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Vol. 31 / February 2019

## Contents

**ARTICLES**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| LEE Yong-Yun | 1 | Mengzi's Philosophical Scheme of Human Nature |
| JUNG Dan Bee | 15 | A New Interpretation of the *Gongsun Longzi*: The White Horse as an Analogy for Human Nature |
| LIU JeeLoo | 39 | A Contemporary Assessment of the "Four-Seven Debate": A Comparative Study of the Moral Psychology of Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung |
| LEE Junghwan | 75 | "The golden rule of our Saviour. . . had been inculcated by Confucius, almost in the same words, four centuries before": The Clash of the Christian and Confucian Golden Rules in 17th- to 19th-Century England |
| HEO Hoon | 117 | A New Approach to the Sasang Constitutional Theory of Yi Je-ma |
| TANG Minggui | 137 | The Characteristics of Qian Shi's Interpretation of the *Lunyu* |
| CHEN Shuangzhu | 153 | *Hou Ju* 後具 or *Ben Ju* 本具?: A Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi's Proposition "*Xin Ju Zhong Li*" 心具衆理 |
| LI Bin | 175 | The Relationship between Conscience and *Qi* in Yangming's Philosophy |
| LIN Yu-Yi | 193 | A Comparative Study on the Compilation of Zhu Xi's Books by King Jeongjo and Chinese Philology: Focusing on the *Juja Seontong* 朱子選統 |
| CHEN Ying-nian | 211 | Mou Zongsan's Concept of Socialism |
| | 229 | APPENDIX |

# 儒 教 文 化 研 究

第三十一輯 / 2019年 2月

## 目 錄

### 學 術 論 文


李容潤 1 孟子“人性”概念的創新意義

鄭旦飛 15 公孫龍子新釋
——比喻人性的白馬

劉紀璐 39 四七之辯與惡之根的現代意義
——對李混与奇大升之道德心理學的比較研究

李定桓 75 “我們的救主的黃金律… 四個世紀之前, 幾乎在同一個詞中, 已被孔子諄諄教誨了”
—— 在17-19世紀英國基督教與儒家黃金律的衝突

許勛 117 李濟馬四象體質論新的詮釋

唐明貴 137 錢時《論語》詮釋的特色

陳雙珠 153 “後具”抑或“本具”？
—— 關於朱子“心具眾理”命題之再詮釋

李彬 175 從工夫論的角度論陽明哲學中良知與氣的關係

林侑毅 193 朝鮮正祖朱子選本編纂與中國文獻關係芻論
—— 以佚本《朱子選統》爲中心

陳迎年 211 牟宗三論社會主義

229 附 錄

# Mengzi's Philosophical Scheme of Human Nature

LEE Yong-Yun

## Abstract

This paper argues that Mengzi's 孟子 view on human nature should be understood not as an empirical observation but as a philosophical scheme. It should be noted that Mengzi is the first philosopher in Chinese history who contended that every human being is born with innate goodness and the potential to become a sage. Mengzi's contention can be viewed as a Copernican revolution within the Chinese intellectual tradition in that he switched the focus of self-cultivation from external effort (i.e., to learn one's intellectual heritage) to internal effort (i.e., to cultivate one's inner potential for goodness or sagehood). This means that Mengzi's view on human nature can be understood as an effort to pave the road to a universal and easy attainment of the highest level of self-cultivation. It is also postulated that Mengzi's critical approach to *Tian* 天 (Heaven) can be viewed as a framework to support his philosophical plan; that is, all human beings are equipped with the seeds of moral perfection.

**Keywords:** Confucianism, Mengzi (Mencius), human nature, philosophical scheme, cosmology, sagehood

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* LEE Yong-Yun is a research professor in the Department of Eastern Philosophy at Sungkyunkwan University (yongyunlee@skku.edu).

** The arguments of this paper are based on chapter four of my dissertation, "Ethical Mapping of *Tian* (Heaven) and *Dao* (Way)."

## 1. Introduction

Mengzi 孟子 (Mencius, c. 380-c. 290 BCE) is well known for his contention that each individual is born with innate moral potential. He is also regarded as one of the founding fathers of Confucianism who attempted to integrate Kongzi's 孔子 (Confucius, 551-479 BCE) legacy of moral teachings into his own moral preaching. His admiration for Kongzi is shown clearly in the statement from the *Mengzi* that: "Ever since humans were born, there has been no greater man than Kongzi."[1] Though this short statement does not tell us why Mengzi admired Kongzi so deeply, this much is clear: Mengzi considered Kongzi the ideal teacher, and thus took him as his exemplar, the predecessor that he most wanted to emulate.[2] Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the *Mengzi* contains more than forty direct quotations of statements from Kongzi, most of which are offered as supporting evidence for Mengzi's claims. Because Kongzi is so often cited as a moral authority for Mengzi's teaching, understanding Kongzi's ethical system is a key prerequisite for grasping the *Mengzi*'s moral orientation, particularly since the teachings of the two masters evince a number of ideological similarities, especially in the fields of cosmology and ethics.[3]

The nexus between cosmology and ethics are postulated to remind us of more flexible, generative, and original approaches to Mengzi's philosophy. These approaches are analogous to the hermeneutic circle in that the concept highlights the point that many realms of human traditions inescapably relational, interdependent, and dynamic.[4] In this regard, the analysis of the two seemly

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1 *Mengzi* 2A.2: "自有生民以來, 未有孔子也."

2 For a study of Mengzi's role as a defender of Kongzi, see Ivanhoe, "Heaven as a source for Ethical Warrant in Early Confucianism."

3 Cosmology is usually understood as a combination of the fields of cosmogony, the study of the origin of the universe, and taxonomy, the study of the classification of entities and their relations. This understanding of cosmology suggests that within any given tradition, even seemingly distinct aspects or social institutions may be better understood if approached from a broad, holistic perspective. Applying this understanding to the comparative study of ethical traditions, I argue that ethical traditions tend to reflect and support the prevailing cosmological framework held by the individuals in that tradition.

4 According to the hermeneutic circle, understanding a text requires that we must move back and forth in a "circle" between the parts and the whole. This circular conception of interpretation is not designed to camouflage an understanding of a particular text or to make understanding and interpretation impossible. Rather, it purports that the parts of a text should be understood as interrelated within a larger system, and that textual understanding should

separate realms has two main goals: to show the dialogic nature of cultural or intellectual phenomena by focusing on the interrelationships between cosmology and ethics, and to provide a more dynamic understanding of the warrants for ethical claims in early Chinese thought. In this regard, cosmology and ethics can be viewed as two important parts of the early Chinese intellectual map, and each plays a role in relation to the other within the total textual network that comprises early Chinese texts, especially in the *Mengzi*.

## 2. *Tian*-Cosmology: *Tian* 天 as the Source of an Ethical Framework

Mengzi's cosmology in many respects appears to be derived from that of Kongzi. One place where this relationship can be clearly observed is in Mengzi's citation of a line from the *Shijing* 詩經 (Classic of Poetry) along with Kongzi's commentary. The passage reads:

> The *Shijing* says "*Tian* gave birth to people; once things exist, rules exist. If common people grasp constant principles, what they like is magnificent virtue." Kongzi said, "Whoever composed the poem knows *dao*. Therefore, if there are things, there must be principles. Common people grasp constant principles, therefore what they like is magnificent virtues."[5]

One inference we can make from this passage is that Kongzi and Mengzi implicitly agree upon *Tian*'s role in generating the physical world. In other words, Mengzi's citation of the line from the *Shijing* and Kongzi's approving remark show his implicit support for Kongzi's view that *Tian* was to be regarded as both first cause and highest of all cosmological entities. Elsewhere, Kongzi describes *Tian* as the greatest entity as seen in the passage, "How great Yao was as a king. Only *Tian* is great; only Yao emulated it!"[6] This is a view that Mengzi seems to share. Mengzi also resembles Kongzi in appearing to hold a naturalistic view of *Tian*. Mengzi

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be founded upon contextual and holistic approaches. Baruch (or Benedictus) de Spinoza is widely credited as the first modern philosopher to spell out what we would now regard as a theory of the hermeneutic circle. See Spinoza, *Theological-Political Treatise*.

[5] *Mengzi* 6A.6: "詩曰, '天生蒸民, 有物有則. 民之秉夷, 好是懿德.' 孔子曰, '爲此詩者, 其知道乎! 故有物必有則, 民之秉夷也, 故好是懿德'." The transmitted version of the *Lunyu* does not contain the *Shijing* passage, which suggests that not all the passages which were available to Mengzi's contemporaries survived the compilation process of the *Lunyu*. For a further discussion of the *Lunyu* compilation process, see Brooks and Brooks, *The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors*.

[6] *Lunyu* 8.19: "大哉, 堯之爲君也! 巍巍乎, 唯天爲大, 唯堯則之!"

says: "*Tian* does not say a word, it just shows its will through natural phenomena and events."[7] This phrase is reminiscent of the following passage from the *Lunyu*: "What did *Tian* say? Four seasons take turns and a hundred things grow. What did *Tian* say?"[8] Both of these passages suggest that *Tian* does not articulate its message through human speech or linguistic communication, but reveals its will indirectly through natural phenomena.

While the two seem to have a shared understanding of *Tian*'s cosmological importance and method of operation, there are notable differences in their understanding of *Tian*'s role in human society. For example, while Kongzi and Mengzi have a similar understanding of *Tian* as a naturalistic entity, there is a clear distinction between the ways that each conceives of *Tian*'s role in regulating human social affairs. Although there are only a few lines addressing the role of *Tian* in the *Lunyu*, it is apparent that *Tian* is viewed as an ultimate entity with the power to rule over and influence human society, as when Kongzi claims that, "He who offends *Tian* has none to whom he can pray."[9] Kongzi's description of *Tian* in the *Lunyu* is consistent with his disciple Zixia's 子夏 understanding of *Tian* as having controlling power over human fate.[10] In other words, in Kongzi's view *Tian* has a decisive role over human life and society which cannot be changed by human efforts.[11]

Such an authoritative and decisive role for *Tian* rarely occurs in Mengzi's writings. Instead, Mengzi typically denies that *Tian* possesses an irresistible power over human wishes or the fruits of social organization. Mengzi says, "Times given by Heaven are not as good as advantages given by the earth, and advantages given by the earth are not as good as harmonies formed by human beings."[12] Here we can see that in Mengzi's eyes *Tian* has no controlling and decisive power over human society. In this regard, we can say that an individual's fate, in Mengzi's view, depends on his or her own effort, rather than external power (in the form of either advantages

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7 *Mengzi* 5A.5: "天不言, 以行與事示之而已矣."

8 *Lunyu* 17.19: "天何言哉? 四時行焉, 百物生焉, 天何言哉?" The rhetorical question in this passage suggests that *Tian* does not speak its message but instead reveals its will as a form of natural phenomena.

9 *Lunyu* 3.13: "獲罪於天, 無所禱也."

10 According to *Lunyu* 12.5, Zixia states: "死生有命, 富貴在天" (Death and birth are predetermined by fate; wealth and official success are a matter of *Tian*).

11 For a detailed discussion about the nexus between cosmological structures and ethical mandates in the *Lunyu*, see Lee, "*Tian* as a Cosmological Framework for Kongzils Moral Teaching."

12 *Mengzi* 2B.1: "天時不如地利, 地利不如人和."

given by the earth or heavenly decrees). We can also infer that Mengzi's view of social possibility is less deterministic and allows for a greater possibility for voluntary human moral transformation.

## 3. Mengzi's Target Audience of Ethical Teaching

Mengzi seems to have imagined a very specific audience for his ethical teachings, namely, members of the ruling class, and kings in particular. Mengzi's rationale for this choice of audience is very clearly stated in the passage, "The virtue of a noble man is like wind; the virtue of a petty man is like grass,"[13] an idea taken almost verbatim from the passage in the *Lunyu* which asserts: "The virtue of a noble man is like wind; the virtue of a petty man is like grass. If the wind blows over the grass, the grass must be bent."[14] The idea of the passage is that common people (i.e., petty men) are susceptible to the influence of their rulers and thus likely to follow the virtues of their rulers. The implication of this idea is that if a ruler is moral, the common people will themselves become moral, as their natures and desires will be bent in emulation of their rulers. In other words, Mengzi argues that the ideal ruler is the one who, in the words of Kongzi, "acts like the North Star, staying in place while the other stars rotate around it."[15] In practical terms, this means that Mengzi's ideal ruler has little need to force the people to become moral, and would be most effective in producing social cohesion and improved morality by dint of example. Such a belief also helps to explain why Mengzi would direct his ethical teachings to the ruling class. Based on the logic in the passages just discussed, the most effective way to improve social morality is simply to teach the ruler how to act morally, since the people are moral mirrors of their rulers.

For Mengzi, the ruler functions as the total exemplar for the common people, especially in terms of morality. In this respect, it can be said that the structural relationship between cosmology and ethics bears a strong resemblance to the relationship between a ruler's morality and the morality of his subjects, since the ruler is expected to provide a moral framework for his subjects in much the same way as cosmology is expected to provide a framework for ethical principles.

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[13] *Mengzi* 3A.2: "君子之德, 風也; 小人之德, 草也."
[14] *Lunyu* 2.19: "君子之德, 風; 小人之德, 草; 草上之風, 必偃."
[15] See *Lunyu* 2.1.

## 4. Human Nature in Moral Learning

Mengzi's view of human nature may also be understood in the light of his cosmological framework.[16] That is, his understanding of human nature also falls within the scope of his cosmological ideas, at least in the sense that Mengzi imagines human beings as capable of becoming good on their own, without reliance on the highest entity, *Tian*. More specifically, Mengzi is well-known for asserting that human nature is good and human beings, by nature, are already equipped with the full potential for ethical goodness.[17] Specifically, Mengzi argues that "All things are equipped inside me,"[18] and asks his listeners to draw on their intrinsic moral potential to make responsible ethical decisions, directing his hearers that "If there are some things you cannot attain, search for them inside yourself."[19] From these statements, we can conclude that Mengzi would likely claim that our ethical knowledge has its source in our innate nature, which already has the complete potential to make us morally good.[20]

Although the *Mengzi*'s description of the source of ethical knowledge is different from the *Lunyu*'s, the two texts' descriptions of known ethical principles are quite similar. Furthermore, both describe the sage kings (Yao 堯, Shun 舜, King Wen 文 and so forth) as the ideal embodiments of moral virtues, and both advocate the study of their moral virtues.

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[16] I use the metaphor of "framework" to illustrate the ways in which intellectual arguments resemble complex physical structures. In most cases, these invisible frameworks fulfill the utilitarian purpose of holding and connecting the different parts of the structure in a unified form. Moreover, the physical and technical properties of the framework (i.e., the materials and layout of the frames) determine the possible shape of the structure which they support. The same is also frequently true for human intellectual products in the sense that these products are frequently undergirded by an ideological framework that bridges its disparate parts and shapes its form.

[17] The *Mengzi* suggests four sprouts (*siduan* 四端) of ethical goodness in the human mind: the feeling of compassion (*ceyin zhi xin* 惻隱之心), the feeling of shame and dislike (*xiuwu zhi xin* 羞惡之心), the feeling of respect (*gongqing zhi xin* 恭敬之心), and the feeling of right and wrong (*shifei zhi xin* 是非之心). See *Mengzi* 2A.6.

[18] *Mengzi* 7A.4: "萬物皆備於我矣." In this respect, Mengzi also said, "Benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are not infused into us from outside; we certainly have them [innately]." See Mengzi 6A.6: "仁義禮智, 非由外鑠我也, 我固有之也."

[19] *Mengzi* 4A.4: "行有不得者, 皆反求諸己."

[20] This potential to acquire moral knowledge is called *liangzhi* 良知 in the *Mengzi*.

## 5. Structural Resemblance between Cosmology and Ethical Framework

As previously discussed, the *Mengzi* maintains a clearer distinction between the divine and human realms, compared to the *Lunyu*. This means that Mengzi's description of *Tian* may be understood as being solely naturalistic, and furthermore, that *Tian*'s anthropomorphic aspects do not affect Mengzi's cosmological and ethical systems.[21] This point deserves greater attention since this naturalistic description of *Tian* in the *Mengzi* seems to be consistent with what might be described as Mengzi's humanistic understanding of both human nature and human moral transformation. In this regard, there seems to be a structural resemblance between Mengzi's cosmology and ethics.[22] One important consequence of Mengzi's naturalistic understanding of *Tian* is that it allows him to favor flexibility over hierarchy in his moral teachings.

The primacy of a naturalistic understanding of *Tian* over an anthropomorphic one is well illustrated by Mengzi's understanding of kingship. The following two passages from the *Mengzi* demonstrate Mengzi's understanding of kingship in a straightforward manner. The first passage is as follows:

> Wan Zhang said, "Is it true that Yao 堯 gave the world under heaven to Shun 舜?" Mengzi replied, "No. the son of *Tian* (i.e., king) cannot give the world under heaven to others." [Wan Zhang asked,] "If so, who gave

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[21] For a general introduction to the relationship between cosmology and ethics in early Confucianism, see Lovin and Reynolds, "In the Beginning," in *Cosmogony and Ethical Order*, pp. 1-38. Ivanhoe's article "Heaven as a source for Ethical Warrant in Early Confucianism" surveys the transformation of *Tian* 天 (Heaven) as a cosmological entity in the landscape of ethics in early China.

[22] The term "structural resemblance" should not be confused with structuralism. The term "structural resemblance" is used to point out where each text has a structural resemblance between the cosmological and other aspects of the society including social structure and the structure of an ethical system. Though I use the expression "structural," I distinguish structural resemblance from structuralism in two important ways. First, structure in structuralism is viewed as a subconscious or autonomous thing. Structuralism holds that structures within a culture are not something intentionally designed or planned, they arise gradually over a long period of time. On the contrary, I argue that Mengzi purposely designed, supported, and advocated his own cosmological claim in his political and ethical teaching. Secondly, structure in structuralism refers to underlying phenomena; it is invisible and unrecognizable in our daily lives since they are deeply structured like the inner frames of a statue or building. On the contrary, cosmology (which conveys "cosmological resemblance") in the *Mengzi* is something taught and advocated intentionally and underlies part of the framework of the society. That is, it is described as a given rule by the highest authority.

> the world under heaven to Shun?" [Mengzi] replied, "Tian gave it." [Wan Zhang asked,] "If *Tian* gave, did *Tian* order it?" [Mengzi] replied, "No. *Tian* does not say a word. *Tian* shows its will through natural phenomena and human affairs."[23]

This passage offers a number of clues regarding how Mengzi understood the role of *Tian* in human political and social affairs. In Mengzi's eyes, the will of *Tian* is to be interpreted solely through terrestrial events without any supernatural intervention. Moreover, even the mandate of heaven (*Tianming* 天命) is not shown to humans through any direct interaction between the heavenly and human realms, but is instead manifest through natural phenomena and existing social conditions. If we state the message of the passage in a simpler way, it can be formulated as follows, "While the present order of things reflects the order of *Tian*, it is unnecessary for us to investigate or to inquire too deeply into the will of *Tian*; in fact, *Tian*'s existence as an active speaker in the world is wholly irrelevant, since *Tian*'s existence or nonexistence makes no difference to the human world whatsoever."

Once we have established this to be the case, we can better understand Mengzi's approval of ousting immoral kings. The story is given as follows:

> King Xuan of Qi asked, "Tang 湯 expelled Jie 桀, King Wu 武王 murdered Zhou 紂, were there such affairs? Mengzi replied to say, "Legend has those stories." [The King] asked, "Is it possible for ministers to murder their king?" [Mengzi] said, "Someone who harms a benevolent man is called a robber; someone who harms a righteous man is called destroyer; destroyers and robbers are all just ordinary men. I heard the ordinary man called "Zhou" 紂 was murdered, but I've never heard that a lord was murdered.[24]

The implications of this passage are that kingship is mutable and that the hierarchy between a king and his subjects can be changed based on the morality of the king. In other words, if kings are immoral (as was the case for Jie 桀 and Zhou 紂), they can no longer be considered kings; rather, their actions have made them commoners. This mutability of social rank is consistent with Mengzi's idea of *Tian*. That is, in his eyes, because the will

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[23] *Mengzi* 5A.5: "萬章曰, '堯以天下與舜, 有諸?' 孟子曰, '否. 天子不能以天下與人.' '然則舜有天下也, 孰與之?' 曰, '天與之.' '天與之者, 諄諄然命之乎?' 曰, '否. 天不言, 以行與事示之而已矣'."

[24] *Mengzi* 5B.9: "齊宣王問曰, '湯放桀, 武王伐紂, 有諸?' 孟子對曰, '於傳有之.' 曰, '臣弒其君, 可乎?' 曰, '賊仁者謂之賊, 賊義者謂之殘, 殘賊之人謂之一夫. 聞誅一夫紂矣, 未聞弒君也'." Jie 桀 is the last king of the Xia Dynasty 夏 and Zhou 紂 is the last king of the Shang Dynasty 商. Both are notorious for their tyrannical rulership.

of *Tian* is reflected in the natural and human world, a humanistic approach to kingship is not only allowed, but encouraged. In other words, kings can be ousted or even murdered if they cause harm to common people without relying on the will of *Tian*, since their claim to kingship is directly linked to their conformity to the order of *Tian*. Mengzi states this idea as follows, "If the lord has made a big mistake then [you] should give advice, doing it repeatedly and if he is still not willing to take your advice, then his position should be overthrown."[25]

The ideas of immutability and flexibility are also seen visible in his teachings about human nature and morality, as seen in the following passage: "When Cao Jiao 曹交 asked, 'Is it possible for every man to become Yao 堯 and Shun 舜?' Mengzi replied 'Yes'."[26] Mengzi's seeming belief in the potential of every person to become fully moral (seen in this passage as the ability to become as morally good as Yao 堯 and Shun 舜) differs greatly from Kongzi's views of human moral possibility. Kongzi holds that there are clear distinctions between human beings from different classes, and that the basic nature of each member of these classes is fixed and cannot be changed. Kongzi says "People can be made to follow it, but they cannot be made to know it."[27] One implication of this passage is that commoners do not have the capacity or ability to know moral rules by themselves, which is why it is fitting that they be led by sage kings or noble men. Another implication of this passage is that some humans have no ability to become consciously and truly moral or to develop fully independent ethical awareness. In other words, Kongzi held that the moral behavior of common people did not flow from innate knowledge or fully formed moral consciousness, but was a trained or conditioned response to outside example, enforcement, or direction. Kongzi's idea of individual moral inflexibility is stated with even more clearity in the passage, "Kongzi said, 'High wisdom and low stupidity cannot be transformable'."[28]

With this in mind, it is apparent that Kongzi's and Mengzi's views on the possibility of human perfectibility are quite different. Kongzi holds that only some people have the innate ability to become independently moral, while Mengzi asserts that every person contains within themselves the real possibility of developing true moral discernment. Again, this distinction is

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[25] *Mengzi* 5B.9: "君有大過則諫, 反覆之而不聽, 則易位."
[26] *Mengzi* 6B.2: "曹交問曰, '人皆可以爲堯舜, 有諸?' 孟子曰, '然'."
[27] *Lunyu* 8.9: "民可使由之, 不可使知之."
[28] *Lunyu* 17.3: "子曰, '唯上知與下愚不移也'."

analogous to their distinct understandings of *Tian*. Mengzi's flexible views on social hierarchy complement and are parallel to his ideas about *Tian*. Because they seem so entwined, we cannot say with confidence that Mengzi's cosmology gave shape to his ethical principles and his ideas on human nature, nor can we say that his ethical principles and ideas on human nature gave shape to his cosmology; the construction of the text is such that we cannot determine with confidence which of these ideas came first or took primacy over other ideas. While proving precedence is a knotty issue, we can assert that Mengzi's cosmology does function at several points as a framework for his ethical teachings, and it is demonstrably the case that he used cosmological ideas (in particular, the *invocation* of *Tian*) as warrants for his ethical claims. In this sense, an understanding of Mengzi's cosmology is essential to understand his ethical teachings on a deeper level.

