was meant to be related chiefly to the natural, inborn aspect of man's individual psychology, without reference to its social manifestations.⁵⁴

On the other hand, in Zhu's understanding of *Zhongyong* section 2, which he classified in its entirety as function, the emphasis shifted to the other side. Although he recognized a similar substance-function relation between *zhong* and *yong* within the passage, the focus lay ultimately on the functional perspective of how the individual behaved in concrete social situations, governed by propriety (*li* 禮) and expressions of righteousness (*yi* 義), and exemplified by the concrete actions of Confucius and the sage kings, as described above. We can furthermore recognize this shift in emphasis in the way that both sections introduce their subject. In section 1, *zhong* and *he* are presented as concepts in the abstract; as grammatical subjects within the section, they are simply furnished with certain ontological definitions without actually being contextualized. As such, they represent the inborn or latent substance of man's psychology. Section 2, on the other hand, approaches the matter from the viewpoint of the "gentleman" (*junzi* 君子) who, as a concrete social actor tasked with exercising the situational Mean, represents its functional application within the real social world.⁵⁵ At this point, then, we can conclude that Chen Chun did not accurately interpret Zhu Xi when he equated the *he* of section 1 directly with the *shizhong* of section 2. While Zhu related *he* chiefly to his theory on man's psychological nature, *shizhong* was interpreted from the perspective of concrete social interaction.

5. Conclusion

Close examination of Zhu Xi's writings has indicated that, contrary to what Johnston and Wang have suggested, Zhu interpreted *zhong* as a composite

⁵⁴ As noted previously, this "naturalist" perspective is corroborated by several personal letters composed by Zhu Xi. See Zhu, *Wenji*, 32:1418-1421, 40:1843-1844, and 42:1903.

⁵⁵ As I noted above, this practice-oriented approach toward *shizhong* is corroborated in several of Zhu Xi's letters. See for example Zhu, *Wenji*, 22:1774, 41:1861, and 54:2583.

term containing two closely related but functionally distinct meanings, each applied to different contexts. Drawing clear connections with his broader psychological and metaphysical framework, Zhu Xi distinguished the hypothetical initial state of man's psychology from its application within the concrete social world. As one's social environment is marked by continuous change and its demands of emotional expression may change from one set of circumstances to the next, the latter interpretation of *zhong*, exemplified by our problematic phrase *shizhong*, must necessarily be situational. As such, Daniel Gardner's rendering of *Zhongyong* section 2 as "[t]he superior man . . . accords with circumstances in finding the perfect balance" achieves the most truthful representation of Zhu Xi's view.⁵⁶ The conflict that consequently arises within Gardner's translation between this situational reading of *zhong* (as *shizhong*) and the durative reading of *zhong* (as *zhonghe*) introduced in the preceding *Zhongyong* section 1, is resolved when we take into account Zhu Xi's metaphysical framework of substance (*ti*) and function (*yong*). Owing to the observation that in Zhu's view substance and function are mutually dependent for their meaningful operation and thus inextricably linked, both sections of *Zhongyong* ultimately relate an identical "essence" of *zhong*, namely a properly balanced emotional state informed by one's Principle-endowed inborn nature. For Zhu Xi, however, both sections address this matter from different perspectives, each related to different aspects of his overarching metaphysical and psychological framework.

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⁵⁶ Gardner, *The Four Books*, 113.

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chubanshe.

論朱熹《中庸章句》對中性概念的解釋

蘇慕仁

中文摘要

“中”被視為《中庸》最核心的概念，在朱熹心理學與道德思想中，有著關鍵性地位。“中”在《中庸》開頭以“中和”、“時中”的形式出現，是這兩個概念的核心部分。儘管“中和”與“時中”在朱熹的心理學思想中有著明顯不同的作用，現今英語學界對朱熹所著的《中庸章句》的解讀中卻沒有對二者之間的關係進行細緻的分析，進而妨礙了對“中”概念的了解。本文旨在解決此問題，首先闡明“時中”的意義，指出朱熹思想裏的“時中”最基本的特征是情境性，指向人際關係中的具體行為。其次論證朱熹將“中和”視為心理學的基本因素，指向人際關係中的抽象概念。儘管“中和”與“時中”有密切的關係，朱熹在闡釋這兩個概念時所使用的理論和視角是截然不同的。

關鍵詞：朱熹，中和，時中，性情，心理學思想

Scholarship and Self-Cultivation: Reconstruction, Dissemination, and Internalization of Confucian Thought in Joseon through the *Xiaoxue* 小學

LO Ming-Tung

Abstract

The introduction of Zhu Xi's 朱熹 *Xiaoxue* 小學 (Little Learning) opened up opportunities for reconstruction of the Confucian knowledge framework in Joseon. Scholars reviewed the role of the Four Books and Five Classics while imbibing from Neo-Confucian philosophy. A localized Confucian knowledge system started to take shape. On the one hand, the Joseon court implemented the *hangnyeong* (code of conduct) and "Nongmyeong" systems, promoting the status of the *Xiaoxue*. On the other hand, county schools and regional institutions in areas such as Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do stressed the significance of the book for self-cultivation, rather than competition for officialdom, reflecting the Joseon scholars' initiative in a locally-oriented elaboration of Confucianism.

Keywords: *Xiaoxue* (Little Learning), The Four Books and Five Classics, Confucian knowledge framework, *hangnyeong* (code of conduct), scholarly approach

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1. Introduction

The Four Books and the Five Classics (*Sishu Wujing* 四書五經) are core texts in Confucian philosophy. They had been introduced in the Korean Peninsula during the Three Kingdom Period (57 BCE-668 CE) and became essential texts in both scholarship and official examinations in ancient Korea. By the Joseon 朝鮮 dynasty (1392-1910), official regulation took the form of the Seonggyungwan 成均館, the foremost national educational institution, focusing students on these texts for royal examinations and moral enhancement. By the late Goryeo 高麗 period (918-1392), with the introduction of texts such as *Xiaoxue* 小學 (Little Learning), *Jiali* 家禮 (Family Rituals), and *Jinsi lu* 近思錄 (Reflections on Things At Hand), Neo-Confucian philosophy had become mainstream among scholars. The promotion of the *Xiaoxue* also motivated reflection on scholarly approaches to Confucian knowledge.

Early in the Joseon dynasty, scholars in service motioned for the inclusion of the *Xiaoxue* as an essential text in the Seonggyungwan's *hangnyeong* 學令 (code of conduct), aiming at securing the *Xiaoxue*'s place alongside the Four Books and Five Classics. Moreover, through the "Nongmyeong" 錄名 (recording names) examination, understanding of the *Xiaoxue* became a prerequisite for further candidacy in royal examinations, making exposure to it essential for scholars. Throughout the Joseon dynasty, the *Xiaoxue* was revered among the literati. However, despite these substantial official endeavors, the policies implemented failed to live up to their designed purposes.

Nationwide popularization of the *Xiaoxue* relied on the efforts of local scholars. Other than regulations implemented by local officials, Confucian masters such as Yi Hwang 李滉 (1501-1570) and Yi I 李珥 (1536-1584) reconstructed their approaches to Confucian philosophy, sound influence of which even reached remote areas like Jeolla-do 全羅道 and Gyeongsang-do 慶尚道. Their approach, implemented through local school regulations, instituted the *Xiaoxue* as the standard for scholarship and propriety, advocating for moral cultivation through daily practice. This changed the emphasis of scholarly learning from career orientation to personal cultivation, and undermined the narrow perception of the *Xiaoxue* as a mere stepping stone to officialdom. Doctrines that stemmed from the *Xiaoxue* became internalized as the objective standard of the ideal moral person.

2. The “Nongmyeong” Examination System

Joseon scholars mostly joined officialdom through the royal civil or military examinations which took place once every 3 years. For civil examinations, the candidates must compete through the preliminary, the semi-final, and the palace examinations, each of which involved three rounds: initiatory, intermediary, and final. During the preliminary exam, candidates were expected to compose essays in response to two questions. The first question was chosen out of four based respectively on the Four Books: *Daxue* 大學 (Great Learning), *Zhongyong* 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean), *Lunyu* 論語 (Analects), and *Mengzi* 孟子 (Master Meng). The second question was chosen out of five based respectively on the Five Classics: *Yijing* 易經 (Book of Changes), *Shijing* 詩經 (Book of Songs), *Shujing* 書經 (Book of History), *Liji* 禮記 (Book of Rites), and *Chunqiu* 春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals). The semi-final tested recitation and interpretation of seven of the above listed texts, with the *Liji* and the *Chunqiu* excluded.¹ Candidates could also take the annual national preparatory exam, of which the first 100 shortlisted would be admitted to the Seonggyungwan in preparation of the civil examinations upon completion of study. Similar to the royal civil examination, the two-round preparatory exam leaned heavily on the classic texts.

In terms of the civil examination and its classics-based orientation, the examination system of the Joseon dynasty accords generally with the preceding Goryeo royal examination system. However, with the arrival of Zhu Xi's 朱熹 Neo-Confucian philosophy during the late Goryeo period, Joseon introduced the “Nongmyeong” examination as a qualification test, focusing on Zhu Xi's *Xiaoxue* and *Jiali*.² In 1407 (7th year of King Taejong's 太宗 reign), Gwon Geun 權近 filed a memorial to the throne, highlighting the significance of the *Xiaoxue* in educating on morality and social ethics. The lack of exposure to this book among contemporary scholars was, according to Gwon Geun, far from acceptable. Official instructors at central and regional levels, he proposed, should therefore make study of the *Xiaoxue* mandatory, on which the authorization of the “Nongmyeong” qualification should be predicated. Upon such authorization by the Seonggyungwan, candidates may then be permitted to proceed to the second round of the national preparatory exam.³ As a major reference for royal

¹ D. Jo, *Daejeon hoetong*, 305-307.

² D. Jo, *Daejeon hoetong*, 309.

examinations, the *Xiaoxue* played a key role in the proliferation of Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucianism during the Joseon dynasty. As a consequence of the "Nongmyeong" examination system, literati who aspired to officialdom collated and refreshed Confucian thoughts, while keeping up to date with trends brought through cultural exchange with China.

The promotion of the *Xiaoxue* as a Confucian must-read in Joseon could not be achieved without rigid execution of the examination policy. However, shortly after the "Nongmyeong" was introduced, the examination became little more than a formality. By the beginning of King Sejong's 世宗 reign (1418-1450), the "Nongmyeong" qualification could already be attained without sitting for the examinations. Complaints were even filed when some candidates failed to acquire the authorization. In 1423 (5th year of King Sejong's reign), Tak Sin 卓愼 proposed tightening supervision over "Nongmyeong" authorization.⁴ Measures of supervision were taken but failed to reach adequate depth. By the beginning of King Jungjong's 中宗 reign (1506-1544), abuse of power had become common among supervisors.⁵ Only one failed candidate had been officially recorded, evidencing the degree of corruption and degradation. Scholarly officials cite the neglect of the *Xiaoxue* in the secondary rounds of the preparatory examinations as a cause for its declining importance as an essential text, but their proposal for its inclusion was dismissed by the king.⁶ "Nongmyeong," intended as an official filter for promoting and testing exposure to the *Xiaoxue*, had failed its primary purpose.

3. Seonggyungwan: Code of Conduct

Official educational institutions in Joseon included the Seonggyungwan and the four district schools (*sabu hakdang* 四部學堂) in the capital, and the county schools (*hyanggyo* 鄉校) in the provinces. Cradling elites for the Imperial College of Supreme Learning, the Seonggyungwan designed the curriculum in accordance with the royal examinations, preparing students for candidacy. Its code of conduct, known as *hangnyeong*, played a significant role in cultivating candidates for civil service.

³ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 24th day of the 3rd lunar month, 7th year of King Taejong's reign (1407).

⁴ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 28th day of the 5th lunar month, 5th year of King Sejong's reign (1423).

⁵ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 12th day of the 6th lunar month, 4th year of King Jungjong's reign (1509).

⁶ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 15th day of the 1st lunar month, 11th year of King Jungjong's reign (1516).

Recorded in the *Taehak ji* 太學志 (A Description of the Royal Institution), the code of conduct consists of eleven items, addressing three aspects: 1) campus conduct, including etiquette at the Confucius temple (item 1), behavior and dress code (item 6), intolerance of indolence (item 7), intolerance of indulgence (item 8), etiquette of greeting teachers (item 9), and residing and dining etiquette (item 10); 2) academic requirements, including teaching references (item 2), monthly teaching plan (item 3), and assessment criteria (item 4); and 3) cultivation of morality, including abidance by the Five Cardinal Relationships (*oryun* 五倫) (item 5), and recommendation for officialdom (item 11). Students who failed to behave accordingly would face punitive consequences to the maximum of a life-time ban from readmission. In response to the requirements of the civil examinations, item 2 prescribes daily study of the Four Books and Five Classics at Myeongnyundang 明倫堂 (Hall of Enlightenment), focusing on argumentation. With the exception of history books, all other references were banned at the institution.⁷

Compilation of the *Taehak ji* by Min Jong-hyeon 閔鍾顯 began in 1784 (8th year of King Jeongjo's 正朝 reign) and was completed the following year. In this text, Min attributed the title of the precursor of *hangnyeong* to the *Taehak seongjeon* 太學成典 (Royal Institution Code), a compilation by Yi Man-bu 李萬敷 in 1689 (15th year of King Sukjong's 肅宗 reign). Not disagreeing with Min's attribution, Choi Kwang Man pointed out that the *Taehak seongjeon*, completed within less than 6 months,⁸ was based on a draft code written by faculty members of the Seonggyungwan. Thus, prior to *Taehak seongjeon*, the prototype of *hangnyeong* had already been available. The *Joseon wangjo sillok* 朝鮮王朝實錄 (Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty) documented the first implementation of the code no later than King Sejong's reign.⁹

By Sejong's reign, the "Nongmyeong" examination was a mere formality, and the faculty of the Seonggyungwan needed an alternative to revive the *Xiaoxue* into the curriculum. Riding on the Seonggyungwan's

⁷ Min, *Taehak ji*, 1:414-415.

⁸ Choi, "Taehak seongjeon-ui jakseong gyeongwi-wa saryojeok gachi," 99.

⁹ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 28th day of the 6th lunar month, 12th year of King Sejong's reign (1430): "宗學博士金墩上書曰 . . . 今學中犯義者及讀書未精者 . . . 依成均學令, 隨即擯楚其僕以懲之。"; *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 6th day of the 6th lunar month, 16th year of King Sejong's reign (1434): "司譯院提調啓 . . . 其餘七品以下所讀考講時, 不通者, 依承文院吏文生徒學令行楚。"; *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 19th day of the 3rd lunar month, 19th year of King Seongjong's reign (1488): "兩使又移坐相近, 同看學令, 密語良久, 大抵皆稱嘆之語。"

mechanisms of reward and punishment, a proposal was filed in 1439 (21st year of King Sejong's reign) for nationwide replacement of the *hangnyeong* with the *Xiaoxue*. Song Eul-gae 宋乙開, assistant magistrate (*jubu* 注簿) of the Seonggyungwan, motioned for the implementation of the *hangnyeong* in educational institutions across the country. The Ministry of Rites (Yejo 禮曹), under King Sejong's order, consulted with faculty members of the Seonggyungwan and concluded afterwards that the *Xiaoxue*, in the role of the code, should be introduced in educational institutions at both a state and a provincial level. However, the king rejected the proposal, deeming it inappropriate to degrade the Confucian canon to the level of regulations.¹⁰

King Sejong's rule on the motion reflects how the *Xiaoxue* was adopted differently for ruling in comparison with the other classics. Based on the "Three Canons of Rites" (*Sanli* 三禮), Zhu Xi's *Xiaoxue* drew heavily on *Liji* for its practicality and value on moral cultivation, especially in chapters such as "Quli" 曲禮 (Summary of the Rules of Propriety), "Shaoyi" 少儀 (Smaller Rules of Demeanour), "Neize" 內則 (Patterns of the Family), "Yuzao" 玉藻 (Jade-bead Pendants of the Royal Cap), "Jiyi" 祭義 (Meaning of Sacrifices), "Yueji" 樂記 (Record of Music), and "Fengji" 坊記 (Record of the Dykes). Sejong's view on the *Xiaoxue* is vindicated in the *Joseon wangjo sillok*. According to the *Xiaoxue*, when meeting seniors on the road, juniors should rush to approach, saluting with joined hands while standing upright.¹¹ The King commended such rites for demonstration of respect for seniority. As pointed out by an official in 1439 (21st year of King Sejong's reign), ill conduct prevailed at the time: upon meeting teachers on the way, the youths, demonstrating utter disrespect, neither dismounted to greet nor gave way.¹² Item 9 of the Seonggyungwan's *hangnyeong*, therefore, made it a must for students to greet properly.¹³ Even though the *Xiaoxue* did not displace the *hangnyeong*, the Seonggyungwan had adapted and integrated its contents into the *hangnyeong* as a measure for creating balance between academic endeavor and moral cultivation.

¹⁰ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 29th day of the 9th lunar month, 21st year of King Sejong's reign (1439).

¹¹ Zhu, *Xiaoxue*, 13:409: "遭先生於道，趨而進，正立拱手" (quoted from the "Quli" of *Liji*).

¹² *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 8th day of the 3rd lunar month, 21st year of King Sejong's reign (1439).

¹³ Min, *Taehak ji*, 1:417: "成均館學令，'諸生道遇師長，呈身拱手，立道左，師長騎馬過行，諸生如或藏身掩面，憚於行禮者，罰。'"

4. *Xiaoxue*: Purpose and Significance

As Confucianism became indigenized into Joseon, the *Xiaoxue* played a role no less significant than the Four Books and Five Classics. However, scholars in Joseon made a distinction between the *Xiaoxue* and other Confucian canons in terms of character building and priorities of study. The former was deemed to be a formative text targeting younger readership for behavior modelling and moral cultivation. As pointed out by Zhu Xi in the *Xiaoxue*'s preface, the book serves to instruct on behavior and etiquette through which one learns to respect seniority and engage with others, laying foundations for personal, familial, communal, and national services. Children, therefore, should start reading it from an early age, building on demeanor over the years.¹⁴ Through the *Xiaoxue*, one learns to identify the cardinal interpersonal relationships in the social hierarchy and act accordingly in daily life. Readership of the book should hence go beyond candidates of civil examinations and beyond the boundaries of official institutions.

Such cultivating purposes positioned the *Xiaoxue* as a top priority among Confucian references for *yusaeng* 儒生 (Confucian students). In 1477 (8th year of King Seongjong's 成宗 reign), Yi Geuk-gi 李克基, second royal secretary (*jwaseungji* 左承旨), was consulted for the selection of classic texts for Seongjong's study. Teaching self-cultivation and social relationships, the *Xiaoxue* was deemed a reference through life. Yi further suggested that exposure should start early, paving the way for beginners to Confucian philosophy and towards a better understanding of classics such as the *Daxue*. This prioritized approach to classic texts was widely approved by Joseon kings and officials.¹⁵ In 1517 (12th year of King Jungjong's 中宗 reign), as the *Xiaoxue* became canon in court, Yu Un 柳雲, regular participant of royal lectures (*chamchangwan* 參贊官), stressed the significance of the cultivation of learning in children: "exposure to the *Xiaoxue* should start at the age of 8, to ease future learning." Jungjong also approved of the "*Xiaoxue* first" approach to scholarship.¹⁶ Early cultivation enables scholarly competence, eventually guaranteeing an ample flow of talents for national service. Thus, the significance of the *Xiaoxue* could not be overemphasized.

¹⁴ Zhu, *Xiaoxue*, 13:393.

¹⁵ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 8th day of the 3rd lunar month, 8th year of King Seongjong's reign (1477).

¹⁶ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 20th day of the 11th lunar month, 12th year of King Jungjong's reign (1517).

As a Neo-Confucian classic, the *Xiaoxue* is not discriminative for age or class, and is rich in practical guidance on ritual practices and daily etiquette. In 1478 (9th year of King Seongjong's reign), when associate initiate (*dongjisa* 同知事) Yi Seung-so 李承召 presented on the "Neize" of *Liji*, King Seongjong was impressed by its rationale on filial piety and queried on how to make such practice common among imperial subjects. Yi replied that if all could learn to empathize from the *Xiaoxue*, there will be none who is not virtuous. Seongjong became convinced that the *Xiaoxue* would lead to moral prevalence.¹⁷

In general, Joseon kings recognized the universal values preserved in the *Xiaoxue* and took them beyond the level of intellectual cultivation, enshrining the doctrines in local educational policies. In 1476 (7th year of King Seongjong's reign), the *Xiaoxue* was already a state measure. Provincial governors (*gwanchalsa* 觀察使) were responsible for ensuring that all local *yusaeng*, junior and senior, be exposed to the *Xiaoxue*—juniors to the level of recitation, seniors application—before progressing to the Four Books. Thus, filial piety and fraternal duty, through the pervasion of the *Xiaoxue*, shall be valued by all.¹⁸ The royal acclaim of the *Xiaoxue* was key to its popularity in Joseon.

5. *Xiaoxue* in Regional Education

Already highly regarded as an accessible canon during King Seongjong's reign, the *Xiaoxue*'s popularity continued through the reign of Yeonsan-gun 燕山君 (1494-1506). By the time of King Jungjong's reign, the educational status of the *Xiaoxue* was further reinforced among the provinces. Jungjong was among the most avid royal advocates of Confucianism, decreeing the *Xiaoxue* as a necessity for children and adults.¹⁹ With his approval, physical copies of the book were printed and delivered to county schools across the country. Between the 11th and 12th years of Jungjong's reign (1516-1517), the Ministry of Rites was ordered to make the *Xiaoxue* accessible to regional institutions nationwide, near and far.²⁰

¹⁷ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 21st day of the 8th lunar month, 9th year of King Seongjong's reign (1478).

¹⁸ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 23rd day of the 7th lunar month, 7th year of King Seongjong's reign (1476).

¹⁹ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 3rd day of the 7th lunar month, 14th year of King Jungjong's reign (1519).

²⁰ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 6th day of the 11th lunar month, 11th year of King Jungjong's reign (1516).

Cultural dissemination, however, relies on more than individual decisions and policy support. Ill-timed policies could hinder rather than advance cultural communication. Overshadowed by the “Gimyo 己卯 Literati Purge” in 1519, which led to the death or removal of such *yusaeng* officials as Jo Gwang-jo 趙光祖, Gim An-guk 金安國, Gim Jeong 金淨, Gi Jun 奇遵, and Gim Sik 金湜, the *Xiaoxue* came to be used as evidence of crime. Scholars in service, fearing implication, washed their hands of the book. In 1522 (17th year of King Jungjong’s reign), official Eo Deuk-gang 魚得江 claimed, “those who used the *Xiaoxue* as a stepping stone for personal gains in court are the culprits behind the present national shortage of talents.”²¹ Since the Gimyo Literati Purge, all *Xiaoxue*-related measures were abolished. Scholars in general avoided public mention of the book, dreading accusations of being Gimyo accomplices. By 1533 (28th year of King Jungjong’s reign), the aftermath of the purge wore off and the taboo on the *Xiaoxue* gradually faded.

Nonetheless, the legacy of the Gimyo Literati Purge lingered in the Joseon court. Between King Jungjong’s later years and King Injong’s 仁宗 brief takeover in 1545, the “Eulsa 乙巳 Literati Purge” swept the court, haunting scholars for more than twenty years. In 1568 (1st year of King Seonjo’s 宣祖 reign), Gi Dae-seung 奇大升 commented during a royal lecture on *Lunyu* on the scholarly climate within and without the court over the past two decades:

Late in Jungjong’s reign, the court was rich in intellectual supply. Yet innocent scholars perished through literati purges, with few survivors. For more than twenty years, Joseon intellectuals, though banished and relegated afar, never neglected on scholarship. . . . *Yusaeng* in county schools continued to study the *Xiaoxue*, *Samgang haengsil do* 三綱行實圖 (Illustrated Guide to the Three Bonds), and *Iryun haengsil do* 二倫行實圖 (Illustrated Guide to the Two Relations). Decrees issued by provincial governors’ offices continued, making the aforementioned items must-reads for local students, near and remote. I lived in a rural area, ignorant of scholarship or the purge. Thanks to the local governor’s decree, I got to read the *Xiaoxue* and follow the ways of the sages.²²

Wearied by purges, scholars in service mostly chose retirement to avoid suspicion and focused on study, staying away from the capital and its persecution. Gi’s account shows that, by and large, literati purges had not spread to compromise educational policies in remote and rural areas.

²¹ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 4th day of the 3rd lunar month, 17th year of King Jungjong’s reign (1522).

²² *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 12th day of the 1st lunar month, 1st year of King Seonjo’s reign (1568).

In fact, Seongjong's and Jungjong's efforts had not been undone. In making education on the *Xiaoxue* available and mandatory nationwide, their policies channelled the circulation of culture on a national scale, which also prompted local responses. In 1517 (12th year of King Jungjong's reign), a year after the decree for the national popularization of the *Xiaoxue* was issued, Gim An-guk was appointed as provincial governor of Gyeongsang-do. While ensuring a wider readership of the *Xiaoxue*, Gim also initiated the circulation of Zhu Xi's *Tongmeng xuzhi* 童蒙須知 (What Children Must Know) in Saneum 山陰 county, advocating for the formative education of children. Officials in court were impressed by Gim's governance. Royal reader-in-waiting (*sidokgwan* 侍讀官) Gi Jun commented: "Gim adopted the *Xiaoxue* to channel morality. Locals found the book beneficial even outside of academic purposes. Therefore, why should we fixate only on goals of prosperity when reading these doctrines in print?"²³ While this might be excessive praise for Gim, the comment does reflect the new appraisal Joseon scholars had for the *Xiaoxue*, as suitable for moral cultivation beyond the narrow application of official selection.

Joseon scholars' refreshed sentiments on Confucian philosophy brought to the foreground the innate values of Confucian classics, which go beyond the purposes of practical gains, and became more pronounced. According to Zhu's *Xiaoxue*, *Jiali*, and *Bailudong gui* 白鹿洞規 (Statutes of the White Deer Cave Academy) and works by authors such as Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤, Cheng Yi 程頤, and Cheng Hao 程顥, entry to officialdom was hardly proof of one's worth. Unlike the Four Books and Five Classics, Neo-Confucian classics advocate inner cultivation and personal practice, offering guidance on achieving "inner sageliness" beyond "outer kingliness." The Seonggyungwan, as the national institution preparing candidates for royal examinations, designed the *hangnyeong* accordingly. Students were bound to memorize the Confucian classics specifically to construct a knowledge system in alignment with the civil examinations. Regional institutions, on the other hand, designed their institutional regulations and statutes—some also named *hangnyeong*—with less restriction. Such local reconstruction brought Neo-Confucian classics into the curriculum, serving for both official pursuits and personal cultivation.

Records of county schools in Bokcheon 福川 of Jeolla-do and Andong-bu 安東府 of Gyeongsang-do show that the *hangnyeong* of state and regional levels differed mainly in two aspects: reference items and approaches

²³ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 25th day of the 4th lunar month, 13th year of King Jungjong's reign (1518).

to moral cultivation. In 1585 (18th year of King Seonjo's reign), when appointed county magistrate (*hyeongam* 縣監) of Dongbok 同福, Jeolla-do, Gim Bu-ryun 金富倫 (1531-1598) issued the *hangnyeong* of Bokcheon county school, which consisted of 20 articles. Between the 38th and 40th years of King Seonjo's reign, Gwon Gi 權紀 (1546-1624), commissioned by Ryu Seong-ryong 柳成龍, composed the *hangnyeong* for Andong-bu county school. In terms of required readings, the two institutions stipulated:

1. Bokcheon *hangnyeong*

For regular study: *Xiaoxue*, *Jiali*, the Four Books and Five Classics, *Jinsi lu*, the *Xingli daquan* 性理大全 (Great Compendium on Human Nature and Principle), and history volumes.

Prohibited: *Zhuangzi* 莊子, *Laozi* 老子, Buddhist texts, minor volumes, and works of other schools.

For regular self-reflection: *Tongmeng xuzhi*.²⁴

2. Andong-bu *hangnyeong*

For regular study: *Xiaoxue*, *Yili* 儀禮 (Etiquette and Ceremonials), the Four Books and Five Classics, *Jinsi lu*, *Xingli daquan*, and history volumes.

Prohibited: *Zhuangzi*, *Laozi*, Buddhist texts, minor volumes, and works of other schools.

For regular self-reflection: *Tongmeng xuzhi*.²⁵

Similar in choices, both institutions included classic Confucian texts, with the addition of Neo-Confucian texts on formative education and etiquette. Compared to trainees at the Seonggyungwan, students of county schools were better exposed to Confucian texts in terms of diversity and quantity.

Neo-Confucianism in the Song dynasty is rooted in reality, advocating academic assiduousness, moral cultivation, and civility. Such philosophy puts self-cultivation before governance, materializing moral principles through daily practice. Local students were also trained to live up to such standards:

1. Bokcheon *hangnyeong*

scholarship combines familiarity, comprehension, and actual practice; students should behave with respect, honesty, humility, and principle and stay free of vulgarity and flippancy, following the principles laid down by Zhou Dunyi and the two Cheng brothers (*er Cheng* 二程).²⁶

²⁴ B. Gim, *Seolwoldang jip*, 41:74.

²⁵ Gwon, *Yeongga ji*, 18:186.

2. Andong-bu *hangnyeong*

scholarship combines familiarity, comprehension, and actual practice; students should behave with respect, honesty, humility, and principle and stay free of vulgarity and flippancy, following the examples of sages such as Zhou Dunyi and the two Cheng brothers.²⁷

Instead of the principles, Andong-bu stressed the examples of sages—specifically Zhou Dunyi, Cheng Yi, and Cheng Hao. Students were also required to copy *Bailudong gui* regularly by hand—a constant reminder that true scholars seldom use flamboyance to win fame and fortune, and sagely ways can be acquired only through developing a thorough understanding of Confucian texts, living in accordance with the principles and setting a good example for others.²⁸

6. Compass for Self-Modelling: A Path to Sageliness

While the objective of scholarship is not necessarily officialdom, the ideal of unification between governance and sageliness is likewise impossible to achieve by sole reliance on self-cultivation in solitude. As witnesses or victims of bureaucratic rivalry, *yusaeng* knew only too well that deciding between service and reclusion was a matter of principle above individual choice for intellectuals in ancient Korea. Since the rule of King Seonjo, Joseon Confucians, represented by Yi Hwang and Yi I, had noted that self-cultivation and officialdom are not contradictory pursuits. However, when scholars narrowly prioritize political advancement they become indolent and morally degraded. Likewise, obsessive fixation on sagely cultivation divorces scholars from their moral obligations. When the choice is made to pursue only one of two complementary paths, both lead to failure. *Yusaeng* went beyond simple acceptance of Confucian thought. Following the guidance of Neo-Confucian philosophy, they internalized this moral guidance into a life-long pursuit of sageliness.

Officialdom was to be the end of governance. Intellectuals competed through official exams in order to serve the country, prioritizing between the pursuits of officialdom and self-cultivation which were far from mutually

²⁶ B. Gim, *Seolwoldang jip*, 41:74.

²⁷ Gwon, *Yeongga ji*, 18:186.

²⁸ Gwon, *Yeongga ji*, 18:186.

exclusive. Yet scholarship's ultimate purpose has to be moral-enhancement rather than official credit. Failure to recognize such a purpose counts as a violation against school principles, as noted in the first item of "Isanwon gyu" 伊山院規 (Statutes of Isan Academy) by Yi Hwang in 1559 (14th year of King Myeongjong's 明宗 reign):

Following the national educational policies, students should abide by the doctrines of the sages and keep faith in the innate goodness of humanity and the eventual prevalence of the sages' ways, endeavoring to master the knowledge which serves as food for both the mind and means. One should also be exposed to a wide range of scholarly works and tomes on history while keeping in mind a clear priority of study. Books of vice and evil are banned from the Academy for avoidance of distraction and confusion.²⁹

Such a pursuit of knowledge for the mind and means mirrors the Joseon scholars' view on scholarship: both self-cultivation and officialdom could be achieved, so long as one keeps reflecting on his intention along the Way. The complementary relationship between the two pursuits goes back to Cheng Hao's discourse on the practice of moral cultivation: "people fear that pursuing officialdom leaves little time for self-cultivation, to which I disagree. In the matter of one month, if ten days are dedicated to preparation of official examinations, plenty still remains for study and self-cultivation. However, if the pursuit of officialdom is targeted as the end instead of the means, the loss of purpose in life is more to be feared than the loss of time."³⁰ Hence, the complaints that preparation for examinations leaves no room for true scholarship and self-cultivation were little more than an excuse for a wavering the mind.

Compositions by Yi I also address similar issues. His *Gyeongmong yogyeol* 擊蒙要訣 (Key to Breaking Folly's Hold), written in 1577 (10th year of King Seonjo's reign), stated that "sages from the past deemed it unnecessary to worry for the time dedicated to pursuit of officialdom. The loss of purpose while pursuing is more to fear. Dedication and determination would make both pursuits possible for success."³¹ Yi elaborated on the Neo-Confucian philosophy, stressing the role of determination in balancing official pursuits and self-cultivation. To understand the significance of determination, according to Yi, a clear purpose should be identified from the very beginning. The first chapters of both

²⁹ H. Yi, *Toegye jip*, 30:430.

³⁰ Zhu and Lü, *Jinsi lu*, 13:239.

³¹ I Yi, *Yulgok jeonseo*, 2:90-91.

Gyeongmong yogyeol and his 1582 (15th year of King Seonjo's reign) composition *Hakgyo mobeom* 學校模範 (Model for Schools) were entitled "Ipji" 立志 (Establishing the Purposes), encouraging scholars to set goals early in study, "endeavoring on a way to sageliness."³² In *Gyeongmong yogyeol*, Yi wrote, "Beginners should establish their purposes first, determined to follow the way of the sages, and never shun from one's commitment." Teachings as such gave clear directions for Joseon intellectuals in the pursuit of self-enhancement. With the expectations and targets of scholarship secured, the profiles of an ideal scholar also become clear.

Yi Hwang and Yi I, respectively the masters of the Yeongnam 嶺南 School and the Giho 畿湖 School, both provided guidance on approaches to scholarship, leaving marks on the academic regulations of county schools, especially in areas such as Jeolla-do, Gyeongsang-do, and Chungcheong-do 忠清道. When first taking office, officials usually imposed measures for the promotion of education within the jurisdiction, which include the implementation of school regulations. For instance, in 1751 (27th year of King Yeongjo's 英祖 reign), Yun Gwang-so 尹光紹 (1708-1786) was appointed the magistrate of Andong-bu, Jeolla-do. After taking office, he implemented the "Heunghak gyubeom" 興學規範 (Regulations for Educational Advancement) consisting of 10 articles.³³ These regulations reached county schools such as Hoge 虎溪 Academy, Byeongsan 屏山 Academy, Samgye 三溪 Academy, Cheongseong 青城 Academy, Mulgye 勿溪 Academy, Doyeon 道淵 Academy, and Gudam 龜潭 Academy. The eighth article of the regulation takes on the views of Cheng Hao and Yi Hwang:

Though a distinction should be made between pursuit for officialdom and scholarship, as the sages of the past put it, the time dedicated to pursuit of officialdom is not to be worried for; the loss of purpose while pursuing is more to fear. Confucian masters of our country also approve of it. *Yusaeng* at school should therefore pursue their way with commitment and determination, upon which success would be achieved. Remember the words of the sages: if the pursuit of officialdom is targeted as the end instead of the means, the loss of purpose in life is more to be feared than the loss of time. Students should be alert against such tendency and stay focused with determination and clear priority. Those who compete through the official examinations should base on classics, balancing the content and comprehension, and stay clear of volumes of vice and evil.³⁴

³² Min, *Taehak ji*, 1:418.

³³ Yun, *Sogok yugo*, 223:491.

Although self-cultivation and officialdom are not contradictory, Joseon intellectuals never saw the latter as the purpose of educational institutions. In 1759 (35th year of King Yeongjo's reign), Gim Jong-jeong 金鍾正 took office as the district magistrate (*hyeollyeong* 縣令) of Uiseong 義城, Gyeongsang-do. In the same year, "Uiseong hyanggyo yusaeng geojeop jeolmok" 義城鄉校儒生居接節目 (Scholarly Approach of Uiseong County School) was issued, of which item 9 stated: "schools are intended for one to acquire the sage's wisdom and understanding of human relations. Nowadays schools exist almost solely for training students for competing in examinations, which is distant from ideal. The government selects intellectuals for service through royal examinations, which is a long-established tradition. And school students' taking time from daily routines for preparation and exchange with peers is nothing unjustified."

Yet Gim thought it was inappropriate for students to dedicate time exclusively to the preparation. For at least 2-4 hours daily, according to Gim, one should commit to self-cultivation and scholarly studies. Exposure to classic texts such as the *Xiaoxue* and *Jinsi lu* should be daily practice. And one should be well aware that officialdom is only the means of scholarly pursuit, not the end.³⁵

In fact, upon his appointment as the chief clerk (*pangwan* 判官) of Jeonju-bu 全州府, Jeolla-do in 1625 (3rd year of Injo's 仁祖 reign), Shin Dal-do 申達道 had made criticism of scholars' concern over passing or failing examinations and being distracted even to the edge of moral degradation.³⁶ Emphasising the role of moral education, Shin implemented "Hakgyu jeolmok" 學規節目 (Academic Regulations) consisting of 20 articles,³⁷ of which article 19 reads: "indispensable as the royal examinations are, they should not be intellectuals' top priority. Moreover, the scholarly pursuit of knowledge does not aim at officialdom. One should dwell on the doctrine of Cheng Hao in pursuit of knowledge for the mind and means instead of being disoriented by fame and fortune."³⁸ Examples as such demonstrate that the prioritization of self-cultivation over pursuit of officialdom was similarly stressed in both Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do.

Topping in a number of county schools and institutions, Yeongnam area was appraised as "the home of the cultured." Local successes in court set

³⁴ Yun, *Sogok yugo*, 223:309.

³⁵ J. Gim, *Ungye mango*, 86:608.

³⁶ Shin, *Mano jip*, 18:420.

³⁷ Shin, *Mano jip*, 18: 468.

³⁸ Shin, *Mano jip*, 18:420.

examples for students and motivated the promotion of academic approaches. *Yusaeng* officials such as Gim Jong-jik 金宗直 and his successors Gim Goeng-pil 金宏弼, Gim An-guk, and Jo Gwang-jo, who won the trust of King Jungjong,³⁹ played significant roles in court in making political decisions as well as promoting Confucian scholarship in the regions. They initiated the administrative hiring system of “Hyeollyanggwa” 賢良科 (Examination for the Learned and Virtuous) in court, introducing capable intellectuals to the king for preaching sagely ways. In rural areas, they advocated the implementation of the “Lantian Lüshi xiangyue” 藍田呂氏鄉約 (Community Compacts of the Lü Family in Lantian), promoting the *Xiaoxue* and *Jiali*. Though fallen victims of the Gimyo Literati Purge, Yeongnam scholars’ (known as the Gimyo Sages) efforts and virtue left a legacy, setting examples for generations to come.

The *Xiaoxue* and other classics of Neo-Confucianism promoted by Gimyo scholars were provided as canon for study and practice. In 1747 (23rd year of King Yeongjo’s reign), Jeong Gan 鄭幹, the newly appointed county magistrate of Boryeong 保寧, Chungcheong-do, commented that “since the Gimyo Literati Purge, the *Xiaoxue* has been dismissed by scholars so much that many are ignorant of what the book is about.”⁴⁰ In response to the royal order, Jeong redacted “Boryeong-hyeon sohak hunmong jeolmok” 保寧縣小學訓蒙節目 (Regulations of the *Xiaoxue* for Boryeong County) for the promotion of the *Xiaoxue*.⁴¹ Article 8 reads:

Our Master Hanhwondang 寒暄堂 dedicated his life to the *Xiaoxue*, a volume inexhaustible of wisdom. It is a book people of all ages should study, not just children.⁴²

The “Master Hanhwondang” refers to Gim Goeng-pil, representative of the Gimyo Sages. Jeong believed that Gim’s dedication to the *Xiaoxue* certified its value for the public. Idolizing the Gimyo Sages as scholarly ideals, Jeong drew on their admiration for the *Xiaoxue*, enshrining the classic as a moral compass towards sageliness and guidance for self-modelling.

