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Confucius' Golden Rule and Its Reformulations by Mencius and Xunzi: *Shu* 恕, the Commonality-Premise, and Human Nature in Pre-Qin Confucianism

LEE Junghwan

Abstract

The primary objective of the present paper is to offer a philosophical account, first, as to a significant intellectual transition, which occurred between Confucius and his successors with regard to *shu* 恕, and, second, about the divergence between Mencius and Xunzi, both of which remain under-examined in current studies of the Confucian Golden Rule. Confucius proposed *shu* as a highest-order moral principle as well as “the method of [realizing] *ren* 仁,” thus conferring enormous weight on this, the earliest formulation of the Golden Rule in human history. He also expressed a conviction in the desirable consequences that the practice of this concise precept would generate. Additionally, this moral principle was expressed with a high degree of consistency in the *Analects*. Nonetheless, the original *shu* formulation of Confucius quickly faded away, and it was replaced comprehensively with diverse forms of reformulation in the post-Confucius classics of ancient Confucianism.

Concerning these issues, the present study shows the following: The Golden Rule in general, including *shu*, is grounded on the premise of human commonalities. The so-called imposition-problem, which constitutes the central idea of modernist objections to the Golden Rule, arises from the transition of the underlying premise from human commonalities to interpersonal differences during the early modern period, rather than its inherent defect or incompleteness as a moral principle. Likewise, a drastic transition in formulating *shu* occurred between Confucius and his successors according to changes in the prevailing views on human commonalities. The notable differences between Mencius and Xunzi in reformulating *shu* also coincided with a great divergence between

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them in articulating Confucius' view on human commonalities in the form of the metaphysical concept of human nature (*xing* 性)

Keywords: the Golden Rule, *shu* 恕, reformulations, the commonality-premise, human nature, the imposition-problem, Confucius; Mencius, Xunzi

1. Introduction

Indisputably, *ren* 仁 is the single word that best epitomizes the essence of Confucius' teachings as a whole. Among the plethora of norms and virtues found in his teachings, "a man of morality should accord with [*ren*] at all times, even in moments of extreme urgency or distress" (*Analects* 4.5).¹ The only other concept given comparable weight by Confucius is *shu* 恕, one of the earliest formulations of the Golden Rule (hereafter, GR) in human history.

Zigong asked, "Is there one teaching that can serve as a guide for one's entire life?" The Master answered, "Is it not *shu*? Do not impose upon others what you yourself do not desire."² (*Analects* 15.24)

Confucius' elevation of *shu* to a supreme position is fully congruent with his identification of a positive application of *shu* as "the method of [realizing] *ren*" (*ren zhi fang* 仁之方, *Analects* 6.28).³ On top of this, he expressed his conviction in this concise moral precept by stating that "Do not impose upon others what you yourself do not desire. In this way, you will encounter no resentment in your public or familial life."⁴ (*Analects* 12.2) Additionally, in these two separate statements of *shu*, he employed the identical formulation "*ji suo bu yu* 己所不欲, *wu shi yu ren* 勿施於人." With respect to consistency, *shu* is in striking contrast with *ren*, which, as widely recognized, he never described or prescribed with equivalent words. A restatement of *shu* by Zigong, one of Confucius' disciples, is recorded in the *Analects*, and despite apparent syntactic differences, it also shows no substantial linguistic divergence from Confucius' original formulation. (*Analects* 5.12)

It is highly intriguing to observe that, despite the exceptional emphasis, conviction, and consistency placed upon it by Confucius himself, the original *shu* formulation faded away quickly and extensively in the subsequent unfolding of ancient Confucianism. *Shu* as a term appears widely in the *Zhongyong* 中庸, the *Mencius*, and the *Xunzi*, suggesting that this concept

¹ For translation, Slingerland, "Kongzi (Confucius) 'The Analects,'" 24 with modifications.

² For translation, Slingerland, "Kongzi (Confucius) 'The Analects,'" 45-46.

³ For translation, Gardner, *The Four Books: The Basic Teachings of the Later Confucian Tradition*, 23 with modifications.

⁴ For translation, Slingerland, "Kongzi (Confucius) 'The Analects,'" 34 with modifications.

played a significant role in the formation of ancient Confucianism. The *shu* formulation with minor modifications, however, is found only in the *Zhongyong* among the post-Confucius texts of ancient Confucianism, and it is under the title of *zhong-shu* 忠恕, instead of *shu*. Further, it is followed immediately by a set of reformulations, as follows:

Zhong-shu is not far from the Way. If you would not be willing to have something imposed upon yourself (*shi zhu ji er bu yuan* 施諸己而不願), then do not impose it upon others (*yi wu shi yu ren* 亦勿施於人). The ways of a *junzi* 君子 are four, and I [Confucius] am not yet capable of (*wei neng* 未能) even one of them: What you require of (*jiu* 求) your son, use in serving your father; . . . what you would require of your subordinate, use in serving your prince; . . . what you would require of your younger brother, use in serving your elder brother; . . . what you would require of your friend, first apply in your treatment of your friend.⁵

Here, the original formulation is simply juxtaposed with the reformulations, but the text does not offer any explications as to compatibility, similarities or differences between them. *Zhong-shu* herein gets closer to the standard negative formulation of GR—"Do not do unto others what you do not wish them do unto you"—than the *shu* formulation in the *Analects*, but it seems a matter of articulation rather than reformulation. Contrastingly, the four "ways" have been widely identified as positive applications of *shu*. What this identification ignores is that they are formulated in a substantially different format. An analogous set of reformulations, albeit in a more abstract format, appears in the *Great Learning* under the title of "xiejü" 絜矩 (the measuring square). As analyzed below, a highly similar set of reformulations is found in the *Xunzi* as well. In a word, this set of substantial reformulations takes the place of the original *shu* formulation in the post-Confucius texts of ancient Confucianism.

The *Mencius* has another substantially distinct form of reformulations (for example, "Simply taking one's mind and imposing it upon others" (*ju si xin jia zhu bi* 舉斯心加諸彼, *Mencius* 1A.7), but the text does not contain the original *shu* formulation as such. Moreover, the essential syntactic structure unique to GR in general, including the original *shu* formulation, is barely noticeable in *Mencius*' reformulations.

⁵ For translation, Nivison, "Golden Rule Arguments in Chinese Moral Philosophy," 63 with modifications.

The primary objective of the present paper is to offer a philosophical account as to this significant intellectual transition which occurred between Confucius and his successors, as well as about the divergence between them, particularly between Mencius and Xunzi. These issues remain unexamined in previous studies of Herbert Fingarette, David Nivison, and P.J. Ivanhoe on Confucian GR, whose approaches are implicitly based on modern premises and modernist reinterpretations. To redress the oversights and anachronism in the previous studies, I place a special focus on analyzing GR in general to reveal, broadly, its essential characteristics as a normative moral principle as well as, specifically, its underlying premises, which are critical for constructing a philosophically solid account of the proposed issues. The present study thereby demonstrates the correlation between the transition in [re]formulating *shu* and the changes in views on human nature. Ultimately, the account thus constructed also sheds fresh light on the history of ancient Confucianism, in addition to providing some suggestions for later philosophical studies on Confucian GR.

2. A Preliminary Analysis of GR in General

Structurally, GR in general is comprised of two parts. The first part says to examine one's own wishes directed toward others (that is, "as you wish others [not] to do unto you"). The second part requires acting upon the others accordingly (that is, "[you must] do [not] unto others"). For the sake of convenience, let us call the former 'the self-examination,' and the latter 'the imperative.' The conjunction "as" in the formulation corresponds to the equals sign ("=") in a mathematical equation, signifying an equivalence and/or consistency between the two parts.

GR is designed to apply to certain relationships between two parties. The formulation does not specify what kinds of relationships are relevant for application. The relational context is comprised of two unspecified parties: "you" as the agent and "others" as the recipient[s]. No further explicit relational qualifications are embedded in this formulation.

The structure of GR, however, implicitly postulates both reciprocity and unilateralism between "you" and "others." In the self-examination part, "others" are agents of action while "you" are the recipient. Reciprocally, the roles are switched in the imperative. On the other hand, the GR formulation

as a whole has a unilateral structure. Whereas “others” are agents only within the parenthesis of what “you wish,” “you” consistently plays the role of agent in both parts: an agent of wishing and an agent of acting. The formulation does not explicitly require an agent to take into consideration the wishes and circumstances of recipients, either. Through a lens of negative interpretation, GR apparently authorizes an agent to treat others “as” [s]he wishes. Nevertheless, no warnings are attached. As further discussed below, this unilateral relational context carries a risk of steering one to impose one’s personal tastes or standards upon others.

The primary objective of GR is to answer the question of how I ought to treat others in a relationship.⁶ In other words, GR is to infer rules of action pertinent to the relationship in question from its practice (namely, ‘the rule-inference function’). This normative moral principle is a unique formulation to answer such a question.⁷ Like a mathematical equation, answering the question by means of GR consists of striking a balance between the self-examination and the imperative.

Formally, a primary principle when exercising GR is ‘equivalent conversion.’ GR is designed to convert one’s own wishes directed toward others *equivalently* into self-imposed obligations toward them, and thus guides one to avoid self-contradiction or arbitrary double standards in treating others.⁸ Probably, the main reason that GR has universally appealed to moral intuition also lies in this unique structure. Equivalent conversion in this regard is a logical and automatic process inherent in the GR formulation itself.

In the practice of GR, on the other hand, equivalent conversion also implies ‘the consistency-requirement.’ The GR formulation does not include any other guidelines other than equivalent conversion. It does not allow any kinds of intervention, including moral judgments, in this conversion process, either. Otherwise, one is hardly able to strike a balance in this process. In

⁶ For this, see Huang, “A Copper Rule Versus the Golden Rule: A Daoist-Confucian Proposal for Global Ethics.”

⁷ Even for modern proponents of GR, its apparent defects like the imposition-problem suffice to discard its rule-inference function. Alternatively, they promote consistency-requirement as its main objective. For more on this, see Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, 108-109; Carson, *Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice*, 129-132; and Gensler, *Ethics and the Golden Rule*, 18-22. Jeffrey Wattles characterizes twentieth-century discussions of GR in analytical philosophy with the expression “the golden rule is reduced to a principle of consistency.” It seems, however, that there exists no consensus on possible meanings of consistency among them, but most commonly tend to cohere GR’s consistency with universalizability (Wattles, *The Golden Rule*, 122-140).

⁸ For a similar expression, see Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, 94.

exercising GR, likewise, the self-examination automatically determines the imperative.⁹ On this basis, however, GR commands that one ought to actually act unto others consistently with the rules of action inferred from the GR practice.

A violation of the consistency-requirement means a self-contradiction, since the rules of action by means of the GR practice are inferred initially from one's 'own' wishes. Note once again that in a formal interpretation, GR's unilateralism does not lead an agent to take into consideration the wishes of recipients at all, or the permissibility of his or her wishes from the recipients' viewpoint. GR is not a principle of compromise. Applying GR to a particular relationship indicates that the relationship between agent and recipient is given and predetermined. If what recipients wish in the relationship is also predetermined and known to the agent, GR often ends in a conflict, dilemma, or a matter of choice and compromise. (For example, let us think, "Serve a piece of pie to a person for dessert, as I wish for the person who likes ice cream for dessert to serve me a piece of pie after dinner.") Instead of providing an answer to the question of how I ought to treat others, this application spawns a different sort of question, that is, whether or not I ought to serve a piece of pie to the person.

Evidently, GR as such seems to designate one's wishes directed toward others as the sole guideline for determining rules of action for the treatment of those others. In this light, GR is distinct from its variants. *Lex talionis* ("Do unto others what they have done unto you") instructs an agent to somehow physically measure what others have done to himself or herself, and then this measurement predetermines the kind and degree of his or her retributive action. Contrastingly, the inversed formulation ("Do unto others what they would have us do unto them"; that is, the "platinum rule") replaces the self-examination with the posited demands of the proposed recipients. To the contrary, GR requires, and authorizes, taking one's own wishes as the principal basis for inferring rules of action for treating others. The rules of action thus inferred must therefore be purely subjective.

This *one-directional* structure carries, then, a risk of driving one to impose one's personal tastes or standards upon others who may have different wishes, tastes, or standards, and thus bring about undesirable consequences such as displeasure, harm or discomfort to actual recipients. (For the sake of convenience, let us call it 'the imposition-problem.') It goes beyond the scope

⁹ Huang, "A Copper Rule Versus the Golden Rule," 402.

of GR to address the questions of whether or not one should act upon others in accordance with rules of action thus inferred, or whether or not the corresponding action would bring about desirable consequences for recipients. GR simply does not provide any guidelines for these questions. As detailed below, the imposition-problem is the core problem that modern proponents of GR strive to address by reinterpreting GR. Nonetheless, this problem is inherent in the formulation itself, which GR as such cannot avoid. Note that like two sides of the same coin, this problem derives from the principle of equivalent conversion and the consistency-requirement, which constitute the principal functions of GR as a moral principle.

3. Modern Objections and the Premises of Interpersonal Differences and Human Commonalities

3.1. Classic Objections

As is suggested by George Bernard Shaw's (1856-1950) remark "Do not do unto others as you would that they should do unto you. Their tastes may not be the same," objections to GR in the modern period have been aimed mainly at its inapplicability to relationships involving interpersonal differences in terms of varied tastes, interests, and even individual human natures. The "three classic objections," which Harry J. Gensler singles out from scores of cases, are as follows:

Objection 1: Different Circumstances: If you're in *different circumstances* from the other person (for example, you have different likes and dislikes), GR can command bad actions.

Objection 2: X's flawed desires: If *X has flawed desires* (about how he wants to be treated), GR can command bad actions.

Objection 3: Your flawed desires: If *you have flawed desires* about how you're to be treated, GR can command bad actions.¹⁰

Objection 2 should be dismissed from the list. Irrespective of moral quality, as analyzed above, the recipient's desires do not directly factor into the GR practice. Rather, this objection is more relevant to the defects of the inversed formulation.

¹⁰ Gensler, *Ethics and the Golden Rule*, 203-204.

Objection 1 shows that GR's unilateralism may lead an agent to act against recipients' specific desires, needs, beliefs and so forth, thus falling into the imposition-problem. In comparison to the other objections, Objection 1 concerns interpersonal differences in various terms but excludes qualities that are measurable by objective standards of values, norms, or goods. Nonetheless, the imposition-problem is inevitable, since it stems from the GR formulation itself.

Objection 3 is a variant of Objection 1, but it makes more evident its inherent problem as a principle of moral reasoning. Whereas Objection 1 concerns conflicts of personal standards, the cases of Objection 3 imply victimizations of recipients by objective standards. Further, it stresses that one may avail oneself of GR to justify one's objectively unjustifiable actions, demonstrating that GR is ineligible for the role of an infallible objective measure of moral judgment.¹¹ In short, despite variations, all three classic objections focus on interpersonal differences.

3. 2. Modern Revisionists

From a logical point of view, human relationships in reality are hardly equal in every respect.¹² In other words, GR is logically inevitable from the purview of the imposition-problem. Modern proponents of GR like Marcus G. Singer and R. M. Hare strive to tackle this problem by revising or reinterpreting the GR formulation. Singer reinterprets GR's consistency-requirement on the ground of "common" rationality. Specifically, he attributes objections against the incompatibility of GR with presumed "differences in human nature or tastes, interests, wishes, needs, and desires" to a critical misunderstanding of GR ("the particular interpretation"). According to him, this alleged misinterpretation leads to an intuitively absurd conclusion that "whatever in particular I would have others do to or for me, I should do to or for others," which most likely results in conflicts between the two different claims of agent and recipient. Instead, the "general interpretation," which Singer suggests as an alternative, is that one should "abstract" oneself from any of one's particular desires and satisfy

¹¹ This problem is also relevant to situations when both agent and recipient equally have the same flawed desires. Suppose "one might wish for another's cooperation in sin, and be willing to reciprocate it." In this case, GR may serve to undermine "many justified social rules, legal, economic, and other" (Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, 379-380. Also see, Gewirth, "The Golden Rule Rationalized," 133-134). Nonetheless, let us put this case aside in the present paper. It is because these types of reciprocal relationships may victimize third-parties, instead of recipients, which goes beyond the scope of GR.

¹² For this, see Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, 379-380.

the requirements of equivalent conversion at a general level of principles or standards (such as the rules of mutual respect and reciprocation). In short, he argues that his alternative interpretation thus makes GR “clearly compatible with differences in tastes, interests, wishes, needs, and desires.”¹³

On the premise of rationality, Singers’ ‘general interpretation’ reinterprets GR in line with “generalizability,” meaning that “one should judge everyone’s conduct, including one’s own, from the point of view of an ‘impartial rational spectator.’”¹⁴ As the abstraction-requirement implies, the general interpretation does meet the consistency-requirement by appealing to the premise of human rationality. However, even granting the argument for now, it still seems that interests and desires in particular cases would diverge between agent and recipient, and that this general interpretation cannot provide specific rules of action in particular cases.¹⁵ As Huang Yong rightly points out, the general interpretation eventually alters GR into an imperative that an agent should judge and behave simply as an impartial, rational spectator.¹⁶ Here, GR is of little use.¹⁷

Despite wide discrepancies in details, a revisionist approach initiated by Hare also employs a comparable strategy. He addresses the objection that “no two actual cases would ever be exactly similar” by arguing that “all we have to do is to imagine an identical case in which the roles [between agent and recipient] are reversed” (“imaginative role-reversibility”) instead of dealing with actual differences existing between individuals. Specifically, imaginative role-reversibility in his framework is to appease “the demand of universalizability,” but it also guides an agent to “ignore” apparently unequal elements such as interpersonal differences in a relationship.¹⁸

Needless to say, Hare’s imaginative role-reversibility also satisfies the consistency-requirement, but hypothetically. In practice, the condition “exactly the same relation” implies a formulation of hypothetical equality between agent and recipient. Gensler rephrases this condition as a “same-situation clause,” in the same sense as imagining “if I were in that situation.” Accordingly, he renders role-reversibility into “switching places” and reformulates GR into “treat others only as you consent to being treated in the same situation.”¹⁹

¹³ Singer, “The Golden Rule,” 295-301.

¹⁴ Singer, “The Golden Rule,” 302.

¹⁵ Singer, “The Golden Rule,” 295-303.

¹⁶ Huang, “A Copper Rule Versus the Golden Rule,” 397.

¹⁷ Singer, “The Golden Rule,” 313.

¹⁸ Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, 106-107.

By the same token, Thomas Carson also adds the conditions of hypothetical role-reversibility and appends "in relevantly similar circumstances" to the original formulation of GR.²⁰

Singer, Hare, Gensler, and Carson all identify the consistency-requirement as GR's most essential function at the loss of the rule-inference function.²¹ In addition, they intend to reestablish GR on the foundation of rationality and associate "universalizability" and "generalizability" with the consistency-requirement. Consistency, in these revisionist interpretations, is clearly elevated as the primary measure or guide for rationality as well as for "being an ideally rational moral judge" from the third-party's point of view.²²

To sum up, both Singer's general interpretation and Hare's role-reversibility are conceived to defend GR by making actual interpersonal differences between agent and recipient hypothetically insignificant. Given the premise of differences between individuals, the modern revisionists shift the basis of commonality from the general homogeneity of interests, beliefs, and tastes to rationality in terms of generalizability and universalizability. Apparently, this rationality-requirement is least authentic to GR's original formulation including Confucius' *shu*. Nonetheless, it is also unquestionable that the original formulation is certainly not designed to promote treating others arbitrarily in accordance with personal desires.

3.3. The Inherent Commonality-Premise

Concerning GR's [in]compatibility with interpersonal differences, L. J. Russell recapitulates it as follows:

It works well enough in a society where interests are relatively homogeneous and simple. But in a complex society, where there are wide differences of point of view and taste and need, it suggests too strongly that the individual has only to consult his own tastes and needs to discover how he ought to behave toward other people.²³

¹⁹ Gensler, *Ethics and the Golden Rule*, 1-2 and 13.

²⁰ Carson, *Lying and Deception*, 129-153, especially 36 and 38.

²¹ Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, 108-109; Carson, *Lying and Deception*, 129-132; Gensler, *Ethics and the Golden Rule*, 18-22. Wattles characterizes twentieth century discussions on the golden rule in analytical philosophy with the expression "the golden rule is reduced to a principle of consistency" (Wattles, *The Golden Rule*, 122-140).

²² Carson, *Lying and Deception*, 129; Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, 94; and Gensler, *Ethics and the Golden Rule*, 14-15.

²³ Russell, "Ideals and Practice," 109-110.

Singer straightforwardly rejects the idea that GR must “rest on the belief that human nature is uniform.” As seen above, he thus reestablishes GR on the ground of rationality as the essential feature of human commonality, whereby it is necessary to “abstract” oneself from particular desires and “make a genuine moral judgment” “from the point of view of an impartial rational spectator.”²⁴ This suggests that irrespective of its specific definitions, human commonality in general is an indispensable precondition for a valid GR practice.

Does this precondition, however, necessarily lead to the limitation, defect, or “incompleteness” of GR in practice? It is highly probable that human commonality is an underlying presupposition for original authors of the GR formulation like Confucius and Jesus. On the other hand, it is hardly imaginable that the original authors were largely ignorant of interpersonal differences, which have been recently accused of being the primary cause of GR’s general incompetence.

Then, what does the term “interpersonal differences” refer to in relationships? No matter when and where one lives, insofar as relationships between human beings are concerned, it must point to somewhere between sheer heterogeneity and complete homogeneity. Concerning the GR practice, in this vein it also means chances, instead of facts or premises, that one may encounter, but the odds vary according to given contexts. The more heterogeneous a society is with respect to values and norms, the higher the odds are, and the more frequently the GR practice is subject to failure. The opposite is also true. GR’s fallibility is context-dependent in practice.

It is a different, and more relevant, question, whether or not homogeneous social environments actually underlay the original authors’ formulation of GR. If it is true, what roles was GR expected to play? Should it be limited to “mediating the application of” “an explicitly defined set of moral guidelines”?²⁵ Then, did they also ignore, dismiss, or minimize the rule-inference function? Or, on the contrary, was social homogeneity an ideal that they desired to accomplish, and did they believe GR would contribute to it significantly? How about Confucius?

Additionally, this set of questions is also closely correlated with views on commonality and difference. Interpersonal differences are readily associated with the imposition-problem in an intellectual milieu (rather than an actual

²⁴ Singer, “The Golden Rule,” 297-303.

²⁵ Ivanhoe, “Reweaving the ‘One Thread’ of the *Analects*,” 24.

social setting), like, for instance, modern individualism, which presumes respect for individuality and tolerance for interpersonal differences as basic moral principles. Accordingly, GR's incompatibility in this regard matters significantly.

Contrastingly, from the viewpoint of a strong belief in human commonality, interpersonal differences indicate, more often than not, eccentricity or deviations from the common grounds, which should be rectified, overcome or suppressed. In this vein, the distinction between "different circumstances" (Objection 1) and "flawed desires" (Objections 2 and 3) might be highly vague or thin. Under this intellectual milieu, recurring undesirable consequences, then, may indicate the "flawed" nature of the desires of the agent or recipient or both, instead of the defects of the GR formulation itself, and thus provide them with opportunities for, for example, self-reflection. GR's [in]efficiency as a moral principle depends largely on which premise—commonality or differences—prevails in interpreting, measuring, and practicing it. It seems that concerns about interpersonal differences and the imposition-problem are uniquely modern.

3. 4. Anachronism in Previous Studies on the Confucian GR

Confucius' elevation of *shu* to supreme status has long been one of the central issues in Confucian studies. Nonetheless, we have numerous reasons to revisit this age-old subject. Historically, modern discussions on the Confucian GR commenced with James Legge, whose ulterior purpose, however, was to show the superiority of the GR of Jesus over its Confucian counterpart.²⁶ Feng Youlan then responded to Legge's disparagement from a Confucian standpoint.²⁷ Responding to these polemically biased studies, Herbert Fingarette pioneered a philosophical investigation of Confucius' *shu* in many respects, but he introduced an anachronism as well. Moreover, his work, in consequence, hindered further exploration of the correlation between *shu* and Confucius' view on human commonality.

Fingarette's exploration starts from Confucius' so-called "one-thread" statement.

The Master said, "Shen 叁! My Way has one [thread] running through it [yi yi guan zhi 一以貫之]." Zengzi replied, "Quite so." The Master went out. The other disciples asked, "What did he mean?" Zheng replied, "Our Master's Way consists simply of *zhong* 忠 and *shu*." (*Analects* 4.15)²⁸

²⁶ Legge, *The Chinese Classics: With a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes*, 31-34, 49, 110-113.

²⁷ Feng, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 43-44.

²⁸ For translation, Nivison, "Golden Rule Arguments in Chinese Moral Philosophy," 64 with

The primary objective of Fingarette's study is to demonstrate that *zhong* and *shu* "are indeed 'one thread'—i.e., internally related to form one complex concept, rather than being independent principles" within the *Analects*.²⁹ In doing so, he concentrated on the concept of "analogies" (*pi* 譬) in the expression "the ability to draw analogies from what is near at hand" (*Analects* 6.28) as "a major clue" in explicating Confucius' *shu*.³⁰ Note, however, that he interprets *shu* principally in line with Hare's imaginative role-reversibility instead of the formulation as it is.³¹

Subsequent studies have also sought to illuminate a possible interrelation between *zhong* and *shu* (in preference to one between *shu* and human nature) to "weave," "reweave," or "unweave" this "one-thread." Ultimately, however, the "one-thread" framework provides them with a way to save Confucius' *shu* from modernist objections, which is recapitulated in the following remark of Fingarette.

A meaning that will conform to my assumption that *shu* is central to the Way taught by Confucius, that it is as such necessarily incomplete, that it can be—and for Confucius is—completed by being fused with *zhong*.³²

As limitations and defects inherent in GR have been revealed in the course of modern philosophy, it becomes hardly acceptable for them to associate the supposedly defective original formulation as such with the utmost authority conferred by Confucius upon *shu*.

These approaches, however, are far-fetched from the start. In the *Analects*, *zhong* 忠 is a relatively important idea, but it is groundless to treat *zhong* on par with *shu*.³³ Nevertheless, David Nivison even converted *zhong* into a specific type of role-reversibility, although, as Ivanhoe rightly points out, "there is not a single passage in the *Analects* in which the notion [*zhong*] is described as a case of imaginatively putting oneself in another's place."³⁴

Furthermore, both Nivison and Ivanhoe follow Fingarette's anachronistic equation of *shu* with imaginative role-reversibility.³⁵ Historically, as discussed

modification.

²⁹ Fingarette, "Following the 'One Thread' of the *Analects*," 376.

³⁰ Fingarette, "Following the 'One Thread' of the *Analects*," 382.

³¹ Fingarette, "Following the 'One Thread' of the *Analects*," 383-387.

³² Fingarette, "Following the 'One Thread' of the *Analects*," 377.

³³ For this, see Van Norden, "Unweaving the 'One Thread' of *Analects* 4:15."

³⁴ Ivanhoe, "Reweaving the 'One Thread' of the *Analects*," 22.

³⁵ Nivison, "Golden Rule Arguments in Chinese Moral Philosophy," 23-27; and Ivanhoe,

above, imaginative role-reversibility was revived by Hare in the 1960s to enhance GR's compatibility, particularly with the modernist premise of interpersonal differences. As further discussed in the next section, such personal differences were actually not a salient concern for Confucius. Additionally, role-reversibility was revived on the basis of rationality, which is even less relevant to Confucius' original formulation. Owing to their groundless confidence in GR as a first-order moral principle, Fingarette and the Sinologists following him fail to notice that *shu* was formulated by Confucius under the premise of human commonalities, which have little to do with the imposition-problem.

4. *Shu* and the Commonality-Premise in Confucius' Thought

Whereas human nature (*xing* 性) formed one of the pivots for constructing Confucian philosophical traditions at its formative stage, ambiguity surrounding Confucius' view on it consequently gave his intellectual descendants considerable latitude in constructing their own distinctive views, which resulted in the great divergences on this metaphysical subject. Most prominently, both Mencius and Xunzi perched their views on diametrically opposite extremes. Subsequently, this polar divergence spawned more varied positions in later discussions on human nature.

On the other hand, although the *Analects* did not present any definite clues, it led to the emergence of a critical question for later Confucians: which one of the two extremes, as well as its later variations, had legitimately inherited and rightly reconstructed the 'orthodox' Confucius' view? Neo-Confucians, and Zhu Xi in particular, claimed to have discovered an uninterrupted transmission from Confucius to Mencius, but they undergirded the claim on the basis of an unprecedented metaphysical system.

The 'authentic' view of Confucius, if any, still remains obscure or ambivalent from our viewpoint. An indisputable fact is that the idea of human nature is conceivable only under the premise of human commonalities, although whereas the former as a concept is characteristically metaphysical, the latter has strong empirical connotations. Therefore, if we can identify the premise of human commonalities in the *Analects*, it may signify that despite great divergences, the later discussions on human nature, particularly those

"Reweaving the 'One Thread' of the *Analects*," 23-24 and 27-29.

of Mencius and Xunzi, derived ultimately from Confucius. On the other hand, there are dozens of statements and descriptions in the *Analects* that are indicative of his view on human commonalities, but the lack of consistency between them hinders us from distinguishing its specific contents.

Concerning this issue, contrastingly, Confucius' descriptions of *shu* deserve special attention, since it is probable that his comprehensive view is encapsulated in this highly abstract principle, which, as analyzed above, requires the premise of human commonalities as an essential precondition for its initial formulation. Conversely, it is also plausible to say that an in-depth analysis of the *shu* formulation brings to light his view on human nature with greater clarity.

It is unquestionable that Confucius formulated *shu* out of the confidence that one's actions, in accordance with the rules inferred from the GR practice, will bring about desirable consequences to any proposed recipients rather than falling into the imposition-problem. This can be directly verifiable from the following statement.

Zhonggong asked about *ren*. The Master said, "When having left the house, comport yourself as if you were receiving an important guest, and when employing the people, behave as if you were overseeing a great sacrifice. Do not impose upon others what you yourself do not desire. In this way, you will encounter no resentment in your public or familial life."³⁶ (*Analects* 12.2)

This dialogue strongly suggests Confucius' conviction in *shu* as a moral principle. Replying to the question about *ren*, he prescribed how one should treat others. The last "no resentment" statement confirms Confucius' great confidence in the positive consequences that the *shu* practice is expected to bring about in private and public relationships. This interpretation is more strongly supported by the point that Confucius proposed *shu* as an answer to the question about *ren*.

In the same vein, Confucius associated the *shu* practice with "the method of [realizing] *ren*" as follows:

Zigong said, "Suppose there was one who widely bestowed benefits on the people and was capable of bringing relief to the multitude. What would you say? Could he be called humane (*ren*)?" The Master said, "Why just *ren*? Wouldn't he surely be *sheng* (聖, a sage)? Even Yao and Shun would find

³⁶ For translation, Slingerland, "Kongzi (Confucius) 'The Analects'," 34 with modifications.

this difficult. Now wishing himself to be established, a man of ren establishes others; and, wishing himself to achieve prominence, he makes others prominent. The ability to draw analogies from what is near at hand (能近取譬 *neng jin qu pi*) can be called the method of [realizing] ren.”³⁷ (*Analects* 6.28)

The pair of imperatives “Wishing himself to be established, establishes others; and, wishing himself to achieve prominence, make others prominent” are widely accepted as a positive application of *shu*. No noticeable qualifications (or concerns) are involved in this application, which also implies Confucius' confidence in the universal applicability of the rules of action thus inferred, which he identified as “the method of [realizing] ren.” Apparently, *shu* practiced at this person-to-person level substantially differs from public actions for the benefit of all people, but Confucius' statement also suggests strong similarities between them with regards to their underlying premises. In terms of recipients, their identity is not bound explicitly by relational qualifications, and it may extend to anyone within the reach of one's actions. In other remarks on *shu* and *ren* as well, Confucius is consistent in this regard. (*Analects* 5.11; 6.24; 12.22; 17.6). In so doing, however, he shows no concern for taking one's personal desires (“wishing”) as the basis for determining one's actions toward others (“establishes others” and “makes others prominent”). This avoidance of addressing interpersonal differences may not be evidence that he simply could not imagine someone (for example, critical recluses [*Analects* 18.5; 18.6]) thinking that “wishing himself to be established, establishes others” would be an undesirable attempt at imposing one's personal standards upon others.

The expression “the ability to draw analogies from what is near at hand” (*neng jin qu pi* 能近取譬) in the quotation above more clearly suggests that the commonality-premise underlay Confucius' formulation of *shu*. As Fingarette also points out, “*pi* (analogies) in the *Analects* is always a ‘comparison’ of likenesses, not differences.”³⁸ *Jin* (“what is near at hand”) indicates oneself, specifically, what one personally but sincerely wants, desires, and believes to be good and right. The expression as a whole means the ability to extend personal desires, beliefs, and standards to others on the grounds of a belief in commonalities between oneself and others, which corresponds to the basic ability (or quality) for practicing *shu*. The phrase “the method of [realizing] ren” implies that Confucius' concerns lay in the lack of ability or willingness of analogizing oneself to others, rather than

³⁷ For translation, Gardner, *The Four Books*, 23 with modifications.

³⁸ Fingarette, “Following the ‘One Thread’ of the *Analects*,” 382.

undesirable consequences that might be brought about by imposing personal standards upon others or the “incompleteness” of the *shu* formulation. As Feng Youlan states, the Confucian GR is “a principle by which one uses oneself as a standard to regulate one’s conduct.”³⁹ Likewise, Confucius accentuated that the practice of *ren* should begin from recognizing oneself as the starting point as well as the premise that all humans possess the potential to achieve it. (*Analects* 2.1; 4.6; 7.29; 12.1).

Throughout the *Analects*, Confucius’ premise of commonalities outweighed considerations for interpersonal differences.

Wealth and social eminence are things that all people desire, and yet unless they are acquired in the proper way I will not abide them. Poverty and disgrace are things that all people hate, and yet unless they are avoided in the proper way I will not despise them. If *junzi* 君子 abandons *ren*, how can he merit the name? *Junzi* does not go against *ren* even for the amount of time required to finish a meal. . . .⁴⁰ (*Analects* 4.5)

In short, Confucius contrasted a strong emphasis on the importance of *ren* with the question of how to satisfy one’s personal inclinations toward wealth and social eminence, which are shared with all others, “in the proper way,” instead of with possible drawbacks arising from differences between individuals.

More clearly and directly, the passage, “By nature [people] are nearly alike; by practice, [they] become different” (*Analects* 17.2) attests to Confucius’ overall belief in human commonality. This therefore also strongly supports the conjecture that *shu* was formulated under the premise that a comprehension of one’s own wants, desires, and feelings would afford “the best guide to the treatment of others.”⁴¹

None of the statements cited above, however, tell us what specifically Confucius had in mind in presupposing human commonalities. In this regard, Zigong’s testimony “The Master’s cultural brilliance is something that is readily heard about, whereas one does not get to hear the Master expounding upon the subjects of human nature or the Way of Heaven” (*Analects* 5.13)⁴² is highly suggestive. Confucius might not feel obliged to substantiate a concept of human nature beyond a general (therefore vague and ambivalent) viewpoint

³⁹ Feng, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 43.

⁴⁰ For translation, Slingerland, “Kongzi (Confucius) ‘The Analects,’” 11 with modification.

⁴¹ Munro, *The Concept of Man in Early China*, 13.

⁴² For translation, Slingerland, “Kongzi (Confucius) ‘The Analects,’” 15.

on human commonalities. According to Donald J Munro, the view that there exist “the common attributes or characteristics with which all men are born” prevailed among the Confucians as well as the Daoists in early China.⁴³

Overall, the ambiguity surrounding Confucius' view allowed his followers to enjoy a large degree of latitude in defining the qualities of human nature, which led to a great divergence between Mencius and Xunzi. What is important to note is that, on the other hand, Confucius' belief in human commonalities also predetermined later inquires in the direction of articulating his view by conceptualizing human nature. In the light that GR in general is conceivable under the premise of commonalities, this also provides an explanation of the adoptions and adaptations of *shu* found widely in the post-Confucius texts of ancient Confucianism.

5. Post-Confucius Reformulations and Human Nature

The commonality-premise forms an essential precondition for the initial formulation of GR and the validity of its actual practices. This correlation is also verified in the compatibility between the *shu* formulation and the view on human commonalities in Confucius' thought.

As mentioned in the introduction, whereas the term *shu* prevailed in the post-Confucius texts of ancient Confucianism, the original *shu* formulation was quickly and extensively replaced with substantial reformulations. This historical change garners more attention when noticing the exceptional position that *shu* takes in the *Analects*. One is that Confucius presented it as “one teaching that can serve as a guide for one's entire life” (*Analects* 15.24) and thus conferred great weight upon its importance, which is nearly comparable to *ren* 仁. The other is consistency in the formulation. Unlike *ren*, the *shu* formulation was reiterated twice by Confucius himself with no modifications (*Analects* 12.2 and 15.24) and once by Zigong with no substantial reformulations (*Analects* 5.12). This confirms that the syntactic and semantic constitution of the formulation was explicitly established in the minds of Confucius and his immediate disciples.

This leads us to the following questions: What caused the drastic change between Confucius and his successors, which seems to go counter to the emphasis, conviction, and consistency made by Confucius himself? How are

⁴³ Munro, *The Concept of Man in Early China*, 1-16.

the later reformulations of *shu* interrelated with the advents of the definitive views on human nature and the great divergence between Mencius and Xunzi? At this moment, let us investigate the correlation and compatibility between the characteristics of the reformulations and the view on human nature in the respective thoughts of Mencius and Xunzi.

At one extreme is Mencius' view on human nature. Throughout the entire *Mencius*, *shu* is alluded to just once.

Mencius said, "The ten thousand things are all already complete in oneself. To reflect oneself and discover integrity (*cheng* 誠)—there is no greater joy than this. In pursuing *ren* 仁, there is nothing closer than firmly acting out of *shu* 恕." (*Mencius* 7A.4)⁴⁴

Like Confucius, Mencius also associated *shu* with *ren*, but this passage does not tell us exactly how he comprehended *shu*. According to Zhu Xi, the first clause specifically indicates the perfect immanency of moral human nature. Suppose, however, that human beings are all born with morally good nature and that human nature manifests itself above the threshold of human consciousness under a certain condition. Then, insofar as one is capable of perceiving the genuine manifestations of inborn morality, what one wishes from others on this basis is not only always morally permissible for oneself but also universally acceptable from the third-party's standpoint.

If this is the case, one does not need to exercise *shu* to find an answer to the question of how one should treat others. Rather, one simply ought to treat others in accordance with one's genuine wishes. To repeat, a precondition is that one should be aware of the genuine contents of human nature within the self before carrying it out. Then, the focus of practice and self-cultivation must be placed on how to satisfy this precondition and thus gain genuine practical knowledge from within. In other words, according to this line of reasoning, insofar as one has the capacity to rightly and clearly perceive manifestations of human nature, one's wishes from others are completely free from the imposition-problem. As discussed above, it is not because this approach takes the uniformity between agent and recipient in terms of 'actual' wishes and desires for granted, but because the imposition-problem within this perspective indicates the "flawed" natures of wishes and desires.

In this vein, instead of reiterating Confucius' original formulation, Mencius transformed Confucius' *shu* into various reformulations. What is notable is that

⁴⁴ For translation, Van Norden, "Mengzi(Mencius)," 152.

he consistently omitted the process of equivalent conversion embedded in *shu*. The directive “simply taking one’s mind and imposing it upon others” (*ju si xin jia zhu bi* 舉斯心加諸彼) (*Mencius* 1A.7) largely reminds us of a critical diagnosis of GR with respect to the imposition-problem, in the sense that it encourages one to transfer one’s likes and dislikes to others without restraint, in a much more direct and unambiguous manner than the original *shu* formulation. Accordingly, no concerns about the risks that such an action might bring harm to recipients are detectable in this directive. Rather, it seems that his concern lay in the incursion of self-centered motives that may lead one not to, or be reluctant to, put one’s wishes into action in relation to others. In this vein, he strongly urged even kings with apparent moral defects to share and enjoy what they personally wished together with the people (*yu min tong le* 與民同樂) (*Mencius* 1B.1 and 4).

Note that Confucius’ original formulation as such does not appear in the *Mencius*. Instead, Mencius reformulated it and presented directives such as “Give them what they want, then they will gather [at your court]; Do not impose what they dislike [upon them]” (*suo yu yu zhi ju zhi* 所欲與之聚之, *suo e wu shi er ye* 所惡勿施爾也) (*Mencius* 4A.9). This directive is particularly close to an altruistic reinterpretation of GR (that is, the inversed formulation) compared to the original formulation, in the light that it designates the wishes of recipients as the standards of the practice (also see, *Mencius* 7A.17), instead of what “you” yourself [do not] desire (*ji suo [bu] yu* 己所[不]欲). In short, Mencius’ strong belief in moral human nature led him to reinterpret Confucius’ *shu* into a principle of direct and extensive transmission of one’s wishes to others, whose reformulation more clearly discloses its vulnerability to the imposition-problem in practice.

At the other extreme, Xunzi characterized human nature as defined by self-centered inclinations. According to him, uncontrolled pursuits of inborn inclinations inevitably lead to conflicts between individuals and eventually to socio-political chaos. To repeat, GR is designed to countermeasure one’s self-centered motives, by letting one’s desires directed toward others be converted equivalently to one’s duties toward those others. Therefore, provided that one’s wishes could not go beyond the bounds of self-centeredness, one’s practice of GR could also not avoid self-contradiction, for rules of action thus inferred would necessarily go counter to those self-interests. In this case, one would not find any motivation to practice GR at the outset. Then, GR itself is of little use, unless this line of reasoning presumes other sources of impetus which are responsible for initial motivations for the GR practice. Here, the

practice of GR must be counted as a deliberate and premeditated process against natural inclinations, rather than as a procedure relating to some kind of spontaneous unfolding of human nature.

Shu appears once in the *Xunzi*, too, but in a substantial reformulation.

Confucius said: “A *junzi* 君子 has three standards for *shu* 恕. Where a person has a lord whom he is incapable of (*buneng* 不能) serving yet requires (*jiu* 求) his own subjects to serve him, this is contrary to the requirements of *shu*. Where a person does not requite [the affections of] his own parents yet requires (*jiu*) his son to be filial toward him, this is contrary to the requirements of *shu*. Where he has an elder brother whom he is incapable of respecting yet requires (*jiu*) his own younger brother to obey his directives, this is contrary to the requirements of *shu*. If a *shi* 士 clearly understands (*ming* 明) the requirements of *shu*, then it is possible for him to correct himself.”⁴⁵

Like the *Mencius*, the *Xunzi* did not include Confucius’ original formulation either. Instead, *Xunzi* reinterpreted *shu* into an ethico-logical self-awareness in line with the principle of consistency-requirement. It seems that under the premise of self-centeredness as human commonality, it is inconceivable for *Xunzi* to infer rules of action on the basis of personal “wishes” (*yu* 欲). In his accounts, personal “wishes” are something that a moral agent should fight against rather than accommodate for the sake of personal moral integrity or public socio-political order. In this vein, he replaced the term “*yu*” (wish, desire, or want) in Confucius’ original formulation with “*jiu*” (require, demand, or pursue), a term that has stronger connotations of intentionality and deliberateness. He thus underlined self-contradictions that would occur when one’s requirements which are directed toward others are inconsistent with the rules of action.

In this vein, *Xunzi* thus deprived *shu* of the rule-inference function. Unlike the original formulation that exists with the least number of qualifications or specifications, his account takes the three rules of action—“serve your lord,” “requite the affections of your own parents,” and “respect your elder brother”—as given and predetermined rather than inferable from the *shu* practice. The three rules are presented as objective ethical standards against which one ought to measure the current states of one’s attitudes toward others. It is logically reasonable to transform, for example, the third

⁴⁵ *Xunzi*, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, 258 with modification.

requirement into a positive application of *shu*—"Respect your elder brothers as you require your own younger brothers to obey your directives"—and infer from it a generalizable rule of action—"Respect your elder brothers." Instead, Xunzi placed more emphasis on whether or not one is capable of (*neng*) abiding by the given rules of action in practice and proposed them as the guidelines for "correcting oneself," a method of moral self-cultivation. As is well known, generally speaking, while delegating the authority of legislating rules of action (*li* 禮) only to sages, he limited the scope of moral practice for ordinary people to their deliberate conformity to these given rules. Despite Confucius' exceptional emphasis on *shu*, therefore, he thus had to readjust the roles of *shu* in line with his unique view on human commonalities.

6. Concluding Remarks

In 1993, the Parliament of the World's Religions identified GR as "the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for families and communities, for races, nations, and religions."⁴⁶ Far earlier than this historic event, the name "Golden Rule" was bestowed by Christian theologians of 17th century England upon a short precept, "Do to others as you would have them do to you" in the *New Testament*, to newly construct Christian ethics. After Thomas Hobbes incorporated it into his political theory as the underlying principle, modern philosophers like David Hume and Immanuel Kant launched philosophical investigations and then cast strong suspicions on its validity as a moral principle.⁴⁷ Its authority as the 'golden' rule, however, was not seriously challenged until the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the upheaval of individualism in association with a pluralistic viewpoint, which argues for the acknowledgement of a diversity of tastes, wishes, and standards, took place. From a wider historical perspective, however, this challenge is as recent as the individualism of modernity.

In contrast, Confucius' *shu*, the earliest mature formulation of GR in human history, immediately prompted his self-confessed successors to amend it, despite the emphasis, conviction, and consistency conferred by Confucius himself upon it. It is out of the question that the so-called imposition-problem has little to do with their motivations for amendment. Unlike the explanations proposed by the previous

⁴⁶ Parliament of the World's Religions, "The Declaration toward a Global Ethics," 7 and 2-3.

⁴⁷ Wattle, *The Golden Rule*, 77-89.

anachronistic studies of Confucian *shu*, this problem is unavoidable for GR in general, because it is inherent in the GR formulation *per se*. As mentioned above, however, this problem is the other side of the same coin: it derives from the principle of equivalent conversion and the consistency-requirement, which constitute the most essential features of GR as a moral principle. Originally, GR was formulated under the premise of human commonalities, which modern individualism has repudiated. The imposition-problem indicates a shift in the underlying premises rather than an indisputable defect or its “incompleteness” as a moral principle. Likewise, the replacement of Confucius’ *shu* with the subsequent substantial reformulations must be also construed in conjunction with the changes in views on human commonalities.

This leads to further interrelated questions, which we have yet to investigate. The reformulations found in the *Zhongyong*, the *Great Learning*, and the *Xunzi* show a considerable affinity between them in terms of relational configuration. As analyzed above, like GR in general, Confucius’ *shu* is comprised of two unspecified parties—“you” as agent and “others” as recipient. In contrast, these reformulations are embedded in ‘asymmetrical’ relationships like the cardinal human relations. This difference has little to do with the changes in views on human nature. Rather, it seems that the reformulations were constructed to incorporate into the scope of Confucius’ *shu* the asymmetrical relationships (particularly, the cardinal human relations), which constituted the unique socio-political standpoint of ancient Confucianism, and at the same time which thus made a striking contrast with the egalitarian perspective of Mohism.

Conversely, then, how can we interpret the transition from the equality-premise embedded in Confucius’ original formulation (that is, the equal relationship between agent and recipient) to the accommodation of asymmetry in the later reformulations? More specifically, how is this egalitarian feature in Confucius’ *shu* formulation related to his promotion of *ren* as the utmost principle in human relationships, which also has strong egalitarian connotations, in contrast particularly with the concepts of *yi* 義 and *li* 禮, which endorse social discriminations? What does it mean with regard to the history of ancient Confucianism that this pattern of asymmetrical reformulations is not found only in the *Mencius* among the post-Confucius classics of ancient Confucianism? Let me conclude the current study here, with the intention that I will deal with these questions in separate papers.

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孔子的黃金率與孟子和荀子的重新解釋 ——先秦儒學的“恕”、共同前提與人性

李定桓

中文摘要

本文主要目的是為孔子和他的繼承人之間在“恕”方面發生重大的知識轉變，以及孟子與荀子的分歧，提供一個哲學說明。但在目前有關儒學黃金率和先秦儒學史的研究中，這一問題仍未被充分檢驗。孔子提出了恕是一種最高級的道德原則與“仁之方”。他對黃金率的最早形成給予了極大的重視。此外，這一道德原則在《論語》中高度一致地表達出來。儘管如此，原來的表達方式很快就消失了，並且在古代儒家經典中，此原來的表達方式被各種形式的重新表述全面取代。

關於這些問題，本研究表明了以下幾點：黃金率一般是以人類共同性為前提。近代時期反對黃金率的強加問題出現，不是由於其道德原則的內在缺陷，而是由早期近代從人類共同性到個人差異的前提轉變。同樣，根據人類共同觀點的變化，孔子和他的繼承人之間發生了劇烈的轉變。孟子與荀子對恕的觀念也有顯著差異，因為關於孔子人性觀，他們之間存在著巨大分歧。

關鍵詞：黃金率，恕，重新解釋，人類共同性的前提，人性，孔子，孟子，荀子

Two Readings of the *Lunyu*: With and Without the Edifying Effect of Music and the Complementary Concept of “Ritual and Music”

JO Jungeun

Abstract

The notions of the edifying effect of music and the complementary functions of ritual (*li* 禮) and music (*yue* 樂), which are emphasized in the “Yuelun” chapter of the *Xunzi* and the “Yueji” chapter of the *Liji*, would not be valid in the *Lunyu* if we consider the possibility that those ideas were formulated after the *Lunyu*. Although the *Lunyu* could perceive music from an ethical viewpoint, it is highly improbable that the *Lunyu* acknowledges music exerting an edifying effect based on its ethical value. If this effect is not valid, the complementary relationship between ritual and music is also inapplicable to the *Lunyu*. The concept of “ritual and music” appears to first gain conceptual significance in the *Lunyu*; however, music is not discussed as a complementary counterpart to ritual but as a subordinate concept of ritual, in that music is mainly portrayed in a ceremonial context where music forms a part of ritual performance. In spite of the questionable validity of understanding the *Lunyu* based on the edifying effect of music and the complementary functions of ritual and music, these ideas are presumed when interpreting some of the passages of the *Lunyu*, including *Lunyu* 17.4, 11.15, 13.3, and 17.11. These ideas are not necessarily assumed when understanding those passages; on the contrary, considering the possibility of those concepts emerging after the *Lunyu*, a more convincing interpretation of the *Lunyu* can be made by maintaining a distance from those notions.

Keywords: *Lunyu*, “Yuelun,” “Yueji,” edifying effect of music, complementary concept of “ritual and music,” ethical value of music

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** A Korean language version of this paper has been published as “Noneo-ui eumangnon: eumak-ui gyohwa jagyong-gwa sangbojeok yeak gaenyeom-e daehan geomto” 논어의 음악론: 음악의 교화작용과 상보적 예악 개념에 대한 검토 (Discourse on Music of the *Lunyu*: Examination of the Edifying Effect of Music and the Complementary Concept of Ritual and Music), *Yugyo sasang munhwa yeongu* (The Study of Confucian Philosophy and Culture) 52 (2013): 33-58. As to the main arguments, this paper is almost identical to the Korean language version; however, some changes are made to supplement the arguments and improve the flow.

1. Introduction

This paper contrasts two readings of *Lunyu* 論語 (Analects of Confucius) 17.4, 11.15, 13.3, and 17.11: one reading assumes “the edifying effect of music” and the complementary concept of “ritual and music” (*liyue* 禮樂) and the other does not.¹ I will then argue that the *Lunyu* is more properly understood when these two ideas are not presumed. By “the edifying effect of music” I mean that music edifies people on the basis of its ethical properties; in other words, music leads people to behaving in accordance with its ethical value.² I use the complementary concept of “ritual and music” with a focus on their contrasting yet complementary functions: ritual imposes order or distinction (*xu* 序 / *jie* 節) and music harmonizes (*he* 和) differences, which promotes a well-ordered, harmonious society.

The above two notions, as I will argue later, were most probably first advocated in the “Yuelun” 樂論 (Discourse on Music) chapter of the *Xunzi* 荀子 (Master Xun) and the “Yueji” 樂記 (Records of Music) chapter of the *Liji* 禮記 (Records of Ritual), both of which postdate the *Lunyu*. As they constitute the main arguments of Confucian discourse on music, they are often taken for granted when interpreting music in Confucian texts, and the *Lunyu* is not an exception. For example, it is argued that the discussion in “Yuelun” about the edifying effect of music and cultivation of the heart/mind from a political point of view originates from the *Lunyu*, and

¹ Both “ritual” and “music” would not be exact translations of *li* 禮 and *yue* 樂. As revealed by its various translations such as ritual, rite, decorum, and propriety, *li* has a wide range of meaning including religious ceremonies and social norms. This paper uses “ritual” in two main contexts: when discussing the *Lunyu*, this term mostly lies in a ceremonial context, but in other cases it mainly means social norms. These different definitions reflect the shift in the relationship between ritual and music I will discuss in this paper. Although the English term “ritual” does not fully embrace those meanings, it is by and large related to both in that it indicates a series of regulations either in a ceremony or society. According to “Yueji,” *yue* consists of vocal and instrumental sounds as well as dance, while being differentiated from *sheng* 聲 whose meaning is restricted to sound. In this paper, “music” mainly indicates a large-scale musical performance as defined in “Yueji,” especially when it is portrayed as ceremonial music; however, “music” is also loosely used without adhering to the definition of “Yueji” in other contexts.

² As known from the fact that music is included in the Six Arts (*liu yi* 六藝), namely six educational subjects to be a noble person, it is a long-held belief that music is effective in promoting a person’s growth. In addition, music can help achieve the aim of a ceremony by arousing positive feelings among participants. Those effects can also be called “the edifying effect” in a broad sense. However, I use this term in a narrower sense: this effect is based on the ethical value that music is believed to preserve.

this view is received in “Yueji.”³ It is also indicated that music, as an edifying tool, is one of the most frequently mentioned subjects of Confucius (551-479 BCE); this subject is later explored by Xunzi (c. 313-238 BCE) and Han Feizi (c. 280-233 BCE) and it becomes orthodox in “Yueji” and “Yueshu” 樂書 (Book of Music) of the *Shiji* 史記 (Records of the Scribe).⁴

Not all scholars argue that Confucius supports the edifying effect of music, even though they admit some similarities between Confucius and Xunzi. For example, Cai Zhongde says that Confucius and Xunzi emphasize the ethical value of music; however, from Xunzi’s particular point of view, music is an edifying tool which makes a complementary pair with ritual.⁵ However, the *Lunyu* has been interpreted not only by modern scholars but also by traditional commentators on the premise of the edifying effect of music as well as the complementary concept of “ritual and “music,” which I believe results from the marked influence of “Yuelun” and “Yueji” on what is called “Confucian discourse on music.” That is, these two ideas which belong to “Yuelun” and “Yueji” were retroactively applied to the *Lunyu* due to the increased importance of the two texts in later times.

The main body of this paper is divided into two main sections: the first section addresses the edifying effect of music and the second section deals with the complementary concept of “ritual and music.” In each section, I will first demonstrate that these two ideas were hardly explored before “Yuelun,” and then demonstrate two readings of *Lunyu* 17.4 and 11.15 (in the first section), and 13.3 and 17.11 (in the second section), with the aim of suggesting that these passages are more adequately understood without these two notions.

2. The Edifying Effect of Music

The edifying effect of music is clearly advocated in “Yuelun”: music, which is believed to retain ethical value, influences not only people’s heart/mind but also their behavior, in morally positive or negative ways.⁶ I will

³ Xu, *Zhongguo yishu jingshen*, 5-6.

⁴ DeWoskin, *A Song for One or Two*, 29.

⁵ Cai, *Zhongguo yinyue meixueshi*, 187-188.

⁶ Besides the edifying effect, “Yuelun” discusses various aspects of music, such as music’s function of evoking feelings, dissimilar ways of enjoying music between a noble man and a petty man, and different types of music that are enjoyed between a well-ordered state

investigate the way that “Yuelun” attaches ethical value to music and examine whether other texts prior to “Yuelun” also advance similar ideas. I will argue that the ethical value of music was also appreciated before “Yuelun”; however, the edifying effect of music based on this value was yet to be as clearly advocated as in “Yuelun.” In line with this argument, I will suggest that it would be misleading to interpret *Lunyu* 17.4 and 11.15 whilst assuming the edifying effect of music.

2.1. The Ethical Value and Edifying Effect of Music in “Yuelun,” *Zuozhuan*, and *Lüshi chunqiu*

“Yuelun” says that “if music [follows] the mean and is balanced, the people become harmonious without being dissipated. If music sounds solemn and dignified, the people behave in a uniform manner without disorder.”⁷ From the correspondence between sound and behavior, we can assume that in order for music to exert ethical influence, music should retain ethical value in the first place. “Yuelun” suggests the resonance between sound and *qi* 氣 (ether/vital force) as a theoretical basis for this specific correspondence: “when evil sound stimulates a person, *qi* going against [the right way] responds to it” and “when refined sound stimulates a person, *qi* going with [the right way] responds to it.” Through this resonance which is based on shared ethical value, evil sound results in disorder and refined sound results in order.⁸ In addition, it argues that refined sound prevents morally bad *qi* from stimulating the heart/mind.⁹

In line with the belief that music determines the chaos and/or stability of a country, music is perceived as a governing tool: “As an object that sages enjoyed, music can make people’s heart/mind morally good. Its [ability] to stimulate people is strong and thus alters manners and customs.”¹⁰ In addition,

and a chaotic state, but these aspects were already discussed before “Yuelun.” As I will discuss later, an edifying effect based on music’s ethical value is firstly explored in “Yuelun,” and as such I would suggest it deserves to be the main argument of “Yuelun.”

⁷ *Xunzi*, “Yuelun”: “樂中平則民和而不流，樂肅莊則民齊而不亂。” Translation is mine; unless otherwise indicated, all translations are mine.

⁸ *Xunzi*, “Yuelun”: “凡姦聲感人而逆氣應之，逆氣成象而亂生焉。正聲感人而順氣應之，順氣成象而治生焉。”

⁹ *Xunzi*, “Yuelun”: “It would cause the intricacy or directness of melody, the elaboration or simplification of instrumentation, the purity or richness of sound, and the rhythm and meter of the music to be sufficient to stir and move the good in men’s heart and to keep evil and base *qi* 氣 sentiments from finding a foothold there” (使其曲直繁省廉肉節奏，足以感動人之善心，使夫邪汙之氣無由得接焉). Translation is from Knoblock, *Xunzi*, vol. 3, 80.

¹⁰ *Xunzi*, “Yuelun”: “樂者，聖人之所樂也，而可以善民心。其感人深，其移風易俗。”

“If music is performed, the people face towards the right direction. Therefore, music is a great tool to rule over the people.”¹¹ In this way, “Yuelun” attaches ethical value to music and argues for an edifying effect based on the resonance between sound and *qi*, two components that share ethical value.

Was it a consensual idea that music retains ethical value and induces certain behavior in accordance with this value during the pre-Qin period? Let us seek an answer to this question by examining the *Zuozhuan* 左傳 (Zuo’s Commentary) and *Lüshi chunqiu* 呂氏春秋 (Annals of Mr Lü). The *Zuozhuan* describes the story of Jizha 季札 (576-484 BCE) who went to Lu 魯 and appraised the music of each enfeoffed state in relation to its governance. In addition, the *Lüshi chunqiu* discusses great music (*dayue* 大樂) and extravagant music (*chiyue* 侈樂) in the context of the rulership. These descriptions relate music to governance and thus seem likely to support music’s ethical value and edifying effect.

According to the record of the 29th year of Duke Xiang (Xianggong 襄公), Jizha listens to each state’s music and makes comments. For example, “It sounds worrisome but not wearing” (*you er bu kun* 憂而不困); “It sounds reflective but not apprehensive” (*si er bu ju* 思而不懼); and “It sounds pleasant but not excessive” (*le er bu yin* 樂而不淫). Moreover, after listening to the music of Zheng 鄭, he makes a prediction based on its overly complex melody: that Zheng would be the first state to perish.¹²

If we interpret Jizha’s prediction from the viewpoint of “Yuelun,” where music is considered to influence the heart/mind to be either compliant or non-compliant towards being governed, it can be understood that people reach a negative emotional state after listening to the music of their country and this emotional state exerts negative effects on people’s behavior. As a result, Zheng is replete with wrongdoers as to be the first state to perish. However, it seems that what Jizha says is not how music affects the heart/mind but how music expresses what is inside the heart/mind, considering Jizha’s reason for ascribing the worrisome sound to Wei 衛: “It sounds worrisome but not wearing. I heard that the virtue of Kang Shu 康叔 and Wugong 武公 of Wei was like this; therefore, this would be the tune of Wei.”¹³

Jizha’s remark presumes that those people’s virtue is reflected in music and so their virtue can be identified by listening to music. In this case, “being

¹¹ *Xunzi*, “Yuelun”: “樂行而民鄉方矣。故樂者治人之盛者也。”

¹² *Zuozhuan*, 29th year of Duke Xiang: “爲之歌鄭，曰，美哉！其細已甚，民弗堪也。是其先亡乎！”

¹³ *Zuozhuan*, 29th year of Duke Xiang: “憂而不困者也。吾聞衛康叔武公之德如是，是其衛風乎！”

worrisome but not wearing” is not what is evoked by music but a musical expression of the virtue of Kang Shu and Wugong. In other words, it is not that music influences the heart/mind but that what is in the heart/mind is expressed in music: Jizha sees music as an expression of inner feelings and virtue, not as an external stimulus to evoke feelings.¹⁴ Therefore, we can assume that Jizha’s story acknowledges the ethical value of music but does not suggest the edifying effect of music.

Jizha’s prediction is not based on the idea that overly complex melody exerts a negative influence on the people so as to bring about the fall of the state. Instead, it would be more convincing to construe that from the music, Jizha recognized the harsh political situation which would result in the fall of the state.¹⁵ Jizha’s story shows the belief that music reflects what is in the heart/mind such as virtue and feeling, but it does not go further to argue that this music brings about psychological or behavioral changes according to its ethical properties, as “Yuelun” argues. In Jizha’s story, music has relevance to governance in that it reveals the political situation of a state either in the present or the past.

The *Lüshi chunqiu* provides the concepts of “great music” (*dayue*) and “extravagant music” (*chiyue*) which have no ethical connotations as apparent as “refined sound” (*zhengsheng* 正聲) and “evil sound” (*jiansheng* 姦聲) in “Yuelun.” Great music sounds delightful to the people in various social relationships, such as ruler and subject, father and son, and elder and younger.¹⁶ This delight is acquired by satisfying sensory desire when people live in a time peaceful enough to allow themselves to enjoy music.¹⁷ In contrast, extravagant music hurts life since it acts as an overly strong stimulus, like a clap of thunder. This type of music is performed under the rulership of an imprudent ruler who

¹⁴ David Shaberg, taking Jizha’s story as an example, indicates that music can express various situations in the past, including political situations. Besides, he suggests that this story reveals Jizha’s particular sagacity: Jizha seized upon what music conveys when listening to it. Shaberg, *A Patterned Past*, 86-95. Considering that what Jizha appreciated was a large-scale musical performance, not only auditory but visual information is also given. Therefore, his evaluation can be based on both kinds of information, as Kim Hakchu and others suggest. “Gyechal gwanak-eul tonghae bon ak-ui uimi-wa jihyang,” 6. However, I would rather focus on auditory information in association with its relation to the heart/mind.

¹⁵ Cai Zhongde interprets that Jizha inferred from the overly complex and fast melody that people cannot bear harsh and meticulous political ordinances. Cai, *Zhongguo yinyue meixueshi*, 44.

¹⁶ *Lüshi chunqiu*, “Dayue”: “大樂，君臣父子長少之所歡欣而說也。”

¹⁷ *Lüshi chunqiu*, “Dayue”: “聲出於和，和出於適。和適先王定樂，由此而生。天下太平，萬物安寧，皆化其上，樂乃可成。”

pursues his desire inordinately. Extravagant music does not merely injure the ruler's body but it also incurs the resentment of the people, sufficient to bring about the decline of the state.¹⁸

Great music and extravagant music represent good and bad music; however, good and bad are not defined ethically but physically. In other words, great music serves as an appropriate strength of physical stimulus whereas extravagant music acts as an inordinate strength of physical stimulus. As the two chapters of the *Lüshi chunqiu* do not postulate the ethical value of music, we can assume neither behavioral patterns corresponding to this value nor the consequent results of order and disorder of the state. In the *Lüshi chunqiu*, music is related to governance in the sense that the types of music for entertainment are varied depending on the ruler's level of virtue; in other words, music is one of the indicators that show the ruler's virtue, which is pivotal to determining the order and/or disorder of the state.

In the above two cases, music is related to governance yet in different ways from "Yuelun." That is, while "Yuelun" argues that refined sound contributes to a well-governed society by inducing good behavior, the *Zuozhuan* implies that one can diagnose political situations through music: in the former, music influences the heart/mind and in the latter what is in the heart/mind is expressed in music. In addition, according to the *Lüshi chunqiu*, different types of music are enjoyed depending on whether it is a settled time governed by a virtuous ruler or an unsettled time governed by a stupid ruler.

In "Yuelun," music is believed to play a crucial role in bringing about a settled time or an unsettled time; however, we can hardly find this belief in the above two cases. Therefore, I would suggest that the edifying effect of music based on its ethical value was not widely recognized during the time of "Yuelun," not to mention before this time, although the concept of seeing music from an ethical perspective can be traced back to before "Yuelun," as in Jizha's story.