## 6. Consequentialist Aspects of the *Mengzi*

As discussed above, the target audience for Mengzi's teachings was primarily political leaders, especially kings and other members of the political elite of his time. Mengzi's intentional choice of audience suggests both that Mengzi's ethical teachings may not have been intended to be employed universally and that they might have specific goals determined by the nature of his audience. In this sense, his moral teachings might be better understood as consequentialist rather than deontological. For example, Mengzi asserts,

> If you [i.e., the current king] rule your state with benevolence, all officials might want to serve in your court, and all farmers might want to cultivate crops in your land.[29]

> Subjects are most essential; the deity of land is second-most essential; the king is less essential. Therefore, someone who wins over the common people becomes the son of *Tian* [i.e., king]; someone who wins over the son of *Tian* becomes a feudal lord; someone who wins over feudal lords becomes a grand official.[30]

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[29] *Mengzi* 1A.7: "今王發政施仁, 使天下仕者皆欲立於王之朝, 耕者皆欲耕於王之野."

[30] *Mengzi* 7B.14: "民爲貴, 社稷次之, 君爲輕. 是故得乎丘民而爲天子, 得乎天子爲諸侯, 得乎諸侯爲大夫."

These two passages suggest that the purpose of Mengzi's teaching was to teach the king benevolence not for its own sake but as a means of winning the approval of the common people, thus making their administration easier. He encouraged moral virtue not for its own ends but as a means of strengthening the state. In this respect, Mengzi's ethical teachings can be seen as modeling consequentialism. If we apply the implication of the ethical teachings reflected in Mengzi's accounts, the morality of the king might be judged from the strength of the state and the morality of common people by the consequences of his behavior. This is not to say that the system of ethics reflected in Mengzi's accounts is purely consequentialist, but it certainly cannot be contained by the Western category of deontology, either.[31]

In making this claim, I am not suggesting that Mengzi's ethics can be simply reduced to his cosmology, but I am asserting that his cosmology seems to function as the framework for his ethical teachings. Most frequently, Mengzi's cosmological descriptions are invoked as the basis for some aspect of his ethical teaching. This structural setup is also found in other realms of his teaching, such as the relationship between a ruler and his subjects. This is why Mengzi's ethical teachings should be understood as consequentialist rather than deontological. (That is, his intentional choice of audience entails that his teaching is designed to persuade that specific audience.) Moreover, the cosmological or ethical claims in the *Mengzi* are conditioned by the political and social context of the time, and their emphasis on the consequences of appropriate rule can be seen as manifesting an acute awareness of historical and social contingencies as well as a nuanced awareness of the primary concerns and objectives of many early Chinese rulers.[32]

## 7. Conclusion

The analysis of ethical claims in relation to cosmology is best understood as a reminder that we must position our research topics among larger structures and draw fuller, more multi-dimensional descriptions of our chosen

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[31] The term deontology is derived from ancient Greek, *Deon*, which means "obligation" or "duty." Kant's version of deontological ethics or deontology holds that decisions should be made solely or primarily by considering one's duties and the rights of others and that such considerations take priority over considerations of one's own interests or benefit. See his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

[32] For a detailed study of Mengzi's consequentialist aspects, see van Norden, "*Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy*."

topics of study. It should be noted the term *Tian* is used chiefly as rhetorical devices to give authority to the claims of Mengzi and establish it as implicitly derived from a super-human, cosmological order.[33] One noteworthy feature of ethical teachings derived from *Tian*, one of the highest entities in the early Chinese cosmological framework, is that the ethical rules are typically advanced and advocated as being manifestations of some type of "natural law." This metaphor should not be understood as a reductionist approach; rather it should be viewed as an attempt at giving undeniable authority to his moral teachings. This means that the use and function of *Tian* enables us to see important structural resemblances between Mengzi's cosmological and ethical teachings.

Though Kongzi and Mengzi share the common approach in appealing to the authority of *Tian* for their moral teachings, the intention points of their invocation of *Tian* differ quite profoundly. Kongzi's hierarchical approach is far more concerned with producing social stability between different social classes, while Mengzi's moral and political counsel focuses more on helping people achieve general well-being while allowing for possible flexibility in their social status. Furthermore, Mengzi's approach can be understood as a Copernican revolution in that he switched the focus of self-cultivation from external effort to internal effort. Unlike Kongzi who gave weight to learning from moral role models such as sage kings, Mengzi put more emphasis on cultivating one's inner potential for goodness or sagehood. In this regard, Mengzi's view on human nature can be understood as an pioneering effort to open the road to a universal and easy attainment of moral perfection.

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[33] Environmental historian Donald Worster makes a similar argument in his book *Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas*, suggesting that the term "nature" has been interpreted in various ways in the West, and intellectuals have employed it as a rhetorical devise to support their claims. In his formulation, thinkers who have made an appeal to "natural law" frequently seek to use one version of "what is" to support their version of "what ought" to be so in human society. In his book *Religious Experience*, Wayne Proudfoot sets forward a similar claim, arguing that individuals in a religious group often rely on supernatural claims or claims about the nature and order of the supernatural as a way of lending support to or giving greater authority to their individual religious practices.

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# 孟子人性論的創新意義

李 容 潤

**中文摘要**

本論文主張孟子的人性論應被理解爲哲學藍圖而不應理解爲現實的觀察。衆所週知，孟子是在中國歷史上第一位提倡性善論的思想家，他主張人生來具有成爲聖人的潛能。孟子的這般看法可理解爲哥白尼式轉向，因爲孟子將人性論的焦點從外在的條件（傳承古代聖王的道德教訓）轉移到內在的素質（修養人與生俱來的內在的道德潛能）。質言之，孟子的人性觀爲人類成聖成賢的最高歸宿鋪陳了首條道路。孟子對天的說明也可理解爲他的哲學計畫的框架之一。也就是說，天的普遍性呈現出人人都具有成聖的種子。

**關鍵詞：**儒學，孟子，人性論，哲學藍圖，宇宙論，聖人

# A New Interpretation of the *Gongsun Longzi*: The White Horse as an Analogy for Human Nature

JUNG Dan Bee

## Abstract

It has been the focus of much debate for scholars studying the *Gongsun longzi* 公孫龍子 whether his most famous sophistry, "White Horse is Not a Horse" (*bai ma fei ma* 白馬非馬), is a proclamation of the Chinese version of a theory of universals. This paper aims to analyze and understand the true implications of "Baimalun" 白馬論 (White Horse Dialogue), by comparing it to the terms and metaphors often used by Gongsun Long's contemporaries and not to concepts of Western philosophy.

For example, in the chapter "Zhiwulun" 指物論 (On Cognition and Things), Gongsun Long claims that *zhi* 指 (cognition) may have binary significance, before and after its addition to external things. This two-fold definition of key terms is found in both the *Xunzi* 荀子 and *Mozi* 墨子: a single character is used to signify human faculty, both before and after its contact with external stimulus. This pattern is repeated in the "Baimalun" chapter: the term horse may customarily refer to both a horse of undecided color or before its combination with color, and a horse of fixed color or after its combination with color.

In the theories of the Hundred Schools, materials composed of undecided characteristics that turn into inflexible objects through external intervention are often used as metaphors for changes in human nature. This pattern, repeated in both "Zhiwulun" and the "Baimalun," may indicate that the white horse, as an object of fixed characteristics, was used as an analogue for the changeability of human nature through education or social interaction, whether for good or bad.

While Xunzi and Mozi stop at pointing out the dual meaning of the key terms, Gongsun Long tends to stress the difference between the two, therefore "White Horse

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* JUNG Dan Bee is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University (danb.jung@gmail.com).

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is Not a Horse." His inclination to emphasize the non-identity of one's inner nature and one's response to external intervention may provide a valuable clue to the true agenda hidden behind his sophistries.

**Keywords:** *Gongsun longzi*, "Baimalun", human nature, external stimulus, theory of universals

## 1. Introduction

"White Horse is Not a Horse" (*bai ma fei ma* 白馬非馬) is an ancient Chinese sophism attributed to Gongsun Long 公孫龍, who lived circa 325–250 BCE during the Warring States period. He is roughly contemporary with Xunzi 荀子 (c. 298-238 BCE), Zhuangzi 莊子 (c. 369-289 BCE) and Hanfeizi 韓非子 (c. 280-233 BCE), who mention him by name or teaching in their records. He is the only member of the School of Names who left behind a document of detailed argument—an eponymous collection of essays, *Gongsun longzi* 公孫龍子, the first chapter of which is an effort to prove why "White Horse is Not a Horse."

Fung Yu-lan 馮友蘭 (1894-1990), upon introducing Gongsun Long to English speaking readers with his book *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, compared the Chinese sophist to Plato.[1] According to Fung, the ancient advocate of the School of Names is the founder of a Chinese version of a theory of universals; his famous sophism is in fact a proclamation that the "idea" of a horse is non-identical to any white horse, or horses of any specific color as particulars.[2]

A. C. Graham, among other Western scholars, argues that this Chinese theory of abstracts is highly improbable.[3] Instead, Graham interprets the "Baimalun" 白馬論 (White Horse Dialogue) chapter as part of a discourse on whole and parts that continues throughout the first three chapters of the *Gongsun longzi*, the only parts which Graham believes to be authentic.[4]

Graham initially believed the discourse on the white horse to be a confusion of class membership and identity. In other words, "White Horse is Not a Horse" does not mean that a white horse is not a member of the horse class, but rather that white horse is not identical to horse.[5] Many of the classical Chinese interpreters seem to take this ambiguity for granted and focus instead on the character of the relationship between the concept of white horse and horse. Well-known names such as Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909-1995), Xu

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[1] *A History of Chinese Philosophy* was published under the romanization "Fung Yu-lan," but alternative spellings of 馮友蘭 include Feng Youlan and Feng Yu Lan.

[2] Fung, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, vol. 1, 203-205.

[3] Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*, 193.

[4] Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*, 166.

[5] Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*, 180.

Fuguan 徐復觀 (1902-1982) and Hu Shih 胡適 (1891-1962) explain, albeit with different vocabulary, that Gongsun Long believed the subordinate and superordinate concepts were independent of each other as opposed to one including the other because they are concepts and not actual groups of horses.[6]

Based on Graham's earlier works on Gongsun Long, Hansen suggests that the White Horse dialogue can be explained by the mereological ontology that is characteristic of the ancient Chinese. Mereology is the formal study of the logical properties of the relation between part and whole. According to Hansen, all nouns in the Chinese language share similar characteristics to the mass nouns in the English language, in the way that a cup of milk is a small part of some imaginary whole that is referred to by the term "milk." For an English speaker, a horse is one unit among many others that are identifiable as belonging to the group of horse, owing to the existence of a universal horse; for a Chinese speaker, a horse is part of a whole mass of horse-stuff.[7]

According to Hansen, Gongsun Long is discussing the compound *baima* 白馬 (white horse) as he would another sort of compound word such as *niuma* 牛馬 (oxen and horses) which is a group comprised of oxen and horses; *baima* and *niuma* being two different kinds of compound words introduced in the *Mozi* 墨子. If white horse is to be considered a compound of white-stuff and horse-stuff, just as in the group of oxen and horses, some are oxen and some are horse and some are not oxen and some are not horse, so in white horse some part is not white and some part is not horse. Because it is also true some part is white and some part is horse, both the propositions "White Horse is Not a Horse" and "White Horse is Horse" are true.

Graham, agreeing with Hansen that Gongsun Long ostensibly declared white horse to be a compound of white and horse, authored a second interpretation of the *Gonsun longzi*. He makes the claim that since Gongsun Long explains the compound of white and horse as an addition of color to shape, the character *ma* 馬 (horse) is used ambiguously in this sophistry as both the animal itself and the shape of the animal. Sometimes a name for part of the thing can be used to represent the entire thing, such as when the word "blade" is used to refer to the entire sword. Nonetheless, a blade (horse as shape) is not a sword (white horse as compound of shape and color).[8]

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[6] Mou, *Mingjia yu xunzi*, 103; Xu, *Gongsun longzi jiangshu*, 10; and Hu, *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*, 235.

[7] Hansen, *Language and Logic in Ancient China*, 159-171.

[8] Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*, 193-215.

If Graham's interpretation is to be believed then what is Gongsun Long trying to tell us, by repeatedly making such a mundane claim as "part is not whole," in phrases that are exceedingly difficult to interpret? On the other hand, if Fung's interpretation is to be believed, as suggests Cheng Chung-ying, are there other schools of Chinese thought which might have influenced Gongsun Long into coming up with such an original idea, pun intended?[9] Some significant Korean scholars take this line of thought and build their theories on it, as do—for instance Kang Ji Yeon or Kim Chul Shin.[10] Kim, based on the theory of universals, develops an understanding of the *Gongsun longzi* that closely resembles Berkeley's subjective idealism.[11]

In this paper, the two main chapters of *Gongsun longzi*, namely the "Baimalun" and "Zhiwulun" 指物論 (On Cognition and Things), are compared for similarities—against phrases in the *Mozi*, *Mengzi* 孟子, *Xunzi* 荀子, and also against each other to prove that the white horse is in fact an analogue for human nature transforming through external influence.

It will be shown that what we discover in the "Zhiwulun" chapter are patterns identical to those found in a set of definitions of terms concerning human nature—one of the major philosophical topics of the time—in the *Mozi* and *Xunzi*. Chapters from the *Mengzi*, *Xunzi* and *Mozi* will also show that flexible materials that become fixed in color, shape or any other characteristic through external intervention were often used as analogues for human nature, which changes through education, rules of propriety, law enforcement or some other outside influence. Additionally, two chapters of the *Gongsun longzi* that apparently deal with two entirely different topics share a distinct pattern of logic and similar uses of vocabulary; this leads us to believe that one—the "Baimalun" chapter—is in fact an analogue for the other—the "Zhiwulun" chapter.

While Gongsun Long has alternately been considered either completely lacking in any philosophical value or lauded as the only thinker in ancient China to spontaneously come up with the Platonic theory of universals, he was never attributed with a theory of human nature, self-discipline, an ideal ruler or nation, or any such concept that is characteristic of pre-Qin Hundred Schools of

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[9] Cheng, "Kong-sun Long: White Horse and Other Issues," 341-354.

[10] Kang, "Gongson ryongja haeseok-ui jemunje bipan," 310-327.

[11] Kim, "Gongson ryongja-ui se juseok-e daehan tadangseong gochal," 156-178. Kim does not make the explicit claim that Gongsun Long's philosophy resembles that of Berkeley's. However, I have construed his interpretation that there is no "objective" world outside the human mind according to Gongsun Long as closely resembling Berkeley's subjective idealism. Kim's work is first of the few that have taken this line of thought.

thought. Is it possible that the major thinkers of the time considered Gongsun Long, someone whose only contribution was to argue "the part is not the whole," so important as to quote and mock him by name? Can "Baimalun," having intrigued so many of his contemporaries, be entirely separate from the single most debated topic of the time: the ideal human being?

Although it seems highly improbable that this should be the case, Gongsun Long's philosophical value as a peer who exchanged ideas on human nature has yet to be proven. This paper is the first part of a series of attempts to place Gongsun Long within the web of philosophical communication among the Hundred Schools, on how human beings complete themselves as part of society and how rulers as complete beings influence all under heaven.

## 2. Rectifying Names: The Dual Significance of Capacity and Contact

In the chapter "Zhiwulun" two seemingly contradictory propositions are pronounced by Gongsun Long.[12] The first appears at the beginning of the treatise, while the second one comes almost at the end. Let us leave the translations unfinished and neutral until the significance of each term and the entire passage becomes clear. The structure of the two propositions looks like this:

No *wu* not *zhi*, *zhi* not *zhi*.[13]
*Zhi* not not *zhi*, *zhi* + *wu* not *zhi*.[14]

So, if such a question is at all possible, is *zhi* "*zhi*" or is it "not *zhi*"? What is it that is "not *zhi*", if it isn't *zhi* that is "not *zhi*"? Notwithstanding the obvious contradiction between the two sentences, the paradoxical sentence "*zhi* not *zhi*" contained in the first proposition is a problem one must solve in order to approach the "Zhiwulun." In the first phrase Gongsun Long claims

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12 The name of the chapter, "Zhiwulun," means the treatise on *zhi* and *wu*, which Graham translates respectively as "pointing" and "things." Although I refer to Graham's interpretation of the relationship between the two concepts, I suggest new definitions for the two characters, making it difficult to use a single translation for the key terms. As a solution, I will use the transliteration "*zhi*" during the first part of my argument where I discuss Graham's interpretation, but later use "cognition," my translation for the character *zhi* 指.

13 *Gongsun longzi*, "Zhiwulun": "物莫非指而指非指."

14 *Gongsun longzi*, "Zhiwulun": "指非非指也, 指與物非指也."

"*zhi* not *zhi*" but in the second sentence he changes his statement to "*zhi* NOT 'not *zhi*'," and also that it is "*zhi* added to *wu*" that is "not *zhi*."

Graham interprets the second proposition as "It is not that to point out is not to point it out, it is pointing out combined with things which is not pointing it out."[15] Using Graham's grammatical structure for interpretation (minus the translation "point out"), let us add some more words to our first rough try at deciphering the sophistry.

*Zhi* not not *zhi*, *zhi* + *wu* not *zhi* →
It is not that *zhi* is not *zhi*, but it is *zhi* added to *wu* that is not *zhi*.

Judging from the fact that both *zhi* and *zhi* + *wu* are considered possible candidates for what is not *zhi*, it can be deduced that *zhi* could be used in place of what is in fact *zhi* + *wu*. This pattern is quite similar to Graham's analysis of the ambiguity in "Baimalun," where "blade" sometimes refers to sword as blade plus handle, but also to blade itself.

Graham does focus on the ambiguity of *zhi*, or "pointing" as is his translation of the term. His interpretation is that in some sentences, the act of pointing is directed at the general world, so it "points out" nothing, but in some cases, some specific thing is in fact "pointed" at. So there are two different types of pointing in the "Zhiwulun"; pointing A—which is a general kind of pointing with no specific object; and pointing B—which is a coupling of an act of pointing and a specific thing, depicted in the "Zhiwulun" using phrases such as *zhi yu wu* 指與物 ("pointing out" added to things) or *wu zhi* 物指 (thing-pointing).

Graham claims that throughout the entire work of *Gonsun Longzi*, the single repeated theme is that the part—even though it may use the same name as the whole—is not the part. As Kang points out, Graham's part-whole theory cannot solve the question of why Gongsun Long claimed that there are no parts in the whole, as in the chapter "Tongbianlun" 通變論 (On Understanding Transformation) where he says there is no *yi* 一 (one), nor upper stroke, nor lower stroke, in *er* 二 (two), even though it is among the first half of the document that Graham believes is authentic.[16]

Therefore, although Hansen's understanding of the Chinese language as mereological combined with Graham's part-whole theory—understanding the

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[15] Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*, 215.
[16] Kang, "Gongson ryongja haeseok-ui jemunje bipan," 314.

key concepts in "Baimalun" and "Zhiwulun" as ambiguous terms that may refer to both part and whole at different times—is enlightening, we might build on their interpretation to figure out what kind of part-whole ambiguity would have been influenced by and given influence to other thinkers of the Hundred Schools era, and also have solved the problem of there being no part in the whole.

In the "Baimalun" chapter, Graham read white and horse as the two parts that comprise the horse as a whole, based on the letter *yu* 與. In the "Zhiwulun" chapter, the character *yu* is again used to refer to the addition of the act of pointing and the object that is being pointed at. Pointing at a certain object is "pointing added to object." Which means even though Gongsun Long uses the same term *yu* to signify "addition," the way Graham divides them into respective parts differs.

So what if the part-whole in "Zhiwulun" is not pointing at the world at large vs. pointing at specific objects, but instead the act or faculty of pointing, in itself, vs. pointing to some object, or pointing "added to" (*yu* 與) object? If white is part as opposed to white horse as whole, then pointing can be part as opposed to thing-pointing as whole—divided where the "addition" respectively takes place. This ambiguity between faculty itself vs. the moment of contact with external object is repeated in some documents roughly contemporary with Gongsun Long.

Chang Won-Tae points out this pattern of dual-definition in relation to some key terms used in the human nature theories contained in several documents of the Hundred Schools era, namely the *Xunzi* and *Mozi*.[17] The following paragraphs are part of the *Mozi*, and they define the term *zhi* 知 (perception) in two different ways.[18]

> *Jing* 經 (Canons): Perception is a capacity.
> *Jingshuo* 經說 (Explanations): Perception: With regard to the capacity of perceiving, it is how one perceives [objects] but does not vouch perception. It is like [good] eyesight.
>
> *Jing*: Perception is contacting.
> *Jingshuo*: Perception: With regard to perceiving, it is through one's

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[17] Chang, "Jeonguk sidae inseongnon-ui hyeongseong-gwa jeongae," 94-97.