In 1762 (38th year of Yeongjo’s reign), Yi Bo-on 李普溫, country magistrate (*jihyeon* 知縣) of Muan 務安, Jeolla-do, formulated regulations comprised of 10 articles for local schools, quoting “Fanshi qijie” 范氏七戒 (Fan’s Seven Disciplines) in the *Xiaoxue* as the sixth article:

³⁹ Areum Publishing House, *Seowonji chongseo*, 8:43.

⁴⁰ Jeong, *Myeonggo jip*, 71:463.

⁴¹ Jeong, *Myeonggo jip*, 71:502.

⁴² Jeong, *Myeonggo jip*, 71:463.

Students should be cautious of their speech and avoid comments on rites. Following the good example of Confucius, who never commented on rebellion and spirits, one should abide by Fan's "Seven Disciplines" and avoid touching on: 1) matters of the court; 2) character and performance of local officials; 3) ill deeds of others; 4) official personnel changes; 5) gain and loss of fortune; 6) vice and flippancy towards women; and 7) praise for the privileged.⁴³

Originally recorded as the precepts of Fan Yiqian 范益謙 in the "Jiayan" 嘉言 (Admirable Sayings) of the *Xiaoxue*,⁴⁴ such disciplines took the form of academic regulations in the county schools of Muan, advising on daily behaviors.

7. Indigenization of Confucianism in Joseon: A Foreign Extension

For Joseon intellectuals, Confucianism was no longer a mere school of thought introduced from abroad. Through centuries of exposure, Confucianism had become integrated as a part of the local culture. Joseon scholars had also evolved from cultural recipients to participants. Upon the rise of Neo-Confucianism and the popularization of the *Xiaoxue* and the *Jiali*, they took initiatives in the reform and localization of the Confucian knowledge framework. Measures taken gave birth to a locally-oriented scholarly approach, demonstrating a more pronounced awareness of national identity.

In the first item of the "Isanwon gyu" by Yi Hwang, a clear line divides Confucian and Neo-Confucian knowledge. According to Yi, the Four Books and Five Classics are the source of core values whereas the *Xiaoxue* and the *Jiali* serve as modelling frames for beginners.⁴⁵ Students should first classify Confucian classics for different phases of study. Given that Confucian texts available in Joseon were rich in quantity and diversity, scholars would be easily lost without such an organized approach to texts. Moreover, students should keep in mind the fundamental purposes of Confucian thought. Otherwise, even with the best teachers, the navigation would end up a blind enterprise. By making such clear distinction among the classics, Yi's method helped students approach texts with a clear purpose

⁴³ Areum Publishing House, *Seowonji chongseo*, 5:160.

⁴⁴ Zhu, *Xiaoxue*, 13:453.

⁴⁵ H. Yi, *Toegye jip*, 30:430.

and organized framework: through the *Xiaoxue* and the *Jiali*, students would learn to recognize hierarchies in human relationships and act accordingly, striving for moral cultivation through daily practice of etiquette; with moral enhancement achieved, one could better appreciate the core value advocated in the Four Books and Five Classics, eventually acquiring the sagely ways.

The *Xiaoxue*, according to Yi Hwang, is closely related to the Four Books and Five Classics, and equally as important. Elaborating on Yi Hwang's view, Yi I proposed the notion of the "Five Books and Five Classics," with the *Xiaoxue* as the addition. According to Yi I, children should start with the *Xiaoxue* before reading other Confucian classics, followed by the Four Books and Five Classics afterwards. In the "Dokseo" 讀書 (Reading Books) chapter of the *Gyeongmong yogyel*, the reading order of classics Yi Hwang designed has echoes of Yi I's:

One should start with the *Xiaoxue*, and then approach texts in the following order: *Daxue* and *Daxue huowen* 大學或問 (Questions on *Daxue*), *Lunyu*, *Mengzi*, *Zhongyong*, *Shijing*, *Liji*, *Shujing*, *Yijing*, and finally *Chunqiu*. Students should approach those ten texts accordingly. As for the Neo-Confucian texts such as *Jinsi lu*, *Jiali*, *Xinjing* 心經 (Scripture of the Mind), *Er Cheng quanshu* 二程全書 (Complete Works of the Cheng Brothers), *Zhuzi quanshu* 朱子全書 (Complete Works of Master Zhu), and *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 (A Classified Collection of the Conversations of Master Zhu), one should closely study them if time allows. If more efforts can be spared, students should also read historical accounts for insights.⁴⁶

Following Zhu Xi's idea, Yi I distinguished the *Xiaoxue* as a reference for beginners. Yet his grouping of the "Five Books and Five Classics" differs from Yi Hwang's idea and Neo-Confucian thought in terms of the perception of the Confucian knowledge framework. Such an innovation places the *Xiaoxue* before all other Neo-Confucian classics. The "Five Books" are juxtaposed with the "Five Classics," striking better balance in terms of quantity and proportion.

The approaches designed by Yi Hwang and Yi I were further implemented in Yeongnam area in Yeongjo's time. In 1751 (27th year of King Yeongjo's reign), when Yun Gwang-so issued the "Heunghak gyubeom," he pointed out the necessity of differentiation of approach to different classics. Thus, in article 3 of the regulation Yun proposed the division of subjects:

⁴⁶ I Yi, *Yulgok jeonse*, 2:84-85.

In terms of reading priority, Master Toegye (Yi Hwang) proposed to treat the Four Books and Five Classics as the source of core values and have the *Xiaoxue* and the *Jiali* serve as modelling frames, advocating also some exposure to history volumes and other classics. Following this path, the references fall in three subjects: the Four Books and Five Classics as the first subject; the *Xiaoxue*, *Jiaoli*, *Xinjing* and *Jinsi lu* as the second; history books and other works as the third. Items of the first subject are fit for memorization; those of the second are fit for close reading and discussion; those of the third are fit for either memorization or close reading.⁴⁷

Based on Yi Hwang's division between the "Four Books" and the "Five Classics," Yun further developed the items into three subjects: 1) the Four Books and Five Classics; 2) Neo-Confucian classics; and 3) history and other works. The three subjects approach texts in different fashions, serving their own respective purposes.

In 1759 (35th year of King Yeongjo's reign), Yang Eung-su 楊應秀 of Namwon 南原, Jeolla-do, took a teaching post at the Museong 武城 Academy in Taemin 泰仁 county,⁴⁸ and implemented county regulations in the form of 18 articles. In article 2, Yang proposed an ordered list similar to Yi I's:

In terms of readings, one should start with the *Xiaoxue*, and then approach texts in the following order: *Daxue* and *Daxue huowen*, *Lunyu*, *Mengzi*, *Zhongyong*, *Shijing*, *Liji*, *Shujing*, *Yijing*, and finally *Chunqiu*. Students should approach those ten texts accordingly. For texts such as *Jinsi lu*, *Jiali*, *Xinjing*, and *Zhuzi quanshu*, no specific order needs to be maintained.⁴⁹

Initiated by Yi Hwang and Yi I, the reconstruction of the Confucian knowledge framework took shape through adjustment of the status of the *Xiaoxue* among the classics. The indigenization of Confucianism in regional institutions was proven sound mostly through the inclusion of formative reference into Confucian classics.

In 1745 (21st year of King Yeongjo's reign), after an inspection trip, the civil governor issued "Gwonhak jeolmok" 勸學節目 (Regulations for Academic Enhancement) in Jeonju 全州, of which article 3 provided an ordered list of references similar to the *Gyeongmong yogyeol*:

In terms of readings, one should start with the *Xiaoxue*, and then approach texts in the following order: *Daxue* and *Daxue huowen*, *Lunyu*, *Mengzi*,

⁴⁷ Yun, *Sogok yugo*, 223:309.

⁴⁸ Yang, *Baeksu jip*, 77:12.

⁴⁹ Yang, *Baeksu jip*, 77:52.

Zhongyong, *Shijing*, *Shujing*, *Yijing*, and finally *Chunqiu*. Students should approach those ten texts accordingly. For texts such as *Jinsi lu*, *Jiali*, *Xinjing*, and *Zhuzi quanshu*, no specific order needs to be maintained.⁵⁰

Other than the removal of the *Liji* in article 3, article 5 states, “for exposure to the *Xiaoxue*, for now, students under regulation should read the *Xiaoxue* or *Gyeongmong yogyeol* once every month.”⁵¹ In other words, within the framework of Confucian knowledge, Yi I’s *Gyeongmong yogyeol* was deemed fit to replace the *Xiaoxue*.

In fact, it was a view shared by many Joseon scholars that Yi I’s work could fill the role of the *Xiaoxue*.⁵² Furthermore, such a tendency was materialized through local school regulations. During the reign of Sukjong and Yeongjo, Yi Jae 李緯 (1680-1746) issued the “Ganghak jeolmok” 講學節目 (Regulations on Lectures) across local schools at Yeonggwang-gun 靈光郡, Jeolla-do, replacing the *Xiaoxue* with the *Gyeongmong yogyeol* as the first item for beginners. The *Xiaoxue* became the second. Article 4 of the regulation reads, “one should first read the *Gyeongmong yogyeol*, starting from “Ipji” to “Cheose” 處世 (Social Conduct). Other texts should be approached in the following order: *Xiaoxue*, *Daxue*, *Daxue huowen*, *Lunyu*, *Mengzi*, *Zhongyong*, *Shijing*, *Shujing*, and *Yijing*.”⁵³ Authored by a Joseon scholar, the *Gyeongmong yogyeol* could be considered more native in content, therefore easier for locals to relate to. It would not be a far stretch to speculate that, through the indigenization of Confucian philosophy, Joseon intellectuals sensed the role switch from the embracer to the participant in culture, feeling the trend move from identifying with Chinese culture to awakening a national identity, which made a local reconstruction of the Confucian frame work possible.

8. Conclusion

The introduction and popularization of the *Xiaoxue* inspired a local reconstruction of the Confucian knowledge framework in Joseon, expanding the influence of Confucianism beyond the border of ancient China. In a time

⁵⁰ Yoon, *Joseon sidae Jeonnam-ui hyanggyo yeongu*, 126.

⁵¹ Yoon, *Joseon sidae Jeonnam-ui hyanggyo yeongu*, 126.

⁵² S. Yi, *Jiho jip*, 143:424.

⁵³ J. Yi, *Doam jip*, 194:541.

of constant clash and fusion between the classic thought and the new, the royal examination system in Joseon played a crucial role in promoting the *Xiaoxue* on an official level. However, the popularization and promotion of the *Xiaoxue* as a classic alongside the Four Books and Five Classics mainly relied on the efforts of Joseon intellectuals. Elaborating on Neo-Confucian thought, scholars in Joseon saw schools as institutions for scholarship and self-cultivation instead of for the preparation of official examinations. The *Xiaoxue*, therefore, was chosen as the model of principle and sageliness, defining a local system of scholarly approach. Yi Hwang's idea of the distinction between the "core values" and the "modelling frame" and Yi I's juxtaposition of the *Xiaoxue* with the Four Books and Five Classics demonstrated Joseon scholars' innovativeness in approaching the Confucian classics, making a substantial impact through the implementation of county school regulations in regional areas such as Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do.

The results of the reconstruction mainly took the shape of local educational regulations, recorded in the county school regulations of Jeolla-do, Gyeongsang-do, and Chungcheong-do, of which Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do topped in quantity. Limited as the jurisdiction might be, the effectiveness and impact of local school regulations in promoting Confucian thought should not be underestimated. For instance, in 1730 (6th year of King Yeongjo's reign), Jo Hyeon-myeong 趙顯命, governor (*gamsa* 監司) of Gyeongsang-do, issued "Gwonhak jeolmok" which became "effective across all counties in the state."⁵⁴ Two years later, the articles' section on learning, winning the praise of the central government, became a reference for the Royal Institution (Taehak 太學) and effective across the country.⁵⁵ The remnants of this regional-to-nationwide geographical footprint of Confucianism in Joseon should be able to bring further insight on cultural spread in future academic endeavors.

The adoption and internalization of Chinese culture in ancient Korea goes a long way back. Undoubtedly, Chinese culture found a deeper root in ancient Korea than in any of its other neighbors. Meanwhile, intellectuals in ancient Korea gradually raised their own voices upon the awakening of national awareness. Reflecting on the role of the intellectuals and the purposes of Confucian thought, these scholars took initiatives in the reconstruction and indigenization of the Confucian knowledge framework. As a leading force

⁵⁴ H. Jo, *Gwirok jip*, 213:155.

⁵⁵ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 21st day of the 9th lunar month, 8th year of King Yeongjo's reign (1732).

in channelling cultural progress, their efforts created great potential for the further development of Confucianism on the Korean peninsula.

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科業與修身 ——從《小學》東傳看朝鮮時期儒家知識的重構、擴散及內化

盧 鳴 東

中文摘要

《小學》東傳朝鮮半島，開啟了儒家知識框架重構的契機。據此，朝鮮士人重新評估“四書五經”的價值，及其與《小學》和宋儒性理學等新興知識的同時，亦創發了具有朝鮮本土特色的學習規模，展開了儒家本土化的進程。在這個新舊知識的交融調和過程之中，朝鮮中央政府嘗試通過成均館“學令”的修訂和“錄名”制度的確立，向朝鮮士人闡揚《小學》的重要性，期望拓寬它的普及程度；另一方面，在鄉校和書院的學習規範內，朝鮮士人倡言《小學》應該用在立志修身之上，不得專為科場服務。從《小學》在朝鮮境內擴散的現實狀況中，我們考察到朝鮮士人所扮演的關鍵角色，特別在慶尚道和全羅道一帶，尤其顯著，他們立足在朝鮮民族性格和自身文化的特徵上，主導儒家文化的傳承和發展，對來自華夏的文化開展無限的探索旅程。

關鍵詞：《小學》，四書五經，儒家知識框架，學令，學習規範

海月崔時亨的世界認識與自任意識

全 聖 健

中文提要

本論文的目的是探討東學第二教主海月崔時亨的“世界認識”與“自任意識”。如果說水雲崔濟愚是創導東學的第一教主,也是主張“天主(한울 *hanul*)的時代到來”的東學宣揚者;那麼海月則是解釋並實踐水雲思想的活動者。海月將水雲倡導的宗教運動擴展為社會運動,並重新解釋“靈符呪文”與“守心正氣”的概念。他還認為包括人類在內的天地萬物都處於互相鬥爭、互相爭奪的狀態,世界也處於不安的狀態下。海月認為這是因為不了解所有宇宙存有是天道的表現,即不了解天主本身的表現而引起的。海月的思想是通過修道,體會個體本質和宇宙生命的合一,他還希望將所有宇宙存在變成受崇敬的對象。海月的“敬物”思想之所以至今還有頗大的意義,也許是因為海月診斷出的由爭奪引起的不安世界還沒結束。

關鍵詞：不安世界,自我表現,靈符呪文,守心正氣,道德顯彰,精神喚起

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** 本論文是2016年11月25日在監理教神學大學,以《宗教與精神健康》為主題舉行的秋季韓國宗教學大會裏發表的,接受各位評審委員的意見,修改了一些漢語表達,而且為了說明東學的本質,還具體解釋了守心正氣的意思以及與陽明學的親緣性。謹在此向對各位評審委員表示感謝。

一、序論

十九世紀，朝鮮王朝已經喪失了支配國政的能力，知識分子的腐敗和無能導致國家秩序的崩潰；外來勢力的侵略妨礙了國家體制的正常運作。在這一情況下，水雲崔濟愚(1824-1864)創導的“東學”¹可以說是回應朝鮮王朝國內外情況的“時代精神”。就像水雲所認為當時是“西勢東漸”的時期，²也就是“怪疾運數”的時代。³特別要注意的是，東學不是當時的統治階級爲了圖謀政權才創造出的舊時代產物，而是作爲被統治對象的民衆以對社會與國家的責任來創建的政治思想。

“東學”與“西學”是相反的詞，西學指的是“天主學”。但因爲東學裏也有“天主”這詞，所以可以說東學與天主學有些親緣性。東學和西學共用的“天主”這一用語，帶有“普遍性的道路”的含義，即“天道”的概念，這就是東學和西學的共同點。但如果站在脫離地理條件和歷史脈絡等普遍性的特殊立場上來看的話，西學和東學所走的路是各不相干的。⁴我們不能從一開始就只關注普遍性，⁵而忽視了具體而特殊的歷史脈絡。例如，孔子出生於魯國卻在鄰國展開自己的“道”，所以他的思想裏帶著鄒魯的特徵，而東學的“道”便是在本地(朝鮮)所創建的，因此不能用“西”來稱呼這種“道”。⁶

那麼東學與西學的不同點具體在哪裏呢？水雲通過“無爲而化”、“氣化之神”、“守心正氣”等“有無”概念來說明這些差異。⁷水雲認為，西學對天主的理解有所歪曲；侍奉天主的方式也有偏差，結果陷入了所謂利己之心當中，從而犯了侵略異國的錯誤。⁸而得到了水雲這種教誨的人，正是東學的第二教主是海月崔時亨(1827-1898)。如果說水雲是創導東學的第一教主、主張“開

1 關於水雲崔濟愚的研究：尹錫山，《東學教祖水雲崔濟愚》；表映三，《東學1》。

2 崔濟愚，《東經大全》，〈布德文〉，頁17-18：“至於庚申，傳聞西洋之人，以爲天主之意，不取富貴，攻取天下，立其堂，行其道，故吾亦有其然，豈其然之疑？”

3 崔濟愚，《龍潭遺詞》，〈安心歌〉，頁15。

4 崔濟愚，《東經大全》，〈論學文〉，頁30-32：“曰：‘與洋道無異者乎？’曰：‘洋學與斯而有異，如呪而無實，然而運則一也，道則同也，理則非也。’曰：‘何爲其然也？’……曰：‘同道言之，則名其西學也？’曰：‘不然。吾亦生於東，受於東。道雖天道，學則東學，況地分東西，西何謂東，東何謂西？’”

5 金容暉，〈수운 최제우의 아국 의식(我國意識)과 동학의 어원적 의미〉(水雲崔濟愚“我國意識”與東學在語源上的意義)，頁310。

6 崔濟愚，《東經大全》，〈論學文〉，頁32：“孔子生於魯，風於鄒，鄒魯之風，傳遺於斯世。吾道受於斯，布於斯，豈可謂以西名之者乎？”

7 水雲的弟子海月將它放在《靈符呪文》和《守心正氣》裏解釋，有關內容在本論文第三章裏詳細解釋。

8 崔濟愚，《東經大全》，〈論學文〉，頁31：“吾道無爲而化矣。守其心正其氣，率其性受其教，化出於自然之中也。西人言無次第，書無皂白，而頓無爲天主之端，只視自爲身之謀，身無氣化之神，學無天主之教。”

辟時代到來”的天主(한울 *hanul*)的宣揚者；那麼海月則是解釋並實踐天主的道路(天道)和人類的道路(人道)的天主的活動者。

1863年，海月繼承水雲的道統；他爲了因爲左道亂政罪名而殉道的水雲，在1892年宣揚了和平的教祖申冤運動；又在1893年，展開了斥倭洋倡義運動，這時他所發表的論說文，闡明這一運動爲了繼承水雲的精神和確保輔國安民思想的目的；1894年，海月正式開始東學農民運動，但1894年12月24日，因北接東學軍的敗亡，其運動以失敗告終。此後海月度過反復躲藏的時期，最後將東學的道統傳給義庵孫秉熙(1861-1922)，⁹並1898年殉道，享年72歲。¹⁰

本論文的目的在於探討東學運動的先導者，¹¹即海月崔時亨的“世界認識”和“自任意識”。

本文在第二章解釋了海月的“世界認識”。海月認爲由於天地萬物處於互相鬥爭、互相爭奪的狀態，世界也處於不安的狀態。這意味著海月將當時的時代看作開辟的時代。所謂“開辟時代”，既是開始新世界、創造新天地的時代，又是彙總一切混亂不安的時代。東學歷史觀將1860年作爲歷史的始點。自五萬年前開天闢地後，歷史不斷地衰落，但到了1860年，歷史終於帶著活力，成爲“變易生成”的後天開辟的歷史性始點。

這就是宇宙與人類一起和諧相生的時期，也是人類之間的怨恨終結的可能性開展的開辟時期。在開辟時代，如果我們能夠知道宇宙的所有存在是天主本身的表現，那麼處於不安狀態的世界內所有存在就能夠脫離不安的困境。也就是說，我們要明白宇宙的所有存在是天道的表現。通過解釋海月的“世界認識”，可以理解東學對宇宙、人間、歷史、世界的觀點。

而第三章則闡釋了海月對水雲所記錄的“靈符呪文”與“守心正氣”的理解和說明。當時的時代被水雲診斷爲怪疾的時代，他認爲他寫的靈符呪文是能夠治療這個時代的重要手段。同時，他還認爲森羅萬象都是天道的表現，從而具體提出了守心正氣的修養法。本文第三章是通過海月的視角，以對靈呪文的“至氣今至原爲大降”八字和本呪文的“侍天主造化定永世不忘萬事知”這十三字的解釋爲中心來進行論述的。¹²

海月積極解釋並實踐水雲提出的“靈符呪文”與“守心正氣”。“靈符呪文”通過三七字呪文的形式表現出東學心法的意義，也就是說如果心裏服侍天主，那麼所有局勢都可以得到穩定，這是宗教信仰的表現。另一方面，“守

⁹ 關於義庵孫秉熙的研究有如下：李炫熙，〈의암 손병희 성사와 천도교의 3.1운동〉（聖師義庵孫秉熙與天道教之三一運動）；吳文煥，〈의암 손병희의 성심관〉（義庵孫秉熙之性心觀）。

¹⁰ 表映三，〈神師崔時亨의生涯〉。

¹¹ 在韓國學術界常用“東學革命”的用語。但筆者認爲，當時的東學沒有顛覆朝鮮王朝支配體制，構成以民爲主的新的政治體制的意圖，所以不應當將東學定爲“革命”，而是要定爲一種社會政治運動。

¹² 《天道教經典》，頁69-70。呪文有〈先生呪文〉與〈弟子呪文〉。〈先生呪文〉是水雲從天主收到的（至氣今至四月來，侍天主令我長生無窮無窮萬事知）；〈弟子呪文〉是在〈初學呪文〉（爲天主顧我情永世不忘萬事宜）裏加了本論文所論的21字。

心正氣”也服侍人類個體內在的天主——心靈，即“守心”；補充天地損傷的氣質，即“正氣”；培養對天主敬畏的心，提出將不安轉換為喜樂的修養法。

第四章通過海月的“道德顯彰”與“精神喚起”，探討他一生所堅持的“自任意識”。海月認為人類真正的主體性是通過萬物平等的意識而成立的。即只有在天主(한울 *hamul*)面前認識到一切存在都是平等的，才能確立人類個體的自我意識。為了實現這一目標，人們必須在夫婦和順的基礎上，彰顯孝悌忠信的道德，同時持續不斷的對精神進行喚起。

在《中庸》裏，有“君子之道，造端乎夫婦”的說法。海月相信通過“守心正氣”能夠實踐仁義禮智，並把入倫初始的夫和婦順作為東學日常哲學。他將對天主的恭敬思想的“敬天”，擴展為“敬人”和“敬物”思想。

二、世界不安與自我表現

在東學運動的背景裏，存在著對當時知識分子的無能和腐敗的抵抗運動的脈絡，然而更大的問題是，當時西方帝國主義國家不僅侵略中國，還在朝鮮半島逐漸擴張自己的勢力。由此可知，東學運動發生的更大契機，便是人們對逐漸強大的勢力西方帝國主義國家所產生的外患意識。¹³ 水雲將這些帝國主義國家稱為“十二諸國”，將西勢東漸的時代診斷為怪疾運數的時代，同時他還意識到朝鮮的運數(即我國運數)處於頗危險的狀態。¹⁴ 繼承水雲道統的海月也認識到當時是怪疾運數的時代，他將這時代定義為“不安世界”。

斯世之運，開闢之運矣。天地不安，山川草木不安，江河魚鼈不安，飛禽走獸皆不安。唯獨人暖衣飽食安逸求道乎？先天後天之運，相交相替，理氣相戰，萬物皆戰，豈無人戰乎？天地日月，古今不變。運數大變，新舊不同。新舊相替之時，舊政既退，新政未佈。理氣不和之際，天下混亂矣。當此時倫理道德自壞，人皆至於禽獸之群，豈非亂乎？¹⁵

十二諸國怪疾運數使天地、山川草木陷入了不安的狀態。開辟的時代就是不安的時代。先天和後天的運數相互交叉，理和氣相互鬥爭，天地萬物進入了互相搶奪的時代。此時，雖然舊時代的政治已經衰退，但新時代的政治還沒完全建立。也就是說，理和氣的關係尚未達到和諧的高度，整個天下禮崩樂壞，人類也如禽獸一般被欲望所掌控。

東學便是在這種背景下誕生的。海月繼承水雲的道統，廣泛傳播其學說，接受對象包括當時的朝鮮民衆、中國民衆乃至世界萬國。¹⁶ 他希望世界

¹³ 崔濟愚，《東經大全》，〈論學文〉，頁209。

¹⁴ 崔濟愚，《東經大全》，〈安心歌〉，頁159-160。

¹⁵ 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈開闢運數〉，頁330-331。

萬國可以自然地成為他所期冀的幸福世界，也就是所謂的“樂天地”。

但是東學在布德過程中，也有很多困難存在。十九世紀朝鮮的社會狀況並不樂觀，因為當時是以“老論”為主的勢道政治（擅權政治）的巔峰時期，老論以南人對天主的信仰作為籍口，對近畿南人進行了無情的壓迫。儘管面對朝鮮後期這種悲觀的情況，東學依然堅持使用“天主”這一用語，所以不可避免的，東學被認定為違背正學（性理學）的“邪學”。換句話說，東學自傳播伊始，便注定了被傳統儒學所鎮壓的命運。不但是儒學者，朝鮮王朝也將東學認定為與天主學相似的似是而非的宗教，從而壓迫東學教徒。由此可見，當時的東學運動在國內外都受到了殘酷的鎮壓。

但是無論國內外的情況多麼悲觀，東學教徒仍然堅定信念，繼續不停的布德。他們認為，這種苦難的經歷，是為了將天主的教誨傳播到世界萬國的一個必經過程而已。同時，他們堅信通過這些經驗，世界萬國的百姓都會明白森羅萬象皆是天道的表現，而天主則參與了萬事萬物的造化。

大哉，天道的靈妙。無事不涉，無物不有，萬象皆是天道的表現。¹⁷

正如海月所說，靈妙的天道是不容易自覺的，干預萬事而存在於萬物的天道則是天主的道路。唯有帶著這種自覺生活，全世界才能成為樂天地，這就是海月的教誨。海月的教誨與西方的神學家斯賓諾莎的“萬有神論”泛神論很相似，也跟東方的“天人合一論”有親緣性。斯賓諾莎的神學是將宇宙萬物看為神自我表現的，因此以西方學問鞏固東學教理的夜雷李敦化的思想裏，也包括斯賓諾莎的思維方式。¹⁸“天人合一”是一般東方思維的邏輯，也是從《周易》和《中庸》裏的“天地人三才思想”發展起來的。隨著儒學思想的發展，“天人合一”思想也產生了多種方式的解釋。尤其是對集北宋五子思想體系之大成的朱熹來說，“理一分殊”的邏輯是對天人合一思想賦予正當性的一種方式，朝鮮儒學當中也強調了這一點，這一切發展都對東學的誕生產生了一定的影響。¹⁹

此外，東學的“天人合一”可以說與陽明學有些親緣性。王陽明擴張了孟子所說的“良知”和“良能”的意思，他將孔子以來成立的儒學理念的總體——“仁”，從人倫層次的意義提高成為宇宙次元的“仁”。²⁰當然，這種擴張是由《中

¹⁶ 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈開闢運數〉，頁333：“當此時，布德師派送於世界各國，而萬國自然樂天地也。”

¹⁷ 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈其他〉，頁428。

¹⁸ 黃棕源，〈이돈화의 우주관과 인간관이 지니는 동서철학 융합적 특징 및 생명철학적 의의〉（在李敦化之宇宙觀和人論中東西哲學交融特徵及生命哲學的意義）。

¹⁹ 金容暉，〈從侍天主思想之變遷論東學研究〉。

²⁰ 王守仁，《大學問》：“是故見孺子之入井，而必有怵惕惻隱之心焉，是其仁之與孺子而為一體也。孺子猶同類者也，見鳥獸之哀鳴殫殫，而必有不忍之心，是其仁之與鳥獸而為一體也。鳥獸猶有知覺者也，見草木之摧折而必有憫恤之心焉，是其仁之與草木而為一體也。草木猶有生

庸》和《周易》的原理而可能的，也就是把“生意”發展到宇宙的次元。²¹

接下來，本文將通過海月的思想，探討他對東學教徒要求的“靈符呪文”與“守心正氣”的修養法究竟是什麼。

三、靈符呪文與守心正氣

《經》曰：“吾有靈符，其名仙藥，其形太極，又形弓弓，受我此符，濟人疾病。”弓乙其形，則心字也。心和氣和，與天同和。弓是天弓，乙是天乙。弓乙吾道之符圖也，天地之形體也。故聖人受之以行天道，以濟蒼生也。²²

靈符呪文與守心正氣是水雲創導的修煉法，水雲將靈符稱為“仙藥”，並將其形象表現為太極或弓弓。但是這種說法對普通百姓而言並不是通俗易懂的。海月則把這種修煉法解釋為在日常生活當中能夠實踐的東西，他將靈符呪文解釋為“心”，這就是東學叫做心學的原因。²³ 如果將名為仙藥的靈符說成太極或弓弓的話，會被誤會有迷信的因素，但是如果將其解釋為“心”，那麼普通的人也可以理解並接近它。

海月認為如果人的心能夠和平的話，那麼這個人的氣質也就會和平起來，人也可以和天主一起和平下來。這就是東學的符圖，天地的形體——弓弓的形象，聖人得到了這道理便可以行天道救濟蒼生。但即使有這種自覺，天地開辟也不是可以立刻完成的，因此，人們為了得到心和氣的順平，就要在日常生活當中服侍天主，不忘記天主干預天地萬物的生長收藏的真理。

呪文三七字，大宇宙、大精神、大生命，圖出之天書也。“侍天主造化定”，是萬物化生之根本也，“永世不忘萬事知”，是人生食祿之源泉也。《經》曰：“侍者，內有神靈，外有氣化，一世之人各知不移者也。”內有神靈者，落地初赤子之心也；外有氣化者，胞胎時理氣應質而成體也。故“外有接靈之氣，內有降話之教。”“至氣今至願為大降”，是也。吾人之化生，侍天靈氣而化生，吾人之生活，亦侍天靈氣而生活，何必斯人也獨謂侍天主？天地萬物，皆莫非侍天主也。彼鳥聲亦是侍天主之聲也。²⁴

東學的教理主張通過二十一個字的“三七字”呪文來修養“心”。“至氣今至願為大降”意味著盼望混元之氣——“至氣”到來；“侍天主造化定”的意思是，如果心裏服膺天主的話，天地萬物的生長收藏歸於穩定；“永世不忘萬事知”是說不要忘記心內神靈永遠同在、心外有氣化，這樣就可以闡明所有的事情。

意者也，見瓦石之毀壞而必有顧惜之心焉，是其仁之與瓦石而為一體也。”

²¹ 全聖健，〈유학의 인륜성과 정감적 인간형에 대하여〉（論儒學之人倫性與情感的人型），頁134-140。

²² 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈靈符呪文〉，頁289-290。

²³ 李讚九，〈水雲心學과 그 展開〉（水雲心學與其展開），頁171。

²⁴ 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈靈符呪文〉，頁292-294。

包括人類在內的所有天地萬物都是服侍天主的，所以森羅萬象是以宇宙氣勢和宇宙的心來貫通的，可以說連天上飛的鳥所發出的鳴叫聲都是侍奉天主的聲音。天主的道就是以天主食天主；以天主化生天主的路。相生和相克的秩序巧妙地配合而形成天主的道。想要明白宇宙氣勢和宇宙的心成為一體的道理，則需要脩練守護心靈、肅正氣質的修養法，海月將這個修養法命名為“守心正氣”。

守心正氣四字，更補天地殞絕之氣。《經》曰：“仁義禮智，先聖之所教，守心正氣，惟我之更定。若非守心正氣，則仁義禮智之道，難以實踐也。”吾著睡之前，曷敢忘水雲大先生主訓教也？洞洞燭無晝無夜。諸君能知守心正氣乎？能知守心正氣之法，入聖何難？守心正氣，萬難中第一難也。雖昏寢之時，能知他人之出入，能聽他人之言笑，可謂守心正氣也。守心正氣之法，孝悌溫恭，保護此心如保赤子，寂寂無忿起之心，惺惺無昏昧之心，可也。心不喜樂，天不感應，心常喜樂，天常感應。我心我敬，天亦悅樂。守心正氣是近天地我心也。真心，天必好之，天必樂之。²⁵

水雲認為儒學的“仁義禮智”的教導是孔子所給的，而“守心正氣”則是水雲自己所定的。他還認為只有通過自己的守心正氣，才能實踐仁義禮智。海月繼承水雲的教導，繼續說明如何實踐守心正氣的方法。首先，他強調“守心正氣”這四字是補充天地損傷的氣質，而且將“孝悌溫恭”做為守心正氣的實踐方法。“孝悌溫恭”是對父母孝順的“孝”；兄弟之間友好的“悌”；體貼他人的“溫”；對萬物保持謹慎的“恭”，這就是仁義禮智的實踐道德。

若再具體說明，仁義禮智是通過人與人之間的交際而成立的。若充實地實踐其道德，必須以盡力盡心的態度來對待別人，這時需要的就是“守心正氣”。守心正氣是與宇宙氣運溝通時具備的，這是個人層面上的修養，但在社會層面上實踐並發揮的話，這就是人與人之間的交際而成立的仁義禮智。總之，通過在日常生活當中實踐孝悌溫恭，能夠補充天地萬物損傷的氣勢（氣質），這就是守心正氣，也是孔子所說的仁義禮智的道理。維持孝悌溫恭的心態是像維護赤子一樣，阻止怨憤、保持覺醒的心態。海月認為如果能夠將心態保持安靜並穩定狀態，心態就會變成喜樂，這時候天主和我之間可以互相感應到彼此。這個道理就是，把從個人開始的守心正氣的修養法擴展到家庭，再從家庭內的孝悌溫恭再擴到國家、世界的一個道理。對海月來說，所有的修養法是從自己的家庭開始的，所以他將東學的教導的第一宗旨稱為“夫和婦順”。

²⁵ 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈守心正氣〉，頁300-302。

四、道德顯彰與精神喚起

夫和婦順，吾道之第一宗旨也。……婦人，一家之主也。敬天也，奉祀也，接賓也，製衣裳，調食也，生產也，布織也，皆莫非必由於婦人之手中也。²⁶

海月將“丈夫溫和，婦人順從”的“夫和婦順”作為東學的第一宗旨。夫婦二人是成為一體、成為一家的根本元素，所以他將一個家庭作為東學的出發點。值得注意的是，海月將婦人命名為家庭的主人。

衆所周知，當時的朝鮮王朝一般認為家長是丈夫而不是婦人，這是因為以男性為主的宗法秩序是時代的主流。但是海月顛覆當時的常識，他強調一家的家長是婦人。之所以婦人是一家的主人，是因為敬天主、奉祭祀、接賓客、製衣裳、調食饌、生孩子、織棉布等事，都是通過婦人之手才能完成的。這是對人類理解的一個嶄新的角度，也是預見女性成為開辟時代的主體的觀點。²⁷擺脫男性主義，而且認定女性主體性的海月思想，將發展到照看生物和無生物的視野。

首先，人不能不敬天，此先師所創明的道法。天主持真理的衷，不懂敬天不會愛真理。敬天絕不是向空虛恭敬上帝的，而是恭敬我的心就是敬天的道理，“吾心不敬即天地不敬”，是也。……再次，人不能不敬人，敬天就是依驚人的行為顯現其效果。若只有敬天沒有敬人，這就是只懂農事的理致而不懂種地似的。修道者侍奉他人像侍奉天主一樣，才能初次實踐道的。……最後，人不能不敬物。只恭敬他人不是道德的極致，直到敬物才與天地氣化合一。²⁸

海月首先提到“恭敬天主”：這是先師水雲創導的道法。水雲所說的“天主”不是存在於心外的其他事物，而是在我心裏內在的天主，也就是我心裏真理的一種表現。所以敬天的道理既包含了恭敬我心裏存在的天主的意思，又包含了使我心態保持恭敬的態度的意思。海月還強調“恭敬他人”。他認為敬人的行為是實踐敬天的道路，他引用了農夫耕地的故事：有個農夫儘管很了解農事的原理，但只要他不播種，就絕對收穫不到一粒果實。這個道理說明，相信東學道理的人首先需要敬人，敬人之後才能真正實踐敬天。最後海月要求“恭敬萬事萬物”。這就是意味著僅僅敬天、敬人，是不能達到道德的極致的，只有做到了恭敬萬事萬物的“敬物”，才能達到道德極致。

“敬物思想”是儒學所說的“天人合一思想”具體化闡述。宇宙萬物是天主的體現，所以對宇宙萬物、所有事件保持恭敬的態度，則是相信宇宙萬物

²⁶ 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈夫和婦順〉，頁339-340。

²⁷ 釜山藝術文化大學東學研究所，《海月崔時亨與東學思想》，頁60-65。這本書是將海月的女性觀以“生態女性主義(生態女權主義, Eco-Feminism)”的角度來解釋。

²⁸ 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈三敬〉，頁354-358。

蘊含天主的一種表現。²⁹“三敬思想”與天地萬物的生長消滅過程，即天地萬物的造物過程有密切的關係。

我常說物物天、事事天。若承認此理致，物物皆是以天食天。人心的偏見來看，以天食天是不符合道理的，萬一以天主全體來看，天主養活天主全體，同質者相互扶助、互為成氣化；異質者以天食天，互為通氣化。於是，天主一面是以同質的氣化養異屬；一面是以異質的氣化圖謀從屬之間連帶的成長發展。總之，以天食天就是天主的氣化作用。大神師解釋“侍”字時，所謂“內有神靈”就是天主；所謂“外有氣化”就是以天食天，至妙的天地妙法全然在氣化裏。³⁰

海月在說明天地萬物的造成過程的同時，揭示萬事皆是天主的命題，這就是他的“三敬思想”的根據。要理解造成的過程，首先要理解相扶相助和以天食天的原理。天主和天主彙合而組成的天地萬物，不是以生長收藏的過程自生的，而是以相扶相助和以天食天的原理進行的。

海月例舉了經驗上的事實來說明以天食天的原理，他認為就如同人類為生存需要衣服和飲食，需要依靠別人、別物，不能獨立生活一樣，天地萬物都是互相依靠而生活的，通過以天食天的道理，天地萬物的生長收藏才能進行。以人類為例來說，呼吸、動靜、屈伸、意識都是有天主的調和，即有了氣化才可能進行的，人類就順從了天主的調和，成為將其調和變出來的存在。³¹海月建議在日常生活當中實踐這原理的方法——食告。

人知天地之祿，則必知食告之理也。知母之乳而長之，則必生孝養之心也。食告，反哺之理也，報恩之道也。對食，必告於天地，不忘其恩為本也。³²

人類依靠天地萬物的產物而生活，而那些天地萬物都是侍奉天主的存在。所以通過實踐食告儀式，對那些存在表示感謝。對待飲食時必先告天地，表示不忘此恩德。海月將這儀式叫做“百年喪”。³³天地萬物像父母，犧牲自己而扶助人類的生存，就像人在活著不忘父母恩惠一樣，我們需要對天地表示感謝的心。

²⁹ 李圭成，〈崔時亨에서 “표현”과 시간〉（在崔時亨思想中“表達”與時間），頁207。在這篇論文裏，著者說：“崔世亨與水雲的現存經驗和他們提出的概念上有一些緊張，即超越時代制約的，連對近代社會也有抵抗力、實踐性、活躍性的緊張”

³⁰ 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈以天食天〉，頁364-366。

³¹ 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈天地父母〉，頁253-254：“何獨人衣人食乎？日亦衣衣，月亦食食。……天依人，人依食，萬事知，食一碗。人依食而資其生成，天依人而現其造化。人之呼吸動靜屈伸衣食，皆天主造化之力。天人相與之機，須臾不可離也。”

³² 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈天地父母〉，頁253。

³³ 崔時亨，《海月神師法說》，〈向我設位〉，頁351-352：“趙在壁問曰：‘喪期，如何而可也？’，神師曰：‘心喪百年，可也。天地父母，為之食告曰心喪百年，人之居生時，不忘父母之念，此是永世不忘也。天地父母四字守之，謂其萬古事蹟分明也。’”

通過海月的教導,我們可以知道不僅是人類作為生活共同體,天地萬物也能夠成為共同體一員的道理。我們可以將這樣一個共同體稱為“生命共同體”。東學的意義是喚起人類精神,使人類自覺全世界能夠成為一個生命共同體為連帶的事實。³⁴這是水雲創導東學的原因,也是海月繼承水雲而發展東學運動的理由。

海月說過,東學顯彰時期是“山皆變黑,路皆布錦之時也,萬國交易之時也”,³⁵也說過“萬國兵馬,我國疆土內,到來而後退之時也”。³⁶他到底指的是什麼時期,我們並不清楚,但通過“萬國兵馬,我國疆土內,到來而後退之時也”的說法,可以看出是國家具有自主的統率權,不受外來勢力的影響,能夠把握獨立性的時候。這說明在通過多樣交易而溝通的世界萬國,各個國家都獲得獨立國家的地位的時候,東學運動的教導才能夠完整地顯彰。

五、結論

從水雲被逮捕並在大邱受斬刑之後,海月到全國各地東逃西躲。與此同時,他召集零散的東學教徒,圖謀重建處於危機狀態的東學教團。海月遵從水雲的遺訓,刊行東學主要經典;為了給水雲申冤,還進行了大規模的教祖申冤運動。海月寫過的通文和告諭文,成為對東學農民運動的堅固支柱,也成為許多民衆的拐杖,他既是與時俱進的東學領導,也是與民衆一起抵禦的父母。所以,我們將他稱為東學歷史上最重要的人物,這是毫無疑問的。

依海月所說,個體事物之間發生的事件都是天主(*hanul*)的表現。人與天主的關係也一樣,是互相不可分開的。天主是人;人亦是天主,而且所有個體都是天主;天主亦是一切萬物。所以包括人類,宇宙內的所有森羅萬象皆是天主的表現。既然世界內所有存在皆是天主,那麼人們怎麼能夠對世界萬物不恭敬呢?