The argument that there was little recognition of the edifying effect of music before "Yuelun" could gain support from the fact that the concept of resonance between sound and *qi*, which is the theoretical basis for this effect, has yet to be extensively discussed before the mid-Warring States period (473-221 BCE). For this reason, we should be careful in applying the concept of the edifying effect of music when interpreting the *Lunyu*.

¹⁸ *Lüshi chunqiu*, "Chiyue": "亂世之樂與此同。爲木革之聲則若雷，爲金石之聲則若霆，爲絲竹歌舞之聲則若譟。以此駭心氣，動耳目，搖蕩生則可矣，以此爲樂則不樂。故樂愈侈，而民愈鬱，國愈亂，主愈卑，則亦失樂之情矣。"

2.2. Reading *Lunyu* 17.4 and 11.15 with and without the Concept of the Edifying Effect of Music

Confucius says that the Shao 韶 music, the music of King Shun, is perfectly beautiful and perfectly good while the Wu 武 music, the music of King Wu, is perfectly beautiful but not perfectly good.¹⁹ According to Kong Anguo 孔安國 (d. 1st century BCE), these dissimilar evaluations result from the way they came to the throne: Shun succeeded to the throne by Yao's abdication while Wu ascended it by using military power.²⁰ In keeping with Kong's interpretation, Confucius's remark on the Shao music and the Wu music has mainly been regarded as an ethical evaluation of music. However, as Park suggests, an ethical implication does not need to be assumed, considering that Confucius also mentioned "good" (*shan* 善) when he heard someone singing really well.²¹ Beauty and goodness can be associated with different aesthetic aspects.²²

Even though it is not clear whether Confucius intended to assess moral implications when he mentioned the goodness of the Shao music, we can still open up a possibility that Confucius perceived music in an ethical way. If so, Confucius's evaluation can be considered similar to that of Jizha who imagined the virtue of Kang Shu and Wugong. That is, Confucius was under the impression of the virtue of King Shun when listening to the Shao music, and it is this virtue that made Confucius attach the value of goodness to the Shao music as Kong suggests.

The ethical value of the Shao music is also implied in Confucius's remark on this music: "I did not think that music could reach here."²³ However, this remark does not provide solid evidence for the ethical value of music theory, since we are not sure what deeply moved Confucius: his evaluation could be solely aesthetic or it could also include moral appreciation or other aspects. Without ruling out other interpretations, I would suggest that this remark favors the theory that Confucius felt exalted because he was morally inspired by King Shun's virtue, which was conveyed by the music.²⁴

¹⁹ *Lunyu* 3.25: "子謂韶，盡美矣，又盡善也。謂武，盡美矣，未盡善也。"

²⁰ Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 223: "韶舜樂名也。謂以聖德受禪故曰盡善也。武武王樂也。以征伐取天下故曰未盡善也。"

²¹ *Lunyu* 7.32: "子與人歌而善，必使反之，而後和之。"

²² Park, "Noneo-e natanan godae junggugin-ui miuisik," 25-27.

²³ *Lunyu* 7.14: "子在齊聞韶，三月不知肉味。曰，不圖爲樂之至於斯也。"

²⁴ Some commentators give no credit to the deep impression made on Confucius by the Shao music which made him forget the taste of meat for three months. For example,

Although we can open up a possibility for Confucius's acknowledgement of the ethical value of music,²⁵ his remark does not support the reading that music can guide people to the right way in accordance with this value.

Although it is not clear whether Confucius regarded music as a governing tool which produces an edifying effect, *Lunyu* 17.4 was interpreted by assuming this effect.

The Master came to the town of Wu. Hearing the sound of stringed instruments and chanting, the Master smiled and said, "Why use an ox-knife to kill a chicken?" Ziyou replied, "In the past I heard it from you, Master, that 'when people of high station (*junzi* 君子) learn about the Way (*dao* 道), they will love their fellow people; when the common people learn about the Way, they will be easy to command.'" The Master said, "My young friends, Yan[Ziyou]'s words are right. What I said was only joking."²⁶

According to Kong Anguo, what Confucius described was using the great *dao* (*dadao* 大道), namely "ritual and music" to govern a small town; the people are well governed without much effort if they are harmonized by music.²⁷ That is, Confucius thought that there was no need to use music in governing such a small town as Wu. Xing Bing 邢昺 (932-1010) presents a similar interpretation and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) also mentions edification by means of ritual and music: Zhu Xi says that Ziyou, chief governor of the town of Wu, edified his people using ritual and music, and therefore the people of the town all sang whilst playing string instruments.²⁸

it is said that despite the beauty of the Shao music, it is improbable Confucius forgot the taste of meat for three months since sages do not adhere to external things. Therefore, it is suggested that the characters 三月 be changed to one character 音. It is also argued that three months (*san yue* 三月) should be three days (*san ri* 三日). In this line of interpretation, *si* 斯 is even interpreted as the state of Qi, not as the level of music. Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 456-459.

²⁵ Another example that can support Confucius's endorsement of the ethical value of music is his remark in *Lunyu* 17.18: "I hate the way in which the sounds of Zheng mess up the music of *ya*" (惡鄭聲之亂雅樂也). In this remark, the sounds of Zheng and the music of *ya* can represent unethical and ethical music respectively. Nevertheless, we can still interpret this remark without assuming the ethical value of music: Confucius would not allow changes in the traditional form of music under the influence of the prevailing sounds of Zheng. What Confucius criticizes is not the sounds of Zheng themselves, but their causing changes in the music of *ya*.

²⁶ *Lunyu* 17.4: "子之武城，聞弦歌之聲。夫子莞爾而笑曰，割雞焉用牛刀？子游對曰，昔者偃也聞諸夫子曰，君子學道則愛人，小人學道則易使也。子曰，二三子！偃之言是也。前言戲之耳。" Translation is from Ni, *Understanding the Analects of Confucius*, 392.

²⁷ Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 1189: "治小何須用大道"; "道謂禮樂也。樂以和人，人和則易使也。"

²⁸ Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 1189: "時子游為武城宰，以禮樂為教，故邑人皆弦歌也。"

According to the above interpretations, ritual and music help people of high station take good care of their people and make the common people harmonious and obedient, as Xing Bing says.²⁹ Those who interpret “singing to the sound of stringed instruments” (*xiange* 弦歌) as an edifying tool identify *dao* as ritual and music, which reveals the tendency to juxtapose music with ritual while focusing on their complementary functions in governing the people. However, whether Confucius had ritual and music in mind when he referred to *dao* is doubtful; there is no obvious example where *dao* indicates ritual and music in the *Lunyu*. The main meaning of *dao* in the *Lunyu* is the right way humans should follow.³⁰

When ritual (*li* 禮) and music (*yue* 樂) appear together in the *Lunyu*, they mostly mean a certain ceremony and accompanying ceremonial music, which bear virtually no relevance to *dao*.³¹ Although it is not quite clear whether the aforementioned commentators presuppose the ethical value of music when they argue for edification by means of music, they seem to understand “ritual and music” from the viewpoint of “Yueji” not the *Lunyu*.³² If so, we may reasonably assume that they subscribe to the theory of the edifying effect of music.³³

Huang Kan 皇侃 (488-545) makes a different interpretation: an ox-knife is not music but Ziyou. Quoting Miao Bo 繆播 (3rd century), Huang Kan says “Ziyou became governor of a small town, and he could let the people live in their proper places. [Therefore, Ziyou] enjoyed the singing to stringed instruments.”³⁴ According to this interpretation, what Confucius indicated is that Ziyou, who has sufficient ability to govern a country with a thousand carriages, only governs a small town like Wu. In other words, Confucius regretted that Ziyou did not have a position suitable enough to demonstrate his ability, just as one killing a chicken using an ox-knife.³⁵

²⁹ Xing, *Lunyu zhushu*, 68: “若在位君子學禮樂，則愛養下人也。若在下小人學禮樂，則人和而易使也。”

³⁰ In the *Lunyu*, *dao* appears nearly 90 times. According to Creel, this number is double all the occurrences of *dao* before the *Lunyu*. Creel suggests that the *Lunyu* redefines *dao* as “the way” above all other ways, which is the main meaning of *dao* in the *Lunyu*. Creel, *Confucius: the Man and the Myth*, 132-133.

³¹ I will discuss how to interpret “ritual and music” in the *Lunyu* in Chapter 3.1.

³² I will discuss the different relationships of “ritual and music” between “Yueji” and the *Lunyu* in more detail in Chapter 3.

³³ If these commentators understood “ritual and music” from the viewpoint of “Yueji,” they were possibly open to acknowledging the ethical value of music and its ethical influences, since this aspect of music entails the newly defined relation between ritual and music in “Yueji,” as I will argue in Chapter 3.

³⁴ Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 1189: “子游宰小邑，能令民得其所，弦歌以樂也。”

In Huang Kan's interpretation, the singing to stringed instruments is not for edification but for entertainment. The musical instruments excavated from the tombs of Marquis Yi of Zeng (Zenghou Yi 曾侯乙) around the 5th century BCE demonstrate large-scaled ritual music and small-scaled ensemble music.³⁶ The latter type of music, which was mainly composed of string and pipe instruments, was usually performed for entertainment. The singing to stringed instruments mentioned in *Lunyu* 17.4 was probably closer to this type of ensemble music.

If an ox-knife indicates Ziyou, this passage can be interpreted to mean that people of high station who have practiced *dao* do not require a large area to govern in order to be devoted to their people. Even though Wu was a small town, Ziyou must have governed it in accordance with *dao*. Confucius admitted that Ziyou's genuine commitment to his governance cannot be compared to killing a chicken using an ox-knife. This interpretation goes well with the wind-grass metaphor: "The virtue of those in high station (*junzi* 君子) is like the wind, and the virtue of the common people (*xiaoren* 小人) is like the grass. The grass will surely bend when the wind blows across it."³⁷ When people of high station display good behavior the common people will follow suit. Similarly, what Ziyou's story demonstrates is that a man of high position is able to cherish his people once he possesses virtue by following *dao*, while the people become compliant with governance once they possess virtue by following *dao*.

Another example that can be read differently on the topic of whether the edifying effect of music is presumed or not is a story about Zilu's 子路 playing the zither (*se* 瑟).

The Master said, "What is You's[Zilu's] zither doing in my gate? The other disciples ceased to treat Zilu with respect. The Master said, "You[Zilu] has ascended to the hall, though he has not yet entered the inner chamber."³⁸

According to the "Bian yue jie" 辯樂解 (Explanation on the Discernment of Music) chapter of the *Kongzi jia yu* 孔子家語 (The School Sayings of Confucius),

³⁵ Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 1189: "惜其不得專千乘之國，如牛刀割雞，不盡其才也。"

³⁶ Regarding the two types of musical performance that the tombs of Marquis Yi of Zeng demonstrate, see So, *Music in the Age of Confucius*, 18-22 and 101.

³⁷ *Lunyu* 12.19: "君子之德風，小人之德草。草上之風，必偃。" Translation is from Ni, *Understanding the Analects of Confucius*, 293.

³⁸ *Lunyu* 11.15: 子曰，由之瑟，奚爲於丘之門？門人不敬子路。子曰，由也升堂矣，未入於室也。" Translation is from Ni, *Understanding the Analects of Confucius*, 268.

Confucius said to Ran Qiu 冉求 after listening to Zilu's playing as follows:

How serious it is that You[Zilu] has no talent! When the former kings established music, they let balanced sound play, thereby adopting it as [a criterion for] moderation. [This music] enters into the south and never goes back to the north. In general, the south is the place of giving birth and raising while the north is the area of killing and conquering. Therefore, the music of the noble person is warm and mellow and it keeps unbiased, thereby nourishing *qi* that gives birth and raises. The feelings of anxiety and sorrow are not inflicted on the heart/mind, and fierce and violent movements do not exist on the body. This is what is called the tune of the stable order. The sound of the petty person is not like this. [This sound] is too strong or too weak and it symbolizes *qi* that kills and conquers. [Therefore,] the mood of impartiality and harmony are not loaded on the heart/mind, and warm and harmonious gestures do not exist on the body. This is what is called the tune of chaos. . . . You[Zilu] belongs to the crowd of ordinary people and he has never been interested in the institution of the former kings; yet, he practices the sound of a ruined country. How could he preserve his body that reaches six to seven *chi*?³⁹

Zilu might have played the northern tune instead of the southern tune. Confucius would have been dissatisfied with the music Zilu played because of its undesirable effects. That is, the sound of a ruined country has a negative tone; therefore, it exerts harmful effects on the body as well as the heart/mind.

The story described in the “Bian yue jie” chapter assumes the edifying effect of music, since it contrasts the tune of the stable order with the tune of chaos, after mentioning the influence of music on the body and the heart/mind. Similar to this story's assumption, Ma Rong 馬融 (79-166) interprets that Zilu's playing the zither was not in tune with *ya* 雅 (court hymns) and *song* 頌 (eulogies), which has virtually the same meaning that Zilu should have cultivated his heart/mind by listening to the tunes of *ya* and *song*.⁴⁰ Huang Kan presents a different interpretation: Zilu's strong personality was reflected in

³⁹ Kongzi jiaoyu, “Bian yue jie”: “甚矣，由之不才也！夫先王之制音也，奏中聲以為節。入於南，不歸於北。夫南者生育之鄉，北者殺伐之城。故君子之音，溫柔居中，以養生育之氣。憂愁之感，不加於心也。暴厲之動，不存於體也。夫然者乃所謂治安之風也。小人之音則不然。亢麗微末，以象殺伐之氣。中和之感，不載於心，溫和之動，不存於體。夫然者，乃所以為亂之風。 . . . 由今也匹夫之徒，曾無意于先王之制，而習亡國之聲。豈能保其六七尺之體哉？”

⁴⁰ Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 771: “子路鼓瑟不合雅頌。” In relation to this annotation, Liu Baonan quotes “cultivating the heart/mind through *ya* and *song*” (雅頌以養心) from “Yueshu” (Book of Music) of the *Shiji*. This quotation shows that, according to Liu, Ma's annotation assumes the effect of music on the heart/mind. Liu, *Lunyu zhengyi*, 454.

his playing the zither. Whenever Confucius heard of Zilu's playing, he sensed Zilu's early death caused by his strong personality; therefore, Confucius tried to persuade his disciple to control his temper.⁴¹

While "Bian yue jie" and Ma Rong assume the influence of music on the heart/mind, Huang Kan assumes that people's personality is reflected in music; the former advocates that music affects the heart/mind while the latter advocates that music expresses what is in the heart/mind. In Huang Kan's interpretation, Confucius is described as a sagacious person who predicts what will happen in the future, similar to the way Jizha is portrayed. This kind of portrayal is also suggested in another passage of the *Lunyu*: when Confucius beat the musical stone, a man recognized that Confucius had something in mind.⁴² In addition, we already examined the possibility that Confucius discerned King Shun's virtue from the Shao music. These instances support the idea that it was not a strange belief around the Spring and Autumn period (771-476 BCE) that inner feeling and virtue are discernible from music.

Then, can we conclude that Huang Kan's interpretation is more convincing than *Kongzi jiayu's* supposition? The answer to this question can be discerned from Confucius's evaluation of Zilu: "You[Zilu] has ascended to the hall, though he has not yet entered the inner chamber." Entering the inner chamber from the hall seems to be a metaphor for sustained effort. Then, what Confucius indicated was probably something that improves through continuous effort. However, choosing a type of tune does not seem a very suitable task to exert ongoing effort for, though not absolutely unsuitable either. What Confucius intended to say might be a comment on Zilu's technique for playing the zither, or it could be personality or morality reflected in sound. If we accept that Confucius placed moral value on the Shao music, we can say that Confucius assessed Zilu's playing based more on his morality than his technique; if Zilu has a great degree of morality, this would be reflected in the sound he makes, but he has yet to reach this degree.⁴³

41 Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 771: "子路性剛，其鼓琴瑟亦有壯氣。孔子知其必不得以壽終，故每抑之。"

42 *Lunyu* 14.39: "子擊磬於衛，有荷蕢而過孔氏之門者，曰，‘有心哉，擊磬乎！’既而曰，‘鄙哉，硤硤乎！’"

43 We even do not need to consider the sound of the zither seriously when interpreting *Lunyu* 11.15. Confucius might have been simply unhappy with Zilu playing the zither in his place for an unknown reason. It is uncertain why Confucius made a remark that sounded unpleasant about Zilu's playing the instrument. However, the other disciples might have ignored Zilu, assuming that Confucius disregarded him. Confucius, who recognized this unintended situation, tried to rectify the situation by saying that Zilu has ascended to the hall. In this case, the state of ascending to the hall does not necessarily have to do with playing the zither, since this evaluation can be made by Confucius's general observation about Zilu.

3. The Complementary Concept of “Ritual and Music”

The notion of an edifying effect based on music’s ethical value as endorsed in “Yuelun” paves the way for the complementary concept of “ritual and music,” namely creating differences by ritual and harmonizing differences by music,⁴⁴ or, in Ni’s words, separating different social roles and harmonizing their relationships.⁴⁵ In this chapter, I will first examine how the relationship between ritual and music is perceived in the *Guoyu* 國語 (Sayings of the States), *Zuozhuan*, and *Zhouli* 周禮 (Rites of Zhou), in order to argue that the complementary functions of ritual and music were hardly discussed before “Yuelun.” I will then move on to “ritual and music” in the *Lunyu*.

3.1. Complementary and Subordinate Relations of Music to Ritual

We have examined the idea that the notion of the edifying effect of music might not be valid in the *Lunyu*. If this notion is not applicable, the complementary concept of “ritual and music” is difficult to approve as well. If so, “Yuelun,” where the edifying effect of music is first endorsed, most probably lays the cornerstone of the complementary functions of ritual and music; however, their complementarity is not distinct. The term *yue* 樂 appears 36 times in “Yuelun”: five of these occurrences appear in the term of *liyue* 禮樂 and another four are discussed along with ritual. With only nine occurrences out of thirty six, it can be suggested that “Yuelun” focuses on music only rather than discussing it in association with ritual. Moreover, even though “Yuelun” mentions the term *liyue*, their contrasting yet complementary relationship is not obvious except in the following sentences: “Music embodies harmonies that can never be altered, just as ritual embodies principles of natural order that can never be changed. Music joins together what is common to all; ritual separates what is different.”⁴⁶

44 “Yueji” often describes the complementary functions of ritual and music. For example, “Music serves to unite; Ritual serves to differentiate. With uniting there is mutual closeness; with differentiation there is mutual respect” (樂者爲同，禮者爲異。同則相親，異則相敬); “Great music shares in the harmony of Heaven and Earth. Great Ritual shares in the regulation of Heaven and Earth. There is harmony, thus the ‘hundred things’ do not suffer loss; there is regulation, thus [there are] sacrifices to Heaven and to Earth” (大樂與天地同和，大禮與天地同節。和故百物不失。節故祀天祭地). Translation is from Cook, “‘Yue Ji’—Record of Music,” 42 and 44.

45 Ni, *Understanding the Analects of Confucius*, 89.

46 *Xunzi*, “Yuelun”: “且樂也者，和之不可變者也，禮也者，理之不可易者也。樂合同，禮別異。”

In the foregoing quotation, harmony and order are contrasted as the main functions of music and ritual; therefore, we can say that their complementary relationship is suggested in “Yuelun,” but the idea is only marginally discussed. It is in “Yueji” that this complementary concept is firmly established, gaining cosmic significance through the linking of ritual and music to earth and heaven, which shows the influence of the Yin-Yang theory:⁴⁷ “Music is the harmony of heaven and earth, and ritual is the order of heaven and earth. There is harmony; therefore, hundreds of things all grow. There is order; therefore, numerous things are all differentiated. Music is created from heaven and ritual is established by earth.”⁴⁸

A complementary relationship between ritual and music could be discussed only after “ritual and music” gained conceptual importance, and it is in the *Lunyu* that this gaining is accomplished. The term *liyue* (ritual and music) does not appear in the *Shijing* 詩經 (Book of Poetry), *Shujing* 書經 (Book of Documents), and *Guoyu*. The *Zuozhuan* mentions this term three times, but it appears together with other terms such as *ci ai* 慈愛 (affection and love) and *shi shu* 詩書 (poetry and document); therefore, conceptual independence has not yet been firmly maintained.⁴⁹ The *Zhouli* mentions this term in the phrases of “appearances of *liyue*” (*liyue zhi yi* 禮樂之儀) and “apparatuses of *liyue*” (*liyue zhi qi* 禮樂之器). It is also mentioned as two elements of the Six Arts, namely ritual, music, archery, horsemanship, calligraphy, and math (*li yue she yu shu shu* 禮樂射御書數). However, we might not be able to consider *Zhouli*’s examples seriously as these occurrences are quite low: only four times in total. Moreover, *liyue* is mentioned with a focus on the ritual apparatus or as an object of learning; the function of music complementary to that of ritual is hardly supported in the *Zhouli* either.⁵⁰

Translation is from Knoblock, *Xunzi*, vol. 3, 84.

⁴⁷ Scott Cook suggests that the *Xunzi* paves the way for interpreting ritual and music from the Yin and Yang perspective in “Yueji” by suggesting their contrasting yet complementary relation. Cook, “Xun Zi on Ritual and Music,” 29.

⁴⁸ Liji, “Yueji”: “樂者，天地之和也。禮者，天地之序也。和故百物皆化。序，故羣物皆別。樂由天作，禮以地制。”

⁴⁹ *Zuozhuan*, 27th year of Duke Zhuang: “禮樂慈愛，戰所畜也”；27th year of Duke Xi: “說禮樂，而敦詩書。詩書，義之府也，禮樂，德之則也。”

⁵⁰ The other example of *liyue* in the *Zhouli* appears as follows: “Ritual and music correspond to the transformation of heaven and earth” (禮樂合天地之化). “Ritual and music” in this sentence can be considered the complementary concept. However, it compares ritual and music with earth and heaven, which opens up the possibility that this description is under the influence of the Yin-Yang theory, which prevailed around or after the time of “Yuelun.” Thus, it would be misleading if we argue that the complimentary concept of “ritual and music” is valid even before “Yuelun,” based on this example of the *Zhouli*.

In the *Lunyu*, the term *liyue* appears seven times in five sentences and there are another three sentences that discuss ritual and music together. The number of occurrences is still not high, but this term independently appears without being grouped with other terms. In addition, considering Confucius's emphasis on ritual and his deep appreciation of music, it would not go too far to suggest that *liyue* first acquires conceptual importance in the *Lunyu*. This conceptual importance could contribute to establishing the complementary relationship between ritual and music in "Yuelun" and "Yueji." However, we cannot assume that this relationship is valid in the *Lunyu* since a subsequently formed concept cannot be applied to an earlier text. This brings up the question: how to interpret "ritual and music" in the *Lunyu*?

We can infer an answer from Confucius's criticism of the Ji family's having eight rows of dance.⁵¹ Eight rows are only allowed to the Zhou king, but the head of the Ji family, whose position is merely a minister of the feudal lord of Lu, uses this form of dance. Confucius's criticism shows his belief that music should follow proper forms in consideration of social status and types of ceremony. Failing to comply with these forms is nothing but the collapse of ritual. In this case, music is not complementary to ritual but, as an accompanied performance of ritual ceremony, subordinate to ritual, which constitutes state institutions. The *Lunyu* does not solely see music as a state institution; however, when music is juxtaposed with ritual, music is almost always perceived as a state institution under the higher category of ritual.

3.2. Reading *Lunyu* 13.3 and 17.11 with and without the Complementary Concept of "Ritual and Music"

Even though it is doubtful that the complementary concept of "ritual and music" is valid in the *Lunyu*, its interpretation seems to remain under the shadow of this concept, including *Lunyu* 1.12.

Master You said, "Bringing harmony (*he* 和) is the most valuable practical function of ritual propriety. This is what makes the way of the former Kings beautiful whether in things great or small. There are situations in which this will not work: If one tries to bring about harmony for harmony's sake without regulating it by ritual propriety, this is not going to work."⁵²

⁵¹ *Lunyu* 3.1: "孔子謂季氏八佾舞於庭，是可忍也，孰不可忍也?"

⁵² *Lunyu* 1.12: "有子曰，'禮之用，和爲貴。先王之道，斯爲美，小大由之。有所不行，知和而和，不以禮節之，亦不可行也。'" Translation is from Ni, *Understanding the Analects of Confucius*, 89.

According to *Lunyu* 1.12, regulation is one of the functions of ritual, and this regulation ultimately aims at harmony; even so, we should not overemphasize harmony as to obscure the value of ritual's regulatory function. Regarding this passage, Ma Rong says that "it should not be done to follow the principle of harmony in every situation without regulating it in accordance with ritual, only knowing that ritual cherishes harmony."⁵³ This interpretation almost restates the original text but at least shows that Ma Rong does not link harmony to music.

In contrast, Xing Bing identifies harmony with music, saying that "if one only follows ritual in every situation whether it is important or not without harmonizing by music, then something would not be carried out in his governance."⁵⁴ Huang Kan also interprets this passage by assuming the complementary functions of ritual and music: "When the king edifies the people, he should use both ritual and music."⁵⁵ However, those interpretations linking harmony to music are criticized by Liu Baonan 劉寶楠 (1791-1855): "harmony is what ritual holds. Thus, harmony is valued when practicing ritual. Huang Kan and Xing Bing are wrong when they identify harmony with music."⁵⁶

Lunyu 1.12 does not even mention music, but only through the concept of harmony, the complementary concept of ritual and music seems to be easily presumed. This tendency implies that the premise of division by ritual and harmony by music, which was in all likelihood first advanced in "Yuelun," served as a useful concept when interpreting the *Lunyu* to some commentators. Then, as for the passages that discuss ritual and music together such as *Lunyu* 13.3 and 17.11, this tendency would be even stronger.

If names are incorrect, speech cannot be smooth (*shun* 順). If speech is not smooth, affairs cannot be accomplished. If affairs cannot be accomplished, ritual propriety and music will not flourish. If ritual propriety and music do not flourish, verdicts and punishments do not hit the mark. If verdicts and punishments do not hit the mark, people will not know how to move their hands and feet.⁵⁷

⁵³ Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 48: "人知禮貴和，而每事從和，不以禮爲節，亦不可行。"

⁵⁴ Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 47: "每事小大皆用禮，而不以樂和之，則其政有所不行也。"

⁵⁵ Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 46: "人君行化必禮樂相須。"

⁵⁶ Liu, *Lunyu zhengyi*, 29: "和是禮中所有，故行禮以和爲貴。皇邢疏以和爲樂，非也。" Regarding diverse interpretations of *Lunyu* 1.12, see Ni, *Understanding the Analects of Confucius*, 89-90. In addition to the two interpretations I have discussed, Ni presents another interpretation that understands *he* 和 as expressing the ideal state of practicing ritual: it is practiced so naturally (*he*) as to be considered one's second nature.

Kong Anguo interprets this passage as signifying that “ritual makes the superior comfortable and music alters customs; if these two functions are not fulfilled there would be a glut of wrong verdicts and punishments.”⁵⁸ Here, Kong assumes the edifying effect of music; if this effect is not exerted, customs are the same as they have always been, not guiding the people to the right way, which causes more people to be punished. Different from Kong’s interpretation, Fan Zuyu 范祖禹 (1041-1098) interprets that “ritual refers to a properly-arranged order in dealing with things, and music refers to harmony among things. If things are not successfully accomplished, neither order nor harmony exists. That is why ritual and music are not flourishing. If ritual and music are not flourishing, conducted political affairs do not comply with *dao*; as a result, verdicts and punishments are not properly given.”⁵⁹

In Fan’s interpretation, ritual and music flourish after order and harmony are maintained; therefore, it can be said that order and harmony are mentioned in relation to ritual practice, including music which is an integral part of it. If ritual and music are not carried out in a way that is orderly and harmonious they cannot flourish, since order and harmony are two of their main aspects. In this case, ritual and music can be regarded as state institutions whose various aspects, such as how to arrange instruments and which musical piece is to be played at a certain ceremony, were traditionally stipulated. Violation of these stipulations is a clear signal that indicates the ruin of state institutions; subsequently, rules concerning punishments are imposed arbitrarily, making the people at a loss as to what to do. In this vein of understanding, the complementary functions of ritual and music are not postulated, and *Lunyu* 17.11 can also be interpreted without these functions, despite the long-standing perception of music as an edifying tool that goes with ritual.

The Master said, “When we say ‘rituals, rituals,’ are we merely speaking about jade and silk? When we say ‘music, music,’ are we merely speaking about bells and drums?”⁶⁰

⁵⁷ *Lunyu* 13.3: 名不正，則言不順，言不順，則事不成，事不成，則禮樂不興，禮樂不興，則刑罰不中，刑罰不中，則民無所措手足。” Translation is from Ni, *Understanding the Analects of Confucius*, 301.

⁵⁸ Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 893: “禮以安上，樂以移風。二者不行，則有淫刑濫罰。”

⁵⁹ Cheng, *Lunyu jishi*, 893: “事得其序之謂禮，物得其和之謂樂。事不成則無序而不和，故禮樂不興。禮樂不興，則施之政事皆失其道，故刑罰不中。”

⁶⁰ *Lunyu* 17.11: 子曰，禮云禮云，玉帛云乎哉？樂云樂云，鐘鼓云乎哉？” Translation is from Ni, *Understanding the Analects of Confucius*, 397.

According to this passage, objects necessary for performing ritual and music such as jade, silk, bells, and drums are not of importance. If so, what should take the first priority? Regarding this question, Ma Rong says that “the value of music does not lie in bells and drums but in its function to improve custom and manners.”⁶¹ In addition, Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127-200) says that “ritual is not simply to worship jade and silk; what makes ritual precious is that it esteems making the superior comfortable and governing the people well.”⁶² Although it is highly doubtful whether Confucius regarded improving custom and manners as one of the principal effects of music, Confucius seems to be understood that way by some commentators, considering Ma Rong’s interpretation of *Lunyü* 17.11 as well as the *Xiaojing* 孝經 (Classic of Filial Piety), which records Confucius’s saying that nothing is comparable to music when it comes to improving custom and manners.⁶³

If we understand music as one of the state institutions, there is no need to contrast music’s role with that of ritual; as part of ritual ceremony, music helps “facilitate the smooth process of the ceremony by evoking positive emotional inclination among participants.”⁶⁴ Music should be performed properly in consideration of social status and situation as specified by the whole procedure of ritual. Jade, silk, bells, and drums are the components under these regulations. When we look for the first priority Confucius took, we do not necessarily consider the functions of ritual and music; Confucius, who emphasizes the balance between the outer and the inner,⁶⁵ could criticize only paying attention to what is displayed without understanding the true meaning of ritual and music.

⁶¹ Cheng, *Lunyü jishi*, 1217: “樂之所貴者，移風易俗也，非謂鍾鼓而已。”

⁶² Cheng, *Lunyü jishi*, 1217: “禮非但崇此玉帛而已，所貴者，乃貴其安上治民。”

⁶³ *Xiaojing*, “Guang yaodao” 廣要道: “子曰。 . . 移風易俗莫善於樂。安上治民莫善於禮。”

⁶⁴ Jo, “Musical Harmony in the *Xunzi* and the *Lüshi Chunqiu*,” 380. P. Wong defines the relationship between music and ritual on two levels: on the one hand, they are undifferentiated on the level of practice. On the other hand, they are distinct in nature and function. As the specific functions of music, Wong presents “enhancing, refining and promoting a greater degree of engagement for those participating in ritual practices.” Wong, “The Music of Ritual Practice—An Interpretation,” 244. I also distinguish their relationship on two levels but from a dissimilar perspective: one is music’s subordinate relationship to ritual; Wong considers the functions unique to music to be carried out on this level, where music serves a ceremonial purpose. The other level is music’s correspondent relationship with ritual. Music’s edifying effect in this relationship probably evolved from the way ceremonial music works; however, by endowing music with more directly wielded power, music does not necessarily require a ceremonial context to exert its edifying effect. For this argument, see Jo, “Musical Harmony in the *Xunzi* and the *Lüshi Chunqiu*,” 379-380.

⁶⁵ *Lunyü* 6.18: “子曰，質勝文則野，文勝質則史。文質彬彬，然後君子。”

In the *Lunyu*, “ritual and music” are hardly perceived as a complementary pair for social order and harmony, as “Yuelun” and “Yueji” assert. In the sense that music is part of ritual ceremony that constitutes state institutions, music is a subordinate concept of ritual, not a complementary one. Even though the relationship between ritual and music is differently assigned, their ultimate aim is the same: a well-ordered, harmonious society. That is, in the *Lunyu*, harmoniously performed ritual and music as stipulated are a reflection of a society of the same kind; in “Yuelun” and “Yueji,” the complementary functions of ritual and music pursue a well-ordered, harmonious society.

4. Conclusion

Do we need to distinguish between ceremonial music that serves as a state institution and music for edification that serves as a governing tool when reading the *Lunyu*? This is the question that made me embark on this paper. As a core concept in Confucian discourse on music, the concept of “ritual and music” is often considered to have a singular meaning as long as it appears in Confucian texts: the meaning that demonstrates their complementary relationship. The *Lunyu*, where the term *liyue* starts to take on conceptual importance, is not an exception.

If music has a complementary relation to ritual, it needs to exert an edifying effect to foster harmony, as a complementing relation to ritual’s function of creating division. I have examined four passages of the *Lunyu* along with their interpretations, and my conclusion is that the *Lunyu* is more adequately understood when we do not assume the notion of the edifying effect of music of “Yuelun” and its interrelated concept of “ritual and music” in complementary relation. The edifying effect of music is based on the resonance between sound and *qi* which began to be widely discussed long after Confucius’s period; therefore, it is rather anachronistic to apply this concept to the *Lunyu*. Accordingly, the complementary concept of “ritual and music,” which requires the notion of the edifying effect of music as a presupposition, is also not valid in the *Lunyu*.

Not only the *Lunyu* but also other texts that are supposed to predate the *Lunyu* do not support the idea of the edifying effect of music and the complementary functions of ritual and music. Although those texts are open to the ideas of the ethical value of music and moral cultivation by means

of music in a broad sense, there is hardly any belief that music causes behavioral changes according to its ethical value. Therefore, it can be suggested that the edifying effect of music, which enables music to be an equal counterpart to ritual, was yet to be widely perceived before “Yuelun.”

Depending on whether or not the edifying effect of music is presupposed, *Lunyu* 17.4 can be read either as a story about Ziyou’s governing a small town with reliance on music’s edifying effect, or as a story about Ziyou not having the chance to demonstrate his ability. In addition, *Lunyu* 11.15 can be read as either regarding the positive and negative effects of music or regarding inner virtue as reflected in music. *Lunyu* 13.3 and 17.11 are also read differently depending on how one understands music in relation to ritual: music as a complementary counterpart of ritual or music as a subordinate element to ritual. Which interpretation is the right one is a question that cannot be answered for sure; however, considering that the edifying effect of music and the complementary concept of “ritual and music” might not have been valid before “Yuelun,” as well as the context of each passage, I would suggest that latter interpretations are more plausible than the former.

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基於“樂”的教化作用與互補式“禮樂” 概念適用與否的《論語》的兩種解讀

趙貞恩

中文摘要

《荀子》〈樂論〉和《禮記》〈樂記〉中所強調的“樂”的教化作用以及互補式“禮樂”概念，從時間上來看可能出現於《論語》之後，因此難以適用於《論語》。雖然可以認為《論語》是從倫理方面來認識“樂”的，然而很難進一步看作是以“樂”的教化作用為前提的。如果教化作用失效，那麼“禮樂”的互補性也難以適用於《論語》。《論語》雖然首度對“禮樂”賦予概念的重要性，但此時主要是從“儀禮”的脈絡上討論“樂”，“樂”不是與“禮”互補的對應概念，而是從屬於“禮”的概念。即，“樂”是遵循“禮”這種準則的“儀禮”構成要素之一。“樂”的教化作用與互補式“禮樂”概念是否適用於《論語》，尚存疑問，然而，對於17.4、11.15、13.3、17.11在內的《論語》諸多章節，往往是以這些概念為前提來解釋的。在解釋這些章節時，不必執意以“樂”的教化作用與互補式“禮樂”概念為前提，而是想到這些概念的出現可能晚於《論語》，並且摒棄帶有這些前提的解釋，才能夠更接近《論語》的本意。

關鍵詞：《論語》，《荀子》〈樂論〉，《禮記》〈樂記〉，“樂”的教化作用，互補式“禮樂”概念，“樂”的倫理價值

Christoph Harbsmeier Contra Karyn Lai and Kevin DeLapp on the Epistemological Characteristics of Early Confucianism

John R. WILLIAMS

Abstract

The present article aims to subject two recent works, which attempt to argue for an interpretation of Confucian epistemology as akin to standpoint epistemology, to critical scrutiny. These works are by Karyn Lai and Kevin DeLapp, respectively. This is achieved by looking at a classic study by Christoph Harbsmeier, *Science and Civilization in China* Volume VII Part 1, and then showing that logical practices in early China, including those displayed in the *Mengzi* 孟子 and *Lunyu* 論語, run contrary to commitments that both Lai and DeLapp attribute to Confucian epistemology. On the basis of this observation, I conclude that Confucianism is not as similar to or as useful for standpoint theories as Lai and DeLapp maintain. While a detailed analysis of Lai's and DeLapp's views is not attempted, the hope is that the positive value of Harbsmeier's volume for understanding early Confucian epistemology is displayed.

Keywords: Mengzi, Confucius, Xunzi, standpoint theory, Christoph Harbsmeier, Karyn Lai, Kevin DeLapp

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[I]n discourse which is designed to persuade, there is nothing fundamentally alien to us in either logic or in the rhetoric. One learns to distrust any interpretation which credits the Chinese with too obvious a fallacy. The concepts are different, perhaps even the categories behind them, but the implicit logic is the same.¹

— A.C. Graham

1. Introduction

The present essay looks at two recent efforts to compare feminist standpoint epistemology with early Confucian epistemology, and then attempts to problematize these accounts vis-à-vis Christoph Harbsmeier's magisterial *Science and Civilization in China* Volume VII Part 1 (henceforth S&CVII:1).

Certain works are deemed dated while others are deemed perennially citable. The *Disputers of the Tao* and *A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought* are both old yet routinely cited, and are thereby (rightly or wrongly) deemed perennially citable. Harbsmeier's more recent contribution to Needham's epic *Science and Civilization in China*, on the other hand, is not even cited in the *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* entry on Chinese epistemology (which, needless to say, cites the aforementioned Graham and Hansen volumes).² If this is because Harbsmeier's work is (at least implicitly) deemed too dated, then this is a terrible mistake. In the present essay I want to suggest that recent attempts to compare early Chinese epistemology to feminist standpoint epistemology suffer because they ignore the insights of S&CVII:1. To this end, I'll hone in on works by Karyn Lai (2016) and Kevin DeLapp (2016) vis-à-vis S&CVII:1.

To be clear, Harbsmeier, unlike Lai and DeLapp, is not concerned with comparing early Confucian epistemology to feminist standpoint theory. Instead, in S&CVII:1 he is interested in the topics of language and logic in early China. However, Lai's, DeLapp's, and Harbsmeier's projects overlap

¹ Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*, 2.

² Alexis McLeod's recent book on truth in China also neglects Harbsmeier, as Van Norden rightfully pointed out in his review of the work: "The preceding doctrines have become something like the consensus among informed scholars of Chinese thought. See, for example, Graham, *Disputers of the Tao* (La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 1989), especially Appendix 2; Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science*; Van Norden, *Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy*, 1-23, 361-380; and Harbsmeier, *Language and Logic*. (A surprising omission in this book is that no works by Harbsmeier are cited.)"

in the sphere of early Confucian epistemology, where Harbsmeier presents a picture that runs contrary to those painted by Lai and DeLapp. Thus, the cross-purposes between DeLapp and Lai, and Harbsmeier are of little consequence for the present inquiry, as it is specifically claims regarding the epistemological commitments of early Confucians that interest me here.

One might be disappointed that the following does not more specifically prioritise my take on the sexism of Confucianism, given that it addresses two authors who are explicitly contending with that topic. Nevertheless, to be explicitly clear, I hope to show that early Confucianism has little to do with standpoint theory as presented by Lai and DeLapp, on the basis of arguments in S&CVII:1. My treatment of Lai and DeLapp is swift, as my intention is only to put their key claims on the table. These are the claims that run contrary to S&CVII:1. Again, to be explicitly clear, the present article is not aiming to provide a detailed analysis of Lai’s and DeLapp’s views, but is instead looking to problematize their main claims, and on the basis of this problematization to show the positive value of some of Harbsmeier’s findings.

2. Karyn Lai

Lai is concerned with three “angles” of looking at standpoint theories vis-à-vis other epistemic theories, namely, (1) “conceptions of knowledge,” (2) “the production of knowledge,” and (3) “knowers and epistemic agency,” and contends that a Confucian account of reliability can contribute to all three angles (2016, 101). The following chart summarizes her account of these three angles as conceived in standpoint theories, as well as what she terms “Anglo-analytic” theories.

Angles	Standpoint theories	“Anglo-analytic” theories
(1) conceptions of knowledge	(a) focused on the agent knowing; (b) focused on knowledge in action; (c) knowledge is value-laden	(a) focused on the thing known, while disregarding the agent doing the knowing; (b) focused on theoretical knowledge; (c) knowledge is value-free

(2) the production of knowledge	(a) knowledge is situation-dependent, and (b) knowledge is produced in these situations	(a) knowledge is situation-independent, while (b) knowledge is discovered, not produced
(3) knowers and epistemic agency	(a) embodied knowing subjects; (b) plurality of knowing voices	(a) disembodied knowing subjects; (b) singularity of knowing voices

The main takeaway of the preceding chart is that agent- and value- neutral knowledge is denied by standpoint theorists. In short, these theorists advocate agent- and value- dependency while “Anglo-analytic” philosophers advocate agent- and value- neutrality, or so we are told. Lai then claims that standpoint theorists seek “procedural objectivity” as a criterion for epistemic justification while “Anglo-analytic” philosophers seek “metaphysically-based” objectivity (2016, 106). The former seek doing things reliably, while the latter seek facts. As will become apparent in the analysis of S&CVII:1 below, this distinction is too simplistic.

Setting these concerns aside at present, Lai asserts that there are certain risks of standpoint theories leading to “epistemic solipsism or subjectivism” (2016, 105, 115-123), as these theories forego common epistemic criteria for preventing such a slide. She claims that Confucianism has resources to remove these risks. How? Lai asserts that Confucians are concerned with *learning* “cultural forms” (*wen* 文) and “behavioural propriety” (*li* 禮), and that “knowing” (*zhi* 知) for the Confucian predominantly entails “reliably” (*xin* 信) “putting into practice” (*xing* 行) what one has learned (2016, 107-110). The risk of “epistemic solipsism or subjectivism” is averted because this all takes place on the level of the community performing its various ritually ordained (but by no means ossified) cultural forms, rather than on the level of the individual (2016, 111-114). In this picture, then, the main epistemological question is whether an epistemic agent within this larger societal context is “reliable” (*xin* 信) across (“longitudinally”) various “episodes” of performing his or her various ritually ordained (but, again, by no means ossified) cultural forms (Lai 2016, 120).

The main problem with Lai’s discussion, as I see it, is that it takes agent- and value- dependency versus agent- and value- neutrality to be a difference in kind rather than a difference in degree. Almost nobody acknowledges *purely* agent- and value- neutral knowledge to be possible, but that does not delegitimise the desire to have a higher degree of agent- and value- neutrality.

If the choice were simply between *pure* agent- and value- neutrality versus agent- and value- dependency, then one must favour the latter as the former is impossible. But that is a false choice, and it is the false choice that Lai appears to present to us. The choice is actually between a highly agent- and value- dependent epistemology (i.e. Lai's vision of Confucian epistemology) versus various less agent- and value- dependent epistemologies, i.e., a difference in *degree*, not in *kind*. As we shall see from S&CVII:1 below, early Confucians were in fact frequently concerned with agent- and value- neutrality in substantiating their various claims, whether in using implicit logical rules of inference and implication, or in appealing to the past.

3. Kevin DeLapp

Like Lai, DeLapp maintains that early Confucianism can serve as a resource for feminist epistemologies, particularly standpoint epistemology. In DeLapp's article, we get an admirably clear statement of three main theses of feminist standpoint epistemology.

- (1) "*The Objectivity Thesis*"— standpoint theory is committed to the rejection of any trans-perspectival or universal standard by which knowledge can be impartially articulated or justified (DeLapp 2016, 128).
- (2) "*The Justification Thesis*"— in the absence of an impartial or universal standard, particular situations and experiences can provide their own sufficient epistemic justification for beliefs formed about those situations and experiences. . . . Being a so-and-so gives you the epistemic right to say things about other so-and-sos that non-so-and-sos don't enjoy (DeLapp 2016, 129).
- (3) "*The Membership Thesis*"— The membership thesis fleshes out the specific criteria for a relevant situation or experience. First, the sorts of situations and experiences which are eligible to become proper standpoints must be *collective*. A single individual does not get any special justificatory status qua individual, but only qua being a member of a group. Furthermore, this collectivity must be *politically self-conscious*. That is, an assemblage of people who do not recognize anything in common among them (including simply the fact that others may have viewed them historically as having something falsely in common) will not qualify as a "standpoint" in the relevant sense. This is one reason for differentiating "standpoint" from "perspective": a standpoint is aware of itself as such, whereas a mere perspective need not be self-aware or collective. An individual woman has a perspective; "women" have a standpoint. Moreover, only those collectivities

which have faced oppression will qualify as standpoints in the requisite way. Standpoints are only forged through opposition. The need to fight for the recognition of being an authority on one's own identity and experience is part of what gives that identity and experience a claim to epistemic justification in the first place—this is one of the “unique abilities of the oppressed” (DeLapp 2016, 130-131; cf., Lai 2016, 111-114).

The preceding are the aspects of standpoint theory that interest DeLapp; notice that, unlike with Lai, there is no mention of “procedural” versus “metaphysically-based” objectivity, nor is there mention of (episodic and/or longitudinal) “reliability.” Still, DeLapp conceives of standpoint epistemology as highly agent- and value- dependent insofar as the justification thesis is concerned, while the justification thesis is controversial at least insofar as it denies agent- and value- neutrality to certain truth-claims. Which truth-claims is he presenting as involving agent- and value- dependency? At least those that involve a “standpoint,” as defined by the membership thesis.

DeLapp has two main worries regarding the simultaneous affirmation of these three theses. As he takes these theses to be essential aspects of standpoint theories, any problems with these theses amount to problems with standpoint theories. First, given the objectivity and membership theses, justification is merely grounded in the contingencies of perspectives (DeLapp 2016, 132). Second, the membership thesis is grounded in the assumption that standpoints are uniform, e.g. the womanly standpoint, and thereby entails a kind of essentialism and false universalism (DeLapp 2016, 133). The former is termed the problem of “relativity” while the latter is termed the problem of “false collectivity” (DeLapp 2016, 133). Note that the first concern is shared with Lai above.

DeLapp argues that Confucian “role epistemology” avoids relativity on the one hand and avoids false collectivity on the other. Unfortunately, the details of how these problems are avoided strike me as less clear than the statements of standpoint theory and its potential shortcomings. Be that as it may, DeLapp claims that in virtue of faithfully living our roles, we are epistemically justified in making claims about those roles (DeLapp 2016, 137). DeLapp terms this faithfulness or goodwill “epistemic fidelity” (2016, 140; cf., Lai's notion of “reliability” above). As one's roles change, “so too does epistemic justification change” (DeLapp 2016, 139). As these roles are concrete and mutable, rather than abstract and immutable, the problem of false collectivity is sidestepped.

Relativity, on the other hand, is circumvented insofar as “roles ground epistemic privilege in something that is insistently concrete in virtue of its relating to other particular persons, e.g. a specific friend, parent, etc.” (DeLapp 2016, 144). I must confess that I do not see (a) how insistent concreteness mitigates relativism or (b) how insistent concreteness is not itself already something supposed by standpoint theorists. Perhaps the claim is that, in virtue of faithfully living one’s roles, in fact *being constituted by* one’s roles, epistemic authority is thereby conferred onto the person living those roles regarding those roles? For example, that is what the following seems to suggest.

So, in something similar to how the occupancy of social relations might supply the meaning of ethical terms by constituting the ethical agent herself, so too might the occupancy of those social relationships supply the standards of epistemic justification by constituting the *knower* (DeLapp 2016, 135).

But that does not seem interestingly distinct from standpoint theory, and seems subject to the same objections thereto—even if one is “constituted by” one’s roles, and those roles are “insistently concrete.” Moreover, it is unclear if DeLapp takes people to only be epistemically justified to make claims about roles, or if there are other epistemic criteria for other sorts of knowledge claims. If the former, then DeLapp’s claim is patently false for reasons given in S&CVII:1 below. If the latter, then role epistemology is not a terribly illuminating epistemological theory.

In any event, DeLapp’s case has two problems. First, early Confucians are not, as we shall see from S&CVII:1 below, committed to anything like the objectivity thesis. Second, like Lai, DeLapp overstates the degree of agent- and value- dependency supposed by early Confucians.

4. Christoph Harbsmeier

The first and most obvious problem with DeLapp’s and Lai’s articles when considered in light of S&CVII:1 is that their definitions of early Confucianism are too narrow. The Confucian lexicographical tradition is frequently indistinguishable from Aristotle, and, much like the later Mohists, the Confucian lexicographers were interested in “the systematic clarification of meanings of words and expressions in the context of a formal description of reality” (Harbsmeier

1998, 60-62). This lexicographical tradition is, for instance, at odds with both the objectivity and justification theses in their epistemological commitments. For an easy refutation of either Lai or DeLapp, this would be a natural place to turn. But I will henceforth grant their narrow definitions of early Confucianism. Before proceeding, however, a summary of Harbsmeier's findings in the field of historical linguistics regarding logical concepts in Classical Chinese is in order, as only then can we discuss logical practice and epistemology. I think Lai and DeLapp are justified in neglecting the lexicographical tradition, insofar as the lexicographers could be said to play little part in Confucian philosophy qua philosophy. (However, I do think that neglecting Xunzi is more perplexing, if not problematic, as I explore in 4.3 below.)

4. 1. Logical Concepts: General Logical Features of Classical Chinese

As the texts under consideration (i.e. *Mengzi* 孟子, *Lunyu* 論語, and *Xunzi* 荀子) are written in Classical Chinese, it would be useful to address the logical features of the language. The logical features of a language are not a mere detail, but rather serve as the guidelines for clear thought. If one does not understand how logical operators are expressed in a given language then, following Harbsmeier (1981), one cannot be said to understand that language. For instance, take negatives: the negative *bu* 不 always negates a verb or verb phrase, and this is true of all occurrences in the *Mengzi* and *Lunyu*. The negative *fei* 非, on the other hand, functions as a contrastive of *bu wei* 不爲, meaning “(the subject) is by no means correctly classified by the predicate” (Harbsmeier 1998, 109). If one follows the conclusions of historical linguists, one can learn many such constant rules governing the language. Harbsmeier is one such linguist, and his method demands textual evidence to put forward claims. If the textual evidence undermines a commonplace claim, e.g. the claim that *fei* 非 never negates a verb, i.e. the commonplace claim that *fei* 非 is a prenominal negative, then so much for the commonplace claim. In the present essay, the focus is on the implications of Harbsmeier's research for Chinese philosophy.

The following chart summarizes the key logical features of the Classical Chinese language, to serve as a rough-and-ready guide as to how logical operators are expressed in the language. The chart is a summary of Harbsmeier's (1998, 114-120) findings regarding negatives and logical sentence connectives.

Category	Key examples
Negation (~p)	<i>bu</i> 不 (“negates a verb or a verbal predicate in a narrative sentence and always precedes the verb phrase it modifies in the pattern (subject) <i>bu</i> predicate which we tend to understand along the lines of ‘(the subject) does not predicate’”); <i>fei</i> 非 (negates the whole predicate in the pattern : (subject) <i>fei</i> predicate <i>ye</i> 也, which we tend to understand along the lines of “(the subject) is by no means correctly classified by the predicate,” where the final particle <i>ye</i> marks the judgemental mode of the statement”); <i>wei</i> 未 (“(temporally:) not yet, (logically:) not quite” refers to the whole predicate”); <i>fu</i> 弗 (“(often contrastively) refuse/fail to . . . (the object)’ always refers to the whole predicate”); <i>mo</i> 莫 (“none (of the subjects)’ has the subject as its scope”); <i>wusuo</i> 無所 (“lack that-which” > “none (of the objects)’ has as its scope the object of the verb which it precedes”); <i>wu</i> 無 (“a negative verb ‘to lack, there are none’”); <i>wu</i> 毋 (“make sure that not, don’t!’ <i>Wu</i> is preverbal. When it precedes a pronoun, it will force this pronoun into a verbal role”); <i>wu</i> 勿 (“avoid to, don’t’ is a prohibitory negation which includes an object”); <i>wei</i> 微 (“if it were not for, but for’ is restricted to pre-nominal position and to subordinate position”); <i>fou</i> 否 (“such is not the case, no’ is a sentential negation which functions as a whole sentence by itself”) (Harbsmeier 1998, 108-111). ³
Implication (p ⊃ q)	Implication: <i>ze</i> 則 ((general implication:) “whenever p then q”); <i>ru</i> 如 / <i>ruo</i> 若 ((particular implication:) “if (on a given occasion) p then q”) (Harbsmeier 1998, 114-116). Counterfactual conditional sentences: <i>shi</i> 使 / <i>ji</i> 籍 (“ <i>shi</i> 使 / <i>ji</i> 籍 p, (<i>ze</i> 則) q,” “if (contrary to fact) it were the case that p, then q”); <i>wei</i> 微 (“if it were not for, but for’ is restricted to pre-nominal position and to subordinate position”) (Harbsmeier 1998, 110, 117).
Inference (p :: q)	<i>p gu</i> 故 / <i>gu yue</i> 故曰 / <i>shi yi</i> 是以 / <i>shi gu</i> 是故 q (“p, therefore q,” with an “assertive (inferential) force”) (Harbsmeier 1998, 118-119). ⁴

³ These are just the commonplace negative terms. See Harbsmeier, *Language and Logic*, 111-112 for more on the scope of negatives.

⁴ Note that “p *ze* 則 q” (“if p, then q”) has a “non-assertive, hypothetical force,” contrary to “p *gu* 故 / *gu yue* 故曰 / *shi yi* 是以 / *shi gu* 是故 q” (Harbsmeier 1998, 118-119).

Disjunction ($p \vee q$)	There are no lexically retrievable terms that correspond to declarative “or” or the descriptive “either or” (Harbsmeier 1998, 119). However, <i>fei</i> 非 p <i>ze</i> 則 q (“if not p then q ”) (note: $\sim p \supset q :: p \vee q$) was current (Harbsmeier 1998, 120).
Conjunction ($p \wedge q$)	“In Classical Chinese nominal conjunction has to be expressed by particles like <i>yu</i> 與 “and, with” and <i>ji</i> 及 “and, with,” whereas sentential conjunction is expressed either (as in English) by simple collocation of the co-ordinate sentences, or by particles like <i>er</i> 而 “but, and then, and thus”” (Harbsmeier 1998, 120).

Much like logical concepts in English, usage can occasionally become slippery in natural language, but the ability to understand the subtleties of the linguistic data vis-à-vis the logical connectives and negatives expressed therein is essential to understanding Chinese philosophy. The logical rules governing the use of negatives in Classical Chinese are highly if not purely logical, contrary to familiar Western languages.

In modern French we say *on ne le voit nulle part*, and this evidently does not make the French illogical people. On the contrary, I remember that I have heard it said that French is a very logical language. If that is so, Classical Chinese seems to be more logical still when it comes to negation There certainly are no sayings in Chinese that on the face of it commit such inexactitudes of logical articulation as we find in the saying “all that glitters is not gold,” which does not improve when one translates it into French: *tout ce qui brille n’est pas d’or*. As if gold did not glitter! One can easily imagine a Chinese scholar writing a treatise wondering about what it does to the mind when one is condemned to think in an exotic Far-Western language, like English or French, that involves such muddle surrounding negation. How, the Chinese may wonder, do they keep their negated thoughts straight? (Harbsmeier 1998, 112).

Beyond negatives and logical sentence connectives, quantifiers also play an important role in understanding the logical concepts of a given language. In Classical Chinese, all of the logical patterns that involve quantification can be expressed.

$\forall x(Px) :: x$ *jie* 皆 P *ye* 也
 $\sim \exists x(Px) :: \forall x(\sim Px) :: x$ *mo* 莫 P *ye* 也

$\exists x(Px) :: x$ *huo* 或 P *ye* 也
 $\sim \forall x(Px) :: \exists x(\sim Px) :: x$ *huo fei* 或非 P *ye* 也

As with negations, there are many non-synonymous universal quantifiers in Classical Chinese, with the most basic in the following chart (see Harbsmeier 1998, 121ff).

Universal Quantifier ($\forall x$)	Meaning
<i>jie</i> 皆	A <i>jie</i> 皆B = All A's are B
<i>ge</i> 各	A <i>ge</i> 各 = of A's each is B
<i>jian</i> 兼	A <i>jian</i> 兼 B = A's are all B
<i>fan</i> 凡	“[1] ‘all’ refers indiscriminately to all objects, never to the subjects . . . [2] ‘speaking generally of’ is limited to whole subjects or topics of sentences and it cannot be used to quantify an embedded noun” (Harbsmeier 1998, 123).
<i>bian</i> 遍	“‘all’ refers indiscriminately to all objects wherever they may be in relation to the speaker, and never to the subjects” (Harbsmeier 1998, 122).
<i>zhou</i> 周	“all objects universally” (Harbsmeier 1998, 122).
<i>jin</i> 盡	“‘the whole lot’ . . . ‘exhaustively’ refers to the object, unless that object is unquantifiable” (Harbsmeier 1998, 122).
<i>mo</i> 莫 (used periphrastically), <i>wu bu</i> 無不, and <i>wu fei</i> 無非	“Universal quantification can be expressed periphrastically. We find the combinations ‘none not (<i>mo bu</i> 莫不),’ ‘none is not (<i>mo fei</i> 莫非),’ ‘there is none who not (<i>wu bu</i> 無不),’ [and] ‘there is none who is not (<i>wu fei</i> 無非).’ These again are syntactically distinct. <i>Mo fei</i> , <i>mo bu</i> , and <i>wu fei</i> invariably refer to the subject, while <i>wu bu</i> may refer to the object . . . In the pattern SUBJECT NONE (<i>mo</i> 莫) VERB OBJECT the negative universal quantifier ‘none (<i>mo</i>)’ will always refer to the subject so that we have to translate the pattern as ‘none of the subjects verb the objects.’ . . . Note that <i>mo</i> unlike English ‘no’ cannot precede the noun it quantifies and is thus not an ‘adjectival’ modifier in any sense at all” (Harbsmeier 1998, 122-123).
<i>zhu</i> 諸	“‘all the (members of a definite set)’ . . . do[es] immediately

	precede the nouns [it] modifies” (Harbsmeier 1998, 123).
zhong 眾	““the whole crowd of” . . . do[es] immediately precede the nouns [it] modifies” (Harbsmeier 1998, 123).
qun 群	““the whole flock of” do[es] immediately precede the nouns [it] modifies” (Harbsmeier 1998, 123).

As with negatives, these non-synonymous quantifiers reveal a lot about the semantic content of the words surrounding them in a given sentence, in addition to their syntactic function as logical quantifiers. Not being clear about these concepts seems to preclude a clear understanding of their implementation in the early Confucian corpus. Imagine, for instance, an English speaker who was not clear about such syntactic categories as manifested in the English language. Such a person would hardly be considered fluent in English, not to mention English-language philosophical literature.

With the negatives, logical connectives, and quantifiers in place, we can now proceed to analyse arguments in the *Lunyu* and *Mengzi* to see if they corroborate or refute Lai’s and DeLapp’s aforementioned claims. That is, the early Confucians had the right linguistic tools at their disposal, but did they utilize them with an eye toward making arguments that hold in a universal manner, and with a high degree of agent- and value- neutrality?

It is important that one understands the nature of the foregoing. The logical patterns found in the syntax of the Classical Chinese language regarding negatives, connectives, and quantifiers are determined by what was actually said within the Classical corpus. Harbsmeier has analysed every single usage of these patterns and his results are publicly available in his *TLS, Thesaurus Linguae Sericae: An Historical and Comparative Encyclopaedia of Chinese Conceptual Schemes*. Of course, Classical Chinese thinkers could have used their language differently, but the curious fact is that they did not.

Thus, the particularist in epistemology who wants to claim that Classical Chinese thinkers valued a high degree of agent- and value- dependency, or that they had no trans-perspectival or universal epistemological criteria, cannot merely assert that the Classical Chinese were thus and so. The curious fact is that these thinkers did not wildly deviate from these patterns of thought, so that things like the transitivity of conditionals (displayed beautifully, for instance, in *Lunyu* 13.3) were uniformly assumed. To refute Harbsmeier’s findings, Lai and DeLapp will have to find counterexamples within the corpus or else modify their claims. In either event, their

comparisons with standpoint epistemology are brought into question. Even if readers are not ultimately convinced by what I argue in the present essay, hopefully they at least see the need to engage findings in historical linguistics. After meeting Harbsmeier, I am convinced that Chinese philosophy, if it is to be done well, leans on the findings of historical linguistics. My underlying motive is to show others what I have seen, so that they in turn can show me where I have been blinded or led astray.

While I cannot reproduce the entire Classical Chinese philosophical corpus in the present article as Harbsmeier has done in TLS, I can provide illustrative examples from the relevant texts, as I proceed to do in the next two sections (IV.2 and IV.3).

4. 2. Logical Practice to Epistemology Part I: Arguments in the *Lunyu* and *Mengzi*

With the logical concepts in view, we can begin to discuss their implementation within the early Confucian corpus. While every argument in these texts cannot be treated in the present essay, representative passages have been selected primarily in accordance with S&CVII:1.

Take the following passage from the *Lunyu*.

2.15 The Master said, “Learning without thought is labour lost; thought without learning is perilous” (trans. Legge).⁵

Here we have two conditionals (1) *xue er bu si ze wang* 學而不思則罔 and (2) *si er bu xue ze dai* 思而不學則殆. The first is claiming that if (one) “studies” *xue* 學 “without thinking” *bu si* 不思, then (one [Waley] or one’s labour [Legge]) is “lost” *wang* 罔. The latter is claiming that if (one) “thinks” *si* 思 “without studying” *bu xue* 不學, then (one is in [Waley] or this is [Legge]) “danger(ous)” *dai* 殆. The negative is *bu* 不 while the implication is marked by the *ze* 則 and *er* 而 functions as a conjunction (see the chart above in 4.1). As Harbsmeier summarizes regarding material implication:

By writing sentences like “p ze q,” the ancient Chinese established a relation between different statements p and q about the world. The general force of *ze* is that given p one would expect that q. The nature and the

⁵ Lau, *Confucius: The Analects*, 14: 子曰: “學而不思則罔, 思而不學則殆.” Cf., Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius*: “The Master said: “Learning without due reflection leads to perplexity; reflection without learning leads to perilous circumstances.””

intensity of this expectation can vary according to context. But by using the particle *ze* the ancient Chinese identified what they saw as (more or less) regular patterns of co-occurrence or concomitance in this world. It was by establishing such patterns of concomitance that they attempted to orientate themselves in the welter of appearances and things and to articulate regularities in the world (1998, 115).

One can go on establishing implicit logical arguments from the passage, but there are two points I want to draw out, namely that *Lunyu* 2.15 is a token of the type of passage that: (1) makes general claims about the way the world is, and (2) contains implicit logical argumentation about how one should orient oneself in such a world, given that the world is thus and so.

Neither Lai nor DeLapp cite this passage or other passages of this type. This is unfortunate, because I would be curious to know how they account for this type of passage. For instance, if we revisit the chart in section II above, the general knowledge claims contained in this type of passage smell more like those on the right side of the chart (“Anglo-analytic” theories) rather than the left (“standpoint” theories). It is likewise unclear how the role epistemologist would interpret such passages. As these passages are far from anomalies, this is most unfortunate.

If one still has doubts regarding *Lunyu* 2.15, *Lunyu* 20.3 provides a necessary condition in the form “unless p, not q.” “Without knowing the force of words, it is impossible to know men” (trans. Legge).⁶ As Harbsmeier summarizes, “Here knowledge is said to be a necessary condition for knowledge of men,” whereas *Lunyu* 13.3 shows that, “Early writers were aware of the transitivity of the relation expressed by this formula” (1998, 115). Notice that *ze* 則 is used in all of these implicative statements.

If names are not correct, then (*ze*) speech will not be in accordance with things. When speech is not in accordance with things, then (*ze*) tasks are not fulfilled. When tasks are not fulfilled, then (*ze*) ritual and music will not flourish. When ritual and music do not flourish, then (*ze*) punishments and fines will not be adequate. When punishments and fines are not adequate, then (*ze*) the people have nowhere to seek refuge (trans. Harbsmeier 1998, 115-116).⁷

⁶ Lau, *Confucius: The Analects*, 204: 不知言，無以知人也。 Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius*: “a person who does not understand words has no way of knowing others.”

⁷ Lau, *Confucius: The Analects*, 120: 名不正，則言不順；言不順，則事不成；事不成，則禮樂不興；禮樂不興，則刑罰不中；刑罰不中，則民無所措手足。 Compare Legge: “If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs cannot be

In this passage (*Lunyu* 13.3) a conclusion is drawn, with a *gu* 故 indicating an inference drawn from the string of implications.

Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. What the superior man requires is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect (trans. Legge).⁸

So, again, here there are general claims about the world, and further claims derived on the basis of these claims. Harbsmeier puts it well, “Arguments do not have to be explicit to be present” (1998, 268). But, even still, there are also explicit syllogisms present in the early Confucian corpus beyond *Lunyu* 13.3. To take but one example, see Zigong’s reply to Confucius in *Mengzi* 2A2, “Not to tire of learning is wisdom. Not to weary of teaching is benevolence. Since you are both benevolent and wise you are, by that token, a sage” (trans. Lau qtd. in Harbsmeier 1998, 280).⁹ The premise that Confucius neither tires of learning nor grows weary of teaching is supplied by Confucius himself in the previous line of the dialogue (*Mengzi* 2A2).

The presence of implicit and explicit arguments clearly utilizing rules of inference and implication makes one wonder how such rules are conceived by Lai and DeLapp. Are they not trans-perspectival? Are they not universally binding? Do they not hold with a high degree of agent- and value- neutrality? Even if they are utilized by agents, the rules of inference and implication get their epistemic force precisely insofar as they hold universally, independent of the agents who utilize them.

The *Mengzi* goes a step further than the *Lunyu*, showing a scientific sensitivity. See, e.g., *Mengzi* 4B26:

In talking about human nature people in the world merely appeal to (clever) reasons (*gu*). Those who appeal to (clever) reasons (*gu*) take self-interest

carried on to success, proprieties and music will not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot.” Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius*, translate the conditionals as “when p, q” instead of “if p, (then) q,” but the logic of the *ze* 則 remains the same.

⁸ Lau, *Confucius: The Analects*, 120: 故君子名之必可言也，言之必可行也。君子於其言，無所苟而已矣。 Cf., Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius*: “Thus, when the exemplary person puts a name to something, it can certainly be spoken, and when spoken it can certainly be acted upon. There is nothing careless in the attitude of the exemplary person toward what is said.”

⁹ Lau, *Confucius: The Analects*: 學不厭，智也；教不倦，仁也。仁且智，夫子既聖矣。

as their basic consideration. What I dislike in clever men is that they bore their way through. If clever men could act as Yu did in guiding the flood waters, then there would be nothing to dislike in them. Yu guided the water by imposing nothing on it that was against its natural tendency. If clever men can also do this, then great indeed will their cleverness be. In spite of the height of the heavens and the distance of the heavenly bodies, if one seeks out the (real) reasons (*gu*), one can calculate the solstices of a thousand years hence without stirring from one's seat (trans. Lau qtd. in Harbsmeier 1998, 275).¹⁰

This "scientifically minded" streak of *Mengzi* is thoroughly at odds with Lai's and DeLapp's representations of early Confucian epistemology as discussed above.

Another type of argument, more prevalent in the *Mengzi* than the *Lunyu*, is the thought experiment, the most famous being the child in the well from *Mengzi* 2A6 and the beggar example from *Mengzi* 6A10.¹¹ And then the last and most obvious form of argument in ancient China is found in appeals to the past, especially in the Confucian classics, where a freakishly high number of claims are motivated with reference to the past (see Harbsmeier 1998, 267-268). Famous examples of using past figures as moral exemplars is seen for example in the famous passage on Boli Xi from *Mengzi* 5A9.¹² The past is also used as precedent to substantiate claims about the present. In such appeals to the past, a concern for accuracy is displayed for example by Confucius in the *Lunyu* 15.26, while a similar concern regarding historical accuracy is displayed by *Mengzi* in *Mengzi* 5A9 and 7B3.¹³ These forms of argument are again thoroughly at odds with Lai's and DeLapp's representations of early Confucian epistemology, as discussed above.

¹⁰ Lau, *Mencius*, 182: 天下之言性也，則故而已矣。故者以利爲本。所惡於智者，爲其鑿也。如智者若禹之行水也，則無惡於智矣。禹之行水也，行其所無事也。如智者亦行其所無事，則智亦大矣。天之高也，星辰之遠也，苟求其故，千歲之日至，可坐而致也。 See Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*, 52-53 for a detailed discussion of this passage. Cf. Van Norden, *Mengzi*, 110.

¹¹ See Van Norden, *Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy*, 88ff for detailed discussion of these passages. While, as seen above, Harbsmeier deals with counterfactuals, he does not explicitly address thought experiments as such. Thus, recognition of this last form of argument owes more to Van Norden than Harbsmeier.

¹² See Van Norden, *Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy*, 92 for detailed discussion of this passage.

¹³ See Van Norden, *Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy*, I.B.I. for a helpful discussion of these passages.

4.3. Logical Practice to Epistemology Part II:

On “Knowing” in the *Xunzi*

Curiously, the text that Lai and DeLapp treat the least serves the most to either refute or confirm their claims. Since it does not fall in either Lai’s or DeLapp’s delimitation of early Confucianism in their works addressed above, I limit myself to pointing out that the *Xunzi* is even more at odds with their proposals than the *Lunyu* and *Mengzi*. Now, in fear that my tone becomes tyrannical, or worse, that I am being disingenuous by bringing up an author (Xunzi) who was unaddressed by the authors I am responding to, let it be clear that I bring up Xunzi only because he wrote expository philosophical essays explicitly on epistemology. Neither the *Mengzi* nor the *Lunyu* contain expository philosophical essays explicitly on epistemology, yet Lai’s and DeLapp’s essays concerned early Confucian epistemology. In fact, neither the *Mengzi* nor the *Lunyu* contain expository philosophical essays. Why would somebody write an essay on early Confucian epistemology without addressing the early Confucian who clearly and explicitly wrote on epistemology? I am not being rhetorical: I am truly confused.

Be that as it may, it is worth noting that Xunzi takes practicing (*neng* 能) virtues and knowing (*zhi* 知) their forms (*li* 理) as logically distinct: (e.g.) “benevolence, righteousness, lawfulness, and correctness have patterns that can be known and practiced” (trans. Hutton qtd. in Van Norden 2011, 170).¹⁴ While ethical cultivation is undoubtedly important for Xunzi, as one does not want to be a “vulgar scholar” who merely regurgitates what one hears, nevertheless one should not be anxious to fold the epistemological into the ethical, and vice versa.

Nevertheless, as far as ethical cultivation is concerned, not to be conflated with epistemology, Xunzi, as in most domains of inquiry he treats, stresses the need to retain standards for analogy, with a scale for weighing—and, in many other examples, straightening—physical objects.

[W]hen men act, it must be on the basis of some scale or standard. If a balance is not properly adjusted, then heavy objects will go up in the air and men will suppose they are light, and light objects will sink down so that men suppose they are heavy. Hence men become deluded as to the true weight of the objects. Similarly, if men’s standards are not correct, then misfortune may come in the guise of what they desire, and they will

¹⁴ Wang, *Xunzi jijie*, 443: 仁義法正有可知可能之理.

take it for good fortune, or good fortune may come in the guise of what they hate and they will mistake it for misfortune. In this way men become deluded as to the true nature of bad and good fortune. The Way is the proper standard for past and present. He who departs from the Way and makes arbitrary choices on the basis of his own judgment does not understand wherein fortune and misfortune lie (trans. Watson 2003).¹⁵

The constant recurrence of such imagery in the *Xunzi* strongly suggests the need for criteria with a high degree of agent- and value- neutrality, to avoid the confusion that follows from too much agent- and value- dependency. Moreover, the rituals that serve as the main tool for ethical cultivation are themselves discussed as, to quote Van Norden (2011, 171), “eternal and unchangeable,” waiting to be discovered by the sages: (e.g.) “Is not ritual perfect indeed! It establishes a lofty standard that is the ultimate of its kind, and none under Heaven can add to or subtract from it” (trans. Hutton qtd. in Van Norden 2011, 171).¹⁶ The former quotes do not bode well for reducing “knowing” to the ability to practice virtues reliably, while quotes like the latter threaten the dynamic character of Lai’s and DeLapp’s pictures of Confucian epistemology. All the same, much more clearly remains to be said on *Xunzi*, and these are just *very*, almost comically brief considerations. However, anything more is beyond the scope of the present essay, which explicitly takes Lai’s and DeLapp’s delimitations as they are. The real concern is that Lai and DeLapp downplay *Xunzi* in their accounts of early Confucian epistemology in the relevant essays.

5. Concluding Remarks

Passages like *Mengzi* 4A17 and *Lunyu* 11.22 (and, in a different way, passages like *Lunyu* 9.3) show beyond a doubt that the early Confucians (as delimited by Lai and DeLapp) did have a particularist streak,¹⁷ but I believe the foregoing examples from S&CVII:1 indubitably reflect that these

¹⁵ Wang, *Xunzi*, 430: 人無動而不可以不與權俱。衡不正，則重懸於仰而人以爲輕，輕懸於俛而人以爲重，此人所以惑於輕重也。權不正，則禍託於欲而人以爲福，福託於惡而人以爲禍，此亦人所以惑於禍福也。道者，古今之正權也，離道而內自擇，則不知禍福之所託。

¹⁶ Wang, *Xunzi*, 355-356: 禮豈不至矣哉! 立隆以爲極，而天下莫之能損益也。There is a sense in which *Xunzi* takes ritual forms to be discovered and a sense in which he takes them to be invented or “produced by conscious activity.” In fact, the latter sense seems to be the way *Xunzi* predominately talks about rituals. These two senses need not be in tension with one another—see Van Norden, *Introduction*, 168-171 for a detailed discussion.

¹⁷ See Van Norden, *Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy*, 45-46 for a detailed discussion of particularism vis-à-vis Confucius.

thinkers also had and employed logical concepts. DeLapp and Lai happily cite passages that represent the particularist streak, but they fail to cite the passages that represent the logical streak, including those appeals to the past and thought experiments which were used as trans-perspectival means of substantiating claims. The claim has never been that the logical streak is all there is to early Confucianism (see e.g. Harbsmeier 1998, 265), but that to completely neglect this logical streak is to misrepresent the tradition. I hope to have shown that DeLapp's and Lai's efforts to compare early Confucian epistemology to feminist standpoint epistemology misrepresent the former, making it appear more amenable to the latter.

One strategy for qualifying Lai's and DeLapp's theses is to admit that there are highly agent- and value- neutral tools (e.g. the rules of inference and implication routinely utilized by Chinese thinkers), but that the apt use of these tools is itself a sort of knowing-how rather than knowing-that (a distinction well-worn by Lai). Barry Allen (2015) recently made a similar argument in a different context,¹⁸ a move that leads to a more situational type of epistemology favourable to Lai and DeLapp, while showing due respect for the insights of S&CVII:1. The key here is subsuming knowing-that to knowing-how without denying the high degree of agent- and value-neutrality of certain tools that fall under the guise of knowing-that (again, e.g. rules of inference and implication). Even this, however, might require toning down DeLapp's objectivity thesis. This qualification represents a weaker version of Lai's thesis, that early Confucians favoured practise over theory (Lai 2016, 107-111), but this version ceases to be controversial and therefore interesting (again, see Allen 2015). In short, while this move makes Lai's and DeLapp's readings truer to the texts, insofar as key claims would no longer run contrary to the logical practices displayed in the texts, it would create two new and distinct problems despite its new strengths: namely, (1) the reading would no longer be original,¹⁹ and (2) the reading would have less to offer standpoint epistemology, as presented by Lai and DeLapp.

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¹⁸ cf. Harbsmeier, *Language and Logic*, 247-248.

¹⁹ Again, I have in mind figures like Allen, *Vanishing Into Things*.

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以何莫邪(Christoph Harbmeister)的 論點否定賴蘊慧(Karyn Lai) 與凱文·德拉普(Kevin Delapp) 所指出的早期儒家認識論的特性

John R. WILLIAMS

中文摘要

賴蘊慧與凱文·德拉普主張儒家認識論與立場認識論是相同的。這篇文章的目的是對這兩者進行批判性的審查。首先，我將回顧何莫邪在《中國科學技術史》第七卷第一分冊的研究，借助其論點以分析早期中國的邏輯思考，包括《孟子》與《論語》中的認識論。其次，我將指出賴蘊慧與德拉普所認為的儒家認識論論點與何莫邪背道而馳。以這個研究為基礎，得出跟賴蘊慧與德拉普相反的結論：儒家認識論與立場認識論並不相似。雖然本研究不會詳盡分析賴蘊慧與德拉普的所有觀點，但是希望藉由何莫邪的研究，能更深入瞭解早期儒家認識論。

關鍵詞：孟子，孔子，荀子，立場認識論，何莫邪(Christoph Harbmeister)，
賴蘊慧(Karyn Lai)，凱文·德拉普(Kevin Delapp)

Virtue and Virtuosity: Xunzi and Aristotle on the Role of Art in Ethical Cultivation

Wilson LEE

Abstract

Christian B. Miller has noted a “realism challenge” for virtue ethicists to provide an account of how the character gap between virtuous agents and non-virtuous agents can be bridged. This is precisely one of Han Feizi’s key criticisms against Confucian virtue ethics, as Eric L. Hutton argues, which also cuts across the Aristotelian one: appealing to virtuous agents as ethical models provides the wrong kind of guidance for the development of virtues. Hutton, however, without going into detail, notes that the notion of rituals in the Confucian tradition *may* be able to sidestep Han Feizi’s criticism. In this essay, I wish to explore not only how the notion of rituals, alongside its corollaries in Xunzi’s Confucian program for ethical cultivation, indeed addresses Han Feizi’s criticism, but also observe that Aristotle’s tragic poetry plays functionally equivalent roles in his own understanding of ethical upbringing. I will begin by considering Han Feizi’s critique of ethical cultivation in virtue ethics *as such* and how it poses a specific problem for the acquisition of the ‘constitutive reasoning’ shared by Aristotle and Xunzi. I will then briefly note that this problem trades on the synthetic structure of human nature found in both Aristotle and Xunzi (the rational/irrational parts of the soul and the heartmind/five faculties), which grounds the way they understand ethical action and agency. Finally, I will suggest how both Aristotle and Xunzi understand the role of the arts in their extensive programme of ethical cultivation, allowing them to respond to Han Feizi’s attack as too narrow a construal of their respective ethical projects. It is hoped that, through this, we may gain a better sense of how more recent virtue ethicists may similarly draw on aesthetic resources for ethical development.

Keywords: Aristotle, Xunzi, virtue ethics, aesthetics, ethical cultivation

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1. The Realism Challenge and Challenge from Chinese Legalism

Apart from the situationist challenge (as set forth by the likes of Gilbert Harman and John Doris), virtue ethics faces a “realism challenge,” which Christian B. Miller formulates as:

the Aristotelian [virtue ethicist] needs to develop some account of how we can start with people whose characters are deficient in these ways and outline steps to best help them gradually transform into virtuous people who, for instance, reliably help when needed for the right reasons and independently of what mood or state of guilt they happen to be in.¹

As a central means for how such a transformation might occur, Miller appeals to the long-held idea of people imitating, or modelling themselves after, virtuous agents. But, as he admits, explanations for how such modelling is supposed to work have not been adequately provided by contemporary virtue ethicists.² Miller himself merely notes empirical support for correlations between virtue acquisition and actual models (e.g. Wilson and Petruska’s 1984 study of having someone else in the room respond morally, or Rushton and Campbell’s 1977 study of having blood donation role models), along with anecdotes for counter-factual or aesthetic models, suggesting—albeit without much detail—that both the *imaginative* and *emotional* faculties are constitutive of how modelling works.³ Sor-Hoon Tan has also suggested this earlier, in relation to quasi-historical models (specifically in pre-Qin Confucianism). The general idea here is that the imagination is stimulated by the models to reframe a situation by placing oneself ‘in their shoes’, thereby foregrounding morally salient factors and producing emotions such as admiration, that play at least motivating roles in getting us to imitate the behavior we have observed.⁴

It might be thought that these correlations and gestures would provide at least *pro tanto* reasons for the plausibility of modelling, while we hold

¹ Miller, “The Real Challenge to Virtue Ethics from Psychology,” 22.

² Miller, *The Character Gap*, 195-204.

³ Wilson and Petruska, “Motivation, Model Attributes, and Prosocial Behavior,” and Rushton and Campbell, “Modeling, Vicarious Reinforcement and Extraversion on Blood Donating in Adults: Immediate and Long-Term Effects,” cited in Miller, *The Character Gap*, 202.

⁴ Miller, *The Character Gap*, 201; Tan, “Imagining Confucius: Paradigmatic Characters and Virtue Ethics,” 419.

out hope for a satisfactory explanation for them. But there would be an urgent problem for such a hope, should there be philosophical reasons against the plausibility of modelling: modelling would not only be irrelevant but the possibility of virtue acquisition might be more diminished than it is currently thought to be.

This is precisely one of the Chinese Legalist Han Feizi's 韓非子 (c. 280-233 BCE) key criticisms against Confucian virtue ethics at the end of the Warring States period in China (475-221 BCE), as Eric L. Hutton argues, which also cuts across the Aristotelian one: appealing to *virtuous agents as ethical models provides the wrong kind of guidance* for the development of virtues. Consider the following passage from "The Five Vermin" (*wudu* 五蠹):

In ancient times King Wen lived in the area between Feng and Hao, his domain no more than a hundred *li* square, but he practiced benevolence and righteousness, won over the Western Barbarians, and eventually became ruler of the world. King Yan of Xu lived east of the Han River in a territory five hundred *li* square. He practiced benevolence and righteousness, and thirty-six states came with gifts of territory to pay him tribute, until King Wen of Jing, fearing for his own safety, called out his troops, attacked Xu, and wiped it out. Thus King Wen practiced benevolence and righteousness and became ruler of the world, but King Yan practiced benevolence and righteousness and destroyed his state. This is because benevolence and righteousness served for ancient times, but no longer serve today. So I say that circumstances differ with the age. . . .

Past and present have different customs; new and old adopt different measures. To try to use the ways of a generous and lenient government to rule the people of a critical age is like trying to drive a runaway horse without using reins or whip. This is the misfortune that ignorance invites.⁵

That is, according to Han Feizi, mimicry of the virtuous agent is in fact *counter-productive* to virtue acquisition under virtue ethics broadly conceived.⁶

⁵ Watson, *Han Feizi: Basic Writings*, 100-102 (*Han Feizi*, "Wudu" 五蠹: "古者文王處豐，鎬之間，地方百里，行仁義而懷西戎，遂王天下。徐偃王處漢東，地方五百里，行仁義，割地而朝者三十有六國，荊文王恐其害己也，舉兵伐徐，遂滅之。故文王行仁義而王天下，偃王行仁義而喪其國，是仁義用於古不用於今也。 . . . 夫古今異俗，新故異備，如欲以寬緩之政，治急世之民，猶無轡策而御驛馬，此不知之患也。").

⁶ As in the situationist challenge, the empirical correlation between models and virtue acquisition, then, would be explained by Han Feizi in terms of a third non-moral factor, i.e. material conditions: Therefore those men in ancient times who abdicated and relinquished the rule of the world were, in a manner of speaking, merely forsaking the life of a gatekeeper and escaping from the toil of a slave. Therefore they thought little of handing over the rule of the world to someone else. Nowadays, however, the magistrate of a district dies and his sons and grand-sons are able to go riding about in carriages for generations after.

Hutton, without going into detail, suggests that the notion of rituals (*li* 禮) in the Confucian tradition ‘may’ be able to sidestep Han Feizi’s criticism.⁷ In this paper, I will pursue Hutton’s line of thought and explore not only how the notion of rituals, alongside its corollaries in Xunzi’s 荀子 (c. 310-c. 235 BCE) Confucian programme for ethical cultivation, indeed addresses Han Feizi’s criticism, but also observe that Aristotle’s (384-322 BCE) notion of tragic poetry in the *Poetics* plays a functionally equivalent role in his own understanding of ethical upbringing.⁸ That is, with respect to *aesthetic models* at least, I will consider how both Xunzi and Aristotle may be understood to provide us with a good sample of ancient answers to the realism challenge. Looking at how aesthetic models work for both of them, alongside each other, would give us a better sense of the range of preexisting approaches available for contemporary appropriation and, in this way, fill in the details for Miller and Tan. But, although these might not be incompatible, I will ultimately suggest that the Xunzian approach would be more promising for the purposes of contemporary appropriation than the Aristotelian one.

In what follows, I will begin by considering Han Feizi’s critique of ethical cultivation in virtue ethics *as such* and how exactly it poses a specific problem for the acquisition of the ‘constitutive reasoning’ shared by Aristotle and Xunzi (§2). I will then briefly note that this problem trades on the synthetic structure of human nature found in both Aristotle and Xunzi (the rational/irrational parts of the soul and the heartmind/five faculties [*xin* 心/*wuguan* 五官]), which grounds the way they understand ethical action and agency (§3). Following this, I will suggest how both Aristotle and Xunzi understand the role of the arts in their extensive programme of ethical cultivation, allowing them to respond to Han Feizi’s attack as too narrow a construal of their respective ethical projects (§4). I will then conclude by briefly considering why contemporary virtue ethicists might want to favor the Xunzian approach over the Aristotelian one (§5).

Therefore people prize such offices. In the matter of relinquishing things, people thought nothing of stepping down from the position of Son of Heaven in ancient times, yet they are very reluctant to give up the post of district magistrate today; this is because of the difference in the actual benefits received. (Watson, *Han Feizi*, 98-99 [*Han Feizi*, “Wudu”: “以是言之, 夫古之讓天子者, 是去監門之養而離臣虜之勞也, 古傳天下而不足多也. 今之縣令, 一日身死, 子孫累世絮駕, 故人重之; 是以人之於讓也, 輕辭古之天子, 難去今之縣令者, 薄厚之實異也.”]). For a Xunzian response to the situationist challenge, see Mower, “Situationism and Confucian Virtue Ethics.”

⁷ Hutton, “Han Feizi’s Criticism of Confucianism and its Implication for Virtue Ethics,” 453.

⁸ I will use ‘Xunzi’ and ‘Han Feizi’ in this essay to refer to the views expressed in the *Xunzi* and the *Han Feizi* respectively as whole entities.

To briefly note, there are obvious limitations in this Anglophone trend of approaching Xunzi's ethics—or Confucian ethics for that matter—in terms of virtue ethics: retrospectively interpreting the classical text(s) and tradition(s) through a contemporary framework risks misrepresenting them, which may turn out to be detrimental to their scholarship and recognition.⁹ Additionally, although many scholars have argued that possessing certain structural similarities is sufficient for a virtue ethical characterisation (e.g. Jiyuan Yu, May Sim, Bryan Van Norden, and Justin Tiwald), the issue is admittedly not a settled matter.¹⁰ Sinophone scholarship, for example, seems to have taken on an explicitly deontological approach to Confucian ethics (e.g. Lee Ming-Huei), with only a minority of Anglophone scholars following suit.¹¹ Nevertheless, my purpose here is only to show how certain strands in Xunzi's (and Aristotle's) *ethics of virtues* has something important to offer contemporary virtue ethicists, however much we want to characterize the former in terms of the latter.¹²

2. Imitation

We might model Xunzi's ethics as an ethics of virtue that has relevance for contemporary virtue ethics, given at least two features of his ethical theory and the structural role which the virtues play in them. The first feature is the (at least partial) “*uncodifiability* of proper moral judgment,” where Xunzi's highest normative standard, the *Dao* 道, cannot be given “any definitive account,” but only varying and inexact descriptions involving the virtues (similar to Aristotle's *eudaimonia* [εὐδαιμονία]).¹³ The second, corollary feature is the “*epistemological privilege* of the virtuous person,” in moral reasoning (the gentleman [*junzi* 君子] who fully embodies the virtues, similar

⁹ For more detailed recent discussions on the plausibility of interpreting Confucian ethics through the virtue ethical framework, see Angle, “The *Analects* and Moral Theory” and Hutton, “On the ‘Virtue Turn’ and the Problem of Categorizing Chinese Thought.”

¹⁰ Yu, *The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle*; Sim, *Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius*; Van Norden, *Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy*; Tiwald, “Confucianism and Virtue Ethics.”

¹¹ See, for examples of the Sinophone approach, Lee, “Confucianism, Kant, and Virtue Ethics” and Wong, “Confucian Ethics and Virtue Ethics Revisited”; for Anglophone examples, see Roetz, *Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age*, and, specifically on Xunzi, Nivison, “Xunzi on ‘Human Nature’” and Soles, “The Nature and Grounds of Xunzi's Disagreement with Mencius.”

¹² The same, of course, may also be said of Aristotle's ethics, although this is not as contentious an issue as in the case of Confucianism (see Buckle, “Aristotle's *Republic* or, Why Aristotle's *Ethics* Is Not Virtue Ethics”).

¹³ Hutton, “Xunzi and Virtue Ethics,” 115-117.

to Aristotle's "good man" [*spoudaios* σπουδαῖος]),¹⁴ not just in "identifying *what* action to take, but also the justification for *why* that is the thing to do."¹⁵ Further, Aristotle and Xunzi share what Hutton calls the notion of "constitutive reasoning," in which "the process of moral reasoning is one wherein virtuous agents must discover for themselves what will constitute achieving those ends in the individual circumstances they face."¹⁶

However, Han Feizi would argue that the *uncodifiability thesis* and the *epistemological privilege* of the virtuous agent are in tension with each other, insofar as the virtuous agent is meant to provide substantive ethical guidance for the moral reasoning of non-virtuous agents, through their imitation of her. We may see this notion of imitation in Aristotle's claim that the person who is just and temperate is the one who "does them *as* just and temperate men do them," and Xunzi's remark that "[the gentleman's] slightest word, his most subtle movement, all can serve as a model for others."¹⁷ The notion of imitation in the virtue ethical approach is perhaps most strongly formulated by Rosalind Hursthouse: "[a]n action is right if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances."¹⁸ The uncodifiability thesis is based on the uncodifiable particularity of the circumstances which individual ethical agents face, and the problem which is thus posed for the notion of imitation is that the virtuous person, as a model for imitation, provides the *wrong* kind of ethical guidance for an agent's constitutive reasoning.

For Han Feizi, this is due to two (not incompatible) reasons: first, "because of changes in the world, what worked in the past will likely fail miserably in the present, even if practiced by equally capable people"; and second, "even if the world has not changed substantially, [agents] of inferior quality will likely encounter calamity if they attempt what more capable [agents] were previously able to accomplish."¹⁹ While Han Feizi's criticism mainly concerns the former, a similar criticism of virtue ethics has been made by Bernard Williams, which stresses the latter: where if the right action depends

¹⁴ Supplementary usage of key Greek terms here draws from Bywater's edition of the *NE*, Ross' edition of the *Politics*, and Kassel's edition of the *Poetics* (Aristotle, *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*; *Aristotelis Politica*; and *Aristotle's Ars Poetica*).

¹⁵ Hutton, "Xunzi and Virtue Ethics," 116; *NE*, 1113a25-30;

¹⁶ Hutton, "Moral Reasoning in Aristotle and Xunzi," 373.

¹⁷ *NE*, 1105b5-10; Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 1.147-148 (*Xunzi*, "Quanxue" 勸學: "端而言, 輒而動, 一可以爲法則").

¹⁸ Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics*, 28.

¹⁹ Hutton, "Han Feizi's Criticism of Confucianism and its Implication for Virtue Ethics," 441.

on the circumstances, and if “the circumstances are defined partly in terms of the agent’s ethical imperfection, the virtuous agent cannot be in *those* circumstances,” and thus attempts by the non-virtuous agent to imitate the virtuous agent would be futile, if not ruinous, “moral weight-lifting.”²⁰ That is, for both Han Feizi and Williams, the external and internal circumstances of the virtuous person’s actions are too specific for mere imitation. As Han Feizi points out, this was the case in King Yan of Xu: the world had changed drastically since the time of King Wen, such that benevolent and righteous practices were disastrous. The possibility of imitating the internal features of the virtuous person’s actions—namely, *good judgment* and *character*—thus still falls to criticism. For the former, the employ of the deliberative procedure of the gentleman or sage king (*shengwang* 聖王) for good judgment, without the corresponding intellectual capacities and/or the different circumstances involved in the appropriate deliberative procedure, would still confound the non-virtuous agent’s attempt to determine the appropriate course of action through her own constitutive reasoning. And for the latter, the non-virtuous agent cannot simply “will oneself into the proper character” (“the tendency to be motivated by certain desires and feelings”), as the “cultivation of character takes time and is a process that works through habituation.”²¹ We see this in Aristotle’s claim that “moral virtue comes about as a result of habit,” and also Confucius’ 孔子 (551–479 BCE) own seventy-year-long cultivation of his “heart’s desire.”²² But perhaps this is seen most strongly in Xunzi’s metaphor of the straightening of crooked wood—involving “the press frame and steaming and bending”²³—for the rectification of people’s bad nature.²⁴

This also poses a problem for Miller and Tan in terms of how we are to understand the role of imaginative and emotional faculties in ethical modelling for the non-virtuous agent, which would presumably be a part of constitutive reasoning: these faculties have not yet been habituated for the tasks even needed for ethical emulation. The agent’s imaginative faculty is still not able to “[put] herself into the model’s shoes” in a way that reliably picks out the morally salient features; nor are her emotions yet primed to

²⁰ Williams, “Replies,” 190.

²¹ Hutton, “Han Feizi’s Criticism of Confucianism and its Implication for Virtue Ethics,” 449.

²² NE, 1103a15–20; Lau, *The Analects*, 2.4 (*Lunyu*, “Weizheng” 為政: “從心所欲”).

²³ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 23.205–207 (*Xunzi*, “Xinge” 性惡: “枸木必將待櫟栢烝矯然後直者”).

²⁴ Unlike Aristotle, for whom “nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature” (NE, 1103a20–25).

reliably motivate her to the relevant moral behavior.

The straightforward mimicry of virtuous persons thus fails to provide the appropriate ethical guidance for non-virtuous agents with respect to the relevant elements of the latter's constitutive reasoning, whether the external circumstances or the deliberative and character components of action. Hutton, responding on behalf of the Confucians, suggests a distinction between a 'goal model' and a 'practice model.' Instead of having the non-virtuous agent imitate "already-achieved virtue," he or she should imitate "what the sages did in order to become virtuous."²⁵ This "separate model for cultivation," or pedagogical model, would "consist of less heroic and more homely actions to imitate, actions that are accordingly more likely to be safe for such a person to do in any circumstances."²⁶

Although he does not elaborate on it, Hutton suggests that the Confucian conception of ritual and its relation to virtue may constitute such "practice models." The rituals function as partial and inexhaustive codifications of the *Dao*, which are themselves subject to revision according to the circumstances (hence satisfying the uncodifiability thesis).²⁷ More broadly, I wish to suggest, in what follows, that for both Xunzi and Aristotle, the arts can provide such "practice models." By "the arts," I refer to Greek poetry and the *Odes* (*Shijing* 詩經), alongside the music to which they relate or even intimately integrated with.²⁸ In addition, I will include, for Xunzi, the *Zhou Rituals* (*Zhouli* 周禮), which are symbolically dense and rarely discussed separately from music.²⁹

3. Composition

Notably, Xunzi rarely discusses the rituals without music (*yue* 樂) (to which the *Odes* are set), as the former's "emphasis on the individual points of decorum and separation of social roles" may cause us to fixate on "merely one corner of the [*Dao*]."³⁰ Both rituals and music are needed to "[govern]

²⁵ Hutton, "Han Feizi's Criticism of Confucianism and its Implication for Virtue Ethics," 451.

²⁶ Hutton, "Han Feizi's Criticism of Confucianism and its Implication for Virtue Ethics," 451.

²⁷ Hutton, "Han Feizi's Criticism of Confucianism and its Implication for Virtue Ethics," 444, note 51.

²⁸ Senyshyn, "The Good and Its Relation to Music Education," 182; Cook, "Xun Zi on Rituals and Music," 3n8.

²⁹ cf. *Analects*, 8.8.

³⁰ Cook, "Xun Zi on Ritual and Music," 26; Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 21.120-121

the human [heartmind]" as "[m]usic unites that which is the same, and ritual distinguishes that which is different."³¹ This inextricability corresponds to Xunzi's notion of the unity of the virtues, where "for [benevolence (*ren* 仁)], [righteousness (*yi* 義)], ritual propriety, and musicality, their achievement is united."³² That is, the virtues cannot be cultivated in isolation. But what is the basis for this unity? Answering this question would help us to better see how the rituals and music may perform the role of a 'practice model'.

For Xunzi, in a virtuous action, the heartmind's deliberation selects one of the many (natural) dispositions of the Heavenly-endowed five faculties to act upon, and such an action, importantly, is performed *in accordance with* the *Dao*'s social distinctions as encoded by the rituals and the harmonious order effected by music—hence "for the sake of [righteousness]" and benevolence. Importantly, motivation for any action comes from the heartmind's deeming which desires (*yu* 欲) ("the responses of the dispositions to things") to fulfil.³³ This deeming of desire is based on the heartmind's manifold understanding of linguistic and corollary normative distinctions, which are to come from the *Odes* and *Documents* (*Shujing* 書經). It may thus be said that "a single desire received from Heaven [being of a natural disposition] is controlled by many things received from the [heartmind]," and being that it can no longer then be simply classified "as something received from Heaven," the desire and the corresponding action, given the involvement of the heartmind, is ethically significant due to this *integration* of the heartmind and the five faculties.³⁴

On that account, moral agency which is ethically significant involves both our capacity for social distinctions and inborn dispositions—the Heavenly and the bestial—in a synthetic relation. This is concretised in *deliberate effort* (*wei* 偽), wherein "the [heartmind] reflects and one's abilities act on" a certain disposition, mediating the division of our essential constitution.³⁵ Such ethically significant actions also include those which "[come] into being through accumulated reflection and training of one's abilities" (i.e. habituation).³⁶ We

(Xunzi "Jiebi" 解蔽: "皆道之一隅也").

³¹ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 20.145-147 (*Xunzi*, "Yuelun" 樂論: "樂合同, 禮別異, 禮樂之統, 管乎人心矣").

³² Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 27.126 (*Xunzi*, "Dalue" 大略: "仁義禮樂, 其致一也").

³³ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 22.275-319 (*Xunzi*, "Zhengming" 正名: "欲者, 情之應也"); Sung, "Yu in the Xunzi," 380.

³⁴ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 22.280-283 (*Xunzi*, "Zhengming": "所受乎天之一欲, 制於所受乎心之多, 固難類所受乎天也").

³⁵ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 22.16 (*Xunzi*, "Zhengming": "心慮而能爲之動謂之偽").

³⁶ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 22.17-18 (*Xunzi*, "Zhengming": "慮積焉, 能習焉, 而後成謂之偽").

can see in this picture, therefore, that the role of rituals and music in ethical cultivation is to habituate the heartmind (“one’s Heavenly lord”) to *act* on the understanding that is patterned on the *Dao*, and to consequently regulate the ‘government’ of the five faculties and the management of their natural dispositions and desires.³⁷ For it is only with the “regulation of ritual [and music]” that the relevant distinctions of the understanding of the *Odes* and *Documents* become *practical*, that the appropriate understanding “connects to things” and becomes wisdom, a virtue.³⁸

Similarly, as with the above analysis of ethically significant action into the activity of the heartmind (judgment) and dispositions (character), against the background of the synthetic structure of human nature, we also find Aristotle analysing action [*praxis*] into thinking and character. This analysis maps onto the rational and the irrational parts of the soul. An action of choice, or *prohairesis* [προαίρεσις] (the “deliberate desire of things in our power”), connects the qualities of intellect and character in ethical agents, where actions of *prohairesis* are expressive of the synthesis between the rational (deliberation) and the irrational (desire) parts of our nature.³⁹ For ethical actions “cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character”: “[i]ntellect itself . . . moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical,” (i.e. *phronesis* [φρόνησις] which aims at *eudaimonia*.) which itself still “does not move anything without desire.”⁴⁰ Aristotle notes that “an animal moves itself insofar as it has desire,” which needs appearances “either rational . . . or perceptual,” whereof the latter is common to humans and other animals.⁴¹ However, similar to Xunzi, deliberate desires are ethically significant, those of rational or “deliberative appearance,” wherein deliberation, through “[measuring] by one <standard>,” makes “one object of appearance out of many.”⁴² This involves suppositions which are both universal (“that this sort of agent ought to do this sort of thing”) and particular (“that this is this sort of thing and I am this sort of agent”), exclusive to the *zoon logikon* [ζῷον λογικόν].⁴³ Therefore, part of proper education and training is to conduce the *integration* and phronetic modification

³⁷ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 17.57-58 (*Xunzi*, “Tianlun” 天論: “夫是之謂天君”).

³⁸ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 1.159-185 (*Xunzi*, “Quanxue”: “不道禮憲，以詩書爲之，譬之猶以指測河也”); Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 22.21-22 (*Xunzi*, “Zhengming”: “知有所合謂之智”).

³⁹ *NE*, 1113a5-15.

⁴⁰ *NE*, 1139a35-b5; *DA*, 433a20-25.

⁴¹ *DA*, 433b25-35.

⁴² *DA*, 434a5-15.

⁴³ *DA*, 434a15-25; Aristotle, *Selections*, 617.

of natural dispositions to become full virtues of character, in habituating the organisation of desires with such discursive and abstract reasoning.⁴⁴

Importantly, for Aristotle, “all the virtues,” whether moral, such as bravery or temperance, or intellectual, such as *phronesis* and *sophia* [σοφία] (which is “intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge”, and which partly constitutes *eudaimonia*), must be cultivated together in the virtuous person.⁴⁵ This unity of virtues, however, presents a problem (shared with Xunzi), for unless the *phronetic* gap between me and the virtuous agent which I am to imitate is bridged, I cannot cultivate other virtues accordingly.

Nevertheless, we can also retrospectively clarify the very pressure point on which Han Feizi pushes: if our desires (and hence deliberation) are dependent on the particular things which are present to our sensory faculties, then even if I may rudimentarily share an understanding of social distinctions/universal suppositions with the virtuous agent, she cannot be an appropriate model as her deliberation would necessarily, constitutively differ from mine. And given the unity of the virtues, the deliberative gap would hinder the full development of other virtues. As Hutton notes, if the neophyte is to be provided with a ‘practice model’, then it must avoid “[granting] that circumstances can vary enough to make almost *any* given type of action [to be imitated] likely to be ruinous.”⁴⁶ The task required of the arts in the ethical cultivation programmes of Aristotle and Xunzi, then, in providing ‘practice models’, is not only to conduce the integration of the synthetic structure of human nature, but to merge virtuous agents and non-virtuous agents, such that the former’s moral reasoning becomes the latter’s.

Here, I submit that where Xunzi may appeal to rituals and music, an Aristotelian ‘practice model’ for the cultivation of virtues in unison may be found in his conception of tragic poetry, which he defines as the imitation of serious action [*praxeos spoudaias πράξεως σπουδαίας*] involving thinking and character.⁴⁷ It is likewise accompanied by music (which is “the greatest of the things by which [tragedy] is made pleasing”), which also plays important roles for tragic poetry, as it does in the *Odes*.⁴⁸ Notably, however, the transformative and unifying role which music plays in the *Odes* is, as we shall see, largely shifted out of focus by other elements of tragedy in Aristotle’s extant discussions.

⁴⁴ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1332a40-b20; cf. Athanassoulis, “Acquiring Aristotelian Virtue.”

⁴⁵ *NE*, 1144b35-40; *NE*, 1141a15-20.

⁴⁶ Hutton, “Han Feizi’s Criticism of Confucianism and its Implication for Virtue Ethics,” 451.

⁴⁷ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1450b10-20.

⁴⁸ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1450b10-20.

4. Performance

For both Aristotle and Xunzi, ethical cultivation may be understood to involve two overlapping, but nevertheless distinct, aspects. Aristotle observes that “education through habituation must come before education through reason, and that education of the body must come before education of the mind,” and those who would learn about ethics “must have been brought up in good habits” for it is “difficult to get from youth up a right training for virtue if one has not been brought up under right laws.”⁴⁹ Be that as it may, what such proper upbringing and right laws involve, as we see in the *Politics*, is legislated education in “reading and writing, gymnastics, music, and . . . drawing,” “[giving] us a body of a certain quality,” “[giving] us a character of a certain quality” (according to the likenesses of “rhythms and melodies”), and making experts “[contemplating] the beauty of bodies.”⁵⁰

For Xunzi, the first aspect of ethical cultivation is the “reciting [of] the classics,” the *Odes*, the *Documents*, (which “contain ancient stories but no explanation of their present application”) and the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (which are “terse and cannot be quickly understood”); the second involves the rituals and music.⁵¹ In keeping with his metaphor of ethical cultivation as wood-straightening, we may understand the first aspect as the soaking environment of the wood, and the latter two aspects as the actual steaming and bending of it.⁵² That is, respectively, the learning for the understanding of the heartmind and the acquisition of wisdom and corresponding habituation of action.⁵³ For one must have familiarity with the relevant symbolism and linguistic and normative distinctions while the practice of them is guided by rituals and music.

⁴⁹ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1338b1-10; *NE*, 1179b30-35.

⁵⁰ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1337b20-25, 1339a20-25, 1340a10-20.

⁵¹ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 1.125-130 (*Xunzi*, “Quanyue”: “其數則始乎誦經”); Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 1.161-163 (*Xunzi*, “Quanyue”: “詩書故而不切, 春秋約而不速”).

⁵² Ideally, one would also have a third, i.e. to draw near to and “imitate the right person in his practice of the precepts of the gentleman,” as the rituals and music “provide proper models but give no precepts” (Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 1.163-164 (*Xunzi*, “Quanyue”: “方其人之習君子之說”); Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 1.160-161 (*Xunzi*, “Quanyue”: “禮樂法而不說”)). But while the role of personal relationships with more-virtuous (albeit not-yet fully virtuous agents) in the discussions of virtue acquisition deserves more attention, this lies beyond the scope of this paper. And while this is an “expedient” path, it is not a necessary one (Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 1.168-169 (*Xunzi*, “Quanyue”: “學之經莫速乎好其人, 隆禮次之”)).

⁵³ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 1.129.

But how then does this dual-aspect education allow for the arts to conduce the integration of the synthetic structure of human nature, and respond to Han Feizi, whether in the form of rituals and music (4.1.), or tragic poetry (4.2.)?

4. 1. Rituals

Earlier, we analysed the integrative action for Xunzi into the activity of the heartmind and the dispositions of the five faculties. We may also understand these two aspects as *wisdom* and *habituated desires* (analogous to Aristotle's *phronesis* and *virtues of character*). I wish to suggest that ritual embodies these two aspects as an *imitation* of the actions of the sage kings. It is imperative to note here that by sage kings, we do not need to simply fall to Han Feizi's attack on the relevance of the past to the present, but can understand the sage kings and their rituals in a more nuanced manner: as retrospective attribution of those who established mimetic models which contribute to the ordering of "all under Heaven" (*tianxia* 天下).⁵⁴ We can, in this way, understand the imitation of sage kings to be construed as ritual practice. Notably, Xunzi does not take the rituals to fully encode the *Dao* and repeatedly advocates for the ability to adapt rituals in response to changing circumstances.⁵⁵ Given this, what is encoded by a ritual may be understood as *neither* an irreducibly subjective action, which cannot be imitated given its particularities, *nor* an objective epistemological criterion, which fixates on a corner of the myriad dynamism of the *Dao*; instead, it is an intersubjective negotiation of pragmatic considerations, equilibrating over time to become a stable model of constitutive reasoning itself, in a specific but extensive number of contexts. The diachronic nature of a ritual is not only found in its performance but also its very constitution. That is, rituals themselves sublate the uncodifiability thesis and the epistemological privilege of the virtuous agent. The *Dao* they track cannot therefore be statically defined by them, as it is itself this dynamic process of ritual structuring and restructuring which patterns 'all under Heaven.' What makes a non-virtuous agent's practice of the rituals the same as the action of, say, Yao's 堯, would then be their continuity within this dynamic tradition and its contribution to the ordering of 'all under Heaven.' In this way, we can better understand what Xunzi means when he says that "learning comes to

⁵⁴ Cua, "Ethical Uses of the Past in Early Confucianism" 57-60.

⁵⁵ Hutton, "Ethics in the *Xunzi*," 84-85; cf. *Analects*, 9. 3.

ritual and then stops,” where ritual is “the ultimate point in pursuit of the [*Dao*] and virtue.”⁵⁶ Hutton’s note of the function of rituals as the preservation of social distinctions and the “*display* of certain attitudes and emotions” alongside their cultivation, thus maps neatly onto our concern that rituals are actions of wisdom and habituated desires.⁵⁷

Notably, the rituals, and their display of certain attitudes and emotions, serve not only to pattern a dynamic order of things in the world, but a symbolic order which is, through ritual, in an interplay with the former order. The symbolic acts as an impetus for ethical motivation by creating social continuity: rather than presenting a detached theoretical discussion of right action, it *represents* in the imagination a vision of community. Accordingly, the sage kings with their rituals come to represent the practical success (and its possibility) of ritual cultivation in perpetuating the envisioned community. But where learning seems to unite people in terms of a shared understanding, rituals function by isolating individuals’ desires (for action and habituation), and so if the movement from a mere collection of disparate desires is to become a positive unity, a harmony, of intermeshed desires *and* individuals, music is required.

Music has two functions which lead it to lend itself to such an intrinsic role in ethical cultivation: the first is that “[s]ounds and music enter into people deeply and transform them quickly”; the second is that it “[leads] people in a single, unified way, and is sufficient to bring order to the myriad changes within them.”⁵⁸ The key characteristics which allow music to perform such functions are that it is non-linguistic and immediate. This means that apprehension of music, unlike the plastic or literary arts, does not pass through the understanding in order to stimulate the faculties and their dispositions. In this way, “the progression, complexity, intensity, and rhythm” of the sounds of *ya* 雅 and *song* 頌 (of the *Odes*) are able to “move the goodness in people’s hearts”—that is, to “regulate one’s desires” and “turn [people] toward what is correct.”⁵⁹ It is no surprise then that the *Xunzi* is replete with a vast number of references to the *Odes* (referred to as “the repository of balanced sound”),

⁵⁶ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 1.140-141 (*Xunzi*, “Quanyue”: “故學至乎禮而止矣。夫是之謂道德之極.”).

⁵⁷ Hutton, “Introduction to *Xunzi: The Complete Text*,” xxvii.

⁵⁸ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 20.61-62 (*Xunzi*, “Yuelun”: “夫聲樂之入人也深，其化人也速”); Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 20.26-28 (*Xunzi*, “Yuelun”: “足以率一道，足以治萬變”).

⁵⁹ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 20.11-13 (*Xunzi*, “Yuelun”: “使其曲直繁省廉肉節奏，足以感動人之善心”); *Xunzi*, trans. Hutton, 20.137-142 (*Xunzi*, “Yuelun”: “以道制欲 . . . 樂行而民鄉方矣”).

whereupon Xunzi draws to ostensibly define ethical action and the *Dao*.⁶⁰ Notably, his own preservation of the verse-form, instead of simply providing a quick reference or exegesis of any ode, is consistent with his high view of its musicality, wherein “music is the height of ordering people.”⁶¹

But even with rituals and music, it seems naïve to expect that one’s preexisting understanding may be so easily modified, or, further, that there would be no conflict between my ‘pre-understanding’ and the pattern of understanding encoded by the ritual and music. Would not my pre-understandings, with their pre-existing linguistic and normative distinctions leading to non-conformist actions and their habituation, obstruct the function of the rituals and music? It is this problem of obstructive pre-understandings which Mencius 孟子 (372-289 BCE) attributes to the infamous “village worthy” of *Analects* 17.13, with whom “[i]t is impossible to embark on the way of Yao and Shun 舜.”⁶² Here, in order to undo the fixity of the preexisting linguistic and normative distinctions, Xunzi would turn to a Zhuangist *pre*-aesthetic exercise: the *fasting of the heartmind* (*xinzhai* 心齋).⁶³ That is, although he does not invoke the notion explicitly, Xunzi means for the heartmind to be empty (*xu* 虛), single-minded (*yi* 壹), and still (*jing* 靜). For him, the heartmind requires fasting in order not to be “drawn aside by even a little thing,” which would alter “on the outside one’s correctness” and deviate “on the inside one’s [heartmind],” such that it would be “incapable of discerning the multifarious patterns of things.”⁶⁴ The fasting opens one’s understanding up to be receptive to the pattern of the *Dao* embodied in the rituals and music. In this way, too, one may slowly remove non-conformist pre-understandings and de-habituate certain dispositions. The success of rituals and music may even be said to be conditioned by this.

4. 2. Tragedy

Similar to the proliferation of the *Odes* in the *Xunzi*, a “vast number of the examples of action that Aristotle gives through his study of ethics come from

⁶⁰ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 1.137 (*Xunzi*, “Quanxue”: “詩者，中聲之所止也”).

⁶¹ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 20.143 (*Xunzi*, “Yuelun”: “故樂也者，治人之盛者也”).

⁶² Lau, *The Analects*, 17.13 (*Lunyu* “Yanghuo” 陽貨: “鄉愿”); Lau, *Mencius*, 7B37 (*Mengzi*, “Jinxinxia” 盡心下: “不可與入堯舜之道”).

⁶³ That is, after Zhuangzi 莊子 (370-287 BCE); cf. *Zhuangzi*, 4:1-11 and Slingerland, *Effortless Action*, 225.

⁶⁴ Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text*, 21.269-272 (*Xunzi*, “Jiebi”: “小物引之，則其正外易，其心內傾，則不足以決羣理矣”).

tragedies” (such as Oedipus’ patricide).⁶⁵ But given that the very problem highlighted by Han Feizi has to do with the relevance-gap between virtuous agents and non-virtuous agents, either Aristotle has an even larger gap if he is offering fictional persons as exemplars, or we must understand these examples as presenting something other than the problem of imitating *morally relevant particulars*. That is, we must understand them as presenting *moral universals* and the *process of deliberation* itself, wherewith *phronesis* is also concerned.⁶⁶ I hope to now show that Aristotle’s use of tragic figures isn’t a weakness in his ethics, by suggesting that tragedy fills the above gap as a pedagogical model and contributes to Aristotle’s ethical cultivation programme.

Aristotle describes poetry as “of the sort of things that might happen and possibilities that come from what is likely or necessary” which are *universals*.⁶⁷ Tragedy, the highest form of poetry, “is an imitation of an action of serious [*spoudaias*] stature and complete, having magnitude . . . accomplishing by means of pity and fear the cleansing of these states of feelings.”⁶⁸ Tragedy is of universals insofar as it imitates “the sorts of things that a certain sort of person turns out to say or do as a result of what is likely or necessary.”⁶⁹ As an imitation, importantly, it is one “not of people but of actions and life.”⁷⁰ Tragedy therefore allows us to be confronted with action which is “visible nowhere but in an image,” as an abstraction from its *particulars*, as it were.⁷¹ The imaging of action is important for ethical understanding, as “an action is spread out in time” and our immediate phenomenal access to it is temporally restricted to our position along the action’s course; we can therefore comprehend, in its entirety, an action “nowhere but in the imagination.”⁷²

An image of an action has to “display the same interior depth that an action does”, such that from the mere *things done* [*pragmata πράγματα*] “emerges the image that matters, of the invisible motions of a soul, as choices are made for reasons and consequences are faced.”⁷³ For the image

⁶⁵ Sachs, “Introduction to *Poetics*,” 2.

⁶⁶ *NE*, 1141b15.

⁶⁷ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1451a30-b10.

⁶⁸ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1449b20-30.

⁶⁹ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1451b1-10.

⁷⁰ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1450a10-20.

⁷¹ Sachs, “Introduction to *Poetics*,” 2.

⁷² Sachs, “Introduction to *Poetics*,” 2.

⁷³ Sachs, “Introduction to *Poetics*,” 2.

of *things done* to be elevated to the level of the image of action, the imitation must include, as mentioned earlier, *thought* and *character*. In the latter, people do not “act in order that they might imitate states of character; rather, they include states of character conjointly on the account of actions [*praxis* *πραξις*].”⁷⁴ This inclusion is made apparent through a choice [*prohairesis*] expressed in “speech or action,” manifesting the “deliberate desire for things in [one’s] own power” to the audience.⁷⁵ This is because one’s character affects the manner wherein the object of deliberation is presented. In a tragic choice, further, deliberation is made manifest in the action or speech, such that what is shown to the audience is the fullness of the content of its deliberative process (which we have noted earlier). It is in this sense that Aristotle says “tragedy is an imitation of people better than we are,” by its pure imitation of their action.⁷⁶

There are, at least, two senses wherein the term ‘virtuous agent’ may be understood in Aristotle’s ethics: as (i) the serious person [*spoudaios*] who is an excellent specimen of a human being “surpassing in virtue and justice,” (e.g. Achilles) or on a weaker reading, as (ii) a decent [*epeikes* *ἐπιεικὲς*] or solid [*chrestos* *χρηστός*] person—the tragic protagonist who can “see what action is called for in any circumstances”, having *phronesis* but not to the excellent person’s extent (e.g. Oedipus).⁷⁷ I submit that Aristotle’s use of (ii) is meant as the pedagogical model, whereby one is habituated to the virtues through the poet’s imitation—which is, importantly, an imitation of the universal (not problematic particulars). For tragic figures indeed miss the mark [*hamartia* *ἁμαρτία*], so that their virtuous [*spoudaias*] actions do not secure good fortune, but not on account of not apprehending the universal. Conversely, use of (i) in Aristotle’s study of ethics is not to be understood as a prescription through which one becomes virtuous by way of direct imitation, but as an inexhaustive description of the goal of *eudaimonia* and its virtuous activity. Accordingly, although (i) may assert normative force on the individual as a desired end, it does not itself constitute the means by which one becomes virtuous. Thus, similar to rituals for Xunzi, imitations of integrative action in decent or solid individuals in tragedies, as clear expressions of the relevant details (*sans* particulars), *character* and *thought*, provide pedagogical models for moral cultivation.

⁷⁴ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1450a20-30.

⁷⁵ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1454a10-20; *NE*, 1113a5-10.

⁷⁶ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1454b1-10.

⁷⁷ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1453a1-10; Sachs, “Glossary to *Poetics*,” 72-74.

Further, just as Xunzi understood music to ‘regulate one’s desires’ and ‘turn [people] toward what is correct’, Aristotle understands music in tragedy (and also out of it) to do the same: that “when we listen to [music] our souls are changed,” “getting into the habit of being pained or pleased by likenesses is close to being in the same condition where the real things [of virtue] are concerned,” as “melodies themselves contain representations of the components of character.”⁷⁸ Further, “since music happens to be one of the pleasures, and virtue is a matter of enjoying, loving, and hating in the right way,” it is through music that one may “learn to judge correctly and get into the habit of enjoying decent characters and noble actions.”⁷⁹ That is, “by learning to take pleasure in the performance of music representing virtues, good characters, and noble actions, one trains oneself to enjoy one’s own real-life virtues, good character, and noble actions.”⁸⁰

However, this has not yet bridged the *phronetic* gap between virtuous agents and non-virtuous agents, only the moral virtues. How does this image come to become mine, such that I don’t merely perceive the protagonist’s action but participate in the exercise of it, gaining not only familiarity with the states of character but also the *thought-processes* involved? My involvement in the tragic figure’s moral choice is crucial in making the imitation of the action as a whole *mine*. This is achieved through tragedy’s characteristic emotions: *fear and pity*, and *wonder*.

Aristotle describes fear as “a sort of pain and agitation derived from the imagination of a future destructive or painful evil”, and that “things are fearful that are pitiable when they happen or are going to happen to others.”⁸¹ Further, pity is “a certain pain at an apparently destructive or painful event happening to one who does not deserve it and which a person might expect himself or one of his own to suffer,” and “people pity things happening to others insofar as they fear for themselves.”⁸² That is, fear is a largely future-oriented affect—which does not have to involve a specific person: one is fearful of an event that may, or has yet to, occur. Pity, conversely, is a largely past-oriented affect which is directed at a specific person: one pities another for an event that has occurred, or is occurring, to her. These affects are a combined experience in tragedy, where we both pity and fear for

⁷⁸ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1340a35-40.

⁷⁹ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1340a35-40.

⁸⁰ Hitz, “Aristotle on Law and Moral Education,” 298 (cf. Brüllmann, “Music Builds Character”).

⁸¹ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric* 1382a-b.

⁸² Aristotle, *On Rhetoric*, 1385b-1386a.

Oedipus in his discovery—in the ambiguity between his acting ignorance, which we pity, and the patricide and incest, whose consequences we fear.

The combination of these affects means that our fear “cuts off any wallowing in sentimental pity” and our pity “blocks any relief in indignant moralism” that fearful consequences should happen to the character.⁸³ In us, the combination *transforms* fear and pity and circumscribes their affective force—this transformation is *katharsis* [κάθαρσις]. So *katharsis* does not “clear pity and fear out of our systems”, but “leaves them with us in a strange new combination.”⁸⁴ Further, their combination also means that the barrier between the one experiencing the painful affects and the tragic figure is overcome and one loses oneself in the temporality of the tragedy itself.⁸⁵ We are distraught by, say, Oedipus’ painful discovery because we feel it *as our own*. That is, importantly, the *katharsis* of painful affects leads to the audience’s identification with the tragic figure and their relocation into the movement of the plot. Here, we can also better understand how Aristotle may regard the *decent* person as a pedagogical model over the *excellent* person, in recognizing that the tragic protagonist must not be an excellent person if she is to arouse fear and pity within me, for in this manner she is more relatable.⁸⁶

Vicarious action, in breaking down the spectator-actor barrier, enables a qualitative leap across the gap in acquiring familiarity with universals. Had I not the familiarity before, I cannot become acquainted with it through any continued quantification of actions I perform without the familiarity. Tragedy thus resolves the problem of how I, a non-virtuous agent (in the deflated sense of virtuous agent), might become originally acquainted with the universal in practice: in merging with the tragic figure, her action *becomes mine*. But just as for Xunzi, I may find that the virtuous agent’s thematization of the world may come into conflict with my pre-existing one. Whereas Xunzi is able to make recourse to the fasting of the heartmind for the withdrawal of my pre-understandings, how can Aristotle account for this?

Here, we note tragedy’s possession of an “awe-striking” impact [*ekplexis* ἐκπληξις], which “comes about . . . when things have happened on account of one another in a *paradoxical* way [*emphasis added*],” and “knocks something away from us.”⁸⁷ This impact, an end whereto the art aims,

⁸³ Sachs, “Introduction to *Poetics*,” 13.

⁸⁴ Sachs, “Introduction to *Poetics*,” 13.

⁸⁵ This is how we might “lose track of time” in being absorbed as an audience.

⁸⁶ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1453a1-10.

produces a state of *wonder* [*thaumazein* θαυμάζειν].⁸⁸ This state, which we experience as we behold Oedipus' discovery, is "the sudden loss of the sense that we understand what is going on", having "all our habitual assumptions and opinions" fall away, such that what is happening isn't thematized under the "explanatory structures that normally guided our lives", but we grasp "the things before us just as they are."⁸⁹ My usual thought-processes are thereby suspended so the decent person's can take precedence in my experience of the tragic action. Therefore, through the poetic elements, which merge virtuous agent and non-virtuous agent and suspend thematization, I come to apprehend and become familiar with universals alongside the relevant phronetic processes. With this, it is not only that I come to vicariously enact the constitutive reasoning of the virtuous agent, but that, in doing so, the *prohairesis* involved integrates my synthetic nature through hers.

5. Concluding Remarks on Contemporary Appropriation

Against Han Feizi, then, it would seem that the criticisms that one's deliberative capacities and predispositions face a gap with respect to the virtuous agent fall short in the above approaches considered. For Xunzi, when fasting one's heartmind, one's initial deliberative capacities and predispositions are being systematically set aside from the process of constitutive reasoning, to allow for those of rituals and music to take their place.⁹⁰ Similarly, Aristotle's 'practice model' may thus be understood to minimally subsist in tragic poetry, wherein one is induced into familiarity with the universals and phronetic processes of virtuous action.

Further, we can also now see in greater detail what Miller and Tan suggested at the outset, that the imagination and emotions *do* indeed play critical roles in ethical modelling for virtue acquisition, at least for the aesthetic models we considered. With Xunzi, we see that the imagination is engaged by the symbolically dense rituals in regulating and guiding the non-virtuous agent's actions according to stable social distinctions, thus

⁸⁷ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1460a20-30, 1452a1-10, 1455a15-20.

⁸⁸ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1460b20-30, 1460a10-20.

⁸⁹ Sachs, "Introduction to Poetics," 16; this grasping is perhaps analogous to how first principles are meant to be grasped in the *Posterior Analytics*.

⁹⁰ Since these still involve the non-virtuous agent's own heart-mind and desires, the imitation of sage kings which occurs through the rituals can still be said to maintain the agent's agency in deliberate effort.

situating her within the milieu of the aesthetic model, while the emotions are principally regulated by music to foster identification with the model and motivate action. With Aristotle, the non-virtuous agent's imagination is engaged in the viewing of the spectacle and dialogue, while emotions are not only stimulated by the constitutive elements of tragedy (with music playing a supplementary role) but themselves function to effect the identification of the non-virtuous agent with the aesthetic model.⁹¹ In addition, while the aesthetic models encourage the exercise of these faculties on the part of the non-virtuous agents, such exercise is thought to be structured and constrained by the models; already isolating morally salient factors and tailoring emotional responses and not leaving it up to the non-virtuous agent to exercise them on her own.⁹² In this way, Xunzian and Aristotelian ethical programmes are able to avoid the problem of uncultivated faculties.

There are thus at least two ways in which virtue ethicists may overcome the criticism of simple mimicry, through a *double mimesis* in the arts: (a) non-virtuous agents are to mimic rituals that themselves mimic virtuous agents, or (b) non-virtuous agents are to mimic tragic figures that themselves mimic virtuous agents. The double mimetic structure in both ways is crucial for keeping the non-virtuous agent's personal interests screened off in relation to the aesthetic, pedagogical models. For, in this way, an important set of the emotions that are cultivated by the arts are the impersonal or vicarious kinds, which as P. F. Strawson points out, are constitutive of our moral relations, such that we do not simply respond emotionally to moral circumstances that only involve us, but to morality as such.⁹³

Although non-speculative historical evidence for the success of Xunzi and Aristotle's aesthetico-ethical program is not exactly abundant, recent studies in psychology may be seen to provide some positive support for the aforementioned sample accounts of the morally relevant kind of engagement of the imagination and emotions by aesthetic models for ethical cultivation.⁹⁴ With respect to *rituals*, there are studies such as Zhong and Liljenquist's

⁹¹ There is the question, of course, of whether figures such as Confucius himself in the Confucian tradition function as aesthetic models in the Aristotelian sense, but this belongs to a separate investigation.

⁹² There are here issues of interpretation, *sensus communis*, and the role of art criticism in the non-virtuous agent's contact with the aesthetic models. But these, again, warrant a separate discussion of their own.

⁹³ Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment."

⁹⁴ Miller's appeal to studies in psychology for the success of modelling, as noted at the outset, pertains only to actual models.

2006 study or Kaspar, Krapp, and König's 2015 study showing the regulative effects that the mere act of hand washing has on moral judgments.⁹⁵ Or, as Colin J. Lewis has recently argued, Xunzi's account of rituals for moral development, specifically, would stand to share the empirical support of the cognitive and pedagogical sciences that Lev Vygotsky's account of psychosocial development receives, in those areas where they overlap.⁹⁶ With respect to *tragedy*, there are those such as Johnson's 2012 study and his 2014 study with Huffman and Jasper, showing the pro-social effects of immersion in narrative fiction (e.g. increasing empathy and reducing implicit bias), alongside Kidd and Castano's 2013 study showing that reading literary fiction improved RMET ("Reading the Mind in the Eyes) scores.⁹⁷ With respect to *music*, we find studies such as Ziv, Hoftman, and Geyer's 2011 study on positive-valence background music on evaluating advertisements encouraging immoral behavior and Mesz et al.'s 2015 study on the consistent capacity of music to convey positive or negative moral concepts through its articulation (e.g. pitch structure and harmonic dissonance).⁹⁸ These studies, while admittedly preliminary and incidental to the Xunzian and Aristotelian programme, at least suggest that contemporary appropriation of pedagogical models in those directions by virtue ethicists would be fruitful for an ethical theory in its relative infancy in modernity.

Nonetheless, I would like to conclude by briefly considering why contemporary virtue ethicists should focus more on appropriating the Xunzian programme for their own purposes (although this is not a recommendation for the Aristotelian to be abandoned entirely).

As Miller notes, contemporary responses to the realism challenge must be "realistic and empirically informed . . . for most human beings to improve their moral characters so as to become virtuous."⁹⁹ While both Xunzian and Aristotelian approaches may fulfil this criterion with respect to non-ideal agency, understood as is, I wish to suggest that responses should also be taking into account *non-ideal social realities*.¹⁰⁰ That is, we should take into

⁹⁵ Zhong and Liljenquist, "Washing Away Your Sins"; Kaspar, Krapp, and König, "Hand Washing Induces a Clean Slate Effect in Moral Judgments."

⁹⁶ Lewis, "Ritual Education and Moral Development," 96.

⁹⁷ Johnson, "Transportation into a Story Increases Empathy, Prosocial Behavior, and Perceptual Bias toward Fearful Expressions"; Johnson, Huffman, and Jasper, "Changing Race Boundary Perception by Reading Narrative Fiction"; Kidd and Castano, "Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of Mind."

⁹⁸ Ziv, Hoftman, and Geyer, "Music and Moral Judgment"; Mesz, et al., "The Music of Morality and Logic."

⁹⁹ Miller, "The Real Challenge to Virtue Ethics from Psychology," 24.