[18] Although the character *zhi* 知 is often translated as "to know" or "knowledge," *zhi* in Classical Chinese is more of a physical experience using all five senses, mostly the faculty of touch, rather than a mental process. As a responsive faculty to external stimuli, the term "to perceive" seems to be the appropriate English counterpart.

> perceiving [capacity] "passing" a thing that one is able to form an impression of it. It is like seeing.[19]

The two definitions are a) capacity and b) contact. Human beings are equipped with the capacity of perception, regardless of whether one is in contact with the object of perception or is in the action of perception at the time; the capacity is there and it is what allows any action or result of perceiving, but capacity itself does not guarantee any result. In that respect, capacity is like good eyesight. A person with 20/20 vision is well equipped, but that capacity alone does not vouch for any visual results. The lighting may be bad, there might not be anything to see, and the person may not have opened his or her eyes in the first place. The first definition is the "faculty" of perception human beings are born with.

The second significance of perception is what happens in the instant human faculty is in contact with an external object. In the second definition of perception, the first meaning of perception of capacity is used, and vice versa. The perceiving capacity, coming in contact with an external object, is what results in the act of perception of a certain object. In Gongsun Long's terms, the perceiving [capacity] combined with the object is the perceiving [of object]; or perceiving is both whole and part. As with the case of pointing that is both part and whole, one might go so far as to claim that perception is not perception; or it is not that perception is not perception, but it is perception combined with object that is not perception. . . so on and so forth. In fact, further along the *Mozi*, it reads:

> *Jing*: To sleep is for perception to not have perception.[20]

In this phrase, the two definitions of perception are used without explanation so its meaning seems ambiguous or even paradoxical. But using the dual definition, we are able to decipher its meaning as "to sleep is for the perceptive capacity to not have any perceptive experience," which is in fact an apt definition of sleep.

Xunzi, who shared Gongsun Long's concern for "*zhengming*" 正名 (rectifying names), also penned a paragraph full of such dual definitions of important terms:

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[19] *Mozi*, 40.3: "知, 材也."; 42.3: "知也者, 所以知也, 而不必知, 若明."; 40.5: "知, 接也."; 42.5: "知, 知也者以其知過物而能貌之, 若見."

[20] *Mozi*, 40.23: "臥, 知無知也."

> What characterizes a man from birth is called his "nature" [*xing* 性]. What is produced out of the harmony of inborn nature, out of the sensibilities of the organ combining [with external things] and the senses responding to stimuli, and what from birth is effortless and spontaneous is called "nature."[21]

Here, "nature" is at once what is there from birth—a capacity so to speak—or what is inborn; and how the inborn nature, as a response to stimuli—or contact with external objects—effortlessly and spontaneously produces in actions or emotions. Xunzi also uses a similar pairing with perception.

> The means of perceiving which is within man is called "perception" Perception that has an object of combination is called "perception."[22]

Although two different characters *zhi* 知 and *zhi* 智 were used, annotators take the second *zhi* 智 to be a typo for the first, so this seems to be another case of inter-definition of the two branches of meaning of a single character: perception, as capacity, is the means of perceiving, and perception as contact is when that capacity meets an external object.[23]

As both later Mohists and Xunzi use this pattern of definition for terms concerning a human capacity that interacts with external influences, i.e. perception, [human] nature, ability, conscious exertion, etc., one might assume that this knowledge that "perception" signifies both the innate capacity and the moment of experience went beyond the borders of a single School.

As capacity and/or contact, what is the main difference that separates the two meanings of perception: nature or ability? The phrase that Xunzi uses over and over again is *he* 合 (combination) of the human capacity and external object. The human capacity to feel, to think, to act does not disappear when there are no sensory objects to stimulate it. In sleep, one cannot say that one's capacity to feel is completely gone, as it lays dormant but only temporarily. The capacity is there, even before the external stimulus; unconnected to any specific sensory object but completely open to any experience specifically because it is unconnected. In the case of a sensory experience, on the other

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21 *Xunzi*, "Zhengming" 正名 (On Rectification of Names): "生之所以然者謂之性. 性之和所生, 精合感應, 不事而自然謂之性." Refer to the translation of Knoblock, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, Vol. 3, 127.

22 *Xunzi*, "Zhengming": "所以知之在人者謂之知. 知有所合謂之智." Refer to the translation of Knoblock, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, Vol. 3, 127.

23 Wang, *Xunzi jijie*, "Zhengming", 3.

hand, the capacity is "fixed," or limited to a certain object: in Xunzi's terms, it is "combined," and in Mozi (c. 470-391 BCE)'s "contacted."

For Gongsun Long as well, this dual definition also holds true for *zhi* 指. As is the case with Graham's translation, the first and foremost significance of *zhi* is "finger" or "to point" with a finger. Nonetheless, pointing to some such visible object with a finger, or indicating some unseen object or idea with a spoken or written word, or reminding someone of places, theories or habits by designation might all fall into the category of *zhi*. Pang Pu goes as far as to translate Gongsun Long's *zhi* as consciousness or thinking process.[24]

Although it might be too farfetched to include the entire process of abstract or logical thinking in *zhi*, it is probable that this vocabulary at least covers the area of the mind being provoked to recognize concrete things and abstract ideas, either by direct contact or by mention of a word. Amongst the terms which indicate such an intellectual process, the word "cognition" seems most appropriate.

Since we have taken the long way round and finally decided on an appropriate term for *zhi*, let's return to our unfinished translation of the "Zhiwulun."

> It is not that *zhi* 指 is not *zhi*, but it is *zhi* + *wu* 物 that is not *zhi*.
>
> → It's not that cognition is not cognition, but it is cognition combined with external object that is not the same as cognition [before addition].

Gongsun Long is stating that cognition as a function or capacity, is not the same as cognition as contact or experience. Here, as opposed to Mozi's "contact" and Xunzi's "combination," Gongsun Long uses the term "add," a character he also uses in the "Baimalun." In the "Zhiwulun," "add" is used to describe contact between cognitive faculty and external objects.

Near the end of the chapter, he also makes the following statements concerning the addition of cognitive faculty and external objects.

> Should there be no cognition of things in the world, what could we say that it is not cognition?
>
> How is it that it depends on the things, and only in being added to them be deemed cognition?[25]

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[24] Pang, *Gongsun longzi quanyi*, 29.

If we take away the negatives and question forms, it translates to "what I mean by 'x is not cognition' it is in fact that 'cognition of objects (object-cognition) is not cognition'," and "cognition [as capacity] that is not added to external things can also be called cognition." Therefore, cognition before the addition may also be called cognition, but cognition before addition is not the same as cognition after addition. Thus, object-cognition is not cognition, but may be called cognition; or to make it even more confusing, cognition is not cognition.

The paradox in the "Zhiwulun" is no longer a paradox, the same way the definition of sleep in the *Mozi* was not a paradox once the double meaning of the "perceptions" was taken into account. That is, one's capacity of perception before stimuli, or one's nature before the intervention of social institution or such external influence, is not the same as what happens on the moment of contact: there is a fusion of the two parts, there is recognition and response to external stimulus; what was tranquil is aroused and changed. The same may be said of the capacity of cognition. When some specific object is connected to the capacity of cognition, there is some instant reaction, so the faculty is no longer a "capacity" capable of connection to any possible thing, but a cognition of a single particular object; it is no longer the same.

This progression from before stimulus to after stimulus in the key terms of human nature theory in the Xunzi and Mozi is the beginning of the question of how humans are transformed from beast-like creatures to sages. How does human faculty, the shape one is born with, react to outside stimulus—objects of desire, social norms, human contact, reward and punishment—to adjust to society? "Zhiwulun," like so many of its contemporary documents, is a discussion on the possibility of change in human nature.

But what of "Baimalun"? Human nature, perception, exertion, ability or cognition can all be understood to have dual meanings, but is it possible for "horse" or "white" to have two such definitions?

The key to solving this question is the fact that "white horse" or similar objects with fixed or unfixed characteristics have long been used as analogues in the debate surrounding human nature among the scholars of the Hundred Schools.

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25 *Gongsun longzi*, "Zhiwulun": "使天下無物指, 誰徑謂非指? . . . 奚待于物而乃與爲指."

### 2.1. The Metaphor of the Flexible Material in the Hundred Schools

Xunzi, notorious for his claim that "human nature is evil," did not exactly assume that all individuals have the innate urge to harm others or wreak havoc on society—it is simply that he did not believe good behavior comes without an education. Because human desire has no limit but the objects of such desire do, chaos is inevitable—such is the reasoning behind the assertion that all humankind is evil. Thus, what Xunzi actually said about human beings is that in the face of desirable objects, they desire them—which is somewhat hard to dispute.

For his argument that human nature is not born complete but needs a touch-up by an external force—such as an education on the rules of propriety formulated by generations of Sages—Xunzi compares human nature to soft, unshaped clay or other unfinished materials which require craftsmanship.

> When the potter shapes the clay to create the vessel, this is the creation of the acquired nature of the potter and not the product of anything inherent in his inborn nature. When an artisan carves a vessel out of a piece of wood, it is the creation of his acquired nature and not the product of his inborn nature.[26]

In the above quote, the potter and the artisan stand for sages who are creators of rules of propriety. Someone poses the question: if Sages were able to make these rules, then would not it mean such rules were part of human nature itself? Xunzi denies that it is so, by giving the above example of craftsmanship. Sages—or artisans—are able to form roof shingles or wooden dishes—rules of propriety, or human execution of them—out of unshaped clay or a chunk of shapeless wood—human nature in its unfixed form.

In this analogue, potentially chaos-wreaking humans with no fixed rules are transformed into rule abiding gentlemen through the addition of the external force of sagely teaching to original human nature; and materials that are shapeless and therefore capable of becoming anything become fixed in shape, through the external force of the craftsman's skill.

Chang points out that Mozi also postulates analogues of such kind concerning human nature, making it a pattern among the thinkers of the

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[26] *Xunzi*, "Xinge" 性惡 (Human Nature is Evil): "夫陶人埏埴而生瓦, 然則瓦埴豈陶人之性也哉? 工人斲木而生器, 然則器木豈工人之性也哉?" Translation is from Knoblock, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, Vol. 3, 153.

Hundred Schools who believed humankind in its natural state is prone to create chaos and therefore should be subject to training.[27]

> When [Master Mozi] saw someone dying silk, he sighed and said: "When something is dyed by blue, it becomes blue. When it is dyed by yellow, it becomes yellow. When what enters changes its color changes."[28]

This is an analogue used to warn rulers about who to keep near and who to be wary of. By addition of the external force that is color dye, threads that were of no fixed color before will become fixed in colors of blue, yellow or any other. Likewise, impressionable rulers with no fixed political tendencies and therefore with endless possibilities are compared to uncolored threads; rulers with fixed fates after association with good or bad lieges are dyed threads.

Xunzi and Mozi are both advocates of the theory that human beings in their natural state cause only chaos, but through education (or more of an enlightenment through the teachings of Mozi in the case of the latter) can become entirely new beings committed to keeping to even the harshest of rules. They share the pattern of this analogy of flexible material becoming fixed in form, and this pattern becomes most apparent in the *Mengzi*, in the dispute with Gaozi (years unknown).

Chapter 6A of the *Mengzi* begins with four dialogues between Mengzi and Gaozi, all of which center on whether human nature is innately good. In the first two dialogues, Gaozi, who does not agree with Mengzi's kindly take on human morality, compares human nature to the bendy willow tree that has no fixed shape, or swirling water with no fixed direction. These flexible materials attain a certain settled characteristic through some external influence, such as an artisan's skill of bending the willow to form cups, or a worker digging a ditch for the water to flow through. Again, the pattern repeated here is that flexible material added to external force equals fixed characteristic.

In 6A.3 and 6A.4, Gaozi reveals what he believes human nature to be about—it is what one is born with, so in other words, an appetite for food and sex is all there is to it. It is quite interesting that Mengzi and Gaozi both make their arguments using analogues of white objects. For the purpose of this paper, the philosophical dispute between the two ancient thinkers is

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[27] Chang, "Jeonguk sidae inseongnon-ui hyeongseong-gwa jeongae," 131-141.

[28] *Mozi*, 3.1: "見染絲者而歎, 曰, '染于蒼則蒼, 染于黃則黃, 所入者變, 其色亦變'." Refer to the translation of Johnston, *The Mozi: A Complete Translation*, 15.

less important than their understanding of the significance of the white objects and their whiteness.

When Gaozi claims that "nature means what is inborn" (*xing zhi wei sheng* 性之爲生) Mengzi plays on words and asks whether he means it as "white means white" (*bai zhi wei bai* 白之爲白), to which question Gaozi readily agrees. By getting Gaozi to agree that *xing* 性 (nature) to *sheng* 生 (inborn) is as *bai* 白 (white) to *bai*, Mengzi reaches the conclusion that Gaozi believes the natures of dogs and cows are the same as humans; Mengzi and Gaozi both agree that the "whiteness" in any white object is identical to that in any other. Even though Mengzi seems quite confident of his triumph, Gaozi, who thought human nature merely consisted of appetites for food and sex, would have readily agreed to the fact that human nature was equal to any animal's, let alone that of the dog or the cow.[29]

Regardless, the thing for us to take notice of here is that once again, a white object is used as an analogue for human nature. Furthermore, the fact that Mengzi uses the comparison that "white of white feathers is the white of snow, and the white of snow is the white of white jade" as his closing "smoking gun" to prove Gaozi wrong, signifies the distinction of whiteness in various objects must have been widespread across the thinkers of the Hundred Schools.

Whereas Gaozi suggests that objects of a certain color (white in this instance) are a fine allegory of his understanding of human nature, Mengzi makes it clear that he disagrees with Gaozi's take. Gaozi uses the analogue of materials without fixed form or direction to describe human nature in its amoral state; he is able to separate shape and direction from an object. If he can discuss the identity of whiteness in different white objects, is he capable of separating whiteness from objects as well? From this discussion of different white objects and shapeless or directionless materials that are used as an analogue for human nature, can the ancient mind move on to use an object that is colorless—or without a fixed color—as another analogue for human nature? The development seems quite a natural one.

So let us go on to compare the two chapters of "Zhiwulun" and "Baimalun" against each other, to prove the point that the white horse was in fact used as a metaphor for externally influenced human nature, as opposed to the "colorless" horse which stands for human nature in its calm state prior to outside stimulus.

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[29] *Mengzi*, 6A.3: "告子曰, '生之謂性.' 孟子曰, '生之謂性也, 猶白之謂白與?' 曰 '然.' '白羽之白也, 猶白雪之白, 白雪之白猶白玉之白與?' 曰 '然.' '然則犬之性猶牛之性, 牛之性猶人之性與?'"

### 2.2. Addition *Yu* 與 and Transformation *Bian* 變 in the *Gongsun longzi*

As already discussed above, the addition of white to horse, or object to the faculty of cognition, were both described using the character *yu*.

> Horse is what is used to refer to the shape. White is what is used to refer to color. What refers to color is not what refers to shape.
> White horse is horse added to white. Is horse added to white identical to horse? That is why I say, "White Horse is not Horse."[30]

As both Hansen and Graham noted, Gongsun Long considers white horse an addition of white and horse, or a compound of white and horse. A compound of two elements cannot be identical to only one of the constituent elements. In the "Zhiwulun," cognition of objects is expressed as "addition of an object to cognition" (*zhi yu wu* 指與物). According to Gongsun Long, horse before the addition of any color is horse as shape, but the interlocutor understands horse as entire horse and fails to comprehend his reasoning. In "Zhiwulun," the character *zhi* may signify the cognitive faculty only, or the moment of cognition when faculty meets external stimulus. In both cases, the ambiguity is horse or cognition itself, and the addition of an external object: horse and color or cognition and object.

The following is a simplified form of the final paragraph of the "Baimalun."

| | |
|---|---|
| p White is white with no fixed place. | p' Horse is non-selective concerning color.[31] |
| q White horse is white with a fixed place. | q' White horse is selective concerning color. |
| r White with fixed place is not white. | r' The non-selective is not the selective. |

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30 *Gongsun longzi*, "Baimalun": "所以命形也, 白者, 所以命色也. 命色者非命形也. 白馬者, 馬與白也, 馬與白馬也? 故曰, '白馬非馬也'."

31 *Gongsun longzi*, "Baimalun": "曰, 白者不定所白, 忘之而可也. 白馬者, 言白定所白也. 定所白者, 非白也. 馬者, 無去取于色, 故黃, 黑皆所以應. 白馬者, 有去取于色, 黃·黑馬皆所以色去, 故唯白馬獨可以應耳. 無去者非有去也, 故曰, '白馬非馬'." Graham translates 定所白 and 不定所白 as "white with fixed place" and "white with no fixed place," as respectively "[white that does] not fix anything as white" and "[white that does] fix something as white." According to Graham's interpretation, it is not white that is or is not fixed; it is horse or some other object that is fixed as white. Annotators such as Pang Pu or Xu Fuguan, by translating 定所 as a fixed location for white to connect to, lend a dual meaning to white as fixed and unfixed, just as horse is ambiguous, thereby making the parallel between propositions p, q, r and p', q', r' complete.

In the above passage, Gongsun Long makes two arguments concerning the non-identity of what is fixed and not fixed, first centering on white (p, q, r), and then on horse (p', q', r'). Gongsun Long's point is clear: white horse and horse are different because one is selective—or fixed in color—and the other is not, and so the difference between white horse and white is the same. "White with fixed place" means white that is only applied to a limited location; white horse is white combined only with horse and with no other object; white stone is white combined with stone and no other object. So because p is not q, paradoxical propositions mentioned above, such as perception is not perception (*zhi wu zhi* 知無知) or cognition is not cognition (*zhi fei zhi* 指非指), are again repeated in proposition r and r' — "White is Not White" and "Horse is Not Horse (r' in another form as horse is the non-selective and white horse is the selective)"—therefore finally taking off the disguised form of "White Horse is Not Horse."

The parallels between the two chapters are quite substantial, considering the strangeness of the arguments. The chapters center around a paradoxical "A is not A" proposition; it turns out A is in fact an ambiguous term signifying both A itself or A+B ($A \neq B$); although A+B may also be called A, Gongsun Long makes it a point to stress that A before the addition of B is also A.

Combined with other examples of the Hundred School tendency to make metaphors of human nature using flexible materials of unfixed characteristics, and the parallels between the "Zhiwulun" and the "Baimalun," it would be safe to assume that the horse of undecided color that becomes fixed in color through the addition of an external object is an analogue of undecided human nature, before the intervention of some external stimulus that becomes "fixed" afterwards.

If the white horse is an analogue for cognition of external things, and therefore representative of human nature responding to social institutions, one can easily guess why Gongsun Long declared there is no *yi* in *er* or part in whole; human nature is transformed through social interaction, so there is no baby in the adult or freshman in the sophomore. According to Mozi, before accepting the Mohist doctrines a person might almost resemble a beast as to his carnal desires, whereas one may afterwards be transformed into a fiercely loyal ascetic, almost saintly in his abstinence. According to Laozi, on the contrary, a baby as wholesome as a piece of un-carved wood may become completely corrupt through life in the secular world. Whichever way it went, the transformation was brought on by external stimuli and the

nature one was endowed with at birth was completely changed, so that no trace of it was left after the "fusion" with what came from outside.

> In "On Understanding Transformation," after the initial question and answer concerning the part and whole,
> Interlocutor: Is there *yi* in *er*?
> Gongsun Long: There is no *yi* in *er*.[32]
> the interlocutor finally asks,
> Interlocutor: If the upper stroke has truly transformed, how can you call it the upper stroke? If it truly has not transformed, how can you call it transformed?[33]

Gongsun Long may answer either one way or the other; it has not transformed so it is simply a slightly altered version of the "upper stroke," or it is no longer the upper stroke. Strangely, Gongsun Long has already expressed his opinion on it a few sentences prior, even though he again seems to use the term "upper stroke" in ambiguous ways.

> Interlocutor: Is it admissible to say the transformed is not the untransformed?
> Gongsun Long: Admissible[34]

The transformed, or *er*, is not the untransformed, or *yi*. In this case of part and whole, the transformation took place the moment the two parts were combined; as white or horse were considered parts of the white horse, the moment the two were added, they too were transformed to white horse. When a pagan is introduced to orthodox doctrine, after she has converted, can the believer still be called pagan; in other words, is the pagan left in the believer? When a bachelor is married and has a wife, can the man be called a bachelor, or is there a bachelor in the married man?

Such a case of transformation of the inner person, described in the *Gonsun longzi* as "addition" of the two parts, one of which is innate and the other external, perfectly accords with the conditions of a part-whole ambiguity where the part can no longer be found in the whole. As an analogue of human nature, the calmness of the mind before external stimulus, although it may

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32 *Gongsun longzi*, "Tongbianlun": "曰, '二有一乎?' 曰, '二無一'."

33 *Gongsun longzi*, "Tongbianlun": "曰, '右苟變, 安可謂右? 苟不變, 安可謂變?'" 右, literally the right side, is often seen as the upper stroke of the character that stands for *er*, as Classical Chinese was written from right to left and from upwards to downwards, so that the upper stroke was identified as the right side.

34 *Gongsun longzi*, "Tongbianlun": "曰, '謂變非不變, 可乎?' 曰, '可'."

share some characteristics with the "universal," much as the mind in its tranquil state might take the same shape from person to person, it is in some ways very different from the Plato's theory of Ideas, and is in no way foreign to the Chinese mind. On the contrary, the Hundred Schools are known for their disputes on what the human mind is in its 'original state', many of which center around analogues of materials of undecided character, as we have seen.

Gongsun Long was another voice discussing the original nature of humanity, like so many of the Hundred Schools. His cryptic dialogues, although almost impossible for us in the 21st century to decipher, might have been just enough for his contemporaries to quote and comment on.

## 3. Concluding Remarks

So much of research on the *Gongsun longzi* in the past century has centered on whether Gongsun Long had indeed come up with a Chinese version of the Plato's theory of Ideas. Is it possible for the users of Classical Chinese to identify the difference between the universal and the particular? Must one think like the Chinese to understand why the white horse is not a horse, or more fundamentally, what is the Chinese mind, and must one know the Chinese mind to research the Hundred Schools?