簡而言之,海月所說的“敬天”、“敬人”、“敬物”的三敬思想就是東學的核心思想。海月將水雲所教的“侍天主思想”擴展為“三敬思想”,使人類明白一切萬物是平等的存在。海月用相生哲學包容相克哲學,這就是“以天食天”的命題。海月將同種之間的關係作為相生關係,異種之間的關係作為相克關

³⁴ 崔時亨,《海月神師法說》,〈吾道之運〉,頁391-392:“申澤雨曰:‘因甲午戰亂,而吾道批評怨聲者,多矣。如何方策,能免此怨聲乎?’神師曰:‘論舉甲午之事,則不為人事,天命之為事,怨人怨天。自後天示歸和,無為怨聲,反於贊成。如甲午之時到來,而為甲午之事,則吾國之事,緣由於此而光輝,喚起世界人民之精神也。’”

³⁵ 崔時亨,《海月神師法說》,〈開辟運數〉:“問曰:‘何是顯道乎’,神師曰:‘山皆變黑,路皆布錦之時也,萬國交易之時也。’”

³⁶ 崔時亨,《海月神師法說》,〈開辟運數〉:“問曰:‘何時如斯乎’,神師曰:‘時有其時,勿為心急,不待自然來矣。萬國兵馬,我國疆土內,到來而後退之時也。’”

係。人類能夠領會世界萬物的平等而實踐“三敬”；領悟一切個體的相依生活而實踐“食告”的話，這世界就變成“樂天”世界。“以天食天”既是說明相克的命題，其實也就是走向相生關係的逆命題。海月的思想裏，充滿對宇宙連帶性的同感（共鳴），³⁷ 所以我們可以將他的思想稱為“新生哲學”。³⁸ 現代人類面臨著輕視生命的風潮、生態系統的破壞等各種問題，在這情況下，海月提出的“三敬思想”和“食告儀式”帶著生活哲學的意義，給現代人類帶來了莫大的啟示。³⁹

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³⁷ 李圭成,《崔時亨的哲學》。

³⁸ 尹老彬,《新生哲學》。

³⁹ 金容煥,〈동서양 사상의 관점에서 본 해월 최시형〉(從東西思想的觀點論海月崔時亨), 頁7-35。

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The Role of Choe Si-hyeong and His Recognition of the World in the Eastern Learning Movement

JEON Sungkun

Abstract

This paper discusses the role of Choe Si-hyeong who is the second leader of the Eastern Learning and his recognition of the world. The Eastern Learning was established by the first leader Choe Je-u and further developed by Choe Si-hyeong. We could call Choe Si-hyeong a labor agitator and religious reformer from a present viewpoint. He diagnosed the 19th century as a world of insecurity which needed a new prescription: the teachings of the Eastern Learning. One of the teachings is serving the Lord of Heaven that is present in all existence in the universe, including inanimate matter which contained numinous spiritual qualities bestowed from on high. Therefore, human-beings have to be respectful to every existence. In order to maintain this attitude, we should first be aware that all things in the universe express the Lord of Heaven. Second, we must control our mind and reveal morality which is not heteronomous but autonomous. Finally, we should ventilate our spirit to the fullest. Choe Si-hyeong's indomitable will spread the spirit of the Eastern Learning until the end of his life.

Keywords: Eastern Learning, world of insecurity, self-expression, spiritual incantation, controlling the mind, revealing morality, ventilating spirit

《論語》與漢唐司法的儒家化

唐明貴

中文提要

《論語》是記錄孔子及其弟子思想的重要經典，在漢唐時期，受引儒入法思潮的影響，《論語》中的“德主刑輔”思想成為司法文化的精髓，“正名”思想成為司法制度的基本原則，“親親相隱”成為司法實踐的指導原則。這不僅促進了儒家思想的法律化，而且也增加了司法制度的人倫色彩，對於中國傳統法律乃至於整個民族文化產生了不可低估的影響。

關鍵詞：《論語》，漢唐司法，儒家化，正名，親親相隱

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自漢代始，伴隨著儒學獨尊地位的逐漸確立，引儒入法，使司法制度和司法活動儒家化，使儒家經義法律化，遂成為整個中國法律思想的特點。魏晉以降，儒學對司法的影響日隆一日。瞿同祖在其所著《中國法律與中國社會》中曾說：儒家引儒入法的企圖在漢代已開始。當時“雖因受條文的拘束，只能在解釋法律及應用經義決獄方面努力，但儒家化運動的成為風氣，日益根深蒂固，實胚胎蘊釀於此時，時機早已成熟，所以曹魏一旦法律（制律），儒家化的法律便應運而生。自魏而後歷晉及北魏、北齊皆可說系此一運動的連續。前一朝法律的儒家因素多為後一朝所吸收，而每一朝又加入若干新的儒家因素，所以內容愈積愈富而體系亦愈益精密”。¹及至唐代，法律及司法活動則完全儒家化。在這場納儒入法的儒家化過程中，作為儒家重要經典的《論語》的作用也不容忽視，其經文中所體現出來的法律精神及原則也被直接或間接地納入了法律條文和司法活動中。

一、《論語》中的“德主刑輔”思想成為司法文化的精髓

孔子認為，統治者應該實行德治，“為政以德，譬如北辰，居其所而眾星共之”。²群臣百姓就會自動圍繞著你轉。由此出發，孔子反對濫用刑罰，強調以己之行，感化眾人。“季康子問政於孔子曰：‘如殺無道，以就有道，何如？’孔子對曰：‘子為政，焉用殺？子善而民善矣。君子之德風，小人之德草。草上之風，必偃’”。³要想民眾向善，與其採用嚴刑峻罰，不如實行教化和引導，“其身正，不令而行；其身不正，雖令不從”。⁴這就要求為政者用禮教來教化民眾。孔子說：“上好禮，則民莫敢不敬。”⁵在他看來，不事先進行教育就直接懲罰，就是暴虐。他說：“不教而誅謂之虐。”⁶因此，孔子提出了“德禮並用、以德為主”的治民思想，他說：“道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；道之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格。”⁷用政法來規範人民，用刑罰來整頓人民，人民只是暫時地免於罪過，卻沒有廉恥之心。如果用道德來誘導人民，用禮教來整頓人民，人民不僅有廉恥之心，而且人心歸服。在這裡，孔子“德”、“禮”並用，而禮在古代又具有法的特徵，是統治者體現等級秩序的行為規範和有效的統治手段。所以這段話從某種程度上可以說是“德主刑輔”思想的前身。

¹ 瞿同祖，《中國法律與中國社會》，頁345-346。

² 《論語》，〈為政〉。

³ 《論語》，〈顏淵〉。

⁴ 《論語》，〈子路〉。

⁵ 《論語》，〈子路〉。

⁶ 《論語》，〈堯曰〉。

⁷ 《論語》，〈為政〉。

及至董仲舒，他從天之陰陽的角度論證了“德主刑輔”的合理性，提出了“任德不任刑”的主張：“王者欲有所爲，宜求其端於天。天道之大者在陰陽，陽爲德，陰爲刑，刑主殺而德主生。天之任德不任刑也。王者承天意以成事，故任德教而不任刑。刑者不可任以治世，猶陰之不可任以成歲也。爲政而任刑，不順於天，故先爲莫之肯爲也。”⁸在此基礎上，他進一步明確了德與刑的關係，一方面，二者是對立統一的關係，“陽爲德，陰爲刑，刑反德而順於德”。⁹另一方面，二者又有主輔之分，“故刑者，德之輔，陰者，陽之助也，陽者，歲之主也”。¹⁰因此，董仲舒提出：“國之所以爲國者，德也，君之所以爲君者，威也。故德不可共，威不可分。”¹¹其治道指向是刑德並用，以德爲主。而德又以教化爲務。他說：“是故南面而治天下，莫不以教化爲大務。立大學以教於國，設庠序以化於邑，漸民以仁，摩民以誼，節民以禮，故其刑罰甚輕而禁不犯者，教化行而習俗美也。”¹²董氏的這一思想，伴隨著西漢王朝對儒家思想的重視和宣導而受到朝廷的推崇，遂成爲傳統社會立法、司法活動的指導思想。

“德主刑輔”在司法實踐中主要體現爲恤刑慎罰上。如漢代，一是蠲除輕減律令。漢武帝時期，由於大興事功，民怨沸騰，所以律令逐漸繁多，《漢書·刑法志》曰：“律令凡三百五十九章，大辟四百九條，千八百八十二事，死罪決事比萬三千四百七十二事。文書盈於幾閣，典者不能遍睹。”法治色彩甚濃。伴隨著儒家思想影響的逐漸深入，而後的繼位者意識到了這一問題，開始著手刪減律令。如漢元帝繼位伊始，便下詔曰：“夫法令者，所以抑暴扶弱，欲其難犯而易避也。今律令煩多而不約，自典文者不能分明，而欲羅元元之不逮，斯豈刑中之意哉！其議律令可蠲除輕減者，條奏，唯在便安萬姓而已。”這就是說，蠲除減輕律令主要是爲了“便安萬姓”，其德治的色彩漸濃。隨後的漢成帝，復下詔曰：“《甫刑》云‘五刑之屬三千，大辟之罰其屬二百’，今大辟之刑千有餘條，律令煩多，百有餘萬言，奇請它比，日以益滋，自明習者不知所由，欲以曉喻眾庶，不亦難乎！於以羅元元之民，夭絕亡辜，豈不哀哉！其與中二千石、二千石、博士及明習律令者議減死刑及可蠲除約省者，令較然易知，條奏。《書》不云乎？‘惟刑之恤哉！’其審核之，務准古法，朕將盡心覽焉。”¹³省刑以愛民、約法以教民的德治味道進一步增加。東漢章帝時期，尚書陳寵建議：“夫爲政也，猶張琴瑟，大弦急者小弦絕，故子貢非臧孫之猛法，而美鄭僑之仁政。方今聖德充塞，假於上下，宜因此時，隆先聖之務，蕩滌煩苛，輕薄極楚，以濟群生，廣至德也。”皇帝採納了他的建議，“帝納寵言，決罪行刑，務於寬厚。其後遂詔有司，禁絕鑽牟贊（禁絕鑽鑽）諸酷痛舊制，解祿惡之禁，除文致之請，讞五十餘事，定著於令”。¹⁴其子陳忠爲尚書時，“又

⁸ 《漢書》，〈董仲舒傳〉。

⁹ 賴炎元，《春秋繁露今注今譯》，頁290。

¹⁰ 賴炎元，《春秋繁露今注今譯》，頁303。

¹¹ 賴炎元，《春秋繁露今注今譯》，頁164。

¹² 《漢書》，〈董仲舒傳〉。

¹³ 《漢書》，〈刑法志〉。

上除蠶室刑，解賊吏三世禁錮，狂易殺人得減重論，母子兄弟相代死聽赦所代者，事皆施行”。¹⁵ 德治的色彩日益榮盛。二是寬宥老幼及婦女。漢代司法的德治色彩還體現在對老幼及婦女的量刑上。如《張家山漢簡·二年律令·具律》有云：“其有贖罪以下，及老小不當刑、刑盡者，皆笞百。”¹⁶ 其中的“老小不當刑”是指老人和小孩免除肉刑。又曰：“女子當磔若要（腰）斬者，棄市。當斬為城旦者黥為舂，當贖斬者贖黥，當耐者贖耐。”¹⁷ 這就是說，如果女性被處於（處以）磔刑及腰斬刑，雖然同為死刑，但在實質等級上都予以了減刑處罰。及至漢宣帝則更進一步，元康四年，下詔曰：“朕念夫耆老之人，髮齒墮落，血氣既衰，亦無逆亂之心，今或羅於文法，執於圜牆，不得終其年命，朕甚憐之。自今以來，諸年八十非誣告、殺傷人，它皆勿坐。”¹⁸ 規定80歲以上老子可部分免刑。至成帝鴻嘉元年，又定令：“年未滿七歲，賊鬥殺人及犯殊死者，上請廷尉以聞，得減死。”¹⁹ 規定幼童犯罪者免於死刑。漢平帝元始四年，在詔書中對老幼及婦女犯罪免刑做了詳細的規定：“眊悼之人，刑法所不加，聖王之所制也。惟苛暴吏多拘繫犯法者親屬、婦女老弱，構怨傷化，百姓苦之。其明敕百寮，婦女非身犯法，及男子八十以上七歲以下，家非坐不道，詔所名捕，它皆勿得繫。其當驗者，即驗問。定著令。”²⁰ 婦女除本身犯法外，不予拘捕；八十以上七歲以下男子，除家中坐不道罪詔書指明拘捕的外，也不予監禁；理應拘訊的就其居所予以訊問。東漢時期，繼續實行老少及婦女減刑政策，光武帝建武三年詔曰：“男子八十以上，十歲以下，及婦人從坐者，自非不道，詔所名捕，皆不得繫，當驗問者，即就驗。”²¹ 將少年定罪年齡由7歲調至10歲。又，《後漢書·孝和孝殤帝紀》記載：“郡國中都官徒及篤癯老小女徒各除半刑，其未競三月者，皆免歸田里。”對老幼、婦女等量刑減半。對老幼及婦女的寬宥，充分體現了孔子德治思想對司法活動的影響。

及至晉朝修訂《晉律》，仍以“恤刑慎罰”為主。一是縮小從坐的範圍。據《晉書·刑法志》記載，晉朝改《賊律》，“但以言語及犯宗廟園陵，謂之大逆無道，要斬，家屬從坐，不及祖父母、孫”，“減梟斬族誅從坐之條，除謀反適養母出女嫁皆不復還坐父母棄市。”二是簡省刑罰。晉律規定，年滿八十的老人、十歲以下的未成年人，以及婦女犯罪時，可得到減免。《晉書·刑法志》曰：“若八十，非殺傷人，他皆勿論。……十歲，不得告言人。”“輕過誤老少女人當罰金杖罰者，皆令半之。”另外，對於投匿名信告人者不再處以棄市之罪，“改投書棄市之科，所以輕刑也。”

¹⁴ 《晉書》，〈刑法志〉。

¹⁵ 《晉書》，〈刑法志〉。

¹⁶ 張家山漢墓竹簡整理小組，《張家山漢墓竹簡》，頁21。

¹⁷ 張家山漢墓竹簡整理小組，《張家山漢墓竹簡》，頁21。

¹⁸ 《漢書》，〈刑法志〉。

¹⁹ 《漢書》，〈刑法志〉。

²⁰ 《漢書》，〈刑法志〉。

²¹ 《隋書》，〈刑法志〉。

南朝時期，梁武帝“銳意儒雅，疏簡刑法”，因此《梁律》也貫徹了“恤刑慎罰”的原則，規定老少、廢疾、婦女及部分官員和家人等人有罪入獄可不戴刑具：“耐罪囚八十已上，十歲已下，及孕者、盲者、侏儒當械繫者，及郡國太守相、都尉、關中侯已上，亭侯已上之父母妻子，及所生坐非死罪除名之罪，二千石已上非檻征者，並頒繫之。”同時，針對“舊獄法，夫有罪，逮妻子，子有罪，逮父母”的規定，武帝乃下詔曰：“自今捕謫(謫)之家，及罪應質作，若年有老小者，可停將送。”這就在法律層面照顧了老幼、婦女及身有殘疾者。他在位期間，還“除贍面之刑”，縮小了從坐的範圍，“詔自今犯罪，非大逆，父母、祖父母勿坐。”²²

北魏孝文帝拓跋宏是一個親自參加修律、對封建法制的完善有較大貢獻的人物，他強調“治因政寬，弊由綱密”，在“恤刑慎罰”方面的做法主要有：一是罷門房之誅。所謂門房之誅，也就是滿門抄斬，累及姻親。北魏時期曾一度實行，孝文帝執政後，詔令“除群行剽劫首謀門誅，律重者止梟首”，²³他在詔書中說：“朕應歷數開一之期，屬千載光熙之運，雖仰嚴誨，猶懼德化不寬，至有門房之誅。下民凶戾，不顧親戚，一人為惡，殃及合門。朕為民父母，深所潛悼。自今已後，非謀反、大逆、干紀、外奔，罪止其身而已。”²⁴把門房之誅置於法內常刑之外，一般不再使用了。二是減輕刑具。據《魏書·刑罰志》記載，孝文帝“時法官及州郡縣不能以情折獄。乃為重枷，大幾圍；復以縊石懸於囚頸，傷內至骨；更使壯卒迭搏之。囚率不堪，因以誣服。吏持此以為能。帝聞而傷之，乃制非大逆有明證而不款辟者，不得大枷。”三是創設存留養親制度。孝文帝十二年詔曰：“犯死罪，若父母、祖父母年老，更無成人子孫，又無期親者，仰案後列奏以待報，著之令格。”又，《法例律》規定：“諸犯死罪，若祖父母、父母年七十以上，無成人子孫，旁無期親者，具狀上請。流者鞭笞，留存養親，終則從流。不在原赦之列。”²⁵犯死罪之人，如其尊親尚在，允許犯人侍奉尊親死後再執行。這不僅符合孝道，也不否定罪責，很有特色。

唐朝君臣對“德主刑輔”的思想認識比較到位，如貞觀二年，太宗對侍臣說：“是以為國之道，必須撫之以仁義，示之以威信，因人之心，去其苛刻，不作異端，自然安靜。”²⁶大臣魏徵也曾說：“聖哲君臨，移風易俗，不資嚴刑峻法，在仁義而已。故非仁無以廣施，非義無以正身。惠下以仁，正身以義，則其政不嚴而理，其教不肅而成矣。然則仁義理之本也，刑罰理之末也。”²⁷可見，“德主刑輔”思想為唐初君臣所接受，成為其治國理政的基本思想。這在唐高宗審定長孫無忌等人撰寫的《唐律疏議》中體現的較為明顯。在《名例律》中，

²² 《隋書》，〈刑法志〉。

²³ 《魏書》，〈刑罰志〉。

²⁴ 《魏書》，〈高祖紀上〉。

²⁵ 《魏書》，〈刑罰志〉。

²⁶ 裴汝誠等，《貞觀政要譯注》，頁232。

²⁷ 裴汝誠等，《貞觀政要譯注》，頁266。

他們明確申明了撰修所遵循的方針：“德禮爲政教之本，刑罰爲政教之用”，二者相輔相成，“猶昏曉陽秋相須而成者也”。²⁸ 受此影響，唐律十分注重慎刑，如刑罰只有五種——笞、杖、徒、流、死，死刑惟有絞、斬二類，其條文也降至111條。即使判了死刑，也須經多次“覆奏”，才能定案。如不按此執行，則對判決者處以刑罰。《斷獄律》曰：“諸死罪囚，不待覆奏報下而決者，流二千里。即奏報應決者，聽三日乃行刑，若限未滿而行刑者，徒一年；即過限，違一日杖一百，二日加一等。”²⁹ 唐律還規定官吏刑訊過度要受到懲處，藉以避免刑訊逼供。《斷獄律》曰：“諸拷囚不得過三度，數總不得過二百，杖罪以下不得過所犯之數。拷滿不承，取保放之。若拷過三度及杖外以他法拷掠者，杖一百；杖數過者，反坐所剩；以故致死者，徒二年。”³⁰ 對拷問囚犯的次數、用刑總數以及拷問過度所受處罰都作了規定。又，唐律按照恤刑的原則，對於老弱病幼殘者所應承擔的刑事責任分層次予以了詳細的規定，《名例律》曰：“諸年七十以上、十五以下及廢疾，犯流罪以下，收贖。八十以上、十歲以下及篤疾，犯反、逆、殺人應死者，上請；盜及傷人者，亦收贖。餘皆不論。九十以上，七歲以下，雖有死罪，不加刑。”³¹ 年齡不同，身體狀況不同，所犯罪不同，可以根據實際情況採用以錢贖罪、上請、不加刑等方式來量刑。唐律對懷孕的婦女也特別做了相應的規定，《斷獄律》曰：“諸婦人犯死罪，懷孕，當決者，聽產後一百日乃行刑。若未產而決者，徒二年；產訖，限未滿而決者，徒一年。失者，各減二等。其過限不決者，依奏報不決法……諸婦人懷孕，犯罪應拷及決杖笞，若未產而拷、決者，杖一百；傷重者，依前人不合捶拷法；產後未滿百日而拷決者，減一等。失者，各減二等。”³² 如果對孕婦及哺乳期的婦女行刑、刑訊，相關責任人也要受到處罰。這些規定都體現了爲政以德的思想。無怪乎《新唐書·刑法志》評論曰：“蓋自高祖、太宗除隋虐亂，治以寬平，民樂其安，重於犯法，致治之美，幾乎三代之盛時。考其推心惻物，其可謂仁矣。”

可見，由孔子宣導的“德主刑輔”思想，由漢及唐，日益爲執政者所接受，逐漸成爲傳統社會司法活動的主導思想。受其影響，省刑罰、寬宥老幼及婦女成爲爲政者制定法律時考慮的主要內容，這在一定程度上削弱了刑罰的野蠻性和殘酷性，緩和了階級矛盾，維護了傳統政治的合法性存在和社會秩序的穩定。

²⁸ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁3。

²⁹ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁572。

³⁰ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁552-553。

³¹ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁80-83。

³² 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁570-571。

二、《論語》中的“正名”思想成為司法制度的基本原則

所謂“正名”，就是指處在不同社會階層的、扮演不同社會角色的人們必須嚴格遵守周禮所規定的“君君、臣臣、父父、子子”³³的等級名分，各安其位，各行其事，從而形成君臣有義、長幼有序的良好社會局面，進而才能達到社會的和諧與穩定。在孔子看來，正名非常重要。據《論語·子路》記載，“子路曰：‘衛君待子而為政，子將奚先？’子曰：‘必也正名乎！’子路曰：‘有是哉，子之迂也，奚其正？’子曰：‘野哉，由也。君子如其所不知，蓋闕如也。名不正，則言不順；言不順，則事不成；事不成，則禮樂不興；禮樂不興，則刑法不中；刑法不中，則民無所措手足。’”可見，正名乃為政之首務，名不正將導致“禮樂不興”、“刑罰不中”和“民無所措手足”；也必將危及社會穩定。

繼孔子之後，孟子、荀子、董仲舒等碩儒繼承和發展了這一思想，尤其是董仲舒明確指出：“治國之端在正名，名之正，興五世。”³⁴他進而將陰陽五行說、天道觀與君臣、父子、夫婦等倫理關係搭掛起來，指出：“君臣、父子、夫婦之義，皆取諸陰陽之道。君為陽，臣為陰；父為陽，子為陰；夫為陽，妻為陰。陰陽無所獨行。其始也不得專起，其終也不得分功，有所兼之義。”³⁵“王道之三綱，可求於天。”³⁶從而在天人系統中確立了“三綱”的基本內容。自此開始，“三綱”遂成為“正名”的代名詞。

及至東漢，由官方論定的《白虎通》則明確指出了三綱的具體內容，《三綱六紀篇》曰：“三綱者，何謂也？謂君臣、父子、夫婦也。……故《含文嘉》曰：‘君為臣綱，父為子綱，夫為妻綱。’”³⁷在三綱中，“父為子綱”是基礎，“君為臣綱”是中心，“夫為妻綱”是羽翼，它們合起來構成維護封建君主專制制度的精神支柱和制定司法制度的根本原則。據此而建構起來的歷代司法制度都對違反這三綱行為的臣民嚴懲不怠。

1、維護君權

漢魏六朝隋唐時期，各政權均嚴厲打擊謀反大逆等直接威脅皇權的犯罪。如《張家山漢簡·二年律令·賊律》規定：“謀反者，皆要（腰）斬。其父母、妻子、同產，無少長皆棄市。”³⁸《漢書·景帝紀》如淳注引漢律曰：“大逆不道，父母妻子同產皆棄市。”武帝元狩元年，淮南王安、衡山王賜、江都王建，失臣子道，謀反逆，皆誅殺，“黨與死者數萬人”。³⁹《漢書·李尋傳》記載，哀帝時，

³³ 《論語》，〈顏淵〉。

³⁴ 賴炎元，《春秋繁露今注今譯》，頁54。

³⁵ 賴炎元，《春秋繁露今注今譯》，頁320。

³⁶ 賴炎元，《春秋繁露今注今譯》，頁321。

³⁷ 班固等，《白虎通》，頁203。

³⁸ 張家山漢墓竹簡整理小組，《張家山漢墓竹簡》，頁133。

“賀良等復欲妄變政事”，被誅殺，“當賀良等執左道，亂朝政，傾覆國家，誣罔主上，不道。賀良等皆伏誅。尋及解光減死一等，徙敦煌郡。”

魏晉南北朝時期，各政權對謀反大逆等也予以嚴懲，如魏律規定：“謀反大逆，臨時捕之，或汙溺，或梟菹，夷其三族，不在律令，所以嚴絕惡跡也。”⁴⁰ 北魏律規定：“大逆不道腰斬，誅其同籍，年十四已下腐刑，女子沒縣官。”⁴¹ 南梁律規定：“其謀反、降、叛、大逆以上，皆斬；父子同產男無少長，皆棄市；母妻姊妹及應從坐棄市者，妻子女妾同補奚官奴婢；貲材沒官。”⁴² 北齊律創立“重罪十條”，“一曰反逆，二曰大逆，三曰叛，四曰降，五曰惡逆，六曰不道，七曰不敬，八曰不孝，九曰不義，十曰內亂。其犯此十者，不在八議論贖之列。”⁴³ 謀反名列首位，且不可議不能贖。北周律雖“不立十惡之目，而重惡逆、不道、大不敬、不孝、不義、內亂之罪，凡惡逆，肆之三日”，“盜賊及謀反、大逆、降、叛、惡逆罪當流者，皆甄一房配為雜戶”。⁴⁴ 對威脅皇權的罪刑亦予以重點打擊。

唐律對侵犯皇權的行為處罰很嚴。如《唐律疏議·賊盜律》規定：“諸謀反及大逆者，皆斬；父子年十六以上皆絞，十五以下及母女、妻妾（子妻妾亦同）、祖孫、兄弟、姊妹、若部曲、資材、田宅並沒官。男夫年八十及篤疾、婦人年六十及廢疾者並免（餘條婦人應緣坐者，准此）；伯叔父、兄弟之子皆流三千里，不限籍之同異。”⁴⁵ “即雖謀反，詞理不能動眾，威力缺乏率人者，亦皆斬（謂結謀真實，而不能為害者。若自述休徵，假託靈異，妄稱兵馬，虛說反由，傳惑眾人而無真狀可驗者，自從祓法）；父子、母女、妻妾並流三千里，資財不在沒限。其謀大逆者絞。”⁴⁶ 可見，只要涉及危害君權的行為，就得緣坐入死，刑及父母妻妾子女和兄弟姐妹，即所謂“謀反、大逆，罪極誅夷，汙其室宅，除惡務本。罪人既不會赦，緣坐亦不合原，去取之宜，皆隨罪人為法。”⁴⁷ 一部《唐律疏議》只有502條，其中涉及維護專制政權及君主人身安全的即有90多條，占全部律文幾近五分之一；規定處以死罪的200餘條，事涉這方面的就有20多條，甚至連“口陳欲反之言，心無真實之計，而無狀可尋者”，亦要“流二千里。”⁴⁸ 由此不難看出，唐律在維護皇帝至高無上地位不受任何侵犯方面是多麼的嚴密和嚴格。

除此之外，進入皇家禁地被視為大不敬，要處以重刑。如漢武帝元鼎四年，嗣侯張拾坐入上林（皇家園林——筆者注）謀盜鹿，完為城旦。（《漢書·功臣

39 《漢書》，〈武帝紀〉。

40 《晉書》，〈刑法志〉。

41 《魏書》，〈刑罰志〉。

42 《隋書》，〈刑法志〉。

43 《隋書》，〈刑法志〉。

44 《隋書》，〈刑法志〉。

45 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁321。

46 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁322。

47 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁88。

48 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁325。

表四·安丘侯》)被剃去鬚毛鬚髮,枷上刑具,服苦役。爲了保衛皇帝的安全,自晉朝始,政府專設律條以“敬上防非”。《唐律疏議·衛禁律》開篇即言:“《衛禁律》者,秦漢及魏未有此篇。晉太宰賈充等,酌漢魏之律,隨事增損,創制此篇,名爲《衛宮律》。自宋洎於後周,此名並無所改。至於北齊,將關禁附之,更名《禁衛律》。隋開皇改爲《衛禁律》。衛者,言警衛之法;禁者,以關禁爲名。但敬上防非,於事尤重,故次名例之下,居諸篇之首。”唐律關於宮廷警衛方面的律條主要有擅入宮殿門、上閣及御所在罪,向宮殿、宮垣、殿垣、上閣及皇帝所在地射箭、放彈及投擲瓦石罪等。如“諸闖入宮門,徒二年。殿門,徒二年半”,“入上閣內者,絞”⁴⁹;盜帝王陵園草木者,“徒二年半”。⁵⁰不尊重御用之物也要嚴懲,如東漢時,“朱穆爲尚書,歲初百官朝賀,有虎賁當階置弓於地,謂群僚曰:‘此天子弓,誰敢干越?’百僚皆避之。穆呵之曰:‘天子之弓當戴之於首上,何敢置地?大不敬。’即收虎賁付獄治罪,皆肅然服之。”⁵¹這是因對天子用的器物不尊敬,而處以“大不敬”罪。僞造御用之物者,法不容恕。如漢律規定:“僞寫皇帝信璽、皇帝行璽,要(腰)斬以勻(徇)。”⁵²唐律規定:“諸僞造皇帝御用八寶者,斬。太皇太后、皇太后、皇后、皇太子寶者,絞。皇太子妃寶,流三千里。”其注曰:“僞造不錄所用,但造即坐。”⁵³只要是僞造,不管用還是不用,一律處罰。與皇帝交談或上書有冒犯之處,也會受到重懲。漢律規定:“諸上書及有言也而謾,完爲城旦舂。其誤不審,罰金四兩。”⁵⁴又,晉人周嵩,由於褒貶朝士而被論以“大不敬棄市”,據《晉書·周嵩傳》記載,周嵩與侍中戴邈同坐,周嵩“褒貶朝士,又詆毀邈,邈密表之。帝召嵩入,面責之。嵩謝罪曰:‘昔唐虞至聖,四凶在朝,陛下雖聖明御世,安能無碌碌之臣乎?’帝怒,收付廷尉。廷尉以嵩大不敬棄市論。”

2、保障父權的絕對權威

家庭是中國傳統社會的基本單位,在孔子看來,“欲治其國,必先齊其家。”⁵⁵爲了維繫父系家長制,就必須強調孝。因爲只有孝,才能“無違”,才能“生,事之以禮;死,葬之以禮,祭之以禮”,⁵⁶才能不犯上作亂。漢代以孝治天下,故將“不孝”入罪,予以嚴懲。如據張家山竹簡《奏讞書》記載,“教人不孝,次不孝之律。不孝者棄市。棄市之次,黥爲城旦舂。”⁵⁷不孝者棄市。殺害、毆打父母的行爲,漢律也嚴懲

49 長孫無忌等,《唐律疏議》,頁150-151。

50 長孫無忌等,《唐律疏議》,頁355。

51 李昉等,《太平御覽》卷三百四十七,頁1598。

52 張家山漢墓竹簡整理小組,《張家山漢墓竹簡》,頁134。

53 長孫無忌等,《唐律疏議》,頁452。

54 張家山漢墓竹簡整理小組,《張家山漢墓竹簡》,頁135。

55 《禮記》,〈雜記〉。

56 《論語》,〈爲政〉。

57 張家山漢墓竹簡整理小組,《張家山漢墓竹簡》,頁227。

不待。張家山漢簡《二年律令·賊律》規定：“子牧殺父母，毆詈泰父母、父母、段大母、主母、後母，及父母告子不孝，皆棄市。”⁵⁸ 漢律還規定，犯不孝罪者不能減免或贖罪：“賊殺傷父母，牧殺父母，毆詈父母，父母告子不孝，其妻子為收者，皆錮，令毋得以爵償、免除及贖。”⁵⁹ 《漢書》中記載了一些對不孝之人處罰的例子。其中不孝父的例子，如據《漢書·景帝紀》記載，景帝時，劉恢說有私怨於其父，而自謀反，欲令其父坐死，被景帝以不孝罪棄市。又據《漢書·衡山王傳》記載，“太子爽，坐告王父，不孝棄市”。不孝母的例子，如據《漢書·王尊傳》記載，元帝時，王尊為美陽令，該地有一女子告假子不孝，曰：“兒常以我為妻，妒笞我。”尊聞之，遣吏收捕驗問，辭服。尊曰：“律無妻母之法，聖人所不忍書，此經所謂造獄者也。”尊於是出坐廷上，取不孝子縣礫著樹，使騎吏五人張弓射殺之，吏民警駭。

魏晉南北朝時期，法律對不孝罪也予以嚴懲。如曹魏律規定：“夫五刑之罪，莫大於不孝。”⁶⁰ 以不孝為重罪。晉律將不孝科以棄市之罪，“子不孝父母，棄市。”⁶¹ “子賊殺傷毆父母，梟首，罵詈，棄市；婦謀殺夫之父母，亦棄市。”⁶² 又，南朝宋明帝曾大赦天下，唯“子殺父母，孫殺祖父母，弟殺兄，妻殺夫，奴殺主，不在赦列。”⁶³ 南陳律規定，如不孝，將受到終身禁錮：“其制唯重清議禁錮之科。若縉紳之族，犯虧名教，不孝及內亂者，發詔棄之，終身不齒。”⁶⁴ 北魏律規定：“害其親者，輒之。”⁶⁵ 魏高祖也曾下詔，專門針對不孝罪，建議加大處罰力度：“三千罪，莫大於不孝，而律不遜父母，罪止髡刑。於理未衷，可更詳改。”⁶⁶

唐律賦予尊長在家庭中的絕對權力。這主要表現在：一是《唐律疏議》明文規定“同居必有尊長”、“家事統於尊”，即尊長享有財產權、對子孫的教令權和主婚權。就財產權而言，唐律規定未經尊長同意，“諸同居卑幼，私輒用財者，十疋笞十，十疋加一等，罪止杖一百。”⁶⁷ 就教令權而言，《唐律疏議》指出：“祖父母、父母有所教令，於事合宜，即須奉以周旋，子孫不得違反。”⁶⁸ 如子孫違反了教令，只要父輩告發，就“徒二年”⁶⁹；如果祖父母、父母因而殺之者，只徒“一年半”。⁷⁰ 就主婚權而言，唐律規定：“諸卑幼在外，尊長後為訂婚。”⁷¹ 二是設

58 張家山漢墓竹簡整理小組，《張家山漢墓竹簡》，頁139。

59 張家山漢墓竹簡整理小組，《張家山漢墓竹簡》，頁139。

60 《魏書》，〈少帝紀〉。

61 《晉書》，〈刑法志〉。

62 程樹德，《九朝律考》，頁243。

63 《宋書》，〈索虜傳〉。

64 《隋書》，〈刑法志〉。

65 《魏書》，〈刑法志〉。

66 《魏書》，〈刑法志〉。

67 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁241。

68 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁438。

69 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁438。

70 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁414。

71 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁432。

不孝罪。《唐律疏議》將不孝列為“十惡”中的一種，“五刑之中……其數甚惡者，事類有十，故稱‘十惡’。”⁷²，“七曰不孝”，其內容包括：“告言、詛誑祖父母、父母，及祖父母、父母在，別籍、異財，若供養有闕；居父母喪，身自嫁娶，若作樂，釋服從吉；聞祖父母、父母喪，匿不舉哀，詐稱祖父母、父母死。”⁷³對不孝罪的具體行為和處罰規定如下：“諸冒祖父母、父母者，絞；毆者，斬；過失殺者，流二千里；傷者，徒三年。”⁷⁴諸子孫“供養有闕者，徒二年。”⁷⁵“諸居父母喪，生子及兄弟別籍、異財者，徒一年。”⁷⁶“諸祖父母、父母被囚禁而嫁娶者，死罪，徒一年半；流罪，減一等；徒罪，杖一百。”⁷⁷諸如此類，規定非常詳細。

3、保證夫權

漢統治者為加強家庭中丈夫的統治地位，製造了“夫為妻綱”的理論。《白虎通·嫁娶》曰：“男女者何謂也？男者任也，任功業也；女者如也，從如人也。在家從父母，既嫁從夫，夫沒從子也。《傳》曰：‘婦人有三從之義也。’夫婦者何謂也？夫者扶也，扶以人道也；婦者服也，服於家事，事人者也。”⁷⁸就是說妻子要無條件地服從丈夫，服侍丈夫。漢律規定：“妻悍而夫毆笞之，非以兵刃也，雖傷之，毋罪。”丈夫可以毆打妻子，但妻子不可以毆打丈夫，“妻毆夫，耐為隸妾。”⁷⁹