¹⁰⁰ Joseph Emmanuel D. Sta. Maria has argued that, irrespective of social realities, the

account not only natural restrictions but socio-structural ones. This may be seen as taking heed of Han Feizi's lesson about attending appropriately to the circumstances which are *both* material and social: we have to attend to the "differences in power and status that can be set up by human beings" and not simply "naturally occurring differences in power and status."¹⁰¹

To be clear, I am only concerned here with how, given non-ideal socio-political circumstances, efforts to theorize virtue ethics should be, at least at the beginning, directed towards that which would best promote virtue acquisition (which would hopefully also be ameliorative) 'for most human beings' under unjust social conditions. With that in mind, it ought to be noted that access to the kind of education required for an appreciation of tragic poetry today is largely restricted to those socio-economic groups who can afford them (of course, the ideal situation for the Aristotelian would be where education is "one and the same for all [citizens]," since "the whole city-state has one single end"),¹⁰² whereas the recitation of the classics is meant to be complementary to the enacting of rituals rather than a condition of them, as it stretches over mundane activities across varying socio-economic groups.

One might appeal to Aristotle's remark in *NE* 10.9 for a similar notion within the Aristotelian tradition, that there are "right laws" which "get from youth up a right training for virtue" and those more mundane ones that "cover the whole of life."¹⁰³ But Aristotle's general understanding of the laws that 'cover the whole of life' is meant to be *restrictive* as opposed to pedagogical, such that people "obey necessity" and "punishments" rather than "argument" and a "sense of what is noble"; conversely, the Confucian understanding of rituals is meant to be pedagogical throughout one's life.¹⁰⁴ Further, it is only the *specific* laws pertaining to the education of the youth that have the status of the 'right laws' for virtue acquisition.¹⁰⁵ However, even if we grant global

Confucian approach (more broadly conceived) is conceptually better suited than the Aristotelian for both a more efficacious acquisition of virtues and for acquiring virtues that are universal in scope (D. Sta. Maria, "*Shu* and *Zhong* as the Virtue of the Golden Rule," 109-110). But I will not be engaging with this here, given that D. Sta. Maria argues for this position through the Qing dynasty (1644-1911 CE) scholar Dai Zhen's 戴震 (1724-1777 CE) conception of 恕 *shu* and 忠 *zhong* and because it does not at all detract from my overall claim in this section, in fact it supports it.

¹⁰¹ Ivanhoe and Van Norden, *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy*, 330 (Han Feizi, "Nanshi" 難勢: "此自然之勢也, 非人之所得設也").

¹⁰² Aristotle, *Politics*, 1337a20-25.

¹⁰³ *NE*, 1179b30-1180a5.

¹⁰⁴ *NE*, 1180a1-5; *Analects* 2.4.

¹⁰⁵ *NE*, 1180a24-29; Aristotle, *Politics* 1337a30-40; Hitz, "Aristotle on Law and Moral Education," 265.

literacy rates to be largely sufficient, or we consider functionally equivalent modern art forms (e.g. opera or film) that are somehow geared towards virtue acquisition and not mere entertainment,¹⁰⁶ there is a further question about access to such virtue-oriented arts (in a sense, one must be able to afford an intermediary to enact what one then spectates).

Given these considerations then, it would be prudent for contemporary virtue ethicists, in trying to address the realism challenge while not necessarily neglecting the Aristotelian approach, to at least begin with the Xunzian one.

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¹⁰⁶ The function of modern art forms as mere entertainment may perhaps be compared to Aristotle's concession of providing "competitions and spectacles for the purposes of relaxation" for the "theatre audiences" who are "boorish and composed of vulgar craftsmen, hired laborers, and other people of that sort" (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1342a15-20). Cf. Adorno and Horkheimer, "The Culture Industry."

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美德與技藝 ——亞里士多德與荀子論藝術在道德修養中的作用

李永勝

中文摘要

克里斯蒂安·米勒(Christian B. Miller)向美德倫理學家提出過一項“實際挑戰”：我們如何能彌合道德的人與不道德的人之間的品格差異？何艾克(Eric L. Hutton)認為韓非子對儒家的主要批判正是圍繞這個議題：韓非子認為儒家美德倫理所設想的以道德之人為道德楷模去引導他人，恰恰是錯誤的指導原則。而韓非子的批判實際上也針對著亞里士多德式美德倫理。關於這個問題，何艾克只是簡略地提出儒家傳統中的“禮”可能可以對應韓非子的批判這一說法，而對此他並未提出更確切的論證。本文將擴展上述思想，更深入地探討“禮”以及荀子對儒家道德修養的學說如何確切對應韓非子的批判。除此之外，本文也將提出這一論點：亞里士多德的悲劇詩詞在他對道德培養的理解中起到與“禮”相同的作用。

首先，我將解析韓非子對美德倫理中的道德修養觀念的批判，並解釋它如何挑戰亞里士多德和荀子的“構成推理”(“constitutive reasoning”)概念。之後，我將簡略地指出，這個問題涉及亞里士多德和荀子對道德行為和能動性的理解的基礎，即人性結構概念(靈魂的理性/非理性部分和心/五官)。最後，我將探討藝術在荀子與亞里士多德道德修養中起到的作用。韓非子對美德倫理道德的評判，源於對荀子與亞里士多德道德修養的理解過於狹隘。我希望由此引導近代美德倫理學家多利用美學來促進道德發展。

關鍵詞：亞里士多德，荀子，德性倫理學，美學，道德修養

Originality from Cultural Boundary: Assimilation and Reconstruction of Music Education in Korea

PARK So Jeong

Abstract

Since Confucian ritual music was reconstructed and rejuvenated in the reign of King Sejong of Joseon 世宗 (r. 1418-1450), Koreans have continued a long-standing tradition of Confucian musical education. King Sejong's enterprising work, however, was not a mere restoration of the original Confucian ritual music, but a gallant reinterpretation of traditional Confucian values. I argue that the veritably successful reconstruction was a result of Korean self-awareness of its culture own marginalized status in the Chinese cultural sphere. The substantial divide in language and culture between China and Korea propelled Joseon Korea away from an uncritical assimilation of mainstream Chinese Confucian culture. These factors also drove King Sejong to develop a new notation system for tunes indigenous to Korea, which was previously deemed as vulgar, and subsequently bringing the newly composed ritual music to the court. Incidentally, the awareness of Korean musical culture turned out to be an ideal way to embody the essence of Confucian music education - the cultivation of musical sensibility and the enjoyment of such music with the people, which had been long-forgotten in the acknowledged history.

The ambivalent nature of Joseon court music is closely related to the development of Neo-Confucian scholarship from Goryeo (918-1392) to Joseon (1392-1987) Korea. With the emergence of the new Joseon dynasty, the continued assimilation and internalization of Confucian values developed into the most influential moral foundation of the new kingdom, from the ruling class down to the common people. A similar originality of cultural boundaries occurred again during the westernization period of early modern Korea, and continued until current contemporary music education in Korea. I will develop the idea of originality from cultural boundary to explore how the reconstructed ideals of Confucian ritual music work in contemporary music education, especially *Gugak*, i.e. Korean traditional music.

Keywords: Music education, King Sejong, Joseon, Korea, Confucian philosophy, Ritual music

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1. Introduction

Korean ritual music can be seen as an actualization of the Confucian musical ideal. Founded on the support of the Neo-Confucian intellectuals in 1392, the Joseon dynasty had sought a Confucian state in various ways.¹ The reconstruction of Confucian ritual music was one of the most salient projects to which the Joseon intellectual energies were devoted. It was believed that music could promote individual moral cultivation and social harmony in light of the unique Confucian belief that music is indispensable for moral education. This Confucian idea resulted in great musical success and those musical works from survived until today.

At a glance, one might have a wrong impression that Korean ritual music was merely a kind of Confucian music. However, if one takes a closer look at the course of its formation and development, one will recognize that the Korean ritual music project was never an admiring satellite of Confucian musical archetype, but rather a venturesome enterprise in which the Chinese styles of music were reconstructed in accordance with the Korean style. This dynamic stream mainly comes from the cultural differences between Chinese and Korean music. For the former, the successive dynasties established in China had been able to identify and preserve the musical styles handed down as the Confucian *yayue* 雅樂 (elegant music).² This music was viewed as the best format to realize Confucian musical ideal even though this music could not help but change over time. For the latter, however, the more Joseon Koreans tried to study the genealogy of Confucian ritual music, the more they sensed the gap between the Korean indigenous tunes and the would-be Confucian musical ideal. Therefore, driven to the edge of the Confucian culture sphere, early Joseon Korea had no

¹ Joseon 朝鮮 was a Korean kingdom which lasted for about five centuries: July 1392 to October 1897. In this paper, the transcriptions of Korean terms are based on Revised Romanization of Korean (hereafter RRK). If necessary, Romanization on McCune-Reischauer system (hereafter MCR) will be provided. For example, Joseon appears as *Chosŏn* in MCR. In some cases, I leave the original transliterations in the quotations intact and provide RRK. Some irregular Romanization of the authors' names is also left untouched. For instance, Seo Inhwa and So In Hwa are the same person but I followed the Romanization shown in respective publication.

² When Chinese characters are used in the Chinese context, I transcribe them with *hanyu pinyin* system and provide the marks of four tones. It is necessary to make distinction between Korean and Chinese pronunciation. Some key terms of Korean ritual music share with the same Chinese characters with their Chinese origins but the scope and implication of the terms became different. For example, *aak* shares the same characters “雅樂” with *yayue* but the implications of the terms are different as we will see.

choice but to assimilate the advanced culture of China and also reconstruct it in a self-actualizing way at the same time.

Contemporary Korean music education inherited the outcome of Joseon Korean reconstruction project. As is well known, the Confucian shrine ritual music (*munmyo jeryeak*, 文廟祭禮樂) is performed for the spirits of Confucius, his disciples, Neo-Confucian scholars and the eighteen Korean Confucian scholars at *munmyo* 文廟 (Confucian shrine in Korea) every year in spring and autumn. The royal ancestral shrine ritual music (*jongmyo jeryeak*, 宗廟祭禮樂) is also performed for the spirits of the kings and queens of the Joseon dynasty at *jongmyo* 宗廟 (Joseon Korean royal shrine) in Seoul every year on the first Sunday of May. Although those ritual music performances have now become a kind of public events for tourists, the musicians and dancers still perform the music and dance which were composed and arranged at the time of the reconstruction period over 600 years ago.

What is more important is the fact that the framework of Korean music was conceived through this reconstruction and it is still taught and even enhanced in contemporary music educational setting. For example, *jeongganbo* 井間譜 (square score) is the notation system invented to record Korean indigenous tunes in the Joseon period.³ Having been deemed as the more effective means to record Korean traditional music than the staff notation, the number of the user of *jeongganbo* is now growing and its significance is increasing. While it was only used by a small number of the educated people in Joseon dynasty, it is now widely used in elementary and secondary school for music education.⁴ Moreover, the necessity of replacing the staff notation with *jeongganbo* for the Korean musical pieces in the textbook has been emphasized,⁵ along with constant efforts to digitalize its input system.⁶

Ironically, the sincere endeavors towards a Confucian ideal music resulted in a paradigm shift from the adoption of Chinese tunes to the

³ *Jeongganbo* is Korean musical notation system created in the reign of King Sejong (1418-1450) to record time value, pitch, and key. In the early *jeongganbo*, it is said that each block (*jeonggan* 井間) represents a unit of time and pitch; that other information is written in the block; and that a group of blocks constitute bigger musical phrases. There are contending opinions on the interpretation of time values of music pieces recorded in old *jeongganbo*. As for the various interpretations, Hwang, "Critical Assessment: The Rhythmic Interpretation of *Jeongganbo*," 77.

⁴ As for the use of *jeongganbo* in Joseon dynasty, Kwon, "History of Korean Notation," 3. As for its wide use in the music education of contemporary Korea, Kwak, "Hanguk jeontong eumak gyoyuk-ui cheolhakjeok todae-wa gyogwa gwajeong jeokhapseong bunseok."

⁵ Byun, "Eumak gyogwaseo-e surokdoen gugak jeaegok-ui chegye-e daehan nonui," 83-85.

⁶ Park and Hur, "Jeongganbo imnyeok siseutem seolgye mit guhyeon," 435-440; Lee, Choi, Park, and Kang, "Gugak jeongganbo-ui oseonbo byeonhwan-e daehan yeongu," 248-251.

reconstruction of Confucian ideal based on Korean indigenous tunes. Joseon Korea, conscious of the characteristics of Korean music and language which do not fit the Chinese mold, was able to come up with ingenious ritual music equipped with new hermeneutical stance, which is theoretically based on Confucian philosophy, while practically rooted in Korean indigenous tunes. Without these awareness and practice, Korean traditional music would not have been transmitted as the musical pieces up till today, and more crucially the category of “Korean music” would not have been viable.

Although various musical sources coexist and compete in the musical landscape of Korea today, it is the musical genre of *gugak* 國樂 (Korean music) that gives Koreans their musical identity and holds an important role in music education. Although *gugak* is often rendered into merely “Korean traditional music,” modernized *gugak* also flourishes on contemporary sites.⁷ The connection between traditional *gugak* and modern *gugak* is the acknowledged and sustained musical identity that resulted from the reconstruction project of the Joseon Dynasty. In light of this, I will concentrate on how the Korean musical identity was formed in the process of the reconstruction of Confucian music and then briefly discuss how this is related to modern Korean music education.

2. Ritual Music as Confucian Ideal Education

For Confucians in traditional societies, music education had never been a neutral activity nor mere public entertainment, but a necessary and fundamental process for moral cultivation.⁸ “*Liyue*” 禮樂, which means “ritual and music” or “ritual music” as Confucius promoted and envisaged, could not have merely meant the establishment of social regulations and court music performances; it included the individual discipline of moral and musical sensibility. Subsequently, Mencius (372-289 BCE) was more concerned with the actualization of moral potential by deepening musical sensibility, while Xunzi (c. 310-c. 238 BCE) elaborated on the theory of ritual and music to facilitate the establishment of proper ritual music in the ideal Confucian state. From the period of Han Confucianism, however, state-led musical practice has emphasized two possible directions of musical cultivation: individual morality and state ethics. A long tradition of the letter-bound commentary works in Han

⁷ H. Song, “Hyeondae gugak, geu wonhyeongseong-gwa byeonhwa saengseong,” 25-26.

⁸ S. Park, “Music as a Necessary Means of Moral Education,” 125-126.

scholarship was unquestionably helpful in the preservation of intact Confucian classical texts, but was nevertheless powerless in presenting substantial solutions to certain contending issues in Confucian philosophy of music, such as conflicts between musical innovation and succession of classical music or aesthetics and ethics-oriented development of music.⁹

Among the ritual and music that Confucian scholars sought to preserve, ritual might have been successful in maintaining its original form, but music could have had less success because of its fluid nature. There was an initial gap between the music legitimated by Confucian intellectuals and the music widely favored by the common people, and this gap grew from generation to generation. As a result, Confucian philosophy of music was merely ideologized without its material body. It formed a vicious cycle in which successive rulers repeatedly collected and reorganized so called *yayue* 雅樂, hoping to build an ideal state on the basis of it. However, because no one fully understood or really enjoyed it, there was no influence on their people at all,¹⁰ and the cycle continued. In the end, the reconstructed court musical performance could not survive in any Chinese courts.

In reality, Confucian endorsement of ritual music contains complex narrative incorporating a lot of room for interpretation. In early Confucian discourse on music, various views were proposed and they contested with different nuances. Country to certain myths concerning the later Confucians, even Xunzi himself was not completely strict towards musical innovation. Moreover, Mencius pronounced “whether it is the music of today or the music of antiquity makes no difference,”¹¹ and developed a platform for both musical currency and classicality. From Mencius’ point of view, musical innovation was a matter of course. The question was whether the newly created music could penetrate and profoundly move the people.¹² Unfortunately, Mencius’ thread was not woven into the cloth of Confucian ritual music.

It seems paradoxical that Neo-Confucian scholars adored Mencius as an orthodox of Confucianism while entirely missing his point on music. Although Mencius showed such an insightful observation on musical innovation, Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), a leading figure of Neo-Confucianism, concluded that the way Mencius talked was rather “crude (*cu* 粗)” upon reading the very passage

⁹ Park, *Liudong de yinyue siwei*, 5-18.

¹⁰ Yang, *Zhongguo gudai yinyue shigao*, vol.1, 126.

¹¹ Mencius 1B1: “今之樂，由古之樂也。” Note that some editions have written this passage as follows: “今之樂，猶古之樂也。”

¹² Mencius 7A14: “仁聲之入人也深。”

of Mencius 1B1.¹³ Zhuxi wanted to dismiss this significant observation of Mencius as an ad hoc remark made in urgent circumstances to persuade his opponents.¹⁴ Most probably, the deeply rooted hierarchical understanding of *guyue* 古樂 (classical music) versus *xinyue* 新樂 (new music) and *yayue* 雅樂 (elegant music) versus *su Yue* 俗樂 (vulgar music)¹⁵ resulted in a hindrance for the later Confucians to perceive the context of Mencius as is. The early Joseon intellectuals also faced the same problem since the constituents of the Joseon Dynasty had chosen Neo-Confucianism as their cultural identity. At first, they simply accepted Zhuxi's interpretations, but as time went on their views and considerations on the matter became increasingly complex.

At the beginning, Korean Neo-Confucian scholars faithfully followed the Neo-Confucian doctrine as state ideology throughout various aspects such as ritual, laws, and music. After tremendous effort in documental and instrumental investigations, the scholars were confident that they could restore the would-be authentic ancient music, *Aak* 雅樂,¹⁶ and the most orthodox scholars in the Joseon court began to insist that indigenous tunes should be expelled from the court or at least its use be restricted otherwise.¹⁷ Some of them even thought that the name of *hyangak* 鄉樂, which means "indigenous music," itself should be altered because it sounded vulgar.¹⁸

King Sejong (r. 1418-1450), the fourth king of Joseon, had different views. He contemplated the ambivalent nature of reconciling an advanced but foreign culture, with the development of a proper national culture, and decided to pursue both. On the one hand, it would be an unrealistic idea to replace all the indigenous musical performances (*hyangak* 鄉樂) handed down from Goryeo dynasty with the newly established court music (*aak* 雅樂) which are based on Chinese tunes. On the other hand, if the Joseon royal family and the literati decided to expel all the indigenous tunes from the Joseon court and tried

¹³ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 19: 431-432: "孟子說得便粗, 如云: 今樂猶古樂"; *Zhuzi yulei*, 43: 1106: "孟子說得便粗, 如今之樂猶古之樂."

¹⁴ Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 51: 1225: "孟子開道時君, 故曰: 今之樂猶古之樂"; *Zhuzi yulei*, 60: 1456: "如孟子答, 今之樂猶古之樂, 這裏且要得他與百姓同樂是緊急."

¹⁵ S. Park, "Music as a Necessary Means of Moral Education," Table 1.

¹⁶ *Aak* indicates Sino-Korean court music, which was originally imported from Song China in 1116 and yet arranged into more refined musical performances in Joseon period. As for the scope and role of *aak* in Joseon court musical setting, S. Park, "Music as a Necessary Means of Moral Education," 130-132 and Table 2.

¹⁷ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 21st day of the 12th lunar month, 9th year of King Sejong's reign (1427); 4th day of the 1st lunar month, 10th year of King Sejong's reign (1428); and 28th day of the 7th lunar month, 12th year of King Sejong's reign (1430).

¹⁸ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 19th day of the 2nd lunar month, 12th year of King Sejong's reign (1430): "樂名世稱鄉樂, 亦甚鄙俚, 願殿下改之."

to assimilate themselves to the Chinese tunes, then it would be detrimental to loss the emotional bonds between the court and their people. As a result, instead of uncritically following Chinese music, King Sejong tried to accommodate Korean indigenous tunes to the advanced format of court music. To do so, he developed a new notation system suitable for Korean indigenous tunes, collected folk songs, rewrote the lyrics to be worthy of court music, and brought the newly composed ritual music to the court.

Awareness of its own musical culture turned out to be the best way to embody the long-forgotten ideal of Confucian music education, that is to say, Mencius' tradition. Mencius' passages, which stress on the cultivation of musical susceptibility and the enjoyment with all the people rather than ideological succession of classical music, became to promote a liberal attitude towards "indigenous music" or "new music" and to encourage people to cultivate morality on the basis of motivated pleasure instead of imposing desirable behaviors on the people. I believe that it may not be coincidental that King Sejong named one of newly composed musical pieces "Enjoyment with the People" (*yeomillak* 與民樂), in the sense that it was the epitome of Mencius' musical ideal and yet had long been forgotten in the legitimate history of Confucian musical discourse.

3. Reconstruction of Ritual Music in Joseon Korea

Although the reconstruction of Korean ritual music was inspired by King Sejong, its full realization required subsequent efforts for many generations, from King Sejo 世祖 (r. 1455-1468, the 7th king) to King Jeongjo 正祖 (r. 1776-1800, the 22nd king) through King Seongjong 成宗 (r. 1469-1494, the 9th king) among many others. King Sejo, in particular, improved the previously created new score, *jeongganbo*, to be more serviceable and introduced new musical pieces composed by his father King Sejong, "Botaepyeong" 保太平 (Maintaining the Great Peace) and "Jeongdaeeop" 定大業 (Founding a Great Dynasty), to the royal ancestral shrine. During the reign of King Seongjong, the publication of the comprehensive treatise of Korean music, *Akhak gwebeom* 樂學軌範 (Treatise of Music), was completed and more scores such as *hapjabo* 合字譜 (music tablature) were created for Korean string instrumental music. Faced with the popularization of folk music in the second half of the Joseon dynasty, King Jeongjo tried to resurrect Confucian ideal music in the court.

Although there were some ups and downs, the reconstruction project of Korean ritual music continued throughout the Joseon dynasty and the reconstructed ritual music became part of the cultural strength supporting Joseon for half a millennium. Korean ritual music was unique in the following ways. Firstly, the indigenous tunes were recognized as a significant source of music and were gradually introduced to the court music. Secondly, the simultaneous pursuit of native and imported music made Korean ritual music sustainable without falling into mannerism or ending in a costly but useless enterprise, as we can see from the fact that the native music survived in Royal Ancestral Shrine and the imported music in Confucian Shrine until today. Thirdly, contrary to the popular image of Korean Confucianism as a blind adherent of Neo-Confucian doctrine, *inter alia*, *jujahak* 朱子學, the groundbreaking interpretation of Confucian philosophy of music was made and new musical pieces, such as “Yeomillak” 與民樂, created on the basis of the new interpretation. Lastly, with the invention of *jeongganbo*, Korean music gradually gained a sustainable system of musical learning. This systemization ultimately led to a greater awareness of what Korean music is. Perhaps this is the very reason why the reconstructed ritual music and its formulation are still seen in contemporary music education of Korea. Let us discuss these points in detail.

4. Recognition of Indigenous Tune, *Hyangak* 鄉樂

To avoid confusion, I would like to briefly explain some terminology first. In early Joseon Korea, there were three genres of court music: *aak* 雅樂, *dangak* 唐樂, and *hyangak* 鄉樂. *Aak* is Korean pronunciation of “*yayue*” 雅樂, first appearing in the *Lunyu*.¹⁹ Unlike *yayue*, which was extended to denote Confucian ideal music or Asian traditional music in general, *aak* was a relative concept to *hyangak* in the Joseon court.²⁰ *Aak* only meant Sino-Korean court music, the restoration of ancient Chinese music based on “*daeseong aak*” from Song dynasty.²¹ Therefore, *aak* in Joseon Korea was basically the preservation

¹⁹ *Lunyu* 17.18.

²⁰ Provine, “The Korean Courtyard Ensemble for Ritual Music (*Aak*),” 91. “*Aak*, unlike Chinese *yayue* and Japanese *gagaku* (both written with the same Chinese characters), is not a collective term for a number of court music genres, though some Koreans have loosely used the word in that sense in the present century. Rather, the term *aak* identifies a specific genre of Korean ritual music which is now performed only in the context of only in the Sacrifice to Confucius, though in earlier centuries it was also played in a further five state sacrificial rites.”

²¹ S. Park, “Music as a Necessary Means of Moral Education,” 131.

of Chinese court music that was “early Chinese ritual melodies which have since been lost in China itself.”²² *Dangak*, also known as Sino-Korean music, was introduced before the 8th century,²³ but was assimilated into Korean people for a long time and performed in a Koreanized style for the purpose of entertainment.²⁴ *Hyangak*, on the other hand, meant indigenous tunes which were relatively less refined music which most Joseon Korean peoples regarded as easy to perceive and most enjoyable.²⁵

The status of *hyangak* was in a period of changes. At the start of the reconstruction, the main priority was not how to introduce *hyangak* to the court but how to restore an authentic *hak*.²⁶ The orthodoxy group of scholars was not happy with the presence of *hyangak* in the court despite the fact that it was not possible to remove all the elements of *hyangak* from court music. Nevertheless, indebted to Sejong’s unparalleled insight and painstaking defense, the importance of *hyangak* was patiently and yet gradually recognized by more people.²⁷ Eventually, *hyangak* became the dominant musical style at the second half of the Joseon dynasty.²⁸

When King Taejong, the father of King Sejong, commanded to discard all kinds of performances of *hyangak* and unify court music with Chinese music, namely, *aak* and *dangak*,²⁹ he was probably not thinking about the

²² Provine, “The Treatise on Ceremonial Music (1430) in the Annals of the Korean King Sejong.”

1. Nevertheless, there are occasions when some scholars today use *aak* in a broader sense.

²³ So, “Court Music,” 14. *Dangak* literally means “music of the Tang 唐 dynasty,” but it has become a broader term also including Chinese music imported after the Tang dynasty.

²⁴ Because of its long term assimilation, *dangak* was regarded as secularized music although it still retained some Chinese style, and therefore it was placed in the Ubang (右坊 Right Office) of Jangagwon 掌樂院 together with *hyangak*, while *aak* was in charge of the Jwabang (左坊 Left Office), being highly respected.

²⁵ *Hyangak* was also subjected to conceptual stretch. While its literal meaning was “indigenous music,” the category of *hyangak* often included non-Chinese origin music, for instance, Silk Road music.

²⁶ The appearance frequency of *aak* in *Joseon wangjo sillok* is 305 times, far higher than *hyangak* (50 times) and *dangak* (43 times), and widely distributed to the reign of nearly all the kings.

²⁷ We will observe some examples but it may deserve to mention the following statistic. Although the overall frequency of the related records to music and musical terms is very high in the reign of King Sejong, the discussion on *hyangak* exclusively converges into the *Annals of King Sejong*, where *hyangak* appears 42 out of 50 times in the whole *Joseon wangjo sillok* (84%). *Aak*, which has 176 out of 305 (57.7%) and *dangak*, 25 out of 43 (58%). This statistic is grounded on <http://sillok.history.go.kr/main/main.jsp>.

²⁸ So “Court Music,” 15: “The second half of the Joseon dynasty saw a remarkable popularization of *hyangak* and a gradual decline of *dangak*. Among *hyangak* of that period, several pieces clearly show interrelationships between court music and music of the literati.”

²⁹ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 7th day of the 4th lunar month, 9th year of King Taejong’s reign (1409): “豈禮樂之謂乎! 雅樂乃唐樂。參酌改正, 用之宗廟, 用之朝會燕享可矣。豈可隨事而異其樂乎?” 黃

practical difficulties or the self-awareness of indigenous culture, but Ming dynasty's approval of newly established Joseon dynasty as a legitimate regime. Upon his immediate ascension to the throne, King Sejong ordered the removal of the use of *hyangak* at a diplomatic ritual with the Ming dynasty³⁰ and issued a command to change the existing vulgar lyrics of *hyangak*.³¹ This change in his recognition of *hyangak* seemed to be in accordance with his deepening understanding of music: He began to wonder why Koreans had to abruptly play unfamiliar Chinese tunes at the ancestral shrine ritual, instead of entertaining their ancestors with native music which was familiar to them in their lifetime.³² Unfortunately, this reasonable apprehension was not properly addressed during his lifetime. Whenever the opportunity arose, aristocrats sent him letters to request restriction of the use of *hyangak*, and was adamant against the idea of using *hyangak* at ancestral sacrifices.³³

When confronted with such resistance, Sejong tried to argue the following points. Firstly, *aak* was not originally Korean, but was in fact Chinese music. Secondly, for that reason it would be out of place to replace *hyangak* with *aak* for deceased audiences whom had listened to *hyangak* during their entire life, even though you could play the *aak* for a deceased Chinese person. Furthermore, given the fact that *aak* had been reconstructed in various dynasties of China which were different from each other, there could be no definite standard of *aak*. Lastly, even if Koreans attempted to unify all kinds of the court music performances with *aak*, it was not possible to get the exact pitch because there was no way to meet the standard requirement for instrumental materials due to the climate differences between China and Korea.³⁴ Although some people agreed with King Sejong's claim

喜對曰：“用鄉樂久，未能改耳。”上曰：“如知其非，狃於久而不改可乎？”左代言李榘啓曰：“臣奉使上國，觀奉天門常置雅樂。”上曰：“上國之法，宜遵用之。”

³⁰ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 19th day of the 8th lunar month, 1st year of King Sejong's reign (1419): “奏樂除鄉樂，專用《觀天庭》，《受明命》，《賀皇恩》。”

³¹ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 19th day of the 1st lunar month, 2nd year of King Sejong's reign (1420): 上曰：“宴享時，常用鄉樂，甚爲鄙俚。其令卞季良，趙庸，鄭以吾等以獻壽之意，警戒之辭，各製歌詞三首。”

³² *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 15th day of the 10th lunar month, 7th year of King Sejong's reign (1425): “且我國本習鄉樂，宗廟之祭，先奏唐樂，至於三獻之時，乃奏鄉樂。以祖考平日之所聞者用之何如？其與孟思誠議焉。”

³³ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 21st day of the 12th lunar month, 9th year of King Sejong's reign (1427): “請鄉樂毋用於宗廟，只用於文昭，廣孝殿終獻。”從之；*Joseon wangjo sillok*, 4th day of the 1st lunar month, 10th year of King Sejong's reign (1428): 禮曹啓：“曾令宗廟祭，勿奏鄉樂，請於園壇，社稷，風雲雷雨，雩祀，先農，先蠶，釋奠等祭，亦勿用鄉樂。”從之；*Joseon wangjo sillok*, 28th day of the 7th lunar month, 12th year of King Sejong's reign (1430): 上謂代言等曰：“奉常少尹朴堧建議，請用雅樂，勿用鄉樂，予嘉其言，命令修正，堧專心致志，今適遭疾，將繼堧者誰歟？... 左副代言金宗瑞啓曰：... 我朝禮樂，倖擬中華。”

³⁴ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 11th day of the 9th lunar month, 12th year of King Sejong (1430):

that we should not abandon *hyangak* for the sake of Chinese music,³⁵ the musical pieces in the strains of *hyangak* was never performed in the royal ancestral shrine until King Sejo (r. 1455-1468) seized the throne.

5. Ritual Music of Royal Ancestral Shrine, *Jongmyo* 宗廟, and Confucian Shrine, *Munmyo* 文廟

Ever since King Sejo replaced the ritual music of the royal ancestral shrine previously in the strains of *aak* with the newly arranged music in the strains of *hyangak* in 1464,³⁶ the spirits of Joseon royal family could finally enjoy their own ritual music in peace. The enduring musical pieces, represented by “Jeongdaeeop” 定大業 (Founding a Great Dynasty) and “Botaepyeong” 保太平 (Maintaining the Great Peace), were originally composed by Sejong in 1447 and employed in formal meetings at the court.³⁷ These musical pieces were called “new music” (*sinak* 新樂)³⁸ because they were totally new compositions and recorded in the brand-new notation system, unlike *Aak*, which might also be new in a sense but was meticulously restored on the basis of the ancient documents and instruments and thus called “old music” or “classical music” (*goak* 古樂).

Although “new music” was conceptually at odd to “old music” and was often discriminated by scholars who fancied themselves as orthodox Confucians, “new music” was not entirely condemned because of its “newness” and likewise “old music” was not always defended because its “oldness.” Considering the usages of the extremely stretched term *yayue* 雅樂 and the hallowed term “*guyue*” 古樂 in traditional scholarships of China,³⁹ those of *aak* 雅樂 and “*goak*” 古樂 in Korean context were not overloaded

“上謂左右曰：雅樂，本非我國之聲，實中國之音也。中國之人平日聞之熟矣，奏之祭祀宜矣，我國之人，則生而聞鄉樂，歿而奏雅樂，何如？況雅樂，中國歷代所製不同，而黃鍾之聲，且有高下。是知雅樂之制，中國亦未定也，故予欲於朝會及賀禮，皆奏雅樂，而恐未得製作之中也。以黃鍾之管而候氣，亦未易為也。”

³⁵ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 2nd day of the 8th lunar month, 13th year of King Sejong's reign (1431): 上謂孟思誠曰：“人言會禮不可用女樂，若罷女樂，而男樂足觀則可矣，若不合音律，則奈何？且文武舞者之服，恐不似中原，其於旁觀何？欲用中朝之樂，而盡棄鄉樂，斷不可也。”思誠對曰：“上教誠然，何可盡棄鄉樂乎？先奏雅樂，而兼用鄉樂可”

³⁶ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 14th day of the 1st lunar month, 10th year of King Sejo's reign (1464): “上親祀宗廟，奏新制定大業，保太平之樂。”

³⁷ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 4th day of the 6th lunar month, 29th year of King Sejong's reign (1447).

³⁸ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 24th day of the 10th lunar month, 1st year of King Danjong's reign (1452): “且定大業，保太平新樂，則工師一二人外，無傳習者，請期年後，以單聲習樂，試才授職。”

³⁹ S. Park, “Music as a Necessary Means of Moral Education,” 127-130.

but quite flexible. For example, *goak* could be used for indicating “the old indigenous tunes” (*bonguk goak* 本國古樂), embedded in the cultural base of Korean music.⁴⁰ That is to say, there was no deeply-rooted conceptual barrier between “new music” and “old music” and this conceptual flexibility seemed to be helpful for Joseon ritual music in preserving the most ancient Chinese ritual music and at the same time pursuing new compositions of Korean ritual music based on Koreans’ own culture and language.

In short, Confucian shrine ritual music (*munmyo jeryeak* 文廟祭禮樂) belongs to *aak* and was called “old music,” whereas the royal ancestral shrine ritual music (*jongmyo jeryeak* 宗廟祭禮樂) belongs to *hyangak* and was called “new music.” However, the “old music” was not completely old and also the “new music” not purely new. The new musical pieces created for use in court ceremonies were composed on the basis of *hyangak* and *gochwiaek* 鼓吹樂 (drumming and blowing music) under the reign of King Sejong.⁴¹ This *gochwiaek* was processional music diverged from the strains of *dangak*, which means that the newly composed musical pieces, such as “Botaepyeong” 保太平, “Jeongdaeeop” 定大業 and particularly “Yeomillak” 與民樂, initially included some musical elements of Chinese tunes. Those music pieces have gone through changes with the times, and been transformed to be more suitable to Koreans’ taste for music.

“Botaepyeong” and “Jeongdaeeop” are two main suites of eleven pieces of the current royal ancestral shrine ritual music. As one could guess from the titles, which mean “praising civil achievements of the kings” and “extolling their military exploits” respectively,⁴² they faithfully embodied the primary format of Confucian ritual music, comprising of civil (*wenwu* 文舞) and military dances (*wuwu* 武舞). However, it should not be misunderstood that Korean ritual music is a kind of combination of Korean content and Chinese format. What Joseon Korea really appreciated was by no means a specific format reconstructed in a specific dynasty of China, but rather the Confucian proposal of balancing both aspects of civil and military concerns, which are needed for the establishment and management of a new dynasty, and of sharing the valuable lessons from the state construction process with the people by expressing them into musical performance.

Grounded on the idea that Korean ancestors would enjoy Korean tunes, Joseon Koreans made a fundamental innovation in their ritual music. The

⁴⁰ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 23rd day of the 6th lunar month, 18th year of King Sejong’s reign (1436): “《唯子》, 《啄木》, 《憂息》, 乃是本國古樂.”

⁴¹ So, “Court Music,” 15.

⁴² So, “Court Music,” 16.

cultural differences could have been an obstacle in realizing Confucian orthodoxy tradition, but their recognition of their cultural identity lead them down the path that allowed the two different musical traditions to coexist. For their own ancestors, Joseon Korea introduced Korean musical traits to sacrificial rituals by offering up their favorite songs, and for the sacrifices to Confucius and his disciples, they tried to restore and offer up the favorite songs of Confucius. Confucian shrine ritual music, *munmyo jeryeak*, is the sole survivor among a good number of the *aak* reconstructed at the time. It still sounds unfamiliar to Korean's ears, even though it has been played for almost a millennium in the Korean peninsula.⁴³ Since it is the restoration of an ancient Chinese musical piece and its original form was relatively unchanged, it does not fit the sentiment of the Korean people. Undeniably, Confucian shrine music too underwent some changes with the times. For example, it was originally a very slow music, but the tempo of performance had gotten even slower over time.⁴⁴ A main factor of these changes seems to be the idea that Confucian ritual music should be elegant and slow, which does not reflect the emotional needs of Korean people.

6. New Music Based on New Interpretation: "Enjoyment with the People" (*Yeomillak*)

"Yeomillak" has indeed lived an interesting life. Not all newly composed ritual music survived for very long. Although most have been transmitted to the present, indebted to the notation system, *jeongganbo*, many of the newly composed music are not actually played live. "Yeomillak," however, is established and still being performed. It should be noted that its successful life was not caused by ideological tenacity, but by modifications and variations according to the emotional needs of the times. "Yeomillak" was composed on the basis of *dangak* with some *hyangak* components for the banquets and the processions in the court. From the beginning, it was played in two versions, "'Yeomillak' in slow tempo" (*yeomillak man* 與民樂慢) and "'Yeomillak' in fast tempo" (*yeomillak ryeong* 與民樂令), and these kinds of variations were extended and deepened.⁴⁵ Afterwards, a new arrangement

⁴³ It can be said that *munmyo jeryeak* survived 900 years if counting from the introduction of *daeseong aak* 大晟雅樂 in 1116 to today. It is still in the repertory of National Gugak Centre in Korea.

⁴⁴ Oh, "Munmyo jeryeak-ui hanbae byeonhwa-wa geu baegyong-e daehan gochal," 108-109.

⁴⁵ Moon, "Sejong sillok akbo" *yeomillak eumak hyeongsik-gwa geu byeoncheon-e daehan gochal*."

of “Yeomillak” based on *hyangak* (*yeomillak hyang* 與民樂鄉) was played with indigenous instruments (*hyang akgi* 鄉樂器) in the court and it was associated with the variations that had been played outside the court.⁴⁶ That is to say, “Yeomillak” was at the heart of the intersection between realms of court music and folk music.

The fact that “Yeomillak” was enjoyed among the people beyond the confines of court music seems to fulfill the expectations from its title, “enjoyment with the people.” Undoubtedly, this title exhibited Mencius’ musical ideal, *yeomin tongle* 與民同樂,⁴⁷ or at least explains that, unlike the Neo-Confucian scholars in China, the christener of this piece of music understood the very passage in *Mengzi* as a musical ideal. Most likely, Joseon Koreans appreciated not only this passage but also other related passages to music in *Mengzi*. Although they did not straightforwardly criticize the Neo-Confucian commentaries on *Mengzi*, which neglected the significance of Mencius’ musical passages, Joseon Koreans made considerable references to Mencius’ passages as important grounds in the course of musical discussion.⁴⁸ For example, the phrase, “Music of the shared enjoyment between the ruler and ministers” (*junchen xiangyue zhi yue* 君臣相說之樂) in *Mengzi* 1B4, was a customary expression for the musical ideal in their debates.⁴⁹ In another example, one of the most provocative passages of *Mengzi*, “*jin zhi yue, you gu zhi yue ye*” 今之樂,猶古之樂也 was also quoted in the writings of a Joseon Korean scholar, Ryu Jung-gyo 柳重教 (1832-1893). Even though Ryu was known as one of the most conservative Confucians,⁵⁰ he had no problem

⁴⁶ B. Song, “Joseon hugi yeomillakgye akgok-ui jeonseung yangsang: Sillok, uigwe, holgi-reul jungsim-euro,” 126.

⁴⁷ Mencius 1B1; 1B4.

⁴⁸ In *Joseon wangjo sillok*, besides “*Junchen xiangyue zhi yue* 君臣相說之樂,” another expressions of the Mencius, such as “*zhishao* 徵招[韶]” and “*jueshao* 角招,” are also mentioned to be ideal music, sometimes appearing as its shorten form of “*zhijue zhishao* 徵角之招,” “*zhijue zhiyin* 徵角之音” or “*zhijue zhiyue* 徵角之樂.” *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 14th day of the 5th lunar month, 3rd year of King Yeonsangun’s reign (1497); 5th day of the 9th lunar month, 8th year of King Gwanghaegun’s reign (1616); 27th day of the 2nd lunar month, 24th year of King Yeongjo’s reign (1748); 29th day of the 6th lunar month, 44th year of King Yeongjo’s reign (1768); 3rd day of the 9th lunar month, 2nd year of King Jeongjo’s reign (1778).

⁴⁹ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 27th day of the 11th lunar month, 15th year of King Sejong’s reign (1433): “柳思訥上書曰: . . . 實無愧於雅頌, 上項詩詞樂章, 群臣嘗然莫知, 豈君臣相悅之樂乎?”; 29th day of the 12th lunar month, 22nd year of King Sejong’s reign (1491): “金礪石等上疏, 略曰: . . . 何必用女樂, 然後爲君臣相悅之樂哉?”; 25th day of the 10th lunar month, 21st year of King Myeongjong’s reign (1566): “昔者齊景公, 一聞晏子之言, 而作君臣相悅之樂. 其詩曰: 畜君何尤? 孟子曰: 畜君者, 好君也. 人君之所以畜止其君者, 皆其愛君之至誠也.” Ironically, Korean Confucian intellectuals quoted this phrase in order to request a king to adopt their preferable music, namely, *aak* in Chinese style instead of Korean indigenous music.

⁵⁰ J. Song, “19segi yuhakja-ui Yu Jong-gyo-ui yangnon,” 125.

expressing his opinion opposing the Neo-Confucian commentaries on *Mengzi*' passage. As such, it can be said that Korean Neo-Confucians in the Joseon Dynasty generally adhered to Chinese Neo-Confucianism, but not necessarily accepted Chinese Neo-Confucian interpretations in all aspects.

Interestingly enough, King Sejong tried to bring the musical ideal of "Yeomillak" into practice as the name implies. He regularly held various kinds of feasts for the officials and the aged people, literally sharing enjoyment with them.⁵¹ While Sejong collected indigenous tunes from all over the country as musical sources for *hyangak*,⁵² he also went outside of the palace and played the newly composed music for the people to hear. According to the record,⁵³ large crowds gathered to watch these musical performances.⁵⁴ Of course, it is likely that "Yeomillak" was not the only repertory of performances performed for the people. However, it became a representation of the intention to share the fruit of the reconstructed musical culture, based on a new interpretation, with the people. Nowadays, "Yeomillak" not only indicates the specific music pieces which have been surviving from the 15th century, but also came to be used as an iconic term for the essence or the ideal of Korean traditional music. Today, Korean people often give the name of "Yeomillak" to Korean music performances, collections of Korean traditional music, and even the armature for practicing Korean traditional music.

7. Korean Mensural Notation System, *Jeongganbo* 井間譜

Without the newly invented notation, *jeongganbo*, the aforementioned achievements in Korean ritual music could not have been transmitted to the present. The most crucial reason for the invention of *jeongganbo* was that one could not properly record *hyangak*, Korean tunes, with the existing notation systems which were made for *dangak*, essentially Chinese tunes.

⁵¹ H. Song, "Sejong-ui munye gamseong-gwa yeonhoe-ui jeongchi," 96-104.

⁵² *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 12th day of the 9th lunar month, 15th year of King Sejong's reign (1433): "聲樂之理, 有關時政. 今慣習鄉樂五十餘聲, 竝新羅, 百濟, 高(句)麗時民間俚語, 猶可想見當時政治得失, 足爲勸戒. 我朝開國以來, 禮樂大行, 朝廟雅頌之樂已備, 獨民俗歌謠之詞, 無採錄之法, 實爲未便. 自今依古者採詩之法, 令各道州縣, 勿論詩章俚語, 關係五倫之正, 足爲勸勉者及其間曠夫怨女之謠, 未免變風者, 悉令搜訪, 每年歲抄, 採擇上送."

⁵³ *Joseon wangjo sillok*, 1st day of the 3rd lunar month, 25th year of King Sejong's reign (1443): "上與王妃幸忠清道溫陽郡溫井, 王世子從之. . . . 是日, 次龍仁縣刀川邊, 伶人十五人奏樂自昏至二鼓. 是行, 道經守令, 皆於境上迎謁, 凡民觀瞻者, 填溢街路."

⁵⁴ H. Song, "Sejong-ui eumak jeongchi mokjeok-gwa bangbeop gochal," 195-196.

Unlike the neighboring cultures, China and Japan, Korean music uses asymmetric meters, called “*jangdan* 長短,” in different types of rhythm (*bak* 拍 and *sobak* 小拍). This musical feature is related to the texts of the songs, and this was the fundamental reason for the need for a new notation system, *jeongganbo*.⁵⁵ In other words, the creation of *jeongganbo* is deeply related to the recognition of Koreans’ linguistic and musical identity. Although there were other imported notations and also a much older notation system for Korean tunes, for instance, *yukbo* 肉譜 (mnemonic notation) displaying oral imitations of the sounds of musical instruments, none of them were able to notate lengths of notes, the rhythm, the scale, or the tonality clearly.⁵⁶

Instead of rejecting all the previous notations developed in Korea and importing from China, Sejong carefully studied those various notations and borrowed worthy methodology from them. There were multiple notations that were simultaneously used for different types of music in the ritual music book of King Sejong (*Scores in Annals of King Sejong* 世宗實錄樂譜). *Jeongganbo* was formed on the foundations of existing notations and was continuously revised.⁵⁷ In order to write the court musical pieces in the strains of *hyangak*, which were supposed to be grand-scale ensembles, this new notation system had to be contrived. On the other hand, *Aak* was also performed in a large scale but was not needed to be recorded in *jeongganbo* because its melody line and rhythm were regular. Folk music was just occasionally recorded in *jeongganbo* because it was played in a simple setting.

As such, *jeongganbo* did not start as a perfect notation system but had gradually evolved into the best alternative notation for Korean music in current music education. Even though Western music was introduced to Korea over a century and much of Korean traditional music has been recorded on the staff notation in the meantime, the use of *jeongganbo* is now increasing and more people are becoming aware of its value since staff notation cannot properly express the indigenous features of Korean music, such as triple and asymmetric meters. As I see it, *jeongganbo* is not merely a marvelous brainchild of a great genius who lived in the past, but rather a musical matrix for Korean musical minds.

Still, *jeongganbo* leaves room for improvement and there are many restrictions in its employment as well. For instance, it still uses traditional

⁵⁵ Y. Lee, “Hanguk eumak-ui ibak, sambak, obak, palbak,” 88.

⁵⁶ Kwon, “History of Korean Notation,” 4-10.

⁵⁷ H. Song, “Sejongdae dongasia yeangnon-ui insik yangsang-gwa uirye eumak jeongbig,” 131-135.

Chinese characters which deter young Koreans, and it is inconvenient to note transposition or scale variation. Also, most of vocal and instrumental folk music developed in the 18th and 19th century of Joseon Korea was not systematically recorded in *jeongganbo*, but just orally transmitted or occasionally recorded in *yukbo*. It is not unusual to know that Korean musicians did not strive to write their music on the scores, because in the Korean tradition, no one sincerely regarded written music as real music, whereas the Western tradition musical development has given more esteem to a written composition. For this reason, *jeongganbo* was a fascinating invention in many ways, but mainly served as memory and record of musical performances at the state event rather than as an individual musician's tool for composition.⁵⁸

8. Continuity in Contemporary Korean Music Education: *Gugak* and *Jeongganbo*

The contemporary scene of Korean music and music education is enlivened by many musical sources from all over the world. Before modern music education began in 1945, Korean music was heavily influenced by Japanese and American music, and a wider variety of music is now flourishing in Korea from Western classic music to K-pop music. Nevertheless, Confucian principles and values remain strong in the course of cultural convergence in the formation of Korean school music education,⁵⁹ and a remarkable continuity is substantiated between the Korean musical identity as contemplated and revealed in the Joseon Dynasty and the musical features that contemporary Koreans consider as indispensable elements of "Korean music." Diversity in musical cultures requires modern Koreans to rethink the identity of Korean music, and the accomplished tradition of Korean music enabled them to create a genre called "*Gugak*" i.e. "Korean music" in the floods of influential musical cultures.

The growth of *gugak* as a medium to cultural identity is proven not just by external success but also by internal recognition. For example, the presence of National *gugak* Center is considered to be a symbol of sustained traditional culture in the wave of modernization, and the Korean ritual music is often cherished by other Asian countries as a transmission of one of the oldest ritual music. But what is more significant to me is that there are the

⁵⁸ H. Song, "Hyeondae gugak, geu wonhyeongseong-gwa byeonhwa saengseong," 27-28.

⁵⁹ Choi, "The History of Korean School Music Education," 138.

growing awareness of the inner qualities of Korean music and the continuity between traditional and modern *gugak*.

The first thing that stands out is the increasing needs for the Korean notation system, *jeongganbo*, and its introduction to school music education. Traditional *gugak* as well as contemporary *gugak* have been recorded with staff notation and *jeongganbo* have nearly been neglected for a long time since modern education was introduced to Korea. However, more and more people have come to realize that *gugak* cannot be adequately represented with staff notation, and *jeongganbo* is accepted as an important notation in Korean music curriculum today. Some professional *gugak* musicians trained by staff notation may possibly feel that staff notation is easier to read than *jeongganbo*. However, for educational purposes, many people are of the opinion that *jeongganbo* is a more accurate and convenient notation for expressing Korean traditional music.⁶⁰ Furthermore, even outside of the field of Korean music education, there have been steady efforts to make *jeongganbo* a suitable notation for contemporary society such as research on *jeongganbo* processing system for composition or computer music.⁶¹

The second and more important thing, is the internal continuity residing in the concept of “Korean music” when it is pronounced as *hyangak* or *gugak*.” In a broader sense, “Korean music” could possibly mean any kind of music played in Korean soil or practiced and composed by Koreans. However, when one attempts to distinguish true “Korean music”, one may want to use the term *gugak* instead. On the one hand, just as *hyangak* was used to refer to indigenous tunes by Joseon Koreans between Chinese and Korean cultural boundaries, the term *gugak* is used to refer to music that has Korean characteristics in it. On the other hand, while *hyangak* was used more often with negative implications, *gugak* is evolving into a flexible terminology. Literally speaking, while *gugak* 國樂 is a shorten form of “Korean” (Hanguk 韓國) plus “music” (*eumak* 音樂), it is a more specific term than “Korean music” in a broader sense. In comparison with *sogak* 俗樂 (folk music) or *hyangak* 鄉樂 (indigenous music) defined by contrast with *aak* or *dangak* in the strains of Chinese music, *gugak* is a generic term which has a much wider range covering from all sorts of ritual music, *hyangak* or *dangak*, to all kinds of folk music such as *pansori*, *sanjo* or *sinawi*, even including contemporary music pieces composed on the theme

⁶⁰ Hwang and Sung, “Eumak gyogwaseo gugak gibo chegye-ui olbareun banghyang mosaek.”

⁶¹ Park and Hur, “Jeongganbo imnyeok siseutem seolgye mit guhyeon”; and Kim and Kim, “Keompyuteo eumak-eul wihan gugakbo (jeongganbo) cheori siseutem-ui seolgye-wa guhyeon.”

or the components of Korean music. To sum it up, *gugak* has no discrimination between court and folk, or the past and the present, as well as no rejection of foreign musical sources, but has the dynamic reality of Korean music, the essence of which has been successively maintained in the process of assimilation and reconstruction.

Gugak may not be the most favored of genre,⁶² but is the most enduring musical source in contemporary Korea and in this sense, it could simply be rendered as “Korean traditional music.” It would be misleading, however, to think *gugak* as something that is against “innovative,” because it is a musical phenomenon which has been kept alive through its commitment to innovation throughout every historical period. Even though Koreans are apt to introduce new styles of music, after a bout of enthusiastic acceptance, the music most loved and most appreciated by the people is a new creation based on Korean reinterpretation of the crossover style. These new pieces of music are called Korean rock, Korean rap, cross-over and so on, and the innovative is often guided and influenced by some components of *gugak*.

I would argue that this dynamic nature of *gugak* is greatly indebted to the reconstruction of Confucian ritual music. The tension between the position to absorb advanced Chinese culture and the position to nurture indigenous Korean culture lasted almost throughout the Joseon dynasty. The persistent tension eventually resulted in compatibility between both positions. In the course of conflicts, debates, and settlements between these two perspectives, the former gradually learned how to actualize Confucian ideals on a different soil and the latter realized how to elevate and refine indigenous culture. If Joseon Koreans were merely compliant followers of Confucianism, adhering too closely to the wording of Confucian classical texts, they could not have found their own way by breaking through the stiffness of the ancient literary commentaries. If they were merely nationalistic lovers of indigenous music, unable to observe from an objective viewpoint, they could not have developed such a variety of music.

9. Concluding Remarks

What Joseon Koreans achieved is originality build from the fringe. Through the amalgamation of the mainstream and the familiar, Joseon Koreans

⁶² For the research on the preference for Korean music compared to other world music, see Fung, “Musicians’ and Nonmusicians’ Preferences for World Musics,” 75.

discovered their own cultural identity that had been marginalized from the mainstream culture. While the Confucian music culture formed in ancient China has been revered as the invariable ideal of moral education by the surrounding cultures, its practical implementation was rarely achieved in the successive dynasties of China. However, the originality achieved in the process of Joseon Korean reconstruction of Confucian culture led to the awareness of Korean cultural identity which survived to this day. Perhaps it is because Joseon Koreans were trying to realize the Confucian ideals from a peripheral position in the undeniable reality that they had a cultural difference between China and Korea. Since they had no musical specimen of Confucian ritual music and the meticulous reconstruction revealed that no restoration could accurately meet the ancient ideal, they were awakened to the variability of music and the realization that the nature of the Confucian ideal cannot be fixed to a certain materialized form. Therefore, the Confucian ideal they sought was not a certain type of Chinese tunes imported from a particular dynasty, even though those tunes were treated as valuable cases of once-realization. The nationwide reconstruction of Korean ritual music resulted in the formation of musical identity and history in Korea.

Now, it will be interesting to ask how today's Korean music will evolve given its history of originality from the fringe. The cultural identity of Koreans has never been invariable and there remains conflict between esteemed mainstream culture and familiar folksy culture in contemporary Korea. Some people prefer the music of familiar Korean culture while others follow the newer mainstream music, which some may see as eroding the Korean cultural identity. Depending on what contemporary Koreans learn from Joseon Korean experiences, they could perhaps find a new original way to amalgamate the mainstream and the familiar.

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文化邊界的原創性 ——韓國音樂教育上的儒家音樂論的吸收與重構

朴 素 晶

中文摘要

自朝鮮世宗大王(1418-1450在位)統治時期的儒家儀式音樂改革以來,韓國人繼承了儒家音樂教育的悠久傳統。然而,世宗大王的儒家儀式音樂重構不僅僅是對原始儒家儀式音樂的修復,更是對傳統儒家價值觀勇敢的重新解讀。中國和韓國之間語言和文化的巨大差異,不允許朝鮮知識人對中國主流文化不加批判的同化。這些因素也促使世宗大王為韓國本土音樂開發了一種新的樂譜系統——這種系統以前被認為是粗俗的,隨後將新組合的儀式音樂帶到宮廷。對韓國音樂文化的自覺和認同意識,使得朝鮮以及韓國人並非盲目地模仿中國音樂,而是體現出儒家音樂教育精髓的理想方式,即音樂感性的培養和“與民同樂”。這是在文化邊界發現的原創性。朝鮮宮廷音樂的矛盾性質,與從高麗王朝(918-1392)發展到朝鮮王朝(1392-1897)的韓國新儒學有密切相關。隨著朝鮮新王朝的出現,儒家價值觀的不斷融化和內化,逐漸發展成為新統治階級,並作為從統治階級到庶民最具影響力的道德基礎。此外,這種文化邊界的創造力也再次出現於朝鮮王朝邁向現代韓國的過渡期中。在韓國的近代化時期,西方和韓國音樂文化之間的衝突和重建,展現了文化邊界的原創性,也影響了韓國當代音樂教育。

關鍵詞：音樂教育, 世宗大王, 朝鮮, 韓國, 儒家哲學, 儀式音樂

孔子“思無邪”命題的再思考

張 明

中文提要

在傳世文獻《論語》及近年來整理出版的出土文獻《孔子詩論》中，孔子引詩、評詩雖多“斷章取義”，但“引詩不離句義”始終是其引用、評價《詩經》的一條基本原則，這一點也是我們把握“思無邪”命題的根本出發點。“思無邪”最初是描述馬跑起來“從不偏斜”的樣子，孔子用它來概括《詩經》的藝術精神，則意在強調《詩經》思想情感之“正”。然此處之“正”又非政治教化之“正”，乃性情之“正”，即凸顯人的自然情感，強調其“誠”、“直”、“不虛妄”之特性。從這一意義出發，“思無邪”實際上就是要求詩人之情志應發自本心而無偽飾。也正是因為以“真實”與“誠摯”為標準，故“詩三百”中才容納了那些被視之為“淫詩”的作品。

關鍵詞：孔子，“思無邪”，“正”，“誠”，《論語》，《孔子詩論》

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春秋時期，“賦詩斷章，余取所求”¹式地用詩、引詩、賦詩現象是非常普遍的，正如有學者指出的那樣：“無論是《國語》、《左傳》還是《戰國策》，其所引詩都是本著‘斷章取義’的原則來進行的”，“在春秋時期，詩作為貴族社會獨特的交往方式，是以詩所蘊涵的價值為前提的”，“詩的價值不是某個人賦予的，甚至不是作詩者本人所賦予的，它是特定的政治狀況以及由其所決定的文化空間的產物。”²處在同一時期的孔子自然亦不例外。然而，孔子“斷章取義”地引詩、評詩又並非完全撇開詩句隨意杜撰，而是注重在原詩的意義上進行思想的引導和興發，也就是戴震所講的“古人賦《詩》，斷章必依於義可交通，未有盡失其義，誤讀其字者。使斷取一句而並其字不顧，是亂經也”，³這一點同樣是我們今天理解孔子“思無邪”命題的一個根本出發點。

一、“引詩不離句義”——孔子用詩原則

《論語》中對《詩經》詩句的引用共有五處，均以其原義為本，在此基礎上衍生出與仁學相關的思想內涵。比如，〈學而〉篇記載了子貢與孔子的一段對話，當子貢問孔子對“貧而無諂，富而無驕”的境界怎麼評價的時候，孔子說：“可也”。但孔子認為這不過是最起碼的道德修養，其境界“未若貧而樂，富而好禮者也。”子貢於是聯想了〈國風·衛風·淇奥〉中的兩句詩“如切如磋，如琢如磨”。⁴這兩句詩意在表明，君子人格以及“仁”之境界就像美玉一樣，需要不斷地打磨，精益求精。子貢能如此活用《詩》，舉一反三，正是善於積極地接受《詩》的表現，因此孔子非常高興地說，我可以與你談詩論道了！再如，〈八佾〉篇中子夏問孔子說：“‘巧笑倩兮，美目盼兮’，素以爲絢兮，何謂也？”孔子回答說：“繪事後素。”子夏所引“巧笑倩兮，美目盼兮”之詩句出自〈衛風·碩人〉，⁵“巧笑”、“美目”描寫衛莊公夫人莊姜動人的外貌。但莊姜不止有外貌的美，而且還有更美的內在品質，據《毛傳》載曰：

¹ 《左傳》，〈襄公〉二十八年。

² 李春青，《詩與意識形態：西周至兩漢詩歌功能的演變與中國詩學觀念的生成》，頁129。

³ 戴震，《毛鄭詩考證》卷3，頁634。

⁴ 〈國風·衛風·淇奥〉原詩：“瞻彼淇奥，綠竹猗猗。有匪君子，如切如磋，如琢如磨。瑟兮僞兮，赫兮咺兮。有匪君子，終不可諼兮。瞻彼淇奥，綠竹青青。有匪君子，充耳琇瑋，會弁如星。瑟兮僞兮，赫兮咺兮。有匪君子，終不可諼兮。瞻彼淇奥，綠竹如簀。有匪君子，如金如錫，如圭如璧。寬兮綽兮，猗重較兮。善戲謔兮，不爲虐兮。”

⁵ 〈國風·衛風·碩人〉原詩：“碩人其碩，衣錦褰衣。齊侯之子，衛侯之妻，東宮之妹，邢侯之姨，譚公維私。手如柔荑，膚如凝脂，領如蝤蛴，齒如瓠犀，螓首蛾眉，巧笑倩兮，美目盼兮。碩人敖敖，說于農郊。四牡有騁，朱幘鑣鑣，翟裼以朝。大夫夙退，無使君勞。河水洋洋，北流活活。施施濈濈，鱣鮪發發，葭莢揭揭。庶薑孽孽，庶士有暵。”

“碩人，閔莊姜也。莊公惑於嬖妾，使驕上僭。莊姜賢而不荅，終以無子，國人閔而憂之。”⁶ 孔子由此引伸出內在之美必先於外在之美，有內美方可言外美的美學思想。而子夏從“繪事後素”一語，立刻悟到“仁”與“禮”的關係，說“禮後乎？”在孔子的思想中，“仁”是“禮”的內質，“禮”是“仁”的外化，“仁”於“禮”為先，“禮”為“仁”之後，孔子說過：“人而不仁，如禮何？人而不仁，如樂何？”⁷ 失“仁”不足言“禮”，無“素”則“繪事”無補於事，一句“禮後乎”，正中孔子下懷。將審美與道德融合為一，將孔子的思想觀念詩化，可能是孔子本人也始料未及的，因而反過來讚揚子夏啟發了他。另外，〈八佾〉篇中談到：“三家者以《雍》徹。子曰：‘相維辟公，天子穆穆’，奚取於三家之堂？”這是由對春秋時期僭禮行為的批評引申出對禮樂秩序的強調；〈泰伯〉篇中，曾子有疾，召門弟子曰：“啟予足！啟予手！《詩》云：‘戰戰兢兢，如臨深淵，如履薄冰。’而而今而後，吾知免夫。小子！”這是由為人處事的謹慎引申出曾子對孝道的理解。

2001年以來整理出版的上博簡《孔子詩論》提供了很多不見於傳世文獻的孔子論《詩》內容，其中記錄了孔子對五十八首詩的評論，可以說這是迄今為止我們能見到的最詳盡、最系統的孔子論《詩》的文獻資料。這些詩歌評論中，有為數不少的內容也是對《詩經》原義的引申。比如，孔子在評價〈葛覃〉、〈甘棠〉、〈木瓜〉等詩時說：

吾以〈葛覃〉得氏初之詩。民性固然，見其美必欲反其（本），夫葛之見歌也，……。〈第十六簡〉

吾以〈甘棠〉得宗廟之敬，民性固然，甚貴其人，必敬其位；悅其人，必好其所為，惡其人者亦然。〈第二十四簡〉

〔吾以〈木瓜〉得〕幣帛之不可去也。民性固然，其隱志必有以抒也。其言有所載而後內，或前之而後交，人不可干也。〈第二十簡〉

孔子對這一組詩的闡發仍是沿著從詩本義到引申義的思路來進行的。首先來看孔子對〈葛覃〉詩的評價：“吾以得氏初之詩。”“氏”字，廖名春讀為“祗”。祗，敬也；詩，志也。“氏初之詩”則為“敬初之心”。⁸ “吾以〈葛覃〉得氏初之詩”，就是說“我從〈葛覃〉中感受到了敬本的思想”。對於〈葛覃〉一詩，⁹ 其主旨歷來是眾說紛紜。〈毛詩序〉、孔穎達、朱熹均認為該詩言“后妃之德”或“后妃之本”，¹⁰ 而清代詩論家方玉潤則對以上觀點表示質疑，他

⁶ 毛亨，《毛詩正義》卷3，頁260。

⁷ 《論語》，〈八佾〉。

⁸ 廖名春，〈上海博物館藏詩論簡校釋〉，頁12。

⁹ 〈國風·周南·葛覃〉原詩：“葛之覃兮，施于中谷，維葉萋萋。黃鳥于飛，集於灌木，其鳴喈喈。葛之覃兮，施于中谷，維葉莫莫。是刈是穫，為絺為綌，服之無斁。言告師氏，言告言歸。薄汙我私，薄浣我衣。害浣害否？歸寧父母。”

¹⁰ 〈毛詩序〉認為該詩：“后妃之本也。后妃在父母家，則志在於女功之事，躬儉節用，服汗濯之衣，尊敬師傅，則可以歸安父母，化天下以婦道也。”孔疏曰：“作〈葛覃〉詩者，言后妃之本

說：“〈小序〉以爲‘后妃之本’，《集傳》遂以爲‘后妃所自作’，不知何所證據？以致駁之者云：‘後處深宮，安得見葛之延于谷中，以及此原野之間鳥鳴叢木景象乎？’愚謂后縱勤勞，豈必親手‘是刈是穫’；后即節儉，亦不至歸寧尚服澣衣。縱或有之，亦屬矯強，非情之正，豈得謂一國母儀乎？”故此，方氏認爲該詩應與〈關雎〉相同，均“采之民間”，“同爲房中樂，前詠初昏，此賦歸寧耳”，且“因歸寧而澣衣，因澣衣而念絺綌，因絺綌而想葛之初生，……。”¹¹ 這一點應與孔子的思路是相同的，因爲詩中的女主人公由“維葉萋萋”、“維葉莫莫”想到“葛之覃兮”，由“爲絺爲綌”、“服之無斁”的幸福生活想到了“歸寧父母”，這正是“見其美而欲反其本”的人性使然。因此，孔子對該詩的評價沒有半點陳腐的道德說教氣，而是從詩中反映的生活現實中自然而然地讀出了“爲人之本”的思想——“孝”。