Indeed, in order for people of the twenty-first century to understand Gongsun Long, the importance of discussing ancient problems in modern language is understandable, but it is equally important that it is debated in relevance to its own setting. We will never understand any of the ideas of the Hundred Schools correctly by contrasting them only against modern, or ancient Greek ideas. Only by comparing Gongsun Long's arguments against his contemporaries or close predecessors—Xunzi, Later Mohists or even Gaozi—will we be able to fully grasp his meaning.

Xunzi and Later Mohists used the technique of dual-definition of key terms used in the human nature debate. This dual meaning is very important in understanding the change of human from an uncouth creature to a highly socialized being. This dual definition is closely resembled in Gongsun Long's "Zhiwulun." The resemblance strongly hints that this chapter may be understood as a discussion (albeit a cryptic one) on the transformation of human nature, before and after external stimulus.

Meanwhile, there are uncanny parallels between the chapters "Baimalun" and "Zhiwulun." Materials composed of undecided characteristics being transformed into fixed objects through external intervention, and in some cases the whiteness of different objects, are used as metaphors for human nature in several documents of the Hundred Schools. This leads to the conclusion that the White Horse Dialogue may be construed as an analogue for Gongsun Long's theory of human nature.

"White Horse is Not Horse" (*bai ma fei ma* 白馬非馬), "Cognition is not Cognition [with objects]" (*zhi fei zhi* 指非指) and "the Transformed is not the Untransformed" (*bian fei bu bian* 變非不變) so apparently Gongsun Long believes human nature before stimulus is different from human nature after stimulus. Nevertheless, it is never made clear whether he believes education or training are mandatory to make humankind "better," like Xunzi or Mozi, or whether he takes the opposite line similar to Laozi or Zhuangzi and claims nature itself is valuable as it is and should not be meddled with.

In this paper, I intentionally dealt only the first half of the *Gongsun longzi* that Graham did not renounce as apocryphal, whose judgment has yet to be substantially confronted. However, as Graham himself stated, the difference in the usage of terms between the first and second half of the document is not as grave as the fact that "there is little serious thought" in the discarded half.[35]

Nonetheless, by understanding the White Horse as a metaphor for human nature, it is possible to understand the latter half of the *Gongsun longzi* as a significant contribution, while still bearing substantial resemblance to the rest of the document both in logic and in use of language. The latter half contains more clues concerning Gongsun Long's understanding of human nature and whether it has more to lose or gain by contact with outside stimulus. I shall endeavor to prove this in subsequent papers, while concluding this one by offering a new interpretation of the *Gongsun longzi*: that it is in fact a document concerning the transformation the human mind goes through by contact with the outside world.

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[35] Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*, 165.

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# 公孫龍子新釋
## ——比喻人性的白馬

鄭 旦 飛

**中文摘要**

直至目前爲止，以公孫龍爲題的論文偏向於討論“白馬非馬”詭辯是否與共相有關的問題。對於此問題歷來大概有兩種主張：一爲在古漢語的語言特性上普遍者是不可能的主張，另一爲雖然語言未能區別普遍者，但思考卻能的主張。然而，透過古希臘的哲學概念來與中國古代思想的概念比較其異同並無意義。相反，我們應透過比較公孫龍所使用的概念和諸子百家的概念去尋找其意義。

在〈指物論〉一篇當中我們可以找到公孫龍主張“指”具有與物結合起來之前和之後的兩種不同的意思。這模式在《荀子》正名篇及《墨經》中提到的“知”、“能”、“性”等與本性論相關的詞語當中也能發現到。考慮到不少注釋者認爲“指”讓人們聯想到概念的思考能力，我們可得知〈指物論〉亦和“知”等相似，和人的內在資質以及因外部刺激而產生的反應的重義性相關。這喚起人質疑人性根據外部刺激會如何變化的問題，即爲本性論發展過程中的一個階段。

另外，從詞彙的使用狀況和論述展開的方法兩方面來看，〈指物論〉和〈白馬論〉兩篇的模式相似。而在孟子與告子的論辯，以至墨家，荀子等跟本性有關的議論中，特性未定的材料透過外部的介入而得以定下其模樣和方向的比喻經常出現。關於顏色未定的馬和顏色已定的白馬的差別的〈白馬論〉詭辯，其實就是反映了外部介入之前和之後，人性並不可能相同這一主張。

**關鍵詞**：公孫龍子，白馬論，人性，外部刺激，共相問題

# A Contemporary Assessment of the "Four-Seven Debate": A Comparative Study of the Moral Psychology of Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung

LIU JeeLoo

## Abstract

This paper provides a comparative study of the moral psychology of Yi Hwang 李滉 (Toegye 退溪, 1501-1570) and Ki Dae-seung 奇大升 (Gobong 高峰, 1527-1572) in the context of contemporary psychological analysis of the nature and root of human evil. It is an attempt to re-situate the age-old debate on the moral attributes of human emotions as well as moral sentiments in the contemporary moral discourse. Even though the two Korean Neo-Confucians were not engaged in psychological analysis themselves, and their debate was not meant to proffer working solutions to the reality of human evil, we can nevertheless gain new insights into their earnest debate by looking at it from our contemporary perspective. This contemporary hermeneutic analysis also highlights the different orientations and concerns between traditional and contemporary moral discourses: the former are more individual and inward-looking, paying greater attention to moral purity in the mind; and the latter are more social and outward-looking, focusing on one's conduct and its consequences.

**Keywords:** Yi Hwang, Ki Dae-seung, Zhu Xi, the four moral sprouts (*siduan* 四端), the seven emotions (*qiqing* 七情), the Four-Seven debate, evil

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* LIU JeeLoo is Chair and Professor in the Department of Philosophy, California State University, Fullerton, USA. He is also Executive Director of the International Society for Chinese Philosophy (jeelooliu@gmail.com).

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## 1. Introduction

This paper focuses on the debate on the distinct ontological roots and moral attributes of "the four moral sprouts" (*siduan* 四端) and "the seven emotions" (*qiqing* 七情) between Yi Hwang 李滉 (Toegye 退溪, 1501-1570) and Ki Dae-seung 奇大升 (Gobong 高峰, 1527-1572).[1] The four sprouts—the feeling of commiseration, the feeling of shame and disgust, the feeling of reverence and deference, and the sense of right and wrong—originated in the *Mengzi* 孟子, and Mengzi viewed them as universally present in all humans, validating the goodness of human nature. The enumeration of seven emotions—joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, resentment, and desire—came from the *Liji* 禮記 (The Book of Rites), while the *Zhongyong* 中庸 (The Doctrine of the Mean) also lists joy, anger, sadness, and happiness as the four paradigmatic natural emotions. The four sprouts characterize human *nature* (*xing* 性), as exemplifications of humanity's moral essence. Chinese Neo-Confucians mostly focused on the elaboration of the four moral sprouts, paying little attention to the seven emotions. At most, the discussion was on the differences, or connections, between the sentiment of commiseration, which is the sprout of humaneness (*ren* 仁) and familial love (*ai* 愛). Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) himself, for example, embraced Cheng Hao's 程顥 (1032-1085) view that nature is nature, emotion is emotion, and *humaneness* cannot be conflated with *love*.[2] However, in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism there was never any systematic comparison between the four sprouts and the seven emotions. In contrast, the debate on the relations between the four moral sprouts and the seven emotions spanned over five hundred years in the Korean intellectual history of Confucianism.[3] The two leading interlocutors were Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung, who engaged in frequent written exchanges regarding their opposing views for over three years and prolonged the discussion for another four years.[4] This debate can be seen as the most important philosophical

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[1] There is an English translation of this debate, entitled *The Four-Seven Debate: An Annotated Translation of the Most Famous Controversy in Korean Neo-Confucian Thought*, by Michael C. Kalton. The reference to the debate in this paper, however, is from the Chinese/Korean text *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo* 定本退溪全書 (Complete Works of Toegye).

[2] Cf. Lin, "Zhonghan ruxue de qing: yi zhuzi yu lituixi weili."

[3] Li, *Siduan yu qiqing: guanyu daode qinggan de bijiao zhexue tantao*, 213.

[4] Li, *Siduan yu qiqing: guanyu daode qinggan de bijiao zhexue tantao*, 234. According to Michael C. Kalton, in 1559, Yi Hwang wrote an eight-page letter espousing his view on the distinction between the four sprouts and the seven emotions to Ki Dae-seung, who then

dispute in the history of Korean Neo-Confucianism. According to Michael C. Kalton, the English translator of *The Four-Seven Debate*, this debate "addressed issues at the core of the great [Cheng-Zhu 程朱] synthesis in a way that set an important and distinctive agenda for subsequent generations of Korean thinkers."[5] Contemporary expert on Chinese Neo-Confucianism Chen Lai 陳來 also argues that the "Four-Seven Debate" manifested Korean Neo-Confucians' efforts to further develop Zhu Xi's philosophy, to deal with some controversial issues raised by Zhu Xi's remarks. On this topic, "they have paid attention to and spent a great deal of time discussing some problems that were neglected in the history of Chinese Neo-Confucianism."[6]

This paper cannot possibly do justice to the extent of the dispute, the complexity of the surrounding issues, the various argumentations proposed by different Korean Neo-Confucians, or the wide-ranging discussions on it by contemporary Korean scholars. The aim of this paper is to sort out the key issues on which Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung held opposing views, and to assess the philosophical significance of this debate in the context of contemporary moral discourse, especially from the perspective of modern psychology. Even though the debate itself is purely metaphysical and speculative on the root of human evil, this paper will place the debate against some contemporary psychological analyses of the root of human evil, to examine whether the debate could be sustained in this context.

Since both Yi and Ki regarded their own views as the correct rendition of Zhu Xi's views on human nature and human emotion, we shall begin with the elucidation of Zhu Xi's view in this respect.

## 2. The Root of Good and Evil According to Zhu Xi[7]

Even though Zhu Xi embraced Mengzi's view of human nature, he also criticized it as missing an important aspect: the constitutions of *qi* (氣, material force). Zhu Xi says:

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responded with a forty-two-page, paragraph by paragraph critique of Yi's letter. In reply, Yi wrote a forty-six-page point by point response to Ki's critique. Ki again wrote a lengthy reply with some concession to Yi's points, but significant differences remained. The final concession on Ki's part came around 1566, when he wrote a general summary statement of the issue accepting most of Yi's points (Kalton 1994, xxix).

[5] Kalton, *The Four-Seven Debate: An Annotated Translation of the Most Famous Controversy in Korean Neo-Confucian Thought*, xv.

[6] Chen Lai, "Luelun chaoxian lichao ruxue lihuang yu qidasheng de xingqing liqi zhibian," 112.

[7] Part of this section comes from Liu JeeLoo, *Neo-Confucianism: Metaphysics, Mind, and Morality*.

> Mengzi's discourse is all about the goodness of human nature. When it comes to the not-so-good part, Mengzi attributes the cause to one's being led astray. So it is like at the beginning everyone is purely good and it is only later that one becomes *not so good*. But this view is neglecting the *qi* aspect in the exposition of human nature, and it is thus inadequate. It is only after the Chengs put forth the aspect of *qi* and disposition (*qizhi* 氣質) to supplement Mengzi's theory, that we now have a complete discourse on human nature.[8]

Zhu Xi argues that when one talks about human nature, one cannot dispense with the material and psychological dispositions that make up each individual. The latter is what Zhang Zai 張載 (1020-1077) had called "*qi*-material constituted nature" (*qizhi zhi xing* 氣質之性). Zhu Xi says, "The nature that is endowed by heaven must be embedded in the physical constitution of the thing. It is analogous to a ladle of water: without the container, the water would have no place to settle."[9] In this analogy, Zhu Xi is speaking of how principle (*li* 理) needs *qi* to be realized in human beings. In Zhu Xi's explanation, the various constitutions of *qi* are responsible for our being good or bad.

According to Kwon-loi Shun, "Zhu Xi endorsed the Cheng brothers' distinctions between two ways of viewing the nature—original nature and material nature—regarding the former as perfectly good and the latter as having the potential to be not good."[10] On Cheng Hao's definition "What is inborn is called nature," Zhu Xi comments, "What is imparted by Heaven to all things is called 'mandate.' What is received by them from Heaven is called nature. . . . Man's nature and mandate exist before physical form, while *qi* exists after physical form. What exists before physical form is the one principle harmonious and undifferentiated, and it is invariably good. What exists after physical form, however, is confused and mixed, and good and evil are thereby differentiated."[11] In this remark, we see that Zhu Xi separates the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* aspects of our mental and moral makeup. The *a priori* aspect is what he calls "nature" (*xing* 性), and it is purely good. On the *a posteriori* level, however, we are not morally equal. Zhu Xi says, "All humans have good nature, and yet some people are born good while some are born bad. This difference is due to their various

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[8] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:193, emphasis added.
[9] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:195.
[10] Shun, "Zhu Xi's Moral Psychology," 178.
[11] Chan, *A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy*, 597.

constitutions of *qi*."[12] Our *qi*-constitution makes up our mind's emotions (*qing* 情). Zhu Xi explains the constitutions of *qi* as our temperament and dispositions. For instance, some people are prone to anger and violence, while some people tend to be weak and indecisive. These are our personality flaws, and we are also born with them. This is why even though all humans have the same endowment of principle, each person's potential of becoming a full-fledged moral agent has varying degrees of success.

Zhang Zai offered the separation between heavenly endowed nature and *qi*-material constituted nature as his explanation for the presence of human evil. According to Allen Wittenborn, Neo-Confucians including Zhang Zai, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi "did not wholeheartedly agree with Mengzi that evil originated with man. To them, evil originated with physical nature." However, this is not to say that they took evil "to be a natural phenomenon and not a moral one."[13] Chinese Neo-Confucians were preoccupied with locating the origin of human evil within the human mind. Zhu Xi embraces Zhang Zai's doctrine that the mind is the master of both nature and emotion. Zhu Xi says, "Nature is simply the principle of the mind, while emotion is simply the manifestation of nature. . . . Zhang Zai's doctrine that '*the mind encompasses both nature and emotion*' is excellent."[14] In Zhu Xi's moral psychology, the human mind is fully responsible for our morality as well as our moral failure. In other words, the root of good and evil lies in the human mind. He says that the mind itself can sometimes be "not good" (*bushan* 不善).[15] However, if the mind encompasses both nature and emotion while nature is purely good, then the component that could lead the mind to deviate from good must be the mind's emotion.

For Zhu Xi, "evil" results from the imbalance of emotion. As biological and moral beings, we have our natural emotions and innate moral sentiments. "If our emotions are all expressed with due measure and degree (*zhongjie* 中節), then they are good; if they miss the appropriate measure and degree (*buzhongjie* 不中節), then they become evil."[16] The Chinese phrase '*zhongjie* 中節' here literally means "in agreement with ritual propriety," "following the right pitch (in music)," "seasonal harmony," or "having the right measurement," etc. In

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[12] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:198.

[13] Wittenborn, "Some Aspects of Mind and the Problem of Knowledge in Chu Hsi's Philosophy," 28.

[14] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:227.

[15] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:228.

[16] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:363.

other words, there is an external, objective standard for whether something is *zhongjie*. How to define the objective standard for the appropriate measure and degree of our natural emotions and desires is of course not an easy task. Zhu Xi's answer is to appeal to the mindset of the sages. Their emotions and conduct would always have "appropriate measure and degree." Hence, *how the sage would feel and react* in the given situation becomes the external standard for all of us. We therefore need to learn from the sages.

Zhu Xi could be regarded as an ethical rationalist, in that he had a guarded view towards all forms of human feelings and emotions. In his eyes, even the four moral sprouts, which Mengzi praised as the proof of the goodness of human nature, are not totally unproblematic, since they could also lead to wrongful acts. Zhu Xi says, "In the human mind, if one has too much commiseration, then one could become indulgent and weak. If one has too much sense of shame and disgust, then one could end up feeling morally incensed towards the wrong things."[17] In other words, our feelings and emotions, even when they are the so-called "moral sentiments" as the four moral sprouts, could deviate from the norm and bring us to committing moral ills. For Zhu Xi, the four sprouts also belong to the category of emotion (*qing* 情). However, unlike the natural emotions such as joy and anger that are the issuance (*fa* 發) of *qi*, the four sprouts are the issuance of principle (*li* 理).[18] In Zhu Xi's assessment of the possible moral deviance of the four sprouts, lay the seed for the Korean Neo-Confucian "four-seven debate." Zhu Xi's ambivalence in categorizing the four sprouts and the other natural emotions lends support to both Yi Hwang's and Ki Dae-seung's interpretations.[19]

Following the tradition of classical Confucianism, Zhu Xi also separated our heart/mind into two dimensions: one is in accord with the way (*dao* 道) and is called "the dao mind" (*daoxin* 道心); the other is characterized as "the human mind" (*renxin* 人心). In the classic the *Shangshu* 尚書 (The Book of Documents), there is a famous remark that is often cited in later Confucian works: "the human mind is perilous; the dao mind is subtle." With this remark, Zhu Xi repeatedly emphasized his one-mind theory: the division between the two minds is merely based on the mind's intentional object.

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[17] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:193.

[18] Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 53: 1297, cited in Yang, *Cong dangdai ruxue guandian kan hanguo ruxue de zhongyao lunzheng*, 63.

[19] As we shall see in the next section, Yi Hwang focused on Zhu Xi's separating the four sprouts as the manifestations of principle and the other emotions as the manifestations of *qi*. Ki Dae-seung, on the other hand, focused on Zhu Xi's aligning the four sprouts with the seven emotions.

Zhu Xi identifies the dao mind as the mind's cognitive apprehension of principle, while he locates the human mind at the level of human emotion and desire. He says, "The mind has intelligent awareness. When what it apprehends is principle itself, it is called 'the dao mind.' When what it apprehends is desire, then it is called 'the human mind.'"[20] In response to a student's question about this division, Zhu Xi explains, "There is only this one mind. When the mind's perception follows the desire of the senses, it is the human mind; when the mind's perception follows the path of moral righteousness and principle, it is the dao mind."[21] In general, the sage has both the dao mind and human mind. The sage is someone who abstains from operating only under his human mind, while ordinary people are often driven by their human mind. Even though the human mind is not purely evil, it is easily tempted to go astray; hence, it is described as "perilous" in the *Shangshu*. The distinction Zhu Xi makes between the cognitive mind and the mind with emotion and desire, along with his endorsement of the former, again reveals his theoretical affinity with contemporary ethical rationalism.

Zhu Xi links desire with emotion and gives the metaphor of water to explain their relation: "Desire is generated by emotion. The human mind is like water, and human nature is the water at rest, while emotion is the water in flow. Desire, on the other hand, is like the ripples and waves of water, which can be good and can be bad."[22] In other words, the mind encompasses nature and emotion, just as water can be at rest or in motion. Desire is the arousal of emotion, as ripples are caused by water in motion. As long as one's emotions are aroused, one cannot avoid having desires. Even though Zhu Xi did acknowledge that some desires are good, such as a moral agent's desire to achieve humaneness, in general he argued that human desire and heavenly principle are incompatible: "In one's heart, if heavenly principle is preserved, then human desire will disappear; if human desire wins over, then heavenly principle is extinguished. There has never been a mixture of heavenly principle and human desire in the same heart."[23] The reason why human desire is always bad, in Zhu Xi's assessment, is its intrinsically self-centered (*si* 私) nature.[24] The precept of the Heavenly principle is to

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[20] Zhu, *Zhuzi yulei*, 4:1487.

[21] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 16:2663.

[22] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:229.

[23] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:388.

[24] In Zhu Xi's discussion on desire (*yu* 欲) he typically refers to human desire (*renyu* 人欲) or self-centered desire (*siyu* 私欲).

be impartial (*gong* 公), which stands in opposition to self-centered desire. Zhu Xi says, "Everything can have the polarity of right and wrong: what is right is the impartiality of the Heavenly principle; what is wrong is the self-regarding human desire. One must carefully discern these two in every affair."[25] For example, he says, eating and drinking is part of the Heavenly principle, but if one pursues delicious food and drink, then it becomes human desire.[26] This example shows that he rejects human desire primarily because desire belongs to the private realm and falls on the material level. One's desire should only be for intellectual enrichment and spiritual gain.

According to Zhu Xi, there is a constant battle in one's heart between good and evil, between heavenly principle and human desire. "If one of them advances, then the other retreats; and vice versa. There is no way to stay neutral and not make any advancement or retreat."[27] This is why one cannot do it alone; one needs to study and learn. "Before one learns, one's heart is filled with human desire. After one begins learning, heavenly principle naturally gets exposed and human desire gradually diminishes. This is of course good; however, there will be layer after layer of obstructions that need to be removed. Even after one has removed the major desires, one still needs to scrutinize one's deeper, subtler desires." Ultimately, the goal of learning is to "completely remove human desire so as to return to the precept of heavenly principle."[28] The more one learns about right and wrong and truth and morality, the fewer desires one will have. Eventually, one can return to the correct path. In other words, moral attainment must rely on moral education. It is based on thinking and reflection, not on feeling or emotion.

If evil originates in the mind's emotional manifestations and material desires, then the human mind is not a sufficient grounding for human morality. Philip J. Ivanhoe argues that under Zhu Xi's theory of human nature, we are not guaranteed moral success and we cannot fully trust the human mind's capacity for fulfilling our moral predispositions:

> Given that our original, pure natures remain mired in *qi*, no matter how hard or how long we work at self-cultivation, we never can fully escape the limitations of *renxin* [the human mind]. As a result, our ethical status remains in a 'precarious' state, and we are 'prone to error.' These aspects

[25] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:390.
[26] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:389.
[27] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:389.
[28] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:390.

> of Zhu's philosophy led him to view the human heart-mind with a significant level of distrust and to look to the heart-mind of the Way as his absolute standard and guide.[29]

We can see that even though Zhu Xi affirms the goodness of human nature, he is not optimistic about an individual's attainment of moral goodness. We have a purely good moral essence, but this *a priori* moral grounding is stuck in the *a posteriori* physical constitutions which are manifested in our personality, temperament, emotion and desire. The latter obstructs the former from being completely realized in the individual's mind. In other words, our temperament, our emotions, and our desires could interfere with our efforts for moral cultivation. To combat any moral impurity or moral failure resulting from our *qi*-constitutions (in particular, our emotion and desire), we need to resort to the mind to reflect on our nature as the foundation of our morality.