另外，自漢律始，有七棄之規定：“無子棄，絕世也；淫泆棄，亂類也；不事舅姑棄，悖德也；口舌棄，離親也；盜竊棄，反義也；嫉妒棄，亂家也；惡疾棄，不可奉宗廟也。”⁸⁰即妻子凡具有不孝順公婆、無子、淫妒、有惡疾、多言、盜竊中任何一項，丈夫都有權休妻。同時男子還可以找各種藉口，將妻子趕走，這樣的例子很多，如王吉曾因妻子摘鄰居家的棗子而休妻，事見《漢書·王吉傳》；鮑永的妻子因在其繼母前罵狗而遭棄，事見《後漢書·鮑永傳》；孫謙因妻子慢待堂兄而休妻，事見《梁書·孫謙傳》。由此可見，男子可以因小事而休妻，而為法律和社會所認可。然而妻子即使在丈夫有惡劣行為的情況下，也不得拋棄丈夫。《白虎通·嫁娶》云：“夫有惡行，妻不得去。”因為“地無去天之義”，“一與之齊，終身不改”，故夫“雖有惡，不得去也。”⁸¹片面強調妻子對丈夫的單方面的義務。

⁷² 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁6。

⁷³ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁12。

⁷⁴ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁414。

⁷⁵ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁438。

⁷⁶ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁236。

⁷⁷ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁258。

⁷⁸ 班固等，《白虎通》，頁268-269。

⁷⁹ 張家山漢墓竹簡整理小組，《張家山漢墓竹簡》，頁139。

⁸⁰ 程樹德，《九朝律考》，頁115。

⁸¹ 班固等，《白虎通》，頁257。

晉朝時，規定妻傷夫判罪比一般傷死人的罪行多一年：“傷死人四歲刑，妻傷夫五歲刑。”⁸²

唐律進一步確認了男尊女卑的夫權統治。一是懲處女方悔婚罪。《唐律疏議·戶婚律》規定：“諸許嫁女，已報婚書及有私約，而輒悔者，杖六十。若更許他人者，杖一百；已成者，徒一年半。後娶者知情，減一等。女追歸前夫，前夫不娶，還聘財，後夫婚如法。”⁸³ 女方悔婚，需承擔一定的責任，而男家則可以不娶。二是實行夫妻同罪而異罰。夫妻之間，唐律認為義同長幼，所以夫妻相毆鬥，同罪而異罰。如《鬥訟律》規定：“諸妻毆夫，徒一年；若毆傷重者，加凡鬥傷三等；死者，斬。媵及妾犯者，各加一等。”⁸⁴ 反之，如果丈夫“毆傷妻者，減凡人三等；死者，以凡人論。毆妾折傷以上，減妻二等。”⁸⁵ 可見同一鬥傷罪，妻則加凡人三等，男則減凡人二等，量刑相差五等之多；同樣致死，妻子殺夫要斬，而夫殺妻以凡人論。律條同時規定，丈夫過失殺傷妻妾不問罪，“過失殺者，各勿論”；而妻、媵、妾過失殺傷夫“各減二等”而已。⁸⁶ 三是懲治夫喪嫁娶。對於居夫喪期間而嫁娶者，唐律規定：“諸居父母及夫喪而嫁娶者，徒三年；妾減三等。”⁸⁷ 為夫守喪期滿之後，如不願改嫁，除其祖父母、父母外，他人不能逼其強嫁，“諸夫喪服除而欲守志，非女之祖父母、父母而強嫁之者，徒一年；期親嫁者，減二等。各離之。女追歸前家，娶者不坐。”⁸⁸ 四是妻妾不能擅自離開或改嫁。唐律規定：“即妻妾擅去者，徒二年；因而改嫁者，加二等。”⁸⁹ 其對夫權的維護由此可見。

綜上，由孔子宣導的“君君臣臣父父子子”的“正名”思想，歷經董仲舒等碩儒的改造，逐漸演化成爲“三綱”，並日益滲透到司法制度中，這不僅促進了儒家思想的法律化，使儒家思想成爲了傳統社會控制系統的核心和樞紐；而且也促進了司法制度的儒學化，爲嚴苛的法律增加了濃濃的道德倫理色彩，二者的有機結合，共同維繫了傳統社會的宗法等級秩序，鞏固了封建統治秩序。

三、《論語》中的“親親相隱”成爲司法實踐的指導原則

親親得相容隱，就是法律允許親屬藏匿包庇犯罪而不承擔刑事責任的原則。這一司法原則，淵源於孔子的“父爲子隱，子爲父隱”。《論語·子路》

⁸² 程樹德，《九朝律考》，頁243。

⁸³ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁254。

⁸⁴ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁410。

⁸⁵ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁409。

⁸⁶ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁410。

⁸⁷ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁257。

⁸⁸ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁265。

⁸⁹ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁268。

載：“葉公語孔子曰：‘吾黨有直躬者，其父攘羊，而子證之。’孔子曰：‘吾黨之直者異於是：父爲子隱，子爲父隱，直在其中矣。’”邢昺疏云：其父盜羊，而子言於失主，證明其父爲盜羊者。葉公以此誇於孔子，說明其鄉黨中有以正直而行事的人。孔子不同意他的說法，“言吾黨之直者異於此證父之直者。子苟有過，父爲隱之，則慈也。父苟有過，子爲隱之，則孝也。孝慈則忠，忠則直也。故曰‘直在其中矣’。”⁹⁰由此可知，孔子之所以提倡父子相隱，其目的是爲了維護傳統的宗法制度和倫理道德，進而鞏固父權制家庭，這也有利於培養人們的忠君思想和鞏固傳統的統治秩序。

秦朝時，親親相容隱原則已初露端倪。秦律不允許子告父、奴告主。如《法律答問》說：“子告父母，臣妾告主，勿聽。”又說：“主擅殺、刑髡其子、臣妾，是謂‘非公室告’，勿聽。而行者，告者罪。”⁹¹這說明在秦朝，子告父母，奴告主，不予受理。如果非要告的話，就要受處罰了。但秦律不禁止妻告夫，《法律答問》說：“‘夫有罪，妻先告，不收。’妻媵臣妾、衣器當收不當收？不當收。”⁹²即丈夫有罪，如果妻先告發，不僅不負連坐責任，且不沒收陪嫁的奴僕和衣物。由於秦朝以法家思想爲指導，親親相容隱沒有上升爲普遍的法律原則。

到了漢朝，由於儒家學者的鼓吹，親親相容隱逐漸上升爲司法原則。西漢初期，禁止卑幼控告尊長。如《漢書·衡山王劉賜傳》載，漢武帝時，衡山王劉賜謀反，又欲廢太子劉爽，立劉孝爲太子。“爽聞，即使所善白贏之長安上書，言衡山王與子謀逆，言孝作兵車鍛矢，與王御者奸。”後衡山王事敗自殺，而“太子爽告父不孝，棄市”。該事例說明，即使“重首匿之科”的漢武帝也不容許子告父，那怕是犯謀反罪的父親。

在漢昭帝始元六年召開的鹽鐵會議上，御史大夫桑弘羊和賢良文學們曾就是否廢除“首匿相坐之法”展開過激烈的爭論。據《鹽鐵論·周秦》記載，賢良文學們要求廢除“首匿相坐之法”，即要求允許親屬隱匿不告而不相坐。但桑弘羊堅決反對，在他看來，一是“一室之中，父兄之際，若身體相屬，一節動而知其心”，親屬最知情。二是親屬負有不教之責，“居家相察，出入相司。父不教子，兄不正弟”，難咎其責。三是親屬隱匿相坐，可以警告民人：“爲非，法之必加，而戮及父兄，必懼而爲善”，可以起到預防犯罪的作用。賢良文學們則反駁說：“今以子誅父，以弟誅兄，親戚相坐，什伍相連，若引根本之及華葉，傷小指之累四體也。如此，則以有罪株及無罪，無罪者寡矣。”在他們看來，“首匿相坐之法立，骨肉之恩廢，而刑罪多”，所以反對“父子之相坐”，而主張“子爲父隱，父爲子隱”。

及至漢宣帝，正式確立了親親相容隱的原則。漢宣帝地節四年（前66）曾下詔容許親屬相隱：“父子之親，夫婦之道，天性也。雖有患禍，猶蒙死而存之。

⁹⁰ 邢昺，《論語注疏》，頁200。

⁹¹ 睡虎地秦墓竹簡整理小組，《睡虎地秦墓竹簡》，頁196。

⁹² 睡虎地秦墓竹簡整理小組，《睡虎地秦墓竹簡》，頁196。

誠愛結於心，仁厚之至也，豈能違之哉！自今子首匿父母，妻匿夫，孫匿大父母，皆勿坐。其父母匿子，夫匿妻，大父母匿孫，罪殊死，皆上請廷尉以聞。”⁹³ 公開規定子孫首匿父母、祖父母，妻子首匿丈夫，都不用承擔刑事責任；父母、祖父母匿子孫，除死罪上請減免外，其它也不用承擔刑事責任。該詔書不但把孔子所限定的父子相為隱的範圍擴大到夫婦、祖孫，而且把這一倫理原則上升為刑罰原則而賦予法律效力，成為《論語》經義法律化的一個重要標誌。自此，親親相容隱的刑罰原則正式確定下來，並為後世立法者所承襲。

降及東漢，班固的《白虎通》不僅從“五行”和天屬的角度論述了“父為子隱，子為父隱”的原因，“父為子隱，何法？法木之藏火也；子為父隱，何法？法水逃金也”，⁹⁴ “君不為臣隱，父獨為子隱何？以為父子一體，而分榮恥相及”，⁹⁵ 而且將相為容隱的範圍擴大到兄弟、朋友、夫妻，《論語》曰：‘父為子隱，子為父隱，直在其中矣。’兄弟相為隱乎？曰：然。與父子同義。故周公誅四國常以祿甫為主也。朋友相為隱者，人本接朋結友為欲立身揚名也。朋友之道有四焉，通財不在其中。近則正之，遠則稱之，樂則思之，患則死之。夫妻相為隱乎？《傳》曰：‘曾子去妻，黎蒸不熟。’問曰：‘婦有七出，不蒸亦預乎？’曰：‘吾聞之也，絕交令可友，棄妻令可嫁也。黎蒸不熟而已，何問其故乎！’”此為隱之也。⁹⁶ 由於《白虎通》是東漢章帝時，諸儒論議五經同異，皇帝“稱制臨決”的產物，因此我們可以說它基本上代表了東漢政權對這一問題的態度。

親屬相容隱的原則在西漢元帝、成帝對待東平王宇這件事上充分的體現了出來。東平王宇是元帝的同父異母弟，立國後，經常與奸滑之徒來往，犯法之事時有發生，但“上以至親貴弗罪，傳相連坐”。後其母又上書元帝言其不孝，元帝一方面對東平王曉以大義，勸其潔身自好：“蓋聞親親之恩莫重於孝，尊尊之義莫大於忠，故諸侯在位不驕以致孝道，制節謹度以翼天子，然後富貴不離於身，而社稷可保。今聞王自修有闕，……謗自內興，朕甚憚焉，為王懼之。……故臨遣太中大夫子驁諭王朕意。孔子曰：‘過而不改，是為過矣。’王其深惟熟思之，無違朕意。”一方面又以親情勸說王太后，希望她能原諒東平王的過失：“夫富善之門莫美於和睦，患咎之首莫大於內離。今東平王出繼祿之中而托於南面之位，加以年齒方剛，涉學日寡，……能無失禮義者，其惟聖人乎？《傳》曰：‘父為子隱，直在其中矣。’王太后明察此意，不可不詳。閨門之內，母子之間，同氣異息，骨肉之恩，豈可忽哉！豈可忽哉！昔周公戒伯禽曰：‘故舊無大故，則不可棄也，毋求備於一人。’夫以故舊之恩，猶忍小惡，而況此乎！”東平王悔過服罪，“因使者頓首謝死罪，願灑心自改”。元帝又下“詔書敕傅相”對王進行儒家經典教育，“今王富於春秋，氣力

⁹³ 《漢書》·〈宣帝紀〉。

⁹⁴ 班固等，《白虎通》，頁96。

⁹⁵ 班固等，《白虎通》，頁121。

⁹⁶ 班固等，《白虎通》，頁121-122。

勇武，獲師傅之教淺，加以少所聞見，自今以來，非五經之正術，敢以遊獵非禮道王者，輒以名聞”。

但元帝死後，東平王不但對嗣位的成帝有所誹議，而且放言自己差點作了天子；不但居喪期間飲酒食肉，妻妾不離側，而且絞殺了欲告發其罪行的人。有司奏請逮捕懲辦，成帝沒有治其罪，僅削二縣而已。三年之後，成帝又以親親之故下詔恢復所削之縣，詔曰：“蓋聞仁以親親，古之道也。前東平王有關，有司請廢，朕不忍。又請削，朕不敢專。惟王之至親，未嘗忘於心。今聞王改行自新，尊修經術，親近仁人，非法之求，不以奸吏，朕甚嘉焉。傳不云乎？朝過夕改，君子與之。其復前所削縣如故。”⁹⁷這是西漢皇帝以兄弟、叔侄之至親關係相容隱的典型事例。在這件事情的處理過程中，元、成二帝不但在實際操作中具體貫徹執行了《論語》首倡的親屬相容隱的原則，而且還時常引用《論語》經文為自己的行為張目。

東漢時，這一原則在皇室成員犯罪時也得到了充分運用。漢明帝永平十三年，有人告發“楚王英與漁陽王平、顏忠等造作圖書，有逆謀，事下案驗。有司奏英招聚奸滑，制作圖讖，擅相官秩，置諸侯王公將軍二千石，大逆不道，請誅之。”明帝“以親親不忍，乃廢英，徙丹陽涇縣，賜湯沐邑五百戶。遣大鴻臚持節護送，使伎人奴婢鼓吹悉從，得乘衣車，持兵弩，行道射獵，極意自娛。男女為侯主者，食邑如故。楚太后勿上璽綬，留住楚宮。”⁹⁸對犯大逆不道之人，不但不誅殺，反而優待尤加，其曲法伸情之意可見一斑。

在魏晉南北朝時期，親親相容隱原則得到了進一步的確認，不僅容許親屬相隱，如後秦姚興曾詔令“聽祖父母昆弟相容隱”，⁹⁹北魏有“子孫告父母、祖父母者死”¹⁰⁰的律條；而且出現了相容隱的親人不得在法庭上作證人的論調，且在現實生活中和法律上得到了認可。如東晉元帝時衛展上書反對“考子正父刑，鞭父母問子所在”的作法：“今施行詔書，有孝子正父死刑，或鞭父母問子所在。近主者所稱《庚寅詔書》：舉家逃亡，家長斬。若長是逃亡之主，斬之，雖重猶可。設子孫犯事，將考祖父逃亡，逃亡是子孫，是（而）父祖嬰其酷。傷順破教，如此者眾。相隱之道離，則君臣之義廢；君臣之義廢，則犯上之奸生矣。”¹⁰¹親屬間相互證罪，既有悖於親親相隱，也會導致犯上作亂之事的發生。又，宋文帝時侍中蔡廓建議，“鞠獄不宜令子孫下辭明言父祖之罪，虧教傷情，莫此為大。自今但令家人與囚相見，無乞鞠之訴，便足以明伏罪，不須責家人下辭。”朝議咸以為允，從之。¹⁰²如果相容隱的親人在法庭上作證人，不但不會受賞，而且要治罪。如梁武帝時建康女子任提女，坐誘口

⁹⁷ 《漢書》，〈宣元六王傳〉。

⁹⁸ 《後漢書》，〈光武十王傳〉。

⁹⁹ 《晉書》，〈姚興載記上〉。

¹⁰⁰ 《魏書》，〈竇瑗傳〉。

¹⁰¹ 《晉書》，〈刑法志〉。

¹⁰² 《宋書》，〈蔡廓傳〉。

當死。其子景慈對鞠辭云，母實行此。是時法官虞僧虬啟稱，“案子之事親，有隱無犯，直躬證父，仲尼爲非。景慈素無防閑之道，死有明日之據，陷親極刑，傷和損俗。凡乞鞠不審，降罪一等，豈得避五歲之刑，忽死母之命？景慈宜加罪辟。”詔流於交州。¹⁰³

及至唐律，進一步完備、健全了這一制度。《唐律疏議·名例律》“同居相隱”條說：“諸同居，若大功以上親，及外祖父母、外孫，若孫之婦、夫之兄弟及兄弟妻，有罪相爲隱；部曲、奴婢爲主隱：皆勿論。即漏露其事及謗語消息亦不坐。其小功以下相隱，減凡人三等。”¹⁰⁴在容隱範圍上，唐律所規定有明顯的擴大。既有按服制等級所定的“大功”以上親，也包括“同財共居”的家庭成員，還包括“服雖輕、倫情重”的外祖父母、外孫、孫之婦、夫之兄弟及兄弟妻。除此之外，部曲和奴婢還可爲主人隱罪。於此範圍之外的親屬之間，雖沒有容隱權，但相互隱匿罪行，在量刑上也與普通人不同，而是“減凡人三等”處理。

親親相容隱，既是權利，也是義務。如果告發容隱範圍內的親屬，告發者的行爲即構成犯罪，而被告者反因親屬的告發而免於處罰。在唐律中，除謀反、謀大逆和謀叛罪外，卑幼告發尊長，均視爲犯罪。《唐律疏議·鬥訟律》“告祖父母父母”條規定：告祖父母父母者，違反了“十惡”之一的“不孝”罪，不論所告是否屬實，告發之子孫均處以死刑，“諸告期親尊長、外祖父母、夫、夫之祖父母，雖得實，徒二年。”¹⁰⁵“告期親以下總麻以上尊長”、“告總麻以上卑幼”條規定：“告大功尊長，各減一等。小功、總麻，減二等。”¹⁰⁶“部曲奴婢告主”條規定，部曲或奴婢告主人的“皆絞”，告主人親屬的要以親等分別處以杖至流不等。

卑幼告尊長有罪，尊長告卑幼亦有罪。《白居易集》卷六十七中有這樣的案例，很能說明問題。如某甲告其子行盜，有人譏其父子不相隱，某甲稱自己的行爲是“大義滅親”。白居易判曰：“法許原親，慈同隱惡。俾恩流於下，亦直在其中。甲忝齒人倫，忍傷天性。義方失教，曾莫愧於父頑；攘竊成奸，尚不爲其子隱。道既虧於庭訓，禮遂闕於家肥。且情比樂羊，可謂不慈傷教；況罪非石厚，徒云大義滅親。是不及情，所宜致誚。”¹⁰⁷顯然，判詞判言甲不應告子，而應爲子隱。

由上可見，由孔子提出的“父子相隱”思想，歷經漢唐統治者和儒家學者的推演，遂成爲漢唐司法中的基本原則，其相容隱的範圍也隨之不斷擴大，由父子而兄弟、朋友、夫妻，由大功以上親、外祖父母、外孫，若孫之婦、夫之兄弟及兄弟妻而及部曲、奴婢。

¹⁰³ 《隋書》，〈刑法志〉。

¹⁰⁴ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁435。

¹⁰⁵ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁435。

¹⁰⁶ 長孫無忌等，《唐律疏議》，頁435。

¹⁰⁷ 白居易，《白居易集》，頁1416。

四、結語

中華法系和中華法制文明源遠流長、博大精深，在世界法制文明歷史上佔有重要的地位，在其發展過程中形成了特色鮮明的時代精神和民族特性。特別是漢代以法律儒家化取代秦代法律法家化，開始了法律儒家化的歷史進程，至“唐律一準乎禮”，標誌著法律儒家化的最後完成，奠定了中華法系禮法並用的治國模式和中國獨特的儒家法律文化。¹⁰⁸ 在整個法律儒家化的過程中，作為記錄孔子及其弟子思想重要經典的《論語》，扮演了重要角色，其中的“德主刑輔”思想成為司法文化的精髓、“正名”思想成為司法制度的基本原則、“親親相隱”理念成為司法實踐的指導原則。這不僅促進了儒家思想的法律化，而且也增加了司法制度的人倫色彩，對於中國傳統法律乃至於整個民族文化產生了不可低估的影響。

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¹⁰⁸ 管學輝，〈淺談中國法律儒家化的歷史進程〉，頁9-10。

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The *Analects* and the Confucianization of Judiciary in the Han and Tang Dynasties

TANG Ming-Gui

Abstract

The *Analects* is an important classic which records the thoughts of Confucius and his disciples. During the Han and Tang dynasties, influenced by the ideological trend of instilling confucianism into laws, the idea of “morality-guiding and penalty-supplementing” in the *Analects* was regarded as the quintessence of judicial culture, along with “rectification of names” as the fundamental principle of the judicial system, and “mutual concealment between relatives” as the guiding principle of judicial practice. This not only promoted the legalization of confucianism, but also added ethical characteristics to the judicial system, which has exerted a profound influence on Chinese traditional laws and even the entire national culture.

Keywords: *Analects*, judiciary in the Han and Tang dynasties, Confucianization, rectification of names, mutual concealment between relatives

論王廷相對張載“太虛即氣”的承繼與轉型

林彥廷

中文提要

“太虛即氣”是張載思想體系中的核心命題，該命題一方面承繼自漢代以來所流行的氣化宇宙圖式，另一方面由於受到佛學的影響，使中國的氣論思想得到更進一步的提升，從宇宙生成的實然層面躍至對形上本體的討論，這種思想的昇華與轉變開啟了宋明理學後續的發展，並為其發展立下重要的里程碑。王廷相作為明代後期的哲學家，對於張載之說持有高度肯定，如以下提到：“橫渠此論闡造化之密，明人性之源，開示後學之功大矣。”¹ 由於同為主張氣一元論者，因此許多後世學者將王廷相視為張載與王船山之間的中流砥柱，但是否因此能說二者的思想全然相通？抑或僅是部分相似？本文以“太虛即氣”為題，即在於探討二者的思想聯繫，為了說明這一點，必須部份結合朱熹理氣之說的想法，以便於進行比較，在研究進路上，本文將會分成以下三個部分進行說明：（一）張載的“太虛即氣”——宇宙論與本體論之雙重並建；（二）王廷相對張載“太虛即氣”之說的詮解；（三）參考前輩學者們的研究成果與檢視方法，說明王廷相與張載學說形態的同異之處。

關鍵詞：太虛，氣，性，神

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¹ 王廷相，《王氏家藏集》卷三十三，〈橫渠理氣辨〉，頁602。

張載之學與王廷相的思想聯繫，是學者探討王廷相之說的重要切入點之一，特別是張載的“太虛即氣”說，對王廷相的天道心性論所產生的影響。本文嘗試透過“太虛即氣”考察張載、王廷相兩位不同時代哲學家的思想聯繫。首先，闡述張載“太虛即氣”之大義，以說明其思想所蘊含的雙重詮釋，其次則是就王廷相對此思想的繼承進行梳理，最後便是集結不同學者的觀點，藉以檢視張載與王廷相思想之間的異同，其主要目的在於探討：張、王二氏是否均屬同一類型的自然氣論？

一、張載的“太虛即氣”——宇宙論與本體論之雙重並建

張載“太虛即氣”的提出，原因有二，其一重在於闡述與發展儒家的天道性命之說，其二則在於辯佛，參見其文：

釋氏不知天命而以心法起滅天地，以小緣大，以末緣本，其不能窮而為之幻妄，真所謂疑冰者與！釋氏妄意天性而不知範圍天用，反以六根之微因緣天地。明不能盡，則誣天地日月為幻妄，蔽其用於一身之小，溺其志於虛空之大，所以語大語小，流通失中。²

佛學的盛行，是張載天道論形構的外在刺激，透過上述引文，可以看到張載批判佛學的重心，乃在於天道性命之實有性。“天命”於儒家而言，乃為貫通宇宙實然與形上價值的最高的根源，由於“命”字同時兼具命令與限定義，因此“天命”同時兼具超越性與內在性，一方面“天命”決定萬有之運行，在其之上非有他物所能改變，另一方面，“天命”亦呈顯於萬有的殊多儀態，此一力量於儒家哲學而言，乃為實有，如以虛空言，便是否定了人物內在價值的基礎。

順此，張載進而指出佛學不明人認識能力的侷限性，所謂‘範圍天用’，據清代學者王夫之注：“天用者，升降之恆，屈伸之化，皆太虛一實之理氣成乎大用也。天無體，用即其體。範圍者，大心以廣運之，則天之用顯而天體可知矣。”³“天用”是就太虛氣化而言，說明森羅萬象皆為一氣升降屈伸所化；“範圍”則是以“心”的認識能力而言，指出人的認識作用乃因道體之顯用而起，所謂“大心以廣運之”，可與張載的另一觀點相呼應：“今言盡物且未說到窮理，但恐以聞見為心則不足以盡心。人本無心，因物為心，若只以聞見為心，但恐小卻心。”⁴這段引文的重心，即在於闡述人的認識能力不限於感官聞見的層

2 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·大心〉，頁26。

3 王夫之，《張子正蒙注》，頁111。

4 張載，《張載集》，〈張子語錄·語錄下〉，頁333。

次，若能超越感官的限制，便能掌握萬物的原因原理，進一步達到“天體可知”，但若執於感官經驗，便會面臨到：“今盈天地間者皆物也，如只據己之聞見，所接幾何，安能盡之？”⁵的問題，愚見以為，這段話或許可用來解釋上述引文中，張載對佛學“六根之微”的批判，及某些滯留於“耳目心知”的儒生，認為若僅以微小的耳目心知之見，便欲以說明萬物之體性為虛空，則會有所偏失。⁶

張載既以“天命”之實有性反駁佛學性空之說，則勢必要回答何謂“天命”，以及天命與萬物之間的聯繫，此二者便是“太虛即氣”的問題意識，順此，“太虛即氣”的整體內容包含兩種面向：

1、整體存在界的實有不虛

在對於萬有起源的思考上，張載提出“太和”、“氣”與“太虛”。“太和”是從總持萬有之全的整體性而言，參見其言：“太和所謂道，中涵浮沉、升降、動靜，相感之性，是生絪縕、相盪、勝負、屈伸之始。”⁷由此可知，“太和”是統一諸多對反特性的最高原因原理，此一原理亦是“道”，然此道非靜態的道理，乃是包含浮沉、升降、與動靜相感的過程，故學者牟宗三將“太和”釋為“至和”，⁸即是在肯定不同個別存有與其實存活動的前提下，所呈顯出的一種和諧與秩序。

然“太和”僅是一種抽象性徵，⁹若要進一步深入探討其內容，則又可分為“氣”與“太虛”，這兩個概念實為創生道體的不同面向，如以下提到：“太虛無形，氣之本體，其聚其散，變化之客形爾。”¹⁰“氣”意味道體與萬物實有性之所在，參見其言：“氣聚則離明得施而有形，氣不聚則離明不得施而無形。”¹¹此處張載以氣之聚不聚，貫通萬物之有形與無形，於人而言，世間萬物萬象，有可見與不可見、形與無形之分，然皆為一氣之所化，因此萬物的根本乃為實有；作為構成萬物所需的必然要素，氣的存在狀態包含“蒸鬱凝聚，接於目而後知

⁵ 張載，《張載集》，〈張子語錄·語錄下〉，頁333。

⁶ 當然，從佛學的立場來看，張載的批判可能有所失當，因為佛學是以萬有無自性的角度，說明天地萬物皆屬緣起法，故謂其如幻如化、生滅無常，人若執其為實有，則為妄見，唯有消去此執，方為真見，在此一層面上，可以說佛學以有為幻妄，以空為萬物之本；但是張載是從儒家天道性命的實有性切入，因此二者看待世間的觀點自會有所不同，以此觀之，張載言：“釋氏妄意天性而不知範圍天用，反以六根之微因緣天地。”此是重在於從存有論批判佛學以空為主的思路。然這並非本文的探討宗旨，故暫且先不論。

⁷ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·太和〉，頁7。

⁸ 牟宗三，《心體與性體》第一冊，頁437。

⁹ “抽象性徵”一詞是引用學者杜保瑞的觀點，他曾提到：“由於張載是就整個存在界的全體來講道體的運動變化原理的，因此‘太和’就是道體的抽象性徵。”抽象性徵即是透過人的理性思辨活動，對於道體進行概念意義上的描寫。學者杜保瑞指出關於道體自身所具有的特徵，其討論可以分成兩種不同的型態進路，其一便是從宇宙存在的始源狀態切入討論，此一問題討論涉及創生道體的“存在特徵”；其二便是就萬有的生滅變化之現象，作一意義的解說，藉此掌握萬象背後的原因原理，由於此一原因原理是透過人的理性思辨與抽象作用而得到的，故以“抽象”稱之。杜保瑞，《北宋哲學》，頁51-52。

¹⁰ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·太和〉，頁7。

¹¹ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·太和〉，頁8。

之”以及“健、順、動、止、浩然、湛然之得”，故氣的存在方式不限於已形之物，也包括無形象的運動變化，其變化徵兆能夠被體察到，因此張載提到：“凡可狀，皆有也；凡有，皆象也；凡象，皆氣也。”¹² 說明有形之物與無形之跡象，皆屬“氣化”的範圍。“太虛”則為“氣”的存在性徵，用以說明氣的根本狀態乃為無形，透過其聚散，形成了森羅萬象，然萬物本為有限，無法恆存，故曰“客形”，順此，張載進而提到：“太虛不能無氣，氣不能不聚而為萬物，萬物不能不散而為太虛。”¹³ 說明萬物之生滅流轉，皆處於“太虛-氣化-太虛”的架構之中。

2、“神”與“性”——貫通道體與萬有的兩個面向

在奠定以氣貫通萬物有無的前提下，張載進而以“神”與“性”為基礎，說明太虛之氣與萬物的內在聯繫。“神”一字，就“神”而言，張載對此一概念討論甚多，於〈太和〉便出現八次，〈神化〉更是對此進行詳細論述，其主要用意在於述說創生道體的實有作用與特性，如以下提到：“清通而不可象為神”，¹⁴ 即用來說明“神”之特性乃為通暢無礙，其作用妙而莫測，無法被人所掌握與限定，故曰：“不可象”，順此，張載提到：“太虛為清，清則無礙，無礙故神”¹⁵、“凡氣清則通，昏則壅，清極則神。”¹⁶ 此處可以看到張載為“神”、“太虛”與“氣”建立一內在聯繫。所謂“極”，按《說文》云，為：“棟也”，意指最高處，作名詞用，可解釋為一物之內在限定或本性，作動詞用可解釋為窮究；結合二點，說明“神”是就清虛之氣深妙而不可測的作用而言。¹⁷

然而，此一清虛之氣在凝聚生成萬物之後，所呈顯的乃為：“反清為濁，濁則礙，礙則形。”¹⁸ ‘反’說明了當太虛之氣凝聚形成萬物之後，由原先無形的‘清而無礙’，進入了有形的‘濁而有礙’，呈顯出一種完美程度的相對性。張載曾提到：“凡天地法象，皆神化之糟粕爾”¹⁹、“萬物形色，神之糟粕”²⁰ ‘糟粕’一詞指出在具體的作用上，相較於太虛之氣的清通神妙而言，是有限且受礙，故為不完美。

‘神’雖指出萬物皆為太虛之氣神化妙用而產生的‘糟粕’，然透過‘性’則得以使萬有與道體之間相互貫通，何謂‘性’？參見其言：“由太虛，有天之名，由氣化，有道之名，合虛與氣，有性之名。”²¹ 這句話呈顯出層層遞進的動態

¹² 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·乾稱〉，頁63。

¹³ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·太和〉，頁7。

¹⁴ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·太和〉，頁7。

¹⁵ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·太和〉，頁9。

¹⁶ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·太和〉，頁9。

¹⁷ 張載針對“虛”、“氣”、“神”三者所建立的聯繫，亦可見於〈正蒙·誠明〉，參見其言：“氣之性本虛而神”此處提到的“本”說明“虛”與“神”乃為“氣”所固有，故能達到：“聚散，攻取百途”的境界。

¹⁸ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·太和〉，頁9。

¹⁹ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·太和〉，頁9。

²⁰ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·太和〉，頁10。

過程,“太虛有天之名”即是將太虛之氣與天作一聯繫,從此一角度而言,天乃為萬物未形、渾然一氣的狀態;“氣化有道之名”說明太虛之氣凝聚而成萬物的過程;結合這兩點,方為“性”的內容,即是萬物透過最高道體的分受,而各有其本性,其發展乃皆源自於道體在其具體生命中的落實與呈顯,因此張載道:“性通乎氣之外,命行乎氣之內。”²²“性”乃為道體與萬物的貫通,於個體的實有活動上,則為重氣外的工夫,“命”則為重氣內的工夫,兩者相互配合,方構成張載的氣本體論證。然萬物作為“糟粕”的定位並未改變,依此,張載進而指出“性”於道體與萬物,有兩種不同的體現,就太虛之氣而言,其性之呈顯為“湛一至靜”的天地之性,在此一方面,萬物皆同,如以下提到:“天性在人,正由水性之在冰,凝釋雖異,為物一也”,²³然在氣化萬物的具體過程中,則各有所異,參見其言:“遊氣紛擾,合而成質者,生人物之萬殊”,²⁴“合而成質”者便為氣質之性,如以下提到:“形而後有氣質之性”,²⁵這裡說明在萬物成形之後,便有其不同的屬性,因此便有通閉、開塞、剛柔、緩速與清濁之不同,此乃萬有之殊態。

學者朱建民曾簡述張載的天道論特色,乃為“神化之體用不二”,²⁶此語甚為精要簡明,然而,在對佛學進行批判時,張載最常使用的卻是“太虛”,“太虛”一詞,於儒家思想脈絡中,甚少出現,然張載使用此一詞彙,重在於以“虛”對治佛老之“空”與“無”,故當他提出:“太虛無形,氣之本體”²⁷、“知虛空即氣,則有無,隱顯,神化,性命通一無二”²⁸等論點時,其大意便是強調萬物的有無與隱顯,實為一氣所化,因此萬有之本並非如佛學所言之性空,而為實有,此一實有保證萬物存在的基礎,萬物雖有生死朽壞,但其存在皆立基於道體與萬有之內在聯繫,故二者雖有清通濁礙之別,卻不妨礙二者相互融通的關係。

二、王廷相對張載“太虛即氣”的承繼與詮解

張載的“太虛即氣”雖保有存在界的真實不虛,然也啟發學者的省思,即是“太虛”與“氣”的關係之界定,是否應將二者視為等同,亦或是相即不離的體用關係?此一問題成為對於後期哲學發展的討論焦點之一,進而產生兩種不同的詮解立場。

²¹ 張載,《張載集》,〈正蒙·太和〉,頁9。

²² 張載,《張載集》,〈正蒙·誠明〉,頁21。

²³ 張載,《張載集》,〈正蒙·誠明〉,頁22。

²⁴ 張載,《張載集》,〈正蒙·太和〉,頁9。

²⁵ 張載,《張載集》,〈正蒙·誠明〉,頁23。

²⁶ 朱建民,《張載思想研究》,頁75。

²⁷ 張載,《張載集》,〈正蒙·太和〉,頁7。

²⁸ 張載,《張載集》,〈正蒙·太和〉,頁8。

對於張載的“太虛即氣”說，二程曾提出質疑：“立清虛一大爲萬物之源，恐未安，須兼清濁虛實乃可言神。”²⁹、“形而上者謂之道，形而下者謂之器。”若如或者以清虛一大爲天道，則乃以器言而非道也。”³⁰ 其核心在於若將“太虛即氣”釋爲“太虛是氣”，則可能會造成以偏概全，僅說“器”卻忽視“道”的問題。朱熹則進一步指出“太虛即氣”只是說明萬物之生成變化與相對性的由來，卻無法說明道體所稟有的無限意蘊與萬有之內在價值，因此他針對張載的“太虛”做了以下的界定：“問：橫渠云：‘太虛即氣，太虛何所指？’曰：‘他亦指理，說的不分曉。’”³¹ 朱熹於引文中，直指“太虛”爲“理”，此一觀點承自二程之說，如以下提到：“先生曰：‘亦無太虛。’遂指虛曰：‘皆是理，安得謂之虛？天下無實於理者。’”³² 在〈正蒙·太和〉中，“理”的提出是用來做爲保證氣化流行的順而不妄，如以下提到：“天地之氣，雖聚散、攻取百途，然其爲理也順而不妄”³³ 這句話說明氣化之用變化難測，然其聚其散皆有其理，此“理”並非太虛道體，而是內在於氣化作用的必然理序與規律；不過到了朱熹，“理”乃保障萬物真實無妄與奠定氣化流行的恆常依據，因此“理”不僅內在於氣化流行之中，亦必須超越於氣化流行之上。

不過到了王廷相，程朱的理氣之說有了方向性的轉變，程朱重理氣的體用之別，王廷相則是主張“太虛是氣”，認爲二者乃爲同實異名，順此，王廷相對於“太虛即氣”的承繼與詮解有三：

1、物虛實皆氣

王廷相在以下提到：“天內外皆氣，地中亦氣，物虛實皆氣，通極上下造化之實體也。”³⁴；“兩儀未判，太虛固氣也。天地既生，中虛亦氣也。”³⁵ 這兩段引文可以看出王廷相著重於元氣的實有性，“兩儀未判”即是天地未分之狀，然而此一狀態並非無物或絕對的虛無，其自身便是混沌未分的清虛之氣，在萬物已形之後，元氣亦充滿於天地中間廣漠的虛空之中，因此王廷相以“實體”稱之，“實體”重在於說明道體與萬有的客觀實存性，所謂“物虛實皆氣”，便是王氏對張載：“虛空即氣”的理解，文中提到的“皆”與“即”，其意蘊相同，“虛實”之義則爲有形與無形，此處王廷相指出氣作爲實有，瀰漫充塞於虛空，這種實有不單限於既形之物，同時亦包括元氣未形的狀態，由於元氣未形，人無法以感官辨別稀微不形的氣，因此王廷相又稱其狀態爲：“太虛”或“太極”，如以下提到：“（元氣）不可以爲象，故曰太虛”³⁶、“先於天者，太虛之氣

²⁹ 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，〈河南程氏遺書卷二上·二先生語二上〉，頁21。

³⁰ 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，〈河南程氏遺書卷十一·明道先生語一〉，頁118。

³¹ 朱熹，《朱子語類》卷九十九，〈張子之書二〉，頁2534。

³² 程顥、程頤，《二程集》，〈河南程氏遺書卷三·二先生語三〉，頁66。

³³ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·太和〉，頁7。

³⁴ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·道體〉，頁753。

³⁵ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·乾運〉，頁758。

爾。無形也，無象與數也，故曰太極。”³⁷、“（元氣）不可以象名狀，故曰太虛”³⁸形、象、數三者的意義皆是從已形或是人可以認知的狀態述說之，從此一角度而言，元氣未形，故不可以“象”言，謂之“太虛”，作為萬物存在之首要原因，故謂之“太極”，因此他進而提到：“虛者氣之本，故虛空即氣。質者氣之成，故天地萬物有生。”³⁹此處直指太虛為氣之無形的本然狀態，天地萬物是氣聚而有形的狀態，有形便固然有象可言，因此很顯然，王廷相是從具體生成的角度，對“元氣”、“太虛”、“太極”與“萬物”的關係作一內在聯繫。

2、理為氣之理，元氣之上無物

王廷相論理氣，最明確的看法即是“元氣之上無道無理”，強調世間萬物皆由一氣所成，在其之上，無其他更高原因或實體，因此他提到：“元氣之上無物，不可知其所自，故曰太極，不可以象名狀，故曰太虛耳。”⁴⁰這段話乃針對朱熹與南宋儒者：“獨以理言太極而惡涉於氣。”⁴¹的觀點而提出；朱熹以“理”解“太極”，其重在於為氣化流行方向尋求一貞定的形上基礎，然王廷相則是以動靜述說理不可能為太極，並獨立於陰陽之外，⁴²如此一來，理僅是氣之運行條理，如他提到：“氣載乎理，理出於氣，一貫而不可離絕言之者也。故有元氣，即有元道。”⁴³從這裡可以看出程朱的理或道，其意義在王廷相思想中的轉變，依朱熹觀點，理為形上本體，對於二氣五行有引導作用，故為太極，然就王廷相言之，氣是萬化之根本，理便是氣化的條理，其所以會產生如此的轉變，乃在於王廷相是從生化的角度看待道體，從此一角度言之，若僅論理，則只是虛而無著，因為論氣之生成，關涉於動靜，動靜為氣之固有能力，因此按其理路，便會得出：“未判則理存於太虛。既判，則理載於天地。”⁴⁴之觀點，在萬物生成的序列上，王廷相指出氣先於理，天地未判，則理存在於未分的元氣之中，天地既分，理仍內存於天地運行之中。