〈甘棠〉一詩主旨比較明確，基本上認爲是懷念召伯所作。¹² 這裡的“召伯”即“燕召公”。司馬遷曾就這首詩的背景進行過詳細說明：“召公之治西方，甚得兆民和。召公巡行鄉邑，有棠樹，決獄政事其下，自侯伯至庶人，各得其所，無失職者。召公卒，而民人思召公之政，懷棠樹，不敢伐，歌詠之，作〈甘棠〉之詩。”¹³ 〈甘棠〉一詩睹物思人，表達了民眾對召公的愛戴，而這種愛源於對召公體恤民情，不攪擾百姓的崇高德性的敬慕。由此出發，孔子又引申出了“貴其人，敬其位”的思想，並進一步聯想到了“宗廟之敬”，認爲這些皆“民性固然”也。宗廟是祭祀祖先的場所，而祭祀祖先的目的則是要“慎終追遠，民德歸厚矣。”¹⁴ “教民復古復始，不忘其所由生也。”¹⁵ “慎終追遠”，“不忘其所由生”，其實質也都是強調人要懷有敬本之情。《孔子家語》〈廟制〉中孔子講過一段話：“詩云：‘蔽芾甘棠，勿剪勿敗，召伯所憩。’周人之于邵公也，愛其人猶敬其所舍之樹，況祖宗其功德而可以不尊奉其廟焉？”這一段話可視爲對“吾以〈甘棠〉得宗廟之敬”的解釋。

性也。謂貞專節儉自有性也，〈敘〉又申說之。后妃先在父母之家，則已專志於女功之事，復能身自儉約，謹節財用，服此汗濯之衣而尊敬師傅。在家本有此性，出嫁修而不改，婦禮無愆。當於夫氏，則可以歸問安否于父母，化天下以爲婦之道也。”（毛亨，《毛詩正義》卷1，頁36。）《詩集傳》卷1亦云：“此詩后妃所自作，故無讚美之詞。然於此可以見其已貴而能勤，已富而能儉，已長而敬不弛于師傅，已嫁而孝不衰于父母，是皆德之厚而人所難也。〈小序〉以爲后妃之本，庶幾近之。”（朱熹，《詩集傳》卷1，頁3。）

¹¹ 方玉潤，《詩經原始》卷1，頁76。

¹² 〈甘棠〉原詩：“蔽芾甘棠，勿剪勿伐，召伯所茇。蔽芾甘棠，勿剪勿敗，召伯所憩。蔽芾甘棠，勿剪勿敗，召伯所說。”（毛詩序）云：“〈甘棠〉，美召伯也。召伯之教，明于南國。”鄭箋云：“召伯聽男女之訟，不重煩勞百姓，止舍小棠之下而聽斷焉，國人被其德，說其化，思其人，敬其樹。”（毛亨，《毛詩正義》卷1，頁91-92。）《詩集傳》云：“召伯循行南國，以布文王之政，或舍甘棠之下。其後人思其德，故愛其樹而不忍傷也。”（朱熹，《詩集傳》卷1，頁10。）

¹³ 《史記》，〈燕召公世家〉。

¹⁴ 《論語》，〈學而〉。

¹⁵ 《禮記》，〈祭義〉。

〈木瓜〉一詩的主旨據統計達七種之多，有“美齊桓公說”、¹⁶“臣下報上說”、¹⁷“男女贈答說”、¹⁸“諷衛人報齊說”、¹⁹“諷送禮行賄說”、²⁰“朋友贈答說”、²¹“禮尚往來說”²²等。以上諸種觀點雖各不相同，但均是從具體的社交關係如君臣、男女或國與國等來解說的，而孔子則從具體社交關係的言說中超越出來，凸顯了人與人交接之“禮”的必要性和重要性，認為像“幣帛”這樣的賓客交往通好之禮物，絕非是簡單的交換物品，而是承載著豐富的

¹⁶ 〈毛詩序〉云：“〈木瓜〉，美齊桓公也。衛國有狄人之敗，出處於漕，齊桓公救而封之，遺之車馬器服焉。衛人思之，欲厚報之，而作是詩也。”鄭玄《箋》說同。唐代孔穎達《疏》曰：“有狄之敗，懿公時也。至戴公，為宋桓公迎而立之，出處於漕，後即為齊公子無虧所救。戴公卒，文公立，齊桓公又城楚丘以封之。則戴也、文也，皆為齊所救而封之也。……欲厚報之，則時實不能報也，心所欲耳。經三章皆欲報之辭。”（毛亨，《毛詩正義》卷3，頁289-290。）嚴粲《詩緝》卷6：“〈木瓜〉美桓公，衛人之情也。《春秋》不與桓公專封，所以尊王也。”（《摘藻堂四庫全書薈要》（第27冊），〈經部·詩類〉，臺灣世界書局影印本。）《詩古微》，〈邶鄘衛義例篇下〉：“〈衛風〉終於〈木瓜〉，所以著齊桓攘狄之功業。”“正著故衛甫亡之事，則亦邶、鄘遺民從徙渡河者所作。”（魏源，《魏源全集》（第1冊），頁218-221。）

¹⁷ 《詩三家義集疏》卷3（下）：“賈子《新書》〈禮篇〉引由余云：‘苞苴時有，筐篚時至，則群臣附。’《詩》曰：‘投我以木瓜，報之以瓊琚。匪報也，永以為好也。’上少投之，則下以軀償矣。弗敢謂報，願長以為好。古之蓄其下者，其報施如此。”“賈子本經學大師，與荀卿淵源相接，其言可信。當其時惟有魯《詩》，若舊《序》以為美桓，賈子不能指為臣下報上之義，是其原本古訓，更無可疑。”（王先謙，《詩三家義集疏》（上冊），頁311。）與王同代學者陳壽祺、陳喬樞《三家詩遺說考》卷1，〈魯詩遺說考〉：“賈子引由余語，苞苴時有，筐篚時至，則群臣附，而以〈木瓜〉之詩為證。知魯《詩》說以此篇為臣下思報禮而作，與毛《序》言衛人欲報齊桓之義異矣。”（《續修四庫全書》（第76冊），〈經部·詩類〉華東師大圖書館藏清刻上海續集影印本。）

¹⁸ 《詩集傳》卷3：“言人有贈我以微物，我當報之以重寶，而猶未足以為報也，但欲其長以為好而不忘耳。疑亦男女相贈答之詞，如《靜女》之類。”（朱熹，《詩集傳》卷3，頁41。）姚舜牧《重訂詩經疑問》卷2：“此詩語極輕佻，似男女相贈答之辭。”（《影印文淵閣四庫全書》（第74冊），〈經部·詩類〉。）此說頗被今之學者如聞一多、余冠英、程俊英、藍菊蓀等所認可，且進一步明確為情詩戀歌。

¹⁹ 輔廣《詩童子問》卷2：“竊意桓公既歿之後，衛文公伐齊，殺長立幼。衛人感桓公之惠而責文公之無恩，故為是詩以風其上。”（《影印文淵閣四庫全書》（第68冊），〈經部·詩類〉。）方玉潤《詩經原始》卷4：“此詩非美齊桓，乃諷衛人以報齊桓也。”“衛人始終並未報齊，非惟不報，且又乘齊五子之亂而伐其喪，則背德孰甚焉？此詩之所以作也。明言之不敢，故假小事以諷之，使其自得之於言外意。詩人諷刺往往如此。”（方玉潤，《詩經原始》卷4，頁188。）

²⁰ 朱謀埠《詩故》卷2：“〈木瓜〉……蓋刺苞苴之禮公行也。木瓜、木桃、木李，皆刻木為果以充簞實者，物至微矣。以瓊琚、瓊瑤、瓊玖而猶若有歉焉，又為遜順之詞以導之，政以賄成有如此。”（《影印文淵閣四庫全書》（第73冊），〈經部·詩類〉。）《詩切》：“〈木瓜〉，刺賄也。”（牟庭，《詩切》，頁691。）王應麟《詩考》引晁氏詩序論曰：“賈誼以為下之報上。”（《影印文淵閣四庫全書》（第69冊），〈經部·詩類〉。）

²¹ 《詩經通論》卷4：“然以為朋友相贈答亦異不可，何必定是男女耶！”（姚際恒，《詩經通論》卷4，頁91。）同代學者崔述《讀風偶識》卷2：“木瓜之施輕，瓊琚之報重，猶以為不足報，而但以為‘永好’，其為尋常贈答之詩無疑。”（崔述，《讀風偶識》卷2，頁47。）劉沅《詩經恒解》卷1：“朋友相贈之詩。蓋施雖薄而意厚，故報之者相愛於無己也。”（劉沅，《槐軒全書·詩經恒解》，影印清豫誠堂刻本。）

²² 吳懋清《毛詩復古錄》卷2：“衛承武公投桃報李之教，禮尚往來，因作是歌，以達其意。”（吳懋清，《毛詩復古錄》卷2，影印清光緒二十年廣州刻本。）《詩經直解》卷5：“〈木瓜〉，言一投一報，薄施厚報之詩。徒有概念，美無故實。詩義自明，不容臆說。此當采自歌謠，今亦有得一還兩、得牛還馬之諺語。”（陳子展，《詩經直解》卷5（上冊），頁198。）

“志”：“禮之先幣帛也，欲民之先事而後祿也。先財而後禮則民利，無辭而行情則民爭，故君子于有饋者弗能見，則不禮其饋。”²³ 這樣，孔子就從詩句中原來具體的禮義關係提升為具有普遍性的禮義原則，並深入闡明了支撐其成立的精神內容。

除了以上三例外，《孔子詩論》中類似的思路在引用、評價〈關雎〉、〈燕燕〉、〈漢廣〉、〈綠衣〉、〈宛丘〉、〈菁菁者莪〉等詩句時均有體現。如果再結合前文所述《論語》中孔子對《詩經》的引用、評價，不難發現其引詩、評詩雖多“斷章取義”，“然亦不當大違原義”，²⁴ 故“引詩不離句義”是孔子引詩、評詩的“一以貫之”之道，由此也為我們準確把握“思無邪”命題提供了指導思想和方法。

二、“思無邪”命題之辨析

“思無邪”之語出自《詩經》〈魯頌·駉〉篇，為方便論述，現將原詩摘錄如下：

駉駉牡馬，在坰之野。薄言駉者！有驪有皇，有驪有黃，以車彭彭。思無疆，思馬斯臧！
駉駉牡馬，在坰之野。薄言駉者！有騅有駟，有騂有騏，以車伉伉。思無期，思馬斯才！
駉駉牡馬，在坰之野。薄言駉者！有驪有駟，有騂有騏，以車繹繹。思無斁，思馬斯作！
駉駉牡馬，在坰之野。薄言駉者！有騅有駟，有騂有騏，以車祛祛。思無邪，思馬斯徂！

古今學者對這首詩的理解雖眾說紛紜、莫衷一是，²⁵ 但它首先是一首詠馬詩應是確定無疑的。全詩四章，每章列出四種不同毛色的馬，共寫出十六種馬，極言牧馬盛多。在寫法上，整首詩用的都是複唱的方式，各章的句數、字數及句型結構完全相同，只是變化不同的關鍵字。這些關鍵字就是馬駕車的狀態，分別用“彭彭”、“伉伉”、“繹繹”、“祛祛”來描寫。“彭彭”本是連續擊鼓的聲音，這裡用來形容馬駕車的強健有力，使人仿佛聽到馬在進行過程中四足踏地發出的響聲；“伉伉”，形容馬行進的速度很快。《楚辭》〈招魂〉在形容土伯的猙獰可怕時有“逐人駟駟”之語，王逸注曰：“逐人駟駟，

²³ 《禮記》，〈坊記〉。

²⁴ 錢穆，《論語新解》，頁25。

²⁵ 這首詩的主旨歷來眾說紛紜，難成定論。有的認為是歌頌魯僖公馬政的詩，最具代表性的就是《毛詩序》：“《駉》，頌僖公也。僖公能遵伯禽之法，儉以足用，寬以愛民，務農重谷，牧于坰野，魯人尊之，於是季孫行父請命于周，而史克作是頌。”（毛亨，《毛詩正義》卷20，頁1627。）這一觀點在歷代學者的認可度比較高；有的則認為是借養馬以喻魯國人才之盛。《詩經原始》卷18云：“此諸家皆謂‘頌僖公牧馬之盛’，愚獨以為喻魯育賢之眾，蓋借馬以比賢人君子耳。”（方玉潤，《詩經原始》卷18，頁631。）這種說法也不是沒有道理，可備參考。

其走捷疾。”“伉伉”、“駉駉”，都是健步如飛之狀；“繹繹”，連續不斷之意，突出馬的持久的耐力；“祛祛”，《說苑》〈奉使〉云：“入門祛衣不趨。”祛，指撩起。祛又指衣袖、袖口，人在走路時隨著手臂擺動，衣袖上下揮舞，取其舒張之義。對於馬的駕車形態，用以上四個詞語加以描繪，取象角度各異，前後不相重複，全面展示了馬的雄姿。²⁶ 與之相應，在描述完馬駕車的狀態後，詩句後面先後出現“思無疆”、“思無期”、“思無斁”、“思無邪”，方玉潤認為這四個“思”引申出來的意義“當屬馬言”，²⁷ 也就是指馬跑起來“沒有盡頭”、“沒有停下來的時候”、“不知疲倦”、“從不偏斜”。而孔子在《論語》〈為政〉篇用“思無邪”來概括《詩經》的總體特性，顯然已與其本義發生了改變（不再是言“馬”），這種改變直接導致了後世對這一命題闡釋的歧義多解。不過，歧義再多恐怕仍需從“思無邪”原意“不偏斜”處延伸而來。

那麼究竟該如何理解“思無邪”的含義呢？要準確把握住這一命題的內涵，首先必須對“思”與“無邪”的各自含義進行梳理。對於“思”字，大體有兩種解讀：一是認為“思”為心思之意，鄭玄《毛詩傳箋》、孔穎達《毛詩注疏》、朱熹《詩集傳》皆主此義；二是認為“思”為發語詞，陳奐《詩毛氏傳疏》、俞樾《曲園雜纂》等均言“思”為句首語氣詞，無實意。今人郭紹虞、朱自清從此說，眾學者紛紛從之。筆者認為，兩種觀點對於命題的解讀實際上並不會產生根本性的影響，但從“思”字在《詩經》中的使用情況以及古漢語的使用習慣來說，將“思”作無實義的語氣詞或許更準確一些。²⁸

這樣看來，理解“思無邪”命題的關鍵就在於對“無邪”的理解上了。何為“無邪”？歸納起來大體有如下幾種說法：

一是將“無邪”訓為“正”，魏何晏《集解》引包咸語曰：“思無邪”，“歸於正也。”²⁹ 但何為“正”？包氏語焉不詳。南朝梁代皇侃《義疏》引衛瓘語曰：“不曰‘思正’，而曰‘思無邪’，明正無所思邪，邪去則合於正也。”³⁰ 北宋韓駒曾說過：“詩言志，當先正其心志，心志正，則道德仁義之語，高雅淳厚之義自具。三百篇中有美有刺，所謂‘思無邪’也，先具此質，卻論工拙。”³¹ 北宋另外一位學者邢昺《論語注疏》曰：“此章言為政之道在於去邪歸正，故舉《詩》要當一句以言之。……‘思無邪’者，此《詩》之一言，《魯頌·駉》篇文

²⁶ 李炳海，《〈詩經〉解讀》，頁497-498。

²⁷ 方玉潤，《詩經原始》，頁631。

²⁸ 據筆者統計，“思”字在〈國風〉中出現了57次，除8處作語氣詞外，其餘均有實際意義；〈小雅〉出現了19次，2處有實際意義，其餘均為語氣詞；〈大雅〉中出現12次，2處有實際意義外，其餘均為語氣詞；〈頌〉中“思”出現了23次，除1處有實際意義外，其餘均為語氣詞。另，清代學者劉淇曾這樣總結歸納“思”字的用法：“凡思字在句端者，發語辭也，如伊、維之類。在句尾者，語已辭也，如今、而之類。”（《助字辨略》卷1）兩相比照，“思無邪”中的“思”應該屬於這一類虛詞。

²⁹ 何晏，《論語集解義疏》卷1，頁14。

³⁰ 何晏，《論語集解義疏》卷1，頁14。

³¹ 《陵陽室中語》。

也。《詩》之爲體，論功頌德，止僻防邪，大抵皆歸於正，故此一句可以當之也。”³² 呂祖謙《呂氏家塾讀詩記》也說這是指“作詩人所思皆無邪”，今人楊伯峻則認爲這是指《詩經》的“思想純正”。³³

二是將“無邪”訓爲“誠”，如北宋程頤曰：“‘思無邪’者，誠也。”³⁴ 南宋的朱熹曰：“蓋行無邪，未是誠；思無邪，乃可爲誠也。”³⁵ 進而認爲“凡《詩》之言，善者可以感發人之善心，惡者可以懲創人之逸志，其用歸於使人得其性情之正而已。”³⁶ 張栻亦云：“《詩》三百篇，美惡怨刺雖有不同，而其言之發，皆出於惻坦之公心，而非有他也。故‘思無邪’一語可以蔽之。”“學者學夫詩，則有以識夫性情之正矣。”³⁷ 顯然，與何晏、皇侃、韓駒、呂祖謙等學者從作詩人的角度以“正”來釋“無邪”不同，朱熹和張栻是從詩教“正心誠意”之功能出發，強調“思無邪”重在教讀者，其目的是“正人心”。在他們看來，詩道性情，各詠其事，讀詩者只有心無邪，才能皆用於正耳，誠如朱熹所言：“詩之言美惡不同，或勸或懲，皆有以使人得其情性之正。”³⁸

三是將“無邪”訓爲“無涯”。近人于省吾《澤螺居詩經新證》則認爲《詩經》〈魯頌·駉〉中的“思無疆”、“思無期”、“思無斁”、“思無邪”語例相仿。他將“思”理解爲發語詞，認爲“疆”與“期”通“記”，“斁”讀爲“度”，“邪”讀爲“圉”，“圉”又通“圍”。因此，在他看來，“‘思無疆’猶言無已；‘思無期’猶言無算；‘思無斁’猶言無數；‘思無邪’猶言無邊。無已、無算、無數、無邊詞異而義同。”³⁹ 此種觀點與傳統解讀完全不同，而是另闢蹊徑，視角獨特，頗有新意。

以上諸說各有優長，本難以定論，然郭店楚墓竹簡的出土，成爲孔子“思無邪”命題的定讞之論。郭店楚簡《語叢三》第四十八、四十九簡云：“思無疆，思無期，思無怠，思無不由義者。”饒宗頤認爲這幾句話明顯是“摘自〈魯頌〉”，並且是“斷章取義以說《詩》”。在他看來，這是孔門以及儒家說詩、引詩的一個歷來傳統，⁴⁰ 此說甚是。我們將這四句話與〈魯頌·駉〉篇進行對照，不難發現“思無疆，思無期，思無怠”分別對應〈魯頌·駉〉中的“思無疆”、“思無期”、“思無斁”，而“思無不由義者”則與“思無邪”相對應。只不過，“‘思無邪’是反說，‘思無不由義者’是正說”，“‘無不由義’即‘無邪’”。⁴¹ 這就表明，于省吾對“思無邪”命題的解釋是不能夠成立的，否則無法與“思無不由義”的意思相對應。因此，郭店楚簡《語叢三》，爲我們準確把握“思無邪”命題提供了重要理論支撐。

³² 何晏，《論語注疏》卷2，頁12。

³³ 楊伯峻，《論語譯注》，頁11。

³⁴ 朱熹，《四書章句集注》，頁54。

³⁵ 黎靖德，《朱子語類》卷23，頁800。

³⁶ 朱熹，《四書章句集注》，頁53。

³⁷ 張栻，《癸巳論語解》卷1，頁7。

³⁸ 朱熹，《詩集傳》，頁238。

³⁹ 于省吾，《澤螺居詩經新證》，頁171-173。

⁴⁰ 饒宗頤，《詩言志再辨》，頁10。

⁴¹ 廖名春，《郭店楚簡與《詩經》》，頁48。

排除了第三種觀點之後，那麼，前兩種觀點哪種更準確一些呢？比較而言，第二種或許更準確一些。因為從《詩經》所選作品的實際情況來看，有的詩表現出激憤的怨刺之情，有的描寫男女之情大膽直白，乃至於被後人視為“淫詩”，如《鄭風》中的《山有扶蘇》、《野有蔓草》、《狡童》、《褰裳》、《溱洧》，《陳風》中的《月出》、《澤陂》，《邶風》中的《靜女》，《鄘風》中的《桑中》等等，這些詩歌表現兩性之情頗為露骨，朱熹甚至把《褰裳》解讀為“淫女語其私者”。而對於這一類的詩，孔子不僅沒有把它們當做“淫詩”刪掉，相反還大量保存下來（尤其是保存下來二十一首《鄭風》）。若以後儒的思想標準來衡量，很難用“純正”來解釋，故以“正”訓“無邪”自然也就失去了其合理性。不過，這倒從另一方面證明了第二種觀點的有效性。細究起來，上述這些情詩都表現了人的真實感情，不虛不偽，這便可以稱為“誠”，而孔子欣賞的正是這一點。當然，不可否認的是，孔子的確說過“鄭聲淫”、“惡鄭聲之亂雅樂也”之類的話，⁴²但那主要不是針對詩歌而是針對音樂來談的。⁴³在孔子看來，“鄭聲”作為俗樂是“淫”的，但作為表達誠摯愛情的詩歌則是“無邪”的。後來，王國維曾專門澄清說，有些詩“可謂淫鄙之尤，然無視為淫詞、鄙詞者，以其真也。……非無淫詞，讀之但覺其親切動人，非無鄙詞，但覺其精力彌滿。”⁴⁴這就解決了為什麼孔子一方面說“鄭聲淫”但同時又說“詩三百”、“思無邪”的矛盾了。

三、“思無邪”內涵之詮解

根據上述辨析，我們可以進一步明確地闡述“思無邪”命題的內涵了。所謂“邪”者，“偽”也，故“無邪”的含義就是“不偽”、“不虛”。《易》《乾》有言：“閑邪存其誠”。孔穎達釋曰：“言防閑邪惡，當自存其誠實也。”可見，“無邪”與“純真”是一致的。東漢王充雖然在人性論上與孔孟相異，但在對“思無邪”的理解上，卻是完全認同的。《論衡》《佚文》篇云：“聖賢定意于筆，筆集成文，文具情顯，後人觀之，以見正邪。……《論衡》篇以十數，亦一言也，曰‘疾虛妄’。”在王充看來，“無邪”的意思就是“疾虛妄”，即真實而不虛偽，而前面提及的宋儒以“誠”訓“無邪”其實也是在強調這一點。“誠”在宋儒那裡兼有宇宙本體與人格境界雙重意義，“誠者，合內外之道，便是表裏如一，內實如此，外也實如此。故程子曰：‘思無邪’，誠也。”⁴⁵然學詩如學道，必先明誠之理，才能知正，才能守德，才能克邪，才能清除私欲邪念，由此“思無邪”而誠，以立

⁴² 《論語》、《陽貨》。

⁴³ 張明，〈“樂而不淫，哀而不傷”——〈關雎〉作為音樂藝術的審美原則〉，頁62-64。

⁴⁴ 王國維，《人間詞話》。

⁴⁵ 黎靖德，《朱子語類》卷23，頁799。

起心中的正性、正覺、正理、正悟。故宋儒以“誠”訓之，便意味著對“無邪”之詮解轉向了情性論。朱熹以“正”訓“無邪”，強調的便是情性之“正”，而非政治教化之“正”，誠如斯言：“情性是貼思，正是貼無邪。此如做時文相似，只恁地貼，方分曉。若好善惡惡皆出於正，便會無邪。如果是正，自無虛偽，自無邪。”《朱子語類》又結合《詩經》進一步提到：“詩人之思，皆情性也。情性本出於正，豈有假偽得來底？思，便是情性；無邪，便是正。以此觀之，《詩》三百篇，皆出於情性之正。”⁴⁶ 朱熹的這一論斷已然從政治教化評詩轉入以情性評詩，其中“誠”與“正”強調的乃是情性之真摯無偽、不做作。就此而言，後世文人在理解“思無邪”這一命題時，又多加以借鑒和引申。

比如，金代元好問在《楊叔能小亨集引》就曾說到：“唐詩所以絕出於三百篇之後者，知本焉爾矣！何謂本？誠是也。……情動於中而形於言，言發乎邇而見乎遠，……故曰：不誠無物。”⁴⁷ 元好問以“誠”為《詩經》與唐詩之“本”，而“誠”與“思無邪”相通，其特點就是“情動於中而形於言”，強調了情感的真切動人。明瞿佑《歸田詩話》〈序〉亦云：“古《詩》三百篇，孔子取‘思無邪’一言以蓋之。夫‘思無邪’者，誠也。人能以誠誦詩，則善惡皆有益。學詩之要，豈有外於誠乎？”⁴⁸ 瞿佑認為作詩與誦詩的“思無邪”，如果能統一在“誠”上，這樣才可以收到懲惡揚善的效果。鄭浩在《論語集注述要》中認為“邪”的古義是“徐”，當訓為“虛徐”。他說：“‘無邪’字在《詩》〈駟〉篇中，當與上三章‘無期’、‘無疆’、‘無斁’義不相遠，非邪惡之邪也。……古義邪即徐也。”由此可以理解在《詩經》中，“無論孝子、忠臣、怨男、愁女皆出於至情流溢，直寫衷曲，毫無偽託虛徐之意，即所謂‘詩言志’者，此三百篇之所同也，故曰一言以蔽之。”⁴⁹ 國學大師錢穆對此說深表認同，認為“無邪，直義”。“三百篇之作者，……直寫衷曲，毫無偽託虛假，……故孔子舉此一言以包蓋其大義。詩人性情，千古如照，故學於詩而可以興觀群怨。”⁵⁰ 當代美學家李澤厚在解釋“思無邪”時，同時引用了程頤與鄭浩的觀點，並將“無邪”釋為“不虛假”。⁵¹ 文學批評史專家陳良運也認為“無邪”即真實的思想情感：“程子說：‘思無邪，誠也。’何謂‘誠’？即‘實’。所謂‘思無邪’，就是說《詩》三百篇都是表達真實思想感情的作品。”⁵² 由此可見，《詩經》中雖“貞淫正變，無所不包”，⁵³ 且“‘思’字境界無盡，然‘所歸則一耳’，⁵⁴ 這個‘一’實質上就是‘誠’。

46 黎靖德，《朱子語類》卷23，頁799-801。

47 元好問，《元好問全集》（下冊）卷36，頁38。

48 瞿佑，《歸田詩話》，頁1。

49 程樹德，《論語集釋》卷3，頁66-67。

50 錢穆，《論語新解》，頁25。

51 李澤厚，《論語今讀》，頁50。

52 陳良運，《中國詩學批評史》，頁37。

53 袁枚，《隨園詩話》卷14。

54 劉熙載，《藝概》，〈詩概〉。

“思無邪”的這一內涵同樣也體現在孔子對其他所引《詩經》詩句的評價上。〈子罕〉篇中引用了《詩經》中的幾句逸詩：“唐棣之華，偏其反而。豈不爾思，室是遠而。”子曰：“未之思也，夫何遠之有？”詩人說，唐棣（即常棣，今之謂棠梨樹）樹開花，翩翩搖擺，先開後合，難道我不想念你嗎？只是居住相隔遙遠！這可能是一首思念情人、或處江湖之遠而思君的詩，孔子發現並批評其感情表達不真的跡象：不是相隔遙遠而是不想念啊，如果真心想念，怎麼會覺得遙遠呢？這裡是由對虛偽愛情的批評強調感情表達的真實可信。《孔子詩論》第十七簡曰：“〈揚之水〉，其愛婦烈。”〈揚之水〉，今本《詩經》中〈王風〉、〈鄭風〉、〈唐風〉各有一篇，原簡未注明出自哪一篇。本文從李學勤說，以為指的是〈王風·揚之水〉：

揚之水，不流束薪。彼其之子，不與我戍申。懷哉懷哉，曷月予還歸哉？
 揚之水，不流束楚。彼其之子，不與我戍甫。懷哉懷哉，曷月予還歸哉？
 揚之水，不流束蒲。彼其之子，不與我戍許。懷哉懷哉，曷月予還歸哉？

從該詩內容上看，這是一位遠地戍邊的將士懷念家中妻子的詩。詩中的“彼其之子”，應指妻子。周時婦、女有別。“婦”是對婚後女子的通稱，所以孔子以“愛婦”稱之。而“愛婦”對丈夫的思念之情過於濃重，乃至於達到了“烈”的程度，雖有失性情之中正平和，但其真摯性不容置疑。孔子對〈邶風·燕燕〉的評論，有“〈燕燕〉之情，以其蜀也”之語。馬承源認為，此篇詩意言之子歸嫁遠送之情。而對“蜀”，則認為“當讀作‘獨’，若假借為‘篤’也可。……‘篤’乃言情之厚。”⁵⁵ 龐朴也引郭店簡與馬王堆帛書讀“蜀”為“獨”，並解釋“燕燕之情，以其獨也”為“其情專一不渝和不假修飾出於至誠。”⁵⁶ 在評價〈陳風·宛丘〉時，孔子說：“〈宛丘〉曰：‘洵有情，而亡望。’吾善之。”⁵⁷ 從文義來看，詩中描寫的是一位男子愛上了一位以巫為職業的舞女。但因為周代有巫女不嫁的習俗，所以他把這份愛情只能深深地藏在心裡，以禮自持，保持著一種理性的態度。此詩中的男子，與〈漢廣〉中的男主人公一樣，均是具有深情卻又能以禮相節之人。孔子所“善”的正是這樣一種真實無妄而又有所節制的情感態度。另外，像《孔子詩論》第十簡所言“〈關雎〉之改”、“〈鵲巢〉之歸”、“〈甘棠〉之保”、“〈綠衣〉之思”等等，也都是從不同側面強調了情感的深厚和誠摯。

由此可見，孔子理解的“無邪”並非像漢儒那樣僅將之限定於政教範圍之中，而是將人的自然情感凸顯出來，強調其“誠”、“直”、“疾虛妄”、“不虛徐”之特性。從這一意義出發，“思無邪”實際上就是要求詩人之情志應發自本心而無偽飾。這也就意味著，《詩經》之所以被歷代詩人、詩論家特別看

⁵⁵ 馬承源，《上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書·孔子詩論》（一），頁145。

⁵⁶ 龐朴，《上博藏簡零箋》，頁237-238。

⁵⁷ 馬承源，《上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書·孔子詩論》（一），頁151。

重，排除其神聖化了的“經”的因素，便主要是其自然而發的真性情。“詩以道情，道之爲言路也。情之所至，詩無不至；詩之所至，情以之至。”“唯此窅窅搖搖之中，有一切真情在內，可興、可觀、可群、可怨，是以有取於詩。”⁵⁸ 同時，也正是因爲以“真實”與“誠摯”爲標準，在“詩三百”中，才容納了那些被視之爲“淫詩”的作品。

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⁵⁸ 王夫之，《古詩評選》卷4，頁654、681。

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A New Approach to the Expression “Innocent Thoughts” (*Si wu xie* 思無邪)

ZHANG Ming

Abstract

Confucius quoted many poems in his teachings, as seen in the transmitted *Lunyu* 論語 (*Analects*) and the excavated text *Kongzi shi lun* 孔子詩論 (Confucius' Comments on the *Book of Poetry*). However, the poems Confucius quoted cannot be found in the transmitted text *Shijing* 詩經 (Book of Poetry), even though “quoting poems without distorting the context” (*yin shi bu li qu yi* 引詩不離句義) was always a basic principle when Confucius quoted and evaluated the *Book of Poetry*; this is also the fundamental starting point that allows us to grasp the true meaning of the expression “innocent thoughts” (*si wu xie* 思無邪). Though the expression “innocent thoughts” originally meant “never being skewed” on horseback, Confucius used it to summarize the artistic spirit of, and emphasize the “pure” thoughts and emotions in the *Book of Poetry*. However, the “purenness” in his teaching does not refer to the “purenness” of political education but the “purenness” of temperament, which highlights natural emotions and moral virtues such as honesty, uprightness, and integrity. In this regard, “innocent thoughts” actually require that the emotion of the poet should be taken from the heart without any artifice. This is because truth and sincerity are the main yardsticks of the poems, and the *Book of Poetry* also contains some sensuality.

Keywords: Confucius, innocent thoughts, pureness, honesty, *Analects*, Confucius' Comments on the *Book of Poetry*

《論》、《孟》、《學》、《庸》在隋唐時期的 流傳及地位嬗變

唐 明 貴

中文提要

隋唐時期,《論語》被視為六經之精華,是研讀六經的入門書,其文句不僅出現在詔書、奏章、家訓及詩歌中,而且還滲入到社會生活中。《孟子》地位有明顯的升格跡象,不僅引述、評價、闡釋等散見於各種文獻中,而且還出現了專題討論的文章和列為考試科目的訴求。《大學》、《中庸》開始引起學人的關注,探求《大學》與儒家心性、《中庸》與佛教之間關係的文章次第出現,其學術地位也有所提升。

關鍵詞：《論語》,《孟子》,《大學》,《中庸》,隋唐,流傳

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一、序論

在隋唐時期,《論語》的流傳進一步廣泛,其文句不僅出現在詔書和奏章中,而且出現在文章及詩歌中。《孟子》獲得了新生,其引述、評價、闡釋等散見於唐代文獻中,地位有明顯的升格跡象。《大學》、《中庸》開始引起學人的關注,其學術地位有所提升。

學界關於這一時期《論語》、《孟子》、《大學》、《中庸》流傳和地位變遷的文章不多,其中涉及單經的主要有陳祥龍〈論《論語》在學校教育中的嬗變〉(《陰山學刊》2016年第4期)、李峻岫的《漢唐孟子學概論》(齊魯書社2010年版)、鄒憬〈《中庸》成書公案與今本《中庸》的流傳與升格〉(曲阜師範大學碩士論文,2008年)等;涉及“四書”的主要有束景南和王曉華的〈四書升格運動與時代四書學的興起——漢學向宋學轉型的經典詮釋歷程〉(《歷史研究》2007年第5期)、王銘的〈唐宋之際“四書”的升格運動〉(陝西師範大學碩士論文,2002年)等。基於此,本文擬在此方面有所拓展。

二、《論語》的流傳與影響

隋唐時期,《論語》被視為六經之精華,是研讀六經的入門書。據《舊唐書》〈薛防傳〉記載,穆宗常謂侍臣曰:“朕欲習學經史,何先?”放對曰:“經者,先聖之至言,仲尼之所發明,皆天人之極致,誠萬代不刊之典也。史記前代成敗得失之跡,亦足鑒其興亡。然得失相參,是非無准的,固不可為經典比也。”帝曰:“《六經》所尚不一,志學之士,白首不能盡通,如何得其要?”對曰:“《論語》者《六經》之菁華,《孝經》者人倫之本。窮理執要,真可謂聖人至言。是以漢朝《論語》首列學官,光武令虎賁之士皆習《孝經》,玄宗親為《孝經》注解,皆使當時大理,四海乂寧。蓋人知孝慈,氣感和樂之所致也。”上曰:“聖人以孝為至德要道,其信然乎!”正因為此,它被人們所研讀,為人們所徵引、所效仿,不斷釋放著自身的能量。

第一,隋唐時期出現了兩部模仿《論語》的專著——《中說》和《女論語》。

《中說》乃記載隋代大儒王通弟子薛收、姚義根據其聽課筆記仿《論語》例整理而成的一部著作。據《新唐書》〈王績傳〉記載,王通“仿古作《六經》,又為《中說》以擬《論語》,不為諸儒稱道,故書不顯,惟《中說》獨傳”。又,宋人王觀國論述頗詳,其〈文中子敘篇〉云:

阮逸注《文中子》,又作《敘篇》曰:“文中子之教,繼素王之道,故以《王道篇》為首。古先聖王俯仰二儀,必合其德,故次以《問易篇》。天

尊地卑，故次之以《禮樂篇》。事君莫如周公，故次之以《周公篇》。周公之道，神乎《易》中，故次之以《問易篇》。易之教化，莫大乎禮樂，故次之以《禮樂篇》。禮樂著明則史，故次之以《述史篇》。興文立制，變理爲大，故次之以《魏相篇》。既變理，則至於命，故次之以《立命篇》。通性命者，關氏之《易》，故次之以《關朗篇》終焉。”觀國按：王通死，門人薛守、姚義綴通之說，名之曰《中說》。杜淹爲御史大夫，索其說於通弟王凝，凝退而求之，得《中說》百餘紙，雜記不著篇目。貞觀十九年，凝以《中說》授統之子福時，福時始編爲十篇，勒成十卷，其事備見於福時所撰《王氏家書雜錄》，其篇目但以篇首二字爲之：如《文中子》曰“甚矣！王道難行也”，即以《王道》爲目；房玄齡問事君，即以《事君》爲目；劉玄問《易》，即以《問易》爲目。十篇皆此類，非通所自定。亦如《論語》篇目，乃門弟子所纂集，止取篇首二字爲目：如“學而時習之”，即以《學而》爲目；“爲政以德”，即以《爲政》爲目，非有他意義也。阮氏不察，乃以《文中子》十篇作敘篇，曲折附會而爲之說，則誤矣。¹

可見，《中說》無論是從篇目來源來說，還是從內容來說，確爲仿《論語》之作。

《女論語》是唐代貞元年間宋若莘、宋若昭姐妹模仿《論語》而撰寫的一部女子訓誡教材。據《新唐書》〈宋若昭傳〉記載，“若莘誨諸妹如嚴師，著《女論語》十篇，大抵准《論語》，以韋宣文君代孔子，曹大家等爲顏、冉，推明婦道所宜。若昭又爲傳申釋之”。另據《舊唐書》〈宋若昭傳〉記載，“若莘教誨諸四妹，有如嚴師，著《女論語》十篇，其言模仿《論語》，以韋逞母宣文君宋氏代仲尼，以曹大家等代顏、閔，悉以婦道所尚。若昭注釋，皆有理致。貞元中，昭義節度使李抱貞表薦以聞。德宗俱召入宮”。該書共分“立身”、“學作”、“學禮”、“早起”、“事父母”、“事舅姑”、“事夫”、“訓男女”、“營家”、“待客”、“和柔”、“守節”十二章，詳細具體地講述了女性爲女、爲妻、爲母所應遵循的行爲處事原則。堪稱中國古代儒家女性教育的代表作，對儒家禮教思想在女性群體中的傳播產生了深遠的影響。

第二，《論語》被廣泛徵引。在唐代，《論語》成爲人們徵引較爲廣泛的經典，這在《全唐文》中有據可查。其徵引涉及到《論語》的所有篇目，既有直引，也有間接引用。直接引用，如《全唐文》卷十四高宗《冊紀五慎澤州刺史文》中有“造次於仁”句，出自《里仁》篇；卷二十七玄宗《緩徵詔》中有“百姓不足，君孰與足”句，出自《顏淵》篇；卷一百五十五馬周《上太宗疏》中有“吾不與祭，如不祭”句，出自《八佾》篇。間接引用，如《全唐文》卷二十玄宗《命張說等與兩省侍臣講讀制》中有“德之不修，學之不講，是吾憂也”、“既富而教”和“道德齊禮”句，分別引自《述而》篇、《子路》篇和《爲政》篇；卷九十六武皇后《搜訪賢良詔》中有“十室之邑，忠信尚存”、“三人同行，我師猶在”句，分別引自《公冶長》篇和《述而》篇。有時是直接引用和間接引用並行，如卷一百六十六盧照鄰《與洛陽名流朝士乞藥直書》有“有能一日用其力於仁者

¹ 王觀國，《學林》，頁47-48。

乎？未有力不足者”、“君子無終食之間違仁”、“在輿則倚於衡”和“仁遠乎哉！我欲仁，斯仁至矣”句，分別出自〈里仁〉篇（前两句）、〈衛靈公〉篇和〈述而〉篇，其中既有直引，也有間接引用。卷三百二十二蕭穎士《爲陳正卿進續尚書表》中有“堯之爲君也，煥乎其文章”和“殷因於夏禮，周因於殷禮，所損益可知也”句，兩者分別來自〈泰伯〉篇和〈爲政〉篇，也是直引和間引並用。

第三，《論語》已滲入人們的社會生活中。

一是《論語》經文在唐代家訓中頻頻出現。如曾任唐中宗宰相的蘇瓌在其子蘇頲出任宰相時寫了一篇戒子從政的文字，名曰《中樞龜鏡》。其中在談到邊防事務時引用了《論語》〈子路〉篇“不教而戰，是謂棄之”，告戒兒子要注意邊防建設：“欲庶而富，在乎久安。不教而戰，是謂棄之。佐理在乎謹守制度，俾邊將嚴兵修斥堠，使封疆不侵。不必誤廣，徒費中國，事無益也。”²又中唐散文大家李華《與弟莒書》曰：“昔田仁、任安俱爲大將軍舍人，臥馬廄中。無何，詔大將軍出征匈奴，遣大夫趙禹選大將軍官屬，舍人衣服鮮明，二子冠帶憔悴。趙禹獨與二子言論於禁中，即日召見，皆拜二千石。汝有二子之實，未遇趙公之舉。馬廄高眠，古今一也。又仲尼嘗爲委吏，歎曰：‘富貴如可求，雖執鞭之士，吾亦爲之’。魏舒爲郎官，時屬沙汰，乃祇被而出，自言曰：‘當自我始。’大才當大用，如時人不識，何爲歎憤哉！先師曰：‘不患無位，患所以立。’汝當自修，況事叔父。吾之休廢，永無榮耀於伯仲之間。自非深仁高義，長才厚德，又焉肯惠於朽壤枯木哉？莒省吾意，當努力也。”³李華這封書信，突出強調了孔子所說的“不患無位，患所以立”，諄諄教導弟弟人貴自立，不怕沒有名分和地位，只怕缺乏立身於世的志氣和本領。

二是品評人物徵引《論語》。如楊炯《常州刺史伯父東平楊公墓志銘》說：“公簡貴不交流俗，非禮不動，非禮不行。望之儼然，聽其言也厲。”⁴其中“非禮不動，非禮不行”間接引用了〈顏淵〉篇中的內容，“望之儼然，聽其言也厲”來自〈子張〉篇。韓愈《答胡生書》中評價胡生說：“謀道不謀食，樂以忘憂者，生之謂矣。”⁵其中“謀道不謀食”、“樂以忘憂”分別出自〈衛靈公〉篇和〈述而〉篇。李翱《楊烈婦傳》說：“若楊氏者，婦人也。孔子曰：‘仁者必有勇。’楊氏當之矣。”⁶其中“仁者必有勇”來自〈憲問〉篇。

三是《論語》成爲愉心悅情的酒令。在唐代，《論語》成爲飲酒時的酒令籌。1982年1月，在江蘇省鎮江市丹徒縣丁卯橋出土了唐代“論語玉燭”酒令籌筒，中有令籌50枚，形制大小相同，每枚令籌正面刻有令辭，上半段選錄《論語》語句，下半段是酒令的具體內容，包括飲酒的對象、方法和數量。具體內容如下：

² 陸林，《中國家訓大觀》，頁272-273。

³ 陸林，《中國家訓大觀》，頁280。

⁴ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁1978-1979。

⁵ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5592。

⁶ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁6465。

與(有)朋自遠方來,不亦樂(說)乎。上客五分。
巧言令色,鮮矣人(仁)。自飲五分。
愛眾,而親人(仁)。勸意到。
與朋友交,言而有信。請人伴十分。
君子不重則不威。勸官高處十分。
恭近於禮樂,遠恥辱也。放。
敏於事而慎於言。放。
貧兒(而)無谄,富兒(而)無嬌(驕)。任勸兩人。⁷

爲政以德,譬如北辰。官上高處十分。⁸

管仲之器小哉。放。⁹

擇不處人(仁),焉得智(知)。上下各五分。
未曾(不能)以禮讓爲國乎。好爭令處五分。
君子欲訥於言而敏於行。恭默處七分。
朋友數斯疏矣。勸主人五分。¹⁰

道不行乘桴浮於海。自飲十分。
聞一[以]知十。勸玉燭錄事五分。
敏而好學,不恥下問。律事五分。
十室之邑,必有忠信。請許兩人伴。¹¹

乘肥馬,衣輕裘。衣服鮮好處十分。
與爾鄰里鄉黨乎。上下各七分。
斯人也而有斯疾也。勸大戶十分。
一簞食,一瓢飲。自酌五分。¹²

子在齊[聞]韶,三月不知肉味,上主人五分。
擇其善者而從之。大器四十分。
苟有過,人必知之。新放蓋處五分。¹³

不在其位,不謀其正(政)。錄事五分。
學而(如)不及,猶恐失之。自飲七分。¹⁴

子罕言利與命與人(仁)。放。
吾少也賤,固(故)多能鄙事。錄事十分。
瞻之在前,忽然(焉)在後。來遲處五分。
君子居之,何漏(陋)之有。自飲十分。
後生可畏。少年處五分。
疋(匹)夫不可奪志也。自飲十分。¹⁵

⁷ 《論語》,〈學而〉。

⁸ 《論語》,〈爲政〉。

⁹ 《論語》,〈八佾〉。

¹⁰ 《論語》,〈里仁〉。

¹¹ 《論語》,〈公冶長〉。

¹² 《論語》,〈雍也〉。

¹³ 《論語》,〈述而〉。

¹⁴ 《論語》,〈泰伯〉。

食不□(厭)精。勸主人五分。
唯酒無量不及亂。大戶十分。¹⁶

夫人不言，言必有中。任勸意到。¹⁷

尅(克)已復禮，天下歸仁焉。在座勸十分。
出門如見大賓。勸主人五分。
己所不欲，勿施於人。放。
死生有命，實貴在天。自飲十分。
四海之內，皆為兄弟(皆兄弟也)。任勸十分。
駟不及舌。多語處十分。¹⁸

刑罰不中則□(民)無所措(錯)手足。觥錄事五分。¹⁹

樂然後□(笑)，人不厭(厭)其□(笑)。勸意到。²⁰

軍旅之事，未之學也。放。²¹

陳力就烈(列)，不能者止。放。²²

割雞焉用牛刀。勸律錄事七分。
天何言哉，四時行焉。在座各勸十分。
惡居下流而訕上者。末座兩人各十分。²³

由上可見，這些酒令籌的文字，有的缺筆，有的簡化，有的通假，有的異體，還有的錯漏，但無一例外都出自《論語》，只是與通行之版本略有不同而已。酒令籌的下半部分，規定酒令的內容，所涉及對象有25種之多，共分飲、勸、處、放四種情況。“飲”主要包括自飲、自酌、請人伴、許請兩人伴、上主人飲、上下飲、大戶飲、大器飲、上客飲、就錄事飲、玉燭錄事飲等；“勸”主要包括任勸、任勸兩人、勸主人、勸意到、在座勸、在座各勸、勸大戶、勸律錄事等；“處”指處罰酒，主要包括官上高處、頻得勸人處、恭默處、來遲處、少年處、多語處、好爭令處、衣服鮮好處、新放盞處等；“放”即每人都不飲，重新開始。飲酒之量有五分、七分、十分、四十分之說。按，唐人以“十分”為一杯，也就是少則半杯，多則四杯。²⁴

¹⁵ 《論語》，〈子罕〉。

¹⁶ 《論語》，〈鄉黨〉。

¹⁷ 《論語》，〈先進〉。

¹⁸ 《論語》，〈顏淵〉。

¹⁹ 《論語》，〈子路〉。

²⁰ 《論語》，〈憲問〉。

²¹ 《論語》，〈衛靈公〉。

²² 《論語》，〈季氏〉。

²³ 《論語》，〈陽貨〉。

²⁴ 陸九皋、劉興，〈論語玉燭考略〉，頁34-36。

《論語玉燭》的出現，說明《論語》在唐代已經相當普及，業已深入人們的日常生活。

第四，出現了就《論語》中的某個問題予以專論的文章。如《全唐文》卷五百三十四中李觀的《辨曾參不為孔門十哲論》、卷五百五十七韓愈的《省試顏子不貳過論》、卷五百八十四柳宗元的《乘桴說》、卷五百九十八歐陽詹的《懷州應宏詞試片言折獄論》等。其中柳宗元寫道：

子曰：“道不行，乘桴浮於海，從我者其由與！”子路聞之喜。子曰：“由也，好勇過我，無所取材。”說曰：海與桴與材，皆喻也。海者，聖人至道之本，所以浩然而遊息者也。桴者，所以遊息之具也。材者，所以為桴者也。《易》曰：“復其見天地之心乎？”則天地之心者，聖人之海也。復者，聖人之桴也。所以復者，桴之材也。孔子自以拯生入之道，不得行乎其時，將復於至道而遊息焉。謂由也勇於聞義，果於避世，故許其從之也。其終曰“無所取材”云者，言子路徒勇於聞義，果於避世，而未得所以為復者也。此以退子路兼人之氣，而明復之難耳。然則有其材以為其桴，而遊息於海，其聖人乎？子謂顏淵曰：“用之則行，舍之則藏，唯我與爾有是夫！”由是而言，以此追庶幾之說，則回近得矣。而曰“其由也與”者，當是歎也，回死矣夫。或問曰“子必聖人之云爾乎？”曰：“吾何敢？吾以廣異聞，且使遁世者得吾言以為學，其於無悶也，捷焉而已矣。”²⁵

此處，柳宗元專門圍繞《論語》〈公冶長〉篇中的“乘桴浮於海”展開論述，在他看來，“海與桴與材”皆是比喻之說，並非孔子真實想法，他只是藉以抒懷而已，其意圖旨在與弟子“復於至道而遊息焉”。

第五，出現了以《論語》經文為主題的賦文。如白居易的《省試性習相近遠賦》（以“君子之所慎焉”為韻）和君子不器賦（以“用之則行，無施不可”為韻）、王起的《弋不射宿賦》（以“君子仁及飛鳥”為韻）、浩虛舟的《行不由徑賦》（以“處心行道，有如此焉”為韻）、蔣防的《草上之風賦》（以“君子之德，風偃乎草”為韻）等。其中白居易的《省試性習相近遠賦》寫道：

噫！下自人，上達君。德以慎立，而性由習分。習則生常，將俾夫善惡區別；慎之在始，必辨乎是非糾紛。原夫性相近者，豈不以有教無類，其歸於一揆；習相遠者，豈不以殊途異致，乃差於千里。昏明波注，導為愚智之源；邪正歧分，開成理亂之軌。安得不稽其本，謀其始。觀所恒，察所以。考成敗而取捨，審臧否而行止。俾流遁者返迷途於騷人，積習者遵要道於君子。且夫德莫德於老氏，乃曰道是從矣；聖莫聖於宣尼，亦曰非生知之。則知德在修身，將見素而抱樸；聖由志學，必切問而近思。在乎積藝業於黍累，慎言行於毫釐。故得其門，志彌篤兮，性彌近矣；由其徑，習愈精兮，道愈遠而其旨可顯，其義可舉。勿謂習之近，徇跡而相背重阻；勿謂性之遠，反真而相去幾許。亦猶一源派別，隨渾澄而或濁或清；一氣脈分，任吹煦而為寒為暑。是以君子稽古於時習之初，辨惑於成性之所。然則性者中之和，習者外之徇。中和思於馴致，外徇戒於妄進。非所習而習則性

²⁵ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5899。

傷，得所習而習則性順。故聖與狂由乎念與罔念，福與禍在乎慎與不
慎。慎之義，莫匪乎率道爲本，見善而遷。觀誠僞於既往，審進退於
未然。故得之則至性大同，若水濟水也；失之則眾心不等，猶面隔面
焉。誠哉性習之說，吾將以爲教先。²⁶

該文以“君子之所慎焉”爲官韻，圍繞“學習和慎重選擇學習內容對於人
社會本性養成這一問題陳述己見”，“不僅切中題意鋪衍成文，而且自覺迎
合時代精神，語必宗經，言中章句，顯示出其深厚的經學根底；同時在程
式的規範下通過迎合命題旨趣展現了自己的學優才高”，²⁷ 成爲了唐代科場
試賦作品中的典範。

三、《孟子》的流傳與升格

隋唐時期，《孟子》是學者們喜歡研習的儒家典籍之一，誠如楊俊《荀子
序》所言：“《孟子》有趙氏《章句》，漢氏亦嘗立博士，傳習不絕。故今之君
子，多好其書。”²⁸ 伴隨著儒學復興運動的興起，孟子其人和其書的地位也
漸趨提升。這主要表現在：

第一，《孟子》成爲士人時常引述的經書之一。這一點主要體現在《全唐
詩》和《全唐文》中。通過檢視二書，“我們發現，唐代士人對孟子的關注從初
盛唐到中晚唐明顯地呈現出漸次增強的態勢。初盛唐時期，只有魏徵、劉知
幾、盧照鄰、王勃、張九齡、李華、楊綰、趙匡等人在其詩文中提到孟子，但
是到了中晚唐，人數就明顯增多了。如梁肅、柳冕、韓愈、柳宗元、孟郊、李
程、李翱、李宗閔、李德裕、權德輿、白居易、張籍、皇甫湜、王叡、杜牧、
李商隱、羅隱、皮日休、陸龜蒙、林慎思、李璣、來鵠、程晏等。這其中不僅
有韓愈、柳宗元、白居易、李商隱、杜牧等詩文大家，還有李宗閔、李德
裕、權德輿等在政治上有影響力的士人。可見，在中晚唐的士人階層，關注
孟子已成爲一種很普遍的文化現象”。²⁹ 如王勃曾提及孟子的“浩然之氣”思
想：“有時無主，賈生獻流涕之書；有志無時，孟軻養浩然之氣。”³⁰ 梁肅
《梁高士碣》中有“孟子稱：‘聞柳下惠之風者，鄙夫寬，薄夫敦’”句，³¹ 語出
《孟子》〈盡心下〉；《房正字墓誌銘》中有“孟子云：‘雖有錙基，不如待時’”
句，³² 語出《孟子》〈公孫丑上〉。韓愈《上張僕射書》中有“孟子有云：今之諸

²⁶ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁6675-6676。

²⁷ 王士祥，〈筆精思密——論白居易性習相近遠賦的藝術特徵〉，頁24。

²⁸ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁7522。

²⁹ 蘭翠，〈韓愈尊崇孟子探因——兼論唐人對孟子的接受〉，頁27。

³⁰ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁1824。

³¹ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5286。

³² 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5291。

侯無大相過者，以其皆‘好臣其所教，而不好臣其所受教’，今之時，與孟子之時又加遠矣，皆好其聞命而奔走者，不好其直己而行道者”句，³³語出《孟子》〈公孫丑下〉。

第二，力圖將《孟子》納入科考經書之列，從制度層面推崇孟子。這主要體現在楊綰和趙匡的上疏中。唐肅宗寶應二年(763)，禮部侍郎楊綰上疏請求將《孟子》列為孝廉舉人兼習可考試的經書：“孝廉舉人，請取精通一經。每經問義二十條，皆須旁通諸義，深識微言；試策三道，每日問一道，問古今理體。取堪行用者，經義及策全通為上第，望付吏部便與官；義通七、策通二為中第，與出身；下第者罷之。《論語》、《孝經》，聖人深旨；《孟子》，儒門之達者，望兼習此三者為一經，其試如上。”³⁴建議將《孟子》與《論語》、《孝經》一起列為一經，意欲拉升《孟子》的地位。趙匡也曾提出類似的建議，其《舉人條例》說：“其有通《禮記》、《尚書》、《論語》、《孝經》之外，更通《道德》諸經，通《元經》、《孟子》、《荀卿子》、《呂氏春秋》、《管子》、《墨子》、《韓子》，謂之茂才舉。”³⁵及至皮日休，他更上層樓，專門撰寫了《請《孟子》為學科書》，建議將《孟子》增列到設科取士的經書序列：“臣聞聖人之道，不過乎經。經之降者，不過乎史。史之降者，不過乎子。子不異乎道者，孟子也。舍是子者，必戾乎經史。又率於子者，則聖人之盜也。夫孟子之文，粲若經傳。天惜其道，不燼於秦。自漢氏得其書，常置博士以專其學。故其文繼乎六藝，光乎百氏，真聖人之微旨也。若然者，何其道奕奕於前，而其書沒沒於後？得非道拘乎正，文極乎奧，有好邪者憚正而不舉，嗜淺者鄙奧而無稱耶？蓋仲尼愛文王嗜昌黎以取味，後之人將愛仲尼者，其嗜在孟子矣。嗚呼！古之士以湯武為逆取者，其不讀《孟子》乎？以楊墨為達智者，其不讀《孟子》乎？由是觀之，孟子之功利於人，亦不輕矣。今有司除茂才明經外，其次有熟莊周、列子書者，亦登於科。其誘善也雖深，而懸科也未正。夫莊、列之文，荒唐之文也。讀之可以為方外之士，習之可以為鴻荒之民。安有能汲汲以救時補教為志哉？伏請命有司去莊、列之書，以《孟子》為主。有能精通其義者，其科選視明經。苟若是也，不謝漢之博士矣。既遂之，如儒道不行，聖化無補，則可刑其言者。”³⁶雖然三人的建議均未能實行，但無形中卻抬高了《孟子》的地位。

第三，圍繞《孟子》的學說開展專題討論。如“性善論”是孟子思想的核心學說之一，圍繞著此學說，唐代學者發表了不同的意見。如韓愈就批評了孟子的性善說，指出孟子“人之性善”說“舉其中而遺其上下者也，得其一而失其二者也”，並舉例說“叔魚之生也，其母視之，知其必以賄死；楊食我之

³³ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5591。

³⁴ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁3357。

³⁵ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁3604。

³⁶ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁8350。

生也，叔向之母聞其號也，知必滅其宗；越椒之生也，子文以為大戚，知若敖氏之鬼不食也。人之性果善乎？”³⁷ 皇甫湜的《孟子荀子言性論》認為孟子性善說與荀子性惡說均是一偏之說，孟子的目的是“勸人汰心源返天理者”，荀子的目的是“勸人黜嗜欲求善良”，兩者殊途而同歸，只不過孟子之說“合經為多，故為賢”罷了。其文曰：

孟子曰：“人之性善。”荀子曰：“其善者偽也。”是於聖人，皆一偏之論也。推而言之，性之品有三，下愚、中人、上智是也。聖人言性之品亦有三，可上、可下、不移是也。黃帝生而神靈，幼而徇齊；文王在母不憂，在師不煩；後稷不坼不副，克岐克嶷。之謂上智矣。齊桓公以管仲輔之則理，以易牙輔之則亂；子夏出見紛華而悅，入聞仁義而樂。之謂中人矣。越椒之生，熊虎之狀；叔魚之生，溪壑之心。謂下愚矣。是故有有生而惡者，得稱性善乎哉？有生而善者，得稱性惡乎哉？故曰孟子、荀卿之言，其於聖人，皆一偏之說也。窮理盡性，惟聖人能之。宜乎微言絕而異端作，大義乖而偏說行。孟子大儒也，荀卿亦大儒也，是豈特開異門，故持曲辯哉？蓋思有所未至，明有所不周耳。即二子之說，原其始而要其終，其於輔教化尊仁義，亦殊趨而一致，異派而同源也。何以明之？孟子以為惻隱之心，人皆有之，是非之心，人皆有之，性之生善，由水之趨下，物誘於外，情動於中，然後之惡焉，是勸人汰心源返天理者也。荀子曰：“人之生不知尊親，長習於教，然後知焉；人之幼不知禮讓，長習於教，然後知焉。”是勸人黜嗜欲求善良者也。一則舉本而推末，一則自葉而流根，故曰二子之說，殊趨而一致，異派而同源也。雖然，孟子之心，以人性皆如堯舜，未至者斯勉矣；荀卿之言，以人之性皆如桀瞽，則不及者斯怠矣。《書》曰：“唯人最靈。”《記》曰：“人生而靜，感於物而動。”則孟之言，合經為多，益故為賢乎。³⁸

杜牧則持相反觀點，在他看來，愛怒是惡之端，只有受到禮法約束，才能“不出於道”，從這一角度來講，荀子的性惡論較孟子學說為佳。其《三子言性辯》說：

孟子言人性善，荀子言人性惡，楊子言人性善惡混。曰喜、曰哀、曰懼、曰惡、曰欲、曰愛、曰怒，夫七者情也，情出於性也。夫七情中，愛者怒者，生而自能。是二者性之根，惡之端也。乳兒見乳必爭求，不得即啼，是愛與怒與兒俱生也，夫豈知其五者焉。既壯，而五者隨而生焉。或有或亡，或厚或薄，至於愛、怒，曾不須與與乳兒相離，而至於壯也。君子之性，愛怒淡然，不出於道。中人可以上下者，有愛拘於禮，有怒懼於法也。世有禮法，其有逾者，不敢恣其情；世無禮法，亦隨而熾焉。至於小人，雖有禮法而不能制，愛則求之，求之不得即怒，怒則亂。故曰愛、怒者，性之本，惡之端，與乳兒俱生，相隨而至於壯也。凡言性情之善者，多引舜、禹；言不善者，多引丹朱、商均。夫舜、禹二君子，生人以來，如二君子者凡有幾人？不可引以為喻。丹朱、商均為堯、舜子，夫生於堯、舜之世，被其化，皆為善人，況生於其室，親為父子，蒸不能潤，灼不能熱，是其惡與堯、舜之

³⁷ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5650。

³⁸ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁7032。

善等耳。天止一日月耳，言光明者，豈可引以為喻。人之品類，可與上下者眾，可與上下之性，愛怒居多。愛、怒者，惡之端也。苟言人之性惡，比於二子，苟得多矣。³⁹

李商隱對孟子的性善說稱讚有加，他說：“孟子之言性善，抑揚今古，秀絕天人。”⁴⁰

又，針對孟子的王霸之說，李宗閔做《隨論》上下篇，對世人對孟子王霸之辯中存在的疑問予以了——辯說，批判了孟子的個別主張：

客有問宗閔曰：“孟軻稱齊王由反手，謂管仲為不足為。若是則功業存乎人，不存乎時，不亦信乎？”宗閔曰：非也。可以王而王，可以霸而霸，非人之所能為也，皆此時也。人皆奉時以行道者也，不能由道以作時者也；能因變以建功者也，不能由功以反變者也。客有曰：“王霸之事，既聞之矣。或言伊尹負鼎，百里奚飯牛，而孟軻非之，曰未聞枉己而直人者也。又曰聖人之行不同，潔其身而已矣。又可信乎？”宗閔曰：非也。聖人以枉道為恥，以屈道為辱，不以屈身為辱。唯守其道，故雖辱其身而進焉，非其道，故潔其身而退焉。進退豈有他，唯道所在而已矣。進取之士，誠能察伊尹顏淵之所以進退，思仲尼執鞭亦為，觀大《易》動靜不失其時，後匹夫之果其行，無忘兼濟之道，則雖有甚於牛鼎之恥，吾將歌誦之不暇，又何譏焉！若果孟軻之言，則人之相率獨其善而已矣，惡能理天下哉！⁴¹

雖然上述專題討論以批評孟子學說為主，但從另一方面卻也反映出學者們對孟子的關注度在不斷升溫。

第四，將孟子視為儒學傳承鏈條上極為重要的一環。唐初，盧照鄰在論及儒學傳承時，依然是荀孟並稱，他說：“昔文王既沒，道不在於茲乎；尼父克生，禮盡歸於是矣。其後荀卿、孟子，服儒者之褒衣；屈平、宋玉，弄詞人之柔翰。”⁴²“自獲麟絕筆，一千三四百年，游、夏之門，時有荀卿、孟子；屈、宋之後，直至賈誼、相如。”⁴³及至韓愈，則認為孟子繼承孔子之道更純粹一些，而荀子則有些差距：“始吾讀孟軻書，然後知孔子之道尊，聖人之道易行，王易王，霸易霸也。以為孔子之徒沒，尊聖人者，孟氏而已。晚得揚雄書，益尊信孟氏。因雄書而孟氏益尊，則雄者亦聖人之徒歟！聖人之道，不傳於世；周之衰，好事者各以其說干時君，紛紛藉藉相亂，《六經》與百家之說錯雜，然老師大儒猶在。火於秦，黃老於漢，其存而醇者，孟軻氏而止耳，揚雄氏而止耳。及得荀氏書，於是又知有荀氏者也。考其辭，時若不粹；要其歸，與孔子異者鮮矣，抑猶在軻、雄之間乎？孔子刪《詩》、《書》，筆削《春秋》，合於道者著之，離於道者