## 3. The Four-Seven Debate between Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung

Both Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung claimed to be true followers of Zhu Xi's teaching, and they often cited Zhu Xi's remarks in support of their own views. However, their views actually diverge greatly. From their extended exchanges of correspondence, we can see that Yi and Ki disagreed on the following philosophical issues:

### 3.1. The Categorization of the Four Sprouts and the Seven Emotions

Yi Hwang separates the four sprouts and the seven emotions as having different ontological origins and divergent moral attributes, and serving distinct moral functions. For Yi, the four sprouts are what make human morality possible, whereas the seven emotions are simply natural emotions that humans share with other creatures. One of the arguments he gives is that if four sprouts and seven emotions are all emotions, then why the different designations of four and seven?[30] His point was not terminological, but that since the human psyche has a complicated structure of emotions with distinct moral and biological functions, we should not mix up all emotions indiscriminately. In separating

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[29] Ivanhoe, *Readings from the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism*, 39.

[30] Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:47. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes of Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung are from Yi Hwang's *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo* 定本退溪全書 (Complete Works of Toegye).

the two sets of emotions, Yi embraces Mengzi's conviction of the unique moral essence that humans have.

Ki Dae-seung held the position that there is only one category of emotions and the seven emotions encompass the four sprouts, "not that outside of the seven emotions there are extra four sprouts."[31] For Ki, the four sprouts and the seven emotions are essentially the same; they are both humans' natural emotions. According to Taiwanese scholar Yang Cho-Hon's interpretation, the relation between the four sprouts and the seven emotions for Ki Dae-seung is that between the part (*pian* 偏) and the whole (*quan* 全). The four sprouts single out the positive aspects of the seven emotions, whereas the seven emotions themselves cover the totality of emotions.[32] In other words, for Ki Dae-seung, there is no *other* ontological category for the four sprouts. Ki argues that, according to the *Zhongyong*, the seven emotions have the unaroused state (*weifa* 未發) and the aroused state (*yifa* 已發), and in each of these states, the emotions could attain either equilibrium (*zhong* 中) or harmony (*he* 和).[33] When they are in the state of equilibrium before arousal, they are simply part of our inborn nature and are thus identified with the four sprouts. When they are in the state of post-arousal harmony, they are rectified (*zheng* 正) emotions and do not deviate from principle (*li*). Ki says, "Indeed the four sprouts originate in the human nature of the four cardinal virtues; however, so are the seven emotions. Otherwise, why would Zhu Xi say that 'before the emotions were aroused, they were simply part of nature,' or why would he say that 'emotions are simply the manifestations of nature'?"[34] In holding this view, Ki is expressly rejecting the Daoist and Buddhist denouncement of human emotions. However, in placing the four sprouts in the midst of the seven emotions, he is also denying the innate moral attributes of Mengzi's moral psychology. This is the next point of disagreement between Yi and Ki.

### 3.2. The Moral Attributes of the Four Sprouts and the Seven Emotions

Yi Hwang argues that the four sprouts are purely good with no mixture of evil; they are what Mengzi had singled out as the good (*shan* 善) human

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[31] Cited in Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:52.

[32] Yang, *Cong dangdai ruxue guandian kan hanguo ruxue de zhongyao lunzheng*, 71.

[33] One reviewer for this journal suggests that Ki considered the seven emotions as the aroused state, not the unaroused state.

[34] Cited in Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:78, emphasis added.

nature.[35] As for the seven emotions, he thinks that they do not have determinate moral attributes and could become either good or evil. By placing the four sprouts on a higher moral plane, Yi Hwang is reaffirming Mengzi's moral metaphysics of the mind. The sense of "good" in the depiction of the four sprouts is not evaluative, but denotative. That is to say, Mengzi was not praising the four sprouts as being good; rather, he was defining "good" in terms of humans' possession of the four kinds of sentiments.[36] As Mengzi argues, human psychology is equipped with four beginnings for moral development, which he calls the "four moral sprouts." If the core referent of "good" is the set of moral attributes in human psychology, then we can apply the property "is good" to people who manifest these moral attributes, and to states of affairs that are conducive to the manifestations of these moral attributes or are the realization of these moral attributes. In other words, a person is good if and only if she has the virtues of humaneness, righteousness, respect and wisdom; an act is good if and only if it is done out of the agent's senses of commiseration, shame and disgust, reverence and deference, and her sense of right and wrong. Yi Hwang explained that Mengzi was only talking about the legitimate (*zhengdang* 正當) manifestation of the four sprouts. He regards human nature to be pure good and believes it would be erroneous to also call evil a part of human nature.[37]

This unique sense of moral essence in the four sprouts is lost when Ki Dae-seung argues that both the four sprouts and the seven emotions could be either good or bad. To begin with, Ki assigns moral attributes to the seven emotions. His textual support comes from the *Zhongyong*. According to the *Zhongyong*, before these emotions are aroused, they are in the state of equilibrium (*zhong* 中); when they are aroused and expressed with due measure and degree (*zhongjie* 中節), they are in the state of harmony (*he* 和). Both of these states are good (*shan* 善). Therefore, natural emotions can be good. According to Ki, this passage from the *Zhongyong* shows that the natural emotions are also in agreement with principle (*li* 理) and the way

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35 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:47.

36 Mengzi was the first Confucian to specifically use this word to describe the natural attributes that human beings are born with—the so-called "human nature"—when he stated: "human nature is *good*." This statement is often seen as *evaluative*, so what Mengzi states is taken to be in praise of human nature. However, this statement can also be interpreted as *descriptive* which would mean that what Mengzi stated was a depiction of the natural attributes of human psychology. Under this second reading, the term "good" in Mengzi's usage has a specific referent: humans' psychological constitution.

37 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:118.

(*dao* 道). It is only when these emotions are not regulated to be in line with due measure that they could be faulted with being the root of evil. If natural emotions are regulated to attain "due measure and degree", they are all good. When the expression of emotion is out of sync with due measure and degree, it is because of one's *qi*-disposition and one's material desire.[38] To regulate the seven emotions so that their expressions are all in due measure, one needs to have a capacity for self-monitoring, as well as the ability to make a cognitive assessment of a situation and the appropriateness of one's emotion in the given situation. That is to say, in Ki's moral psychology, human good is a man-made achievement through the regulation of emotions.

Ki further argues that when Mengzi was so joyful that he could not sleep, that was a form of joy. When Shun killed the four villains, that was a form of anger. When Confucius mourned and wept so hard, that was a form of sadness. When Confucius was happy with the company of his students, it was a form of happiness. This shows that the sages' emotions must exemplify the original state of principle. The same goes for ordinary people: they experience joy upon seeing their parents or family, and they experience sadness when attending funerals. Aren't these emotions also a manifestation of the original state of principle? Therefore, emotions must not be separated from the principle of nature.[39]

If Ki merely elevated the moral status of the seven emotions to equal that of the four sprouts, then his view would not have been so at odds with Yi Hwang's positive view of the four sprouts. However, at the same time, Ki claims that the four sprouts are not guaranteed to be fault-free. He uses the same standard for assessing the situational appropriateness of the sentiments that represent the moral sprouts: "If one has the heart of commiseration when one ought not to commiserate, or if one has the feeling of shame and disgust when one ought not to feel this way, then one's sentiments are not correct (*zheng* 正)."[40] Here he is assessing the moral attributes of the four sprouts as they are aroused or manifested. He cites from Zhu Xi's *Yulei* 語類 (The Classified Dialogues of Zhu Xi) that the four sprouts must also be expected to be "in due measure" as the situation calls for. If one commiserates when one should not or feels shame and disgust when one ought not to, then such expressions of the sentiments are "not in

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[38] Cited in Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:69.
[39] Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:79.
[40] Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:150.

due measures."[41] In his view, the four sprouts are as vulnerable as the seven emotions: they could also be unbalanced and inappropriate in their manifestation. In the pre-arousal state, both the four sprouts and the seven emotions are originally good. In the post-arousal state, on the other hand, both could be bad. We cannot underestimate the importance of this claim. What Ki Dae-seung expressed was a metaphysical disagreement with Yi Hwang—as well as with Mengzi. He did not think that humans have any special moral essence. For him, the four sprouts are no different from animals' natural emotions, and both sets of emotions need the mind's conscious awareness of situational appropriateness and the correspondingly fitting responses for regulation. This view is actually closer to Xunzi's assertion on the source of human morality: Human nature is bad; what is good (*shan* 善) comes from deliberate effort (*wei* 僞).[42]

At this point we can see that at the bottom of the four-seven debate was a metaphysical dispute between Yi and Ki. This is our next point of comparison.

### 3.3. The Ontological Constitutions of the Four Sprouts and the Seven Emotions[43]

Yi Hwang argued that the four sprouts are derived from *principle*, while the seven emotions are derived from *qi*. He frequently cited Zhu Xi's remark to back up this distinction: "Four sprouts are the manifestations of principle (*li zhi fa* 理之發); seven emotions are the manifestations of *qi* (*qi zhi fa* 氣之發)."[44] He embraced Zhang Zai's distinction between the "heavenly endowed nature" and "*qi*-material constituted nature."[45] He argues that when

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41 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:154.

42 *Xunzi* 荀子, Ch. 23.

43 In Yang Cho-Hon's detailed analysis of the Four-Seven debate, he took this ontological dispute to be the key issue of the debate. According to his analysis, Yi Hwang takes the four sprouts to be "issued from" principle, and this shows that Yi Hwang's notion of *principle* is active and independent. Yang argues that Yi Hwang's "issuance from principle" (*lifa* 理發) is a crucial point that marks the divergence of two theoretical models in Neo-Confucianism. See Yang, *Cong dangdai ruxue guandian kan hanguo ruxue de zhongyao lunzheng*, 120-121. The focus of this paper, however, is on the moral psychology of Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung. Hence, the analysis is focused on the roles of the four sprouts and the seven emotions in moral motivation, not on their respective ontological constitution.

44 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:197.

45 In a letter responding to questions ("Wenmu" 問目, in *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 8:302-307), Yi Hwang acknowledged that he could not really understand the true meaning of "*zhi*." The interlocutor wrote, "One's ability to think and move is the function of *qi*, but the meaning

we talk about nature (*xing* 性), we distinguish the original nature from principle and the nature from *qi*'s composition. So, when it comes to emotion (*qing* 情), why cannot we also distinguish between the kinds of emotions based on principle and the kinds of emotions derived from *qi*'s composition?[46] Principle in his conception stands for a higher ontological dimension in the universe, while *qi* constitutes the concrete things in the world. By separating the two dimensions, Yi was endorsing Zhu Xi's dualism of principle and *qi*. He also criticized Ki for committing to monism. As he put it, "When it comes to the end-state (*mo* 末), we could say that we see the original state of principle within the natural manifestations of *qi*, and it may appear that principle and *qi* are conjoined as one. However, if you [Ki] really think that principle and *qi* are one thing without distinction, then it is not what I could know."[47] It is clear that Yi rejected Ki's metaphysical view.

Ki Dae-seung seems to implicitly reject this dualism, or at least he only wants to pay attention to the concrete world, in which principle and *qi* are always intermingled. He thinks that since principle and *qi* are inseparable, the seven emotions must also be based on principle. We can say that the seven emotions are derived from the mixture of principle and *qi*, but we cannot say that they are based on *qi* alone.[48] Furthermore, he argues that both the four sprouts and the seven emotions originate in the mind, and the mind is the unification of both principle and *qi*; thus, all emotions must also contain both principle and *qi*.[49] He thinks that we cannot separate the ontological constitutions of the four sprouts and the seven emotions, because principle is "the master of *qi*," while *qi* is the realization of principle. Principle and *qi*, "though ontologically distinct, are always intermingled and inseparable in

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of *zhi* is the most difficult to grasp. Previous Confucians have interpreted it as covering either behavior or one's physique. . . ." In reply, Yi wrote: "I too have a hard time figuring out the meaning of '*zhi*.' If it is just about one's physique, then [how do we explain the fact that] we have seen beautiful people with evil mentality, or ugly people with admirable conduct? Clearly the word cannot be understood merely as one's shape and form" (Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo,* 8:306). In the end, Yi used the analogy of the mold for tiles to illustrate the *zhi* of humans. He wrote: "A person's having *zhi* is like a tile's having a mold. Some molds are constructed to perfection, and the quality of the soil is just right. . . ; whereas some molds are made well but the quality of the soil is either too loose or too dense, too hard or too soft. Sometimes the molds are poorly made, but the quality of the soil is good. . . . Hence, whether one has good or bad *zhi* cannot be decided by the [external] shape or mold." (Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo,* 8:306-307).

46 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:48.

47 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:99.

48 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:68.

49 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:78.

concrete things."[50] Therefore, it cannot be the case that the four sprouts are based on principle alone, while the seven emotions are based on *qi*.[51] According to Yang Cho-Hon's analysis, for Ki, principle is above form (*xingershang* 形而上) while *qi* is within form (*xingerxia* 形而下). Principle is the ontological grounding for *qi*, and the issuance of *qi* must be based on principle. All forms of emotion—be it the four sprouts or the seven emotions—are issued from *qi*, thus they must all have principle for grounding. Principle itself, on the other hand, is inactive and cannot itself generate emotion.[52] Therefore, Ki naturally believes that there is no ontological distinction in the makeup of the four sprouts and the seven emotions.[53]

### 3.4. The Connection between Heavenly Endowed Nature and *Qi*-Material Constituted Nature

As explained earlier, Yi Hwang separates *qi*-material constituted nature from what Mengzi refers to as human nature, since only the latter is based on principle, whereas Ki Dae-seung thinks that *qi*-material constituted nature is also based on principle. The two philosophers used the metaphor of the "moon in the water" in their explication of the connection between heavenly endowed nature and *qi*-material constituted nature. Ki suggested that the heavenly endowed nature is like the moon in the sky, whereas the *qi*-material constituted nature is like the moon in the water. Even though the moon in the water is different from the moon in the sky, ultimately it is just one moon. One should not disregard the moon in the water and treat it merely as water. In other words, one should not treat *qi*-material constituted nature merely as having the element of *qi*.[54] To his argument, Yi had a sharp rebuttal: Even if it is just one moon in the sky and reflected in the water, what is in the sky is the real moon while what is in the water is merely the reflection of light. If one reaches for the moon in the water, there is

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50 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:53.

51 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:53.

52 Many contemporary scholars, following the analysis of Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909-1995), treat Zhu Xi's *principle* as that which has only the sense of being, but not the sense of activity. In his *Neo-Confucianism: Metaphysics, Mind, and Morality*, Liu uses a different analysis: Zhu Xi's *principle* lacks causal efficacy and becomes a "metaphysical dangler" in his worldview. The idea is the same: for Zhu Xi, principle must rely on *qi* to produce and to act on things.

53 Yang, *Cong dangdai ruxue guandian kan hanguo ruxue de zhongyao lunzheng*, 72.

54 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:142.

nothing to be grasped other than reflections. Furthermore, when the water is still, the moon's reflection is still; but when the water is gushing down or is stirred up by big winds, the moon's reflection is broken up, even to the point of vanishing. Through this analogy, we realize that we cannot say that nature is truly embedded in *qi*-material constituted nature, just as the moon is never really in the water.[55] Ki's reply to Yi's challenge was to reiterate his view that both the four sprouts and the seven emotions originate from the same human nature. They do not have two separate sources.

To get a better sense of their views of human nature, let us examine this debate on the analogy of the moon more closely. Yi thinks that the heavenly endowed nature and our *qi*-material constituted nature are qualitatively different. When the former is embedded in the latter in each individual, its purity is never altered, just as the moon in the sky is not affected by whatever happens to its reflections in the water. Hence, in his view there is an absolute, inherent goodness in human beings. He argues that when Mengzi spoke of the goodness of human nature, or when Zisi 子思 (c. 481-402 BCE) in the *Zhongyong* referred to the heavenly endowed nature, they were both talking about the purely good human nature derived from principle alone. The *qi*-material constituted nature is not "the original state of nature."[56] Therefore, he argues, the emotions that emerge from the *qi*-material constituted nature are likely to flow into evil (*xieer* 邪惡).[57] Ki, on the other hand, treats the heavenly endowed nature as the moon's reflections in the water. The state of the water could affect the state of the moon in the water; therefore, sometimes the heavenly endowed nature could be destroyed or diminished by the *qi*-material constituted nature. This explains why Ki would think that even the four sprouts could turn out to be not good (*bushan* 不善). While Yi's emphasis is on the metaphysical foundation of human existence, Ki's focus seems to be on the empirical being: the way human beings exist after birth is necessarily an entangled *qi*-existence.

The above comparative study shows that Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung have both captured part of the essence of Zhu Xi's moral psychology. Yi was correct in separating the ontological sources of the four spouts (nature-*xing* 性) and the seven emotions (emotion-*qing* 情), while Ki was more truthful to Zhu Xi's guarded appraisal of the moral contribution of

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55 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:143.

56 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:96.

57 *Tianming tushuo* 天命圖說, cited in Liu Zhenwei, "Lun hanru lituixi dui chuantong ruxue renxinglun de quanshi," 75.

both the four sprouts and the seven emotions. Yi's full embrace of the moral worth of the four sprouts reflects Mengzi's moral sentimentalism more, while Ki's emphasis on the importance of norm and standard better captures Zhu Xi's ethical rationalism. On account of his own intellectualist bent, Zhu Xi's exposition of Mengzi's doctrine may not have reflected Mengzi's true spirit of moral sentimentalism, and in Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung's Four-Seven debate, we see that one could be true to Zhu Xi's moral psychology without being true to that of Mengzi, and vice versa.[58]

In the final section, we shall turn to the assessment of the two views in the context of contemporary moral discourse on evil, to see which view, albeit their similarities in many respects, could proffer us a more accurate analysis of the root of evil and the means to combat it.

## 4. A Contemporary Assessment of the Four-Seven Debate

Even though the Four-Seven debate touches on the ontological issues of principle and *qi* as well as the constitution of human nature, ultimately the debate concerns the foundation of human morality and the root of human evil. However, neither Yi Hwang nor Ki Dae-seung actually provided us with a credible explanation for the emergence of evil. Both Yi and Ki seemed to have used "not good" and "evil" interchangeably. They both agreed that the seven emotions could be released in an unjustified manner (not in due measure), and their debate focused on whether the four sprouts could also be in the form of "not good" or "evil." The conflation of "not good" and "evil" lies at the bottom of their entangled debate, and the fault may have derived from Zhu Xi's interpretation of "evil." Ki Dae-seung cited

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[58] Lin Yuehui pointed out that Zhu Xi's view on the four sprouts might not have been truly compatible with that of Mengzi, because while Mengzi advocated the supreme innate goodness of human nature, Zhu Xi placed both the four sprouts and the seven emotions on the level of *qi*, which is "below the form *xingerxia*" (Lin, "Zhonghan ruxue de qing: yi zhuzi yu lituixi weili," 98). In her view, this incompatibility reveals the theoretical predicament of Zhu Xi's theory of human nature and emotion. She thinks this also leads to the indeterminacy of the goodness of the four sprouts in Yi Hwang's moral psychology (Lin, "Zhonghan ruxue de qing: yi zhuzi yu lituixi weili," 100). At the same time, Yang Cho-Hon also pointed out that Zhu Xi and Mengzi advocated distinct philosophical systems, and Yi Hwang's view had a greater affinity with that of Mengzi than that of Zhu Xi (Yang, *Cong dangdai ruxue guandian kan hanguo ruxue de zhongyao lunzheng*, 103; 164). He criticized Ki Dae-seung's view of the four sprouts as having betrayed Mengzi's original intent of the pure goodness of human nature (Yang, *Cong dangdai ruxue guandian kan hanguo ruxue de zhongyao lunzheng*, 149).

Zhu Xi's remark that "evil is simply not being able to be good."[59] The implicit conception of evil is that evil is not real; it is merely the absence of good. However, we cannot simply take this easy way out. Evil is a real phenomenon that demands our attention. Evil is a fact of the human world; it originates in humans' minds and deeds but becomes a human fact in social contexts. Allen Wittenborn explains evil as a social phenomenon, not just an individual's mental state of having imbalanced emotions:

> The problem of good and evil becomes real only when one's moral life has begun, when in a one-on-one relationship one has to deal with a physical nature which is unbalanced, and which therefore causes one to deviate from the mean and which puts one in the position of isolation, discrimination and opposition, thus setting oneself against another individual.[60]

Therefore, "While evil or evil desires or thoughts may be seated in the mind, it only becomes an issue to contend within a social situation."[61] However, in Zhu Xi's moral psychology an acknowledgement of the social nature of evil seems to be missing. We have seen that Zhu Xi attributes the root of evil to the individual's imbalanced and unregulated feelings and emotions. Nevertheless, human sentiments and emotions by birth do not lead to evil (*er* 惡). At most, they can be seen as "not good" (*bushan* 不善), but there is a huge leap from "not good" to "evil." Even if one could defend these philosophers by claiming that the Chinese word "*er*" should only be rendered as "bad," which bears a similar connotation to that of "not good," *it remains a human fact that there is evil*. If Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung accepted and defended Mengzi's teaching that human nature is basically good, then how do they explain the presence of human evil throughout human history? Could human evil possibly be derived from either the four spouts or the seven emotions? Or, is there another source? Furthermore, since both Yi Hwang and Ki Dae-seung embraced Mengzi's conviction that the foundation of human morality lies in the moral fact of our having the four sprouts, they must also answer this question: how could we employ the four sprouts to defeat human evil?

Philip G. Zimbardo, the psychologist who designed the notorious *Stanford Prison Experiment*, defines 'evil' this way: "Evil consists in

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59 Yi, *Jeongbon toegye jeonseo*, 3:90.