36 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·道體〉，頁751。

37 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈雅述上〉，頁845。

38 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈雅述上〉，頁849。

39 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·五行〉，頁808。

40 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈雅述上〉，頁849。

41 王廷相，《王氏家藏集》卷三十三，〈太極辯〉，頁596。

42 參見其言：“如曰：‘未有天地，畢竟是有此理’，如曰：‘源頭只有此理，立乎二氣五行萬物之先’，如曰：‘當時元無一物，只有此理，便會動靜生陰陽’……嗟乎！支離顛倒，豈其然耶？”，王廷相，《王氏家藏集》卷三十三，〈太極辯〉，頁596。

43 王廷相，《王氏家藏集》卷三十三，〈太極辯〉，頁596。

44 王廷相，《王氏家藏集》卷三十三，〈太極辯〉，頁596。

3、性氣一貫，性生於氣

王廷相提到：“大抵性生於氣，離而二之，必不可得。”⁴⁵ 這句話是針對朱熹所言，他引用朱熹與蔡季通的對話，提到：“朱子答蔡季通云：‘人之有生，性與氣合而已。即其已合而析言之，則性主於理而無形，氣主於氣而有質。’即此數言，見先生論性劈頭就差。”⁴⁶ 在此處對話中，朱熹是用構成論解釋性理與氣的關係，文中提到：“性與氣合”說明具體人性的組成因素乃為性之理與形體之氣，二者在實物中雖渾然為一，但是卻有其形上與形下的區分。王廷相的“性生於氣”不單是取消二者的區別，更重要的是他從造化論的背景基礎，指出氣為性之根源，參見其言：“余以為人物之性無非氣質之所為者，離氣言性，則性無處所，與虛同歸”⁴⁷ 這裡王廷相以為，人物之性的產生，來自於氣化流行的過程，他曾提到：“人具形氣而後性出焉”，⁴⁸ 形氣是指元氣凝結為具體個別之物以後，仍在其中流行的氣，二者是同質，元氣既凝為萬物，故萬物之性自是由氣而來，所以王廷相提到：“人物之性無非氣質之所為者”是直接以現實具體的人物之性為性，再者王廷相以“生”來說明二者的關係，自然比體用關係更為緊密，若離氣言性，便等同是將其生生造化的因果關係切斷，那麼性自成虛無飄渺之物，與虛無同實。

順此，王廷相進而提到：“性者，陰陽之神理，生於形氣而妙乎形氣者。”⁴⁹ “陰陽之神理”所指的是氣化神妙之理，王廷相在論陰陽時，曾總結道：“凡有形體以至氤氲蔥蒼之氣可象者，皆陰也；所以變化，運動，升降，飛揚之不可見者，皆陽也。”⁵⁰ 陰為氣的凝結作用，落實在已出之物上，為實然之物的具體狀態；陽為氣化運動之主要原因，為一切實然之物發展與延續的動態勢能，兩者結合便為“性”的具體內容，因為“性”本身是源於陰陽之氣而產生，故不可能獨立於形氣之上，其作用惟有在形氣之中方能發揮，因此曰其為：“生於形氣而妙乎形氣”，順此，王廷相提到：“存乎體者，氣之機也。故息不已焉。存乎氣者，神之用也，故性有靈焉。”⁵¹ “存乎體者，氣之機也。故息不已焉。”說明萬有形氣之活動乃源乎於元氣生生不息之機，“機”可用於指稱事物發生的樞紐、變化之所由，此機在元氣之中，即為“神”，⁵² 在個別事物之中，則為“性”，此“性”須在形氣之中方能發揮應有的機能，其形體機能的整體運作，便是性的具體內容，性由氣而生，在氣之內，因其陽的生生之用與陰的凝結之用，因此在氣化生萬物之後，其性稟有

⁴⁵ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈雅述下〉，頁875。

⁴⁶ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈雅述上〉，頁851。

⁴⁷ 王廷相，《王氏家藏集》卷二十八，〈答薛君采論性書〉，頁518。

⁴⁸ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈雅述上〉，頁851。

⁴⁹ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·問成性〉，頁767。

⁵⁰ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·道〉，頁752。

⁵¹ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·問成性〉，頁766。

⁵² 參見其文：“元氣之上無物，有元氣即有元神，有元神即能運行而為陰陽，有陰陽則天地萬物之性理備矣，非元氣之外又有物以主宰之。”王廷相，《王氏家藏集》卷二十八，〈答薛君采論性書〉，頁517。

陰陽造化之用，形體之陰與無形之陽聯繫在一起，二者缺其一，則不能體現其靈妙之神用，故後文曰：“體壞則機息，機息則氣滅，氣滅則神返。”⁵³

基於上述，王廷相對於張載“太虛即氣”的詮解，主旨有二，其一是藉由張載之說，強調萬有之本源乃為元氣，在元氣之上，無有它物，該道體之發用則為氣化流行，以生化萬有，在基於“元氣之上，無道無理”的前提下，“理”只是氣化流行之中，順而無妄的秩序性，而非貞定其流行方向的形上本體，順此進而強調萬有之性，僅有氣質之性，若持朱熹理體氣用的觀點，落實於人性上，易導致性二分為天地義理與氣質的困境。⁵⁴王氏之說，未必公允，然而礙其篇幅，則必須另立專文處理。

三、王廷相與張載思想之異同

雖然王廷相與張載皆以一氣作為貫通萬物有無的根源，在氣化之外，並無其他具有超越性的形上本體。然而，問題在於：張載是否與王廷相屬於同一類型的自然氣論者？⁵⁵對此，當代學者有不同的看法，就總體而言，可以分為“相同”與“相異”之說，然而就“相同”的角度而言，則必須要針對張、王二氏所提出的“氣”之意涵進行省思，以說明二者的異同，順此，可將其分析與探討角度，區分為以下三種切入點：

⁵³ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·問成性〉，頁766。

⁵⁴ 朱熹的人性論與理氣論是相互推演與貫通的關係，在朱熹之說，理與氣在實然層面雖無有分別，然從邏輯的角度而言，二者有形上與形下、體與用之別，“體”為形而上，是決定事物運行的內在原因原理，“用”為形而下，是形上之理體的顯現，“體”對於“用”有決定性的影響，在此一前提下，天地氣化之象乃為理之發用，其定位不能超越其恆常本體，因此學者陳來曾對此簡述道：“在中國哲學中，體是第一性的，用是第二性的。”按照此一分別，便有朱熹天地、氣質之性的架構產生，然而愚見以為王廷相的質疑實則上並非無有道理，因為朱熹之說所採取的珠寶之喻，隱藏著理氣分割的內在矛盾，寶珠與濁水是兩種不同的客體，以此為喻，則容易產生性理與氣二者相對的誤解，如同朱熹曾以人馬比喻理氣關係般，從實體化的角度理解，很容易會將性理視為脫離於具體器物的存在，此一質疑不單是王廷相，在薛瑄等明初學者的相關論述中，皆有提出。

⁵⁵ “自然氣論”一詞是引用學者劉又銘依照氣本論於宋明以來的發展提出所提出的兩類三型之說，其一是神聖氣本論：將元氣視為一種價值滿盈的神聖本體，由於元氣作為本源，具有其神聖性，因此透過生化流行而分受得來的本心本性，便具有神聖圓滿、不假外求的本然美善，以王夫之、劉戡山、黃宗羲為代表，當然，“神聖氣本論”的提出，其用意在於與“自然氣本論”作一區分，但是在之前並未有人會用“神聖”一詞去稱呼理本論或心本論，因此劉氏的區分是否恰當仍有待商榷；其二是自然氣本論，相比神聖氣本論而言，則較為單純簡樸，以羅欽順、王廷相、戴震、焦循等人為代表，該基本論點強調一氣流行的宇宙論，然而在氣化流行的過程中，該氣運行的理則或軌跡便包含著一種必然性，落實在形下世界或個體之物上，便成為萬物遵循的準則。劉又銘，〈宋明清氣本論研究的若干問題〉，頁205-206。

1、從唯物論強調萬有構成的客觀性基礎之角度而言，二者所言之氣乃為通同

唯物論的學說特色，在於將整體實在界歸結於物質與從屬於物質而有的力量，美國學者Peter K. McInerney曾對唯物論作一清楚明確的解釋：“唯物論主張惟有物質與物質屬性存在，不存在非物質的實體，也沒有非物質的屬性。”⁵⁶ 唯物論的“物質”概念，基本上涉及到萬有的具體性、客觀性與實在性，從此一角度來看，“氣”實與唯物論有所交集，此一交集乃是就二者皆作為萬物構成的質料義與實有義而言，因此有些學者特別從唯物論的角度，說明張、王所言之氣乃為通同，因為就宇宙實然的層面上來看，二氏皆主張殊別萬象為一氣所化，在氣化之外，並無其他具有超越性的形上本體，⁵⁷ 順此，在理氣關係的討論上，便會得出氣為第一序的存有。

然而此處需要注意的是，從唯物論的角度出發，或許可以為氣論提供新的詮釋空間，然這並不意味著單純從唯物論的角度，去評判張、王的氣論思想，是恰當的，因為唯物論的“物質”概念是處於被動的狀態，這種被動來自於事物自身的慣性，所以每一物本身既不能主動進行運動，亦不能主動地對他物產生影響或作用。相較之下，中國的“氣”雖具有物質性，但卻又不是全然的物質，作為創生道體，“氣”具有主動性與活潑性，這種主動性與活潑性一方面源自於氣與其他範疇的聯繫與結合，如“精”與“神”可以說明氣化之神妙不測，以及氣本身所具有的超化能力，此外，其他天道範疇如道、理、太極與陰陽五行，在某些程度上，也豐富了氣範疇的內涵，所以唯物論最多只能說明氣具有物質性的面向，但卻不能說明氣的動態性與理則性。此一特性不限於張、王二氏所有，而是屬於中國哲學所具有的內涵與特色。

2、從本體論的角度而言，二者所言之氣不同

吾人皆能同意，從宇宙的實然層面而言，張、王二氏提出的氣化論，為萬有的具體性與實在性提供了基礎，然若進一步從本體論的角度而言，則學者們對於二者的氣論，有不同的觀點，造成這種觀點與詮釋方向不同的原因，仍在於對張載“太虛即氣”的解讀；“太虛即氣”基本上可以有兩種解釋：

(1) 太虛是氣：認為太虛與氣是全然同質，為氣之本然狀態，如學者馮友蘭論道：“張載引這些話，是用以說明氣是一種極細微的物質……極細微的物質，散而不可見，好像是虛無，可以稱之為‘太虛’。其實‘太虛’並不是虛

⁵⁶ Peter K. McInerney, 《哲學概論》，林逢祺譯，頁116。

⁵⁷ 如學者張岱年對張載“太虛即氣”的解讀，便是從唯物論的角度而言，例如他提到：“張載的唯物主義的特點之一就在於論證了虛與氣的統一。他認為，虛也是氣，虛與氣是同一實在的不同狀況。”，“太虛、氣、萬物，乃是同一實體的不同狀態”對於張岱年而言，“本體”的解釋乃為“本來的實體”，以此為前提，太虛是氣本身無形無狀的狀態，而氣之聚散則為客形、倏忽不定，二者並無質上的差異。張岱年，《張岱年文集》，頁12、139。

無，而是‘氣之本體’。”⁵⁸在此他指出氣是一種細微物質，太虛即是這種細微物質散而不見其形跡的狀態。順此，就王廷相的立場來看，他對於張載“太虛即氣”的解讀亦若如是，將“太虛”與“氣”視為同一實體的不同狀態，其重心有二：一以氣為本源，二則肯定氣本與氣化的內在聯繫，如王廷相提到：“氣者，造化之本。有渾渾者，有生生者，皆道之體也。生則有滅。故有始有終。渾然者充塞宇宙，無跡無軌，不見其始，安知其終？”⁵⁹氣是生化的道體，亦是萬物變化的原因，未生時乃為渾然未分，在氣化生成時仍與萬物合一，從其過程而言，被生之萬物因其有限性，故有生滅與始終，萬物之發展歷程，最終仍要歸於太虛之氣，而這太虛之氣充塞於宇宙之間、無始亦無終。

(2) 太虛與氣相即不離：強調太虛與氣為體用關係，持此一論證者為學者牟宗三，以張載“散殊而可象為氣，清通而不可象為神”為出發點，說明太虛與氣有所不同，參見其文：“此第二段提出‘太虛’一詞是由‘清通而不可象為神’而說者。吾人可以從‘清通而不可象為神’來規定‘太虛’。”⁶⁰對牟氏而言，“氣”、“神”不離，但二者有所分，“氣”有象跡，散殊有異可呈顯為象；“神”無象跡、純一至和，不可形隔，故曰其為“清通而不可象”。⁶¹順此，牟氏進而指出“即”包含二義，一是不等，二是不離，說明太虛之神不同於氣，然二者圓融，通一無二，其清妙神用呈顯在氣化作用上能通而不滯，使氣之聚散動靜得以貫通。⁶²故從體用關係而言，太虛不能離氣，這便是圓融義，然卻不能說太虛與氣等同，因二者有層級之別。

學者牟宗三雖未將張載與王廷相擺在一起討論，但是觀其立場，則可知他對“太虛即氣”的解讀，不同於王廷相，反之，較為接近朱熹的理氣說，何以會有如此的差異？乃在於張載的“太虛即氣”隱含有超越的面向，特別呈顯於張載“天地-氣質之性”的理論架構，“天地之性”是用以說明萬有的共通性，指出天地間一切的存在，皆是從太虛之氣從清通而無礙的狀態，透過氣化凝聚生成諸多有形窒礙的萬有之自我轉化歷程，“湛一，氣之本”⁶³乃是“氣之性本虛而神”的另一說明，指太虛之氣清通深邃而不可測，具有神化萬物的奧妙之性，然此一本性是在氣尚未凝聚化物之先所有，在生成萬有的過程中，太虛之氣尚未能完全體現此一本性，故有所偏，因此張載提到：“氣有剛柔、緩速、清濁之氣也。質，才也。氣質是一物。”⁶⁴這種有所偏構成了萬物殊別之諸多情態，其所呈顯的殊多性便是相對於太虛之氣“湛一虛神”的“氣質之性”。

⁵⁸ 馮友蘭，《中國哲學史新編》下冊，頁143-144。

⁵⁹ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·道體〉，頁755。

⁶⁰ 牟宗三，《心體與性體》，頁443。

⁶¹ 牟宗三，《心體與性體》，頁442。

⁶² 牟宗三，《心體與性體》，頁459。

⁶³ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·誠明〉，頁21。

⁶⁴ 張載，《張載集》，〈經學理窟·學大原上〉，頁281。

從存有論的層面上,“天地-氣質之性”的提出,說明太虛之氣的湛一本然之性在透過氣化落實於萬有之中,因受到形體之限制,呈顯出不同的樣貌,然萬物在秉性上雖有所限,卻不會影響其道體本源的存在與完善,因此張載於以下提到:“天所性者通極於道,氣之昏明不足以蔽之,天所命者通極於性,遇之吉凶不足以伐之。”⁶⁵說明萬物的本性實現雖會因形體的受限有所影響,但其存在不會因為所稟氣質昏明被遮蔽,亦不因爲具體生命歷程的遭遇不同有所改變,因此“天地之性”的提出,說明萬有之存在價值皆本然地爲善。

然而到了王廷相,基於他“性氣一元”的觀點,“天地之性”的向度被取消了,而僅肯定氣質之性,如此一來,“性”於萬有之中的體現則有人物美惡、靈明不齊的現象,爲了說明這一點,王廷相首先以天之氣爲例,參見其文:“天之氣有善有惡,觀四時風雨、霾霧、霜雹之會,與夫寒暑、毒厲、瘴疫之偏,可睹矣。”⁶⁶“天之氣”是從一個具體物質之天的角度切入,王廷相在論造化順序時,曾提到:“太虛氣化之先物也,地不得而並焉。天體成,則氣化屬之天矣。”⁶⁷相較於其他萬物而言,天不僅是最先形成,同時亦是最爲接近元氣未分的狀態,但王廷相透過天之四時運行所產生的種種自然現象,說明天稟氣之有所偏,順此提到:“況人之生,本於父母之精血軀,與天地之氣又隔一層。”⁶⁸明顯指出萬物之間存在著一種存有完善性的層級,這種存有階級,是從一個皆同爲氣化存有的角度,說明天、人與萬物稟氣皆有所偏。

何以會產生這種有所偏?乃在於陰陽氣化有偏勝之分,參見其文:“陰陽之合,有賓主偏勝之義,偏勝者恆主之。”⁶⁹“偏”、“勝”二字合之,可引伸爲側重之意,所以進而有主賓之分,順此王廷相提到:“氣不可爲天地之中,人可爲天地之中。以人受二氣之沖和也,與萬物殊矣。性不可爲人之中,善可爲人之中。氣有偏駁,而善則性之中和者也。”⁷⁰關於“天地之中”,王廷相的解釋乃爲:“天地之化,人物之性,中焉而已。過陰過陽則不和而育成;過柔過剛則不和而成道。故化之太和者,天地之中也。”⁷¹由此觀之,“天地之中”是對比於“過陰過陽”而言的,所指應爲陰陽中和之狀態,是天地運行所呈現出的一種和諧,然而王廷相卻言:“氣不可爲天地之中”,其理由在於氣化本身存在著過陰過陽的現象,由於氣本身是無自我意識的實體,故在已然之物上,自然會有偏勝不均,故單就氣而言,則不能直接以其爲天地之中,而是以人爲天地之中,因相較於萬有而言,惟有人是巧妙結合陽之動力與陰之形體而成的特殊存在。

65 張載,《張載集》,〈正蒙·誠明〉,頁21。

66 王廷相,《王廷相集》,〈雅述上〉,頁840。

67 王廷相,《王廷相集》,〈慎言·道體〉,頁752。

68 王廷相,《王廷相集》,〈雅述上〉,頁840。

69 王廷相,《王廷相集》,〈慎言·乾運〉,頁756。

70 王廷相,《王廷相集》,〈慎言·問成性〉,頁768。

71 王廷相,《王廷相集》,〈慎言·問成性〉,頁768。

然而在人之中，因為所稟之氣有所偏駁，所以其性亦不可為人之中，而是以“善”為主，“善”統攝了萬物與人，所指為何？王廷相在上述中提到：“善則性之中和者也”性由陰陽之中和而成，因此不難判定此“善”是就氣之中和的角度而言，然根據“氣不可為天地之中”的論點來看，氣之中和並非一開始就完整存在，乃是須要透過後天的運行推移，方可達致中和之善，故曰：“化之太和者。”，至於性由氣而來，固然亦承繼此一發展的內在潛能，既然氣是變動的，性亦是變動的，如此一來便與張載的“天地之性”所蘊含的超越向度，以及程朱“性即理”的界定不同。

3、從工夫論修持目標的角度而言，二者所言之氣相異

張載“天地-氣質之性”的理論架構，從存有的面向，說明萬有的共通性；從人作為道德主體的面向出發，則是將其存在與價值的根本，推源於天地之性，張載提到：“形而後有氣質之性，善反之則天地之性存焉。故氣質之性，君子有弗性者焉。”⁷²“形而後有氣質之性”是太虛之氣的自我轉化而成，反映在人身上為：“口腹於飲食，鼻舌於臭味，皆攻取之性也。”⁷³然張載認為在其之上，有一更高層面的價值根源，此一根源的實現，乃在於“反”，順此張載指出：“性於人無不善，繫其善反不善反而已。”⁷⁴此處所指天地之性既為本性實現，亦為價值根源之所在，故性無不善也，若能盡性，則能體現出天地之性的本然樣貌，因此張載提到：“德不勝氣，性命於氣；德勝其氣，性命於德。窮理盡性，則性天德，命天理，氣之不可變者，獨死生修天而已。”⁷⁵德·氣之對舉，乃為內在生命與形軀生命的對應，於張載而言，人的生命境界並不限於對形軀生命的追求，而是能在一形體生命的實然層面中，透過“反”的工夫，將生命之應然體現於世。

然而到了王廷相，天地之性既被否定，則人為學目的不是反歸，而是維持並發揚現有之善，順此王廷相提出兩項方法：

(1) 名教的確立，參見其言：“性者緣乎生者也，道者緣乎性者也，教者緣乎道者也。”⁷⁶此處王廷相將“性”、“道”、“教”三者以“緣”聯繫在一起，“性者緣乎生者也”表示性的呈顯乃從生命的整體性而言；“道者緣乎性者也”透過對於這些規律的觀察、研究與體會，再將此傳授給他人。藉此，王廷相進而提到：“聖人緣生民而為治，修其性之善者以立教，名教立而善惡準焉。”指出名教的定立，是透過對人性的窮極探究與修治而來，由於人之性情乃為：“各任其情以為愛憎，由之相伐相賊胥此以出”，⁷⁷因此王廷相認為必須：“取其性之可以相生、

⁷² 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·誠明〉，頁23。

⁷³ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·誠明〉，頁22。

⁷⁴ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·誠明〉，頁22。

⁷⁵ 張載，《張載集》，〈正蒙·誠明〉，頁23。

⁷⁶ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·問成性〉，頁765。

⁷⁷ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·問成性〉，頁765。

相安、相久而有益於治者，以教後世，而仁義禮智定焉。”⁷⁸ 以達到：“使善者有所持循而入，不善者有所懲戒而變。”⁷⁹

(2) 性成於習：名教的成立是外在的表現，欲達到人性的教化，則需透過“習”，“習”據《說文》云，為：“數飛也。從羽從白。凡習之屬皆從習。”可引申為習慣的積累與養成，習慣的積累，深受後天環境的諸多影響因素所造成。結合這兩種解釋，王廷相的“性成於習”，其重心是在說明人能否透過後天的教化，順應其人性中可為善的一面，進而努力成就人之為人的美善與特質，因此他提到：“性與道合則為善，性與道乖則為惡。”⁸⁰ 說明善惡的判別在於是否合乎道之標準。

透過以上三個觀點，以比較張、王二氏的思路，其實有所相通，此一相通處有兩點：其一在於二者在界定萬有的實然性之上，皆以一氣化生為基礎；其二則是指出“性”並非是脫離其具體之生的懸置者，必須是就現實具體的層面而言，故不得離氣言性，氣是構成具體事物的重要因素，其自身便具有生生之理，故性之實現也必須是在個體的生命歷程中。

因為二者皆從個體實存的角度論性，故必然會與氣質結合在一起，然而氣質有清濁粹駁之異，人性故不可能全然純善。但是從其內在思路而言，則雙方仍有所不同，其原因在於張載的“太虛即氣”所蘊含的超越向度，使人即便在存有自身完美度有限的前提下，仍具有復性的可能，這便是“天地-氣質之性”提出的根本原因，該思想不單是本體論，同時亦為修持工夫的基礎，然此一向度為王廷相所取消，王廷相對於“性”的界定，是基於性氣一元的觀點下而提出的，因此便導出“氣有清濁、性有善惡”，在此一前提下，則張載主張的修持工夫之方向，到王廷相則已有所轉變。

四、結論

透過上述的比較與分析，可謂其張載與王廷相思想之異同，張載的“太虛即氣”重在於說明兩點，其一是存有界之實存不虛，強調萬物之生滅皆奠基於一氣之上，其次則是在基於這層實然之上，進而點出太虛之氣的清通無礙與萬有的形濁窒礙，二者雖有分神化與糟粕，然透過性使其彼此之間有一內在聯繫，而性的呈顯由於二者之不同，故有天地一氣質之性的區別，但此一區別並非絕然相異，乃是一氣之性的不同體現，若能透過“反”的工夫，便能超越種種氣質之限制，使其應然的理想境界能於從實然限定的具體生命中得以體現。

⁷⁸ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈慎言·問成性〉，頁765。

⁷⁹ 王廷相，《王廷相集》，〈雅述上〉，頁850。

⁸⁰ 王廷相，《王氏家藏集》卷二十八，〈答薛君采論性書〉，頁518。

王廷相對於張載“太虛即氣”的承繼，在於以一氣保障萬有之實存，強調一氣之作用，使有無虛實得以相互融通，此外，由於氣與萬物的生成關係，因此以“性氣一貫、性生於氣”作為元氣道體與萬有之聯繫。然而在對於“性”的界定上，王廷相則是取消天地之性的應然層面，進而強調性由氣質之所為，故所體現者乃有善與不善之分，人之秉氣既有所分，便無本然之善，人欲至善，便必須經由名教的確立與後天的學習，此一觀點實與張載的復性之說有其差別，如此一來，人性之修養論便從復其本然之性的模式，下降至氣質之性的經營與強化。

有些學者認為，王廷相於張載氣論思想的發展脈絡中，雖是不可避免地，但同時也使張載的“太虛即氣”所蘊藏的意涵，被受限於一停滯不前，甚至是往後倒退的局面，⁸¹對此，愚見以為，王廷相之說與張載有所別異，實屬常情，一方面二者的時代背景，間隔甚大，所面對的問題亦有所不同，然無可否認地，從思想脈絡的層面來看，王廷相之說，在某些程度上實有與張載之學相承接之處；其次，“太虛即氣”的命題，本就存在著宇宙論與本體論二者並建的雙重詮釋，即可言“相即不離”，亦可說“全然同一”，然不論是從何一角度立論，雙方思想的基底，皆是從萬有的實存性為出發點，此一實存性，既不可被認為是宇宙機械式的運作，亦非是與其生生之德的神妙大用完全區分開來，而應是如學者劉又銘所言，為：“渾沌自然而蘊含著豐富意義、價值、生機與動能並因而可以凝聚為形質、化生為萬物”⁸²元氣道體自身所蘊涵的生生之德與價值義，透過氣化流行的發用，得以體現於萬有之上。在此一整體性之中，萬有與道體相互融合，在其具體生命的歷程之中，展現出存在的美善價值。

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⁸¹ 曾振宇，《思想世界的概念系統》，頁176。

⁸² 劉又銘，《理在氣中：羅欽順、王廷相、顧炎武、戴震氣本論研究》，頁175。

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Wang Tingxiang's Inheritance and Development of Zhang Zai's "The Great Void Being the Same as Material Force"

LIN Yen-Ting

Abstract

"The great void being the same as material force" is an important proposition in Zhang Zai's ideological system. This proposition is not only associated with the cosmos theory of *qi* in the Han dynasty, but also influenced by the ontology of Buddhism. This proposition encouraged the development of Neo-Confucianism toward a metaphysical framework. As one of the key philosophers in the mid-Ming dynasty, Wang Tingxiang deemed highly of Zhang Zai's contribution to the development of Neo-Confucianism; he claimed that Zhang Zai had a great contribution to later generations by revealing the secrets of nature and probing the mystery of life. Zhang Zai and Wang Tingxiang both agreed that *qi* or material force is the cause of the universe. For this reason, most scholars believe that Wang Tingxiang is a successor of Zhang Zai; however, beyond this superficial similarity, we need to carefully analyze their difference and resemblance. This paper aims to explore the thought of Zhang Zai and Wang Tingxiang, focusing on their interpretation of "the great void being the same as material force."

Keywords: *taixu* 太虛 (great void), *qi* 氣 (material force), *xing* 性, *shen* 神

傳統孝行成爲負擔的理由

——《世宗實錄》中出現的孝行特點和問題

金 德 均

中文提要

孝行是人類固有的一種道德價值。任何動物都具有一個共同點，那就是本能的去愛護自己的子女。但是把得到的愛再報答回去的特徵只有人類才具有。從孝行中可以發現人類和禽獸的不同點。百行的根本是日常的孝行，這是任何人都應該要做，也是任何人都能夠做到的日常型孝行，所以孝行慢慢轉變成了要求時間、經濟奉獻和犧牲的守墓型孝行。孝行成爲了大家都很難做到的特別的事情。加之，隨著舉薦孝行者給予獎賞的制度越來越盛行，官吏們需要找到一些客觀的孝行依據，與那些在日常生活中不容易被發現的孝行相比，他們找到了大家都能看到的被確定、被公開的孝行事例。結果，花費大量時間、經費和努力的守墓型孝行就被大量的舉薦，可以說孝行賞制度反而成爲了守墓型孝行增加的原因。本文將通過整理《世宗實錄》的內容來研究孝悌的特點和問題，以及這些問題是怎樣被暴露出來的。

關鍵詞：孝，忠孝烈，割股斷指，三年喪，世宗實錄

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一、前言

朝鮮社會的統治理念是儒教，儒教人倫關係的基本法則是三綱五倫。其中君臣、父子、夫婦的正確關係被規定為忠、孝、烈，各種被當作模範的事例以圖畫和文字的形式被編纂在《三綱行實圖》中。《三綱行實圖》編纂於1434年世宗朝，由於1428年名叫金禾的晉州人殺害了自己父親，直接導致了《三綱行實圖》的編纂。世宗在和群臣議政時，聽到了這一事件後龍顏大怒。¹自責地指出之所以會發生這種違背倫理道德的犯罪行為，是因為缺乏教育。世宗召集群臣，為了弘揚孝悌、整頓風俗共同商討了對策。原欲編著《孝行錄》，後亦編成《三綱行實圖》。《孝行錄》這本書的廣泛流傳，讓一般百姓們開始學習孝悌。²為了實現三代的理想政治，首先要確保君臣、父子、夫婦之間的倫理關係。因此，就要把關於忠、孝、烈的一些典型的模範行為和事蹟，用圖畫和文字的方式表現出來。世宗認為：“庶幾愚婦愚夫，皆得易以觀感而興起，則化民成俗之一道也。”³序文中選取了中國和朝鮮的一百名孝子、忠臣、烈女的模範代表人物，把他們的事蹟用圖畫和文字的形式表現出來。在這裡表明了很重要的一點，就是如同上樑不正下樑歪一樣，領導者的治國哲學和價值觀對百姓是很重要的。堯舜時代和桀紂時代的差異，就在於“良由君上導養之如何耳。”⁴他們之所以治亂其根本原因是為了教育和培養百姓的本性，用現代的方式來說就是取決於怎樣來實施人性教育。

朝鮮時代強調和普及孝悌思想的原因，因為在於孝悌是社會不可缺少的重要文化。我們知道在傳統社會裡，特別是朝鮮時代，是推行孝悌文化最好的一個時代。我們也這樣美化它。但是，當時之所以強調孝悌，是因為就算沒有老子所提出的觀點，⁵孝悌也是急需普及的一種思想。正是因為沒有去實踐孝悌或孝悌文化的消失，孝悌思想才會被強調。從世宗的言論中也可以看到這樣的話。世宗說：“三代之治皆所以明人倫也。後世教化陵夷，百姓不親，君臣父子夫婦之大倫，率皆昧於所性，而常失於薄。”⁶換言之，就是沒有施行孝悌（良好人性修養）教育的話，這個社會將會變成一個冷漠薄情的社會。通過教育可以開發人性，這其中也包含了孝悌的思想。

本文將通過整理《世宗實錄》的內容來研究孝悌的特點和問題，以及這些問題是怎樣被暴露出來的。強調和鼓勵孝悌，開始施行孝行者表彰和優待

1 《世宗實錄》，世宗十年（1428）九月二十七日。

2 《世宗實錄》，世宗十年（1428）十月三日。

3 《世宗實錄》，世宗十四年（1432）六月九日。

4 《世宗實錄》，世宗十四年（1432）六月九日。

5 《老子》十八章：“大道廢，有仁義；慧智出，有大偽；六親不和，有孝慈；國家昏亂，有忠臣。”

6 《世宗實錄》，世宗十四年六月九日。

政策,但是之後又出現了什麼與其意圖背道而馳的結果?在日常生活中孝悌又是怎樣變成了一種負擔的?又是什麼原因讓孝行獎賞制度把孝悌變成一種負擔的?這都是本文想要研究和指出的問題。

二、孝行者獎賞制度

朝鮮時代孝行教育是人性教育的一個方式,當時也出現過把孝行加入法律條文強制執行的情況。這樣的法律被稱為孝行法。當時,孝行法的特徵大致可以分為兩個部分,第一獎勵孝行者,第二處罰不孝子。獎勵孝行者的方式分為四種,分別是旌門、賞職、復戶、賞物。旌門作為最高級別的獎勵方式,一般情況在獎勵的同時也會伴隨賞職、復戶、賞物的獎賞。賞職是賜予官職的制度;復戶是免除或減免徭役的制度;賞物是獎勵衣服或物品的制度。

以賞物而言,鎮川人士金德崇就是一個例子。七十歲的金德崇在家裡同時侍奉九十五歲的父親和八十五歲的岳母,就是一個行孝的典範。他盡心侍奉兩家年邁老人的事蹟為鄰里所知,鎮川的縣監上報朝廷後,朝廷賞賜他酒、肉和十石米。⁷

下一個是賞賜官職的例子。各地區推舉出孝子錄用為官吏的制度,始於漢代的孝廉制。之後,這個制度被一些貪戀權貴的人們所濫用,冒牌孝子層出不窮。因為產生了這樣的副作用,這個制度在中國漸漸的消失了。在《世宗實錄》的記載中,因為行孝而受賜官職的事例數不勝數。在紀錄中,世宗七年(1425)到世宗三十一年(1449),被記載的事例就有十六件。⁸這裡出現的人物都是因為行孝而獲得賞職、復戶和賞物的人。

其中世宗十一年(1429)九月二十四日的紀錄中,記載了一個典型的有關孝行者舉薦制度的事例。內容是尚州人士嚴幹,五十歲了依然是個末端小官,但是因為行孝而被周圍的人舉薦的故事。年輕的時候科舉及第,受命任奉常副錄事兼成均學錄,但是因為父母遠在家鄉無法侍奉,雖然萬般不舍,但是為了盡孝,毅然申請回鄉。回家後,他每天為父母準備美味的食物,無微不至的侍奉父母。雖然竭盡全力的奉養父母,但是父母依舊相繼離開了人世。他為父母守喪六年,遵循著士大夫家的《家禮》儀式,沒有舉行佛教儀式。作為士大夫,他這樣的孝行受到了高度的讚揚。地方的官吏為他申請了表彰和升官,但是根據循資制度(規定官吏任命和升職的制度,依據在職年數來決定是否可以升職,不得隨意晉升官吏),不可能將他升職。知道這件事的大臣們紛紛說:“資於事父,以事君,

⁷ 《世宗實錄》,世宗二十六年(1444)三月十三日。

⁸ 《世宗實錄》,世宗七年(1425)九月十一日,十一年九月二十四日,十三年五月十八日、九月十一日、十月九日,十六年二月三日、三月二十二日、六月十二日、六月十七日、七月二十五日、八月二十四日、十月九日,二十年十一月十六日,三十一年六月二十二日、六月二十八日、十一月十八日等。

而敬同。⁹又說：“君子之事親孝，故忠可移於君”。¹⁰這就是所謂的忠臣出於孝子之門。盛世崇尚孝道，嚴幹的孝行就是典型的例子。在一個小官位上一直工作到老，這與當今盛世的孝治難道不相駁嗎？強烈希望皇帝不要注重先後順序任用官員，獎勵孝風。這是通過“孝治”弘揚“孝風”，這是表彰孝行者，把國家變成一個孝行國的奏呈。如果說上奏文的基礎是“孝治”和“孝風”的話，這就是以《孝經》為依據的世宗時代。進而成為了日後朝鮮社會的政治基本。

三、孝行的內容和問題

1、割股斷指型的自我犧牲式孝行

在以“孝治”為基礎的朝鮮社會裡，《孝經》雖然是最基本的經書，但是也曾經多次出現這樣的情況：一些違背了《孝經》內容的事情，卻被當作孝行來稱頌。愛惜自己的身體雖然是孝行中強調的內容，但是為了醫治父母而“割股斷指”的事例也層出不窮。

賤民出身的屠夫梁貴珍，父親身患疾病，多方求醫未果。聽周圍的人說吃人肉可以治病，便砍了自己的手指烤給父親服用，父親的病就這樣奇跡般的好了。朝廷為了稱頌他這樣的孝行，給他立了旌門，獎賞他復戶。¹¹這就是“斷指”為父母治病的孝子故事。但是因為它違背了《孝經》“開宗明義章”裡所提到的愛護身體的孝行內容，引起了很大的爭議。不過即使是這樣，在朝鮮社會裡依然有很多孝子們為盡孝而傷害自己身體的事例。

住在金汝島的女子金孝生也是一個例子。父親因為患了癲狂症受盡折磨，十二歲的孝生聽信了吃人肉可以治病的謠傳，背著父母砍下手指放進湯裡給父親服用，父親的病情漸有好轉。島上的監司向朝廷上報，賞賜給她旌門和復戶。¹²

石珍也是一個典型的事例。石珍的父親身受惡疾折磨，他為父親多方尋藥，可父親病情依舊不見好轉。陷入絕望的石珍有一天遇到一位僧人，僧人告訴他說：“把人骨磨碎後混著血服用，可以治療此病。”石珍聽信了此話，砍了自己的無名指和血一起沖泡給父親服用，父親的病便好轉了。¹³

知道這個事情的地方官吏說：“夫傷其身體，非孝之中道，然其孝行足以感動人心。”¹⁴在向都觀察使上報後，又向君王上報，在村口的公告上讚揚了他的孝行，並免除了他的吏役。

⁹ 《孝經》，〈士〉。

¹⁰ 《孝經》，〈廣揚名〉。

¹¹ 《世宗實錄》，世宗五年(1423)十一月十七日。

¹² 《世宗實錄》，世宗十一年(1429)三月十四日。

¹³ 《世宗實錄》，世宗二年(1420)十月十八日。

¹⁴ 《世宗實錄》，世宗二年(1420)十月十八日。

這裡提到的關鍵內容是“斷指”，是一種自殘身體的行為，不是正確的孝行。像“割股斷指”一樣的獵奇式自我犧牲的行為，違背了《孝經》中提到的“身體髮膚，受之父母，不敢毀傷，孝之始也”的內容，從保護身體的層面來說它是一種錯誤的行為。但是因為這種孝行治癒父母的疾病，這種真心實意的孝行雖然違背了孝經的內容，但是卻給周邊的人留下了莫大的感動，所以表彰是一種被限制的表示方式。

《世宗實錄》裡也委婉的提到這樣的內容。在議政府的奏章上寫到“然斷指則過常之事，不必如是而後以為孝也。至如孝心純至，順悅親意，人無間言，特異於人者，則尤宜褒獎。自今令中外一皆褒舉，以勵風俗。如或有實行而不舉，或無實跡而謬舉者，其所舉鄉里人及官吏，按問科罪。從之。”¹⁵ 類似“割股斷指”這樣的孝行沒有必要把它作為孝行的典範，應該要表彰平常生活中一些日常的孝行。“至於折骨和藥，六年居墓，為行詭激，不可為訓者，恐不可特異其科也。”¹⁶ 這也就是說，自殘身體是不能成為孝行楷模的。

日常和平常型的孝行在時間上都是有要求的，所以做起來很難。像“割股斷指”這種類型的孝行，容易引起人們的注意，只做一次就能立竿見影，很多冒牌的孝子反而能很輕易的利用這點犯罪。換句話說，為了避免因表彰孝子賞賜官位而引起的副作用，將舉薦冒牌孝子的人定罪，這是最恰當的反面教材。初衷是為了表彰孝行，但是這種只做一次就能引起注意的“斷指割骨”或三年守喪的行為，很容易成為冒牌者利用的工具。找出舉薦冒牌孝子的官吏和百姓，就可以確定以孝行為幌子進行勾結犯罪的事實。

2、一般型孝行事例的特徵和問題

世宗在即位時向中央和地方的官吏們羅列了各種該遵循的事項，特別強調了表彰孝子這一條。明示官員尋找探訪“義夫”、“節婦”、“孝子”、“順孫”的典範，一旦確定立即表彰。¹⁷ 保護為國捐軀的烈士家屬，幫助其子孫，任用有能之人，特別強調了孝和忠。任用烈士家屬的部門為“設忠義衛，...身犯不忠不孝者及其子孫，不許入屬。”¹⁸