³⁹ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁7816。

⁴⁰ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁8100。

⁴¹ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁7331-7333。

⁴² 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁1691。

⁴³ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁1692。

黜去之，故《詩》、《書》、《春秋》無疵。余欲削荀氏之不合者，附於聖人之籍，亦孔子之志歟！孟氏，醇乎醇者也。荀與揚，大醇而小疵。”⁴⁴稍後的陸龜蒙在《大儒評》亦公開宣稱荀子不如孟子：“世以孟軻氏、荀卿子爲大儒，觀其書不悖孔子之道，非儒而何？然李斯嘗學於荀卿，入秦干始皇帝，並天下，用爲左丞相。一旦誘諸生，聚而坑之。復下禁曰：‘天下敢有藏百家語，詣守尉燒之。偶語詩書者棄市。’昔孔子之於弟子也，自仲由冉求以下，皆言其可使之才。及其仁，則曰不知也。斯聞孔子之道於荀卿，位至丞相，是行其道得其志者也，反焚滅詩書，坑殺儒士，爲不仁也甚矣。不知不仁，孰謂況賢？知而傳之以道，是昧觀德也。雖斯具五刑，而況得稱大儒乎？吾以爲不如孟軻。”⁴⁵在標舉孟子比荀子更接近孔子之道的同時，韓愈等人也開始釐定孟子在儒學傳承環節中的位置。在韓愈看來，無孟子，則孔子之道的承傳恐成問題，他說：“孟子雖賢聖，不得位，空言無施，雖切何補？然賴其言，而今學者尚知宗孔氏，崇仁義，貴王賤霸而已。其大經大法，皆亡滅而不救，壞爛而不收，所謂存十一於千百，安在其能廓如也？然向無孟氏，則皆服左衽而言侏離矣。故愈嘗推尊孟氏，以爲功不在禹下者，爲此也。”⁴⁶因此，孟子在儒學傳承上居功甚偉。於是乎，他將荀子排除在儒學傳承環節之外，由孟子直達揚雄：“己之道乃夫子、孟子、揚雄所傳之道也”，“自文王沒，武王、周公、成康相與守之，禮樂皆在。及乎夫子，未久也；自夫子而及乎孟子，未久也；自孟子而及乎揚雄，亦未久也。然猶其勤若此，其困若此，而後能有所立，吾其可易而爲之哉！”⁴⁷在此基礎上，他確立了孟子的傳道地位，指出，欲求孔子之道必自孟子始：“孟軻師子思，子思之學，蓋出曾子。自孔子沒，群弟子莫不有書，獨孟軻氏之傳得其宗，故吾少而樂觀焉。太原王崑示予所爲文，好舉孟子之所道者。與之言，信悅孟子，而屢贊其文辭。夫沿河而下，苟不止，雖有遲疾，必至於海。如不得其道也，雖疾不止，終莫幸而至焉。故學者必慎其所道。道於楊、墨、老、莊、佛之學，而欲之聖人之道，猶航斷港絕潢，以望至於海也。故求觀聖人之道，必自孟子始。”⁴⁸不僅指出了孟子的師承，而且確立了其傳道的唯一性。

韓愈還進而確定了孟子在道統中的位置：“斯吾所謂道也，非向所謂老與佛之道也。堯以是傳之舜，舜以是傳之禹，禹以是傳之湯，湯以是傳之文武、周公，文武、周公傳之孔子，孔子傳之孟軻，軻之死，不得其傳焉。”⁴⁹如此一來，孟子的重要性就更加突顯了。

第五，孟子得以配享孔廟。據韓愈《處州孔子廟碑》記載，處州刺史李繁上任伊始，便興建孔廟，孟子得以配享。他說：“自天子至郡邑守長，通

⁴⁴ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5656。

⁴⁵ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁8413。

⁴⁶ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5602。

⁴⁷ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5578。

⁴⁸ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5620-5621。

⁴⁹ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5650。

得祀而遍天下者，唯社稷與孔子爲然。而社祭土，稷祭穀，句龍與棄，乃其佐享，非其專主，又其位所，不屋而壇；豈如孔子用王者事，巍然當座，以門人爲配。自天子而下，北面跪祭；進退誠敬，禮如親弟子者。句龍、棄以功，孔子以德，固自有次第哉！自古多有以功德得其位者，不得常祀；句龍、棄、孔子，皆不得位，而得常祀；然其祀事，皆不如孔子之盛。所謂生人以來，未有如孔子者。其賢過於堯舜遠者，此其效歟！郡邑皆有孔子廟，或不能修事，雖設博士弟子，或役於有司，名存實亡，失其所業。獨處州刺史鄴侯李繁至官，能以爲先。既新作孔子廟，又令工改爲顏子至子夏十人像，其餘六十二子，及後大儒公羊高、左丘明、孟軻、荀況、伏生、毛公、韓生、董生、高堂生、揚雄、鄭玄等數十人，皆圖之壁。”⁵⁰一方面闡明了修建孔子廟的意義，一方面指出了處州孔廟的特別之處，那就是將孟子等人也“圖之壁”，接受配祭。這也從一個側面說明當時尊孟的風氣。

四、《大學》、《中庸》的流傳及學術地位的提升

《大學》作爲《禮記》中的一篇，在唐以前並沒有引起人們的格外關注，泯然眾篇而已。誠如馮友蘭先生所言：“《大學》本爲《禮記》中之一篇，又爲荀學，漢以後至唐，無特別稱道之者。”⁵¹及至中唐，面對道佛大行、儒家式微之形勢，部分學者欲倡明儒學，《大學》也開始進入人們的視野。如陸贄在《論裴延齡奸蠹書》中論及“是以古先聖哲之立言垂訓，必殷勤切至，以小人爲戒者，豈將有意讎而沮之哉。誠以其蔽主之明，害時之理，致禍之源博，傷善之釁深，所以有國有家者，不得不去耳”這一問題時，曾引用說：“在《禮記》則曰：‘小人行險以徼幸’，‘長國家而務財用者，必自小人矣。小人使爲國家，而災害並至，雖有善人，無如之何’。”⁵²其中“長國家而務財用者，必自小人矣。小人使爲國家，而災害並至，雖有善人，無如之何”來源自《大學》，其文曰：“長國家而務財用者，必自小人矣。彼爲善之，小人之使爲國家，災害並至。雖有善者，亦無如之何矣！”

在《論敘遷幸之由狀》中，陸贄駁斥“家國禍福，皆有天命”論時，曾引證《禮記》：“《禮記》引詩而釋之曰：‘〈大雅〉云：‘殷之未喪師，克配上帝，儀監於殷，駿命不易。’言得眾則得國，失眾則失國也’。”⁵³其文源自《大學》：“《詩》云：‘殷之未喪師，克配上帝，儀監於殷，峻命不易。’道得眾則得國，失眾則失國。”

⁵⁰ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5678。

⁵¹ 馮友蘭，《三松堂學術文集》，頁216。

⁵² 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁4761。

⁵³ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁4777。

又，在《奉天請罷瓊林大盈二庫狀》中，陸贄為論證“聖人之立教也，賤貨而尊讓，遠利而尚廉”之意時，兩次引用了《大學》的經文“貨悖而入，必悖而出”，“財散則民聚，財聚則民散”。⁵⁴

雖然陸贄幾次引證《大學》，但他並沒有使之與儒家心性之學聯繫起來。真正使《大學》走上前臺展現其作用的則是韓愈，他做《原道》，以明儒家之道，以破佛老“治心而外天下國家”之非，使之不僅適用於個人之內在修養，而且可以用於治國理政。他說：“《傳》曰：‘古之欲明明德於天下者，先治其國；欲治其國者，先齊其家；欲齊其家者，先修其身；欲修其身者，先正其心；欲正其心者，先誠其意。’然則，古之所謂正心而誠意者，將以有為也。今也欲治其心，而外天下國家，滅其天常，子焉而不父其父，臣焉而不君其君。”⁵⁵在這段文字中，韓愈通過引證《大學》，強調指出要注重內心修養，只有心術正、意念誠，才能有所作為，才能齊家治國平天下。也就是由內聖而外王。同時，批評了佛教的只知“治心”不知治國、拋棄倫理綱常的錯誤論調。陳寅恪就此指出：“退之首先發見《小戴記》中〈大學〉一篇，闡明其說，抽象之心性與具體之政治社會組織可以融會無礙，即儘量談心說性，兼能濟世安民，雖相反而實相成，天竺為體，華夏為用，退之於此奠定後來宋代新儒學之基礎。”⁵⁶

相對於《大學》而言，《中庸》的關注度更高些。在《全唐文》中就有幾處直接提及《中庸》。如李華《唐贈太子少師崔公神道碑》曰：

《禮》之〈中庸〉曰：“父為士，子為大夫，葬以士，祭以大夫。”⁵⁷

權德輿《唐故義武軍節度使營田易定等州觀察處置使開府儀同三司檢校司空同中書門下平章事範陽郡王贈太師貞武張公遺愛碑銘（並序）》曰：

《禮》之〈中庸〉曰：“誠之不可揜。”⁵⁸

陳諫《勸聽政表》〈第二表〉曰：

《禮》之〈中庸〉曰：“武王、周公，其達孝乎！夫孝者，善繼人之志，善述人之事者也。”⁵⁹

邱光庭《論地浮於大海中》曰：

⁵⁴ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁4792-4793。

⁵⁵ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5649頁。

⁵⁶ 陳寅恪，《金明館叢稿初編》，頁288。

⁵⁷ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁3229。

⁵⁸ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5059。

⁵⁹ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁7000。

漁翁問曰：“《中庸》云（《禮記》篇名也）：‘地之廣厚，振河海而不泄（鄭元注云：振，收也。）’則是海居地上。子云地浮於海中，何也？”答曰：“作《記》之人（作《禮記》之人也），欲明積小致大，極言地之廣厚，非實也（《中庸》云：‘今夫地一撮土之多也，及其廣厚，載華嶽而不重，振河海而不泄。萬物生焉。’為其意言積小致大，地從撮土之多，遂能收河海而不泄，此立教之文非窮理也）。”⁶⁰

也有幾處雖出自《中庸》，但未明言的。如陸贄《奉天請數對群臣兼許令論事狀》中的“誠者物之終始，不誠無物”，⁶¹《謝密旨因論所宣事狀》中的“《禮記》云：‘凡為天下國家有九經’，其一曰：‘理亂持危，朝聘以時，厚往而薄來，所以懷諸侯也’。”⁶²權德輿《釋疑》中的“《記》曰：‘君子居易以俟命’。”⁶³常仲儒《河中府新修文宣王廟碑》中的“《禮》云：‘百代以俟聖人而不惑也’。”⁶⁴杜宣猷《鄭左丞祭梓華府君碑陰記》中的“《禮》云：‘君子居易以俟命，小人行險以徼幸’。”⁶⁵

時人有的也開始討論《中庸》中的問題，如歐陽詹的《自明誠論》就關注了“誠明”：

自性達物曰誠，自學達誠曰明。上聖述誠以啟明，其次考明以得誠。苟非將聖，未有不由明而致誠者。文武周孔，自性而誠者也。無其性，不可得而及矣。顏子遊夏，得誠自明者也。有其明，可得而至焉。從古而還，自明而誠者眾矣：尹喜自明誠而長生，公孫宏自明誠而為卿，張子房自明誠而輔劉，公孫鞅自明誠而佐嬴。明之於誠，猶玉待琢，器用於是乎成。故曰“玉不琢，不成器；人不學，不知道”。器者，隱於不琢而見於琢者也；誠者，隱於不明而見乎明者也。無有琢玉而不成器，用明而不至誠焉。嗚呼！既明且誠，施之身，可以正百行而通神明；處之家，可以事父母而親弟兄；遊於鄉，可以睦閭里而寧訟爭；行於國，可以輯群臣而子黎；立於朝，可以上下序；據於天下，可以教化平。明之於誠，所恨不誠也；苟誠也，蹈水火其罔害，彌天地而必答，豈止君臣鄉黨之間乎！父子兄弟之際乎！大哉！明誠也。凡百君子有明也，何不急夫誠？先師有言曰：“生而知之者上也。”所謂自性而誠者也。又曰：“學而知之者次也。”所謂自明而誠者也。且仁遠乎哉？我欲仁，斯仁至矣。夫然，則自明而誠可致也。苟致之者，與自性而誠，異派而同流矣。知之者知之，委之者知之。⁶⁶

當時的學者也開始借《中庸》來闡發己意。如韓愈《省試顏子不貳過論》說：“《中庸》曰：‘自誠明謂之性，自明誠謂之教。’自誠明者，不勉而中，不思而得，從容中道，聖人也，無過者也；自明誠者，擇善而固執之者也，不

⁶⁰ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁9380。

⁶¹ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁4784。

⁶² 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁4828。

⁶³ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5050。

⁶⁴ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5394。

⁶⁵ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁7953。

⁶⁶ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁6041-6042。

勉則不中，不思則不得，不貳過者也。”⁶⁷ 借助誠明思想來論證顏子的“不貳過”。李翱做《復性書》，欲開誠明之源，恢復“廢棄不揚”之道，使儒家的心性之說復觀於世。對此，章太炎曾說：“明心見性之儒，首推子思、孟子。唐有李習之，作《復性書》，大旨一依《中庸》。習之曾研習禪宗。……今觀《復性書》雖依《中庸》立論，其實陰習釋家之旨。”⁶⁸

權德輿注重儒家經典《中庸》和《易》，從中尋找與佛教教義的共通之處。他說：“嘗試言之，以《中庸》之‘自誠而明以盡萬物之性’，以大《易》之‘寂然不動感而遂通’，則‘方袍褒衣’，其極致一也。向使師與孔聖同時，其顏生、閔損之列歟？”⁶⁹

晚後的劉禹錫則把《中庸》中的心性與佛教的內典搭掛了起來，認為二者有異曲同工之妙。他說：“曩予習《禮》之《中庸》，至‘不勉而中，不思而得’，悚然知聖人之德，學以至於無學。然而斯言也，猶示行者以室廬之奧耳，求其筌術而布武，未易得也。晚讀佛書，見大雄念物之普，級寶山而梯之，高揭慧火，巧鎔惡見，廣疏便門，旁束邪經。其所證入，如舟訴川，未始念於前而日遠矣。夫何勉而思之邪？是余知突奧於《中庸》，啟鍵關於內典。會而歸之，猶初心也。”⁷⁰ 以《中庸》與佛學相印證，始知其堂奧，突出以佛釋儒的必要性。

這些都說明《中庸》開始受到學者的關注，其傳播在不斷擴大，其學術地位在不斷提升。

五、結論

通過以上論述，我們不難得出以下結論：

在隋唐時期，《論語》作為“先聖至言”，被視為“萬代不刊之典”和六經之精華，被人們所研讀，為人們所徵引、所效仿，不僅出現了模仿《論語》而著的《中說》和《女論語》，而且被廣泛徵引以表達思想、訓誡子弟、品評人物，在日常生活中也扮演了重要的角色。

隋唐時期，學者們對孟子的關注從初盛唐到中晚唐明顯地呈現出漸次增強的態勢，《孟子》不僅被廣泛徵引於《全唐詩》和《全唐文》中，而且楊綰和趙匡還力圖將《孟子》納入科考經書之列，從制度層面推崇孟子；不僅出現了專題討論孟子“性善說”、“王霸之辯”的文章，而且將孟子視為儒學傳承鏈條上極為重要的一環，配享孔廟。

⁶⁷ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5638。

⁶⁸ 章太炎，《國學講演錄》，頁181。

⁶⁹ 董誥等，《全唐文》，頁5104。

⁷⁰ 陶敏、陶紅雨，《劉禹錫全集編年校注》，頁191。

隋唐時期，面對道佛大行、儒家式微之形勢，部分學者欲倡明儒學，《大學》、《中庸》作為單篇開始進入人們的視野，不僅經文被直接引用，而且成為闡發心性之學和打通儒釋的載體。

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The Spread and Rise in Status of the Four Books of Confucianism during the Sui and Tang Dynasties

TANG Minggui

Abstract

In the Sui and Tang dynasties, the *Analects* (i.e. *Lunyu* 論語) was regarded as the quintessence of the Six Classics, and was the introductory reading for the study and interpretation of the six texts. Passages and sentences from the *Analects* were quoted in imperial edicts, memorials to the throne, family instructions and a number of poems, and were also often referred to in social life. As for Mencius, remarkable signs indicated its rise in status. Not only were citations, comments and interpretations seen dispersedly in various kinds of literature, but exploratory articles on specific topics and the appeal of listing it as a subject of examination also came into being. The *Great Learning* and the *Doctrine of the Mean* began to get more attention from scholars. Research articles emerged one after another on the relationship between the *Great Learning* and Confucian Mind-Nature theory, and on the relationship between The *Doctrine of the Mean* and Buddhism, indicating a rise in their academic status.

Keywords: the *Analects*, the *Mencius*, the *Great Learning*, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, Sui and Tang dynasties, spread

林希逸《莊子口義》在朝鮮的傳播、 刊行與其文化內涵

金 鎬

中文提要

《莊子》一書本具有豐富的詮釋空間，因此在不同時空背景中，往往出現不同內涵的詮釋著作。其中，（宋）林希逸的《莊子口義》具有“以儒解莊”的詮釋傾向，正因為如此，此書傳播到朝鮮與日本，並對於當時社會產生一些影響。《莊子口義》在日本的傳播問題，已有專文討論相關問題，而將林希逸《莊子口義》放在朝鮮的時空環境中加以探討的少之又少。鑒於此，本文以《莊子口義》的傳播與朝鮮學界的接受為範圍，主要探究兩個問題：首先，從版本學的角度爬梳整理主要朝鮮刊本《莊子口義》，並說明朝鮮刊本與中國刊本之間的異同；其次，對於《莊子口義》在朝鮮傳播與刊行的文化內涵，試圖加以探討，藉此窺見朝鮮學界亦有“以儒解莊”的詮釋傾向。

關鍵詞：林希逸，《莊子口義》，朝鮮刊本，以儒解莊，文化內涵

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一、前言

《莊子》一書本具有豐富的詮釋空間，因此在不同時空背景中，往往出現不同內涵的詮釋著作。郭象從玄學角度注解《莊子》、成玄英從道教觀點注解《莊子》和林希逸從儒家的角度注解《莊子》等，就是這方面顯明的例子。換言之，中國歷代注解《莊子》的著作往往代表某一時期特殊的學術背景以及獨特的詮釋傾向。在明末清初天崩地裂的環境中，不少學者從各不相同的視野關懷《莊子》，也是一個明證。¹那麼不禁有一個疑問，《莊子》以及各種注解本在東亞其他國家是否有任何影響？答案當然是肯定的。就韓國而言，《莊子》早在三國時代已傳入韓國，而且經過高麗、朝鮮時期，影響到不少文人學者的為文為學，這是毋庸置疑的。

其中，林希逸的《莊子口義》是具有代表性的例子，一些專家已經注意到此書傳播到朝鮮與日本，並對於當時社會產生一些影響。《莊子口義》在日本的傳播問題，已有專文討論相關問題，²而將林希逸《莊子口義》放在朝鮮的時空環境中加以探討的少之又少。³鑒於此，本文首先從版本學的角度爬梳整理主要朝鮮刊本《莊子口義》，藉此說明朝鮮刊本與中國刊本之間的異同，同時對於它在朝鮮傳播與刊行的文化內涵，試圖加以說明。

二、《莊子口義》在朝鮮的傳播與刊行

首先簡單地說明一下《莊子》在朝鮮的傳播與接受過程。就朝鮮而言，《莊子》的傳播與接受大致上可以16世紀後期至17世紀中期為分歧點，分為兩個階段。第一階段為建國初期至16世紀中葉，但此一時期前後對於《莊子》的看法亦並不一致。首先，建國初期，朝鮮學界在批評佛教與道教的基礎上，要鞏固性理學的地位，因而形成了避異端的風氣，如鄭道傳(1342-1398)的看法具有代表性，他在〈心問天答〉、〈心氣理篇〉與〈佛氏雜辨〉中對於

¹ 謝明陽，《明遺民的莊子定位論題》。

² 池田知久，〈林希逸莊子虞齋口義在日本〉，頁517-533。

³ 據筆者所知，相關研究成果僅有崔在穆的〈朝鮮時代における林希逸『三子虞齋口義』の受容〉(頁315-340)。這篇文章主要調查《三子虞齋口義》的朝鮮版本，並說明朝鮮學界如何接受《三子虞齋口義》的問題。但它談及《莊子虞齋口義》的部分較少，而且《莊子口義》在朝鮮出版的文化意義等問題，其論述並不夠深入。後來，兩位匿名審查人還提供崔在穆〈林希逸『三子虞齋口義』の韓國版本調査〉(頁211-232)一文，此篇文章則主要從版本學的角度說明各種《三子虞齋口義》的韓國版本以及其存藏概況等，因此有關版本的內容跟〈朝鮮時代における林希逸『三子虞齋口義』の受容〉相比，更為豐富。但其內容亦並未涉及到朝鮮刊本《莊子口義》與中國刊本在內容上的異同以及《莊子口義》在朝鮮出版的文化意義等。

佛、道的批評，可謂不遺餘力。但進入15世紀，有時在朝廷經筵中，卻進講《老子》與《莊子》，同時由王室主導刊印了《莊子》，而且不少文人認為《莊子》不失為文章學習的參考書，因此，它仍然成為不少讀書人的閱讀對象。⁴尤其當時朝鮮學者確實不把《莊子口義》當做異端之書，正如成宗五年（1474），慶州所刊庚子字活字覆刊本《莊子口義》〈跋文〉說“大綱領大宗旨未嘗與聖人異也。膚齋，孔孟之徒也，豈誣我哉！”⁵很顯然地，15世紀朝鮮學界已認為《莊子口義》的宗旨並不違背孔孟之道。即便如此，在儒學獨尊的思想潮流下，《莊子》尚無法進入朝鮮學界的核心，反而始終處於周邊。而且到了16世紀，學者們對於《老子》與《莊子》嚴厲地加以批評，如李滉（1501-1570）曾說：“老莊之虛誕，或有耽尚，而侮聖蔑禮之風間作。”⁶在這種風氣之中，《老子》和《莊子》自然會成為被排斥的對象。

第二階段為16世紀後半至17世紀中葉時期，朝鮮正處於朋黨的分化與對立，性理學無法解決社會上的種種弊端，因而當時知識分子在思想、文學上試著尋找新的突破點。《莊子》正好迎合這種時代要求，當時文壇的主要人物，如申欽（1566-1628）、張維（1587-1638）與柳夢寅（1559-1623）等人積極接受《莊子》的思維模式與寫作方法，其他不少文人學者也參與這種潮流。⁷換言之，16世紀後半至17世紀中葉，很多朝鮮文人學者積極地從不同角度閱讀《莊子》，並闡發相關內容，因而形成了一段朝鮮莊學的興盛期。林希逸的《莊子口義》亦在上述的過程中，得以傳播與刊行。

（一）簡介主要朝鮮刊本《莊子口義》

下面筆者要將林希逸的《莊子口義》在朝鮮傳播與刊行情況，以現存版本為主，簡略地說明一下。依據“韓國古典籍綜合目錄系統”，做初步調查，朝鮮本林希逸《莊子口義》共有八十多個。這八十多個可分為三大系統：一為活字本系統；二為木版本系統；三為寫本系統。⁸

首先，活字本系統的主要版本有如下幾種：

4 金允景，〈조선전기도가사상연구〉（朝鮮前期道家思想研究），頁9-32。

5 李仁榮，《清芬室書目》，頁4591。

6 李滉，〈戊辰六條疏〉，《退溪集》卷6，頁190上。

7 安世鉉，〈조선중기 한문산문에서 장자 수용의 양상과 그 의미〉（朝鮮中期在漢文散文中的莊子接受情況與其內涵），頁437-471。

8 在此，筆者要將眾多的朝鮮本《莊子膚齋口義》，按照版種來加以區別，藉此說明各版種《莊子膚齋口義》的一些特色。關於較為詳細的朝鮮本《莊子膚齋口義》的冊數、版式與所藏地等，可參看崔在穆〈林希逸『三子膚齋口義』의韓國版本調査〉，頁215-224。

	版本名	書名	版式	卷數	所藏單位
1	金屬活字本 (庚子字)	《莊子 肅齋口義》	四周雙邊, 半郭 22.6×14.9cm, 有界, 11行21字, 小字雙行, 上下黑口, 內向黑魚尾	卷9-11, 3冊 (缺帙)	高麗大學校 圖書館 화산貴-48A-9-11
				卷7-8/9-10	誠庵古書 博物館資料室 誠庵3-212 / 213
				卷8	國立中央 圖書館 B21264-6
2	金屬活字本 (甲寅字本)	《句解南華真經》	四周雙邊, 半郭 25.0×16.9cm, 有界, 10行17字, 註雙行, 內向三葉花紋魚尾	卷1-2 / 7-10	高麗大學校 圖書館 만송 貴-48C-1, 4-5
				卷1-3, 5	啟明大學校 東山圖書館 이커 181.2226- 임희일 ㄱ
				10卷5冊	韓國學中央研 究院圖書館 C3-3C
				1冊 (2-5冊缺)	韓國學中央研 究院圖書館 C3-3
				卷10	國立中央 圖書館 B2古朝11-9
3	金屬活字本 (初鑄甲寅字 多混入補字)	《句解南華真經》	四周雙邊, 半郭 25.0×17.5cm, 有界, 10行17字, 註雙行, 內向三葉花紋魚尾	卷5-6	誠庵古書 博物館資料室 誠庵3-195
				卷1	高麗大學校 圖書館 /華山 C2-A33B-1
4	金屬活字本 (改鑄甲寅字)	《句解南華真經》	四周雙邊, 半郭 25.0×17.0cm, 有界, 10行17字, 註雙行, 內向三葉花紋魚尾	1冊	首爾大學校 奎章閣 韓國學研究院 181.1-1m1gn-00
5	金屬活字本 (戊申字本)	《莊子》	四周雙邊, 半郭 24.6×17.1cm, 有界, 10行17字, 註雙行, 內向三葉花紋魚尾	3卷1冊	成均館大學校 尊經閣 C03-0037

就鑄造年代而言，庚子字自世宗2年(1420)開始鑄造，到了世宗3年(1421)完成。甲寅字在世宗16年(1434)鑄造，其字體美麗，且大小亦適合，因而好幾次補鑄或改鑄。至於戊申字，顯宗9年戊申(1668)，由金佐明模仿甲寅字而鑄造。金佐明死後，此活字移到校書館，一直被使用。總之，活字本《莊子口義》可說從15世紀初到朝鮮後期一直被刊印，這隱約地說明《莊子口義》備受重視的事實。

其次，木版本系統在八十多個朝鮮本林希逸《莊子口義》中數量最多，而且往往是上面提及的活字本之覆刻本，主要版本如下：

	版本名	書名	版式	卷數	所藏單位
1	木版本 (庚子字翻刻本)	《莊子 肅齋口義》	四周雙邊，半郭 20.9×14.7cm，有界， 11行21字，小字雙行， 上下黑口，內向 黑魚尾	3卷1冊	高麗大學校圖書館 만송貴-488-5
				2卷1冊	誠庵古書博物館資料室 誠庵3-214
2	木版本 (成宗5年(1474)刊本)	《莊子 肅齋口義》	四周雙邊，半郭 21.9×14.7cm，有界， 11行21字，小字雙行， 上下黑口，內向 黑魚尾	10卷3冊	國立中央圖書館 B2古朝11-8b21264-7
3	木版本 (壬辰(1592)以前刊本)	《莊子 肅齋口義》	四周雙邊，半郭 22.9×14.2cm，有界， 11行21字，小字雙行， 上下白口，上下內向 黑魚尾	2卷1冊(缺帙)	高麗大學校圖書館 신암貴-48-2
4	木版本 (戊申字翻刻本)	《句解南華真經》	四周雙邊，半郭 23.1×17.4cm，有界， 10行17字，註雙行， 內向二葉花紋魚尾	卷3-6	誠庵古書博物館資料室 誠庵3-196
				卷5-6	誠庵古書博物館資料室 誠庵3-197
				卷5-6	誠庵古書博物館資料室 誠庵3-198
				卷4	誠庵古書博物館資料室 誠庵 3-199
				卷1-10	誠庵古書博物館資料室 誠庵 3-200

5	木版本 (甲寅字覆刻版)	《句解南華真經》	四周單邊, 半郭 22.0×16.9cm, 有界, 10行17字, 註雙行, 內向二葉花紋魚尾	冊1-2, 5 (卷1-4, 9-10)	東國大學校 中央圖書館 D181.275-장77 ㄱ
6	木版本 (甲寅字覆刻混入補版)	《句解南華真經》	四周單邊, 半郭 22.3×17.1cm 有界, 10行17字, 註雙行, 內向二葉花紋魚尾	冊1-5 (卷1-10)	東國大學校 中央圖書館 D181.275-장77 ㄱ2
7	木版本 (甲寅字體訓鍊都監字翻刻本)	《句解南華真經》	四周單邊, 半郭 21.4×17.1cm 有界, 10行17字, 內向 黑一二葉花紋魚尾	10卷10冊	成均館大學校 尊經閣 C03-0014

最後，寫本系統在八十多個朝鮮本當中共有十七種。刊本之外，為數不少的寫本的存在，也足以說明朝鮮文人學者熱衷閱讀《莊子》的程度。朝鮮中期的著名文人俞彥鎬(1730-1796)曾云：“偶得《南華經》抄，熟看深味。其於齊得喪一死生之論，尤有喚迷成覺者。”⁹ 俞彥鎬自謂在偶然的機會下，抄《莊子》而接觸《莊子》為學之精隨，然後得到一些心得，《莊子》寫本對於當時文人學者的影響，可見一斑。還有一點需要說明的是，寫本的用途似乎不完全是閱讀，而是熱衷閱讀《莊子》的文人學者為了藏書而抄寫的，現藏國立中央圖書館的一種寫本(索書號：B11264-4)，其字體又工整又秀氣，具有藝術方面的價值。

據以上的內容，我們可以知道以下三點：

首先，朝鮮刊本林希逸《莊子口義》，就書名而言，有《莊子虞齋口義》與《句解南華真經》(僅有“戊申字本”，其書名為《莊子》)之分。就版式而言，最大的差別在於行款，前者都是11行21字，後者都是10行17字。至於寫本，11行22字、10行20字，各不一樣。

其次，眾多朝鮮刊本林希逸《莊子口義》的存在，正和上面《莊子》在朝鮮的傳播與接受過程相應。換言之，林希逸《莊子口義》自朝鮮初期至後期，均有版本問世。尤其是到了16世紀後半，朝鮮學界比以前更關注《莊子》，林希逸《莊子口義》亦備受矚目，因而大量出現活字本、木版本與寫本等。

最後，需要注意的是幾種活字本的存在。眾所周知，在朝鮮，書籍出版的權力大部分由朝廷掌控，尤其是活字本。上面提及的“庚子字本”、“甲寅字本”與“戊申字本”等，都是以朝廷製造的活字來刊印的。那麼林希逸《莊子口義》由活字來刊印，意味著朝廷主導並有意地出版。本來屬於異端的書籍，自朝鮮初期以來，國家主導其出版事業，這種事實頗耐人尋味。這方面的論述，於下面論述《莊子口義》在朝鮮刊行的文化內涵時，再加以說明，故在此不贅述。

⁹ 俞彥鎬,〈蒙演〉,《燕石》冊8,頁156下。

(二) 朝鮮刊本《莊子口義》的主要特色

爲了探討朝鮮刊本《莊子口義》與中國刊本之間的異同，下面將兩種朝鮮刊本(活字本與木版本)與1997年中國出版的《莊子膚齋口義校注》略做比較。¹⁰

	戊申字本 (肅宗至景宗刊)	甲寅字體訓練督 監字覆刻本 (朝鮮後期刊)	校注本 (以明萬曆二年施 觀民刻本爲底本)	校注說明
1	逍遙遊 豈惟形骸 有聾盲哉?(頁7上)	豈惟形骸 有聾盲哉?(頁8上)	豈惟形骸 有聾瞽哉?(頁8)	“瞽”，道藏本作 “盲”。
2	有彼有是，正與方 生之說同，……。 (頁18上)	有彼有是，正與方 生之說同，……。 (頁21上)	有彼有是，止與 方生之說同，……。 (頁23)	“止”，疑當作 “正”。
3	我雖如此誇說， 而所聽之本自 不曉，乃強欲以 此曉之。(頁22上)	我雖如此誇說， 而所聽之本自 不曉，乃強欲以 此曉之。(頁25下)	我雖如此誇說， 而所聽之本自 不曉，乃強以 此曉之。(頁30)	道藏本“強” 下有一“欲”字； “不”，原作“分”， 據宋本改。
4	龍泉水淬刀 劍特堅利，……。 (頁22下)	龍泉水淬刀 劍特堅利，……。 (頁26上)	龍泉水淬刀 劍特堅利，……。 (頁30)	“特”，原作“時”， 宋本、道藏本俱 同，據史記 蘇秦傳注改。
5	謙，滿也，喉藏物 曰嘽。以廉爲廉， 則有自滿之意。 (頁26下)	謙，滿也，喉藏物 曰嘽。以廉爲廉，則 有自滿之意。 (頁30下)	謙，滿也，猴藏物 曰嘽。以廉爲廉， 則有自滿之意。 (頁36)	“以廉爲廉”，疑當 作“以嘽爲廉”。
6	養生主 再以殆字申言之， 所以傲後世者 深矣。(頁1上)	再以殆字申言之， 所以傲後世者 深矣。(頁1下)	再以殆字申言之， 所以警後世者 深矣。(頁46)	“警”，宋本作 “傲”。
7	此意蓋言 世事之難易， 皆有自然之理。 (頁3下)	此意蓋言 世事之難易， 皆有自然之理。 (頁4上)	此事蓋言 世事之難易， 皆有自然之理。 (頁3下)	“事”，道藏本作 “意”。
8	便是“履虎尾” 遊於羿轂中之意。 (頁4下)	便是“履虎尾” 遊於羿轂中之意。 (頁5下)	便是“履虎尾” 遊於羿轂中之意。 (頁53)	“轂”，原作“殼”， 據宋本、 道藏本改。
9	人間世 玄亦織，續亦織， 不日玄縞織， ……。 (頁6下)	玄亦織，續亦織， 不日玄縞織， ……。 (頁7下)	玄亦織，縞亦織， 不日玄縞織， ……。 (頁56)	“縞”，原作“續”， 據宋本改，下同。

¹⁰ 在此，筆者按照刊行年代與刊刻形式，僅挑選三種不同版本加以對比，以此窺見朝鮮本與中國本的異同之一斑，並說明一些朝鮮本的特點。但更詳細的校勘內容，應將眾多的朝鮮本納入到對比的範圍，才可呈現出來。

10	而強以仁義法度之言陳術於暴惡人之前。(頁7下)	而強以仁義法度之言陳術於暴惡人之前。(頁9上)	而強以仁義法度之言陳述於暴惡人之前。(頁58)	“述”，道藏本作“術”。
11	內直者，內以此理自守其真實也，……。(頁)	內直者，內以此理自守其真實也，……。(頁11下)	內直者，內以此理自守其真實也，……。(頁62)	“直”，宋本、道藏本作“真”。
12	以彼之闕喻我之虛，……。(頁12下)	以彼之闕喻我之虛，……。(頁15上)	以彼之闕喻我之虛，……。(頁65)	“喻”，原作“俞”，據宋本、道藏本改。
13	又拈起箇言行來，蓋人世之相與，……。(頁16上)	又拈起箇言行來，蓋人世之相與，……。(頁19上)	又拈起箇言行來，蓋人世之相與，……。(頁70)	“拈”，原作“粘”，據宋本、道藏本改。
14	子綦曰：此何木哉？此必有異材夫。……以至於此其他也。……貴人官商之家求禪音膳傍禪傍爲棺用也者斬之。(頁22上)	子綦曰：此何木哉？此必有異材夫。……以至於此其他也。……貴人官商之家求禪音膳傍禪傍爲棺用也者斬之。(頁25下)	子綦曰：此何木哉？此必有異材夫。……以至於此其大也。……貴人官商之家求禪傍者斬之。(頁76)	“夫”，原作“矣”，據宋本、道藏本改； “如”，據宋本、道藏本作“於”； “禪”，原作“禪”，據道藏本改。
15	德充符 十數而未止也。(頁30下)	十數而未止也。(頁36下)	數十而未止也。(頁30下)	“數十”，宋本作“十數”。
16	亦作瞬，音舜若驚貌。……此皆形容之文，有過當處。(頁31上)	亦瞬，音舜若驚貌。……此皆形容之文，有過當處。(頁37下)	若，驚貌。……此皆形容之文，有過當處。(頁91)	“文”下宋本有一“時”字。
17	大宗師 ……即無求飽之意，禪家所謂……。(頁1上)	……即無求飽之意，禪家所謂……。(頁2下)	……即無求飽之意，禪家所謂……。(頁99)	“謂”，原作“爲”，據宋本、道藏本改。
18	又安得以吾書字義求之！去若對二反又仇達二音寂，靜也，面壁十九年，是其容寂處。(頁3上)	又安得以吾書字義求之！去若對二反又仇達二音寂，靜也，面壁十九年，是其容寂處。(頁3上)	又安得以吾書字義求之！寂，靜也，面壁十九年，是其容寂處。(頁102)	疑誤，達摩只面壁九年。
19	……無大無小，皆非也。(頁3下)	……無大無小，皆非也。(頁4下)	……無大無小，皆爲非也。(頁103)	“爲”，原無此字，據宋本補。

20	許豈褚伊二反 韋氏得之，以天 地，伏戲音義得 之…… 堪坯扶眉 厚杯二反得之 …… 當令作一眼 看。(頁8上)	許豈褚伊二反 韋氏得之，以天 地，伏戲音義得 之…… 堪坯扶眉 杯二反得之…… 當令作一眼看。 (頁9上)	韋氏得之， 以天地，伏戲得之 …… 堪坯得之 …… 當另作一眼 看。(頁109)	“坏”，宋本、道藏 本作“坯”；“另”， 宋本、道藏本作 “令”。
21	夫卜梁倚有聖人 之才而無聖人之 道子葵、子偶， 皆是寓言，……。 (頁8下)	夫卜梁倚有聖人 之才而無聖人之 道子葵、子偶， 皆是寓言，……。 (頁10上)	夫卜梁倚有聖人 之才而無聖人之 道子葵、女偶， 皆是寓言，……。 (頁111)	“女”，原作“子”， 據宋本改。
22	不知此等人不待 學佛而後有也。 (頁12下)	不知此等人不待 學佛而後有也。 (頁15下)	不知此等人不待 學佛而自有也。 (頁116)	“自”，原作“後”， 據宋本改。
23	…… 得道則隨其 分量以爲生， 無事而自定， 無事，無爲也。 (頁14上)	…… 得道則隨其 分重以爲生， 無事而生定， 無事，無爲也。 (頁16下)	…… 得道則隨其 分量以爲生， 無事而生定， 無事，無爲也。 (頁118)	“生”，原作“自”， 據宋本改。
24	應 帝王 汝又何帛音藝 又魚例反 以治天下 感予之心爲! (頁20下)	汝又何帛音藝 又魚例反 以治天下 感予之心爲! (頁24下)	汝又何帛 以治天下 感予之心爲! (頁127)	“帛”，原本下有 “音藝”二小字， 據宋本、 道藏本刪。
25	可以比明王否， 言學之爲者事， 如此可否。 (頁21上)	可以比明王否， 言學之爲者事， 如此可否。 (頁25上)	可以比明王否， 言用之爲者事， 如此可否。 (頁129)	“用”，原作“學”， 據宋本改。
26	因以爲茅靡， 因以爲波流， 故逃也。(頁24上)	因以爲茅靡， 因以爲波流， 故逃也。(頁29上)	因以爲弟靡， 因以爲波流， 故逃也。(頁133)	“弟”，原作“茅”， 據宋本改。下同。
27	代其妻執釁於鼎 竈之間而不出也。 (頁24下)	化其妻執釁於鼎 竈之間而不出也。 (頁29下)	代其妻執釁於鼎 竈之間而不出也。 (頁134)	“間”，宋本作“內”。
28	天之受我以是理， 吾能盡之……。 (頁25上)	天之受我以是理， 吾能盡之……。 (頁25上)	天之授我以是理， 吾能盡之……。 (頁135)	“授”，原作“受”， 據宋本改。

29	人間世之命也夫， 自是箇箇有意 …… 希逸應曰： “以中庸‘聖人所 不知’之語斷之 ……”。 (頁26上-26下)	人間世之命也夫， 自是箇箇有意 …… 希逸應曰： “以中庸‘聖人所 不知’之語斷之 ……”。 (頁31下-32上)	大宗師之命也夫， 自是箇箇有意 …… 希逸應曰： “以中庸‘聖人所 不知’之語斷之 ……”。 (頁137)	“大宗師”，原作 “人間世”，據宋本 改；“語”，原作 “結”，據宋本、 道藏本改。
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據以上的比較，我們可知：


第一、就版本源流而言，朝鮮刊本的情況較為複雜，那是因為其字句往往與宋本、道藏本相同，但也有不盡相同的地方，這一點正是朝鮮刊本的特色之一。如1、3、6、7、8、10、11、12、13、14、15、17、20、23的例子均說明朝鮮刊本的內容往往與宋本、道藏本相同。與此相反，4、9、16、19、21、22、24、25、26、27、28、29等例子均說明朝鮮刊本與明萬曆二年施觀民刻本有相同之處。另外，例子2的情況較為特別，那是因為校注者在沒有提及對校資料的情況下，認為“‘止’，疑當作‘正’，”則這一部分當然是校注者考慮前後文意來判斷的。在此字句上，朝鮮刊本已經與校注者的意見相同，這種現象值得關注。基於這種現象，我們可以推測朝鮮刊本似乎經過一些校勘過程，不然，朝鮮刊本不可能具有宋本、道藏本以及其他版本的不同面貌。¹¹ 另外，就內容而言，兩種朝鮮刊本的內容也不是完全一致，也足以說明這種可能性。

第二、就刊印年代而言，“戊申字本”大致上在肅宗至景宗年間刊印；“甲寅字體訓練督監字覆刻本”大致上在朝鮮後期刊印。兩種版本做個比較，我們不難發現兩者大部分的內容是一致的，只不過一些地方有所出入而已，如例子23與27就屬於這方面的例子。不過，有一個問題是我們需要注意的，那就是有的朝鮮刊本有韓文口訣，有的就沒有。正如“戊申字本”沒有韓文口訣（圖一），“甲寅字體訓練督監字覆刻本”則有韓文口訣（圖二）。經過初步考察，筆者發現朝鮮前期刊印的活字本幾乎無韓文口訣，與此相反，朝鮮後期刊行的《莊子口義》幾乎有韓文口訣，這似乎是朝鮮中期以後刊行的朝鮮刊本《莊子口義》的共同特色，也是朝鮮本林希逸《莊子口義》的另一種特色。所謂“韓文口訣”的存在，無疑是給朝鮮學者提供便於理解《莊子口義》的思維空間。

¹¹ 我們在眾多朝鮮刊本中國圖書中無法找到有關校勘的記載，但是經過比對，則往往可發現有些朝鮮刊本確實經過校勘，因而其內容與中國刊本不盡相同，而且有的版本比中國刊本具有更高的文獻價值。朝鮮明宗十六年(1561)刊行的賀欽《醫問先生集》為很好的例子，此朝鮮刊本可謂依據“嘉靖九年刊本”和“嘉靖二十三年刊本”，加上做一些校勘工作而刊刻的。詳細內容，可參看金鎬，《賀欽《醫問先生集》在朝鮮的傳播、刊行與朝鮮學界對賀欽學說的認識》，頁53-76。



(圖一) 戊申字本

(圖二) 甲寅字體
訓鍊都監字覆刻本

三、《莊子口義》在朝鮮刊行的文化內涵

林希逸《莊子口義》傳入朝鮮以後，不少朝鮮刊本問世，而且其數量也不少。這種現象到底具有什麼樣的文化內涵呢？此問題可從如下三個方面加以說明。

首先，林希逸《莊子口義》在朝鮮的傳播與刊行，與當時的學術風氣的變化有密切關係。筆者前面已指出，朝鮮前期爲了鞏固性理學的正統地位，排斥老莊思想。照道理，這當然會對於朝鮮文人接受《莊子口義》產生不良的影響，但弔詭的是，自朝鮮前期開始，陸續出現一些版本，如庚子字本、甲寅字本等。如世宗爲了振興詞章之學，往往由朝廷以活字或木板刊行中國古典詩文集，《莊子》也在其刊行對象裡頭。¹²“庚子字”爲世宗2年(1420)至3年(1421)間鑄造的，“甲寅字”爲世宗16年(1434)以《孝順事實》與《爲善陰騭》爲字本，不足的部分由首陽大君補寫來鑄造的。世宗7年(1425)1月17日甚至將鑄字所刊印的《莊子》賜給文臣們，這個本子就是庚子字本《莊子虞齋口義》。如此說來，《莊子口義》的庚子字本、甲寅字本之存在，可證明《莊子口義》的出版與當時朝廷的文化政策有密不可分的關係。

不過，自16世紀後半開始，不少朝鮮刊本《莊子口義》的出現，不僅藉朝廷主導刊行，尚賴於一般文人學者的積極接受並藉此發揮自身的學術觀點。趙龜命(1693-1737)爲很好的例子。趙龜命雖然出身於少論名門，一生不關心政治，在思想上脫離當時主流的性理學，反而喜愛老莊和佛教，被稱爲“自言得之《南華經》者爲多”。¹³趙龜命在《讀老子》中，認爲一般學者常

¹² 除了《莊子》之外，世宗21年(1439)命纂註韓愈和柳宗元的文集以及杜詩；世宗17年(1435)以甲寅字刊印《分類補註李太白詩》；世宗21年(1439)以木板刊印《詩人玉屑》；世宗22年(1440)以甲寅字刊印《唐柳先生集》、《唐詩鼓吹》與《續鼓吹》等。

¹³ 趙龜命(1690-1752)《東溪小傳》：“君有貞疾，平居多杜門，不接人事。日夜究心，爲古文辭，浸淫涵蓄。蓋三十餘年，而其文益大肆，妙悟玄解，務發己見，不規規於古人繩墨之內。君自言得之《南華經》者爲多，而以蘓長公爲歸云。”《歸鹿集》卷19，頁152下。

把老子與莊子並稱，而這是因為他們不知道兩者“本源之不相混”，接著提出“莊子，儒而激者也；老子則別於儒矣”的看法，而最後主張“莊子妙於論心，老子深於觀物”。¹⁴ 趙龜命將《莊子》列於儒家，這種觀點在中國不罕見，¹⁵ 但是如果考慮朝鮮初期不少學者曾經將它當作異端的事實，這已充分表示朝鮮中期學術的變化。我們從趙龜命的例子，可看出朝鮮中期文人學者對於《莊子》接受程度已較為深入，這無疑給《莊子口義》在朝鮮傳播與刊行，提供了最有力的學術背景。更有趣的是，像趙龜命的例子可能不少，吳翻(1592-1634)的記載可證明這種事實：

按《漢(書)》《藝文志》云：“《莊子》五十二篇”，《唐書》云：“四十卷”，今行於世者，只三十三篇。而《讓王》以下四篇，蘇長公又謂非莊子所作。陳深品節諸子而刪此四篇，則真經二十九篇矣。出於晚周，不離秦火，越漢踰唐，猶有全經。五代以後，泯而不傳者十九，可勝惜哉！余見《讓王》一篇，如屠羊說孤竹子數段，理趣全是《南華》，筆力全是先秦，決非東京以下拘拘繩墨者所能到。取以附諸真經，合成三十篇而讀之，識于此以示同好。”¹⁶

這段引文，主要說明吳翻對於《莊子》內容真偽的看法，這無非是基於吳氏對於《莊子》的深入理解。不過，更值得注意的是，吳翻自編《莊子》三十篇並撰識文，給同好看。所謂“同好”，指的是吳氏同時代喜讀《莊子》的文人學者，則我們通過此段記載可窺見當時閱讀《莊子》的文人學者已形成一個“群”。這種事實不但說明《莊子》已成為不少知識分子喜讀的文本，並且閱讀《莊子》的讀者群逐漸擴大起來。又李廷龜(1564-1635)與張維、李植、申欽並稱為漢文四大家，對於當時文壇有一定的影響力，他曾說：“家食雖有屢空之憂，西湖几案間入眼怡神。使兒輩朝讀《南華經》，晝誦唐人詩。憑

¹⁴ 《讀老子》，《東谿集》卷7，頁148下。

¹⁵ 如蘇軾能見到莊子思想與儒家會通之處，說：“余以為莊子蓋助孔子者，要不可以為法耳。楚公子微服出亡，而門者難之。其僕操箠而罵曰：‘隸也不力。’門者出之。事固有倒行而逆施者。以僕為不愛公子，則不可；以為事公子之法，亦不可。故莊子之言，皆實予而文不予，陽擠而陰助之，其正言蓋無幾。至於詆訾孔子，未嘗不微見其意。”〈莊子祠堂記〉，《蘇軾全集校注》第11冊，頁1085；另外，王安石亦在〈答陳樞書〉中明確地指出“莊生之書，其通性命之分，而不以生死禍福累其心，此其近聖人也。自非明智不能及此。”《王安石全集》第7冊，頁1380；王安石又在〈莊周(上)〉說：“昔先王之澤，至莊子之時竭矣。天下之俗，譎詐大作，質樸並散，雖世之學士大夫，未有知貴己賤物之道者也。於是棄絕乎禮義之緒，奪攘乎利害之際，趨利而不以為辱，殞身而不以為怨，漸漬陷溺，以至乎不可救已。莊子病之，思其說以矯天下之弊而歸之於正也。其心過慮，以為仁義禮樂皆不足以正之，故同是非，齊彼我，一利害，則以足乎心為得，此其所以矯天下之弊者也。既以其說矯弊矣，又懼來世之遂實吾說而不見天地之純、古人之大體也，於是又傷其心於卒篇以自解。故其篇曰：‘《詩》以道志，《書》以道事，《禮》以道行，《樂》以道陰陽，《春秋》以道名分。’由此而觀之，莊子豈不知聖人者哉？又曰：‘譬如耳目鼻口皆有所明，不能相通，猶百家眾技皆有所長，時有所用。’用是以明聖人之道，其全在彼而不在乎，而亦自列其書於宋鉏、慎到、墨翟、老聃之徒，俱為不該不徧一曲之士。蓋欲明吾之言有為而作，非大道之全云爾。然則莊子豈非有意於天下之弊而存聖人之道乎？伯夷之清，柳下惠之和，皆有矯於天下者也，莊子用其心亦二聖人之徒矣。”《王安石全集》第6冊，頁1231-1232。

¹⁶ 吳翻，〈讀莊子〉，《天坡集》卷4，頁106上。

几而聽之，此樂足以忘飢。”¹⁷ 這段記載雖然是李廷龜私人的生活片鱗，但將《莊子》與唐詩並提，並指出它們為眾人的閱讀對象，從中可推測閱讀《莊子》，已經成為較為普遍的讀書行為。

那麼到了朝鮮中期，為何《莊子》成為普遍的閱讀對象呢？原因當然很多，李敏敘所說的一段話可提供一個線索：

《南華經》一件。此中舊有刊本，而剝甚不可讀，近纔補刊。雖未全新，猶可觀。此書雖外書，多名理之言，鄙棄則可惜，故此奉呈。¹⁸

在李敏敘看來，《莊子》仍然是“外書”，但其內容“多名理之言”，此正是朝鮮中期，《莊子》得以傳播與刊行的原因之一。

其次，筆者認為不少朝鮮文人學者閱讀林希逸《莊子口義》，而且印本數量頗多，其中會有一定的接受背景。而且林希逸《莊子口義》確實對於朝鮮的莊學發展有所影響。先說明一下前者。所謂接受背景，指的是林希逸《莊子口義》在朝鮮得以廣泛流傳以及刊印數量多，自有相應的學術背景。那是朝鮮中期以來，不少朝鮮文人學者在解釋《莊子》的方法上，與《莊子口義》有一些相通之處。例如，從文學角度解《莊》評《莊》，是《莊子口義》的一大特色，朝鮮中期文人也從同樣的角度解釋《莊子》。如金得臣（1604-1684）的友人李季全“嗜《南華經》，孜孜不怠，樂在其中。讀而益讀，不知日之將暝。窮而益窮，不覺夜之將艾，猶以為不足，扁堂名曰讀南堂。其讀之嗜也，尤於古人之嗜而不能已耶。”但是，金得臣認為，以儒學的角度來看，《南華經》畢竟是外道，因此金氏擔憂儒家經典與《莊子》之間，閱讀重點倒過來，可能產生一些弊端，那就是“不嗜聖經而先嗜《南華》，則不啻不知意與法也，必流入於莊周之外道”。金氏接著說：

意者雖志於儒道，其素所業則大肆力於文章也。不業文則已，如業之則不讀《南華》而知文之法乎？蘇長公曰：“吾讀《南華》，然後知文之法也，為文而不知法，可乎？”吾友張季遇嘗有言曰：為文之道，意為主，法為次也，至哉！知文者之言也。為文而只以意不以法，則其文徒意而已。只以法不以意，則其文徒法而已。此乃操觚者之所共知也。季全結髮以來，出遊於韻人學子之叢，窺其翰墨之畦逕。故於其文也，知其意為主法為次矣。是以季全讀聖經而以意之正，知為主於文。讀《南華》而以法之奇，知為次於文。則季全之文將欲意正而法奇矣。意為主，法為次，故季全之嗜《南華》，非惑於外道也。嗜其《南華》之文之法而欲體之故也。既以意為主則又以法為次者，合於為文之道也。吾於此知季全讀南堂之義也耳。余觀韓昌黎之文而知其倣《南華》之法，觀任疏庵之文而知其倣《南華》之法。自古及今，為文者不嗜南華之奇浩而未有能成文章者也。¹⁹

¹⁷ 李廷龜，〈答白沙〉，《月沙先生集》卷35，頁94上。

¹⁸ 李敏敘，〈與文谷金相國書〉，《西河先生集》卷17，頁311下。

¹⁹ 金得臣，〈讀南堂序〉，《柏谷先祖文集》冊5，頁143下-144上。

在金得臣看來，爲文之道應該“意爲主，法爲次”。金氏爲了解釋“意”和“法”的含意，以其友人李季全的文章爲例，說：“季全讀聖經而以意之正，知爲主於文。讀《南華》而以法之奇，知爲次於文”，由此可見，金氏“儒道爲文章之意的根源”與“《莊子》爲文章之法的來源”的認識。在此，需要注意的是，金得臣從文章學的角度肯定《莊子》的爲文之法，而且如果遵守“意爲主，法爲次”的爲文之道，嗜讀《莊子》，並“非惑於外道”的行爲。筆者以爲金得臣的看法正好表示朝鮮文人的隱憂，就是閱讀《莊子》可能觸及外道之名。無論如何，這種看法自然會給閱讀《莊子》帶來很大的詮釋空間，從這個角度來看，《莊子》在朝鮮中期以來似乎已從異端的枷鎖解脫下來。²⁰ 實際上，金得臣的這種看法與宋朝王安石、蘇軾與林希逸從文學角度肯定《莊子》的認識無不相通。與此有關，金得臣認爲爲文者無法得到《莊子》文章之“奇”，導致“未有能成文章”的後果，並指出朝鮮中期的文人任淑英（1576-1623）就是追求並效法《莊子》爲文之奇。有趣的是，從“奇”的角度肯定《莊子》，也正是林希逸《莊子口義》的特色，林氏認爲《莊子》文章一個突出的特點是“奇”，正如林氏評論“指窮於爲薪，火傳也，不知其盡也”時，他說：“此死生之喻也，謂如以薪熾火，指其薪而觀之，則薪有窮盡之時，而世間之火，自古及今，傳而不絕，未嘗見其盡。此三句，奇文也，死生之理，固非可以言語盡。”²¹ 這些例子已說明朝鮮中期以來，有些文人對於《莊子》認識，與林希逸等中國文人並無不同。

其次，以儒解莊是《莊子口義》的另一特色，因爲如此，《莊子口義》往往直接引用儒家的概念論斷與《莊子》對照。朝鮮中期以來，一些文人學者亦有類似的解《莊》傾向，如李宜顯（1669-1745）說：

老莊，異端之雄也。老簡而深，莊博而辨。比之吾道，《道德經》如《論語》，《南華經》如《孟子》。《莊》之《齊物論》，極論其道之大致，亦如孟子之《浩然》章。《天下》篇，歷叙諸子，以及於老聃。亦如《孟子》末篇論道統之傳。雖其道有是非邪正之別，著書立言之宗旨則略相似。²²

李宜顯站在儒家的立場，認爲《莊子》雖然是異端，《齊物論》與《天下》篇卻與《孟子》的內容無不相通，因此最後認爲《莊子》與《孟子》的“著書立

²⁰ 這種事實並不能代表整個朝鮮社會的風氣，尤其是朝鮮王室有時仍然將《莊子》當作異端之說，如仁祖2年（1624）11月16日，當時全羅道監事李溟將當地刊印的書籍呈上仁祖御覽。左副承旨洪命亨（1581-1636）指責其中有《南華經》與李商隱的詩《浣花流水》等書籍，那是因爲洪氏認爲《南華經》爲“異端誠淫之說”，李商隱的詩爲“詩人雕篆之作”。此事見於《仁祖實錄》：“左副承旨洪命亨啓曰：‘全羅監司李溟上送書冊別單，如《南華經》、李商隱《浣花流水》等冊，亦備御覽。雖出於道內書籍無遺印送之意，而異端誠淫之說，詩人雕篆之作，豈宜塵瀆於清燕之覽乎？關係治道學問者外，其餘書冊，請勿許進，李溟亦爲推考。’答曰：‘依啓，李溟勿推。’”7卷，仁祖2年11月16日（明天啟4年），國史編纂委員會編，《朝鮮王朝實錄》33冊，頁655。

²¹ 〈內篇·養生主〉，《莊子虞齋口義》，頁55。

²² 《陶谷集》卷27，《雲陽漫錄》58則，頁428上。

言之宗旨則略相似”。有趣的是，李氏的這種結論具有調和莊儒矛盾的意圖，同時與林希逸所說的莊子“大綱領、大宗旨未嘗與聖人異也”²³無不一致。另外，成海應(1760-1839)亦有類似的傾向：

壬午冬十一月，大雪飛走，皆絕上下。林壑皎潔，獨坐一室。晃朗虛明，意者天欲人洗垢滌汙，使自勵操飭躬得亭亭於塵埃之表。人反自出沒於慾浪之中，遂爲外物所奪。遇此奇境而迷不能省也，苟能省焉，則人皆追軌夷齊、鍾武三閭。而俗安得不清，風安得不美哉！《南華經》〈人間世〉之篇曰：“瞻彼闕者，虛室生白”。夫己欲去則心虛，心虛則明生焉，是《中庸》所謂“自明誠也”，欲不去則心不虛，心不虛則明無由生焉。今夫攪水而濁，使滓穢充溢而求鑑人形得乎？莊生雖寓言放浪，有時至論，爲君子之所取者如此。²⁴

對於“瞻彼闕者，虛室生白”，林希逸則說：“以彼之闕喻我之虛，則見虛中自然生明。生白即生明也，不曰生明，而曰生白，此莊子之奇文也。即此虛明之地，便是萬物之所由萃。”²⁵林氏的註解似乎側重於文章之法，可是由“虛”闡發“生白”即是“生明”，這與成氏所謂“夫己欲去則心虛，心虛則明生焉”的看法有異曲同工之妙，而且成海應最後以《中庸》“自明誠”的觀點來解釋《莊子》〈人間世〉的看法，已明顯地呈現出以儒解莊的傾向。另外，成氏認為《莊子》雖然是寓言，但是“至論”的部分也有，而且認為可以採納其觀點，這無非是以儒通莊的看法。

再來，談一下林希逸《莊子口義》對於朝鮮莊學的影響問題。據相關資料，朝鮮中期以來，有些朝鮮學者談及林希逸《莊子口義》的內容，其中有的與《莊子》無關，²⁶有的與《莊子》有關。²⁷而朝鮮學者受到《莊子口義》影響的最直接的證據，我們在朴世堂(1629-1703)的《南華經註解刪補》中找到。朝鮮時期，註解《莊子》的著作僅有兩種，朴世堂的《南華經註解刪補》爲其中之一，而且是唯一註解《莊子》全篇的。²⁸就編纂體例而言，《南華經註解刪補》以焦竑《莊子翼》爲基礎，採錄對象爲郭象《莊子注》、呂惠卿《莊子義》、林希逸《莊子口義》、褚伯秀《南華真經義海纂微》、焦竑《莊子翼》與陳深《莊子品節》等。其中，採錄最多的就是林希逸《莊子口義》，一共引用296次，²⁹由此，我們不難得知《莊子口義》對於朴世堂《南華經註解刪補》確

23 〈莊子肅齋口義發題〉，《莊子肅齋口義》，頁2。

24 〈題南華經人間世篇後〉，《研經齋全集·續集》17冊，頁459下。

25 〈內篇·人間世〉，《莊子肅齋口義》，頁65。

26 《芝峯類說》卷17，〈雜事部·名號〉說：“史記註，司馬彪曰箕子名胥餘。又《莊子》曰：‘箕子胥餘，註胥餘箕子名。’林希逸《口義》曰：‘胥餘古之賢人。余意上文孤不偕，務光，伯夷，叔齊觀之，則箕子胥餘似是二人。’而應劭《漢官儀》云：‘紂時胥餘爲太師，蓋亦謂箕子耳。’”

27 〈雜識〉：“林希逸云：‘聖人知道則心愈細，異端知道則心愈龐。細故智周萬物，龐故一事不措，是儒釋之分。’”《立齋先生遺稿》卷11，頁183上-183下。

28 另一種《莊子》註解的著作爲韓元震(1682-1751)的《莊子辨解》。

29 其他書籍的引用次數爲郭象277次、呂惠卿170次等。這方面較爲詳細的論述，可參看田賢

實有所影響。那麼朴世堂為何那麼多次引用《莊子口義》的內容呢？這無非是與朴世堂認同林希逸詮釋《莊子》的看法有關。比如，朴世堂就“夫隨其成心而師之，誰獨且無師乎？”的按語說：

成心，天有定理所賦於我者，誰獨無師，言若能知師此心，則不待於師，而自得其理，所謂歸而求之，有餘師者也。心自取，心能自契於至理，言無分賢愚，同有此心也。

林希逸的注解云：

成心者，人人皆有此心，天理渾然而無不備者也。言汝之生，皆有見成一個天理，若能以此為師，則誰獨無之！非惟賢者有此，愚者亦有之。³⁰

朴世堂與林希逸對於“成心”的解釋，非常類似。其重點在於將道家的“成心”觀念轉換成儒家的“天理”，藉此調和儒莊之間的差別。因此，有的論者認為朴世堂在“成心”與“明”的解釋上，受到林希逸的影響，是有道理的。³¹ 朴世堂的看法在其《年譜》裡，更明確地呈現出來：

先生嘗曰：“……且其精理入神，如識性亦莫如《莊子》。所謂‘隨其成心而師之，誰獨且無師者’，深合率性性善之旨，非荀楊之比，殆隱居放言者類之，故曰王道之餘也。”³²

朴世堂談及“人性論”，竟然主張理解人性莫過於《莊子》，而且《莊子》“隨其成心而師之，誰獨且無師者”的主旨，符合於儒家“率性性善之旨”。所謂“率性性善之旨”指的是《中庸》“天命之謂性，率性之謂道”和《孟子》“道性善，言必稱堯舜”，朴世堂藉此主張《莊子》為“王道之餘”。在此，我們非常明確地看到朴世堂注解《莊子》亦有“以儒解莊”的傾向，而且引用儒家經典，如《中庸》與《孟子》等，來闡釋《莊子》，這種闡釋方式也與《莊子口義》無不一致。同時代的南克寬(1689-1714)在《夢嚙集乾》〈雜著·端居日記〉中談及《莊子》時，³³ 引用《莊子》〈漁父〉中的“子審仁義之間，察同異之際，觀動靜之變，適受與之度，好惡之情，和喜怒之節，而幾於不免矣。”部分，接著引用

美，〈關於朴世堂《南華經註解刪補》編纂體裁的考察〉，頁341-366。

³⁰ 〈內篇·齊物論〉，《莊子虞齋口義》，頁21。

³¹ 曹漢碩，〈朴世堂의 ‘成心’과 ‘明’ 解釋의 『莊子』 注釋史의 意味——郭象·呂惠卿·林希逸 해석과의 비교를 중심으로〉(從『莊子』注釋史的角度看朴世堂‘成心’與‘明’解釋的涵義)，頁153-180。

³² 〈年譜〉，《西溪集》卷22，頁444上。朴世堂以儒解莊的傾向，亦可表現在於注解《老子》方面，如“先生註《道德經》，為文以序曰：‘……其道雖不合聖人之法，其意亦欲修身治人。’”

³³ 南克寬從小與鄭齊斗(1649-1736)、崔錫鼎(1646-1715)等人交游，通過他們接觸到批評朱喜的解經方法之主張。正因為如此，他的為學超越朱子學的範疇，推崇為學傾向與他類似的朴世堂等人。

林希逸《莊子口義》的註解以及朴世堂的《南華經註解刪補》的看法。³⁴從此，我們不難得知朝鮮中期文人學者接受《莊子口義》的情況之一斑。

最後，我們通過朝鮮與日本如何接受林希逸的《莊子口義》做個比較，可發現朝鮮接受林希逸《莊子口義》的一些特色。周啟成對於林希逸《莊子口義》在日本傳播問題有如下的看法：

《口義》成書於十三世紀，而十四世紀即已傳入日本。今所知始讀《莊子口義》的是惟肖得巖，他是“五山”臨濟宗的禪僧，“五山”文學的代表人物之一。而到十七世紀，由於德川幕府的儒官林羅山的大力推薦，由於《口義》是融合儒佛道為主旨，投合了正居於統治地位的朱子學和佛學的口味，所以《口義》竟在當時日本莊學方面成為最權威的注本，許多人讀《莊》只讀《口義》（《老子口義》、《列子口義》也同時受到重視）。直到十八世紀，徂徠學派興起，他們主張古學主義，排斥宋學，於是《口義》也受到批評，因而逐漸失勢。³⁵

此文指出《莊子口義》何時傳入日本、傳播主體為何人以及其與當時學術的互動關係等。以下就此三個方面來敘述《莊子口義》在朝鮮的接受情況，藉此說明一下韓、日兩國接受《莊子口義》到底有什麼異同之處。

首先，《莊子口義》何時傳入朝鮮？因為相關資料不足，無法說明其明確時期。不過，世宗7年（1425）以庚子字刊印《莊子口義》，因此林希逸《莊子口義》傳入朝鮮的時期，最晚不能晚於1425年，與日本的情況差不多，這應無問題。

其次，就傳播主體而言，日本以林濟宗的禪僧（惟肖得巖）為主，到了江戶時代，儒學家林羅山（1583-1657）為興盛的媒介。在此點上，朝、日兩國接受《莊子口義》呈現出最大的不同。正如上述，《莊子口義》傳入朝鮮之後，朝鮮以朝廷為主刊印《莊子口義》。換言之，在朝鮮傳播《莊子口義》時，最主要的傳播主體無疑是朝廷本身。之後，朝鮮接受並傳播《莊子口義》的主體依然是以儒學為本的文人學者，在此過程中並沒有禪僧（惟肖得巖）等佛教因素。

最後，在《莊子口義》傳播朝、日兩國的過程中，就與當時的學術思想互動關係上，亦有較大的差別。此問題可從兩個方面來說明。一、《莊子口義》在日本傳播，佛教有舉足輕重的作用，正如池田畦知久指出“《口義》融合儒佛道為主旨，投合了正居於統治地位的朱子學和佛學的口味”，而正如上述，《莊子口義》在朝鮮傳播，佛教的作用幾乎找不到。二、朝鮮中期以後，雖然有些學者主張反朱子學，提倡陽明學等，如尹鑄、鄭齊斗等，但是這些主張始終無法形成一個強而有力的學風，因此，以朱子學為主的宋學仍然是

³⁴ 〈雜著·端居日記〉，《夢嘯集乾》，頁307上。

³⁵ 〈前言〉，《莊子庸齋口義》，頁17。這方面更詳細的論述，可參看池田畦知久、周一良譯，〈林希逸莊子庸齋口義在日本〉，林希逸、周啟成校注，《莊子庸齋口義校注》附錄，頁517-533。

學術主流。雖然到了18-19世紀，實學風氣很盛，但《莊子口義》沒有面臨像日本那樣明顯地受到批評。當然，這不是意味著朝鮮學者對於《莊子口義》完全沒有批評，實際上，批評林希逸《莊子口義》的記載不難找，如洪汝河（1620-1674）指出“古人爲文，主於明理，而自然成章，未嘗言及文章蹊徑上也。朱先生亦嘗口說利病，而無一字於註文中及之，使善觀者，自然曉得。林希逸註《莊子》，都說文章好揚揚地。《莊子》本意不如此，安得爲後世之子雲乎。”³⁶這是從文章學的角度批評林希逸《莊子口義》的例子。

四、結語

據以上的論述，本文得到以下幾點結論：

第一、林希逸《莊子口義》傳入朝鮮之後，陸續刊印了，版本也較多。大致上可分爲三大系統：活字本系統、木版本系統與寫本系統。調查發現，朝鮮刊本有兩點特色：（一）就版本源流而言，朝鮮刊本具有宋本、道藏本以及其他版本的不同面貌；（二）朝鮮前期刊印的活字本幾乎無韓文口訣，與此相反，朝鮮中後期刊行的《莊子口義》幾乎有韓文口訣。所謂“韓文口訣”，無疑是朝鮮文人學者理解《莊子口義》的獨特思維模式。

第二、自16世紀後半開始，閱讀《莊子》的文人學者形成一個“群”，而且不少朝鮮文人學者在解釋《莊子》的方法上，與林希逸的《莊子口義》有一些相通之處，如從文學角度解《莊》評《莊》、以儒解莊等。

第三、林希逸《莊子口義》對於朝鮮莊學的發展確實有影響，我們在朴世堂的《南華經註解刪補》中找到最直接的證據。

第四、經過朝鮮與日本如何接受林希逸的《莊子口義》做個比較，可發現朝鮮接受林希逸《莊子口義》的一些特色。林希逸《莊子口義》傳入朝鮮之際，朝鮮以朝廷爲主陸續刊印了《莊子口義》，中期以降，接受並傳播《莊子口義》的主體依然是以儒學爲本的文人學者。另外，在《莊子口義》傳播朝鮮的過程中，就與當時的學術思想互動關係上，佛教的作用幾乎找不到。

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³⁶ 《讀書笥記·四書發凡口訣》，《木齋先生文集》卷9，頁505下。

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The Entry of the *Zhuangzi kouyi* 莊子口義 by Lin Xiyi 林希逸 into Joseon, the Publication of the Commentary, and Its Cultural Significance

KIM Ho

Abstract

The *Zhuangzi* 莊子 is a book that can be interpreted diversely. For this reason, many commentaries on the text were written at different times in Chinese history, each commentary with different implicit meanings. Among them, the *Zhuangzi kouyi* 莊子口義 by Lin Xiyi 林希逸 from the Song dynasty 宋 is a commentary characterized by the fact that the text is interpreted from Confucian perspectives (*yi ru jie zhuang* 以儒解莊). What is interesting is that it was read in Joseon and Japan and had certain effects on the academic circles of the two countries. Previous studies on its entry into Japan have been conducted, yet in contrast, only few studies on its entry into Joseon have been made. With this difference in mind, this paper aims mainly to explore two issues within the scope of the research: its entry into Joseon and the acceptance of the text by Joseon academic circles. First, this paper intends to summarize and analyze the text *Zhuangzi kouyi* (the Joseon edition 朝鮮刊本) from the perspectives of bibliography, explaining the differences between the Joseon edition and the Chinese edition. Next, the implicit cultural significance that its entry into Joseon and its publication in the nation had will be explained in detail. That is, this study will explain the reception of the Joseon academic circles, as well its academic ethos in terms of why the *Zhuangzi* is interpreted from Confucian perspectives.