60 Wittenborn, "Some Aspects of Mind and the Problem of Knowledge in Chu Hsi's Philosophy," 28.

61 Wittenborn, "Some Aspects of Mind and the Problem of Knowledge in Chu Hsi's Philosophy," 28.

intentionally behaving in ways that harm, abuse, demean, dehumanize, or destroy innocent others—or using one's authority and systemic power to encourage or permit others to do so on your behalf."[62] In the past hundred years, we have witnessed evil not merely as the result of institutional practices, but more often as the acts of free-willed individuals. These individuals were not born psychologically deviant or morally depraved. In other words, they were not demons at birth and most likely possessed the four moral sprouts; they were quite normal human beings, *just like us*. However, under certain circumstances such as war, social unrest and authoritarian regimes, these "normal people" turned into psychopathic mass murderers, executioners, torturers, assassins, rapists, and sadistic voyeurs in a very short time. Neighbors turned against one another, sons and daughters betrayed their parents, and students abused or tortured their teachers. To a shocking extent, some people came up with the most debased forms of treatment for fellow human beings, performing the cruelest acts completely below human decency and beyond human comprehension. We have seen this kind of character transformation in the Holocaust, in the Rape of Nanking, in the ethnic cleansing and rapes of the Tutsi by the Hutu people in Rwanda, in the Turks' massacre of Armenians, in the Bosnian genocide, in China's Cultural Revolution, and recently in the scandalous events of the American Abu Ghraib prison. To claim that these evil deeds were simply the result of "imbalanced and unregulated emotion" is trivializing the undeniable presence of human evil. To reinforce his doctrine of the universality of the feeling of commiseration, Mengzi made the following sweeping claim: "All men have the mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others" (*ren jie you buren ren zhi xin* 人皆有不忍人之心).[63] However, we must turn to psychologists for a more realistic account of human behavior and character transformation in adverse situations. If individuals were born with this sense of commiseration, then why would they lose it completely in certain social contexts? We need to understand the situations in which these acts of atrocity took place and investigate the causal connections between the individual and the society that surrounds him or her.[64]

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62 Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, 5.

63 *The Mengzi* 孟子 2A:6; Chan, *A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy*, 65, emphasis added.

64 As Zimbardo says, "Abstract knowledge of the situation, even when detailed, does not capture the affective tone of the place, its nonverbal features, its emergent norms, or the ego involvement and arousal of being a participant." Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, 322.

In his book *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, Zimbardo analyzes the key factors that turn ordinary good people into evil ones: conformity, obedience, deindividuation, dehumanization, moral disengagement, along with the evil of inaction.[65] Among these mental ills, *dehumanization of others* is at the root of the individual's moral disengagement, lack of empathy, and barbaric conduct. As Zimbardo puts it, "Dehumanization occurs whenever some human beings consider other human beings to be excluded from the moral order of being a human person. . . . By identifying certain individuals or groups as being *outside the sphere of humanity*, dehumanizing agents suspend the morality that might typically govern reasoned actions toward their fellows."[66] The evildoers in those situations did not believe they were doing anything wrong; on the contrary, some of them felt that they were fulfilling their moral duties to wipe out those dehumanized others, just as we would not hesitate to kill a rat or a cockroach. Once individuals stop viewing others as fellow human beings, they enter into the moral disengagement mode and stop caring about how others suffer from their acts. Even in contemporary psychological experiments, studies have found that when a subject group is given a dehumanizing labeling, participants tend to give out more severe punishments, such as higher intensity electric shocks (of course, no one was really shocked). In contrast, those labeled "nice people" are harmed the least. Zimbardo says, "There is an important message about the power of words, labels, rhetoric, and stereotyped labeling, to be used for good or evil."[67] This observation shows how individuals' mindsets and conduct are influenced and even negatively transformed by their social surroundings. Furthermore, such social influences begin by affecting individuals' judgment through words and images, thereby altering their sentiments as well.

On the level of society, dehumanization is typically the result of national media propaganda. Zimbardo describes the powerful influences of a massive bombardment of words and images: national media propaganda "induces a fear of vulnerability among citizens who can imagine what it would be like to be dominated by that enemy. That fear becomes morphed into hatred and a willingness to take hostile action to reduce its threat. It extends its reaches into a willingness to send our children to die or be

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[65] Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, 21.

[66] Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, 307, emphasis added.

[67] Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, 309.

maimed in battle against that threatening enemy."[68] This intensely felt emotion of fear and the accompanying hostility could be the basis for human evil; however, it seems to originate from the external environment; in particular, social conditioning resulting from the brainwashing effect of mass propaganda. We cannot fault either our four sprouts or our seven emotions for giving rise to such negative emotions as hatred, contempt, hostility, and aggression. What these emotions demonstrate is actually the absence of the four sprouts: a sense of apathy toward others' suffering, the loss of societal propriety, the lack of the sense of righteousness, and a distorted sense of right and wrong. In other words, it is not what we possess within us by birth—our four sprouts and our seven emotions; it is rather what we do not preserve, that leads to human evil. The emergence of evil cannot be blamed on human sentiment and emotion.

If true evil results from social conditioning and situational pressures, then how do individuals resist the temptation of evil? Could regulating one's emotions to always be "in due measure" possibly help one resist negative societal pressures? I argue that even if our natural emotion is not to be blamed for the rise of evil, the grounding for our moral fiber cannot simply be the due measurement of the seven emotions. The Mencian school of the goodness of human nature advocates the *a priori* grounding of human morality, because the assurance of our mental guard has to come from something bigger than our own self-regulation, our resolve, and our reason. Ki Dae-seung argues that even the four sprouts could lead to "not good"; hence, they need to be regulated and monitored by one's own mind. However, for Mengzi, the four sprouts are what make human morality possible. The possession of these innate sentiments distinguishes humans from other animals. Even if the four sprouts could be "not good", they certainly could not be the pathway to *evil*. Otherwise, the Mencian thesis of the goodness of human nature would be rebuffed or invalidated. The salient point behind Mengzi's doctrine is to advocate that there is an internal, *a priori*, and universal grounding for the possibility of human morality. This grounding has to be stable and enduring. Ki Dae-seung's placement of the four sprouts within the same category as the seven emotions turned Mengzi's view into a purely empirical claim about human emotion and human effort (the mind's regulation of all forms of emotions). In this respect, Yi Hwang better captures Mengzi's moral metaphysics in affirming the pure goodness

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[68] Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, 312.

of the four sprouts. As Lin Yuehui notes, Yi Hwang's account of the four sprouts as the manifestation of principle is an affirmation of the innate [moral] essence of human beings. There cannot be any mixture of evil in the four sprouts.[69] Of course, neither Mengzi nor Yi Hwang would claim that the four sprouts are by themselves self-sufficient and virtue-warranting. The four sprouts still need to be cultivated, but they are nevertheless pure and good. They are our inborn sense of awareness of others' sufferings, others' moral judgments, others' moral conducts, others' moral standards, others' normative practices as well as existing social etiquette, and so on and so forth. In other words, these sentiments are *moral sentiments* with an intense *social* awareness. They belong only to *social beings*.

Emotions, on the other hand, are natural and biological, and they typically involve visceral manifestations. Emotions are simply humans' natural responses to external things and objects, and on their own, they have no moral value. If unchecked, furthermore, they could lead to wrongful acts. One's love could lead to crimes of passion; one's anger could lead to revenge and murder. One's sadness could lead to self-destruction, and one's desire could bring about unlawful deeds. Generally speaking, the seven emotions belong to humans' lower-level bodily reactions which they share with other animals. Emotions are the adaptive by-products of the evolutionary process and have helped us survive by producing appropriate responses such as fight or flight, bonding or isolation, mourning or celebration, and so on and so forth, to various external stimuli. According to contemporary psychology, emotions are primarily physical reactions that can be objectively measured by the chemicals released in the blood stream, the rhythm of heart beats, facial expressions, breathing patterns, muscle tension, and other bodily signs.

In contemporary terminology, the difference between the four sprouts and the seven emotions can be compared to the distinction between feeling and emotion. According to the distinguished neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, who specialized in the study of human emotions, "Emotions play out in the theater of the body. Feelings play out in the theater of the mind."[70] Damasio explains,

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69 Lin, "Zhonghan ruxue de qing: yi zhuzi yu lituixi weili," 94.

70 Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*, 28. Damasio's demarcation of feelings and emotions is not without its critics. Some have argued against his claim that emotions are not cognitive, in that there is at least some minimal cognition of the situation required for one to experience the emotions. The subtle distinction between feelings and emotions in human psychology needs more study and reflection than can be afforded with the scope of this paper. The distinction between the four sprouts and the seven emotions, on the other hand, can be better made in the context of Confucian moral metaphysics.

"emotions are actions or movement, many of them public, visible to others as they occur in the face, in the voice, in specific behavior. . . . Feelings, on the other hand, are always hidden, like all mental images necessarily are, unseen to anyone other than their rightful owner, the most private property of the organism in whose brain they occur."[71] For emotions, Damasio also ascribes the states of *equilibrium* and *harmony* as the ideal aim for the organism.[72] However, the equilibrium he has in mind is not moral; rather, it is "the equilibrium of life functions and consequently on life regulation."[73] Damasio's understanding of equilibrium is derived from Spinoza and modern biology. He says, "Seen though the light of modern biology, the [Spinoza] system is conditioned by the presence of life; the presence of a natural tendency to preserve that life; the fact the preservation of life depends on the equilibrium of life functions and consequently on life regulation."[74] In other words, this state of equilibrium of emotions is a biological condition, conducive to the organism's survival with wellbeing. Harmony, or the harmonious state, as Damasio depicts it, is to have emotions "in harmony with the individual circumstances" and is an evaluative term.[75] He says that harmony "is the same in biological and artificial operations: ease, efficiency, rapidity, power."[76] In other words, when emotions reach the states of equilibrium and harmony, they are good in the natural sense, but not necessarily in the moral sense. We could possibly apply this understanding to the states of equilibrium (*zhong* 中) and harmony (*he* 和) in the *Zhongyong*. That is to say, the *Zhongyong* could be praising equilibrium and harmony as ideal biological states of emotions before and after arousal, and this appraisal is not necessarily a moral one.[77] A supportive reasoning for this interpretation is that the state of equilibrium, as the *Zhongyong* defines it, is before emotions are aroused. It would be a stretch to praise any moral agent for maintaining this mental state, since this state of equilibrium is before any emotion is

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71 Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*, 28.

72 Damasio's choice of *equilibrium* has nothing to do with *Zhongyong*. It is derived from Spinoza's conception. Spinoza associates joy with states of equilibrium for the organism. Damasio says, for Spinoza, "Joyous states signify optimal physiological coordination and smooth running of the operations of life. They not only are conducive to survival but to survival with well-being" (Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*, 137).

73 Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*, 174.

74 Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*, 174.

75 Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*, 56.

76 Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*, 314, note 2.

77 This interpretation would be quite controversial and revolutionary for sure. However, it might actually be a worthy approach to our study of the moral psychology in the *Zhongyong*.

aroused in the agent. That is to say, it is not through the agent's effort that he or she maintains the state of equilibrium. Morality consists of deeds and practices that go far beyond the natural equilibrium or the achieved harmony of one's own emotions.

Similar to feelings, the four sprouts are also properties of the mind, not necessarily visceral or visible to others. One's sense of commiseration could be triggered with very slight changes in facial expression, and one's sense of shame or disgust does not necessarily lead to any change in one's conduct. One's sense of reverence and deference is a solemn mental preparedness with respect to the external environment and the surrounding people, and it may or may not manifest in one's demeanor. Finally, one's sense of right and wrong is a spontaneous judgment on the moral propriety of oneself and others' actions and thoughts. None of these moral feelings necessarily involve bodily reactions or manifest behaviors, and yet they are supposed to serve as the grounding for human morality.

To see how the four sprouts and the seven emotions differ in their moral functions, we can carefully compare and contrast the following sets: the sense of commiseration versus the feeling of love; the sense of shame and disgust versus the feelings of sadness and anger; the sense of reverence and humility versus the feeling of fear, and the sense of right and wrong versus joy and anger. Our sense of commiseration is distinct from the feeling of love. Love is an intense emotion toward one's family or loved ones. The sense of commiseration, on the other hand, is not restricted to one's biological kinship. This sentiment and the emotion of love both involve the agitation of the mind and the urge to bestow care and concern for others; however, the two have different origins. Love originates in the biologically based parental feelings towards the child or the tender emotions among siblings. The sense of commiseration, on the other hand, is based on a universal, innate endowment from Heaven. Only the sentiment of commiseration can be the "sprout" of the virtue of humaneness. The altruistic act that manifests the virtue of humaneness must be motivated by our innate sentiment of commiseration for the sufferings of those who are not biologically related to us.

The sentiment of shame and disgust includes both a sense of shame for one's own wrongdoing (action) or one's failure to do the right thing (inaction), and a sense of disgust for others' wrongdoing. They essentially involve implicit moral judgments that are based on one's moral standards. The sentiment of shame is closely associated with the agent's sense of self-worth. One would not want to *debase* oneself by doing what one

considers a shameful act. Therefore, the sense of shame can serve as the "sprout" of moral integrity which Mengzi called "righteousness" (*yi* 義). It is the motivational foundation for our righteous acts. The sense of disgust should be separated from an impulsive physical reaction that is associated with hygiene or aesthetics. It is in particular a form of moral disgust, which can be interpreted as an emotionally charged attitude of "disapproval" upon seeing another's wrongdoing or inappropriate suggestion. In the *Mengzi*, the sense of shame and the sense of moral disgust are conjoined as one unified sentiment.[78] This sentiment cannot be conflated with the emotions of sadness or anger, even if shame could arouse sadness, and disgust could be accompanied by anger. Sadness and anger on their own are not morally charged, since they do not involve any moral judgment.

The sentiment of reverence and deference includes a sense of observance of the social context in which one finds oneself, as well as a sense of respect for others and deference in one's attitude towards those with expertise or authority. Mengzi thinks that this sentiment is the foundation for propriety (*li* 禮). Because of our sentiment of reverence and deference, we would aim to act appropriately in different contexts and towards different objects. Therefore, this sentiment is the motivational foundation for our acts of propriety. The emotion of fear, on the other hand, originates in our survival instinct. As Damasio argues, emotions such as fear serve a "regulatory" function in the agent's body in the face of environmental threats or opportunities, and they are sometimes accompanied by physiological reactions within the organism, such as the amount of certain chemical molecules, body temperatures, sources of energy and the repair of bodily tissues, etc. These emotions "aim directly at life regulation by starving off dangers or helping the organism take advantage of an opportunity, or indirectly by facilitating social relations."[79] In other words, the emotion of fear is part of the biological package that came with survival and adaptation.

Zhu Xi sometimes does identify reverence with awe (*wei* 畏),[80] which is often used in connection with the feeling of fear (*ju* 懼). Awe can inspire

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[78] According to Zhu Xi's commentary, shame arises from the self-criticism of one's own immorality, while moral disgust has others' immorality as the target. What an individual feels a strong shame for in her own conduct and what she feels indignant about in others' doing often go hand-in-hand.

[79] Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*, 39.

[80] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:372.

appropriate conduct, as for example, in the classic *shangshu*, the ancient king Tang says, "I am in awe of god, and I do not dare to do anything incorrect" (*yu wei shangdi bu gan bu zheng* 予畏上帝, 不敢不正).[81]

However, *awe* is typically object-oriented, and the sentiment is aroused in the object's presence. Zhu Xi's notion of reverence, on the other hand, is not object-directed; it is an inward gaze on one's body and mind with composure and concentration. Zhu Xi says, "[Reverence] is not a state of sitting alone, hearing nothing and seeing nothing, as if one were in a stupor. Rather, if one simply collects one's body and mind, be ordered and neat, without whimsical indulgence, then one is in a state of reverence."[82] Being reverent means being mindful: one is mindful of one's own intent, one's own desire, one's focal point of attention, one's extraneous thoughts or ideas, one's conduct and speech, one's demeanor and even one's attire, etc. If one is constantly in a reverent mental state, then one should be fully self-aware and self-monitored. We may even say that Zhu Xi's notion of reverence is being reverent of how one should conduct oneself. Therefore, the feeling of reverence and deference is surely a property of the mind, in contrast to the emotion of fear, which is a property of the body as a biological organism.

Finally, the sense of right and wrong is one's ability to perceive the difference between the two. Similar to the sentiment of shame and disgust, this sense is also innate in us, even if sometimes the judgment of right and wrong can differ from society to society. Having the ability to discern right and wrong is our natural endowment, not one which is socially conditioned or culturally constructed. The sense of right and wrong must accompany the release of our natural emotions as well. One should be joyful when it is right to be joyful; one should be angry when it is right to be angry. If our seven emotions can be regulated by our sense of right and wrong, then they would not lead to the state of "not good" since the release of emotions would all be in due measure and harmonious. At the same time, the spontaneous expression of emotion without any cognitive assessment of the context, the object, and the suitability of the expressed emotion, could not have been morally sanctioned, even if the spontaneity itself is a natural reaction. In other words, the sense of right and wrong should accompany the seven emotions, but it is not the same as the emotion of joy or anger itself.

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[81] *Shangshu* 尚書 (The Book of Documents), "Tangshi" 湯誓. Cited in Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 16:2632.

[82] Zhu, *Zhuzi quanshu*, 14:369.

Seeing that we should separate the four sprouts as abilities from the content or object of our feelings, we can conclude that Ki Dae-seung was wrong to suggest that the four sprouts could become "not good" or even "evil." They are merely our abilities to feel commiseration for others' suffering, to have a sense of shame and disgust, reverence and deference, and to discern right from wrong. What Ki depicted were the wrong judgments (of the situation or of the object/event being so judged) that may have accompanied these moral senses. The four sprouts themselves in Mengzi's moral psychology have two dimensions: the pre-judgmental and content-free ability and the post-judgment response in each given situation.[83] The sense of commiseration is a spontaneous aversion upon witnessing others' pain or suffering. From empirical studies of human psychology (Hoffman 1981; Darley and Latané 1968; Latené and Rodin 1969), we learn that genuine altruistic behavior is most often a spontaneous reaction to either others' present suffering or their impending harm. However, one could also turn off this reaction once one realizes that the victim is actually a detestable villain. The sense of shame and moral disgust is inborn, but the content of shame and the arousal of indignation is culturally grounded and developed in social contexts. For each individual in a given social context, there is a judgment-laden sense of shame and disgust aimed at the particular conduct of oneself or of others. Those judgments are not evolutionarily based and are not innate in us. For example, one could be inculcated to feel shame for remarrying long after the spouse has passed away, or be disgusted with homosexuality and bisexuality, as we have seen in certain cultures. If these sentiments cause an inappropriate arousal with the wrong targets, then it is the social atmosphere that is to be blamed, not our innate capacity to feel shame and disgust. The same goes for our sense of reverence and deference. Some social practices are not worthy of our reverence and deference, such as the ostracism and persecution of Jews during the Nazi regime. However, if we had not had this sense, then there would have been no culture, no etiquette, no rituals or ceremonies, and no social norms. This is what happens in nature within the animal kingdom. Finally, all three sentiments must be coupled with our innate sense of right and wrong. It is with this moral sense that we see the unification of sentiment and judgment.

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[83] Ni Liangkang explicates that there are two dimensions in Mengzi's sense of shame and disgust: one is biological and inborn; the other is cultural and developed. The former refers to our ability to feel shame and indignation, while the latter refers to the content of our shame and indignation (Ni, "Xiuwuzhixin yu daodeyishi de laiyuan").

Since the four sprouts have the distinct moral and social functions to play that the seven natural emotions could not muster, the mental preparation to guard against the emergence of evil must also be based on the four sprouts. The heart of commiseration may be the first step preventing individuals from imposing cruelty on others. However, when bombarded with the propaganda that is aimed to produce hostility against those others, most people are unable to generate their sense of commiseration through empathic imagination. In Zimbardo's study of how ordinary people turn evil, he found that the most important tool that the power elite often employs to turn citizens of one society into staunch enemies of the citizens of another society is to arouse in them a "hostile imagination"—"a psychological construction embedded deeply in their minds by propaganda that transforms those others into 'The Enemy.'"[84] Empathy begins with self-identification with the other. If one is already imagining the other as a lesser creature, one is *not* going to be willing, or able, to engage in empathic imagination of the pain and suffering that one is about to inflict on those others.

The sense of shame and disgust, on the other hand, may be our most important mental guard against the rise of evil. According to Mengzi, for any person, there is always something that he or she would not do even in the face of death. Although we may make different moral assessments of what is acceptable and what is not, everyone has an upper limit of what he or she could tolerate and a bottom threshold of what he or she would deem acceptable.[85] The sense of shame sets the psychological boundary for what one would deem morally acceptable or morally outrageous in one's own conduct. Furthermore, a person without the sense of shame would have nothing to stop him from becoming a sensible knave in Hume's term or a Glauconian moral skeptic in Plato's *Republic*, who would consider doing any immoral deed, as long as he could get away with it without suffering any negative repercussions. It is with this sense of shame and disgust, properly cultivated, that one could build a moral defense to guard against being turned into an evil monster in hostile situations created by mass propaganda. The sense of reverence and deference, accompanied by the

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[84] Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, 11.

[85] According to Mengzi, "There are cases when a man does not take the course even if by taking it he can preserve his life, and he does not do anything even if by doing it he can avoid danger. Therefore, there is something men love more than life and there is something men hate more than death ("由是則生而有不用也; 由是則可以辟患而有不爲也. 是故, 所欲有甚於生者, 所惡有甚於死者") (*The Mengzi* 6A:10; Chan, *A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy*, 57).

emotion of fear, could easily transform one into a blind follower of the society's prevailing practices or the commands of the tyrannical regime. The sense of shame and disgust, in contrast, can be seen as one's moral compass, without which one could not be an autonomous moral agent, guided by one's own moral sense.

Even though the sense of shame and disgust is individualistic, it presumably would have no function for a lone subject. If a person were to be born in the wild with no moral guidance or peer sanctions whatsoever, then it is questionable whether this person would have a fully developed sense of shame and disgust, even if he were biologically equipped with this capacity. A prerequisite for a fully developed sense of shame and disgust is social culture. The content of the evaluative judgment cultivated alongside our innate sense of shame and disgust has to be socially developed—whether by intentional education or through unintentional immersion. In Chen Shaoming's 陳少明 analysis of the phenomenology of shame, he points out the social dimension of the sense of shame: "Shame is not just an individual emotional feeling. Both the conditions that elicit it (presence of others) and the consequences it leads to (causing disgrace to friends and family) show that shame includes emotional relations that are difficult to separate from the self and others. Theoretically speaking, the more a particular culture stresses interpersonal relations, the stronger is this shame awareness."[86] This analysis supports the view that the four sprouts require the proper social environment to foster and to mode in the right direction, and shame is a perfect example of the social dimension of moral sentiments.

When social sanctions on individuals' wrongdoings evaporate, the moral decline of ordinary good people to extraordinary evil ones could be quite rapid. One reason is that people lose their sense of shame. Zimbardo describes the powerful causal influences of anonymity on the act of a grave crime. He observed that anonymity can induce "antisocial effects" when "people felt no one could identify them" in a setting that encouraged aggression.[87] Anonymity has such an effect exactly because it mitigates people's fear of being shamed and invoking disgust. According to Chen Shaoming,

> Anonymity is like a masquerade ball where faces are covered. Under the situation of mutual anonymity, many taboos may be broken, and language

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[86] Chen, "A Phenomenological Analysis of Shame," 58.