世宗即位之後，為了實行孝行表彰制度，首次在全國尋訪孝子實例，人數高達數百名。之後又命令尋找特別的典型模範，重新挑選了四十一名孝子。世宗二年(1420)一月二十一日的紀錄，以圖表形式整理如下。這裡“昏定晨省”、“出必告”、“反必面”這樣日常的孝行歸納為日常型；“斷指割骨”或其他自殘身體、犧牲喪命的行為歸納為犧牲型；三年或六年墳前守孝的歸納為守墓型。包括其他類型都羅列在下表中。

¹⁵ 《世宗實錄》，世宗二十三年(1441)十月二十二日。

¹⁶ 《世宗實錄》，世宗十五年(1433)一月十八日。

¹⁷ 《世宗實錄》，世宗登基年(1418)十一月三日。

¹⁸ 《世宗實錄》，世宗登基年(1418)十一月三日。

編號	職位和姓名	孝行內容	類型
1	大興戶長 李成萬	他和弟弟順一起盡心侍奉父母, 每天都獻上美味的食物。爲了讓父母親開心, 每年的春天和秋天都會準備美酒佳餚, 邀請周圍的親朋好友來參加宴席。父母去世後, 哥哥守護著母親的墳墓, 弟弟守護著父親的墳墓。每天早晚兄弟兩人都要聚在一起, 在父親或者母親墳前一起吃飯。所有的食物不論多少都一起分享著吃。	日常型 守墓型
2	海美船軍 林上左	母親離世後, 爲母親守墳, 因爲家境貧困就自己做草鞋去賣, 賺了錢之後爲母親祭祀。	守墓型
3	朴蕤	母親不幸去世後, 一直爲母親守墓, 妻子出去打工賺錢準備祭祀的食材。偶爾沒錢的時候, 也會準備蔬菜爲母親祭祀。	守墓型
4	仁同的 金閨	因爲出海謀生無法回家, 此時正好母親身患疫病, 雖然其他兒子們都避而不見, 但是金閨卻馬上回家照看母親, 母親病逝後親自處理完安葬事宜, 一直爲母親守喪三年。	犧牲型 守墓型 (三年喪)
5	珍原書生 李格的妻子 沈氏	在年僅七歲時父親就撒手人寰, 但她仍然用心的侍奉著母親, 父親過早的離世使得她悲痛欲絕, 她在父親的靈堂旁蓋了一個棚子, 像父親身前一樣盡心的爲父親守孝。	守墓型
6	公州縣監 鄭自丘的妻子 高氏	三十三歲時丈夫去世, 父親勸他改嫁, 但是她不聽, 在墳墓旁邊建了個草棚, 每當逢年過節都爲丈夫祭祀。	貞節型 守墓型
7	沔川少監 沈仁富的妻子 耿氏	二十八歲時丈夫就離開了人世, 家裡人都勸她改嫁, 但是她誓死不從, 一直守護著貞節。	貞節型
8	瑞山私奴 莫金的妻子 召史	二十四歲時丈夫不幸去世, 很多人想帶她走, 但是她不肯從, 一直爲丈夫守節, 現在已經五十四歲了。	貞節型
9	連山及第 金問的妻子 許氏	二十歲時丈夫去世, 在墳墓旁邊蓋了個棚子, 連續三年每天早晚親自爲丈夫獻飯祭祀, 至今每天以淚洗面, 從不梳妝打扮。	貞節型 守墓型 (三年喪)
10	大邱郎將 金鼎的妻子 徐氏	二十四歲時丈夫不幸離世, 父親勸他改嫁, 他毅然拒絕、誓死不從, 現在四十八歲。	貞節型
11	善山船軍 趙乙生的妻子 樂加伊	丙子年丈夫被倭寇俘虜生死不明, 她不喝酒不吃肉, 連帶氣味的野菜也不食用, 父母勸她改嫁, 她流著眼淚誓死不屈, 一直守著妻子的本, 八年後丈夫平安歸來, 一起過著幸福的生活。	貞節型

12	書生 金珣的妻子 佛非	二十歲時丈夫撒手人寰，父親勸他改嫁，她以死明誓寧死不從，一直侍奉著父母。	貞節型 日常型
13	咸昌 朴希俊的妻子 金氏	二十三歲時丈夫離開了人世，父親勸他改嫁，她再三推辭一直為丈夫守節，現在已經47歲了	貞節型
14	永川郎將 李鮮的妻子 鄭氏	二十四歲時丈夫過世，父母勸其改嫁，但是她不肯從，至今都不吃肉。	貞節型
15	迎日典提控 李登的妻子氏	二十七歲時丈夫在首爾去世，不遠千里的帶回了丈夫的屍身，埋葬在家北邊的一座山上，每月初一十五都會去墳前祭拜丈夫。	貞節型 日常型
16	金海錄事 尹弘道的妻子 裴氏	十九歲時丈夫去世，盡心盡力的奉養婆婆，婆婆去世後依然盡心盡力的祭祀。	貞節型 日常型 守墓型
17	宜甯書生 沈致的妻子 石氏	二十歲時丈夫亡故，竭盡所能的對婆婆盡孝，她父親勸她改嫁，她執意不肯聽從父親的話。她說：“丈夫是獨子，又過早去世，要是改嫁的話，誰來照顧我已故丈夫患病的老母。”之後又格外用心的侍奉婆婆，婆婆每次外出時都會親自攙扶。	貞節型 日常型
18	陝川長興副使 長友良的妻子 韓氏	二十五歲時因為沒有產下子嗣，被丈夫拋棄。但是她依舊為丈夫守節一直沒有改嫁。婆婆過逝後為婆婆守喪六年，每逢忌日都會祭祀。	貞節型 守墓型 (六年喪)
19	全州記官 李瓊的妻子 召史	用心侍奉婆婆，公公婆婆相繼去世後，替丈夫守孝變賣了所有家產為老人舉行葬禮。	貞節型 日常型 守墓型
20	井邑散員 陳慶的妻子 劉氏	三十歲時丈夫在倭亂中喪生，至今都為丈夫守節、為婆婆盡孝。	貞節型 日常型
21	錦山副正 林英順的妻子 韓氏	二十六歲時丈夫過逝，至今都為丈夫守節，現在已經六十一歲了。	貞節型
22	散員 李益的妻子 召史	二十五歲時丈夫離世，依然為丈夫守孝，現在已經六十七歲了。	貞節型
23	光州別將 洪瑛的妻子 朴氏	三十一歲時丈夫去世，對婆婆盡孝，現在已經五十一歲了。	貞節型 日常型
24	羅州翰 林趙琢的妻子 羅氏	二十四歲丈夫去世，雖然膝下無兒無女，但是依然為丈夫守節終身未改嫁。	貞節型

25	泰仁司正 朴慥的妻子 林氏	跟隨丈夫一起去首爾生活，婆婆因患病行動不便。有一天家裡突然起火，她奮不顧身的跳進火海裡背著婆婆逃了出來，雖然她的頭和手臂都被火燒傷，但是幸好婆婆並無大礙。	犧牲型
26	濟州主簿 文邦貴	按這個地區的風俗，原本沒有守喪三年的規定，丙戌年間父親去世他為父親守孝三年，喪制都依照家禮的制度進行，建立了守孝的孝道風氣。之後濟州道的人們以他為典範紛紛效仿，有三名為父親守墓，守喪滿3年的人數為十名。	守墓型 (三年喪)
27	首爾 權景	小時候父親過世，一直照顧單身的母親並遵守昏定晨省的規定。外出回家後一定向母親報告，從不隨意亂動家裡的物品，一定要向母親請示後才使用。如果看到美味佳餚的話，一定會帶回家中獻給母親。如果母親患病的話，馬上請醫生為母親看病，親自做湯熬藥。衣不解帶，日夜陪床服侍直到母親痊癒。	日常型
28	中部幼學 全思禮	父親過世後以天為被、以地為席，每天以稀粥度日，不食美食，為父守喪三年。用心侍奉母親，外出和歸來時都會向母親報告。認真的履行昏定晨省的規定。學業上也十分用心。	守墓型 (三年喪) 日常型
29	公州 判撫山縣事 林暮	庚午年間七十九名倭寇闖入家中，他把大門堵死讓倭寇無法進入，後來護送父母逃出，自己也平安無事。	犧牲型
30	舒川 俞仁奉	用心侍奉父母，無論嚴寒酷暑、颶風下雨，任何事都親力親為，竭盡全力的為父母盡孝。父母去世後守孝六年。	日常型 守墓型 (六年喪)
31	海美別將 林雨	丁巳年間倭寇突襲包圍了村莊，為了保護病倒的父親，隻身一人與倭寇搏鬥，背著父親逃亡，死裡逃生。	犧牲型
32	幼學 鄭孝新	為去世的父親守喪三年。	守墓型 (三年喪)
33	安陰散員 沈腆	戊辰年間倭寇突襲，抓走了父親，他準備了銀兩隻身前往敵營，用錢換回了父親。	犧牲型
34	善山書生 田益修	丁巳年父親外出打仗，如對待父母一樣盡心地侍奉祖父。祖父過世後在墓地旁建了一個窩棚，為祖父守喪三年。	日常型 守墓型 (三年喪)
35	咸昌幼學 申孝良	在祖父墳前守喪三年，只吃素。	守墓型 (三年喪)
36	幼學 申孝溫	在為父親守孝的三年期間，不吃蔬菜和水果，不僅用心奉養母親和祖父，而且十分恭順聽話。	守墓型 (三年喪) 日常型
37	務安生員 金生禹	盡心盡孝，父母離世後在墳前為父母守喪六年，每天在簡陋的草席上裹著泥土睡覺，猶如父母生前一樣盡孝。	日常型 守墓型 (六年喪)

38	海美幼學 鄭安義	為祖母守墳盡孝。	守墓型
39	晉州郎將 姜用珍	倭寇入侵後，與牧使朴子安兩人一起對抗倭寇，但是寡不敵眾，在差點被敵人抓的時候，他把自己乘坐的馬給了牧使，牧使得以幸免於難。	犧牲型
40	金堤交授官 鄭坤	用自己的積蓄建立了書院，不論是本鄉的百姓還是外鄉的百姓，只要想讀書的都可以進書院學習。	※ 教育活動
41	光州生員 崔保民	用自己的積蓄建立了書院，教書育人。	※ 教育活動

上述事例以不同類別整理如下：

類型	日常型	犧牲型	守墓型	貞節型	其他(教育、忠臣、兄弟之愛、尊師...)
共計41件 (複數)	14件	6件	19件 (六年喪3件)	19件	2件
比率	34%	15%	46%	46%	5%

〈材料1〉世宗二年(1420)孝行類型

守喪三年、六年，在時間經濟方面犧牲和奉獻的守墓型，和女性放棄自我生活專心奉養父母的貞節型高達十九件。接下來，“斷指割骨”，以身救父、以身救母的犧牲型一共六件。“昏定省晨”、“必告反面”、“親嘗湯藥”的日常型孝型為十二件。

在壯年時期守喪六年，在很長一段時間裡在墳前盡孝守墳，這種孝型都伴隨著不同尋常的奉獻、獻身與自我犧牲。26號文邦貴的例子，在沒有守孝風俗的濟州道守喪三年，他的孝行影響到了附近的人，使這種儒教式的葬禮文化慢慢的在濟州道傳播開來。

不過，最值得關注的是1、40號和41號事例。平日準備美食奉養父母，偶爾邀請父母的朋友大擺筵席。父母去世後，守墳盡孝，兄弟們歸家後平均分配財物，不貪圖一己之利，過著團結友愛的幸福生活。這是很值得關注的事例。雖然是極其日常和平凡的事例，也很容易做到，但是之所以說它平凡，是因為和容易引起注意的“斷指割骨”、“三年喪”、“六年喪”等極端的自我犧牲奉獻的孝行相比，它確實略顯平凡。還有，在奉養父母方面，不分長男和次子，兄弟之間一起分擔、一同盡孝的深厚友愛也是值得關注的。在家庭條件不富裕的情況下，子女一人獨立奉養父母，包攬祭禮，這樣的孝行與兄弟們一起分擔責任奉養父母的孝行相比，更像是一種“獨縛(一個人負擔)”行為。

上面所記載的孝行事例是世宗初期(1420)的特點，有關中期的事例都記載在世宗十年(1428)十月二十八日的紀錄裡，查看這一時期的紀錄，也是一件很有意義的事情。前面提到的晉州一個兒子殺害了自己的父親，這種違背倫理道德的犯罪行為發生在當年九月，所以查看這個時期的孝子紀錄顯得格外的有意義。

編號	職位和姓名	地區	孝行內容	類型
1	幼學韓允雍 大司成黃玹	首爾東部	天性敦厚正直, 父親早逝後, 他盡心奉養母親。早晨出門時向母親問好, 晚上回家時也向母親問好, 睡前親自為母親鋪床蓋被。噓寒問暖, 按照天氣變化給母親添減衣服。每天去拜望母親三次。無論颶風下雨從未間斷過。在母親身邊服侍時恭順聽話, 和顏悅色, 從不忤逆母親。如果拿到美味的食物, 就算很少也一定帶回去獻給母親。母親身患疾病時, 一定要親自嘗試湯藥再送給母親, 因為擔憂母親的病情, 深夜都無法入睡。(昏定晨省、親嘗湯藥)	日常型
2	幼學李成蹊 司直李元的兒子	首爾中部	一直陪伴在父親身邊, 和顏悅色、輕聲細語的服侍老人, 外出回家後一定去向父親請安。早晨問安, 晚上為父親鋪床蓋被, 從不敢忤逆父親的意思。父親患病後不食美味, 著急地四處尋訪問醫, 竭盡全力的為父親醫治。父母相繼離世後, 六年間依照周文公的《家禮》一直為父母守喪。返魂時早晚都獻飯祭祀, 不曾偷懶。按照四季變化給父母獻上新鮮的食物, 一直堅持著盡孝。家裡著火時書和傢俱用品都燒了, 但他首先從火場中搶救出了父母的遺像, 避免了遺像被燒毀。	日常型 犧牲型 守墓型 (六年喪)
3	錄事全忠禮		父親喪事時每天睡著席子枕著木塊, 只吃稀粥, 從不食美味。辦完喪事後每天早晚祭奠父親。照顧順從母親, 從不忤逆母親。出門前一定告知母親, 回家後一定向母親請安。每天早晚向母親問安, 為母親鋪床蓋被, 母親患病時一定要先嘗湯藥。這樣的孝行不曾改變, 一直堅持到年老。	日常型 守墓型 (三年喪)
4	幼學裴弘湜	京畿長湍	母親喪事時禁食三日, 大殮之後才開始吃粥。在母親墳前守喪三年, 睡著席子枕著木塊, 無論嚴寒酷暑、颶風下雨, 一直守護在墳墓邊直到守孝結束。為了表彰他的孝行, 在村口為他建起了旌門。之後父親也去世了, 傷心欲絕的他日漸消瘦, 哀痛之情難以名狀。	守墓型 (三年喪)
5	書生宋倫	安城	雖然上有三位哥哥, 但是作為公子守喪三年, 三年守喪結束後, 又在墳墓前搭了棚子, 每天不食美味, 守喪四年。	守墓型 (四年喪)
6	幼學尹興智	原平	在為父親辦葬禮時數日禁食, 喪葬的所有部分都依照《家禮》的規定來舉行, 在墳墓前守孝三年, 只吃清粥不吃蔬菜和水果, 親自生火做飯祭祀父親。	守墓型 (三年喪)

7	書生 林自秀		父親去世時在墳墓旁邊搭起了一個棚子，三年期間只吃清粥度日，睡覺時連席子也不鋪，早晚親自生火做飯祭祀父親。	守墓型 (三年喪)
8	廣興倉副丞 鄭勉	抱川	父母相繼去世後，在墳墓前爲父守孝六年，和弟弟兩人親自搬運石頭做了石牆和石板。清晨和傍晚都會在父母墳前嚎啕大哭。平均分配了家奴和財產，不貪圖一己之利。還哭著說道：“父母的願望就是希望看到兒女們成家立業，兩個弟弟至今都未成家，這可怎麼辦？”最後將自己分到的財產和家奴全部都讓給了兩個弟弟。	*兄弟愛 守墓型 (六年喪)
9	書生金順 司正金可畏	忠清道 大興	父母過世時那年正好鬧饑荒，金順守著母親的墳墓，金可畏守著父母的墳墓，他們自己編製草鞋換來小米，每天早晚親自生火做飯祭祀父母，一直守喪三年。	守墓型 (三年喪)
10	任山壽	溫水	父母去世後，每天傷心欲絕的背著泥土去給父母建墳，一直守孝六年。之後每年朔望時都會去祭祀父母。	守墓型 (六年喪)
11	學生 鄭江	全羅道 順天	母親去世後，父親娶了小老婆，鄭江雖然住在離父親五里地的地方，但是仍然每天三次去給父親問安。不論是嚴寒酷暑、颶風下雪從未間斷過。看見父親在打掃庭院，馬上上前搶著幹活，不肯讓父母受累。父親健在時從不遠遊，參加村裡人們一起舉行的宴席，即使晚到了也一定提早回家。如果人們勸他多留片刻再走，他就會說：“我牽掛著父親，先告辭了。”拿到美味佳餚一定帶回家獻給父親。這份孝心十年如一日的堅守著。父親去世後，每日只食粥，鋪著草席在父親墳墓旁守喪三年。	日常型 守墓行 (三年喪)
12	金難	慶尚道 咸昌	家裡只有一間房間，某天家裡突然起火了，金難不顧生死的沖進火海救出了臥病在床的母親，母親和他都被大火燒傷，三日後母親便去世了。因爲大火也燒傷了自己，在經歷了一年期間的折磨後，終於痊癒。	犧牲型
13	生員 宋滔	蔚山	父母身患疾病多年，十年間一直用心照顧父母，四處尋藥就醫，但是父母相隔一年相繼去世。宋滔親自搬運泥土和石頭建造了墳墓。喪制也是依照《家禮》施行，沒有舉行佛教的儀式，設立了祠堂請來神主。清晨出門上香，時而爲父母祭祀。	守墓型 (六年喪)

14	司正 朴成德	宜寧	九歲時父親去世,成人後遷移了父親的墳墓,換上孝服,食素三年追思父親。七十三歲高齡的母親一直以來身患風疾,常年在母親身旁侍奉,親自為母親煎藥,準備美味獻給母親。偶爾因為軍務要外出過夜的話,都會拒絕,說:“我母親年齡大了。”一直不肯吃魚肉等肉食。	守墓型 (三年喪) 日常型
15	幼學 劉安	居昌	十五歲時父親逝世,每天早晚親自生火做飯為父親祭祀。搬運泥土和石頭修建墳墓,三年間從不偷懶,一直住在草棚裡為父守孝。母親去世後又為母親守喪三年,哀痛之情不亞於父親離世時。	守墓型 (六年喪)
16	散員 張特	大丘	父親離開人世後為父親舉辦葬禮,七日後才肯進食吃粥,不食蔬菜和水果,……每天早晚生火做飯祭祀父親,搬運泥土和石頭親自修建墳墓。三年期間哀痛的緬懷父親,就像在靈堂一樣。一天晚上來了一隻老虎,老虎一直大聲吼叫,他也一點不畏懼,始終守在墳墓旁邊不肯離開。	守墓型 (六年喪)
17	韓箕斗	黃海道 白川	為人清廉正直,父親離世後在墳前搭了個草棚為父守喪三年,侍奉母親盡心盡孝。	守墓型 (三年喪)
18	幼學 李甲耕	瑞興	母親去世後在墳前搭了一個草棚,一邊盡孝一邊砍樹種地,每天早晚親自做飯祭祀母親。父親去世後又繼續為父親守喪六年。	守墓型 (六年喪)
19	司直 李甫家	咸吉道 北青	父親去世後守喪三年。	守墓型 (三年喪)
20	書生 申汝和	咸吉道 北青	父親去世後守喪三年。	守墓型 (三年喪)
21	書生 金汝貴	平安道 撫山	一共為父母在墓前守喪六年,只食用清粥。	守墓型 (六年喪)
22	書生 李天瑞	平安道 撫山	父親逝世後在墳前為父親守孝,自己身患疾病,就算病情加重時,每天早晚也為父親祭祀,三年從未間斷過。	犧牲型 守墓型 (三年喪)
23	正設判官 朴侃	江西	作為獨子為雙親分別守喪三年,每天親自生火做飯祭祀,每天在墳前嚎啕大哭,哀思之情溢於言表。每年春秋帶上泥土去給父母添墳。	守墓型 (六年喪)
24	書云正 鄭均的妻子 許氏	京畿道 安城	三十六歲時丈夫不幸去世,恪守貞節每天準備美味的食物侍奉婆婆。……癸卯甲辰年間疫疾盛行,許多年輕人因此病倒,許氏毫無畏懼和平時一樣每天都準備小菜獻給婆婆,自己和婆婆都平安無事。之後婆婆去世後,在家附近向北的一個地方安葬了婆婆,每天早晚都會祭拜。出去的時候會告知婆婆,回家的時候會向婆婆請安。	日常型 守節型 守墓型

25	司宰監副正 金允和的 妻子李氏	首爾 南部	丈夫不幸撒手人寰後，把丈夫安葬在抱川，在墳前守墓三年。	守墓型 (三年喪)
26	節制使洪尚 直的妻子 文氏	京畿道 積城	丈夫過逝後在墳墓旁搭了一個棚子，每天早晚都祭拜丈夫，一步也不離開墳墓直到大祥。守墓結束後也不敢住得太遠，住在一個較近的村莊裡，每逢朔望和逢年過節一定會去祭拜丈夫。	守墓型 (三年喪)
27	書生朴漢生 的妻子 鄭氏	忠清道 公州	二十歲時丈夫拋棄了她，和其他女人過日子。父母打算讓她改嫁，但是他不肯。三十歲時丈夫去世，父母又再次勸她改嫁，她依舊回絕了。	貞節型
28	監務李仲斌 的妻子 林氏	洪州	丈夫過早去世後依舊為丈夫守節，婆婆過世後守喪三年。	貞節型 守墓型 (三年喪)
29	小監朴孟文 的妻子 趙氏		三十九歲時丈夫去世，為夫守喪三年，婆婆過世後又為婆婆守孝。	守墓型 (六年喪)
30	幼學崔以源 的學生 李氏	全羅道 全州	十八歲時丈夫去世，請示父母後在家附近修建了墳墓，雖然家境貧寒，但是卻變賣了家產每天早晚的祭拜丈夫。三年守喪結束後，父母打算讓她重新改嫁，連日子都訂下來了，但她堅決不從，誓死要為丈夫守節，逃到了婆婆家。	貞節型 守墓型 (三年喪)
31	及第金九淵 的妻子 李氏		二十六歲時丈夫去世，搬到了離墳墓較近的地方居住，每到朔望時一定回去祭拜。十三年間一直侍奉婆婆，不喝酒、不吃肉，偶爾還會做布襪去墳前守墓，像丈夫生前一樣。”	守墓型
32	戶長梁佃的 妻子	南原	二十八歲時丈夫離世，父母打算讓她改嫁，但是她下定決心發誓要為丈夫守節，不吃魚肉和葷菜。	貞節型
33	書生 崔有龍的 妻子	潭陽	四十四歲時，戊辰年間倭寇大舉入侵，崔有龍從行廊去防禦倭寇，妻子帶著兩個兒子躲在了岩石下的草叢裡。敵人撲上去打算強暴她，她頑強抵抗誓死不從，最後被敵人用長矛刺死了。正好周圍的鄰居們發現了她，覺得她很可憐，等敵人退去後取回她的屍身，把她安葬了。	貞節型 犧牲型
34	中樞院副使 李沈的 妻子文氏	濟州道	十九歲時嫁為人婦，三年後去了首爾，一直無兒無女。丈夫死後來求婚的人雖然很多，但是她為了守節都拒絕了。	貞節型
35	職員石阿甫 甫里介的 妻子無命	旌義	二十歲時嫁為人婦，九年後丈夫去世，她無兒無女、無父無母，也沒奴僕照顧，在困苦饑餓中度過每一天。雖然求婚的人很多，但是她依然為夫守節。	貞節型

36	茶房別監余伯壩的妻子尹氏	慶尚道慶州	十九歲時丈夫去世，無兒無女，也沒有奴僕，生活雖然很拮据，但是每當朔望時就會去祭拜並且放聲大哭。喪禮結束後，母親打算讓她改嫁，她爲了守節逃回了公公婆婆家。之後公公去世後守喪三年，從沒有一天偷懶過，至今爲止每天都祭拜老人。	貞節型 守墓型 (六年喪)
37	知郡事李台慶的妻子姜氏	黃海道穀山	二十九歲時丈夫去世，守孝三年後，一年四季都盡心盡力的舉行祭祀。判士曹允明打算娶她，她剃了頭髮誓死不從。後來象山君的兒子姜鎮也想娶她，她逃跑後躲起來又把頭髮給剃了。親戚們屢次把她禁足，她又逃到首爾，過了很久回來之後，依然和以前一樣祭拜丈夫。	守墓型 (三年喪) 貞節型
38	幼學尹元常的母親	平安道陽德	三十二歲時丈夫撒手人寰，爲丈夫守喪三年。每逢朔望都在墳墓前大哭，一步也不離開。六個兒子年紀幼小，她親自挑水砍柴，過著孤單的生活。她的母親和親戚都勸她改嫁，但是她都拒絕了。用心侍奉婆婆二十年，婆婆去世後三年重孝在身。	貞節型 守墓型 (六年喪)
39	記官乙奉的母親	撫山	三十三歲時丈夫去世，守喪三年。母親和家人打算讓她改嫁，她都拒接。盡心恭順的侍奉八十九歲的婆婆。丈夫去世二十年後，每到丈夫忌日時都解開頭髮痛哭流涕。	守墓型 (三年喪) 貞節型 日常型
40	訓導官尹統	慶州	在很小的時候母親去世，長大後很遺憾自己年幼時沒能侍奉父親，侍奉祖父像侍奉父親一樣用心。覺得父母年事已高，能侍奉的日子不長了，所以放棄了仕途回到家中，每天清晨問安，傍晚爲祖父鋪床疊被，一直在祖父身邊不曾離開一步。侍奉祖父時盡心的恭順聽話，祖父去世後萬分哀痛、嚎啕大哭。在墳墓前搭了帳篷守孝三年。	守墓型 (三年喪) 日常型 (養志)

上述事例以不同類別整理如下：

類型	日常型	犧牲型	守墓型	貞節型	其他(教育、忠臣、兄弟愛、尊師…)
共計40件 (複數)	7件	4件	33件(六年喪12件、四年喪1件)	11件	1件(兄弟愛)
比率 (複數)	17.5%	10%	82.5%	27.5%	2.5%

〈材料2〉世宗十年(1428)孝行類型

上面8號事例很引人關注。父母相繼去世後，兄弟之間團結友愛，保持著深厚的兄弟之情。公正公平的分配了家裡的財產。哥哥還特別照顧沒有成

家立業、生兒育女的弟弟。這就是《論語·學而》“孝弟也者，其爲仁之本與”中提到孝時，不只單純的強調孝，同時也強調了“孝悌”。指出了恭敬父母和兄弟友愛的重要性。

上面的事例還有一個特點，與丈夫生死離別後，妻子不僅守節還盡孝。出嫁後變成外人的朝鮮女人根據“三從之道”的思想，在儒教社會裡“女必從夫”、“夫唱婦隨”是結婚女人的宿命。正因為如此，不論在中國還是朝鮮的歷史上，丈夫去世後自愛守節的事例非常多。仔細研究上述事例，丈夫去世後，娘家父母極力勸告女兒改嫁的事例也值得關注。寡婦再嫁禁止法在朝鮮成宗八年(1477)施行。世宗時代(世宗十一年, 1429)的記載說道夫婦“人倫之本，萬化之源”，又從“一與之齊，終身不改”中提及“三從之道”，“一失其身，則行同禽獸，罪莫大焉”。¹⁹ 但是，查看上述事例，在重新整理後可以發現，即便只在1428年以前，改嫁是自由行爲，不受法律限制。那在1429年九月三十日怎麼會出現“終身不改”這樣的內容呢？

還有一個特殊的情況，三年喪、六年喪這樣的守墓型孝行一共三十三例，和之前相比數量大大增多。其中六年喪十二例，四年喪一例，四年以上的墳前守墓孝行在三十三例中占了十三例，這具有不同尋常的意義。與其相比，來察看一下四年以後世宗十四年(1432)九月十三日的紀錄

編號	職位和姓名	職位	孝行內容	類型
1	金 物	醴泉郡	“家境貧寒，即使沒有奴婢也盡心侍奉父母，恪守孝道。父親去世時本來打算在墓前守孝，但是正好母親生患重病，沒有辦法在墓前守孝。母親去世後在墓前搭了一個帳篷，每天早晚在墓前痛哭。守孝期限滿後只吃清粥，一直深深的遺憾沒爲父親守孝，之後爲父守喪三年，自始至終一直盡心盡力。”	守墓型 (六年喪)
2	金孝良	昌原府	“十五歲時父親身患重病，四處尋訪就醫都不見好轉，聽信了山民說人骨對治病有奇效，便砍下手指炒熟之後，曬乾磨成粉末，沖泡到酒裡餵給父親。”	犧牲型 (斷指)
3	田佐命	善山府	“父母重病在床，七年全身不能動彈，親自爲母煎藥，端屎端尿。母親去世後在墳前守孝，幾年後父親也相繼去世，把父親和母親合葬後，在墳墓旁搭了柵子守孝四年。守孝結束後也不肯離開，村裡人都勸他離開，他又守孝三個月，每天哀聲大哭。”	犧牲型 守墓型 (四年喪)

¹⁹ 《世宗實錄》，世宗十一年(1429)九月三十日。

4	梁鬱	產陰縣	“奉養父母一直用心的遵循昏定晨省，盡心盡力的照顧母親，每天準備美味的食物。父親逝世後三天禁食，在墳墓旁搭建棚子守孝三年。隨後母親也跟著去世，把母親和父親合葬後，向宗親和鄰居借了錢，又變賣了家財為父母祭祀。一直在墓前守喪三年。”	日常型 守墓型 (六年喪) 犧牲型
5	尹殷保、 徐鷺	知禮縣	“拜張志道為師，在其門下學習。以前曾和老師約定：‘應該同等的侍奉君王、老師和父親。老師沒有子嗣，老師去世後我應該在墓前守孝三年。’老師去世，向父母請示後，根據喪葬禮節訂製了衣冠，在墓前搭了棚子親自做飯祭祀。有一天，殷保的父親生病了，他回到家中衣不解帶地為父親煎藥，父親病情好轉後又回到了墓地，繼續在棚子裡過了一個月。有一天他突然做了一個奇怪的夢，他立馬回家去，果然發現父親又生病了，五天後便離開了人世。……幾個月後，一隻烏鴉叼著香盒向北山飛去，把香盒放在墳墓前，他的學生沈澄和裴現撿到盒子後一看，就是之前遺失的那個盒子。殷保雖然要為父親守孝，但是每逢初一、十五一定會去祭拜老師。徐鷺一個人在老師墳前搭了帳篷，為老師守孝三年。”	守墓型 (六年喪) ※為老師守喪三年
6	任柔	首爾	“二十歲時母親生病，一直照顧母親親自煎藥，一點也不敢偷懶。父親去世後，禁食三日，三年期間痛哭欲絕。之後外祖母又相繼去世，任柔代替父親成為喪主悲痛追思。父親病情嚴重時，聽信謠言說人血對治病有特效，所以割破手臂取血為父治病，父親的病果然痊癒。”	犧牲型 守墓型 (三年喪)
7	康叔全		“小時候出去玩要時，必向父母告知行蹤；外出歸家時，必向父母請安。長大後從不曾離開父母身邊半步，恪守‘昏定晨省，外出回家後定告知父母’。父母八十五歲高齡時同時患有風疾，他照顧父母，為父母煎藥，十年裡從未間斷過。帶著父母到溫泉沐浴，三年後父母病情痊癒。父母對他的孝行很感動，打算把家產和奴婢都傳給他，但是叔全一邊拒絕一邊說：‘給生病的父母尋藥治療是子女應盡的本分……’父母便隨了他的願。”	日常型 兄弟愛

8	高用禮		“雖然家庭條件不富裕，但依然盡心奉養七十九歲的老母，每日準備美味的食物，恪守昏定晨省。無論嚴寒酷暑都細心的嘘寒問暖。母親逝世後，依據《家禮》的禮節為母守孝。在墳墓旁搭了一個棚子，每天早晚都祭拜……。”	日常型 守墓型 (三年喪)
9	副司正 朴忱	忠清道 天安	“父母年事已高，四個弟弟也全都踏上仕途。朴忱一個人盡心盡力奉養父母。就算父母生了一點小病，也四處尋醫問藥。逢年過節時一定會準備美酒佳餚，宴請鄉里的親朋好友讓父母高興。”	日常型
10	卞袍	稷山縣	“十一歲時父親去世，守孝三年來不吃鹽和醬料，每天穿著單薄的衣物，不穿布襪待在家附近，吃著清粥，鬱鬱寡歡。每天早晚都大聲痛哭。盡心奉養母親，恪守昏定省晨，不食美味。”	守墓型 (三年喪) 日常型
11	吳旼庚	龍仁縣	“在父母墳前守孝六年，哥哥和嫂子過早離世，留下六個無依無靠的孩子，他視孩子為己出，用心養育每個孩子。作為一家之長，給兩個孩子舉辦了婚禮。”	守墓型 (六年喪) 兄弟愛
12	別侍衛 趙旋	陽川縣	“雖然家境貧寒，但是依舊用心的奉養母親。母親臥病在床幾個月了，親自為母親煎藥，端屎端尿。母親臨終對趙旋說：‘我沒有子嗣又是獨女，但是我還有位九十四歲高齡的老母，現在我無法奉養她老人家了。你能這樣為我盡孝，這樣的孝心如果能同樣的對待我的母親，我就死而無憾了。’母親去世後趙旋悲痛大哭，按照禮節舉行了葬禮。像對親生母親一樣侍奉外祖母。外祖母過世後，在母親的墳墓旁安葬了外祖母，在墳墓旁搭了草棚守孝三年……。”	守墓型 (三年喪) 家庭愛 (奉養外祖母)
13	司直宋乙生 的妻子曹氏	黃海道 平山府	“二十五歲時丈夫去世，葬禮結束後父親打算讓她改嫁，她不從，已經堅持了二十三年了。逢年過節，初一十五時一定回去拜祭丈夫。奉養父親，每天獻上美味的食物。母親去世後穿了三年的喪服，在離墳墓很近的地方建起一座小屋，每天早晚都去奉食祭拜。”	守墓型 (六年喪) 貞節型

14	李奇	慶尚道 軍威縣	“十九歲時母親去世，舉行完葬禮後對父親說：‘我去為母親守墳。’父親說：‘我現在孤身一人，家裡條件也不富裕，你哥哥又去服軍役了，誰能幫你守墳啊？’李奇說：‘媽媽雖然有兩個兒子，但是哥哥現在服軍役，我一個人也沒有什麼工作，除了我還有誰能去為母親守墓。’帶著糧食便去為母親守墓了。把草編起來準備建造草棚，在母親靈堂旁傷心地大哭。兩天之後父親去看到後，十分的感動，終於答應了他，並幫助他一起搭了草棚。……父親也去世了，把父親和母親一起合葬，搬運泥土和石頭修建了墳墓。”	守墓型 (三年喪)
15	李奇遇	京畿 梁州	“平日裡侍奉父母恪守孝道，用心準備美味的食物奉養雙親。母親離開人世後禁食三天，悲痛欲絕地在墳前搭了草棚守孝。剛脫下喪服，父親突然又去世了。把父親和母親合葬在一起，在墓前守孝三年。親戚們不忍心看到他一個人拉拔孩子，湊了錢給他娶了媳婦。”	日常型 守墓型 (六年喪)

上述事例以不同類別整理如下：

類型	日常型	犧牲型	守墓型	貞節型	其他(教育、忠臣、兄弟愛、尊師……)
共計15件 (複數)	6件	4件	12件 (六年喪6件， 四年喪1件)	1件	4件
比率	40%	27%	80%	7%	27%

〈材料3〉世宗十四年(1432)孝行類型

之所以說關注世宗十四年(1432)九月十三日的孝行事例是具有特殊意義的，是因為當年六月九日爲了預防發生違背倫理道德的罪行，編寫了孝行教育材料《三綱行實錄》，這些孝子都是當年被舉薦出來的。特別值得注意的是5號事例，尹殷保和徐鶻在老師墳前爲老師守墓三年。根據“君師夫一體”的思想，對老師也得像對父親一樣守禮，其中一個人雖然父親去世，但是依然同時心懷孝道和師道，恪守禮節。

另外，11號事例也是很有關注價值的。吳旼庚在父母去世後墳前守孝六年，哥哥和嫂子過早離世，留下六個無依無靠的孩子，他把孩子視如己出，用心養育每個孩子。作爲一家之長，給兩個孩子舉辦了婚禮。這體現了兄弟之間有福同享，有難同當的高尚情懷。

12號趙旋的事例也引人注目。雖然家境貧寒，但是依舊用心地服侍母親，母親去世後又盡心地侍奉外祖母。不過，通過這些事例，我們也可以看到一些令人惋惜的故事——14號李奇的事例。母親去世後，因爲家庭條件不富裕，父親反對他守孝三年。李奇不聽依然堅持守孝三年，但是守孝期間父親

也不幸去世。在家境貧窮連家事都不能顧及的情況下,守孝三年導致了無法對父親盡孝。這樣的三年孝到底具有什麼意義?這值得我們深思。奉養健在的父親和為去世的母親盡孝,孰輕孰重?這是一個值得反省的事例。

在分析了全部事例後,發現有一點很特別,那就是和以前相比,守墓型的孝行占了80%,比率很高。值得關注的是,六年喪的例子占了絕大多數。那麼為什麼守墓型的事例會比以前有所增加呢?首先我們通過不同時期的資料來比較研究一下。

類型	世宗二年(1420)	世宗十年(1428)	世宗十四年(1432)
日常型	34%	17.5%	40%
犧牲型	15%	10%	27%
守墓型	46% (守墓型19件中, 六年喪3件, 長期比例9%)	82.5% (守墓型33件中, 六年喪12件,四年喪1件, 長期比例39.4%)	80% (守墓型12件中,六年喪6件, 四年喪1件,長期比例58.3%)
貞節型	46%	27.5%	7%
其他	5%	2.5%	20%

〈材料4〉年度孝行類型比較表

從圖表中可以看出變化最大的是守墓型孝行。1420年占了46%的比例,1428年占了82.5%的比例,1432年占了80%的比例,幾乎增長了近兩倍。同時值得關注的是,包括“斷指割骨”這種不顧自我安危的犧牲型孝行,也從1420年的15%增加到了1432年的27%。

前面雖然也提過,這就是世宗大王獎勵和優待孝行者的制度所帶來的結果。需要付出時間和努力的日常性孝行,因為都發生在家庭內部,所以不太可能引起大眾的注意。加之,因為在家裡盡孝是朝鮮社會儒教式生活所強調的家庭氛圍,所以也被看作是一種理所應當的事情。如果不是治療疾病這種特別的情況,是很難被周邊的人們所發現的。在墳前守孝三年或六年,這是一種在公開場合表現的孝行。雖然從某種層面上來說,這是本人想把自己的孝行展示給世人看,但是從舉薦孝子的官吏的立場來說,更需要的是一些顯而易見的客觀具體的孝行,而不是一些隱蔽的孝行。從舉薦者的角度來看,既客觀又方便舉薦的事例,就是守孝三年或六年。這就是守墓型孝子一定會比日常型孝子增加很多的原因。當然,因為犧牲型是一種在不顧自我安危的情況下發生的孝行,要滿足這個條件的話,就必須有類似外敵入侵、火災、疾病等這些災難發生的條件。但是守墓型是任何人都可以遇到的一種條件(喪禮),只要稍微努力一下,不管是誰都可以做到的孝行。從守墓的特性上來看,首先最應該考慮的是能否為家裡的生計負責,但是恰好相反,認為守墓盡孝比家裡的生計更重要的事例數不勝數。這是一個值得深思的問題。侍奉死者比侍奉生者更為重要,這非常值得我們反思。因為這樣,關於世宗對於守墓型孝行的看法非常靈活,我們通過具體的事例來確定一下。

四、結論

孝行雖然是子女對父母的基本道理,也是百行的根本。行孝雖然是出生長大後對父母恩惠的一種理所應當的報答,但是之所以是百行的根本,是因為人類不同於動物,孝行是一種人類固有的道德價值。任何動物都具有一個共同點,那就是本能的去愛護自己的子女。但是把得到的愛再報答回去的特徵只有人類才具有。人類和禽獸的不同點可以從孝行中發現。出生、長大、成人、自立的過程中,從父母那得到的恩惠是慈愛,反過來老、病、衰不能自立時,子女報答父母的心是孝行,這和只會接受的動物相比是有明顯區別的。因為是後天得到的,所以孝行成為了生活中供養的核心。供養父母(養口體)、順從父母(養志)、恭順父母都是父母生前的問題。

但是不知道從什麼時候開始,孝行的中心轉移到葬禮和祭禮上去了。與生前的孝行相比,死後的孝行,即守墓型孝行成為了孝的基本價值。並且轉變成了一種宗教型、絕對型的價值。甚至還出現了表彰和獎賞的制度。三年都還不夠,儘管不會再有喪禮,但是還是出現了像以前一樣為父母守喪四年和六年的事情。百行的根本是日常的孝行,這是任何都應該要做的事,也是任何人都能做到的日常型孝行。孝行慢慢轉變成了要求時間、經濟奉獻和犧牲的守墓型孝行,孝行成為了不管是誰都很難做到的特別的事情。隨著舉薦孝行者給予獎賞的制度越來越盛行,官吏們需要找到一些客觀的孝行依據,與那些在日常生活中不容易被發現的孝行相比,他們找到了大家都能夠看的到被確定、被公開的孝行事例。結果,花費大量時間、經費和努力的守墓型孝行就被大量的舉薦,可以說孝行賞制度成為了守墓型孝行增加的原因。

把誰都應該要做的孝行變成了誰都無法做的孝行,這是有問題的。不是上下班式的守墓,也不是鐘點工式的守墓,而是在墳墓旁邊花費整整三年到六年的時間行孝,這樣的孝行對於一般人來說是有負擔的。最後,它的命運就是隨著時間的流逝漸漸消失地無影無蹤。在這裡和日常型孝行不同,像“斷指割骨”一樣需要很大犧牲和決斷的犧牲型孝行,雖然和經典的孝行存在一定的差距,但是它卻給世人留下一種深刻的印象,並且還成爲了一種孝行典範。這就是孝在現實生活中變成了一種負擔的原因。這樣一來,守墓型、犧牲型和孝行獎賞制度,就是導致了孝和一般大眾漸行漸遠的罪魁禍首。也就是說,傳統孝行特點中摻雜了平常人難以承受的犧牲和獻身精神,這就會讓人感到負擔。

從現代的角度去重新審視傳統孝行特點的話,它並不是一種孝行的樣本,而應該是一種反省的因素。在過去,日常型孝行也出現了很多,但是超越生死極限的犧牲型孝行,和需要付出時間、物質和努力的守墓型孝行卻成為了孝行的典範,結果導致孝行離一般人越來越遠。所以說傳統型孝行是把孝變成一種負擔的因素。《論語》中所提到的“身體健康”、“恭敬的心”、“和顏

悅色”都可以說是孝行。²⁰ 但是這樣的孝行被犧牲型孝行和守墓型孝行所掩蓋，讓人們覺得它不算是孝行，甚至輕視它。世宗大王在對待守墓型、犧牲型孝行時所採取的靈活態度和判斷，可以說是權衡孝行的重要基準，給我們指明了孝行的方向。表彰兄弟之愛和家庭之愛，這應該成為我們今天學習的榜樣。這樣的孝行難道不是一種有價值的孝行嗎？

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²⁰ 《論語》，〈為政〉。

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Why Is Traditional Filial Piety Burdensome?