Keywords: Lin Xiyi, the *Zhuangzi kouyi*, interpretation of the *Zhuangzi* from Confucian perspectives, implicit cultural significance

郭店楚墓竹簡之“𡗗 (性)”字句研究

朴 永 鎮

中文提要

人性問題在春秋戰國時期就曾引起頗多爭論。在先秦的出土文獻中也記載了儒家學派的人性觀點。本文以1993年出土的戰國時期文獻——郭店楚墓竹簡為主要研究對象，考察這本被分類為儒家典籍中的“性”字及其含義，而且進一步探究帶有“性”字的句子的思想意義。在郭店楚墓竹簡中，“性”字被表現為“𡗗”字。該字綜合了現代的“姓”和“性”兩個字，“姓”字意味著“百姓”，而“性”字則指“人性”。其中所說的“性”為天之所命是指天命賦予了人之生命本質。早在春秋時期孔子就曾對人的本質提出了“性近習遠”之說，而戰國時期的孟子則提出了“性善”一說。前者主張的是自然人性說，而後者則主張道德人性說，這兩者之間有較大的思想差異。郭店楚墓竹簡被推斷為是介於孔孟之間的重要理論著作和思想學說，它包含了大量自然釋性和道德釋性的論述。通過這些論述，我們可以知道春秋戰國之際儒家思想家們既以自然之氣釋性，又以道德之情論性。而孟子以後，人性論爭則以人性是善還是惡的道德性為中心展開。通過對郭店楚墓竹簡中的人性觀念進行研究，我們可以清晰了解到孔孟之間的人性思想的差距及其傳承關係。郭店楚墓竹簡可以說是人性思想史上連接孔子和孟子的重要環節。

關鍵詞：郭店，楚墓，竹簡，春秋，戰國，𡗗，性，人性，儒家

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一、導言

人性論追溯的是人性的本源、本質及善惡的問題。人性論是哲學領域的一個老課題，有很多學術流派，各流派的思想家們又都有自己的看法，十分複雜。到目前為止，研究顯示的關於人性論的研究，從孔子(公元前551年-公元前479年)就已經開始了。但是，現存的孔子對人性的論述並不多。在《論語》中“性”字也只出現過兩次。其一為《論語》〈陽貨〉中的“性相近也，習相遠也。”其二是《論語》〈公治長〉中的“子貢曰：夫子之文章，可得而聞也；夫子之言性與天道，不可得而聞也。”《論語》中其他與人性思想有關的論述，即《論語》〈季氏〉中的“中人以上，可以語上也；中人以下，不可以語上也”；“生而知之者，上也；學而知之者，次也；困而學之，又其次也；困而不學，民斯為下也”和《論語》〈陽貨〉中的“唯上智與下愚不移。”孔子在人性方面的劃時代的偉大貢獻就在于他提出了“性相近也，習相遠也”這一思想。這句話的意思是說，所有人的天生之性都是差不多的，但是可以通過後天的學習、熏陶，來提升修養和精神內涵等，進而由于後天的努力以及環境的不同，使個人的人性有了好壞之分、道德修養有了高低之分、掌握知識有了多少之分，當然社會地位也會產生高低之分。孔子的這種人性思想是自然人性說，並不是以道德感情論性。孔子以後，孟子(約公元前372年-公元前289年)和荀子(約公元前313年-公元前238年)一邊繼承了孔子的人性思想，一邊又對人性展開了以善、惡為主題的討論。這樣，對於人性的論述，孔子和孟子、荀子之間產生了很大的分歧。在1993年以前，人們並不知道這種分歧產生的原因和發展過程。直到1993年才發現了端倪。

1993年冬天，湖北省荊門市郭店一號楚墓裏出土了一批竹簡，其典籍內包含的文獻被分為道家類、近乎法家類或縱橫家類、儒家類。¹ 荊門市博物館編輯的《郭店楚墓竹簡》自1998年由文物出版社出版以來，引起了哲學界、文字學界等方面的廣泛興趣，發表了很多相關的研究文章。這批楚國² (約公元前10世紀-公元前223年)竹簡³ 裏含有頗多的與人性思想有關的論述。其中，〈性自命出〉是一篇專門論性的著作。楚簡的出土為幫助了解儒

¹ 典籍的篇數一共是18篇，其中被分為道家類的文獻是〈老子(甲本)〉、〈老子(乙本)〉、〈老子(丙本)〉、〈太一生水〉；被分為近乎法家、縱橫家類的文獻是〈語叢四〉；其餘都被分為儒家類的文獻，就是〈緇衣〉、〈五行〉、〈性自命出〉、〈六德〉、〈尊德意〉、〈成之聞之〉、〈唐虞之道〉、〈忠信之道〉、〈窮達以時〉、〈魯穆公問子思〉、〈語叢一〉、〈語叢二〉、〈語叢三〉。

² 楚國，又稱荊、荊楚，春秋戰國時代(公元前770年-公元前221年)的一個諸侯國，約占有今湖北全省和河南、安徽、湖南、江蘇、浙江的一部分。

³ 湖北省荊門市博物館〈荊門郭店一號楚墓〉報告中指出：郭店M1具有戰國(公元前約475年-公元前221年)中期偏晚的特點，其下葬年代當在公元前4世紀中葉至前3世紀初。(湖北省荊門市博物館，〈荊門郭店一號楚墓〉，頁47。)

家早期的人性論提供了重要依據。目前學術界圍繞楚簡展開了激烈的討論，其中大部分的研究成果都是以〈性自命出〉為中心展開的。除了〈性自命出〉以外，其他篇也有關於人性的論述。所以，為了完整地研究好楚簡中的人性思想，需要以〈性自命出〉為主要研究對象，並兼顧其他篇。

本文擬在前人研究的基礎上對楚簡作進一步探討，並對儒家早期人性論的性質、特徵重新作出系統、深入的研究和論證。對於楚簡中體現出的人性思想，提出以下一系列的追問，其一：“性”字的本源是什麼？其二：“性”的內涵是什麼？其三：楚簡中體現的人性觀是什麼？當然這裏也包括了對人性的善惡判斷等問題。通過這個研究，可以幫助釐清孔子和孟子對人性論的定義和人性論發展過程。換言之，也就是理解春秋戰國時期的自然人性說和道德人性說兩個不同觀念。

二、楚簡中的“眚(性)”字

楚簡裏，與現代漢語中的“眚”字相似的字有“𠄎”、“𠄎”、“𠄎”、“𠄎”、“𠄎”、“𠄎”等，雖然它們有細微的不同之處，但是造型基本相同。⁴“眚”字在詞典中被定義為：眼睛生翳子；疾病，疾苦；災異；過失，錯誤；通“省”，減省。在楚簡中，“眚”字有兩種含義，一個是指百姓的“姓”，另一個是指人性的“性”。〈老子(丙本)〉⁵和〈緇衣〉⁶中的“眚”字都是指百姓的“姓”。〈性自命出〉、〈成之聞之〉、〈唐虞之道〉、〈語叢二〉、〈語叢三〉的“眚”字則是指人性的“性”。

班固(32-92)《白虎通義》〈姓名〉中曰：“姓生也，人所稟天氣所以生者也。”清朝(1644-1912)徐灝《說文解字注箋》曰：“姓之本義謂生，故古通作生，其後因生以賜姓，遂為姓氏字耳。”《管子》〈君臣上〉曰：“道者誠人之姓也。非在人也。而聖王明君，善知而道之者也。”戴望(1837-1873)《管子校正》中曰：“姓，生也。”《國語》〈周語中〉曰：“而帥其卿佐以淫于夏氏，不亦嬪姓矣乎？”韋昭(204-273)《國語注》曰：“姓，命也。”由此可見，姓與生、性，本來相通，都可寫作“眚”。此外，《說文解字》〈眉部〉曰：“省：視也，從眉省，從中。”“省”字在甲骨文中寫作“𠄎”，從中從目，而在楚簡中它被寫成了從生從目、上生下目的“𠄎”、“𠄎”等，看起來與楚簡中的“眚”幾乎一樣。由

4 有“眚”字的篇一共是7篇，就是〈老子(丙本)〉、〈緇衣〉、〈性自命出〉、〈成之聞之〉、〈唐虞之道〉、〈語叢二〉、〈語叢三〉。

5 〈老子(丙本)〉第2簡：“成事遂功，而百眚(姓)曰我自然也。”(荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁121。)

6 〈緇衣〉第5-6簡：“字曰：上人疑則百眚(姓)惑，下難知則君長勞”；第9簡：“《詩》云：‘誰秉國成，不自為貞，卒勞百眚(姓)’”；第11簡：“章志以昭百眚(姓)”；第12簡：“百眚(姓)以仁道。”(荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁129。)

此可見，在當時，省、眚、生、性、姓，都是相通的。從漢字造字的表意角度，完全看不出這個從生從目的“眚”字有任何有關眼病的暗示。所以，《說文解字》〈目部〉中“眚：目病生翳也。從目生聲”的定義並沒有完全包括先秦時期它的所有的義項。倒是“眚”從生從目的上下結構，在幫助人們理解“性”的本意上，給予了深刻的啓示：“從生”，表示生命，這是不言而喻的；“從目”，實際上也是大有講究的。《孟子》〈離婁上〉曰：“存乎人者，莫良于眸子。眸子不能掩其惡。胸中正，則眸子瞭焉；胸中不正，則眸子眊焉。聽其言也，觀其眸子，人焉廋哉？”從這裏就可以看出，古人一開始就把“目”當成了心靈的窗戶。《禮記》〈郊特牲〉曰：“目者氣之清明者也”，《韓詩外傳》卷四曰：“目者心之符也”，《釋名》〈釋形體〉曰：“目，默也，默而內識也”這些都是在講“目”與“心”有一種天然的聯係。估計這就是楚簡中將“性”字都寫成了“眚”字的原因。也有人推測“這個從生從目的‘眚’字，很可能就是當時性情之‘性’的本字，是後來儒家的教化勢力加強之後，才以從心從生的‘性’字代替了‘眚’，而‘眚’之本字卻不好閑置，故挪作他用了。”⁷

我認為，楚簡中，特別是〈性自命出〉中的“性”字，沒有寫成從心從生的“性”，而寫成“眚”，是由于“眚”是人之所以爲人的天賦之性、天生之質。在〈性自命出〉中，“性”字是一種蘊涵在人的生命之中的，只有通過心志物取才能表現出來的生命原體。因此，它不能與後天的心志教化之“心”混同在一起。從心從生的“性”字，完全是後期的概念。傅斯年(1896-1950)在《性命古訓辯證》中說，先秦時期諸種典籍中的言性，“皆不脫生之本義。必確認此點，然後可論晚周之性說矣。”⁸從字的字形上來看，他的看法是有一定道理的。但是，先秦時期沒有從心從生的“性”字的原因並不是他所說的“不脫生之本義”。因爲在楚簡裏能看見“生”字，此“生”字的內涵是與傅斯年說的出生或生命意義相近。楚簡到處能看見的“眚”字，具有生命、出生意思的“生”字意義和百姓、人性的意思。⁹而先秦時期並沒有從心從生的“性”字的原因，估計是在於當時的人們習以爲常、日用而不知的天命觀、天人觀以及對人性的獨特理解。¹⁰

三、楚簡中的帶“眚(性)”字的句子

“性”不論是物性還是人性，都是構成生命體的本質的東西，是生命之初始。在楚簡制作以前的時代，“天”爲人“性”的本源，“性”乃天命賦予人之

⁷ 歐陽禎人，《先秦儒家性情思想研究》，頁63。

⁸ 傅斯年，《性命古訓辯證》，頁71。

⁹ 在楚簡中到處能看見“生”字，比如，〈性自命出〉第7-8簡載：“牛生而長，鴈生而伸，其眚(性)……而學或使之也。”(荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。)

¹⁰ 歐陽禎人，《先秦儒家性情思想研究》，頁62-64。

生命本質，包括深刻而豐富的生命內涵。天命既為人性的本源，那麼，對於天、命或天命的體察與知覺，則是人性修養及人回歸其本源的生命意識的必然要求與反映。在楚簡中，“性”字記載最多的篇章是〈性自命出〉，它集中涉及到了“性”的問題。只有先研究好〈性自命出〉中的帶“性”字的句子，研究起其他篇章中的帶“性”字的句子才更容易理解。

(一)〈性自命出〉

第1-2簡：“凡人唯(雖)又(有)眚(性)，心亡莫志，𠄎(待)勿(物)而句(後)𠄎(作)，𠄎(待)兌(悅)而句(後)行，𠄎(待)習而句(後)奠。”¹¹

“性”，楚簡本作“眚”，古文中“眚”與“省”同字。《說文解字》曰：“眚：目病生翳也。從目生聲”；“省：視也。從眉省，從中。”這裏的“性”，通“眚”，屬於同音假借，其內涵與傳世文獻記載的先秦古人觀念裏的人性基本一致，指人天生所具有的生理機能、心理本能等等。換句話說，就是人先天的資質和稟賦皆為性。如《孟子》〈告子上〉曰：“生之謂性。”又《孟子》〈盡心上〉曰：“形色，天性也。”《荀子》〈正名〉曰：“散名之在人者，生之所以然者謂之性；性之和所生，精合感應，不事而自然謂之性。”“性”是人的本性，藏於人的內心，是只有靠外物的激發才會從內向外顯露出來的東西。¹²

這一段楚簡的語義有些複雜，推出了“性”、“心”、“志”、“物”、“情”等相關概念，認為人皆有性有心，然而性之活動狀態及心志，皆與外物有關。所以，這裏並不僅僅是講性或講心，而是心與性皆講，性與心兩者皆待物而後動作，待悅而後流行，待習而後定止。心、性並不是不受物、情、習影響的純超然之物，而是在物、情、習的作用下形成的真實的人心、人性。心是藏志之物，然志之藏因物而起，待悅而後行，候習而後定，所以心本無定志，待習而後定。

第2簡：“𡇗(喜)𡇗(怒)𡇗(哀)悲之𡇗(氣)，眚(性)也。”¹³

“氣”，《孟子》〈公孫丑上〉曰：“夫志，氣之帥也；氣，體之充也。”趙岐(?-201)《孟子注》曰：“志，心所念慮也。氣，所以充滿性體為喜怒也。”此簡以情氣論性，這樣的情感論也見於傳世文獻，如《禮記》〈禮運〉“何謂人情？喜怒哀懼愛惡欲七者，弗學而能。”所以，“氣”非謂物質性之氣，而應泛指人之精神力、生命力；¹⁴“氣”是情氣。¹⁵

¹¹ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

¹² 李零，《郭店楚簡校讀記》，頁117。

¹³ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

¹⁴ 劉昕嵐，〈郭店楚簡《性自命出》篇箋釋〉，頁330。

“喜怒哀悲之氣”皆爲性，此類思想亦見于《大戴禮記》〈文王官人〉中的“民有五性，喜怒欲懼憂也。喜氣內畜，雖欲隱之，陽喜必見；怒氣內畜，雖欲隱之，陽怒必見；欲氣內畜，雖欲隱之，陽欲必見；懼氣內畜，雖欲隱之，陽懼必見；憂氣內畜，雖欲隱之，陽憂必見。五氣誠于中，發形于外，民情不隱也。”其所言的喜怒欲懼憂五氣藏于中則爲“情”。由此，我們能知道此簡所言的“及其見于外，則物取之也”，¹⁶是指喜怒哀悲之氣受動于物而現之于外的表現，即爲喜怒哀悲之“情”。

此簡直接把“氣”指定爲“性”。因喜怒哀悲皆爲情，所以喜怒哀悲之氣則又可直稱爲情氣。情氣又爲性，這是性真實的流動內容之一，也是性能生情的原因。情氣之謂性，本是“生之謂性”的一個分命題。性爲情氣，但此情此性不是凝固僵滯、不動不變的，而是像氣一樣流動變化，可以向周身與身外流動，因此物才能感之、誘之、導之，使其靈魂變化起來，而在性物的這種關係中，心的作用亦可以由此預設進去。¹⁷

第2-3簡：“眚(性)自命出，命自天降。”¹⁸

裘錫圭認爲，“《中庸》中的‘天命之謂性’，意與此句相似。”¹⁹“天”是人以外的世界；“命”則是人所具有的生命和命運。²⁰“命”可能具有雙重含義：就天而言，它是天的意旨，天的命令；就人而言，它卻是純粹的生命。²¹

此句句義可參考《大戴禮記》〈本命〉中的“分于道謂之命，形于一謂之性，化于陰陽，象形而發謂之生，化窮數盡謂之死。故命者性之始也，死者生之終也，有始則必有終矣。”又有清朝王聘珍《大戴禮記解詁》中的：“分，制也。道者，天地自然之理”；“命稟于有生之前，性形于受命之始；命制其性之始，即已定其終，是始必有終也。”

此句中的“天”就是人的生命存在的本源和根據。在這裏，“性”已不再是“性相近也，習相遠也”中的沒有什麼形而上意味之“性”，而是與“天道”建立了一種初步的聯結，從而“性”也被賦予了形而上的意味。

〈性自命出〉中的“性自命出，命自天降”只指出了性的來源爲天命，而對其自身的本質和內涵則沒有提及；而《中庸》中的“天命之謂性”則通過一種定義性的陳述，界定了性的內涵：天命即性，或者天之所命爲性。這裏將性直接地定義爲天之所命。雖然，這兩種表述之間有一定的差異，但這並

¹⁵ 李天紅，《郭店竹簡〈性自命出〉研究》，頁135。

¹⁶ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

¹⁷ 丁四新，《郭店楚墓竹簡思想研究》，頁172。

¹⁸ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

¹⁹ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁182。

²⁰ 李零，《郭店楚簡校讀記》，頁118。

²¹ 李天紅，《郭店竹簡〈性自命出〉研究》，頁136。

不妨礙二者之間擁有其共通的地方。例如：“性自命出，命自天降”與“天命之謂性”二者都明確地指出了性的淵源來自天命。不過和前者比起來，後者抹去了性、命、天這三者之間存在的差異，而直接把天命判定為性。這樣後者所得出的性的內涵比起前者就會產生以下變化：即性為天命，性是超然的形而上者，而且天命自身無有不善，由此就推理出了人性為善的結論。思孟之學之所以能發展成為孟子力主的性善說，正是“天命之謂性”這一理念在當時充分發展的必然結果。而“性自命出，命自天降”中所說的“性”，僅僅是指天命的內容或對象，它與天命自身是有明顯的區別的。這是因為即使人們普遍認為天命自身是無有不善的，但是天命的對象或內容卻並非皆為善，有可能為善、也有可能為不善。所以，絕不能把“性自命出，命自天降”的性與《中庸》的“天命之謂性”中的性混為一談。這二者間是有著顯著的區別的：前者言明了性之淵源之所在，而後者則在前者的基礎提升了一個層次，將性與天命同一。²²

楚簡作者認為，性自天而降，是人之承受其于天，也是人之所以為人的天賦本質、本源。所以，它本身是不可能“待物而後作，待悅而後行，待習而後莫”的。故楚簡有“凡心有志也，亡與□□□□獨行，猶口之不可獨言也”²³ 這種說法。

第3簡：“術(道)司(始)於青(情)，青(情)生於眚(性)。”²⁴

“道”是對物的合理安排，即教化的手段；²⁵〈性自命出〉中的“道”即人道也，以及“禮”也；²⁶“道”又是事物內部固有之規律。²⁷《中庸》曰“道也者，不可須臾離也”，朱熹(1130-1200)在《中庸章句》也謂“道者，日用事物當行之理。”這些說的即是人道始於人情之道。〈性自命出〉第14-15簡中謂人道可以用于教導民衆：“唯人道為可道也。”²⁸ 隨之又指出聖人用以教民的是詩、書、禮、樂，並著重對禮，尤其是樂的作用進行了闡述。由此可見，在楚簡作者看來，禮與道是統一的，禮是道的具體反映。〈性自命出〉中所謂的人道，實指儒家所推崇之禮樂制度，而詩、書、禮、樂則是人道的具體體現。如《論語》〈陽貨〉曰：“子之武城，聞弦歌之聲。夫子莞爾而笑，曰：‘割雞焉用牛刀？’子遊對曰：‘昔者偃也聞諸夫子曰：‘群子學道則愛人，小人學道則易使也。’’何晏(?-249)在《論語集解》中引用孔安國(約公元前156-公元前74)注

²² 丁四新，《郭店楚墓竹簡思想研究》，頁177。

²³ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

²⁴ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

²⁵ 李零，《郭店楚簡校讀記》，頁118。

²⁶ 劉昕嵐，《郭店楚簡〈性自命出〉篇箋釋》，頁330。

²⁷ 李天紅，《郭店竹簡〈性自命出〉研究》，頁136。

²⁸ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

曰：“道，謂禮樂也。樂以和人，人和則易使也。”邢昺(932-1010)在《論語注疏》中曰：“時子遊爲武城宰，意欲以禮樂化導于民，故弦歌”；“道，謂禮樂也。禮節人心，樂和人聲。言若在位，君子學禮樂則愛養下人也；若在下，小人學禮樂則人和而易使也。”《荀子》〈儒效〉中曰：“聖人也者，道之管也。天下之道管是矣，百王之道一是矣。故詩書禮樂之道歸是矣。”唐朝(618-907)楊倞在《荀子注》中曰：“管，樞要也。是，儒學。”通過這些典籍，可見道即禮，禮即道，此乃儒家一貫以來的理念。

“情”是人的感情。它是“性”的流露或外部表現；²⁹情主要指真情。³⁰《禮記》〈樂記〉中“先王本之情性，稽之度數，制之禮義”的語意與楚簡相同。〈性自命出〉所說的“情”，是爲物所取而呈現于外的性，故有“情生于性”之語。它與〈語叢二〉中“情生于性，禮生于情”³¹的意義相同。

性與情雖然同源，但就發生次序而言，性先于情。〈語叢二〉中也有類似的說法：“情生于性，禮生于情……愛生于性……欲生于性……惡生于性……喜生于性……。”³²

“性自命出，命自天降。道始于情，情生于性”的組合展示了一個由天而命，由命而性，由性而情，再由情而道的發展模式。天→命→性→情→道，在先秦儒家那裏，這其中的任何一個環節都是不能夠各自獨立存在的。

所以，第1、2、3簡實際上是〈性自命出〉全文的總綱。

第4簡：“好亞(惡)，告(性)也。所好所亞(惡)，勿(物)也。”³³

《禮記》〈樂記〉曰：“物至知知，然後好惡形焉。好惡無節于內，知誘于外，不能反躬，天理滅矣。夫物之感人無窮，而人之好惡無節，則是物至而人化物也。”《禮記》〈禮運〉又曰：“飲食男女，人之大欲存焉。死亡貧苦，人之大惡存焉。故欲惡者，心之大端也。”所以，“欲惡”即“好惡”，以“好惡”言性情。³⁴

“好惡，性也”中的“好惡”是指人的內在之性。既言好惡，則性或者向物親近，或者舍物疏離；“所好所惡，物也”中的“好”“惡”自身爲性，所好所惡則是好惡的作用，指向的是性動而作用的對象，從性之好惡，到性之所好所惡是性的體用不二。由性到物，有一種天然的指向，所以，物不可能絕對地離開性之作用。

²⁹ 李零，《郭店楚簡校讀記》，頁117。

³⁰ 李天紅，《郭店竹簡〈性自命出〉研究》，頁137。

³¹ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁203。

³² 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁203-204。

³³ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

³⁴ 李天紅，《郭店竹簡〈性自命出〉研究》，頁138。

第4-5簡：“善不□□□，所善所不善，執(勢)也。”³⁵

這裏所缺之字估計是[善，眚(性)也]。裘錫圭認為，“此句可補爲‘善、不善，□也’。”³⁶文義謂人性中亦本有善不善之判斷傾向。³⁷這裏的善不善是性，而不是性的本質。³⁸所謂“善不善，性也”，可能是說人具有分辨、判斷善惡、好壞的本能，判斷善惡、好壞是人的天性。

“好惡”，乃人之本性；“所好所惡”，是指外界事物。“善不善”，亦指人之本性；“所善所不善”，則是指外界事物所處之情勢。“善不[善，性也]”，是說性可以表現爲善，也可以表現爲不善。這裏的“善不善”與前面的“好惡，性也”的“好惡”一樣，都是動詞而不是形容詞；而“所善所不善，勢也”，則是說性成爲善或者不善，取決于外在的“勢”。由此可見，楚簡將人性的善與不善歸因于外在的“勢”，這種論調顯然不屬於性善論，而是自然人性論。

第5簡：“凡眚(性)爲主(主)，勿(物)取之也。”³⁹

“主”指先行存在的、原生的、主題性的東西，與外界之“物”相對應。性爲主爲質，“物取之”則指“物”通過“心”對“性”產生影響。所以，“性”爲主，“物”爲輔。

楚簡以“喜怒哀悲之氣”論性、論情，這清晰地指出了性之不離生之本源的天賦性，故又曰“凡性爲主”。“凡性爲主，物取之也”想要表達的並不是“物”可以直接取“性”，而是說只有通過“心”，物才可以間接地影響性情、熏陶性情。這樣才會有接下來的“金石之有聲，弗扣不鳴，人之雖有性，心弗取不出”的論述。

第5-6簡：“金石之又(有)聖(聲)，□□□□□唯(雖)又(有)眚(性)，心弗取不出。”⁴⁰

關於缺文，李零如下補作：“[弗扣不鳴。人之]。”⁴¹

這裏是說外物首先要動搖心，然後才能由心而取性。性與物之交接及交接後的種種外在表現，都是由心爲之做出的抉擇。也就是說物之所以能取性，必須以心爲中介。所以楚簡前言“物取性”，這裏又講“心取性”，說法雖不同，實質則無異。⁴²

³⁵ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

³⁶ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁182。

³⁷ 劉昕嵐，《郭店楚簡〈性自命出〉篇箋釋》，頁332。

³⁸ 李天紅，《郭店竹簡〈性自命出〉研究》，頁139。

³⁹ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

⁴⁰ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

⁴¹ 李零，《郭店楚簡校讀記》，頁105。

所以，即使有好惡喜怒之天性，但若沒有心感知外物，則不會形見于外。性由靜而動，是依靠心，心的動向則在心物交接過程中發生，心動之後取性。

第7-8簡：“牛生而偃(長)，鴈(鴈)生而執(伸)，其胄(性)……而學或臽(使)之也。”⁴³

關於缺文，李零補作：“[使然。人]。”⁴⁴此句是說人的學習能力，就如同牛體形龐大，鴈脖子長一樣，這是先天的本能，也是天性使之然。⁴⁵即牛生而體大，鴈生而脖子長，這些都是天性使然。就如同人之品性各異。

第9簡：“四溲(海)之內其胄(性)戎(一)也。其甬(用)心各異，𡗗(教)臽(使)狀(然)也。”⁴⁶

此簡完全是孔子“性相近也，習相遠也”思想的擴展與詮釋，其中體現的禮樂教化思想指向已經相當明顯。《荀子》〈性惡〉中曰：“凡人之性者，堯舜之與桀跖，其性一也；君子之與小人，其性一也。”從這一點來看，荀子所述與孔子的“性相近也”其本義是一致的。

第9-10簡：“凡胄(性)或𡗗(動)之，或违(逢?)之，或交之，或萬(厲)之，或出之，或𡗗(養)之，或長之。”⁴⁷

“违”字，又見于第11簡中的“违性者，悅也”。整理者在釋文後加問號，表示自己也不是十分肯定。楚簡將其讀為“逢”，與〈成之聞之〉第32簡中的“是故小人亂天常以逆大道”⁴⁸的意義相同，釋為“逆”。⁴⁹《爾雅》〈釋言〉也曰：“逆，迎也。”《方言》〈第一〉曰：“逢、逆，迎也。”《韓詩外傳》卷九曰：“見色而悅，謂之逆。”所以，第11簡謂“逆性者，悅也”，說的也正是此意。

此句句義為，凡人之性，可以以外物感動之，以歡悅之事迎合之，以心充實之，以行動磨礪之，使它展現出客觀情勢，培養人的後天修養，以增益人之道。換言之，心動之後取性，取性之後，即進入一系列的動態過程。這一過程可分七個階段，即：動性、逢性、交性、厲性、出性、養性、長性。從其內涵看來，這七個層次並不是隨意羅列的，而是有序排列的。其次序反映

⁴² 李天紅，《郭店竹簡〈性自命出〉研究》，頁140。

⁴³ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

⁴⁴ 李零，《郭店楚簡校讀記》，頁105。

⁴⁵ 李天紅，《郭店竹簡〈性自命出〉研究》，頁142。

⁴⁶ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

⁴⁷ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

⁴⁸ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁168。

⁴⁹ 李零，《郭店楚簡校讀記》，頁108。

了“性”的逐步深化的過程。通過最後階段的“養性”、“長性”，更是能充分了解儒家以教養轉化性情的基本教義。這與《唐虞之道》第11簡所曰：“順乎脂膚血氣之情，養性命之正”⁵⁰的意義相近。

第10-12簡：“凡蠱(動)告(性)者，勿(物)也；违(逢?)告(性)者，兌(悅)也；交告(性)者，古(故)也；萬(厲)告(性)者，宜(義)也；出告(性)者，執(勢)也；兼(養)告(性)者，習也；長告(性)者，衍(道)也。”⁵¹

“悅”，楚簡自釋曰：“快于己者之謂悅。”⁵²《廣韻》〈夬〉也曰：“快，稱心也。”《韓詩外傳》卷九曰：“見色而悅，爲之逆。”這是說內在之性通過心與外物的交接，使人感到愉悅。由此可見“物”可改變和影響人之本性。“外物”在主體的心志之中引起了一種特殊的心理反應，這種心理反應謂之“逆”。雖然這種“逆”，是人人都具備的，但是，想要充分利用“逆”的機緣來磨礪人的“性情”，可就不是那麼容易的事情了。只有那些真心想要磨練自己的人才會發現並尋求到這種“逆”的機緣來提高並錘煉自己。

“勢”，是有針對物而言的，其目的還是爲了鍛煉性情，指的是人作爲一種社會性動物所受到的人文制約。因此，其“所善所不善”的對象，是不以個人的意志爲轉移的，具有被動的趨勢、勢態；而習養，卻與“勢”剛好相反，是有目的的、主動進行的心性錘煉。後面第13-14簡中的“習也者，有以習其性也”，在很大程度上是對“動之”、“逆之”、“交之”、“厲之”、“出之”的全面總結。後面第38-40簡中“此義之方也。義，敬之方也。敬，物之即也。篤，仁之方也。仁，性之方也。性或生之。忠，信之方也。信，情之方也”⁵³所展示給我們的實際上是一個習練、修養性情的演變過程。

這段楚簡是對“心”感于“物”、“取”性而“出”的具體說明。“物”能動“性”，然而並非所有的物皆能動性。此“動性”之義，要從“心術”上講。“悅”，即從心上說。凡能動性而“出”者，皆爲能“悅”心之物。而能“悅”人心之“物”必然具有能動性。如〈性自命出〉首段中所謂的“性”、“待悅而後行”，說的亦是這個意思。“故”在此應理解爲“事”。這是從人心與物相交接的行爲上講的。《禮記》〈大學〉中曰：“格物在致知”，朱熹在《大學章句》中將“物”通爲“事”，這都是對的。因爲“出性”之“物”也好，“格物”之“物”也好，都非與人無關的客觀之“物”，而是與人“心”、人之行動相關之事實。“交性”之“故”更是就行爲而言的“物”，所以曰：“有爲也者之謂故。”⁵⁴“勢”是就這些與人心相關之事物總體所成之環境而言的，所以曰：“物之勢者之謂勢。”⁵⁵總而言

⁵⁰ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁157。

⁵¹ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

⁵² 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

⁵³ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁180。

⁵⁴ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

之，人心在與其相關之物的交接行為中，表現出各異的情態，此即前面所提到的“物取之”、“出性者勢也”的意義。這也與《禮記》〈樂記〉中的“應感起物而動，然後心術形焉”同義。

第1簡到12簡全面地構建起了由“天命”→“性”→“心志”→“情”→“物”→“道義”，再由“道義”復歸到“物”→“情”→“心志”→“性”→“天命”這樣一個螺旋式的認識論。在後來的儒學哲學中，這種認識論與人學相互滲透的理論模式就被孟子發展成為“盡心”、“知性”、“知天”，即《孟子》〈盡心上〉中所曰：“盡其心者，知其性也。知其性，則知天矣。”⁵⁶

第13-14簡：“習也者，又(有)以習其胥(性)也。”⁵⁷

“習”即修性、養性。

第29-30簡：“依(哀)、樂，其胥(性)相近也，是古(故)其心不遠。”⁵⁸

哀、樂均為人本性所固有，故人生發或哀或樂之心亦不相遠。這個觀點可以說在字面上繼承或闡述了孔子“性相近也”的主張。楚簡認為凡至樂必悲，悲樂皆至情。就至情這一點來說，二者之性是相近的。不過需要指出的是哀、樂皆為情，與性稍有差異。性是涵情未發者，由哀、樂推其性，皆源于性中涵而未發的至情。此至情從性靈深處說，是哀、樂在性體之中貫然相通、暢然相聯，統彙于至情。由此性中隱涵的至情——或樂或悲之外發，似乎是產生于一念之間的。“哀、樂，其性相近也，是故其心不遠”，也說明了由哀、樂之情，推及其性之相近，又推及其用心之不遠，這其中的關聯已經說得非常清晰可見。大體來說，乃是心作用于性，而使隱涵于性中之情顯發出來，成為真實可感的哀、樂。簡單說來即是“性取情出”而已。因此對情相異而性相近之原因的追向，就落實到其用心不遠的陳述上。

第39簡：“愬(仁)，胥(性)之方也。胥(性)或生之。”⁵⁹

此句文義可以理解為：仁心又從人性而生。⁶⁰

“性或生之”或與下文的“情出于性”有關聯。楚簡自“此義之方也”至“敬，物之節也”，講述合乎禮道的品行；自“篤，仁之方也”至“性或生之”，講述源于人性的德行，一外一內。⁶¹

⁵⁵ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

⁵⁶ 歐陽慎人，〈在摩蕩中弘揚主體——郭店楚簡《性自命出》認識論檢析〉，頁370。

⁵⁷ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

⁵⁸ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁180。

⁵⁹ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁180。

⁶⁰ 劉昕嵐，〈郭店楚簡《性自命出》篇箋釋〉，頁344。

“仁”是性的準則，性則為人生而有之。楚簡把“仁”看作是“性之方”，表明了作者試圖將仁與性統一起來，在其看來，仁可能就是性，或者說是由性生出的，故謂“性或生之”。不過從“或”一字看，作者對此判斷尚有一絲猶豫和不確定。

第40簡：“青(情)出於告(性)。”⁶²

真情出自人的本性。

第40簡：“𢆶(愛)類(類)七，唯告(性)𢆶(愛)為近𢆶(仁)。”⁶³

這句話是說人的愛有七種，只有發自于性的愛才能近乎于仁。這裏同樣肯定了仁來自于性之愛。不過它只說了“性愛為近仁”，而沒有說性愛即是仁。這在表達上是有所保留的。“仁”與前面提到的喜怒哀悲、好惡不同，它雖然是一種情或情感，但它不是自然情感，而是道德情感。它具有對善惡的判斷能力，表達、反映的是主體的意志和欲求。人具有了仁、義、忠、信之情或性，便不再是被動的接受外在的規範和支配，而能表現出主體的自覺和自我意識。從這個意義上說，這個人便是“性善”者了。⁶⁴

第51-52簡：“未𢆶(教)而民互(恆)，告(性)善者也。”⁶⁵

“民恆”指民有恆善之心。⁶⁶《孟子》〈梁惠王上〉中曰：“無恆產而有恆心者，惟士為能”；朱熹在《孟子集注》〈梁惠王章句上〉也曰：“恆，常也。產，生業也。恆產，可常生之業也。恆心，人所常有之善心也。”

“未教而民恆，性善者也”一句，讓我們不得不聯想到孟子的理論淵源是否與〈性自命出〉有什麼關聯呢？正是由于有了“未言而信，有美情者也。未教而民恆，性善者也”⁶⁷這種有德行、善的力量，才會有具備“未賞而民勸，含福者也。未刑而民畏，有心畏者也。賤而民貴之，有德者也。貧而民聚焉，有道者也”⁶⁸此等德行的君子賢人。

從“未教而民恆，性善者也”一句，可以推論出“教而民未恆”之人性，其本性當是非善的。由于人生有善惡之分，所以教化作用才有存在的道理。教之作用即是要使民性達于恆道，止于至善。

61 李天紅，《郭店竹簡〈性自命出〉研究》，頁177-178。

62 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁180。

63 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁180。

64 梁濤，〈竹簡《性自命出》的人性論問題〉，頁68-69。

65 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁181。

66 劉昕嵐，〈郭店楚簡《性自命出》篇箋釋〉，頁348。

67 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁181。

68 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁181。

從楚簡的前後內容來看，其前面側重提出“性可以爲善，可以爲不善”說；而後面則又提出了“性善”說。這樣，楚簡實際呈現出了由自然人性說向道德人性說的過渡過程，而出現這種過渡乃是由于當時儒家正處于分化、過渡時期。

〈性自命出〉對性之本義、性之來源、性之活動的性格、特點以及性與心的關係、性與習的關係、性與仁德的關係皆做有論述。專家學者們對〈性自命出〉的性論亦有多方解說。大體而言可分爲兩種：一種爲持平之論，它側重于客觀的說明；另一種則側重于從《孟子》、《中庸》來解讀本篇性論。在性論的發展過程中，楚簡無疑產生于嚴格的性論體系建立起來以前。〈性自命出〉以“喜怒哀悲之氣”釋“性”，這一點實可與“好惡，性也”這一條合而爲一。在春秋時期人們普遍認爲，好惡喜怒哀樂等特性乃稟自天地，是以其不同的特質所形成的氣，此氣藏于內則爲“性”，發于外則爲“情”。性與情關係非常密切，所以〈性自命出〉中對性的論述被分作二截。第一，言喜怒哀悲之氣爲“性”，即是說“及其見于外，則物取之也”；第二，言好惡爲性，即是說“所好所惡，物也。”這樣，一內一外，一動一靜，兩相對比亦兩相轉化。《荀子》〈正名〉中論性情曰：“性之好惡喜怒哀樂謂之情”，正是接此語脈。本篇中的“性自命出，命自天降”可從《中庸》來解讀。〈性自命出〉中“未教而民恒，性善者也”這一句實當引起我們的注意。所謂“民恒”之內容應當解釋爲民受之于天地的好惡喜怒哀悲之氣爲性，恒保此六氣，無有減損和悖逆，則爲性善。〈性自命出〉本篇的中心在以好惡釋性，以喜怒哀悲之氣釋性，且人性皆相同。即“四海之內其性一也”。而此性便可動、可逢、可交、可厲、可出、可養、可長。恰如文中所說“長養教習”即是一種教。性之可長養交習的目的是使其逢動出入皆有物有則。如此一來，此“性”就與後面所說的純然至善之性產生了一定的差異。依邏輯來看，此“性”是可以通過“習”以養“性”的。所以，本篇所言的“習也者，有以習其性者也”的原因就在于此。

在儒學家中，與〈性自命出〉中論性關聯最爲密切的無疑是孔子。孔子肯定了人性相近，而未表明人性是善是惡。孔子認爲人的行爲的差異來自後天的習染。至于子貢說的“夫子之言性與天道，不可得而聞也”，並非是說孔子不言性與天道。學者們也普遍指出，〈性自命出〉中“四海之內其性一也”也是直接繼承了孔子“性相近”的思想。那麼，〈性自命出〉中的言性與孔子言性是否真的完全相同呢？這仍有待商榷。孔子所言之性實乃兼才而言，因此才有上智下愚之說。故孔子言性之質點與方向，與〈性自命出〉這篇中的“交性”、“養性”、“習其性”的主張並不相同。孔子兼才而言性，〈性自命出〉以情釋性。“才”與“情”固根源于“性”，且爲性之內容的具體表現，所以〈性自命出〉一再強調“道始于情，情生于性”，“禮作于情”，⁶⁹這是將滋情育情與習性養性融合爲一體，又將性之長養交習著落于“情”之基礎之上。除此以外，還

⁶⁹ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁179。

以“情”言“性”，則“情”爲“性”之顯，不言“性”，即無以知其“情”，故“性”爲“情”之本。〈性自命出〉羅列出了誠、義、敬、篤、仁、性、忠、信等各種優良品德。其結論是“情出于性。愛類七，唯性愛爲近仁。”由此可見，由于即情言性之“情”與兼才言性之“才”具有不同的性格，所以孔子言性與〈性自命出〉言性的方向並不相同。〈性自命出〉中雖未圍繞善惡二字討論性，但其習性、養情的主張卻包含著相當的開放性和可能性，所以才會爲日後產生各種不同觀念的文本打下基礎。

楚簡提出的“性自命出，命自天降”，與後來的孟子的主張也有區別。《孟子》〈盡心下〉曰：“口之于味也，目之于色也，耳之于聲也，鼻之于臭也，四肢之于安逸也，性也，有命焉，君子不謂性也。”即是說實然之性並不等于天性之必然。但是，楚簡似乎並不否認出自天命的性的合法性與正當性。“好惡，性也。所好所惡，物也。”是說“性”是稟受于天的。我們可以從天和入兩個不同的角度來觀性：從“天”的角度看，“性”是一種現成的、不可改變的“給定”；但從人的位置上看，“性”則爲一種具有無限可能性和不確定性的“變體”。對於人來說，以天觀性，沒有任何意義，可以討論的只是從人的存在性和現實性立場出發的具有無限可能和不確定性的可更變的“性”。

總之，〈性自命出〉的人性論觀點，從總體上來看就是認爲情出于性，性自命出，命自天降；道始于情，終于義，道兼情義。喜怒哀悲之氣，性也；好惡，性也。仁，性之方也，性或生之；愛類七，惟性愛爲近仁。人皆有性，四海之內其性一也，然而心與性不同，心無定志；其用心各異，教使然也。性一心異，是〈性自命出〉人性論的基本架構。這深刻地表明人性雖然是人皆有之，且無有不一，但人之用心卻各有差異。心之本體雖必降自于天，但心之用卻是超越性之規定而具有自身的獨立性。性與心的差別即是天與人的差別。楚簡的人性論特別強調了用心之異與教化作用的重要性，但這並不意味著本然之性、先天之性的崩塌，而是在人性受心的作用後，在經驗與後天的層次上發生了變化。在根本上“性”還是本質的同一，也即本然之性天然地同一。應該把在人者的“性”分析爲本然之性與受心作用之性，與人性能受或受到其他因素的作用，當作兩碼事，不能攙作一團。⁷⁰

(二)〈唐虞之道〉

第10-12簡：“𡗗(禹)𡗗(治)水，臚(益)𡗗(治)火，后稷(稷)𡗗(治)土，足民𡗗(養)𡗗𡗗𡗗(順)庠(乎)脂膚血𡗗(氣)之青(情)，𡗗(養)眚(性)命之正，安命而弗𡗗(夭)，𡗗(養)生而弗𡗗(傷)，智𡗗𡗗𡗗(禮)悵(畏)守樂孫民𡗗(教)也。”⁷¹

70 丁四新，《郭店楚墓竹簡思想研究》，頁283-284。

71 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁157。

此簡說，大禹職掌治水，益職掌火，後稷職掌土地，這些都是爲了滿足人民生存的需要。根據皮肉血氣等實際身體情況，培養生命之正氣，愛護生命而不殤亡，保養身體而不損傷。職掌音樂，以順民之教化。

先秦儒家已經看得很清楚，如果不“順乎脂膚血氣之情”，就不能“養性命之正”。這種認識無疑是相當人性化的，反映了原始儒家的真誠。〈性命出〉的出發點，始終是建立在性情的“出之”、“內之”之上的，其“動性”、“逆性”、“交性”、“厲性”、“出性”、“養性”、“長性”的基礎，正是把人當人看，即“夫〈天〉生百物，人爲貴。”⁷²

第11簡“順乎脂膚血氣之情，養性命之正，安命而弗夭，養生而弗傷，智□□”的“性命”一詞應該解釋爲“生命”、“壽命”。按此簡義可知人的生命構成：一有“性命之正”的本原者，二有“脂膚血氣之情”的補充。並且“性命之正”與“脂膚血氣之情”具有對立並統一的關係：“性命之正”指性命之本原，情之未發、含蓄凝聚其中者；而“脂膚血氣之情”乃充斥于性命之中，奔溢于脂膚血氣之身體內外。雖然可在性命之正中考慮它的屬性，乃至以性統情，但它對性命之正構成一種否定性。所以，〈唐虞之道〉有云既要“順情”，又要“養性命之正”，並且後者更爲根本。“安命而弗夭，養生而弗傷，智□□”，是指出了養生的根本在於“安命”，或者說在“養性命之正”。只有真正的了解“安命”、“知命”之道，才有更深刻、更根本的方法來提高人生涵養；如若不然，只“順乎脂膚血氣之情”，則爲治標不治本的養生方法，可能適得其反。⁷³

(三)〈成之聞之〉

第26-27簡：“聖人之眚(性)與中人之眚(性)，其生而未又(有)非之，節於而也，則猷(猶)是也。”⁷⁴

裘錫圭認爲，“‘於’下‘而’字疑是誤字。”⁷⁵

此句是說，聖人與一般人的本性在出生時並無差異。這裏要強調的是聖人之性雖與常人無異，但因其修道成果的不同而有了人格高低之別。聖人之性與中人之性，自降生以來即本天然，皆成于天命。這樣的表達方式明顯脫胎于孔子的“中人之性”云云，但是，它發展了孔子的思想理論，試圖將孔子表述中原本有矛盾的地方彌合起來。

第28簡：“此以民皆又(有)眚(性)而聖人不可莫(慕)也。”⁷⁶

⁷² 〈語叢一〉第18簡。(荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁194。)

⁷³ 丁四新，《郭店楚墓竹簡思想研究》，頁272。

⁷⁴ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁168。

⁷⁵ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁170。

此句是說，因為至此則普通人都已經有了他們自己的性格，連聖人也不能再對其有影響了。觀其大義，乃首先將聖人之性與中人之性區別開來，然後討論兩者間的不同，最後歸之于“此以民皆有性而聖人不可慕也”。民雖皆有性，然同聖人之性不在同一層次。聖人之性之高，天就之也，非可學習。這種性不同的觀點直承于孔子，與孔子“性相近也，習相遠也”的人性思想十分接近。楚簡中“民皆有性而聖人不可慕也”的思想表述是孔子“唯上知與下愚不移”思想在楚簡裏的反映。也就是民之性與聖人之性不但不同，而且各有一定，不可習，不可移。⁷⁷

〈成之聞之〉中這兩段帶“性”的句子都是很好的人性論，迎合了孔子的“性相近”之說，還把人性本善的理論進一步向前推進了，與前言〈性自命出〉一說從不同的角度肯定了人性的正面。

(四) 〈語叢二〉

第1-4簡：“情生於眚(性)，豐(禮)生於情，厩(嚴)生於豐(禮)，敬生於厩(嚴)，望(望)生於敬，恥生於憲(望)，利(利)生於恥，廉(廉)生於利(利)。”⁷⁸

“情生于性”此句亦見于〈性自命出〉中第3簡。此段楚簡是說，情感生于天性，禮儀生成于情感，威嚴生成于禮儀，恭敬生成于威嚴，責怨生成于恭敬，羞恥生成于責怨，怨恨生成于羞恥，不滿生成于怨恨。

第1簡“情生于性，禮生于情”，“性”乃生命之本原，“情”則為性之發現，是人的內在生命的流露，反映的是生命的諸種情況，而情感不過為情諸多含義中的一種而已。情，也可理解為人情，所反映的是人之為人的諸種實際情況，與性為人之所以為人的本原有所不同。

〈性自命出〉及〈語叢〉都認為“情生于性”，因此我不同意把“情”完全作為情感來闡述，而主張以人情，即以隨著人性的展開而顯露出的人生命的諸種情況來釋意“情”，但這其中並不排斥情感之義，因為情感亦人情之一。

第8-9簡：“慤(愛)生於眚(性)，羣(親)生於慤(愛)，忠生於羣(親)。”⁷⁹

這段楚簡的意思是說，仁愛生成于天性，親情生成于仁愛，忠信生成于親情。

76 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁168。

77 郭沂，〈郭店楚簡《天降大常》(《成之聞之》)篇疏證〉，頁64-65。

78 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁203。

79 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁203。

第10-12簡：“忞(欲)生於眚(性)，慮生於忞(欲)，惛生於慮，靜生於惛，尚生於靜。”⁸⁰

意思是說，欲望生成于天性，圖謀生成于欲望，背叛生成于圖謀，爭奪生成于背叛，偏愛生成于爭奪。

第20-22簡：“智生於眚(性)，卯生於智，𡗗生於卯，𡗗(好)生於𡗗，從生於𡗗(好)。”⁸¹

意思是說，智慧生成于天性，摹仿生成于智慧，喜悅生成于摹仿，喜好生成于喜悅，順從生成于喜好。

第23-24簡：“子(慈)生於眚(性)，易生於子(慈)，帛生於易，容生於帛。”⁸²

意思是說，慈愛生成于天性，和易生成于慈愛，正直生成于和易，寬容生成于正直。

第25-27簡：“惡生於眚(性)，恚(怒)生於惡，乘生於恚(怒)，𡗗生於𡗗(乘)，惻生於𡗗。”⁸³

意思是說，憎惡生成于天性，憤怒生成于憎惡，爭強好勝之心生成于憤怒，忌恨生成于好勝之心，罪惡生成于忌恨。

第28-29簡：“𡗗(喜)生於眚(性)，樂生於𡗗(喜)，悲生於樂。”⁸⁴

意思是說，歡喜生成于天性，快樂生成于歡喜，悲傷生成于快樂。

第30-31簡：“𡗗(慍)生於眚(性)，𡗗(憂)生於𡗗(慍)，𡗗(哀)生於𡗗(憂)。”⁸⁵

意思是說，怨恨生成于天性，憂愁生成于怨恨，悲哀生成于憂愁。

第32-33簡：“瞿生於眚(性)，監生於瞿，望生於監。”⁸⁶

⁸⁰ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁203。

⁸¹ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁204。

⁸² 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁204。

⁸³ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁204。

⁸⁴ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁204。

⁸⁵ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁204。

⁸⁶ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁204。

意思是說，恐懼生成于天性，貪婪生成于恐懼，怨恨生成于貪婪。

第34-35簡：“彊生於眚(性)，立生於彊，斷生於立。”⁸⁷

意思是說，堅強生成于天性，成就生成于堅強，決斷生成于成就。

第36-37簡：“眚生於眚(性)，悛(疑)生於悛，北(背)生於悛(疑)。”⁸⁸

這段楚簡的意思是說，懦弱生成于天性，多疑生成于懦弱，失敗生成于多疑。

〈語叢二〉通過性之生系列，對性之內涵作出了比較全面而深刻的論述。雖然它對一些概念間的關係劃分得不甚嚴謹，卻形成了體系，所言亦是事實。〈語叢二〉第1-4簡“情生于性，禮生于情，嚴生于禮，敬生于嚴，望生于敬，恥生于望，利生于恥，廉生于利”已明確指出“情生于性”，則性之內涵是可以通過情緒或情氣反推得出。由性到情，情是性之具體表現，但情並不附庸于性，呈現出兩者相互並列或邏輯上的因果關係。在〈語叢二〉第1-4簡的生于系列中，以“情生于性，禮生于情”為例，可以說禮生成于情，當然只是說禮儀產生于情，禮儀則通過禮意的外在表現而收攝含斂于禮意之本體中。但這個禮並不是情。

〈語叢二〉所說的“性”實為“一”，而其所“生”所“出”之情態則多種多樣。從〈語叢二〉“性之生”系列來看，人性內涵的因素是如此之複雜：有“情”、“欲”、“理”、“力”、“能”五個因素。所以，下一個或善或惡的絕對純粹的性的價值判斷是非常困難的。就人性內涵的抽象因素來說，人皆有此五種因素，即在此意義上而不涉及五種性素的具體內涵或內容的話，可以得出人性的抽象同一的結論。⁸⁹

(五)〈語叢三〉

第57、61簡：“人之眚(性)非與止庠(乎)其孝。”⁹⁰

⁸⁷ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁204。

⁸⁸ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁204。

⁸⁹ 《禮記》，〈禮運〉有“何謂人情？喜怒哀懼愛惡欲七者，弗學而能”的表述，“情”，已經發展成了能夠概括喜、怒、哀、懼、愛、惡、欲等各種具體情感的範疇。不但〈語叢二〉之情、欲、愛、慈、惡、喜、慍、智、瞿、強、弱與“性”有關係，而且欲、愛、慈、惡、喜、慍、智、瞿、強、弱與情感有關係，這些範疇都是指的具體的情感。有關它們的敘述都是統領在“情生于性”這樣一個總綱之下的。

⁹⁰ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁212。

大意是說，人性不是別的，只不過是孝而已。

第58簡：“又(有)眚(性)又生庠(乎)生又(有)道。”⁹¹

意為有性命又有成長，叫做“生”。

第68下、69下簡：“又(有)眚(性)又(有)生庠(乎)名。”⁹²

意為有天性又有生命，就可稱名。

第71下、72下簡：“又(有)眚(性)又(有)生者。”⁹³

與上簡之“有性有生”相同。

〈語叢三〉亦屢言“性”字，在第58、68下簡，似是對“性”之本原進行追問，但于“性”之內涵卻未具體深究；第57簡則似是關於人性的一個主張，與人性的內涵雖有關聯，但亦不能具體地指實；第71簡下云“有性有生”，則是論性與生命的邏輯關係，從中得出了性為生命之本源的結論，但對於“性”的內涵仍無明確的分析指明。另外，楚簡殘片中“性”字共出現三次，亦皆無所指明。不過，無論是論性的來源，或論“性”與它者的關係，都在一定程度上表明了“性”的某種特徵，尤其是性係天命之落實于有性有生的觀點，表明了性乃天生之物，是包括其具體形式之人或物的生命質體，是對性的抽象的一般的規定。⁹⁴

〈語叢二〉、〈語叢三〉為當時儒家流行格言之彙集，其中亦見“情生于性”的說法，而“愛生于性”、“欲生于性”、“惡生于性”、“喜生于性”等說法，也支持了這一觀點。

四、楚簡“性”思想與孔孟性思想的關係

在孔子看來，人性是相近的，而人的生命成就之所以不同乃是由于教習使之相遠的緣故。但“性相近”到底是何意思呢？“性相近”可由三個層面進行理解，其一是說，天命賦予人之性即生命體，為本然之性；其二是說，人

⁹¹ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁212。

⁹² 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁213。

⁹³ 荊門市博物館編，《郭店楚墓竹簡》，頁213。

⁹⁴ 丁四新，《郭店楚墓竹簡思想研究》，頁271。

受天命，秉性降生以後，由于修養功夫的不同，或接受天命的天分不同，其性的表現也會有所不同；其三是說，人性因其內涵諸要素之表現與作用有所不同而產生差異。這裏第一個層面是根本，後兩個層面則是在前者的制約之下發揮的其人性的作用。但不可否認的是後兩個層面的意義不能與第一個層面的人性意義發生衝突。現在再回過頭來思考〈成之聞之〉中不提“下愚之性”的原因，想來自然是接受了孔子的教誨，但也沒有就此走上人性天然即異的觀點，自然也沒有與孔子“性相近，習相遠”之教相背離。因此那種把人性分為上、中、下三等的做法，大概就是指“性相近”觀點的第二、三重含義來說的吧。〈性自命出〉中曰：“凡人雖有性”、“四海之內其性一也”，〈成之聞之〉亦曰：“民皆有性”，並強調聖人之性與中人之性的天賦相同，似乎楚簡所持的“人性相一”的論調是當時的一個共識。不過，〈性自命出〉又曰：“未教而民恒，有性善者也。”此“性善”乃天性之善的直接呈現，與尚未形成善惡判斷的天命之性仍有區別。⁹⁵

孔子雖然是儒家學派的開創者，但對“性”問題談論的並不多。而孔子以後對“性”問題進行多方面討論的，從目前資料看，當屬以〈性自命出〉為主的《郭店楚墓竹簡》。《郭店楚墓竹簡》是一個介于孔子與孟子思想之間的先秦儒家典籍。根據這種界定，我們能清楚地看到，孔子本人其實是沒有性善性惡這種思想意識的，但《郭店楚墓竹簡》，特別是其中的〈性自命出〉已經初步具有了性善性惡的思想萌芽，即使它的理論還不成熟，還存在一些思想上的衝突與矛盾。楚簡是遵循著孔子的思想路線的，並且我們不難在其中發現孟子、荀子之性善與性惡論題之爭形成的可能性。如〈性自命出〉所云：“喜怒哀悲之氣，性也。”這是在原始意義上闡述“性”。從這個意義上看，“性”確實是“相近”的，甚至可以說“四海之內其性一也。”然而，“性”又必然要顯露于外，即發而為“情”，表現為人之好惡。因此，〈性自命出〉又曰：“好惡，性也。所好所惡，物也。”由于外部生活的複雜性，讓人的生命處於各種複雜的環境，經歷不同的過程，並產生不同的變化。“或動之，或違(逢?)之，或交之，或厲之，或出之，或養之，或長之。”上述所說都是影響“性”的因素，有自然因素，更有人文因素。“凡動性者，物也；違(逢?)性者，悅也；交性者，故也；厲性者，義也；出性者，勢也；養性者，習也；長性者，道也。”正是上述這些複雜的經歷，使“性”由本然世界進入到了文化世界。因此，楚簡裏講的“性”，雖來自“天”的本然世界，但更主要的是存在于“人”的文化世界之中。而“性”之善惡，都是人的生命在經歷這些複雜的外部生活中逐漸產生並形成的。《孟子》稱“性善”，《荀子》言“性惡”，在這一點上確實與楚簡對“性”的理解不同。《孟子》的性善說和《荀子》的性惡說，二者都是將原始意義上的“性”推向了極端，而使其善惡先呈現出來。換言之，性善說和性惡說都是把文化世界的道德倫理，附加在了本來還處于本

⁹⁵ 丁四新，《郭店楚墓竹簡思想研究》，頁285-287。

然世界的“性”之上。但從另一方面來看，性善說和性惡說的提出以及它們兩者之間的關聯，也未嘗是與楚簡無關的。先秦儒家通過楚簡，對人的生命進行了探討，讓“天”成為了“性”存在的本源和依據，讓原本不具有形而上意味的“性”被賦予了形而上的意味，而原本不可得而聞的“性與天道”理論也變得可得而聞了，這樣也就不可避免地使“性”超越了現實的生活世界，而被賦予了某種先天性的內容。這也許就是孟子將“善”賦予“天”之中，而荀子把“惡”賦予“天”之中，從而使本來受之于“天”的“性”具有了或善或惡的本質。因此，孟荀兩人的人性說，也都可以在楚簡中找到其理論結構上的根據。從這個意義上來講，楚簡是由孔子的人性說過渡到孟子的性善說和荀子的性惡說的一個必不可少的中間環節。⁹⁶

一般來說，儒家性論並不僅僅是從人的自身來探討人性的問題。楚簡中的“性自命出，命自天降”提出了性來自于天，是天賦予的。這是將性與天、命三者統一結合來看待的。由于它出現在很少談及“性”論的孔子之後，《中庸》的“天命之謂性”這一理論在當時就顯得尤為重要和引人注目。這一命題在具體內容和思想史上都具有重大的意義，目前學術界有一種理解：認為性是形而上學的，而楚簡的天是形而上的超越者，是普遍至善的，由這種天所出的性必然是善的。如有學者認為，楚簡在以“喜怒哀悲之氣”和“好惡”來界定“性”的同時，表明此性是天命的，是內在的，這裏所說的“好惡”之“情”即是指仁與義，仁義是內在稟賦的內容。這裏雖然有“性有善有不善”的意思，卻並沒有完全排拒情氣好惡中的善端。這就為後世的性善論埋下了伏線。⁹⁷當然也有學者並不認同楚簡中已有了性善論這一論斷，而是認為這是由于楚簡中的性和命並沒有做到統一致。 “天命之謂性”中，謂天命就是性。而“性自命出”的意思很明瞭，性是從命產生的，性是性，命是命，性、命二也。《中庸》將性和命二合為一，天命善，所以性也必善。楚簡分性命為二，所以言性善，顯得理論沒力氣。⁹⁸反過來說，性命一旦合一，性自然也就成為善的了。可以看出，這種觀點與前者雖有不同，但在思路上一致，與前兩者不同。另有學者則認為，“楚簡有‘天’、‘命’，卻未見‘天命’連用。‘天’意義含混，其中包含有非人力所可測或控制的神秘力量，但卻並無人格的性格。‘命’無神秘的道德含義，指的即是人的感性生命和生存……從而‘性自命出，命自天降’的‘性’，便是與物性相區別的自然人性。這裏毫無‘人性善’的道德說法。後儒直到今天的現代新儒家對‘人性’和‘天命’的道德形而上學的闡釋，似乎值得重新考慮。”⁹⁹楚簡中的“天”，正如論者所說，意義含混，不具備清晰明確的道德含義。而從哲學的層面看，“性自命出，命自天降”表述的是生成論，而不是

96 李維武，《〈性自命出〉的哲學意蘊初探》，頁310-313。

97 郭齊勇，《郭店儒家簡與孟子心性論》，頁24-25。

98 呂紹綱，《性命說—由孔子到思孟》，頁23。

99 李澤厚，《初讀郭店竹簡印象記要》，頁2-3。

本體論。所以，由這種“天”所出的“性”，不論其是否與天合一，都不會必然是一種善性。

五、餘論

由于以往文獻的局限性，人們認為繼孔子之後的儒家人性論是以性善說和性惡說的對立與論證為中心展開的。以〈性自命出〉為主的郭店楚墓竹簡對於“性”的釋義，則揭示了在性善說和性惡說對立與爭論之前，儒家對於“性”的理解則要平和得多，並不是處於一種非此即彼的緊張狀態。楚簡的發現，為春秋戰國時期人性思想的研究，提供了更豐富、更完善的內容。

在楚簡中，人性的“性”字被表記為“眚”字，指人天生所具有的生理機能、心理本能等，來自上天。楚簡共記載了36句含有人性觀念的帶“性”的句子。有的句子表達出了人性的自然人性觀，如：“凡人雖有性，心亡莫志，待物而後作，待悅而後行，待習而後奠”、“喜怒哀悲之氣，性也”、“性自命出，命自天降”、“好惡，性也。所好所惡，物也”、“四海之內其性一也。其用心各異，教使然也”、“習也者，有以習其性也”、“哀樂，其性相近也，是故其心不遠”、“聖人之性與中人之性，其生而未有非之，節于而也，則猶是也”、“情生于性，禮生于情，嚴生于禮，敬生于嚴，望生于敬，恥生于望，利生于恥，廉生于利”等；有的句子則表現出了人性的道德人性觀，又如：“善不□□□，所善所不善，勢也”、“仁，性之方也。性或生之”、“愛類七，唯性愛為近仁”、“未教而民恒，性善者也”、“人之性非與止乎其孝”等；有的句子則只包含了“性”字，但卻並未涉及自然人性觀和道德人性觀，比如：“凡性為主，物取之也”、“有性有生者”等。其中，人性的自然人性觀是楚簡中提到最多的，道德人性觀其次。

由于楚簡是出土文獻，在形式上尚未形成系統，在思想內容上頗片面，看不出有對人性的系統化之論述，也沒有系統的理論體系。但是，我們還是可以通過它充分地了解到孔孟之間的人性思想的傳承與影響。春秋戰國之際儒家學者一邊談到人性的自然性，一邊討論人性的道德性。就是說，他們將這兩者綜合到了一起。孟子以後，人性論爭以善不善或者善惡的道德人性觀為中心展開。在人性論爭的演變過程中，楚簡的人性思想包含了人性的自然因素，同時也包含著人性的道德因素。所以說，楚簡能作為孔子“性近習遠”說和孟子“性善”說的人性思想之間的銜接點。即郭店楚墓竹簡是古代人性論發展史上自然人性觀和道德人性觀之間的銜接點。因楚簡的出土，我們才知道孔子與孟子之間的人性論的演變過程。

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A Study on the Character “*Xing*” 性 (性) in the Excavated Texts at Guodian

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Abstract

The issue of human nature was already discussed a lot during the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period, and some of the excavated pre-Qin texts also refer to Confucian views of human nature. This article analyzes the character “*xing*” 性 and its implications in the bamboo slips excavated in 1993 in the Chu tombs at Guodian. In the Chu bamboo slips, the character “*xing*” 性 was written as “*sheng*” 𡗗, which is a mixture of the two characters, “*xing*” 姓 and “*xing*” 性. The character “*xing*” 姓 refers to “people” and the character “*xing*” 性 means “human nature.” Among them, “*xing*” 性 is believed to be given by Heaven and indicates the essential nature of humans. Confucius claimed that “*xing jin xi yuan*” 性近習遠 (The nature of humans is similar, but human accumulated practices cause differences), whereas Mencius suggested the view of “*xing shan*” 性善 (Human nature is good). There is a difference between these two views, since the former is about natural human nature and the latter concerns moral human nature. The Chu bamboo slips are understood as important writings because many of them interpret human nature in natural terms or in moral terms. By studying the conception of human nature in the Chu bamboo slips, we can understand clearly the gap between Confucius and Mencius and its relations of transmission. In short, the Chu bamboo slips show the transitional stage of views on human nature from Confucius to Mencius.