[87] Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, 24.

> that people would be ashamed to use face-to-face can be freely let out without caring about face. This is because nobody knows who the speaker is and disrepute is linked to a false name and unrelated to any real identity, and hence the speaker will not be disrespected or punished because of this.[88]

The spread of evil in situations where social order has been disrupted is largely due to the lack of accountability for individuals' actions. When people are hidden behind the mask of anonymity, their sense of shame is relaxed because they believe no one would know who they are, and they end up discarding any inhibition against evil acts that was present under a normal social climate. This shows how important it is to maintain a sound society for the making of the individual person.

Equipped with the innate ability to feel shame and disgust, we are prone to respond to the external influences and evaluative judgments of our social environment. One of the goals of Mengzi's moral sentimentalism is to build a moral society in which individuals are cultivated to feel ashamed of and be indignant about what would be considered as morally blameworthy. In other words, our sense of shame and disgust is socially amenable, and it is up to society to define the appropriate set of situations or conduct that should arouse this sentiment in us. I propose that the moral guidance of individual righteousness should be modeled after Confucius' teaching of the virtue of reciprocity (*shu* 恕): "Do not impose on others what you would not have wanted done onto yourself" (*jisuo buyu wushi yuren* 己所不欲, 勿施於人)—the so-called Confucian Golden Rule. This maxim can serve as the foundation for individuals' self-monitoring, which is required to establish social justice. If people had truly considered every human being as existing within the category of our fellow beings and treated everyone with the principle of reciprocity, then the kind of atrocious acts described earlier would not have happened. Lynndie England, the notorious female US Army Reserve solder who was known for her proud smiling picture against tortured and humiliated prisoners at Abu Ghraib, would not have maintained her conviction that she did nothing wrong. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, a female Minister for Family Welfare and the Advancement of Women during the time of the conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, would not have incited troops to rape women before killing them. We need to establish a social culture in which Confucius' principle of reciprocity is ingrained in everyone's mind, such that any violation would incur the sense of shame and disgust in the individual.

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[88] Chen, "A Phenomenological Analysis of Shame," 56.

Even though the sense of shame is individual and private, the conditions that arouse shame are socially conditioned. Bernard Williams calls the locus of genuine social expectations "the internalized other," who represents the social standards by which one evaluates one's own conduct or attitude.[89] As long as the social expectations are the right sort of moral expectations, the sense of shame could lead one to "attempts to reconstruct or improve oneself."[90] The sense of shame and disgust must be coupled with the sense of right and wrong, however. In order for humankind to avoid repeating the atrocious ethnic cleansing seen in the last century, we need to advocate for the social climate that begins with the humanistic imagination of all human beings as one unity under the sky. One must recognize it as right that justice is fairness to all. Individual righteousness manifests itself in the acknowledgement of others' humanistic attributes and a respect for their human dignity. National propaganda that underscores the distinction between us and them, that treats immigrants as unwelcome outsiders, that distinguishes physical attributes among races, that marks groups apart on the basis of ethnicity or historical background, and so on and so forth, are all the pathway to the banality of evil. We as moral agents must recognize the moral assets we possess in our minds: the sense of right and wrong, which is the basis for individual moral judgment. If we cultivate the sprout of righteousness and the sprout of wisdom in our minds, then everyone will treat others as lawful citizens in human society, entitled to fair treatment as a fellow human being and able to be included under the Confucian principle of reciprocity (*shu* 恕). This moral vision is how we could possibly curtail the banality of evil.

## 5. Conclusion

This paper begins with the comparative study of Yi Hwang's and Ki Dae-seung's views on the roles of moral sentiments and natural emotions and ends with the application of the four sprouts; in particular, the sense of shame and disgust as well as the sense of right and wrong, to the problem of combating evil in the contemporary world. The main contention between Yi and Ki was whether the four sprouts and the seven emotions are qualitatively different. This paper's conclusion is that the four sprouts and the seven

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[89] Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 84.
[90] Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 90.

emotions should be viewed as qualitatively distinct, both as a correct rendition of Mengzi's theory of human nature, and as an accurate moral psychology of human feelings and emotions. The four sprouts must work in conjunction with one another, so that our sense of commiseration is accompanied by our sense of shame and disgust, and our sense of reverence and deference is supervised by our sense of right and wrong, and so on. These innate capacities are the foundation of human morality, in that they encompass both the social dimension and the individualistic dimension. The seven natural emotions typically arise with little conscious control, but they have greater causal efficacy for action than the innate capacities of the four sprouts. Therefore, moral sentiments need to rely on natural emotions to motivate actions, whereas natural emotions need to be coupled with our moral sentiments to be regulated with self-awareness and sensibility towards others' emotions or needs. Recognizing the different moral functions of the four sprouts and the seven emotions can enable us to come up with an empirically feasible social moral program to cultivate good and to combat evil.

Traditional Korean scholars would likely contest that the present analysis did not do justice to the four-seven debate, since the debate was not based on the concern for human psychology from an empirical perspective. However, there is now a rising demand for contemporary moral theories to be empirically informed and to offer feasible moral guidelines. Purely metaphysical discourse on the nature and the origin of human morality can no longer sustain contemporary interest and be a viable research agenda. If we wish to continue the debate on whether there are indeed innate moral sentiments that are distinct from natural emotions, and whether one or the other could possibly be viewed as the root of evil, then we need to make the debate relevant to today's problems of human evil.

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# 四七之辯與惡之根的現代意義
## ——對李混与奇大升之道德心理學的比較研究

劉 紀 璐

**中文摘要**

本文以當代心理學的角度對李滉(1501-1570)與奇大升(1527-1572)著名的四七之辯從事比較研究。文章的目的是將這個歷史淵源長久的性情善惡之辯論帶入當代的道德關懷。儘管歷史上的兩位韓儒本人沒有作道德心理學這方面的研究，而且他們的辯論也不是針對人類道德的現實性提出解決方案，我們仍然可以從當代的視域,透過現代的心理學分析，對四七之辯有新一層的理解。本文的現代詮釋同時也顯現出古今道德理論的不同關懷與走向：傳統的道德定義關乎個人，是內觀式的，是精神上的道德潔淨；而現代的道德定義關乎社會，是外觀式的，著重于行爲與成效。

**關鍵詞：**李滉，奇大升，朱熹，四端，七情，四七之辯，惡

# “The golden rule of our Saviour. . . had been inculcated by Confucius, almost in the same words, four centuries before”: The Clash of the Christian and Confucian Golden Rules in 17th- to 19th-Century England

LEE Junghwan

## Abstract

On what grounds did the terse precept in the *New Testament* rise to the “golden” rule in the sense of the supreme and universal moral principle in 17th-century England? What kind of impact did the discovery of its Confucian counterpart, *shu* 恕,—more specifically, the awareness of the fact that “the golden rule of our Saviour. . . had been inculcated by Confucius, almost in the same words, four centuries before,”—bring to the European Christian societies, and how did they respond to it?

The present study is to answer these questions by exploring the European history of the golden rule, especially, that of England, from its initial rise in the 17th century to the frustrations, controversies, and divisions that the discovery of its Confucian counterpart brought about in the 19th century, when the English commercial and missionary activities in China also sharply escalated. It argues that whereas the initial springboard for the rise of the golden rule consisted of its all-encompassing, universal nature, its authority and validity was significantly undermined, partially, by the challenge of modern philosophy and, partially, by the recognition of the precedency of Confucius’ formulations. Consequently, upon entering the 19th century, the dominant focus of discussion shifted from universality and supremacy on the grounds of the theory of the natural law to discrimination and superiority out of sectarian concerns. Additionally, a fresh light is thrown on

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* LEE Junghwan is an associate professor in the Department of Aesthetics at Seoul National University (leejunghw@snu.ac.kr).

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the Christian missionary motives underlying the monumental works of James Legge, including his opinions on Confucianism. A plausible explanation is also provided for how his views on the Confucian golden rule contributed to alleviating the perplexity of the Christian societies of the time through, allegedly, proving the superiority of the Christian golden rule over its Confucian counterpart and thus defending the exclusive authority of Christianity.

**Keywords:** the golden rule, *shu* 恕, universality, superiority, Christianity, Confucianism, James Legge

## 1. Introduction

In early 17th-century England, the precept "all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them" in *Matthew* 7.12 as well as *Luke* 6.31 arose as a supreme and universal moral principle. Before long, in the mid-17th century, this terse precept was bestowed the splendid titles of "the royal law" and "the golden rule." Almost simultaneously in 1658, if not earlier, the West first recognized the parallelism between the Christian golden rule and the Confucian concept of *shu* 恕 (the Confucian golden rule). This discovery has gradually and eventually developed into an understanding of the cross—cultural and cross—temporal ubiquity of the golden rule. On this basis, in 1993, the Parliament of the World's Religions identified the golden rule as "the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for families and communities, for races, nations, and religions."[1]

Across the temporal gap between the 17th and 20th centuries, the main features of the golden rule that attracted special attention were its supremacy as a moral principle and its universality beyond the bounds of time and space. In the meantime, nonetheless, the history of the golden rule did not progress in a unilateral direction. Particularly, as European commercial and missionary activities in China led to the gradual increase of knowledge about Confucianism, an awareness of the parallelism between the Confucian and Christian golden rules, more specifically, the irrefutable fact that "the golden rule of our Saviour. . . had been inculcated by Confucius, almost in the same words, four centuries before,"[2] swirled European Christian society, especially in England, into frustrations, controversies, and divisions, which they had to deal with to defend the exclusive authority of Christianity. The monumental works of James Legge (1815-1897) were also born out of such desperate need. In this regard, the objective of the present study is to trace the history of the golden rule mainly from 17th- to 19th-century England, with a special focus on the changes in the understanding of the golden rule in correlation with the introduction of its Confucian counterpart to the West.

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[1] Parliament of the World's Religions, "The Declaration toward a Global Ethics," 2-3 and 7.
[2] Thornton, "The Life, Times, and Doctrines of Confucius," 376.

## 2. The Peaceful Encounter between the Christian and Confucian Golden Rules in the 17th Century

During the period from Stoicism to the Reformation, the precept "all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them" (*Matthew* 7.12), in conjunction with "as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise" (*Luke* 6.31), was consistently coupled with the idea of the Law of Nature. It thus provided leading theologians like Augustine (354-430), Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225-1274), and Martin Luther (1483-1546) with a fundamental ground for integrating religious and philosophical ethics.[3]

The history of the precept, however, entered into a completely new phase during the period from the late 16th century through the 17th century. Two routes of exploration occurred in parallel without noticeable conflicts. In 17th-century England, unlike the previous general emphases, the terse precept emerged as the most universal and generalizable moral principle of Christianity. As British theologians elevated it to the status of the single supreme principle in both religious and secular dimensions, this precept was bestowed with the superlative titles of "the royal law" and "the golden rule." Simultaneously, escalated attention to this rule led the West to discover its counterparts elsewhere than in Christian texts such as the *Old Testament*. Particularly, as the religious and intellectual interactions between the West and China gradually increased, mostly as the result of the activities of missionaries to China, the Confucian classics also began to be introduced to the West, which led them to eventually recognize that Confucius formulated an equivalent to the Christian golden rule centuries before Jesus. During this period, intriguingly, its elevation as the supreme principle in Christianity was hardly impeded by the discovery of its counterparts among "the heathens." Rather, proponents of the golden rule took advantage of this discovery to support the claim for the universality of the golden rule, while critics cast doubt, instead, on the validity of the natural law as the foundation for claiming the genuine universality of the golden rule.

### 2.1. Constructing the Golden Rule in 17th-Century England

"The golden rule" was not so 'golden' at the initial stage of its emergence in post-Reformation England. In late 16th-century England, the terse precept

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[3] Wattles, *The Golden Rule*, 68-76.

in *Matthew* 7.12 began to be incorporated into the incipient reconstruction of secular Christian ethics. In his *A Catechisme, or Christian Doctrine*, published originally in 1567 and republished several times until the late 19th century, Laurence Vaux (1519-1585) provided readers with Christian lessons in the catechistical format. In the chapter for "instruct[ing] children and ignorant people," he summarized the Ten Commandments into two categories. Three commandments "in the first table" were related to the worship of God. The other seven "in the second table" were associated with secular moral rules, "which command us to give reverence and honor to every man in his degree, to profit all, and hurt none." In so doing, he encapsulated the second-table commandments into the precept "to do onto others, as we would be done to ourselves."[4] The fact that Vaux linked this aphorism to the lower-level instructions for "children and ignorant people" suggests the humble origins of the golden rule.

In early 17th-century England, the precept emerged as the aphorism of the supreme religious and moral principle, thus gaining the title "golden rule." According to Harry J. Gensler, Charles Gibbon is the first author who called the precept "the golden rule" in 1604, and "at least 10 additional British authors before 1650 used *golden rule* to refer to" the precept.[5] In the late 17th century, "the [four] seventeenth-century Englishmen"—Bishop William (active in 1679), George Boraston (active in 1683), John Goodman (1625 or 1626-1690), and Benjamin Camfield (1638-1793)—"wrote such books and gave the golden rule its name."[6] In the meantime, apart from the coinage and circulation of the title, the rise of the precept to its supreme status was truly accelerated by the influential works of Thomas Jackson (1579-1640), the preaches of Mathew Hale (1609-1676) and, more significantly, the controversies ignited by Thomas Hobbes' (1588-1679) *Leviathan*.

In early 17th-century England, Jackson significantly contributed to the elevation of the simple precept in *Matthew* 7.12 to the status of the supreme ethical and religious principle.[7] He did not coin or use the title "the golden

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[4] Vaux, *A Catechisme, or Christian Doctrine*, 48.

[5] Gensler, *Ethics and the Golden Rule*, 83.

[6] Wattles, *The Golden Rule*, 78 and 211n. 3.

[7] In this paper, I use *The Works of Thomas Jackson, D.D.*, published by Oxford University Press in 1844. This collection contains a series of *Commentaries upon the Apostle's Creed*, which was originally published in eleven separate books during the period between the 1610s and 1630s, as well as some treatises and sermons. Because this collection very roughly records the year and publisher of each work, I use the volume numbers and page numbers in this collection for quotation instead of adding the original title of the work and its original year of publication.

rule" but consistently called it "the royal law," "the fundamental rule," "the royal rule," and "the royalist rule" in the same sense.[8] The fact that he was an influential and prolific English theologian as well as a president of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, also greatly stimulated its establishment.

Jackson offered an in-depth interpretation of *Matthew* 7.12 in three consecutive sermons. Although the exact date of its publication is unknown,[9] his extolments of this terse precept are also detected in the other works published in the last years of his lifetime. He therein consistently promoted this precept as "the fundamental rule of justice and equity" and "the fundamental rule of our Saviour,"[10] while lamenting that "the whole Christian world" had lost "the true meaning of it," and thereby "the practices most contrary to it are so universal, and so violent."[11]

In contrast to Vaux who had confined the validity of this precept to the secular ethics ("the second table"), Jackson integrated the religious commandments ("the first table") and the secular ethics ("the second table") into this aphorism, thus substantiating its character as "the royalist rule." He focused "the First Sermon" on explicating that this terse precept encapsulates all holy commandments in the second table with regard to human relationships. At "the Second Sermon," contrastingly, he extended its applicability to all duties to God in the first table. At "the Third Sermon," he furthered the best method to put the precept into practice, mostly in line of the second table.

The two pillars that support Jackson's claim are "Nature" (or the nature law) and "Christianity." He said, "it (i.e., the royalist rule) binds us by Nature . . . gathered by natural reason," on the one hand, and "it binds us in Christianity. . . set down in holy scripture," on the other. "Christianity" refers to the commandments and the doctrine of grace recorded specifically in the *Bible*. In contrast, under the motto "*Natura est optima magistra*" (Nature is the best teacher), "Nature," which "ingrafted" "natural notions or seeds of truth and goodness" "in our souls,"[12] provided him with the grounds for

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[8] Jackson, *The Works of Thomas Jackson* 8:394 and 11:567; "The First Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 22; "The Third Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 74.

[9] Jackson, *The Works of Thomas Jackson*, 11:1 The sermons were annexed deliberately by the publisher, Barnabas Oley, to Jackson's *Ninth Book of Commentaries upon the Apostles' Creed*, which was published posthumously in 1657. The sermons were reprinted in Jackson's collected works, which were also published by Oley in 1673 and then by Oxford University Press in 1844.

[10] Jackson, *The Works of Thomas Jackson* 7:394; 10:567-568.

[11] Jackson, *The Works of Thomas Jackson* 9:157.

[12] Jackson, "The First Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 7-9.

universalizing it. In principle, therefore, each and every person is depicted as having the natural capacity for and sources to apprehend moral truths by oneself, without clinging to the predetermined particular commandments and doctrines prescribed in the *Bible*.

The universality of the royalist rule is grounded on the premise of "the actual equality of nature in all men." The law of nature is not a dormant entity that one should intentionally introspect to comprehend but an active law that dictates the patterns of our feeling and thinking. The royalist law is an articulation of the law of nature into a form of the highest-order moral principle. Therefore, it is no surprise to detect the royalist law or its equivalents in all "natural men" including "the heathen."[13]

Jackson thus conferred a supreme status on this terse precept on the grounds that this short aphorism encapsulated the sum of "the law and the prophets" presented in the *Bible*.

> Out of the practice of this principle or precept all the righteousness which the law and the prophets do teach will sooner spring, and flourish much better, than if we should turn over all the learned comments that have been written upon them, without the practice of this compendious rule.[14]

In this vein, Jackson compared "this most necessary and most worthy the practice" to 'deductive reasoning'; "all doctrines of good life, of honest and upright conversations are derived" from this terse rule.[15] In principle, he thus acknowledged that everyone is born with the capacity to derive from this precept all particular rules of action as well as specific foundations for morality and goodness. The range of particularities appears to be thus enlarged beyond the bounds of the *Bible* without venturing to defy its authority. Through "the royalist rule," he embraced both the religious way of managing one's life in accordance with the "commandments" given in the *Bible* and the secular dimension of one's life outside the *Bible*, which demanded far broader and more diverse rules of action to be adapted to ever changing circumstances. To be brief, in Jackson's scheme, the royalist rule is the principle that bridges the gap between Nature and Christianity in human ethics.

In this scheme, the royalist rule is explicitly associated with the "equality of all men" on the basis of "all things to have one Creator," thus

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[13] Jackson, "The First Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 9-10.
[14] Jackson, "The First Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 5.
[15] Jackson, "The First Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 5-6.

reconciling the royalist rule with "the precept of loving your enemy" and the doctrine of grace.[16] To do so, Jackson transformed (rather than simply interpreted) the precept into a principle of altruism, thus making it compatible with "the doctrine of grace."[17]

For the sake of comparison, especially with Legge, two points call for special attention. First, Jackson compromised equality of all with given religious and social discriminations. He limited the range of the golden rule's application to the extent that it would not undermine "the public constitutions by which they live."[18] Jackson specified the inequalities lying in diverse asymmetrical relationships such as between master and servant, prince and subject, and father and son, and connected it with disparities in dignities, powers, and duties, which were, according to him, ultimately "ordained by God." Therefore, the right practice of the royalist rule should not be extended to the degree that the principle of equality might bring about "the dissolving of order."[19] In this vein, he also disparaged an allegedly excessive emphasis on equality as something that is "tainted with" "inordinate self-love or sinful desires," which should be eliminated to practice the royalist rule in a proper manner.[20]

In addition, Jackson explicitly validated religious and nationalistic favoritism. Although the royalist rule proposes equality of all in principle, according to him, "our desire of doing good may be augmented according to particular respects of nearness, &c; as, to a Christian before a Turk, to an Englishman before another."[21] In his overview, a religious vision in association with the principle of equality is incorporated into the royalist rule, but it does not transcend or outweigh his secular concerns.

The second point that deserves special attention is that Jackson did not make a clear-cut distinction between the positive and negative formulations of the golden rule. He frequently juxtaposed the two formulations ("the affirmative precept" and "the negative precept" in his own terms) in parallelism and related the former with "doing good" to others, and the latter with "doing wrong to others." According to him, both formulations stem from the natural dispositions of "sympathy or fellow feeling of others' misery." "In nature all men are equal, all alike subject to corruption and

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16 Jackson, "The First Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 23.
17 Jackson, "The First Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 25.
18 Jackson, "The Third Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 77.
19 Jackson, "The Second Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 45-46.
20 Jackson, "The Second Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 45-48.
21 Jackson, "The Third Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 74.

calamity." Therefore, "Nature itself" guides us to have a "fear" that evil doings, which have been done to others, might be done to oneself, from which the negative precept arose in order to preclude the prevalence of such evil doings. Oppositely, but in the same vein, because all human beings are naturally inclined toward all good actions that have been done by others, they should also "be as desirous to do good to others in like case," from which the positive formulation arose.[22] In so doing, he consistently ascribed both formulations equally to the law of nature and "the law and the prophets" without asserting the superiority of one over the other.[23] He once uttered that the negative formulation is "somewhat more legible" than the positive formulation on the basis that the former was often mentioned by the heathens as well, whereas the latter was "seldom or never" mentioned by them. However, he immediately shifted emphasis to the equivalence between them within the scope of the law of nature.[24]

Slightly after Jackson, Mathew Hale (1609-1676), who became Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench in 1671, also included an in-depth discussion of the golden rule in one of his treatises, entitled "Of Doing as We Would Be Done Unto." By and large, his discussions overlapped those of Jackson. While he did not use the terms 'the royalist law' or 'the golden rule,' his approach is also based on the theory of the natural law. Additionally, his main emphasis was also on the point that the rule itself is "compendious" but the range of its applications are extraordinarily "comprehensive," embracing both the first and second tables of laws and rules.[25]

Hale's work is still noteworthy in some respects. First, he substantiated the validity of the golden rule in a highly analytical manner instead of resorting to the authority of the *Bible*. As a lawyer and judge himself, he addressed possible objections to the golden rule by dealing with a variety of cases. Second, he reconciled the apparent conflicts between "our reason" and the exercise of the golden rule within the gamut of the natural law, by identifying "our reason" in particular association with the golden rule as "a moral and rational instinct connaturally implanted in the soul," which "holds a clear, evident, plain congruity with our intellective faculty." In this vein,

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[22] Jackson, "The First Sermon (Upon *Mathew* Vii.12)," 10-12.