KIM Dukkyun

Abstract

Filial piety, which is a unique ethical behavior of human beings, is a fundamental responsibility of children to their parents. Most animals take care of their offspring, but only humans return the love to their parents. The responsibilities of filial piety mainly consisted in taking care of one's living parents. During King Sejong's 世宗 reign, however, the focus of filial piety was shifted to emphasizing rites and individual worship for their late parents such as three-year mourning. In other words, filial piety became a religious act. Even the government and/or social organizations encouraged this religious conduct by awarding filial children. These organizations tended to find more extreme cases of filial piety, causing overacting like a prolonged period of mourning lasting four to five years, instead of the typical three-year period during King Sejong's reign. In this way, filial piety required more time and energy making it an extremely difficult and special behavior. As a result, filial piety became a burden to ordinary people in the time of King Sejong.

Keywords: filial piety, loyalist, *Sejong sillok* 世宗實錄, three-year mourning

論荀子的禮和法後王 ——以“禮義統類”概念分析

張 鉉 根

中文提要

荀子的全部思想，一言以蔽之曰：“禮”。“禮”在荀子政治思想中，不僅是他理念構思的中核，且為他制度設計的立足點、歸結點。我們從荀子隆禮義、重知識的“禮義統類”概念而論，就可知荀子的“後王”觀念本身具有其獨立的特別的意義存在。荀子致力主張外在的社會規範；他強調“徵於人”，所以主張人性本惡；又重視“節於今”，所以主張效法後王。荀子重客觀現實，他所要“法”的是可據可證的先王之道，由於歷時久遠，所傳不詳，所以不能夠效法。所能取法的是後王因制革損益而創發的“禮憲”。這是荀子法後王的時間上的理由。荀子的統類說，便是為發現禮義發展中的共理來提供的。“欲知上世，則審周道”，“以近知遠，以一知萬”的說法，都是按此理由來說法後王的。荀子法後王就是法周，要效法的就是周道、周制、周文、周禮。荀子所說法後王，包含有周代典章制度意義。時間上的“禮憲”及空間上的“禮義統類”都和周公有關，荀子所指的後王並不是文武，也不是當代君主，而是周公。

關鍵詞：荀子，禮憲，禮義統類，法後王，周公

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一、序言

在《荀子》一書中言及“先王”者四十九次，談“後王”者十六次。¹ 因此，不少學者把荀子的“法先王”和“法後王”相提並論，在其“先”與“後”的環節上研究荀子思想，又稱它為荀子的歷史意識。² 李中生提出另一個見解，說“荀子既法先王又法後王的學說，可以概括為一句話，即：道法先王，法法後王。”³ 他們的主張都具有自己的理論根據，但是我們從荀子隆禮義、重知識的“統類”概念而論，就可知荀子的“後王”觀念本身具有其獨立的特別的意義存在。

先秦儒家把“治世”看作具有完美秩序的狀態。所以在他們的認識論上，最重要的問題就是如何體認充滿秩序的善。儒家人性觀以善的擴充與實現為目的，他們的政治論是以人倫秩序之充分實現為理想的。孔子稱它為“仁”。孟子側重“仁者愛人”一要義，而由“推擴”之道達到秩序完美的理想世界。反之，荀子側重“克己復禮為仁”，以具體可行的外在之“禮”來實現並維持“養人之欲”、“別親疏貴賤之節”的社會秩序。荀子的全部思想，一言以蔽之曰：“禮”。“禮”在荀子政治思想中，不僅是他理念構思的中核，且為他制度設計的立足點、歸結點。今本《荀子》書三十二篇中，除〈仲尼〉、〈宥坐〉（以下只註篇名）兩篇外，大都對禮的問題有所論述，可見荀子的重禮。

荀子“隆禮義而殺詩書，”⁴ 致力主張外在的社會規範；他主張以欲言性，以人制天，重視辨合符驗，他說：“善言古者，必有節於今；善言天者，必有徵於人。凡論者貴其有辨合，有符驗。”⁵ “徵於人”，所以主張人性本惡；“節於今”，所以主張效法後王。荀子當時，國家的神秘色彩正在逐漸退步，⁶ 他自己的理想君主並非從神秘的先代聖王中找來，而是要從後世君王中找來。

二、荀子禮的意義、範圍及起源

荀子書中，所習用的慣語是“禮義”，處處禮與義連稱，禮以義為其本質。禮雖為聖人制作，但有其依據，有其客觀的制作原則“義”，故荀子曰：“天下

¹ 《四部叢刊初編》本《荀子》(<http://ctext.org/xunzi/>)。

² 廖春春，〈論荀子的“法後王”說〉，頁54-58；東方朔，〈“先王之道”與“法後王”——荀子思想中的歷史意識〉，頁45-54；萬國崔，〈荀子之“法先王”與“法後王”新論〉，頁117-120；徐克謙，〈荀子的“先王”“後王”說與辯證道統觀〉，頁79-83等皆是。

³ 李中生，〈荀子校註叢稿〉，頁64。

⁴ 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。詩書之義，由人之內部主體而發，孟子重內聖，亦善言詩書。但荀子重外王，不重內部主體，所以“隆禮義而殺詩書。”殺是貶抑。韋政通，〈荀子與古代哲學〉，頁5-9。

⁵ 《荀子》，〈性惡〉。

⁶ 陳長琦，〈中國古代國家與政治〉，頁40。

之要，義爲本”⁷，“以義制事”。⁸禮與義實爲一事之表裏。陳大齊說：“禮與義有著同樣的功用”，實有根據，⁹荀子書中大部分“義”字，也可以“禮”替代進去。

1、禮的意義

《說文解字》釋“禮”謂：“禮，履也；所以事神致福也。人示人豐，豐亦聲。”《說文》又云：“豐，行禮之器也，人豆象形。讀與禮同。”由此而觀，“禮”在中國的上古社會中，是一種宗教祭祀的崇拜儀式。上古人且以此宗教活動爲推動人民生活的主要力量，故“禮”慢慢變爲人與人之間的生活規範，終成爲中國傳統文化思想中的主軸觀念。¹⁰

在沒有成文法之社會中，生活規範的效果，可以說和拘束人民行爲的法典作用無所區別，中國古代的“禮”即是。至於周公以宗法制度建立封建組織的社會，以制禮作樂來維繫封建秩序，禮樂便成爲外在的制度形式。孔子從周，崇周公，重人文，禮也隨之成爲儒家思想的中心概念。孔子之道，雖以仁爲本，然未嘗不崇禮，《論語》中“禮”字出現共七十五次。¹¹徐復觀以爲論語中所言的禮有三種意含：一是隨順已有的禮俗；一是擴大本系宗教性的儀節於日常生活中；一是由禮之本而更新禮的意義和精神。¹²孔子之功在擴大禮之範圍而加深其意義，使之成爲正民治國之要術。然孔子言禮，大都以“仁”爲其基本出發點，對禮之內容只提舉凡要而未作詳細的陳述。

荀子則不然，荀子書對禮的內容陳述的即精又詳。《荀子》三十二篇中，“禮”字出現三百四十三次。¹³他的禮不僅含有上述各種意義，且擴大其義，使之落實而成爲具體可行的社會、政治、經濟、法律制度。即是說，荀子一

⁷ 《荀子》，〈疆國〉。

⁸ 《荀子》，〈君子〉。

⁹ 關於禮與義連言的問題，勞思光，《牟著荀學大略讀後感》說：“禮依義而成，故荀子乃說禮義之統。”此說是把義說成禮的依據，其實荀子說禮義之統，是要就“禮”與“義”而言其統，並不包含禮之依據的問題。羅倬漢，《禮與社會倫紀》說：“因禮之見於外爲禮義，後復寫爲禮儀——古義、儀俱從我聲。”在文字學上義儀雖通，但儀是指繁文縟節，繁即不免於雜，而荀子是要即義而彰其統，義是統之義，統與繁雜不相容。陳大齊，《荀子學說》，1989說：“有著同樣功能的，當然不一定是異名同實，亦可能是異名異實，自不得因此遽予論定謂禮即是義。但禮與義即有著同樣的功用，則在功用的觀點上，無庸爲之細加分別。”此說“禮與義有著同樣的功用”是對的，但仍未說出禮義何以必連稱之故。韋政通，《荀子與古代哲學》，頁6-7。韋先生的結論是，荀子曰“以國齊義”（〈王霸〉），“義者所以限禁人之爲惡與姦者也。”（〈疆國〉）即荀子書凡言“義”者，莫非“禮”義，許多提到“義”字的地方，都可以“禮”代進去，而意義完全一樣，故〈大略〉篇即逕說“義，禮也，故行。”

¹⁰ 現代所謂的“禮”也包括儀文與生活規範兩種意義。蕭公權分之爲廣狹二義，他說：“考諸古籍，春秋時人之論禮，含有廣狹之二義。狹義指禮之儀文形式，廣義指一切典章制度。”蕭公權，《中國政治思想史（上）》，頁100。

¹¹ 《武英殿十三經注疏》本《論語注疏》（<http://ctext.org/analects/zh>）。陳飛龍，〈孔孟荀三家禮之比較〉，頁112。

¹² 徐復觀，〈荀子政治思想的解析〉，頁160。

¹³ 按《四部叢刊初編》本《荀子》（<http://ctext.org/xunzi/zh>）。

面以禮爲立人處世的基本要件，認爲禮是一切人生規範的總稱，又一面賦之以新穎的意義，認爲禮是一切治國制度的準繩。曾春海亦分禮之意義爲三種，說：“一爲宇宙萬物所資以生成變化的自然法，是禮的極至。一爲明分使群（富國）、安邦定國的人爲法，以及規範人倫行爲的道德法。”¹⁴ 惟因荀子政治意識特重，故其中人爲法、制度義特強。

2、禮的範圍

如上所述，荀子所說的禮，其範圍下自個人立身處世之道，上至治理國家之道，無不涵攝。他的禮不但兼具禮貌、儀文及制度形式之義，亦且涵蓋應付自然法之義。

先就個人立身處世而言，禮爲一般人所資以遵循的正身工具，荀子曰：

禮者，所以正身也，師者，所以正禮也。無禮何以正身？無師吾安知禮之爲是也？禮然而然，則是情安禮也；師云而云，則是知若師也。¹⁵
禮者，人道之極也。然而不法禮，不足禮，謂之無方之民；法禮，足禮，謂之有方之士。¹⁶
今人之化師法，積文學，道禮義者爲君子；縱性情，安恣睢，而違禮義者爲小人。¹⁷

禮、師皆成爲人在日常的人倫關係中，個人言行所當依照修習的合理規範，也是個人在人類社會的群居生活中，所資以取法的言行方向。觀其言論，在次序上似乎覺得“尊師”爲先，“隆禮”次之。然而荀子的中心觀念，畢竟是在“禮”字上的，故曰：“禮者，人道之極也。”¹⁸

其次，就治國之道而言，禮在政治、經濟、法律、軍事上是治國的規範。荀子云：

禮者，法之大分，類之綱紀也。¹⁹
足國之道：節用裕民，而善臧其餘。節用以禮，裕民以政。……而或以無禮節用之，則必有貪利糾譌之名，而且有空虛窮乏之實矣。²⁰
農分田而耕，賈分貨而販，百工分事而勸，士大夫分職而聽，建國諸侯之君分土而守，三公總方而議，則天子共己而已矣。出若入若，天下莫不平均，莫不治辨，是百王之所同也，而禮法之大分也。²¹
隆禮貴義者其國治，簡禮賤義者其國亂；治者強，亂者弱，是強弱之本也。²²
禮義生而制法度。²³

¹⁴ 曾春海，〈荀子思想中的統類與禮法〉，頁77。

¹⁵ 《荀子》，〈修身〉。

¹⁶ 《荀子》，〈禮論〉。

¹⁷ 《荀子》，〈性惡〉。

¹⁸ 《荀子》，〈禮論〉。

¹⁹ 《荀子》，〈勸學〉。

²⁰ 《荀子》，〈富國〉。

²¹ 《荀子》，〈王霸〉。

²² 《荀子》，〈議兵〉。

由此觀之，荀子的禮在政治經濟上成為規劃社會職類分工，調節社會機能，維繫人民生計以及建構國家體制的客觀形式依據，在法律上成為一切典律的準據，在軍事上成為強國之本，故謂之“法之大本，類之綱紀。”

其次，就自然法則而言，禮是應付或處理自然現象時所應採取的方法，荀子曰：

天地以合，日月以明，四時以序，星辰以行，江河以流，萬物以昌，好惡以節，喜怒以當，以為下則順，以為上則明，萬[物]變[而]不亂，貳之則喪也。禮豈不至矣哉！²⁴

荀子此言，殆謂自然現象之不能為害，生產事業之所以充分發達，亦莫非由於人之能實行禮義。荀子在《天論》中說：“天有其時，地有其財，人有其治”，而極力肯定人的作為能力及人治的價值，與此段記載足以互相輝映。如此，荀子連自然法則也攝入於禮的範圍之內，將禮的範圍更加擴展了。

由上而觀，荀子禮之範圍至為廣大，統括人生及自然、社會及政治一切規範，正如他所言：“故人無禮則不生，事無禮則不成，國家無禮則不寧。”²⁵其中，荀子特別重視的是社會、政治、經濟諸制度，故有時把“禮”稱為“禮憲”。²⁶有了禮憲，方能治國，故禮是正國之具。

3、禮之起源

荀子言性，以為“人之性惡，其善者偽也。”²⁷人之性，生而有有利疾惡，有聲色之好，有耳目之欲，即人之耳、目、口、鼻、形體等五官無不有欲。如此，人乃多欲的動物，必將有師法然後正，得禮義而後治。故荀子論禮之所起，乃以其欲望論為出發點。他說：

禮起於何也？曰：人生而有欲，欲而不得，則不能無求。求而無度量分界，則不能不爭；爭則亂，亂則窮。先王惡其亂也，故制禮義以分之，以養人之欲，給人之求。使欲必不窮於物，物必不屈於欲。兩者相持而長，是禮之所起也。²⁸

此段記載所言禮的起源，²⁹我們可從兩方面探索之；一則“先王惡其亂”而制禮義，二則為了欲與物“相持而長”而起禮義。

²³ 《荀子》，〈性惡〉。

²⁴ 《荀子》，〈禮論〉。

²⁵ 《荀子》，〈修身〉。

²⁶ 《荀子》，〈勸學〉。

²⁷ 《荀子》，〈性惡〉。

²⁸ 《荀子》，〈禮論〉。

²⁹ 關於荀子之前禮、樂名字與意義上之起源問題，羅倬漢分析得極為詳切。羅倬漢，《論禮樂之起源》，頁46-52。

前者，亦可謂禮義之源在於“平亂”的要求。此與墨子論國家起源時之立場相似。³⁰ 墨子早已有社會觀念，肯定國家社會的秩序優先於個人需求，以爲由於人懷私欲以相爭相害，不得不建立政治權力以作統御。³¹ 荀子受其影響，據“人之欲求”立說以釋禮義之起，亦以爲“人生而有欲”，有求遂“不能不爭”，故必須制禮義法度以節之，使人服從一定秩序。於是禮義之起源乃歸於平亂息爭之要求。³² 故荀子又曰：

勢位齊，而欲惡同，物不能澹則必爭；爭則必亂，亂則窮矣。先王惡其亂也，故制禮義以分之，使有貧富貴賤之等，足以相兼臨者，是養天下之本也。³³ 夫貴爲天子，富有天下，是人情之所同欲也；然則從人之欲，則勢不能容，物不能贍也。故先王案爲之制禮義以分之，使有貴賤之等，長幼之差，知愚能不能之分，皆使人載其事，而各得其宜。³⁴

社會資源有限，而人欲無窮，對於同物，多有“同欲”，如是必爭且亂。惟荀子以爲人之有欲乃天生使然，欲不能去，亦不當去，吾人應積極制禮義以養人之欲，使欲之所求適可而止，如此，物資足供人之所需，不至因奢侈消耗而陷於枯竭，兩者斟酌配合，“使欲不窮於物，物必不屈於欲”，如此則生活無虞，社會安定。

至於禮所由出之根本，荀子提出三項，曰：

禮有三本：天地者，生之本也；先祖者，類之本也；君師者，治之本也。無天地，惡生？無先祖，惡出？無君師，惡治？三者偏亡，焉無安人。故禮，上事天，下事地，尊先祖，而隆君師。是禮之三本也。³⁵

天地是生長萬物的，先祖是生育人類的，君師是治理國家、教化人民的，若無天地則無萬物，無先祖則無人類，無君師則無政教。此三者爲人類生命之基本，人當感激尊敬，故對天地祖先，制禮以祭祀致誠；對君師，制禮以恭敬順從。此三者不僅爲禮之最初根本，亦爲制禮之依據，而且是缺一不可的，故云：“三者偏亡焉，無安人。”“安”則指政治上的安寧而言。

荀子之所以重禮，是因爲禮可爲“經國定分”，³⁶ 因此對禮之所由起與所由出問題的探索，不從歷史的觀點去追索，而直接從人的自然情欲和先王之求治而尋覓之。

³⁰ 墨家論社會起源，有極精到之處，墨子以爲國家由人民同意所造成，他說：“君臣萌，通約也。”（《墨子》，〈經上〉）此語近似於西方民約論。墨家在世界上最初達到社會存在的觀念。

³¹ 《墨子》，〈尚同〉。

³² 不過，荀子從物的方面觀察，以爲非組織社會無以劑物之不贍；墨子從心的方面觀察，以爲非組織社會無以齊義之不同。梁啟超，《先秦政治思想史》，頁126-127。

³³ 《荀子》，〈王制〉。

³⁴ 《荀子》，〈榮辱〉。

³⁵ 《荀子》，〈禮論〉。

³⁶ 《荀子》，〈非十二子〉。

三、禮義之統與法後王

荀子以爲“古今一也。類不悖，雖久同理。”³⁷ 因此，他提出“道貫”的主張。“百王之無變，足以爲道貫。一廢一起，應之以貫，理貫不亂。不知貫，不知應變。貫之大體未嘗亡也。亂生其差，治盡其詳。故道之所善，中則可從，畸則不可爲，匿則大惑。”³⁸ 荀子以爲今猶古，良法美制適用於往昔者，必可適用於今日，所以說：“百王之無變，足以爲道貫。”正是由於道有其貫，所以可以從後王之道來窺見百王之道，他說：“百王之道，後王是也。君子審後王之道，而論百王之前，若端拜而議。推禮義之統，分是非之分，總天下之要，治海內之眾，若使一人。故操彌約，而事彌大。五寸之矩，盡天下之方也。”³⁹ 按荀子的本意，“道貫”是指禮義之統。“禮義之統”一語，就是整個荀子思想學說的大旨，但在荀子書中，卻少見此語，而多以“統類”代稱。荀子說：“學者以聖王爲師，法其法，以求其統類。”⁴⁰ 在荀子政治思想結構中，“統類”和禮義、聖王之間有極其重要的關係。荀子大發揮禮義之治，在此禮義發展中的共理便是“統類”。

“統類”是荀子獨發的概念，也可以單獨稱爲“統”或“類”。單獨說“統”，多半是表達具體條貫的實事；單獨說“類”，多半是表達事物依存的理則；合實事與理則爲一，通稱“統類”，遂成至高無上的客觀實存之標誌。就分析“道貫”和“統類”，“道”或“統”是累代聖王經緯天下的大原大則或基本精神，“貫”或“類”是這個大原大則或基本精神的推類及運用。⁴¹ 熊公哲說：“案荀子所謂類，其用要在濟法教之所不及，聞見之所未至。然或言倫類，或言統類。大抵就禮法言，則曰倫類，或簡言曰類。就聖王言，則曰統類，或簡言曰統。此其辨也。”⁴² 筆者很同意熊先生的看法，是因爲荀子的“統”乃聖王具體的政治的正統性(legitimacy)，荀子的“類”乃其政治運作的原理(principle)。

荀子所說“禮義之統”⁴³、“仁義之統”⁴⁴、“禮樂之統”⁴⁵的“統”，大概都是指聖王治理國家的綱紀或統領來說的。⁴⁶ 荀子說：“君子者，天地之參也，萬物之摠也，民之父母也。無君子，則天地不理，禮義無統，上無君師，下無父子，夫是之謂至亂。”⁴⁷ “若夫忠信端慤，而不害傷，則無接而不然，是仁人之

37 《荀子》，〈非相〉。

38 《荀子》，〈天論〉。

39 《荀子》，〈不苟〉。

40 《荀子》，〈解蔽〉。

41 沈成添，〈荀子的禮治思想〉，頁33。他認爲“道貫”與“統類”是類似概念。

42 熊公哲，〈荀卿學案〉，頁27。

43 《荀子》，〈不苟〉。

44 《荀子》，〈榮辱〉。

45 《荀子》，〈樂論〉。

46 荀子書中的“統”字可有多種意義，韋政通分之爲四種：①統字作綱紀解，②統字作本字解，

③統字作領字解，④統字作治字解。韋政通，〈荀子與古代哲學〉，頁16。

47 《荀子》，〈王制〉。

質也。忠信以爲質，端慤以爲統，禮義以爲文，倫類以爲理，喘而言，蹢而動，而一可以爲法則。”⁴⁸在荀子眼裏，禮義是政治的綱紀，所以“無統”則“至亂”，“一統類”才能治理。聖人“總方略，齊言行，一統類。”⁴⁹禮義之所以能說統，其關鍵實在先知“類”，因爲“禮者，法之大分，類之綱紀也。”⁵⁰“法之大分”說的是其義，“類之綱紀”說的是其統，都是指治國綱紀之推類、運用來說的。

牟宗三說：“惟理可以統可以貫。故云：‘類不悖，雖久同理。’⁵¹又云：‘有法者以法行，無法則以類舉。’⁵²每一類有其成類之理。理即成類之根據。握其理，則可以通。‘法教之所不及，聞見之所未至’，⁵³皆可以類通。以類通，即以同類之理通。”⁵⁴牟先生說的很有道理。知類的話，自然可以明統，所以荀子曾以統類連言，說“知統類”、“一統類”等。

在《荀子》書中，使用“類”字的地方非常多，有六十二次。⁵⁵其意義每每不同，⁵⁶其中和荀子政治思想有關的：一爲與統類相連稱者，即把類看作治理國家的綱紀，二爲與“法”相對而言之“類”，即把類看作治法所依存的理則。

就前者來講，荀子說：“脩脩兮其用統類之行也。”⁵⁷唐代楊倞的註釋說：“統類，綱紀也。”楊氏並沒有區別“統”和“類”。其實，統和類都是從其理來構成的綱紀，都有治理國家秩序的意義。荀子說：“倚物怪變，所未嘗聞也，卒然起一方，則舉統類而應之，無所疑作。”⁵⁸“多言則文而類，終日議其所以，言之千舉萬變，其統類一也：是聖人之知也。”⁵⁹

其次，荀子把“類”字與“法”字對言。“法”意味著人所可能或必須循持的“法則度量”“文制典憲”，僅次於禮。不過，“類”是原則性的，先於禮。“有法者以法行，無法者以類舉。以其本知其末，以其左知其右，凡百事異理而相守也。慶賞刑罰，統類而後應；政教習俗，相順而後行。”⁶⁰所以“類”比“法”要深一層，深藏於法的裏層而不容易見面，就是“法教之所不及，聞見之所未至”者。⁶¹荀

48 《荀子》，〈臣道〉。

49 《荀子》，〈非十二子〉。

50 《荀子》，〈勸學〉。

51 《荀子》，〈非相〉。

52 《荀子》，〈王制〉。

53 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

54 牟宗三，《荀學大略》，頁4。

55 俞仁環說五十九次，他正由此“類”字透視荀子的政治思想，他對“類”字的解釋富有獨到之處，可供參考。俞仁環，《從類字透視荀子政治思想之體系》，頁30-39。近按《四部叢刊初編》本《荀子》(<http://ctext.org/xunzi/>)改爲六十二次。

56 就如“統”字一樣，韋政通亦把“類”字之義分爲四種：①類亦作綱紀解，②類作種類解，③類作比類解，④類作法字解。韋政通，《荀子與古代哲學》，頁17-18。

57 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

58 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

59 《荀子》，〈性惡〉。

60 《荀子》，〈大略〉。

61 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

子說：“人無法，則佹佹然；有法而無志其義，則渠渠然；依乎法，而又深其類，然後溫溫然。”⁶² “故學者以聖王爲師，案以聖王之制爲法，法其法以求其統類，以務象效其人。向是而務，士也；類是而幾，君子也；知之，聖人也。”⁶³

“統類”就是一切事類所依據的共理，也是歷代聖王經緯天下之大原大則，亦即是先王禮法的原理原則。由百王累積之法度，統而一之，連而貫之，綜而成爲禮義之統，正因爲如此，統類或禮義之統始可稱之謂“道”。聖人“知通統類”，所以能“舉統類”以應萬變。能應萬變，所以足以爲百姓師表。可見荀子法後王的主旨在於推行先王聖人的“禮義之統”。

四、崇先王而法後王

先秦諸子立論時，多半托付於古人，⁶⁴ 先王論就是其中之一。在戰國君主專制政治的條件下，一般是不能直接對君主加以品評，於是諸子借“先王之道”或“先王之法”爲自己的理論張目。⁶⁵ 先王思想實際是向當時君主提出了一般性的，同時也是一種高標準的要求。就此政治思想的普遍立場來講，荀子所說先王及後王的意義不僅互相類似，也具有同樣的功能。

孔子“祖述堯舜，憲章文武。”⁶⁶ 孟子“道性善，言必稱堯舜。”⁶⁷ 孔孟上宗堯舜，下及文武，素尊先王之道，然並沒有提及“後王”此名詞，只有荀子大力主唱後王說，建立一套獨特的歷史觀以及政治論。其實，荀子也經常說“法先王”，查看他的全部著作，說先王多於稱述後王。例如：“不聞先王之遺言，不知學問之大也。”⁶⁸ “先王之道，忠臣孝子之極也。”⁶⁹ 在基本出發點上荀子和孔孟不同。孟子主性善，所以要由“推擴”其善而達到先王之道；荀子主性惡，所以要由“節制”達到後王之道。荀子大力主唱客觀外在的禮治，所以其所謂“儒者法先王，隆禮義”⁷⁰ 的“先王”，顯然與孟子“遵先王之法”⁷¹ 的“先王”意義不同。⁷²

⁶² 《荀子》，〈修身〉。

⁶³ 《荀子》，〈解蔽〉。

⁶⁴ 黃建中，〈中國古代哲學之起源與發展〉，頁1。

⁶⁵ 先秦諸子諸派中，只有法家反對借古喻今，而主張變古，目的是爲了強化君主專制。即使如此，法家中的一些人物也不免有提出先王來，如商鞅即有稱頌先王治國之道，他說：“古之明君，錯法而民無邪，舉事而材自練，行賞而兵強，此三者治之本也。”（《商君書》，〈錯法〉）又云：“且夫利異而害不同者，先王所以爲保也。”（《商君書》，〈禁使〉）

⁶⁶ 《中庸》。

⁶⁷ 《孟子》，〈滕文公上〉。

⁶⁸ 《荀子》，〈勸學〉。

⁶⁹ 《荀子》，〈禮論〉。

⁷⁰ 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

⁷¹ 《孟子》，〈離婁上〉。

荀子說：“凡言不合先王，不順禮義，謂之奸言；雖辯，君子不聽。法先王，順禮義，黨學者，然而不好言，不樂言，則必非誠士也。”⁷³ “故先王明禮義以一之，致忠信以愛之，尚賢使能以次之。”⁷⁴ “故先王案爲之立文，尊尊親親之義至矣。”⁷⁵ 可見荀子的所以效法先王，就是因爲先王“明禮義”而“立文”，並不著眼於先王內聖的功夫。不僅如此，先王即“審禮”而行，動無不當，又能“善善惡惡”，所以先王可稱謂“積僞”的聖王，也就是審禮治法的外王。荀子說：“請問兼能之奈何？曰：審之禮也。古者先王審禮以方皇周浹於天下，動無不當也。故君子恭而不難，敬而不羣，貧窮而不約，富貴而不驕，並遇變態而不窮，審之禮也。”⁷⁶ “夫尚賢使能，賞有功，罰有罪，非獨一人爲之也，彼先王之道也，一人之本也，善善惡惡之應也，治必由之，古今一也。”⁷⁷

“隆禮義”是荀子所透顯的治國方向，其崇先王也可以說是爲“禮義之統”作準備的。“統”則指累代聖王經緯天下的大原則或基本精神而言。先王“統禮義”、“舉統類而應之”，所以能“疏觀萬物而知其情，參稽治亂而通其度。”⁷⁸ 荀子說：“法先王，統禮義，一制度；以淺持博，以古持今，以一持萬；苟仁義之類也，雖在鳥獸之中，若別白黑；倚物怪變，所未嘗聞也，所未嘗見也，卒然起一方，則舉統類而應之，無所擬作；張法而度之，則倏然若合符節：是大儒者也。”⁷⁹

能夠舉其統類，才能開始應變。〈王制〉有說：“舉措應變而不窮，夫是之謂有原，是王者之人也。”〈非十二子〉又說：“宗原應變，曲得其宜，如是然後聖人也。”“原”即指統類，“有原”“宗原”即是所謂知通禮義之統。先王知通禮義之統，所以“舉措應變而不窮。”荀子所說的先王，實與後王意義相近。荀子曾批評子思、孟子說：“略法先王而不知其統。”⁸⁰ 又指責俗儒說：“逢衣淺帶，解果其冠，略法先王而足亂世術，繆學雜舉，不知法後王而一制度，不知隆禮義而殺詩書；其衣冠行僞已同於世俗矣，然而不知惡；其言議談說已無所以異於墨子矣，然而明不能別；呼先王以欺愚者而求衣食焉；得委積足以揜其口，則揚揚如也；隨其長子，事其便辟，舉其上客，億然若終身之虜而不敢有他志：是俗儒者也。”⁸¹

72 孟子曰：“以不忍人之心，行不忍人之政，治天下可運於掌上。”（《孟子·公孫丑上》）不忍人之政就是仁政，即愛民之政，也就是內聖外王的王道。

73 《荀子》，〈非相〉。

74 《荀子》，〈富國〉。

75 《荀子》，〈禮論〉。

76 《荀子》，〈君道〉。

77 《荀子》，〈強國〉。

78 《荀子》，〈解蔽〉。

79 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

80 《荀子》，〈非十二子〉。

81 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

荀子所指責的，不是法先王本身，而是“略法先王而不知其統”，其著重點則在“不知其統”。荀子心目中的先王，實在是一位能知統類、篤行外王之政治家，那政治家必須以禮為其經緯蹊徑。“原先王，本仁義，則禮正其經緯蹊徑也。”⁸² 先王無不“審禮”“明禮義”“立文”，就是其治道無不由禮，這也就是荀子後王論所包含的主要意義。

五、法後王的理由

那麼，荀子為什麼法後王？所謂“後王”是誰？荀子重客觀現實，他所要“法”的是可據可證的先王之道，由於歷時久遠，所傳不詳，所以不能夠效法。所能取法的是後王因制革損益而創發的“禮憲”。這是荀子法後王的時間上的理由。⁸³ 他說：“妄人者，門庭之間，猶可誣欺也，而況於千世之上乎？聖人何以不可欺？曰：聖人者，以己度者也。故以人度人，以情度情，以類度類，以說度功，以道觀盡，古今一[度]也。類不悖，雖久同理，故鄉乎邪曲而不迷，觀乎雜物而不惑，以此度之。五帝之外無傳人，非無賢人也，久故也。五帝之中無傳政，非無善政也，久故也。禹湯有傳政而不若周之察也，非無善政也，久故也。傳者久則論略，近則論詳；略則舉大，詳則舉小。愚者聞其略而不知其詳，聞其[詳]小而不知其大也。是以文久而滅，節族久而絕。”⁸⁴

“門庭之間”的事情亦不可盡信，何況是遠在千百年之事呢！而且“文久而滅，節族久而絕”，雖欲取遠古之法度，皆早經滅絕，亦無可取法了。如此，先王離今太遠，禮之儀文年久而息，禮之細節時久而變，所以先王之法不能相信，也無從效法。不過，後王承先王之道，因時制宜，代有改革，其所損所益，總以應變不窮，所以要實行先王之道，只好取法後王。

荀子法後王的理由，或許本於孔子。孔子說過：“夏禮吾能言之，杞不足徵也；殷禮吾能言之，宋不足徵也。文獻不足故也，足，則吾能徵之矣。”⁸⁵ 夏殷禮之不足徵，就是因為時間過的太久。“文獻不足”和荀子所說的“文久而滅，節族久而絕”二句，意義相近。堯舜時代已經久遠，遺留下來的文獻太過簡單，不足為憑，夏殷兩代文獻，也沒有完備的紀錄可供參考。荀子雖說：“言[道德]政治之求，不下於安存；言誌意之求，不下於士；言道德之求，不二後王。道過三代謂之蕩，法二後王謂之不雅。”⁸⁶ “蕩”是說廣漠久遠而難知，夏、殷也是蕩，所以說：“禹湯有傳政，不若周之察也。”孔子說：“周監於二

⁸² 《荀子》，〈勸學〉。

⁸³ 陳大齊稱此理由為消極理由。陳大齊，《荀子學說》，頁208。

⁸⁴ 《荀子》，〈非相〉。

⁸⁵ 《論語》，〈八佾〉。

⁸⁶ 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

代，郁郁乎文哉！吾從周。”⁸⁷由此觀之，荀子主法後王，正合乎孔子“從周”之義。⁸⁸所以孔子和荀子言及治道，每次必須以周文為據。惟孔子則“祖述堯舜，憲章文武”而兼“道之以德，齊之以禮”，⁸⁹然荀子則單主“齊之以禮”，卻崇先王而“法”後王。

荀子法後王，又有空間上的理由。歷史古今有其多樣性，但也有普遍法則[共理]存在。荀子的統類說，便是為發現禮義發展中的共理來提供的。“欲知上世，則審周道”，“以近知遠，以一知萬”的說法，都是按此理由來說法後王的。荀子說：“欲觀千歲，則數今日；欲知億萬，則審一二；欲知上世，則審周道；欲審周道，則審其人，所貴君子。故曰：以近知遠，以一知萬，以微知明，此之謂也。”⁹⁰“夫妄人曰：‘古今異情，其所以治亂者異道。’而眾人惑焉。彼眾人者，愚而無說，陋而無度者也。其所見焉，猶可欺也，而況於千世之傳也？……故以人度人，以情度情，以類度類，以說度功，以道觀盡，古今一[度]也。類不悖，雖久同理。”⁹¹古今雖異情，治亂雖異道，然而異情異道之中，必有其普遍共理存在。“以人度人，以情度情，以類度類”，正是從“合內外，通人我”之“度”的智能上來申言後王之良法美行的，所以說：“以道觀盡，古今一也。”

戰國時期，法家“變古”的歷史觀非常流行，他們接受當時政治現實，在現實社會的環境裏追求治亂方策，因此，反對一切“法古”或託古者，而主張變古。⁹²他們說：“聖人不法古，不修今。法古則後於時，修今則塞於勢。周不法商，夏不法虞，三代異勢，而皆可以王。故興王有道，而持之異理。”⁹³是以聖人不期循古，不法常行，論世之事，因為之備。……今欲以先王之政，治當世之民，皆守株之類也。”⁹⁴

荀子不同意“世異則事異，事異則備變”⁹⁵的說法，他把那些主張古今異情、治亂異道者看做“妄人”。荀子的法後王，言古而必節今，知遠而必以近，後王在人的縱貫關係中，具有貫通古今的普遍性，所以說：“古今一道”，這就是孔子“其或繼周者，雖百世可知”⁹⁶的意思。⁹⁷