Keywords: Guodian, Chu tomb, bamboo slip, Spring and Autumn, Warring States, *sheng*, *xing*, human nature, Confucian school

儒教共同體與公議的公論性

——以茶山(丁若鏞)二律背反的儒教共同體論爲中心

全 聖 健

中文提要

本文主要是以指出儒教共同體的兩個方向和摸索未來發展方向爲寫作目的。首先解釋了茶山(丁若鏞)所提出的儒教共同體論的兩個模式，並解決了其具有的“二律背反”矛盾。其次將其兩個模式應用於鄉村中心的朱子學和君權中心的茶山學，進行比較和探討。本論文還提出，儒教共同體確立依據“公議”的“公論”——“公共性的確保”，是具有現代意義的，我們需要以堅持而緩慢堅定的方式，即以積極的消極性的方式來努力使其與現代相適應。

關鍵詞：儒教共同體，君權，民權，公共性，公共的合理性，積極的消極性

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** 本論文通過審查委員的指正並接受各位評審委員的意見，修正、補充了以下內容：一、將題目和目次上的“積極的被動性”修改爲“公議的公論性”。二、對於民本和民主、君權和臣權等概念補充仔細說明，還具體地解釋此概念之間的關係。三、補充說明前近代儒教共同體提出的公共性的現代意義。此外，校正了文理不通的地方。謹在此向對各位評審委員表示感謝。

一、緒論

縱觀朝鮮儒學史，茶山(丁若鏞, 1762-1836)可以說是能夠代表所謂“經世致用、利用厚生、實事求是”的人物。這是因為茶山不僅提出了國家改革的藍圖，還為恢復民生引進各種先進技術，同時又以實證性為基礎追求合理的事實。¹ 所以，稱茶山為“朝鮮後期實學的集大成者”也不為過。

茶山身處的朝鮮後期是在清朝的考證學及西方的天主學、自然科學的影響下，性理學的秩序漸漸地崩潰的時期。當時，由於帝國主義的出現，不止朝鮮國內的政治，國外的政治形勢也十分的不安。在這樣的時代下，茶山為了使國家安定而重新建立國家體系；為了聚集叛離的民心而提出了強有力的君主論。以此為基礎，茶山構想以禮治使國家煥然一新，以立足於家禮、鄉禮、邦禮等的儀禮再造朝鮮王朝。²

但是茶山計畫的國家再造理念和現實之間是存在著很大間隙的。這個間隙正是本論文要探討的“君權和民權的二律背反”。茶山的〈原牧〉和〈湯論〉等著作是立足於民本主義立場，認為天子和諸侯的地位應該是隨著百姓的意願而提升或降低的(即推舉和罷免)。但是，在茶山的《經世遺表》和《牧民心書》等當中，卻又存在著與前者相反的見解，即“辨等”的視角。³ 茶山主張必須通過對辨等的討論，嚴格地區別身份和地位的差異。同時，這種視角暗含了強調作為皇極(帝王統治天下的準則，即所謂大中至正之道)的君主權，這一“君權邏輯”將百姓們設定為“愚民”。

積極援用茶山“推戴論”的民本主義立場的研究，主張以茶山“下而上”的邏輯作為將“民權的優先”擺在首位的存在論或者價值論，並稱之為“茶山思想暗含的民主主義屬性”。⁴ 但是與此相反，將君權的邏輯擺在首位的研究，則是立足於茶山“辨等論”，站在“過時與保守”的立場看待茶山的思想，反對強調茶山思想的“近代與進步”方面的研究。茶山政治論和社會改革論從根本上來看可以稱為“君主制的為民論或重民論”，但是卻不能用“民主主義的民主論”來評價。⁵ 通過以上論述，可以看出茶山的文章當中是存在著很多邏輯上的“矛盾”和“兩難”的。⁶

¹ 通過茶山所著的一表二書可以確認這一點，特別是“齊禮監”和“利用監”等監察機關的新建，可以更好的說明這一點。

² 參照與茶山的“家禮”相關的全聖健，〈《四禮家式》研究〉；與“鄉禮”相關的白敏禎，〈丁若鏞經世書的鄉禮規定和共同體運作的特徵：以《經世遺表》和《牧民心書》的鄉禮問題為中心〉；與“邦禮”相關的金仁圭，〈朝鮮後期《周禮》的接受和國家禮——茶山(丁若鏞)的《周禮》理解和國家禮〉。

³ 《牧民心書》卷8：“禮典六條，辨等。辨等者，安民定志之要義也。等威不明，位級以亂，則民散而無紀矣。”

⁴ 張勝求，〈茶山丁若鏞與民主主義〉，頁69-70。

⁵ 李容周，〈‘經世實學’的知識實踐——以茶山與明末清初經世論的近代性問題為線索〉，頁189。

茶山並非沒試圖去解決這種邏輯上的矛盾。在茶山的君主論中同時存在著“下而上的政治觀”和“強有力的君主論”這兩面，但是，這二者之間並不是完全割裂的，反而在邏輯上有高度一貫性。即，將政治權利集中在國王手中，使“強有力的君主論”得到“力量”，之後，再重新將這個力量用在“下而上的政治觀”的發揮上。⁷

本文在提出上述問題意識的同時，也試圖簡略整理茶山帶有二律背反性的君權與民權邏輯。以帶入的方式來研究分析二者之間的差異，即把從這種邏輯中派生的問題，帶入到茶山構想的儒教共同體論中，來研究分析民權主義“下而上”的政治觀與君權主義“上而下”的政治觀，所描述的儒教共同體的模樣之間有怎樣的差異。

另外，在研究這種儒教共同體論時，還有一種可以參考的邏輯。即性理學國家秩序所具有的鄉村中心的上向式方式和國家中心的下向式方式。如果說前者適用於“下而上”的方式，那麼就可以說後者適用於“上而下”的方式。朝鮮王朝是以宰相為中心建國的，⁸在士禍以後，發展為以士林為中心的政治秩序。宰相中心的政治論或士林中心的政治論，從限制君主的權利這一點來看，都可以說是下而上的政治論。但茶山在現實世界的政治論卻是與此不同的，反而強化了老論中心的宰相權力，因此，可以說是對權力的專橫問題起到了反作用。

二、君權和民權的二律背反

為具體瞭解茶山對君權和民權的觀點，這裡首先以茶山相對較早的著作〈原牧〉和〈湯論〉為中心來分析。這些著作是被公認為展現茶山學術中“近代性”或者“進步性”的作品。

邃古之初，民而已，豈有牧哉？民于于然聚居，有一夫與鄰闕，莫之決，有叟焉善為公言，就而正之，四鄰咸服，推而共尊之，名曰里正。於是數里之民，以其里闕，莫之決，有叟焉俊而多識，就而正之，數里咸服，推而共尊之，名曰黨正。數黨之民，以其黨闕，莫之決，有叟焉賢而有德，就而正之，數黨咸服，名之曰州長。於是數州之長，推一人以為長，名之曰國君；數國之君，推一人以為長，名之曰方伯；四方之伯，推一人以為宗，名之曰皇王。皇王之本，起於里正。⁹

茶山認為，人類的問題是從紛爭開始的。最初人們是在自然的狀態下聚居在一起的，因為發生了紛爭，需要尋找能調解紛爭的人，而這個人需要

6 安外順，〈茶山(丁若鏞)的政治權利論的性格〉，頁92-93。

7 朴賢謨，〈丁若鏞的君主論：以與正祖的關係為中心〉，頁7。

8 都賢喆，〈鄭道傳的政治體制構想與宰相政治論〉，頁184-190。

9 《茶山詩文集》卷10，〈原牧〉。

有很強的判斷能力，讓問題的當事人都認可。當找到這個能夠公正地對待問題的人之後，這個人應該尋找方法給出公正的判決。接下來，因為他可以公正地解決紛爭，人們便賦予了統治的權利，作為村子的一把手“里正”。用以上的邏輯，延伸到整體社會，“里正→黨正→州長→國君→皇王”等最高權力者便被人們認證了。

那麼，對於茶山而言，政治權力的初始目的就是通過調整糾紛來維持秩序。而調整糾紛主體的基本資格是“善為公言”。同時，這個人又要隨著共同體範圍的擴張新增必要的能力——“俊而多識”、“賢而有德”。簡言之，“推舉”和“下而上”的邏輯是反映民意而選出掌權人的方式。然而，這個掌權人自身有問題的情況該如何處理？通過民意真的能夠降低權力者的許可權和地位嗎？

其云侯戴者何？民聚而求其長，長列而求其帥，各立一帥，名之曰侯。侯之中有翹楚，相與會議以戴之，名之曰天子。【柳宗元之意】天子之子若孫不肖，諸侯莫之宗也，亦安而受之，有奮發以中興者，諸侯復往朝之，亦安而受之，不問其往事也。有暴虐淫荒，以殘害萬民者，則相與會議以去之，又戴一翹楚者，以為天子，其去之者，亦未嘗殄其宗祀，滅其遺胤。不過退而復其原初之侯位而已。¹⁰

上文是茶山的後期著作《梅氏書平》中的一段，可以說完整保存了〈原牧〉和〈湯論〉中看到的儒教共同體的理想——通過推舉來選舉諸侯和天子。問題在於，被選出的人當中會有荒淫殘暴危害百姓的人，這時該怎麼辦？結論是：要反映民意，去掉那個人，再重新推舉優秀的人物作為諸侯和天子。而被去掉的人，也只是被降級，他的宗祀和遺族不會滅絕。

只有以強有力的民權為前提，才能依靠民意來做出決定。但是，在茶山的其他著作中，存在著與這個結論完全相反的主張。即，強有力的君權意識。

故天下之田，皆王田也。天下之財，皆王財也。天下之山林、川澤，皆王之山林、川澤也。夫然後王以其田，敷錫厥庶民，王以其財，敷錫厥庶民，王以其山林、川澤之所出，敷錫厥庶民，古之義也。王與民之間，有物梗之，竊其斂時之權，阻其敷錫之恩，則皇不能建極，民不能均受，若貪官、汙吏之橫斂，豪商、猾賈之權利者，是也。¹¹

天下的田地和財物，甚至山林和川澤都是王的所有物。王只要扮演好將這些東西分給百姓的角色即可。茶山將“人主”描繪成在他的國家當中最富有的存在，是具有讓百姓們均等生存的絕對權力的人。如〈洪範〉中所說，“皇建其有極，斂時五福，用敷錫厥庶民。”茶山舉了很多這樣的例子。¹²

¹⁰ 《梅氏書平》，〈逸周書克殷篇辨〉。

¹¹ 《經世遺表》卷11，〈地官修制賦貢制五〉。

¹² 《經世遺表》卷11，〈地官修制賦貢制五〉。“天下之物，誠有此數，然天地定理，人主宜富，下民宜均，故古之聖王，立經陳紀，凡天下富貴之權，總覽在上，降德于兆民。《洪範》曰皇建其有極，斂時五福，用敷錫厥庶民，此之謂也。”

但是這種君主形象與性理學的君主形象是有所不同的。主張“無爲之治”的性理學的君主形象，是將君主權力包括在聖學論體系中的，這是爲了限制君主過度的獨斷。¹³而茶山認爲，君主是擁有絕對的許可權的，他反而把百姓當作愚昧的人，降低了他們的價值。這其實是暴露出了一種愚民意識。¹⁴

茶山在〈原牧〉和〈湯論〉等短文裡，宣揚了“推舉”和“下而上”的邏輯，並且提出了“民意的同意”做爲政治權力的正當性的根據。但是，他的後期所寫的“一表二書”，即被認爲包含了具體現實政治制度改革論的著作當中，卻看不到對這種“民意的同意”的論述。茶山反倒探討了爲恢復君主權的邏輯。那麼，在茶山的著作中看到的這種二律背反，該如何理解呢？

茶山的國家規劃藍圖是以確立預置系統和再造朝鮮王朝爲焦點，用與國政的規劃相關的《經世遺表》、與鄉政的運作相關的《牧民心書》、與家政的執行相關的《四禮家式》等整理出來的。他的這些著述活動可以說是確立邦國體制改革的一個計畫，即是以王道政治理念爲基礎，從中央政府到民間社會整體改革的，具有“行王的問題意識”。¹⁵

將此帶入茶山整理自己一生的〈自撰墓誌銘〉所提到的“六經四書與一表二書的本末論”當中，可以做出如下解釋：茶山通過六經四書復原古制的原型，斟酌和變通今制——即朝鮮王朝的政治體制和運作制度，提出考慮禮治系統的新制。¹⁶將此重新帶回我們的討論中來看，〈原牧〉和〈湯論〉等提出的儒教共同體的理想面貌，是茶山發現的古制原型；一表二書中提出的儒教共同體的現實面貌，是斟酌和變通了古制和今制的新制。

將儒教共同體的兩條路稍加現實化，則有如下兩種形式：用“下而上”的方式擴張的鄉村中心的儒教共同體；用“上而下”的方式整理的國家中心的儒教共同體。前者可以說是以士林(民權)爲中心的；後者則可以稱爲君主(君權)中心的。¹⁷

下一章通過對比晦庵(朱熹，1130-1200)和茶山各自認爲的儒教共同體，分析二者之間異同，並從現實的意義當中探究儒教共同體的前進方向。

¹³ 李敏禎，〈朴世采的皇極認識和君主形象〉，頁162。

¹⁴ 《經世遺表》卷1，〈地館戶曹〉。“愚民可與享成，不可與慮始，一國其騷騷矣。然人主一心，爲萬化之本，誠使聖斷，赫然如英考之於均役，則何患不成？”

¹⁵ 李俸珪，〈通過與明、清的比較考察朝鮮時代《家禮》研究的特色和方向〉，頁247-248。

¹⁶ 全聖健，〈茶山(丁若鏞)的經世學構造與其課題〉，頁20。

¹⁷ 如果“下而上”可以說是積極地反映民意的方式，“上而下”的方式則是以君權爲強制執行的方式。因此，民權和君權形成的對立關係，即是民主主義和專制主義的對立。下一章正是探討君主制下以鄉村爲中心的儒教共同體、以國家爲中心的儒教共同體，這便是臣權與君權之間的對立。本論並非認爲民權和臣權是同等的，而在第二章提到了君權與民權的二律背反，接著在第三章繼續探討君權和臣權的二重面貌，是爲了進行茶山政治學與朱子政治學之間的比較，也爲了確認在茶山的政治體制裡，能夠確保臣權的強化引起的民權強化。

三、儒教共同體的二重面貌

《論語》〈衛靈公〉當中，記載了孔子對舜“無爲而治”的評價。“子曰，無爲而治者，其舜也與？夫何爲哉！恭己正南面而已矣。”朱熹對此有如下的解釋：“無爲而治者，聖人德盛而民化，不待其有所作爲也。”同時，在談到無爲而治的時候，朱熹鮮明地提出了以下的觀點：“獨稱舜者，紹堯之後，而又得人以任眾職，故尤不見其有爲之跡也。”¹⁸

這裡所提到的“賢人”，用孟子所謂的“大人”來稱之也無妨。因爲朱熹曾說：“惟有大人之德，則能格君心之不正，以歸於正，而國無不治矣。大人者，大德之人，正己而物正者也。”¹⁹

總而言之，對於朱熹來說，君主就是要積累自己的“明德”來教化百姓的角色。朱熹認爲，選拔人才的核心方法，是選擇能稱之爲“大人”的“賢人”，讓他接受並處理多種職務，使君主看起來無事可做。即，君主克服自身的私欲，正心修德，掌握好賢人的位置，賦予他責任，這就是關於朱熹的儒教政治論的要點。

朝鮮性理學者們無一例外的，都以朱熹的立論爲根據，將“無爲”作爲“德的政治論”引入君主的理想形象，即“爲政以德，譬如北辰，居其所，而眾星共之。”²⁰同時做到“爲政以德，則不動而化，不言而信，無爲而成。所守者，至簡而能御煩；所處者，至靜而能制動；所務者，至寡而能服眾。”²¹

但是從茶山的立場來看時，這是一種特別危險的想法，讓“聖君”的真實形象被嚴重地歪曲的同時，又讓儒學者們陷入異端邪說。如同《尚書》〈洪範〉篇所說：“皇極”佔據了“極的秩序”的中心位置，是給予所有權限、爲百姓提供“福”的主體。茶山直接目睹了“極”被破壞的時代，對他而言，這種對於君主的思考，不單是思想層面的問題，更與其自身在朝鮮現實世界中看到的、感受到的經驗一樣，是一個嚴重錯誤的問題。

朝鮮社會的慘澹現實正是由這種思想上的弊端所引起的結果。茶山對此有如下慨歎：“今之論治道者，率皆導人主，端拱玄默，無所猷爲。百度頽墮而莫之整理，萬機叢脞而莫之搜撥，不十年而天下腐矣。禍難相承，凋敝不振，而卒莫之開悟，皆無爲之說有以誤之也。”²²

茶山認爲孔子所說的“無爲”只是在得到優秀人才之後，舜對他自己的興奮讚歎而已，並不是說舜在得到這種人物之後，實際上就“什麼都不做（無爲）”了。²³茶山認爲以朱熹爲代表的朝鮮王朝性理學者們，沒有理解孔

¹⁸ 《論語集注》，〈衛靈公〉，朱子注。

¹⁹ 《孟子集注》，〈離婁上〉，朱子注。

²⁰ 《論語集注》，〈爲政〉。

²¹ 《論語集注》，〈爲政〉，朱子注。

²² 《論語古今注》，〈衛靈公〉。

²³ 《論語古今注》，〈衛靈公〉補曰：“舜雖得人，未嘗無爲。此云：無爲者，極言得人而逸，贊

子的本心，錯誤的解釋了經典。因此，茶山極力批判²⁴道：“清淨無爲，即漢儒黃老之學、晉代清虛之談，亂天下壞萬物，異端邪術之尤甚者也。”²⁵

“君主行‘無爲之治’，”從性理學的立場來看，應解釋爲發現自己“明德”的“修德”，作爲牽制君主的禮治。然而，茶山用“有爲而治”對此進行批判，茶山認爲，應該解釋爲提高君主地位的禮治。從這些解釋中可以看出，茶山提出的“有爲君主”是執行“牧民者”的角色，是符合對國家改革再造焦點的角色。

總而言之，作爲推動朝鮮王朝建國理念的性理學政治論，在起用賢人的同時，爲阻止王權的專橫，嘗試積極地活用諫官。士禍以後，隨著時間的流逝，士林的許可權大幅強化，在野的士林政治以鄉村社會爲中心，實現了“下而上”的政治。但是，又隨著時間的流逝，朝鮮王朝的政治家以“老論”爲一元化的同時，性理學政治論發展成了勢道政治。生活在這種時代的茶山認爲，打破它的方法就是大幅強化君主的許可權。所以，茶山規劃了君權中心的“上而下”政治體制。

通過上述內容，我們可以確定一點，無論鄉村主導型禮治秩序或者君主主導型禮治秩序，當它們成爲固定的制度之後，與佔有時空間的歷史所展現的一樣，都會經歷硬化和變質的過程。所以，他們構想和規劃的學問體系、禮治秩序，不是完整的理念，而是反應他們各自經歷的時代精神的結果。我們將他們的規劃要分別理解爲完成儒教共同體的各自的提案。

四、公共性和公議的公論性

上文所提及的儒教共同體的兩個方向，離不開“立賢共治”和“君臣共治”兩個脈絡。另外，上文說到的民主，與從現代意義來說的“民主主義”又完全不同。因爲“民主”這一概念，本身就是在君主制的範圍內被提出的。鄉村中心的儒教共同體和國家中心的儒教共同體雖有共同點，但其共同體的面貌並不相同。

如同緒論所說，上而下和下而上兩種方式，是隨著時代形勢而變化的，是具有一定任意性的。在現在進行的層面中，儒教共同體的這兩條路，互相衝突的可能性是很充分的。只是，儘管有這種不同，在兩種共同體同時具有的有意味性的“公共性”的層面上，還是有共同性的。即，以所謂的共同合理性爲基礎構成國家。

“公共的合理性”是以圓滿的溝通爲目的的，即目標在於相互理解。將此目的與上述的儒教共同體的兩個方向連接的話，臣權和君權並不是對立

歡揄揚也。”

²⁴ 李俸珪，《茶山的政治論：與朱子的距離》。

²⁵ 《論語古今注》，〈爲政〉。“清淨無爲，即漢儒黃老之學，晉代清虛之談，亂天下壞萬物，異端邪術之尤甚者也。”

的，而是臣與君皆作為溝通的主體，所以要以相互理解為前提，確保溝通上的合理性。

事實上，在東亞前近代社會裡，“主體”的問題是很受限制的。但茶山對“臣、民的意思作為與君主的意思相同”的希望，並不能說是不合理的。因此，現代意義上的“公共合理性”應用到前近代的話，可以說是與“民心”或“民意”相同的。

眾所周知，性理學是通過道德本性的覺醒，對從天子到庶人的所有百姓都賦予了維持共同體的責任，這是堅信每人內心保有著虛靈不昧的道德性——仁義禮智四端。²⁶但是，茶山則認為仁義禮智等道德性是“行事以後”才獲得的東西。綜合他們的想法，用現代的思維來理解的話，對個人禮義廉恥的修身正是發揮虛靈不昧的明德，由其發揮的明德行事道德行為是實現正確社會的行事。

反而，茶山希望通過嚴格的官階秩序和身份等級的區分，糾正正在崩壞的朝鮮王朝的秩序。茶山認為，“辨等”是聖人的統治國家、安撫百姓的極大許可權，因此要將辨等作為當務之急。²⁷並且，這種辨等的原理是通過禮治而具體進行的。茶山為了強化百姓們的孝悌慈教育，強調通過“意識上的行禮”和“行動上的有為政治”這一點，可以看出茶山重視統治者和被統治者之間的社會身份和序列。不僅如此，他的有為政治中還蘊含著公共的合理性。

作為儒學者，茶山認為，儒教共同體的最佳理念是“王政”和“仁政”。王政和仁政的理念當中，蘊涵著被稱為“蕩蕩平平”的公共性意義。通過《書經》〈洪範〉的“無偏無常，王道蕩蕩，無常無偏，王道平平。”等內容，將“蕩蕩平平”作為基準的王道，即，把確立皇極的政治理解為王政。〈洪範〉中“五皇極”是在存在論上的九州內，象徵著媒介天與地的運作原理的角色，而現實政治中，作為協調私心和私黨的紛爭，通過公議組成公論的政治運作基礎。²⁸

茶山在〈原政〉中說：“政也者，正也，均吾民也。”包括各種物產、財物、人才、許可權等社會資源的平均分配，是茶山認為的“平均”。但是，在《尚書古訓》中，茶山又說道：“政也者，正也，上以政正民，故謂之正。”最終，將政治看作為少數為政者以政治端正百姓的行為。

26 這一點通過《大學章句》和《孟子集注》可以確認，尤其是《大學章句》〈序言〉。

27 《牧民心書》卷8，〈禮典六條〉。“服章有等，旗旂有等，車乘有等，屋簷有等，祭祀有等，飲食有等，秩然森列，上下以明，此聖人馭世安民之大權也。吾東之俗，辨等頗嚴，上下相維持，各守其分，近世以來，爵祿偏枯，貴族衰替，而豪吏、豪賁，乘時使氣，其屋宇、鞍馬之侈，衣服、飲食之奢，咸踰軌度，下陵上替，無復等級，將何以維持聯絡以之扶元氣而通血脈乎？辨等者，今日之急務也。”

28 《尚書古訓》卷4，〈洪範〉。“民之嚮會于皇極，如三十輻，共向于一轂，如百川萬流，共向于大海。私相嚮會者，皇則惡之，淫朋相聚，或推一人以為長。比德相讎，或戴一人以為賢，黨同伐異，負私滅公，則其國必亂，豈所謂建極乎？大抵皇之所以為皇，以五福之權在皇也，此權下移，皇極乃亡，淫朋比德，權之所以下移也，茲所以首戒之也。”

在性理學的立場來看，性理學建立的政治立論是阻止君主的專橫而強調臣權，以更順利地經營國家為目的的。茶山的立場，則是為了阻止權臣的橫暴，主張強有力的君權來確保儒教共同體的公共性。尤其茶山為王政的目標而提出的“孝悌慈”觀念的省察，使我們在與他人的相互關係中，重組新的公共價值、公共性的意義的時候，可以提供有意義的思維模式。²⁹

儒教共同體的公共合理性可以說是從“孝悌慈”出發，也是從互惠性的原則上出發的。父慈子孝、兄友弟恭並不是單方面的行為，而是所有垂直、水平關係之間互相實踐的原則，即是儒教共同體的原則。

如上述分析，儒教共同體的兩條路的面貌和形象雖然不同，但還是存在共同原型的。就是隨著所謂公議的公論的發揮。用現代語言來說便是公議的公論性。茶山將儒教的核心——“仁”，解釋為兩個人之間的關係，即，將父子、兄弟、君臣、牧民官與百姓等，互相盡本分的關係看作“仁”。³⁰

天下的所有存在，難免要經歷生老病死。不管性理學的鄉村中心或“下而上”的政治體制，還是茶山提出的國家中心或“上而下”的政治體制，都無法擺脫時代性職責，但是它的持續性，使它難免要經歷自身硬化和腐蝕的過程。在茶山看來，修身為主的朝鮮性理學在發展的同時陷入了空虛的邏輯，把君主變成了無事可做的人，他的批判雖然也有一定的說服力，但是茶山提出的君權中心的邏輯也不是沒有問題的。因為雖然有君主地位，但是在歷史上有聖德的君主並沒有那麼多。

到現在為止，對於儒教共同體的討論是查找其現代性意義的一個環節。儒教共同體的基本構思是與“如何組織國家體系”有直接或間接的關係。可以看出，基本上儒教共同體的方向是要從性理學提出的方向發展的。因為儒學所說的君主形象當中，道德力量是更重要的。在防止權力和財力的獨佔化方面，也不例外。

雖說如此，本文中提出的儒教共同體的現在性，是在“積極的消極性”的脈絡中被解讀的。這裡所說的積極的消極性，是指對民主主義和資本主義兩手抓的現代人解釋儒教共同體意義的時候，既要逐漸地接近（消極性），又要堅持努力、毅力而做到的（積極性）意思。

通過朝鮮王朝的歷史展現可以看出，君主權的弱化暴露出勢道家族的政治獨斷，反之，君權的強化暴露出君主制的獨裁權力。在現代的脈絡中，所有共同體都要通過公議來建立公論，並以此為基礎構築合適的系統，在牽制公權力濫用的同時，通過強調權力者的道德性方向而前進。這便是儒教共同體和積極消極性之間的關係。

²⁹ 白敏禎，〈《經世遺表》的政治哲學：公共的權利和王政的理念〉，頁119。

³⁰ 《論語古今注》卷1，〈學而第一〉。“仁者，二人相與也。事親孝為仁，父與子二人也，事兄悌為仁，兄與弟二人也，事君忠為仁，君與臣二人也，牧民慈為仁，牧與民二人也。以至夫婦朋友，凡二人之間，盡其道者皆仁也，然孝弟為之根。”

五、結論

儒教共同體對確立孝悌慈的人倫秩序是有貢獻的。此人倫秩序的進展方式是從家庭擴大到社會，再從社會擴大到國家。它不但適用於性理學，也適用於批判性理學政治論的茶山。不僅如此，茶山的經世學規劃，可以評價為依下向式方向展開的。

這種依靠茶山的強有力君權的政治體制，是和荀子在〈禮論〉中所說的邏輯相似的。因為有無限欲望的人類對有限財貨的所有欲，而產生了紛爭，為了解決這種紛爭，需要堅定地執行身份秩序和位階秩序的禮學秩序——禮治。即，茶山經世學討論的整體發展方式是不擺脫荀子禮學的秩序的，只是茶山通過這種禮治秩序的確立而追求富國強兵的根本立場，是與國富的積累和國防的強化相連的，所以蘊藏著脫離儒教共同體的“經國濟民”理想的危險性。

儒教共同體“經國濟民”的理想是指經營國家和救濟百姓；“救濟百姓”是指使百姓的日常生活穩定，即通過賦稅減免以達到維持家計為目標。如果說將維持家計理解為齊家的家政層面的話，儒教共同體的正確面貌應該是包括士大夫、士庶人的百姓們的日常生活的穩定，即是提供維持婚喪嫁娶的程度上的家計生活。總而言之，儒教共同體的面貌，不在於積累資本而發展的，而在於實現人倫秩序上，即毫無疑問地實踐婚喪嫁娶的。

眾所周知，19世紀是朝鮮王朝的解體時期。面臨三政（田賦、軍政、還穀）的紊亂、兩班（官宦）的過剩、帝國的出現等，國內外都難以經受的磨難的時期。朝鮮王朝失去了政治和經濟上的自主能力，不斷地受到外勢的掠奪，這種情況下無法尋找突破內憂外患的方法。

從這點來看，茶山的邦國規劃是有一定成果的。但是，這種經世濟民的努力卻無法適用於當代，這也是事實。他的規劃在當代沒有被靈活運用，在半個世紀以後，發展為朝鮮學運動，又在半個世紀之後，發展為祖國近代化運動，但如何看待這個事實仍舊存在疑問。

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Confucian Community and the Positive Passivity

JEON Sungkun

Abstract

This paper explores the practicability of the Confucian community with the concept of positive passivity. It will be argued that positive passivity is the key to opening the application of Confucianism to contemporary Korean society. This paper utilizes Kantian antinomy to examine Jeong Yak-yong's 丁若鏞 (1762-1836) political theories, which are seen in his works such as *Wonmok*, *Tangnon*, *Gyeongse yupyo*.

Jeong's antinomy refers to conflict between the power of the king which focuses on a highly centralized system of government, and the power of people which focuses on regionalization. Although his political theory contains conflicting views, his political views deserve publicity, which can be understood as public rationality. We should think of the concept of positive passivity when modernizing Confucian communities. Modern Confucianism should require public rationality for its survival in modern society.

Keywords: Confucian community, power of the king, power of people, publicity, public rationality, positive passivity

Regulations of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

I . General Regulations

1. (Name)

The official name for the institute is “Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture” (hereafter, ICPC), which is an organization that belongs to the Academy of East Asian Studies (hereafter, AEAS) at Sungkyunkwan University.

2. (Objective)

ICPC primarily conducts research in the field of Confucian thought. It also covers general Confucian culture, as well as its development and modernization, in an attempt to provide fundamental guiding principles for humanity in a rapidly developing society.

II . Organization

3. (Constitution)

ICPC is constituted of the following: 1) the director, 2) the management committee, and 3) an editorial board.

4. (Director)

1) The director must be a full-time professor of Sungkyunkwan University, with a specialization that conforms to the objective outlined in article I of this document. The director must be nominated by the university president and appointed by the chairman of the board.

2) The director, representing ICPC, controls the general affairs of ICPC.

3) The basic term for the director is 2 years, which is extendable.

5. (Assistant Director)

1) The director may appoint (an) assistant director(s) to assist with the director’s various tasks.

2) Assistant director(s) must be a research member of ICPC, nominated by the director of ICPC and appointed by the director of AEAS.

3) The basic term for the assistant director is 2 years, which is extendable.

6. (Office)

1) ICPC may assign (an) office(s) according to different research area(s).

2) The head of the office must hold a position equivalent to or greater than that of a research professor. The head must be nominated by

the director of ICPC, approved by the management committee, and appointed by the director of AEAS.

III. Management Committee

7. (Constitution)

- 1) ICPC may establish a management committee in order to discuss and make important decisions regarding general management.
- 2) The management committee shall be no larger than 10 persons. The director will serve as the head of the management committee.
- 3) Members of the management committee must be research members of the ICPC, nominated by the director and appointed by the director of AEAS.

8. (Agenda)

The agenda for the management committee includes:

- 1) Establishing basic plans for management and research.
- 2) Declaring and/or eliminating various rules and regulations.
- 3) Settling the budget and accounts.
- 4) Other relevant management.

9. (Call for Meeting)

- 1) The director must call for any meetings of the management committee.
- 2) Meetings are valid only when more than half of all members are present. In order to settle an agenda, more than half of all members present at a meeting must agree to any decision or action.

IV. Editorial Board

10. (Constitution)

- 1) ICPC includes an editorial board which discusses and makes decisions regarding ICPC publications.
- 2) The editorial board includes the editor-in-chief and noted scholars both in Korea and abroad. The editor-in-chief is the director of ICPC.
- 3) Each editorial board must be appointed by the director. The basic term is 2 years.
- 4) Each year, the editorial board will publish the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*. Rules and dates for publication are established separately.

11. (Call for Meeting)

More than half of the editorial board members present at the meeting must agree in order to settle an agenda.

* The above regulations take effect from March 1, 2000.

The Code of Management for the Editorial Board of the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*

I . General Regulations

1. (Objective)

This regulation is established according to article IV-10-4 of the Regulations for the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (hereafter, ICPC). It comprises the regulatory guidelines for publishing the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture* (hereafter, *JCPC*).

2. (Mission)

- 1) To supervise publication of *JCPC* and the related affairs of acceptance, review, editing, and so on.
- 2) To set up rules and regulations for publishing *JCPC*.

II . Organization of Editorial Board

3. (Constitution)

The editorial board is comprised of editorial advisors, editorial councils, the chief manager (the director), the editor-in-chief, the head of the editing team, and other editing team members.

4. (Appointment of Editorial Advisors and Members)

The director of ICPC appoints editorial advisors and members among noted scholars of highest achievement, both in Korea and abroad.

5. (Terms)

The basic term for editorial board members is 2 years, extendable when necessary. The editor-in-chief is tenured by principle, in order for the journal to maintain its congruity.

6. (Chief Manager)

The director of ICPC is also the chief manger and supervises the editorial board.

7. (Editor-in-chief)

The editor-in-chief is appointed by the director of ICPC and is responsible for all editorial issues.

8. (Head of Editing Team, Editing Team)

The head of the editing team and the editing team's other members are appointed by the director of ICPC. The head of the editing team is responsible for general issues concerning editing, and the assistant head is responsible for assisting with related editorial matters.

III. Publication of *JCPC*

9. (Numbers and Dates of Publication)

JCPC is published twice in one year: on August 31 and February 28.

10. (Circulation)

The size of circulation for *JCPC* is determined by the editorial board.

11. (Size)

The standard size for *JCPC* is 176mm × 248mm.

12. (Editorial System)

- 1) Academic articles written in either Chinese or English.
- 2) Academic articles include: title, abstract, keywords, contents, bibliography, an abstract written in Chinese or English, keywords written in Chinese or English.
- 3) The English title and name of the author must be specified.
- 4) The affiliation of the author must be specified.
- 5) Regulations, bulletins, and materials other than academic articles may be included according to the decision of the editorial board.

IV. Submission of Articles and Management

13. (Subject and Character of the Submitted Article)

The subject of article includes:

- 1) Confucian thought and culture in Korea and abroad.
- 2) Analysis of books, translations, or research articles on related subjects published in Korea or abroad. It may include dissertations.
- 3) Critical reviews on academic trends, mainly in the arts and humanities, related to Confucianism and East Asian studies.

No certain qualification for submission is required.

14. (Number of Words)

- 1) A length of each article is limited to 25,000 characters for Chinese and 12,000 words for English, including the abstract, footnotes, bibliography, etc.
- 2) The number of words permitted for materials other than academic articles and reviews are to be determined by the editorial board.

15. (Submission Guidelines)

- 1) A general call for papers is always extended, but only articles submitted at least three months prior to the publication date are usually subjected to the review process for a specific issue.
- 2) Submissions should be forwarded to jicpc@skku.edu as an email attachment.
- 3) Abstracts in Chinese and English must include five or more keywords.

- 4) If written jointly, the first (main) author and the second (joint) author, as well as their respective name, affiliation, area of research, part(s) of writing, must be noted.
- 5) E-mail address(es) and phone number(s) must be provided for all authors.
16. (Control of Submitted Articles)
 - 1) Submitted articles are, as they arrive, subject to a controlled process.
 - 2) Submitted articles are not returned, and copyright for published articles belongs to ICPC.

V. Reviewing Submitted Articles

17. (Obligation to Review)

All submitted articles must pass the reviewing process.
18. (Regulations for Reviewing Board)
 - 1) In principle, the editorial board will select three outside reviewers for each submitted article and commission them to evaluate the article. If two of the reviewers agree, the article can be published.
 - 2) In specific situations, the editorial board can precede the reviewing process by selecting two outside reviewers. If only one of the reviewers recommends publication, the editorial board can decide whether to publish or reject the article based on the journal's academic standards. In such cases, the editor-in-chief is supposed to make a written report to the chief manager (the director).
 - 3) If submitted articles do not meet the basic requirements of the journal (e.g., in terms of length, subject, etc.), the editorial board can decide not to proceed with the reviewing process and return the submission to the author(s). The editorial board can also ask the author(s) to resubmit after revision.
 - 4) In principle, the board of reviewers must maintain a just and fair attitude, and should not review articles written by scholars with whom they are personally affiliated.
 - 5) For the sake of fairness, the review process will remain anonymous.
19. (Standard of Review)
 - 1) Articles will be reviewed for basic format (20%), originality (20%), clarity of subject (20%), logic (20%), and congruity (20%).
 - 2) The result will divide the articles into two groups: publishable and not publishable.
 - 3) Articles evaluated as not publishable cannot be re-submitted with the same title.
20. (Feedback time)

Reviewers must submit their feedback on each article to the editorial

board within two weeks from it was assigned to them.

21. (Reporting Back the Result)

The editorial board must report back to the author(s) as soon as the results of the reviewing process have been received.

VI. Revision of Regulations

22. (Principle)

This code of management is subject to change when 2/3 of the editorial board agrees, provided that more than half of the editorial board's members are present at the time of voting.

*** Other Regulations**

23. (Others)

- 1) Other issues not written in this code will be treated following customary practices.
- 2) The above regulations take effect from December 20, 2006.
- 3) The editorial board will determine and deal with all other details concerning the above regulations.

The Code of Ethics and Management for the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*

I. General Regulations

1. (Objective)

This regulation is established in order to define the ethical principles and standard of management of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (hereafter, ICPC).

2. (Application)

This regulation is applied to prevent any unjust act within academic agenda of ICPC, and to provide a framework for systematic investigation, management, and resolution if an unjust actions occur. At the same time, it is geared toward protecting the creativity of academic research and strengthening an ethical spirit within academia.

II. Research Ethics

3. (Ethical Code for Authors)

- 1) All authors who submit their articles to the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture* (hereafter, *JCPC*) must follow this code of ethics.
- 2) All research outcomes that are mainly based on faked or fraudulent research or upon already published work without providing any new insight are regarded as forged.
- 3) Any close imitation of another author's ideas and arguments without giving explicit and objective credit to that author is regarded as plagiarism.
- 4) Submission of one's own work that has already been presented and published elsewhere as the first research outcome is regarded as duplication or self-plagiarism.
- 5) Sponsored articles must follow the regulations of the sponsor before submission.
- 6) Authors must take full responsibility for their presented articles.
- 7) Co-authors must make it clear which parts of the essay each author has contributed to, and take responsibility for those parts of the essay.

4. (Ethical Code for the Editorial Board)

- 1) The editorial board members of *JCPC* must follow this code of ethics.
- 2) Editorial board members must participate in editorial meetings and

assume responsibility for receiving articles, the election of reviewers, and the selection of articles for publication,

- 3) Editorial board members must be silent about any personal information of all authors submitting articles. Otherwise, it will be regarded as a misuse of their rights.
 - 4) Editorial board members must strictly follow regulations in confirming submissions and selecting reviewers, etc., lest it should arouse any conflict between reviewers and general board members.
 - 5) If any doubt or questions concerning ethical matters arise, the editorial board must immediately call for an investigation by the ethics committee.
5. (Ethical Code for the Reviewing Committee)
- 1) Members of reviewing committee of *JCPC* must follow this code of ethics.
 - 2) Reviewers must follow the established regulations for providing an objective and fair review of the submitted article, and provide their honest feedback to the editorial board. If a reviewer feels that they cannot review an article assigned to them for an objective reason, they must promptly notify the editorial board.
 - 3) Reviewers must rely on academic standards and their own conscience in reviewing submitted articles. Reviewers cannot reject an article based on their own personal standpoints without sufficient basis, and cannot conclude the review without scrupulously reading the whole article.
 - 4) Reviewers must keep the author's personal information as well as the content of the article confidential throughout the process of review.

III. Establishment and Management of Ethics Committee

6. (Ethics Enforcement)
This regulation is established according to the general regulation, and is already in effect. The director will decide on establishing specific rules to applying these regulations.
7. (Constitution of Ethics Committee)
The Ethics Committee is constituted of the director of Ethics Committee, the editor-in-chief, and up to five members of the editorial board. The director of *ICPC* is also the director of the Ethics Committee.
8. (Function of Ethics Committee)
1) Upon a suspected violation of the ethical code, the ethics committee will proceed to conduct an investigation and issue a decision, notifying the accused of the opinion of the committee. It will also report the issue to the editorial board.

- 2) When investigating the violation, the ethics committee must secure sufficient evidence and keep the whole process confidential.
9. (Accusation of Violation)
 - 1) An accuser must secure specific evidence when reporting an act of violation. Even if the report turns out to be false, the ethics committee can continue an investigation if other evidence is discovered.
 - 2) The same process of accusation applies to both editorial board members and reviewers.
10. (Investigation and Decision)
 - 1) If accused of violating the ethical code, the accused must comply with the investigation conducted by the ethics committee. Noncompliance is regarded as acknowledging the accused violation.
 - 2) All articles under investigation will be postponed for publication until the investigation has been completed and a report issued to the editorial board. Investigations are to be completed before the next term for publication.
11. (Chance of Defense)

The accused has right to defend their article. Their defense can be made before the general members of the editorial board, if the accused wishes to do so.
12. (Forms of Penalty)

Penalties which the ethics committee can impose include warnings, submission restrictions, and expulsion from membership. Already published articles can be deferred or pulled out completely. Sponsored articles, when used unfairly or warned by the sponsor, may also be subject to penalty.
13. (Revision of Regulations)

Any revisions made to this regulations must follow ICPC's revision principles.
14. (Others)

Regulations not written in the above will follow customary practices.

*** Other Regulations**

This regulation is established according to the article 21 of ICPC. It is agreed by the editorial board (October 20, 2007), and is in force since January 1, 2008.

Submission Requirements for Contributors

I. Submission

1. Manuscripts should be written in docx file and are to be submitted as an email attachment to jicpc@skku.edu.
2. Type in "Author's Contact Information" on top of the title of your manuscript, which includes your academic title, affiliation, e-mail address, telephone number(s), and mailing address.
3. On the first page of the body text, make an abstract of about 300 words (including five keywords or more)
4. Unless specially invited, a length of each manuscript (including footnotes) should be around 8,000 words, and should not exceed 12,000 words (font: Times New Roman; font size: 12 pt.; line space: double).

II. Style Guidelines

1. In general, we follow the editorial guidelines established in the 16th edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Please consult the online information of it at www.chicagomanualofstyle.org.
 2. The citation style required by the Journal is short references in footnotes and complete citation data in the REFERENCES section. Short references contain only the author's last name, title of work (shortened if necessary), and page number(s) as in the following example: 1. Fingarette, *Confucius*, 15-16.
 3. Imagine that the readers of your article have little understanding of Asian philosophical and cultural background. Provide explanations for technical terms as well as any words or concepts which are essential to a clear understanding of your article.
 4. When romanizing Chinese terms, use pinyin system. Terms in Korean should be romanized according to the romanization system established in 2000 by the Korean government. For Japanese terms, follow the Hepburn romanization system.
 5. When historic figure(s) and state(s) are first mentioned, provide their dates in parenthesis as follows: Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), Han 漢 (206 BCE-220 CE).
 6. When you quote a passage in pre-modern Chinese texts, put the English translation in the body and the original Chinese text in the footnote.
- * For a more detailed submission guideline, please contact us at jicpc@skku.edu.

儒教文化研究所章程

第一章 總則

第一條 (名稱)

本研究所的正式名稱爲“儒教文化研究所”(以下簡稱“研究所”),是成均館大學東亞學術院的下設機關。

第二條 (目的)

本研究所以研究儒學思想爲主,同時兼顧整個東亞的儒學文化研究,並對儒學的傳統進行現代化的解釋和發展,使之成爲指引人類發展的基本理念。

第二章 組織

第三條 (機構)

研究所的機構如下設置:1. 所長,2. 運營委員會,3. 編輯委員會。

第四條 (所長)

1. 所長必須由符合第一章規定中目的的專業的本校教授擔任,由學校校長提請理事長任命。
2. 所長代表研究所,總體掌管研究所的事務。
3. 所長的任期爲2年,可以連任。

第五條 (部長)

1. 爲了協助所長,並分擔所長的一部分業務,所長下面可以設置部長。
2. 部長從研究委員中產生,由所長提請學術院院長任命。
3. 任期爲2年,可以連任。

第六條 (研究室)

1. 研究所可以根據研究領域的不同而設置研究室。
2. 研究室長由研究教授以上的人擔任,須經運營委員會的審議通過,再由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第三章 運營委員會

第七條 (構成)

1. 爲了便於審議和決定與研究所運營相關的重要事項,研究所可以設置運營委員會。

2. 運營委員會由所長和10人以內的委員構成, 委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員從研究所的研究委員中產生, 由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第八條 (審議事項) 運營委員會主要審議以下事項：

1. 基本運營計劃的確立以及與研究計劃相關的事項。
2. 研究所諸規定的制定與廢除問題。
3. 預算以及結算等諸問題。
4. 其他與研究所運營相關的事項。

第九條 (會議)

1. 會議由委員長召集。
2. 會議要有過半數以上的在職委員出席才可以召開, 出席委員過半數同意才可以決議。

第四章 編輯委員會

第十條 (構成)

1. 爲了審議決定研究所刊行的出版物的編輯事宜, 故設立編輯委員會。
2. 編輯委員會由委員長和國內外的知名學者構成, 委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員由所長任命, 任期爲2年。
4. 編輯委員會每年刊行《儒教文化研究》, 論文的刊行原則以及刊行日期等規定另行制定。

第十一條 (會議)

編輯委員會會議要有出席編輯委員的過半數同意才可以決議。

附則 (施行日) 本規定自2000年3月1日起施行。

《儒教文化研究》編輯委員會運營章程

第一章 總則

第一條 (目的)

本規定是根據儒教文化研究所文件中第4節編輯委員會 (以下簡稱委員會)第27條第1項研究所刊行物的出版條目中《儒教文化研究》的相關規定而制定的。

第二條 (任務)

1. 主管《儒教文化研究》的發刊和相關論文的策劃、接收、評審、編輯等工作。
2. 制定與《儒教文化研究》的發刊相關聯的一系列規定。

第二章 編輯委員會構成

第三條 (構成)

委員會由編輯顧問、編輯委員、主任 (委員長)、主編、編輯部主任 (編輯室長)和編輯構成。

第四條 (編輯顧問和委員的選任)

編輯顧問和編輯委員由儒教文化研究所所長從世界各國有卓越研究業績的權威學者中選擇並任命。

第五條 (委員的任期)

委員任期為2年,必要時可以連任。但為了保證學術雜誌的長期穩定性,主編原則上是連任的。

第六條 (主任)

主任 (委員長)由儒教文化研究所所長兼任,主管編輯委員會。

第七條 (主編)

主編由研究所所長任命,總體負責所有的編輯事務。

第八條 (編輯部主任、編輯)

編輯部主任 (編輯室長)和編輯由研究所所長任命。編輯部主任全面負責編輯事務,編輯輔助主任處理相關的編輯事務。

第三章 《儒教文化研究》的發刊

第九條（發行的次數和日期）

《儒教文化研究》每年兩次刊行，出版日期為8月31日和2月28日。

第十條（發行數量）

《儒教文化研究》的發行數量由委員會決定。

第十一條（開本）

實行176mm×248mm開本。

第十二條（編輯體制）

1. 學術論文使用中文或英文制作。
2. 學術論文的編輯順序原則上分為論文題目、提要、關鍵詞、正文、參考文獻、中英文抄錄、中英文關鍵詞。
3. 必須注明學術論文的英文題目和作者姓名。
4. 必須注明作者的所屬單位、職務和具體的聯系方式。
5. 學術論文以外的各種文章以及會則、會報的刊載與否由委員會決定。

第四章 論文的投稿和管理

第十三條（投稿論文主題和資格）

1. 投稿範圍是以儒學思想為中心的世界各國的儒學文化。
2. 對國內外刊行的相關儒學著作、翻譯著作以及研究類刊物的分析。
3. 對國內外的儒學和東亞學等人文科學類相關論文（包括學位論文）的論評和研究動向報告。
4. 不限論文投稿資格。

第十四條（原稿字數）

1. 一般情況下按照中文15,000字 / 英文8,000words左右（包括腳注、參考文獻、抄錄等）的標準。
2. 論文以外的原稿字數由委員會決定。

第十五條（論文投稿要領）

1. 隨時可以提交論文，但以本刊出版3個月前到達的論文作為該版的審查對象。
2. 論文使用中文或英文格式，投稿時須提交電子版。
3. 中英文的抄錄需各附5個以上的關鍵詞。
4. 如果是共同研究的論文，需要分別標出責任研究員和共同研究員，並且須分別注明姓名和所屬單位、研究領域、執筆範圍和分擔的領域。
5. 來稿須注明作者的電子郵件地址以及聯絡電話。

第十六條 (投稿論文的管理)

1. 投稿論文按照來稿順序, 建立文檔進行統一有序的管理。
2. 來稿論文概不退還, 所刊載論文的著作權歸研究所所有。

第五章 投稿論文的審查

第十七條 (審查義務)

刊載論文必須經過審查。

第十八條 (審查委員規定)

1. 對於投稿的每篇論文, 原則上編輯委員會將選定3名評審委員, 並委託給他們評審。論文經過審查委員2/3以上的贊成才可刊登。
2. 特殊情況下編輯委員會可選定2名評審委員進行論文審查。2名審查委員中只有一名贊成刊登時, 編輯委員會可以通過內部會議決定該論文的刊登與否。而且, 編輯部主任要以書面形式向研究所的主任報告編輯部的決定。
3. 若投稿論文的長短或內容遠遠達不到本刊的基本要求, 委員會可以不進行評審而通告投稿者不可刊載, 或要求修訂後再次投稿。
4. 原則上, 審查委員應堅持公正、公平的作風。而且不得審查與自己同一單位的投稿者的文章。
5. 為了保證審查的公正性, 審查全部採取匿名制。

第十九條 (審查標準)

1. 審查按照基本格式 (20%)、獨創性 (20%)、主題明確性 (20%)、邏輯性 (20%)、完整性 (20%) 來進行綜合評定。
2. 審查結果分為刊載可、否兩類。
3. 被評為不可刊載的論文, 不得再以同一題目向本會投稿。

第二十條 (審查結果報告)

審查委員從收到評審論文之日算起, 應於2周內將審查結果報告給委員會。

第二十一條 (審查結果通告)

委員會收到審查結果報告書後, 立即告知投稿者。

第二十二條 (稿費支付)

對於刊載文章, 支付給作者一定的稿費。

第六章 章程的修訂

第二十三條 (原則)

本章程的修訂要有過半數編輯委員參加, 並且經參加人員2/3以上的同意方可施行。

附 則

第二十四條（其他）

1. 以上沒有列入章程的事宜按照慣例處理。
2. 本規定自2006年12月20日起生效並施行。
3. 本規定在施行過程中發生的細部事項由委員會來決定並處理。

《儒教文化研究》研究倫理及運營規定

第一章 總則

第一條（目的）

本規定的目的在於闡明儒教文化研究所（以下簡稱“本研究所”）學術研究活動的研究倫理和運營基準。

第二條（作用）

本規定的作用在於抵制研究活動中的不正當行為，以及不正當行為發生後體系性的追查，並且保護有創意性的學術研究，提高學問的倫理性。

第二章 研究倫理

第三條（作者倫理）

1. 凡是向本研究所刊行的《儒教文化研究》投稿的作者都應該遵守運營規定。
2. 虛造研究成果或將以前的研究成果刪改變用的一律視為偽造、編造。
3. 對他人的觀點或主張缺乏客觀分析而直接拿來用作自己的觀點，此種行為視為剽竊。
4. 將自己已經發表的研究成果拿來用作首次發表，此種行為視為重複刊載或自我剽竊。
5. 接受研究經費資助的論文只有遵守資助單位的管理規定才可投稿。
6. 對於自己公式發表的論文，作者要負全面責任。
7. 共同研究的情況要注明每個人分擔的部分，以此來各負責任。

第四條（編輯委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的編輯委員應該遵守運營規定。
2. 編輯委員要積極參與編輯會議，要對論文的接收、選定評委以及刊載與否負責任。
3. 編輯委員對於投稿者的個人信息要保密，不得利用私權。
4. 編輯委員要嚴格按照既定的標準來確認論文的投稿以及評審情況等，注意不要引發審評者以及一般會員間的是非。
5. 編輯委員會一旦發現研究倫理上的問題要立即通報倫理委員會。

第五條（審查委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的論文審查委員應該遵守審查規定。
2. 審查委員要根據所定的審查規定對投稿論文進行客觀、公正的

審查,並將審查結果通報給編輯委員會。若自己因客觀情況不能審查,則應及時通報編輯委員會。

3. 審查委員要根據學者的良心和學問的客觀基準來審查論文。在缺乏充分根據的情況下,不能一味地依據自己的學術觀點來判定“不可刊載”,也不能不仔細通讀全文就擅作審查。
4. 審查委員對於審查過程中所知道的作者的個人情況要進行保密,不能私自公開或利用審查論文的內容。

第三章 倫理委員會設置以及運營

第六條 (倫理規定的遵守)

本規定依據本會的會則制定,一經施行,立即生效。只是與此相適應的施行細則由委員長決定。

第七條 (倫理委員會的構成)

倫理委員會由所長、主編和編輯委員(5人左右)組成,所長兼任委員長。

第八條 (倫理委員會的職能)

1. 對於違反本規定的行為,倫理委員會要進行調查和議決,並將相關意見通告給當事人,然後報告給編輯委員會。
2. 在審議違反規定的行為時,要確保能夠充分掌握證據並對事情的經過保密,不到最後時刻不能公開審議意見。

第九條 (違反倫理規定行為的揭發)

1. 若有違反倫理規定的事實,揭發者可以持具體的事實證據向倫理委員會揭發。若揭發的事實是虛偽的,倫理委員會可以繼續維持決議。
2. 編輯委員或審查委員在評審過程中若發現有違反倫理規定的事實也依據如上方法揭發。

第十條 (調查以及審議)

1. 會員若被揭發有違反本研究所倫理規定的行為,則應積極配合倫理委員會的調查,若不配合,其行為則視為違反倫理規定。
2. 對於被揭發的有違反倫理規定的論文,在事實查清以前應採取保留措施。調查審議應在下一期學術期刊發行前結束。

第十一條 (解釋的機會)

對於被揭發有違反倫理規定事實的會員,要給與其充分的解釋機會。解釋的方式可依據當事者的意願公開。

第十二條 (處罰的類型)

倫理委員會的處罰類型有警告、限制投稿、解除委任等。對於已經投稿或刊載的論文可以採取保留或撤銷的措施。對於接受研究經費資助的論文,若因不正當的使用而受到資助機關的警告,也屬於處罰對象之列。

第十三條（規定的修改）

此規定的修改要遵守本研究所的修改原則。

第十四條（其他）

以上規定中沒有涉及的事宜依據慣例處理。

附則

本規定依據本研究所會則第21條制定，並經過編輯委員會（2007年10月20日）的審議，於2008年1月1日起施行。

投稿須知

1. 中文一律使用繁體, 英文按照一般慣例。來稿一律使用中文(或英文)制作, 請提交電子版(jicpc@skku.edu)。
2. 論文的格式順序原則上依次分為論文題目、中文提要(300-400字)、中文關鍵詞(5個以上)、正文、參考文獻、英文題目、英文摘要(大略300words)、英文關鍵詞(5個以上)等。
3. 作者簡介可置於文章的最後, 須注明作者的性別、所屬單位、職務、Email、聯系地址以及具體的電話聯系方式, 以便編輯部聯絡。必要時可附上自己的簡歷。
4. 正文內容請用10.5號字, 行間距為1, 文章字數以15,000字為宜, 可以適當地增減。但最好不要超過25,000字。
5. 文章的章節可以用“一、二、三……”來表示, 若還要細分, 則請用“(一)、(二)、(三)……”來表示。章節題目一律左側對齊, 使用黑體加粗字體。
6. 文章內提到的一切書籍, 都要在正文後的“參考文獻”內注明。參考文獻標記序次如下: 作者,《書名》, 出版地: 出版社, 出版年度。
如: 楊伯峻,《春秋左傳注》, 北京: 中華書局, 1981。
 6. 1. 需要標記編者或譯者時: 作者,〈章節/論文〉, 編者/譯者編/譯《書名》, 頁碼, 出版地: 出版社, 出版年度。
如: 張立文,〈程朱思想的時代精神〉, 楊曉塘編《程朱思想新論》, 頁1-8, 北京: 人民出版社, 1999。
 6. 2. 引用期刊內容時, 請依次注明: 作者, 文章名, 刊物名(包括期數), 文章所在頁碼。
如: 蒙培元,〈儒學是宗教嗎?〉,《孔子研究》, 2002年第2期, 頁39-46。
7. 文章正文的引用文, 採用簡式腳注標記。腳注標記方式如下: 作者, 論文名稱/書名, 引文所在頁碼。
如: 楊伯峻,《春秋左傳注》, 頁56。
蒙培元,〈儒學是宗教嗎?〉, 頁42。
8. 若作者本人有對文章題目、文章內容的說明, 請放在當頁用腳注表示。
9. 來稿一經採用, 即付稿酬。不採用的稿件, 一律不退, 也不奉告評審意見。三個月內未接到採用通知的, 作者可自行處理。
10. 本刊對採用的稿件有刪改權, 不同意刪改者, 請在來稿中申明。
11. 本刊刊發的文章, 作者著作權使用費與稿費一次性付清。如作者不同意文章轉載, 請在來稿時聲明。

共同規約：
成均館大學、輔仁大學、馬來亞大學三校聯名學刊

本刊與《哲學論集》及《漢學研究學刊》訂定聯名期刊，互相推薦論文共同約定事項：

1. 締約雙方接受前揭兩學術期刊之間互相推薦優良的學術論文，並得接受同一作者相近論題的論文同時在兩刊物發刊。細部規定如下：
 - 1) 作為同一作者在聯名期刊同時發表的論文，其論文題目允許在同一專業課題之下，使用兩個性質相關而又可以分辨的不同的題目，分別出現在兩個期刊之中。
 - 2) 根據以上規定訂定題目的兩篇論文，其內容差異性應高於百分之八十。
 - 3) 根據以上兩規定而提出的論文，不接受作者自行投稿的方式，只接受互為聯名期刊任一方編輯部或編輯委員會的推薦論文。
 - 4) 提出推薦兩刊同時發表論文的編輯委員會，應向接受推薦方提出該論文的審查意見書，以及預計在雙方同時刊登的兩篇論文全文，以供接受推薦方的編輯委員會驗證。接受推薦方的編輯委員會，保有是否接受經由以上程序所產生的論文，在己方刊物出版的決定權。
2. 雙方所屬研究單位成員可以在以上規定之外，以個人名義自由向前揭刊物的任一方投稿。
3. 經由以上兩種方式投稿的稿件，均應依照刊登該論文的學術期刊的規定格式撰寫論文。
4. 前揭聯名期刊的雙方同意所有論文以使用中文、英文撰寫的論文為優先接受的論文。

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