⁸⁷ 《論語》，〈八佾〉。

⁸⁸ 荀子雖與孔子同主“從周”，但其所從者復不同。孔子“祖述堯舜，憲章文武”（《禮記·中庸》），其“從周”的重點在於“憲章文武”。反之，荀子主張“從周”，其重點不在“憲章文武”，而在法後王。沈成添，〈荀子的禮治思想〉，頁31。

⁸⁹ 《論語》，〈為政〉。

⁹⁰ 《荀子》，〈非相〉。

⁹¹ 《荀子》，〈非相〉。

⁹² 張鉉根，〈論商鞅的軍國主義教育觀〉，頁69-70。

⁹³ 《商君書》，〈開塞〉。

⁹⁴ 《韓非子》，〈五蠹〉。

⁹⁵ 《韓非子》，〈五蠹〉。

⁹⁶ 《論語》，〈為政〉。

⁹⁷ 荀子是由今世推知往古，是往上推；孔子說“百世可知”，則是往下推，其方向有所不同。蔡仁厚，《孔孟荀哲學》，頁459。

荀子法後王，又有後王本身的積極理由。荀子隆禮義，力求可據可證的道理，那就是燦然明備的周制，所以荀子主張效法今世“天下之君”。他說：“故千人萬人之情，一人之情也。天地始者，今日是也。百王之道，後王是也。君子審後王之道，而論百王之前，若端拜而議。”⁹⁸“欲觀聖王之跡，則於其粲然者矣，後王是也。彼後王者，天下之君也；舍後王而道上古，譬之是猶舍己之君，而事人之君也。”⁹⁹

先王之法，經過後王的所加，變得更美，更切合當前的需要；而且後王之法是積累先代聖王知慮而成，藏有前代善美的法度遺跡，所以燦然大備。因後代法度是損益前代法度而集百王來大成的，所以說：“百王之道，後王是也。”

此外，荀子主張法後王，還有一種直接的理由，是因為當時有一些“俗儒”藉著先王的名號，騙取衣食而“亂世術”，荀子以為這種現象的發生是由於“不知法後王”的緣故。他說：“略法先王而足亂世術，繆學雜舉，不知法後王而一制度，不知隆禮義而殺詩書；其衣冠行偽已同於世俗矣，……忽先王以欺愚者而求衣食焉；得委積足以拾其口，則揚揚如也；……是俗儒者也。”¹⁰⁰

戰國時代，百家學說互相競爭，所謂“俗儒”者，雖然滿口贊揚先王之道，但並不體認其大義，泥古而不通今，不能述後王之美而有所建白，不能應時需而立制度。他們冒充儒者的名義，反而借先王的言說，“以欺愚者而求衣食”。這都是誣先王而亂儒的敗類，所以荀子排斥他們，稱為俗儒。反之，“雅儒”者，“法後王，一制度，隆禮義而殺詩書，其言行已有大法矣。”¹⁰¹

六、結論：法後王就是法周公

荀子即法後王又崇先王，他認識中的先王後王並無本質上的差異，而只有“詳”、“略”的區別。先王之所以“略”，只是因為代遠年湮，已失去時效。荀子不主張效法先王，並不是因為先王不可效法，而是“不詳”的緣故。換言之，荀子所要效法的是詳而適合時宜的，而不是略而不足徵明的。堯舜“能化性，能起偽”¹⁰²，禹、湯“本義務信而天下治”¹⁰³，他們都是先王聖人，足以典範後世，我們可以從中采取治道的大原大則。可惜“傳者久則論略，近則論詳”，所以雖“禹湯有傳政，不若周之察也”“欲知上世，則審周道。”¹⁰⁴這表明荀子法後王就是法周，要效法的就是周道、周制、周文、周禮。荀子所說法後王，包含有周代典章制度意義。¹⁰⁵

⁹⁸ 《荀子》，〈不苟〉。

⁹⁹ 《荀子》，〈非相〉。

¹⁰⁰ 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

¹⁰¹ 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

¹⁰² 《荀子》，〈性惡〉。

¹⁰³ 《荀子》，〈強國〉。

¹⁰⁴ 《荀子》，〈非相〉。

那麼，他所說的後王是誰呢？我們觀察《荀子·非相》的註釋，大多加註者都以文武解釋後王，如唐代楊倞說：“後王，近時之王也。”清代王念孫說：“後王指文武而言。”清代劉臺拱說：“後王，謂文武也，楊註非。”不過，我想荀子所謂的後王並不是指周之文武，而是指制禮作樂的周公。文武二王忙於征伐，¹⁰⁶並沒有創造任何典章制度，周王朝的法度實際創造於周公。周公改制甚多，改原始國家而為封建國家，“兼制天下，立七十一國”，¹⁰⁷且建宗法制度而“天下厭然猶一也。”¹⁰⁸文武並沒有荀子所要求的可據可徵之道，只有周公才有。“欲知上世，則審周道；欲審周道，則審其人，所貴君子。”¹⁰⁹孔子也有這種想法，他雖“憲章文武”，但所要憲章的就是周公的典章制度，所以孔子所謂的“從周”，也可以說是從周公。¹¹⁰

再者，荀子說過：“彼後王者，天下之君。”¹¹¹這是說，歷史發展到周朝，開始出現初次一統天下的局面，這局面的維繫是由於禮制的凝結，而此禮制是由於創禮作樂之周公而起，荀子的主張每必以周禮為據，他效法周公是必然事情。然而周公未曾為王，荀子何故稱他為後王？據《史記》，武王崩，太子成王立，成王少，周公乃攝行政，行政七年，成王長，周公反政成王。¹¹²這證明周公攝行政事七年之中，固曾南面，而不就群臣之列。《史記》又載：“周公之代成王治，南面倍依，以朝諸侯，及七年後，還政成王，北面就臣位。”¹¹³裴駟《集解》曰：“鄭玄曰周公攝王位，以明堂之禮儀朝諸侯也，天子周公也。”¹¹⁴可見，周公確實攝過王位。荀子更詳細地記錄周公攝政期間的偉業，而極讚其為“大儒”，他說：“大儒之效：武王崩，成王幼，周公屏成王而及武王，以屬天下，惡天下之倍周也。履天下之籍，聽天下之斷，偃然如固有之，而天下不稱貪焉。殺管叔，虛殷國，而天下不稱淚焉。兼制天下，立七十一國，姬姓獨居五十三人，而天下不稱偏焉。教誨開導成王，使諭於道，而能撝跡於文武。周公歸周，反籍於成王，而天下不輟事周；然而周公北面而朝之。天子也者，不可以少當也，不可以假攝為也；能則天下歸之，不能則天下去之，是以周公屏成王而及武王，……故以枝代主而非越也；以弟誅兄而非暴也；君臣易位而非不順也。因天下之和，遂文武之業，明主枝之義，抑亦變化矣，天下厭然猶一也。非聖人莫之能焉。夫是之謂大儒之效。”¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁵ 孔繁，《荀子評傳》，頁40。

¹⁰⁶ 史書記載，文王忙於征服近隣部落，所以能三分天下有其二；武王忙於伐紂，即代殷而有天下，不數年即行崩御。

¹⁰⁷ 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

¹⁰⁸ 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

¹⁰⁹ 《荀子》，〈非相〉。

¹¹⁰ 所以有些學者進一步說，孔子也是法後王者。周紹賢，《荀子要義》，頁108-110。

¹¹¹ 《荀子》，〈非相〉。

¹¹² 《史記》，〈周本紀〉。

¹¹³ 《史記》，〈魯周公世家〉。

¹¹⁴ 《史記》，〈魯周公世家〉。

由上可知，時間上的“禮憲”及空間上的“禮義統類”都和周公有關，荀子所指的後王並不是文武，而是周公。楊倞註釋說：“後王，近時之主也。”¹¹⁶有些人以此說明荀子的後王是指當世的君王，但今觀荀子書，全然不是。荀子嘗斥責當世的君主，說：“今君人者，急逐樂而緩其國，豈不過甚矣哉！”¹¹⁷〈宥坐〉更大聲批評當世君主都是“亂其教，繁其刑”的禍首。在〈議兵〉中，雖然對秦國有過好的評價，但又多次評擊秦不講仁義，只不過是強國暴兵。由此觀之，荀子的後王不能為當時君主，而為周公。¹¹⁸周公制禮作樂，荀子發揚而光大之。

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¹¹⁵ 《荀子》，〈儒效〉。

¹¹⁶ 《荀子》，〈非相〉。

¹¹⁷ 《荀子》，〈王霸〉。

¹¹⁸ 劉澤華說，儒家推崇周公的主要理由是：他們即是聖臣，又堪為聖王，集最優秀的君與最優秀的臣這雙重品格於一身。劉澤華，《中國的王權主義》，頁380。

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On Xunzi's Ritual and "Following the Later King": An Analysis of the Idea "A Consistent Principle of Ritual" (*liyi tonglei* 禮義統類)

CHANG Hyun Guen

Abstract

Xunzi's 荀子 all ideas can be synthesized into a single word, "ritual" (*li* 禮). Through Xunzi's concept of "a consistent principle of ritual" (*liyi tonglei* 禮義統類), which reveres ritual and emphasizes knowledge, we can find the concept of "the Later King" (*hou wang* 後王) to have independent, special meaning. Xunzi insisted on external social norms all the way. By emphasizing "verification through people's lives," he asserted that human nature is essentially evil; by focusing on "understanding based on the present," he asserted following the Later King. What Xunzi, who puts stress on objectivity and reality, tried "to follow" (*fa* 法) was the way of the Earlier Kings (*xian wang* 先王). However, he could not follow the way as it was because it was too old and had not been transmitted in detail. Only "the constitution of ritual" (*lixian* 禮憲) can be followed after the Later King's institutional reform. This is the temporal reason that Xunzi asserted following the Later King. Xunzi's "consistent principle of ritual" was to find common principles out of ritual's development process. The opinions such as "See the far things through the close; see ten thousand things through one thing" were the bases to explain the concept of "following the Later King", in other words, "following Zhou 周." Zhou's way, institution, culture, and ritual should be followed. The temporal and spatial concepts of "the constitution of ritual" and "a consistent principle of ritual" were all relevant to Duke of Zhou. The Later King who Xunzi referred to was not King Wen, nor King Wu, nor the lord of those days, but Zhougong.

Keywords: Xunzi 荀子, the constitution of ritual (*lixian* 禮憲), a consistent principle of ritual (*liyi tonglei* 禮義統類), following the Later King, Zhougong 周公

Regulations of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

I . General Regulations

1. (Name)

The official name for the institute is “Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture” (hereafter, ICPC), which is an organization that belongs to the Academy of East Asian Studies (hereafter, AEAS) at Sungkyunkwan University.

2. (Objective)

ICPC primarily conducts research in the field of Confucian thought. It also covers general Confucian culture, as well as its development and modernization, in an attempt to provide fundamental guiding principles for humanity in a rapidly developing society.

II . Organization

3. (Constitution)

ICPC is constituted of the following: 1) the director, 2) the management committee, and 3) an editorial board.

4. (Director)

1) The director must be a full-time professor of Sungkyunkwan University, with a specialization that conforms to the objective outlined in article I of this document. The director must be nominated by the university president and appointed by the chairman of the board.

2) The director, representing ICPC, controls the general affairs of ICPC.

3) The basic term for the director is 2 years, which is extendable.

5. (Assistant Director)

1) The director may appoint (an) assistant director(s) to assist with the director’s various tasks.

2) Assistant director(s) must be a research member of ICPC, nominated by the director of ICPC and appointed by the director of AEAS.

3) The basic term for the assistant director is 2 years, which is extendable.

6. (Office)

1) ICPC may assign (an) office(s) according to different research area(s).

2) The head of the office must hold a position equivalent to or greater than that of a research professor. The head must be nominated by

the director of ICPC, approved by the management committee, and appointed by the director of AEAS.

III. Management Committee

7. (Constitution)

- 1) ICPC may establish a management committee in order to discuss and make important decisions regarding general management.
- 2) The management committee shall be no larger than 10 persons. The director will serve as the head of the management committee.
- 3) Members of the management committee must be research members of the ICPC, nominated by the director and appointed by the director of AEAS.

8. (Agenda)

The agenda for the management committee includes:

- 1) Establishing basic plans for management and research.
- 2) Declaring and/or eliminating various rules and regulations.
- 3) Settling the budget and accounts.
- 4) Other relevant management.

9. (Call for Meeting)

- 1) The director must call for any meetings of the management committee.
- 2) Meetings are valid only when more than half of all members are present. In order to settle an agenda, more than half of all members present at a meeting must agree to any decision or action.

IV. Editorial Board

10. (Constitution)

- 1) ICPC includes an editorial board which discusses and makes decisions regarding ICPC publications.
- 2) The editorial board includes the editor-in-chief and noted scholars both in Korea and abroad. The editor-in-chief is the director of ICPC.
- 3) Each editorial board must be appointed by the director. The basic term is 2 years.
- 4) Each year, the editorial board will publish the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*. Rules and dates for publication are established separately.

11. (Call for Meeting)

More than half of the editorial board members present at the meeting must agree in order to settle an agenda.

* The above regulations take effect from March 1, 2000.

The Code of Management for the Editorial Board of the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*

I . General Regulations

1. (Objective)

This regulation is established according to article IV-10-4 of the Regulations for the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (hereafter, ICPC). It comprises the regulatory guidelines for publishing the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture* (hereafter, *JCPC*).

2. (Mission)

- 1) To supervise publication of *JCPC* and the related affairs of acceptance, review, editing, and so on.
- 2) To set up rules and regulations for publishing *JCPC*.

II . Organization of Editorial Board

3. (Constitution)

The editorial board is comprised of editorial advisors, editorial councils, the chief manager (the director), the editor-in-chief, the head of the editing team, and other editing team members.

4. (Appointment of Editorial Advisors and Members)

The director of ICPC appoints editorial advisors and members among noted scholars of highest achievement, both in Korea and abroad.

5. (Terms)

The basic term for editorial board members is 2 years, extendable when necessary. The editor-in-chief is tenured by principle, in order for the journal to maintain its congruity.

6. (Chief Manager)

The director of ICPC is also the chief manger and supervises the editorial board.

7. (Editor-in-chief)

The editor-in-chief is appointed by the director of ICPC and is responsible for all editorial issues.

8. (Head of Editing Team, Editing Team)

The head of the editing team and the editing team's other members are appointed by the director of ICPC. The head of the editing team is responsible for general issues concerning editing, and the assistant head is responsible for assisting with related editorial matters.

III. Publication of *JCPC*

9. (Numbers and Dates of Publication)

JCPC is published twice in one year: on August 31 and February 28.

10. (Circulation)

The size of circulation for *JCPC* is determined by the editorial board.

11. (Size)

The standard size for *JCPC* is 176mm × 248mm.

12. (Editorial System)

- 1) Academic articles written in either Chinese or English.
- 2) Academic articles include: title, abstract, keywords, contents, bibliography, an abstract written in Chinese or English, keywords written in Chinese or English.
- 3) The English title and name of the author must be specified.
- 4) The affiliation of the author must be specified.
- 5) Regulations, bulletins, and materials other than academic articles may be included according to the decision of the editorial board.

IV. Submission of Articles and Management

13. (Subject and Character of the Submitted Article)

The subject of article includes:

- 1) Confucian thought and culture in Korea and abroad.
- 2) Analysis of books, translations, or research articles on related subjects published in Korea or abroad. It may include dissertations.
- 3) Critical reviews on academic trends, mainly in the arts and humanities, related to Confucianism and East Asian studies.

No certain qualification for submission is required.

14. (Number of Words)

- 1) A length of each article is limited to 25,000 characters for Chinese and 12,000 words for English, including the abstract, footnotes, bibliography, etc.
- 2) The number of words permitted for materials other than academic articles and reviews are to be determined by the editorial board.

15. (Submission Guidelines)

- 1) A general call for papers is always extended, but only articles submitted at least three months prior to the publication date are usually subjected to the review process for a specific issue.
- 2) Submissions should be forwarded to jicpc@skku.edu as an email attachment.
- 3) Abstracts in Chinese or English must include five or more keywords.

- 4) If written jointly, the first (main) author and the second (joint) author, as well as their respective name, affiliation, area of research, part(s) of writing, must be noted.
- 5) E-mail address(es) and phone number(s) must be provided for all authors.
16. (Control of Submitted Articles)
 - 1) Submitted articles are, as they arrive, subject to a controlled process.
 - 2) Submitted articles are not returned, and copyright for published articles belongs to ICPC.

V. Reviewing Submitted Articles

17. (Obligation to Review)

All submitted articles must pass the reviewing process.
18. (Regulations for Reviewing Board)
 - 1) In principle, the editorial board will select three outside reviewers for each submitted article and commission them to evaluate the article. If two of the reviewers agree, the article can be published.
 - 2) In specific situations, the editorial board can precede the reviewing process by selecting two outside reviewers. If only one of the reviewers recommends publication, the editorial board can decide whether to publish or reject the article based on the journal's academic standards. In such cases, the editor-in-chief is supposed to make a written report to the chief manager (the director).
 - 3) If submitted articles do not meet the basic requirements of the journal (e.g., in terms of length, subject, etc.), the editorial board can decide not to proceed with the reviewing process and return the submission to the author(s). The editorial board can also ask the author(s) to resubmit after revision.
 - 4) In principle, the board of reviewers must maintain a just and fair attitude, and should not review articles written by scholars with whom they are personally affiliated.
 - 5) For the sake of fairness, the review process will remain anonymous.
19. (Standard of Review)
 - 1) Articles will be reviewed for basic format (20%), originality (20%), clarity of subject (20%), logic (20%), and congruity (20%).
 - 2) The result will divide the articles into two groups: publishable and not publishable.
 - 3) Articles evaluated as not publishable cannot be re-submitted with the same title.
20. (Feedback time)

Reviewers must submit their feedback on each article to the editorial

board within two weeks from it was assigned to them.

21. (Reporting Back the Result)

The editorial board must report back to the author(s) as soon as the results of the reviewing process have been received.

VI. Revision of Regulations

22. (Principle)

This code of management is subject to change when 2/3 of the editorial board agrees, provided that more than half of the editorial board's members are present at the time of voting.

*** Other Regulations**

23. (Others)

- 1) Other issues not written in this code will be treated following customary practices.
- 2) The above regulations take effect from December 20, 2006.
- 3) The editorial board will determine and deal with all other details concerning the above regulations.

The Code of Ethics and Management for the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*

I. General Regulations

1. (Objective)

This regulation is established in order to define the ethical principles and standard of management of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (hereafter, ICPC).

2. (Application)

This regulation is applied to prevent any unjust act within academic agenda of ICPC, and to provide a framework for systematic investigation, management, and resolution if an unjust actions occur. At the same time, it is geared toward protecting the creativity of academic research and strengthening an ethical spirit within academia.

II. Research Ethics

3. (Ethical Code for Authors)

- 1) All authors who submit their articles to the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture* (hereafter, *JCPC*) must follow this code of ethics.
- 2) All research outcomes that are mainly based on faked or fraudulent research or upon already published work without providing any new insight are regarded as forged.
- 3) Any close imitation of another author's ideas and arguments without giving explicit and objective credit to that author is regarded as plagiarism.
- 4) Submission of one's own work that has already been presented and published elsewhere as the first research outcome is regarded as duplication or self-plagiarism.
- 5) Sponsored articles must follow the regulations of the sponsor before submission.
- 6) Authors must take full responsibility for their presented articles.
- 7) Co-authors must make it clear which parts of the essay each author has contributed to, and take responsibility for those parts of the essay.

4. (Ethical Code for the Editorial Board)

- 1) The editorial board members of *JCPC* must follow this code of ethics.
- 2) Editorial board members must participate in editorial meetings and

assume responsibility for receiving articles, the election of reviewers, and the selection of articles for publication,

- 3) Editorial board members must be silent about any personal information of all authors submitting articles. Otherwise, it will be regarded as a misuse of their rights.
 - 4) Editorial board members must strictly follow regulations in confirming submissions and selecting reviewers, etc., lest it should arouse any conflict between reviewers and general board members.
 - 5) If any doubt or questions concerning ethical matters arise, the editorial board must immediately call for an investigation by the ethics committee.
5. (Ethical Code for the Reviewing Committee)
- 1) Members of reviewing committee of *JCPC* must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) Reviewers must follow the established regulations for providing an objective and fair review of the submitted article, and provide their honest feedback to the editorial board. If a reviewer feels that they cannot review an article assigned to them for an objective reason, they must promptly notify the editorial board.
 - 3) Reviewers must rely on academic standards and their own conscience in reviewing submitted articles. Reviewers cannot reject an article based on their own personal standpoints without sufficient basis, and cannot conclude the review without scrupulously reading the whole article.
 - 4) Reviewers must keep the author's personal information as well as the content of the article confidential throughout the process of review.

III. Establishment and Management of Ethics Committee

6. (Ethics Enforcement)
This regulation is established according to the general regulation, and is already in effect. The director will decide on establishing specific rules to applying these regulations.
7. (Constitution of Ethics Committee)
The Ethics Committee is constituted of the director of Ethics Committee, the editor-in-chief, and up to five members of the editorial board. The director of ICPC is also the director of the Ethics Committee.
8. (Function of Ethics Committee)
1) Upon a suspected violation of the ethical code, the ethics committee will proceed to conduct an investigation and issue a decision, notifying the accused of the opinion of the committee. It will also report the issue to the editorial board.

- 2) When investigating the violation, the ethics committee must secure sufficient evidence and keep the whole process confidential.
9. (Accusation of Violation)
 - 1) An accuser must secure specific evidence when reporting an act of violation. Even if the report turns out to be false, the ethics committee can continue an investigation if other evidence is discovered.
 - 2) The same process of accusation applies to both editorial board members and reviewers.
10. (Investigation and Decision)
 - 1) If accused of violating the ethical code, the accused must comply with the investigation conducted by the ethics committee. Noncompliance is regarded as acknowledging the accused violation.
 - 2) All articles under investigation will be postponed for publication until the investigation has been completed and a report issued to the editorial board. Investigations are to be completed before the next term for publication.
11. (Chance of Defense)

The accused has right to defend their article. Their defense can be made before the general members of the editorial board, if the accused wishes to do so.
12. (Forms of Penalty)

Penalties which the ethics committee can impose include warnings, submission restrictions, and expulsion from membership. Already published articles can be deferred or pulled out completely. Sponsored articles, when used unfairly or warned by the sponsor, may also be subject to penalty.
13. (Revision of Regulations)

Any revisions made to this regulations must follow ICPC's revision principles.
14. (Others)

Regulations not written in the above will follow customary practices.

*** Other Regulations**

This regulation is established according to the article 21 of ICPC. It is agreed by the editorial board (October 20, 2007), and is in force since January 1, 2008.

Submission Requirements for Contributors

I. Submission

1. Manuscripts should be done in docx file and are to be submitted as an email attachment to jicpc@skku.edu.
2. Type in "Author's Contact Information" on top of the title of your manuscript, which includes your academic title, affiliation, e-mail address, telephone number(s), and mailing address.
3. On the first page of the body text, make an abstract of about 300 words (including five key words or more)
4. Unless specially invited, a length of each manuscript (including footnotes) should be around 8,000 words, and should not exceed 12,000 words (font: Times New Roman; font size: 12 pt.; line space: double).

II. Style Guidelines

1. In general, we follow the editorial guidelines established in the 16th edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Please consult the online information of it at www.chicagomanualofstyle.org.
 2. The citation style required by the Journal is short references in footnotes and complete citation data in the REFERENCES section. Short references contain only the author's last name, title of work (shortened if necessary), and page number(s) as in the following example: 1. Fingarette, *Confucius*, 15-16.
 3. Imagine that the readers of your article have little understanding of Asian philosophical and cultural background. Provide explanations for technical terms as well as any words or concepts which are essential to a clear understanding of your article.
 4. When romanizing Chinese terms, use pinyin system. Terms in Korean should be romanized according to the romanization system established in 2000 by the Korean government. For Japanese terms, follow the Hepburn romanization system.
 5. When historic figure(s) and state(s) are first mentioned, provide their dates in parenthesis as follows: Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), Han 漢 (206 BCE-220 CE).
 6. When you quote a passage in pre-modern Chinese texts, put the English translation in the body and the original Chinese text in the footnote.
- * For a more detailed submission guideline, please contact us at jicpc@skku.edu.

儒教文化研究所章程

第一章 總則

第一條 (名稱)

本研究所的正式名稱爲“儒教文化研究所”(以下簡稱“研究所”),是成均館大學東亞學術院的下設機關。

第二條 (目的)

本研究所以研究儒學思想爲主,同時兼顧整個東亞的儒學文化研究,並對儒學的傳統進行現代化的解釋和發展,使之成爲指引人類發展的基本理念。

第二章 組織

第三條 (機構)

研究所的機構如下設置:1. 所長,2. 運營委員會,3. 編輯委員會。

第四條 (所長)

1. 所長必須由符合第一章規定中目的的專業的本校教授擔任,由學校校長提請理事長任命。
2. 所長代表研究所,總體掌管研究所的事務。
3. 所長的任期爲2年,可以連任。

第五條 (部長)

1. 爲了協助所長,並分擔所長的一部分業務,所長下面可以設置部長。
2. 部長從研究委員中產生,由所長提請學術院院長任命。
3. 任期爲2年,可以連任。

第六條 (研究室)

1. 研究所可以根據研究領域的不同而設置研究室。
2. 研究室長由研究教授以上的人擔任,須經運營委員會的審議通過,再由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第三章 運營委員會

第七條 (構成)

1. 爲了便於審議和決定與研究所運營相關的重要事項,研究所可以設置運營委員會。

2. 運營委員會由所長和10人以內的委員構成, 委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員從研究所的研究委員中產生, 由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第八條 (審議事項)運營委員會主要審議以下事項：

1. 基本運營計劃的確立以及與研究計劃相關的事項。
2. 研究所諸規定的制定與廢除問題。
3. 預算以及結算等諸問題。
4. 其他與研究所運營相關的事項。

第九條 (會議)

1. 會議由委員長召集。
2. 會議要有過半數以上的在職委員出席才可以召開, 出席委員過半數同意才可以決議。

第四章 編輯委員會

第十條 (構成)

1. 爲了審議決定研究所刊行的出版物的編輯事宜, 故設立編輯委員會。
2. 編輯委員會由委員長和國內外的知名學者構成, 委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員由所長任命, 任期爲2年。
4. 編輯委員會每年刊行《儒教文化研究》, 論文的刊行原則以及刊行日期等規定另行制定。

第十一條 (會議)

編輯委員會會議要有出席編輯委員的過半數同意才可以決議。

附則 (施行日)本規定自2000年3月1日起施行。

《儒教文化研究》編輯委員會運營章程

第一章 總則

第一條（目的）

本規定是根據儒教文化研究所文件中第4節編輯委員會（以下簡稱委員會）第27條第1項研究所刊行物的出版條目中《儒教文化研究》的相關規定而制定的。

第二條（任務）

1. 主管《儒教文化研究》的發刊和相關論文的策劃、接收、評審、編輯等工作。
2. 制定與《儒教文化研究》的發刊相關聯的一系列規定。

第二章 編輯委員會構成

第三條（構成）

委員會由編輯顧問、編輯委員、主任（委員長）、主編、編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯構成。

第四條（編輯顧問和委員的選任）

編輯顧問和編輯委員由儒教文化研究所所長從世界各國有卓越研究業績的權威學者中選擇並任命。

第五條（委員的任期）

委員任期為2年，必要時可以連任。但為了保證學術雜誌的長期穩定性，主編原則上是連任的。

第六條（主任）

主任（委員長）由儒教文化研究所所長兼任，主管編輯委員會。

第七條（主編）

主編由研究所所長任命，總體負責所有的編輯事務。

第八條（編輯部主任、編輯）

編輯部主任（編輯室長）和編輯由研究所所長任命。編輯部主任全面負責編輯事務，編輯輔助主任處理相關的編輯事務。

第三章 《儒教文化研究》的發刊

第九條（發行的次數和日期）

《儒教文化研究》每年兩次刊行，出版日期為8月31日和2月28日。

第十條（發行數量）

《儒教文化研究》的發行數量由委員會決定。

第十一條（開本）

實行176mm×248mm開本。

第十二條（編輯體制）

1. 學術論文使用中文或英文制作。
2. 學術論文的編輯順序原則上分為論文題目、提要、關鍵詞、正文、參考文獻、中英文抄錄、中英文關鍵詞。
3. 必須注明學術論文的英文題目和作者姓名。
4. 必須注明作者的所屬單位、職務和具體的聯系方式。
5. 學術論文以外的各種文章以及會則、會報的刊載與否由委員會決定。

第四章 論文的投稿和管理

第十三條（投稿論文主題和資格）

1. 投稿範圍是以儒學思想為中心的世界各國的儒學文化。
2. 對國內外刊行的相關儒學著作、翻譯著作以及研究類刊物的分析。
3. 對國內外的儒學和東亞學等人文科學類相關論文（包括學位論文）的論評和研究動向報告。
4. 不限論文投稿資格。

第十四條（原稿字數）

1. 一般情況下按照中文15,000字 / 英文8,000words左右（包括腳注、參考文獻、抄錄等）的標準。
2. 論文以外的原稿字數由委員會決定。

第十五條（論文投稿要領）

1. 隨時可以提交論文，但以本刊出版3個月前到達的論文作為該版的審查對象。
2. 論文使用中文或英文格式，投稿時須提交電子版。
3. 中英文的抄錄需各附5個以上的關鍵詞。
4. 如果是共同研究的論文，需要分別標出責任研究員和共同研究員，並且須分別注明姓名和所屬單位、研究領域、執筆範圍和分擔的領域。
5. 來稿須注明作者的電子郵件地址以及聯絡電話。

第十六條 (投稿論文的管理)

1. 投稿論文按照來稿順序, 建立文檔進行統一有序的管理。
2. 來稿論文概不退還, 所刊載論文的著作權歸研究所所有。

第五章 投稿論文的審查

第十七條 (審查義務)

刊載論文必須經過審查。

第十八條 (審查委員規定)

1. 對於投稿的每篇論文, 原則上編輯委員會將選定3名評審委員, 並委託給他們評審。論文經過審查委員2/3以上的贊成才可刊登。
2. 特殊情況下編輯委員會可選定2名評審委員進行論文審查。2名審查委員中只有一名贊成刊登時, 編輯委員會可以通過內部會議決定該論文的刊登與否。而且, 編輯部主任要以書面形式向研究所的主任報告編輯部的決定。
3. 若投稿論文的長短或內容遠遠達不到本刊的基本要求, 委員會可以不進行評審而通告投稿者不可刊載, 或要求修訂後再次投稿。
4. 原則上, 審查委員應堅持公正、公平的作風。而且不得審查與自己同一單位的投稿者的文章。
5. 為了保證審查的公正性, 審查全部採取匿名制。

第十九條 (審查標準)

1. 審查按照基本格式 (20%)、獨創性 (20%)、主題明確性 (20%)、邏輯性 (20%)、完整性 (20%) 來進行綜合評定。
2. 審查結果分為刊載可、否兩類。
3. 被評為不可刊載的論文, 不得再以同一題目向本會投稿。

第二十條 (審查結果報告)

審查委員從收到評審論文之日算起, 應於2周內將審查結果報告給委員會。

第二十一條 (審查結果通告)

委員會收到審查結果報告書後, 立即告知投稿者。

第二十二條 (稿費支付)

對於刊載文章, 支付給作者一定的稿費。

第六章 章程的修訂

第二十三條 (原則)

本章程的修訂要有過半數編輯委員參加, 並且經參加人員2/3以上的同意方可施行。

附 則

第二十四條（其他）

1. 以上沒有列入章程的事宜按照慣例處理。
2. 本規定自2006年12月20日起生效並施行。
3. 本規定在施行過程中發生的細部事項由委員會來決定並處理。

《儒教文化研究》研究倫理及運營規定

第一章 總則

第一條（目的）

本規定的目的在於闡明儒教文化研究所（以下簡稱“本研究所”）學術研究活動的研究倫理和運營基準。

第二條（作用）

本規定的作用在於抵制研究活動中的不正當行為，以及不正當行為發生後體系性的追查，並且保護有創意性的學術研究，提高學問的倫理性。

第二章 研究倫理

第三條（作者倫理）

1. 凡是向本研究所刊行的《儒教文化研究》投稿的作者都應該遵守運營規定。
2. 虛造研究成果或將以前的研究成果刪改變用的一律視為偽造、編造。
3. 對他人的觀點或主張缺乏客觀分析而直接拿來用作自己的觀點，此種行為視為剽竊。
4. 將自己已經發表的研究成果拿來用作首次發表，此種行為視為重複刊載或自我剽竊。
5. 接受研究經費資助的論文只有遵守資助單位的管理規定才可投稿。
6. 對於自己公式發表的論文，作者要負全面責任。
7. 共同研究的情況要注明每個人分擔的部分，以此來各負責任。

第四條（編輯委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的編輯委員應該遵守運營規定。
2. 編輯委員要積極參與編輯會議，要對論文的接收、選定評委以及刊載與否負責任。
3. 編輯委員對於投稿者的個人信息要保密，不得利用私權。
4. 編輯委員要嚴格按照既定的標準來確認論文的投稿以及評審情況等，注意不要引發審評者以及一般會員間的是非。
5. 編輯委員會一旦發現研究倫理上的問題要立即通報倫理委員會。

第五條（審查委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的論文審查委員應該遵守審查規定。
2. 審查委員要根據所定的審查規定對投稿論文進行客觀、公正的

審查,並將審查結果通報給編輯委員會。若自己因客觀情況不能審查,則應及時通報編輯委員會。

3. 審查委員要根據學者的良心和學問的客觀基準來審查論文。在缺乏充分根據的情況下,不能一味地依據自己的學術觀點來判定“不可刊載”,也不能不仔細通讀全文就擅作審查。
4. 審查委員對於審查過程中所知道的作者的個人情況要進行保密,不能私自公開或利用審查論文的內容。

第三章 倫理委員會設置以及運營

第六條 (倫理規定的遵守)

本規定依據本會的會則制定,一經施行,立即生效。只是與此相適應的施行細則由委員長決定。

第七條 (倫理委員會的構成)

倫理委員會由所長、主編和編輯委員(5人左右)組成,所長兼任委員長。

第八條 (倫理委員會的職能)

1. 對於違反本規定的行為,倫理委員會要進行調查和議決,並將相關意見通告給當事人,然後報告給編輯委員會。
2. 在審議違反規定的行為時,要確保能夠充分掌握證據並對事情的經過保密,不到最後時刻不能公開審議意見。

第九條 (違反倫理規定行為的揭發)

1. 若有違反倫理規定的事實,揭發者可以持具體的事實證據向倫理委員會揭發。若揭發的事實是虛偽的,倫理委員會可以繼續維持決議。
2. 編輯委員或審查委員在評審過程中若發現有違反倫理規定的事實也依據如上方法揭發。

第十條 (調查以及審議)

1. 會員若被揭發有違反本研究所倫理規定的行為,則應積極配合倫理委員會的調查,若不配合,其行為則視為違反倫理規定。
2. 對於被揭發的有違反倫理規定的論文,在事實查清以前應採取保留措施。調查審議應在下一期學術期刊發行前結束。

第十一條 (解釋的機會)

對於被揭發有違反倫理規定事實的會員,要給與其充分的解釋機會。解釋的方式可依據當事者的意願公開。

第十二條 (處罰的類型)

倫理委員會的處罰類型有警告、限制投稿、解除委任等。對於已經投稿或刊載的論文可以採取保留或撤銷的措施。對於接受研究經費資助的論文,若因不正當的使用而受到資助機關的警告,也屬於處罰對象之列。

第十三條（規定的修改）

此規定的修改要遵守本研究所的修改原則。

第十四條（其他）

以上規定中沒有涉及的事宜依據慣例處理。

附則

本規定依據本研究所會則第21條制定，並經過編輯委員會（2007年10月20日）的審議，於2008年1月1日起施行。

投稿須知

1. 中文一律使用繁體, 英文按照一般慣例。來稿一律使用中文(或英文)制作, 請提交電子版(jicpc@skku.edu)。
2. 論文的格式順序原則上依次分為論文題目、中文提要(300-400字)、中文關鍵詞(5個以上)、正文、參考文獻、英文題目、英文摘要(大略300words)、英文關鍵詞(5個以上)等。
3. 作者簡介可置於文章的最後, 須注明作者的性別、所屬單位、職務、Email、聯系地址以及具體的電話聯系方式, 以便編輯部聯絡。必要時可附上自己的簡歷。
4. 正文內容請用10.5號字, 行間距為1, 文章字數以15,000字為宜, 可以適當地增減。但最好不要超過25,000字。
5. 文章的章節可以用“一、二、三……”來表示, 若還要細分, 則請用“(一)、(二)、(三)……”來表示。章節題目一律左側對齊, 使用黑體加粗字體。
6. 文章內提到的一切書籍, 都要在正文後的“參考文獻”內注明。參考文獻標記序次如下: 作者,《書名》, 出版地: 出版社, 出版年度。
如: 楊伯峻,《春秋左傳注》, 北京: 中華書局, 1981。
6. 1. 需要標記編者或譯者時: 作者,〈章節/論文〉, 編者/譯者編/譯《書名》, 頁碼, 出版地: 出版社, 出版年度。
如: 張立文,〈程朱思想的時代精神〉, 楊曉塘編《程朱思想新論》, 頁1-8, 北京: 人民出版社, 1999。
6. 2. 引用期刊內容時, 請依次注明: 作者, 文章名, 刊物名(包括期數), 文章所在頁碼。
如: 蒙培元,〈儒學是宗教嗎?〉,《孔子研究》, 2002年第2期, 頁39-46。
7. 文章正文的引用文, 採用簡式腳注標記。腳注標記方式如下: 作者, 論文名稱/書名, 引文所在頁碼。
如: 楊伯峻,《春秋左傳注》, 頁56。
蒙培元,〈儒學是宗教嗎?〉, 頁42。
8. 若作者本人有對文章題目、文章內容的說明, 請放在當頁用腳注表示。
9. 來稿一經採用, 即付稿酬。不採用的稿件, 一律不退, 也不奉告評審意見。三個月內未接到採用通知的, 作者可自行處理。
10. 本刊對採用的稿件有刪改權, 不同意刪改者, 請在來稿中申明。
11. 本刊刊發的文章, 作者著作權使用費與稿費一次性付清。如作者不同意文章轉載, 請在來稿時聲明。

共同規約：
成均館大學、輔仁大學、馬來亞大學三校聯名學刊

本刊與《哲學論集》及《漢學研究學刊》訂定聯名期刊，互相推薦論文共同約定事項：

1. 締約雙方接受前揭兩學術期刊之間互相推薦優良的學術論文，並得接受同一作者相近論題的論文同時在兩刊物發刊。細部規定如下：
 - 1) 作為同一作者在聯名期刊同時發表的論文，其論文題目允許在同一專業課題之下，使用兩個性質相關而又可以分辨的不同的題目，分別出現在兩個期刊之中。
 - 2) 根據以上規定訂定題目的兩篇論文，其內容差異性應高於百分之八十。
 - 3) 根據以上兩規定而提出的論文，不接受作者自行投稿的方式，只接受互為聯名期刊任一方編輯部或編輯委員會的推薦論文。
 - 4) 提出推薦兩刊同時發表論文的編輯委員會，應向接受推薦方提出該論文的審查意見書，以及預計在雙方同時刊登的兩篇論文全文，以供接受推薦方的編輯委員會驗證。接受推薦方的編輯委員會，保有是否接受經由以上程序所產生的論文，在己方刊物出版的決定權。
2. 雙方所屬研究單位成員可以在以上規定之外，以個人名義自由向前揭刊物的任一方投稿。
3. 經由以上兩種方式投稿的稿件，均應依照刊登該論文的學術期刊的規定格式撰寫論文。
4. 前揭聯名期刊的雙方同意所有論文以使用中文、英文撰寫的論文為優先接受的論文。

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