[23] Jackson, *The Works of Thomas Jackson* 10:241-245.

[24] Jackson, *The Works of Thomas Jackson* 10:243.

[25] Hale, "Of Doing as We Would Be Done Unto," 378-380. The date when "Of Doing as We Would Be Done Unto" was first published is unknown, but the fact that Hale did not mention anything about Hobbes suggests that it was probably written before 1651.

he described the exercise of the golden rule as something that "the soul assents to the things by a kind of immediate intuition. . . without the necessity or use of processive or inductive ratiocination." Thus, he also made the validity of the golden rule compatible even with the idea of "*rasa tabula*" (not '*tabula rasa*' in his own wording), which directly contradicts the central idea of the natural law.[26]

Hale advocated the "excellence" of the Christian golden rule over its heathen counterparts, but he hardly let Christian sectarianism interfere with his arguments. Like Jackson, he also discussed the differences between the positive and negative formulations. Unlike Jackson, however, Hale placed far greater emphasis on the "comprehensive" nature of the positive formulation, which consisted in the genuine "excellency" of the Christian golden rule. According to his analysis, the positive formulation includes the negative formulation within it and thus embraces both the principles of justice and righteousness as well as those of love, benevolence, and charity, whereas the negative formulations of "the heathens," including Jews, were limited to "the prohibitory part of this precept" and the principles of justice and righteousness.[27] When arguing for the "excellency" of the Christian golden rule on the basis of the positive-negative distinction, however, he aimed at rebuilding the morality and religiosity of Christian society internally rather than promoting Christian sectarianism against the heathens externally. Therefore, he did not utter anything more about the differences for the purpose of disparaging the heathen version of the golden rule, which, as seen below, makes a notable contrast to the attitudes of 19th-century Christian sinologists toward the Confucian golden rule.

After Hale's treatise "Of Doing as We Would Be Done Unto," this title was used to refer to the precept in *Matthew* 7.12 and *Luke* 6.31 before the neologism of "the golden rule" or "the royal law." For example, Francis Atterbury (1663-1732) preached a sermon on *Matthew* 7.12 before Queen Anne at St. James's Chappel in 1704, whose published title is *The Rule of Doing as We Would Be Done Unto*.[28]

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[26] Hale, "Of Doing as We Would Be Done Unto," 382-385. Hale did not specify whom he referred to by those who "suppose the soul to be *rasa tabula*," but note that Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* was first published in 1689, more than two decades after Hale's death.

[27] Hale, "Of Doing as We Would Be Done Unto," 379-380; 387-401.

[28] Atterbury, *The Rule of Doing as We Would Be Done Unto*. Also see Atwood, *The Rule of Doing as We Would Be Done Unto*; Mawson, *The Duty of Doing as We Would Be Done Unto*.

Arguably, it was Hobbes who triggered modern philosophical discussions about the golden rule. Similar to Jackson, he also presented it as "the law of nature," which not only meets the requirements of rationality and universality but also satisfies the ends of Christianity and commonwealth of all. Although the name "the golden rule" was coined slightly later by his contemporary Englishmen, he argued that "the laws of nature to be taken notice of by all men" (that is, justice, equity, modesty, and mercy) can be "contracted into" the negative formulation of the golden rule —" Do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself." He highlighted its terseness as "one easy sum [of the universal laws of nature], intelligible even to the meanest capacity" by further saying that one "has no more to do in learning the laws of nature but. . . to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place."[29]

Hobbes used the positive and negative formulations interchangeably. Only in the chapter "A Christian Commonwealth," did he make a distinction by calling the former "the words of our Saviour" and the latter "the law of nature."[30] Elsewhere in *Leviathan*, however, he also referred the positive formulation to "the law of nature" without any notice.[31] In line with universality and rationality, he also reformulated it into "Do not that to another which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thyself."[32]

Hobbes' reductionism immediately provoked objections. For example, Roberto Sharrock (1630-1684) attempted to disqualify the golden rule as a universal law by providing counterexamples; these included the judge-criminal case, which was proposed initially by Jackson and repeatedly quoted to test the (in)validity of the golden rule by later influential thinkers such as Samuel Pufendorf and Immanuel Kant.[33]

It seems that, on the other hand, Hobbes' reductionism also inspired 17th-century English Christian proponents of the golden rule to entitle the precept "the golden rule." At a sermon addressed at St. Lawrence Church,

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[29] Hobbes, *Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*, ch. xv.35, 99. Note that the switch of places here means equity or equivalence between the duty to others and one's self-interests in comprehending how one should treat others rather than imaginative role-reversibility in the form of "if I were in the place of others."

[30] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. xlii.11, 339.

[31] For the, Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. xvii.2, 106.

[32] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. xxvi.13, 177.

[33] Sharrock, *Hypothesis Ēthikē*, ch. 2, N. 11, 63-65. For the later quotations of the judge-criminal case, see Pufendorf, *De Jure Naturae et Gentium* (1672), 181; Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* 4:429-430.

London, in 1683, Boraston also referred to Hobbes in a critical manner, labelling him as "a most shameful instance."[34] Nonetheless, instead of discarding the precept, he organized the sermon along the lines of the arguments of Jackson in the format of a summary. The sermon was published in 1684 in London under the title *The Royal Law: or, The Golden Rule of Justice and Charity*.

The terms "the golden rule" and "the royal law" were soon adopted by John Goodman (1625 or 1626-1690) for the title of his book *The Golden Rule, or, The Royal Law of Equity Explained*, which also contributed considerably to the circulation and establishment of these terms. Like Jackson, Goodman was not disturbed by the historical fact that the precept was formulated by the heathens earlier than, and independently of, that of Jesus.[35] His overarching objective was to explain why the precept was "the golden rule" and "the royal law" "for the Improving of the State of Mankind, or for the Maintaining of Justice and Equity, Peace and Love in the World."[36] Taking the natural law as a philosophical foundation, the alleged historically-proven universality of the golden rule beyond time, space, and religion mattered to him far more than the originality or superiority of Jesus' formulation. He then turned the focus of his explications to providing a "remedy" for the previous misunderstandings, contradictions, and miscarriages of this "Common Rule."[37]

Like Jackson, Goodman also substantiated the necessity and practicability of the golden rule on the basis of the compatibility of the golden rule with the biblical idea that all human beings are equal before God. He said, "Now. . . to deal alike between those that are equal themselves, is a first principle of reason in all mankind, and therefore do deal by our neighbour as we would be dealt by our selves, is an universal and indispensable law of justice."[38] From a different angle, however, the necessities of equality and impartiality are not directly inferred from the golden rule itself or from logical reasoning but from the Christian view on humanity from the perspective of God. In a similar vein, he proceeded to further that the necessary condition for properly applying the golden rule to particular cases consists not only in the authentic knowledge of the antecedently approved lawfulness of particular moral rules, which the *Bible* provided; he also added a requirement that one should think a particular

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[34] Boraston, *The Royal Law: or, The Golden Rule of Justice and Charity*, 8.
[35] Goodman, *The Golden Rule, or, the Royal Law of Equity Explained*, 1-2.
[36] Goodman, *The Golden Rule, or, the Royal Law of Equity Explained*, 3.
[37] Goodman, *The Golden Rule, or, the Royal Law of Equity Explained*, 3-5.
[38] Goodman, *The Golden Rule, or, the Royal Law of Equity Explained*, 12-13.

"measure of that thing or action," deduced from the golden rule, to be "due and of right" by oneself, "if the case was mine," as if it were not others.[39]

On these grounds, Goodman inferred the universality of the golden rule from equality and impartiality. From a different angle, although divine and religious duties toward God are not properly inferable from the golden rule, this rule can serve as a universal law in human communities on the biblical foundation of equality of all human beings before God and the requirement of impartiality.

In the fifth and last examination concerning the bounds and limits of the golden rule, Goodman associated the golden rule with Christian ethics through his claim that this rule is designed by our Saviour as a rule of "kindness and primary obligation" instead of "retribution or requital." In this vein, he reinterpreted the golden rule into the formulation "*do that to others in the first place, which they would be glad to receive from others in the second place*."[40] Then, he linked this reinterpretation in line with "an evangelical spirit of the gospel" with the biblical commandments such as "Love our enemies" and "Be the salt of the earth, the light of the world, and the first movers in every good thing."[41]

Goodman's systematic explications show how the golden rule facilitated the great transition from the religious aspiration toward God to the formation of the secular Christian ethics in association with the biblical ideas of equity and impartiality. He simply acknowledged that the rule was not designed for a religious purpose and in this sense called it "the Second Table of the Law."[42] Like Jackson and Hale, nonetheless, his overall exploration aimed to demonstrate that the golden rule could provide a bridge to close the fundamental gap between the religious laws and secular Christian ethics.

### 2.2. The Initial Recognition of the Confucian Golden Rule

Simultaneously, but independently of the rise the golden rule, European missionaries to China began to translate the Confucian classics into Latin, which eventually led them to become aware of the existence of the Confucian version of the golden rule. Due to the universality-oriented viewpoint on the golden rule at the time, however, this discovery had the effect of reinforcing

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[39] Goodman, *The Golden Rule, or, the Royal Law of Equity Explained*, 25.
[40] Goodman, *The Golden Rule, or, the Royal Law of Equity Explained*, 34-35 (Italics his).
[41] Goodman, *The Golden Rule, or, the Royal Law of Equity Explained*, 35-36.
[42] Goodman, *The Golden Rule, or, the Royal Law of Equity Explained*, 20.

the argument for its validity as a universal moral principle rather than of undermining the authority of the Christian golden rule.

In the last years of the 16th century, Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607), an Italian Jesuit missionary to China, reportedly translated three of *Sisu* 四書 (the Four Books)—*Daxue* 大學 (the Great Learning), *Zhongyong* 中庸 (the Doctrine of the Mean) and *Lunyu* 論語 (the Analects)—into Latin, but this first European translation of the Confucian classics was neither preserved nor published.[43]

Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) quoted Confucius' *shu*—formulation twice in his *Tianzhu shiyi* 天主實義 (The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven) in order to show its consistency with the Christian doctrines.[44] Nonetheless, he did not mention its similitude with the Christian golden rule at all, never mind the differences between them. Moreover, Ricci's work, written in Chinese and published in Beijing in the year 1603, had little impact on Western discussions of the golden rule. It is reported that at the end of the 16th century, Ricci made his own Latin translation of *Sisu*, which has been lost.[45]

The probable first appearance of Confucius' *shu*-formulation in European writings is in a text by Martino Martini (1614-1661), an Italian Jesuit missionary. In his *Sinicae Historiae Decas Prima* (The First Decade of the History of China) published in 1658, he briefly discussed Confucian ethics with a high degree of respect. He quoted a Latin translation of *shu*—"*Ne facias ulli, quod pati nolis*" (Do not do to any man what you do not want to suffer)—together with the statement that the Chinese "measured the mind of others" (*qua alterins animum metimur*) by "the high virtues of justice and fidelity."[46] Although no direct reference is offered, it is highly probable that he quoted this phrase from a comment on *Matthew* 7.12 by Lactantinus (c. 250-325), a Christian Roman apologist and advisor to the first Christian Roman emperor, Constantine I.[47]

The first complete European translation of *Lunyu* appeared nearly a century after Ruggieri's first attempt. A body of Jesuit missionaries, including Phillippe Couplet (1623-1693), cooperatively translated the *Daxue*, *Zhongyong*, and *Lunyu* into Latin and published them in 1687 under the title *Confucius*

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43 Meynard, *The Jesuit Reading of Confucius*, 3-6.

44 Ricci, *Tianzhu shiyi*, bk. 2, ch. 5, 9b-10a; ch. 6, 22a.

45 Meynard, *The Jesuit Reading of Confucius*, 6-9.

46 Martini, *Sinicae Historiae Decas Prima*, 130.

47 For Lactantinus' comment, see Stanley, *The Faith and Practice of a Church of England-Man*, 115-116.

*Sinarum Philosophus* (Confucius, the Philosopher of China). One year later, in 1688, this set of works was re-translated into French under the title *La Morale de Confucius, Philosophe de la Chine* (The Moral of Confucius, Chinese Philosopher) and was circulated quickly and widely in France.[48]

It is noteworthy that, like the 17th century English advocates of the golden rule, the Jesuit translators also did not make any distinctions between the positive and negative formulations. They accordingly rendered the *shu* formulation, which Confucius himself put forward in the negative form in *Lunyu* 5.12, 12.2, and 15.24, into the negative formulations.[49] Contrastingly, they translated the word *shu* in the passage "My Way has one [thread] running through it" (*wudao yiyi guanzhi* 吾道一以貫之) in the *Lunyu* 4.15, into a positive formulation "*talem te esse erga alios, quales esse veils alios erga te*" (you should do unto others as you wish for them to do unto you), although this translation was directly associated with the negative formulation in 15.24.[50] This unintended 'mistake' suggests that no differences existed in their minds, not only between the positive and negative formulations but also between the Christian and Confucian versions of the golden rule.

This point is reaffirmed by Samuel Pufendorf's (1632-1694) *De Jure Naturae et Gentium* (Of the Law of Nature and Nations). Its 1684 second-edition includes Confucius' shu-formulation, which is not contained in its 1672 first-edition, together with the comparable passages by Hobbes, Aristotle, and Inca Manco Capace (the legendary founder of the Peruvian Empire). Pufendorf quoted the *shu* formulation from Martini's *Sinicae Historiae Decas Prima*.[51] Contrastingly, the French version of *De Jure Naturae et Gentium*, *Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens,* annotated by Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744), relocated all quotations except those of Hobbes to a footnote, but this version instead straightforwardly mentioned that "this rule is confided in the wisest of Peagans, and what is more, by our Lord, which modern authors does not generally trump it."[52] This bold remark was modified once again in the 1729 English version, which again relocated the quotations but back into the main body of the texts, and interpolated the passage "And indeed this is no other than that great rule prescribed by our

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48 Lach and Van Kley, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, 1681.

49 Meynard, *The Jesuit Reading of Confucius*, 205-206, 364-364, and 475.

50 Meynard, *The Jesuit Reading of Confucius*, 190.

51 Pufendorf, *De Jure Naturae et Gentium*(1672), 205; and also see, Pufendorf, *De Jure Naturae e*181.

52 Pufendorf, *Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens*, 1:175-176.

Saviour himself, of *Doing to Men as we would be done by*. Matthew. Vii.12" at its end.[53] Intriguingly, this passage or its equivalents did not show up in the Latin versions, which were published after the English version, although Barbeyrac's name appears on the front cover.[54]

By listing these quotations comparable to the Christian golden rule, however, Pufendorf intended to demonstrate the limits of this rule in the sense of the invalidity of the Law of Nature drawn from reason.

> [T]his rule is not universal. . . . Yet we must confess that this precept cannot be esteemed a fundamental axiom of the Law of Nature; since it is only a corollary of that Law which obliges us to *hold all Men equal with our selves*; and therefore may be demonstrated a priori.[55]

When listing the non-Christian quotations, Pufendorf did not directly connect them to the Christian golden rule by Jesus. His criticism was aimed primarily at the theory of the natural law rather than the golden rule itself. Whereas the proponents of the golden rule presented the universality of the precept as irrefutable evidence for the validity of its theoretical foundation, Pufendorf listed the quotations to show that the universality of the golden rule was not sufficient to substantiate the theory of the natural law. By also utilizing the counterexamples provided by Sharrock, he eventually drove a substantial wedge between the theory of the natural law and the golden rule.

Considering the exclusive nature of Christianity, it is an intriguing phenomenon that the discovery of the Confucian version of the golden rule did not noticeably dampen the 17th-century zeal for establishing the golden rule as the core of Christian ethics. Overall, the English advocates of the golden rule then concentrated on substantiating the terse precept in the *New Testament* as "the crowning principle of morality."[56] In so doing, they were generally open-minded to its ubiquity beyond Christianity, which, as detailed in the next section, makes a striking contrast with later 18th- and 19th-century proponents, who sought to demonstrate the originality and superiority of the formulation of "our Saviour" out of sectarian motives. On the contrary, the 17th-century advocates defended its validity through comprehensively

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53 Pufendorf, *Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens*, 1:134 with modifications.

54 For example, see its 1744 Latin version published in Germany. Pufendorf and Hertius, *De Jure Naturae et Gentium*, 1:200.

55 Pufendorf, *De Jure Naturae et Gentium* (1672), 181. For English translation, Pufendorf, *Of the Law of Nature and Nations*, 135 with modifications.

56 Wattles, *The Golden Rule*, 78.

addressing diverse objections. It is highly probable that the carefully selected counterexamples listed in the works of Goodman and Hale were the byproducts of intensive controversies at the time, which, as seen in the criticism of Sharrock, were triggered by Hobbes' incorporation of it into his provocative work.

For the sake of comparison, it is particularly noteworthy that they paid less attention to the differences between the positive and negative formulations than 19th-century proponents would do, which James Legge particularly highlighted to argue for the superiority of the Christian formulation over its Confucian counterpart. Instead, they extracted from the *Bible* both the positive and negative rules. In this vein, for example, Goodman plainly stated, "My obligation from this rule principally lies in this, that I both do, or refrain from doing (respectively) toward him, all that which (turning the tables, and then consulting my own heart and conscience) I should think that neighbor of mine *bound* to do, or to refrain from doing towards me in the like case."[57] Thus, they focused on the universality and comprehensive applicability of this "compendious" precept, thus naming it "the golden rule" and "the royal law." Note that the negative formulation instead of the positive one is found in early post-biblical Christian writings of the first and second centuries like *Didache* (The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles) and *Apology of Aristides*, testifying to its practical importance in the early Christian Church of the second th century.[58]

## 3. From Universality to Superiority: the 19th Century

The 17th-century concurrence of the establishment of the golden rule with the discovery of its Confucian counterpart eventually led to an inevitable conflict in the 19th century. The conflict occurred at the end of the 18th th century, intensified during the early 19th century, and culminated in the mid-19th century, when James Legge published his English translations of the Confucian Classics. In this and subsequent Sinologist works, Legge wished to end the parallelism thus far established between the Confucian and Christian golden rules by systematically demonstrating the superiority

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[57] Goodman, *The Golden Rule*, *or*, *The Royal Law of Equity Explained*, 26.
[58] Spooner, "Golden Rule," 311.

of the golden rule of Jesus over its Confucian counterpart. Prior to Legge, however, Sinologists and Christian theologians were divided in dealing with the irrefutable fact that "the golden rule of our Saviour, . . . had been inculcated by Confucius, almost in the same words, four centuries before."

From Pufendorf onward, critical re-examinations of the golden rule were undertaken by modern philosophers like John Locke (1632-1704), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), thus bringing into focus the limitations of the golden rule as a moral principle as well as bringing into question the centuries-long bond between this rule and the natural law.[59] For example, Locke argued that the mind is originally "a blank slate," in stark opposition to the theory of the natural law. From a different angle, the fact that the golden rule attracted attention from the most prominent philosophers then also attested to the firm establishment of its position in the institutional, political, and social realms at that time. In early 18th-century England, for example, the golden rule was extensively utilized in the political realm to resist against the tyrannical oppressions of the British church and the British political system.[60]

Entering the 19th century, contrastingly, sectarian concerns quickly eclipsed philosophical inquiries. The ubiquity of the golden rule, which had been employed to support its legitimacy in the 17th century, surfaced as, arguably, the most critical issue. Especially, the indisputable fact that Confucius had formulated the golden rule centuries before "our Saviour" turned into a perplexing problem that Christian Sinologists and missionaries to China had to deal with, in order to defend the superiority and originality of Christianity. Rather than forming a consensus, however, they were widely divided on this problem, which was closely correlated with their views on, or attitudes toward, Confucianism as well as their characterization of the Chinese and the Chinese civilization in general. This perplexity and division continued until the mid-19th century, when Legge proposed a systematic, comprehensive, but sectarian solution from the Christian standpoint.

In 1809, Joshua Marshman (1768-1837), a British Christian missionary, published an English translation of the first half of the *Lunyu* together with Zhu Xi's commentary. Concerning the *Lunyu* 4.15, he rendered *zhong* into "affection" and *shu* into "benevolence." At an attached "comment," he introduced Cheng Hao's definition of *shu* as "*tui ji ji wu*" 推己及物, which

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[59] For this, see Wattles, *The Golden Rule*, 81-89; Gensler, *Ethics and the Golden Rule*, 84-87.
[60] For example, see Gordon, *The Independent Whig*. Vol 3.

was translated into "a desire to seek the good of others equally with one's own."[61] In the same vein, concerning Zigong's self-made claim to the *shu* practice and Confucius' rebuttal in the *Lunyu* 5.12, he contrasted "to act towards others as we wish them to act towards us, is complete virtue" with "to restrain ourselves from doing that to others which we dislike ourselves, is a degree of virtue."[62] Rather than making a formal distinction between the positive and negative formulations, however, he simply translated the comments of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi in this manner, in which they expounded "the difference between ren and *shu*" (*ren shu zhi bie* 仁恕之別). Nor did Marshman allude to the parallelism between the Confucian and Christian versions of the golden rule.

In 1828, David Collie (?-1828), a British Christian missionary, presented the first complete European translation of *Sisu*, published in English with his extensive notes. Unlike Marshman's generally neutral stance, his work was strongly motivated by his sectarian interests, as is evident in his remark "In the whole compass of his writings, there does not appear to us to be a single idea above the reach of any plain man at all accustomed to reflection."[63] Concerning *zhong-shu* in the *Zhongyong* and *Lunyu* 4.15, he translated the words into "faithfulness and benevolence."[64] Whereas he was consistent in translating *shu* formulation in the *Lunyu* into the negative formulation, he interpreted *shu* in a note to the *Lunyu* 4.15 into a positive formulation as well—"to do to others as we wish them to do to us, is benevolence,"[65] which strongly suggests his awareness of the parallelism between Confucius and Christ on the golden rule.

Nonetheless, Collie did not utter the term "the golden rule" at all, to say nothing of the parallelism. On the other hand, he added the following note to the *Lunyu* 14.34.

> How different is this from the mild precept of the Prince of peace. "Love your enemies, do good to them who hate you, and pray for them who despitefully use you and persecute you." Reader judge for yourself, whether the dictates of the Chinese sage, or the commandment of the Divine Saviour, appears most like the doctrine of the God of love.[66]

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61 Marshman, *The Works of Confucius*, 238-239.
62 Marshman, *The Works of Confucius*, 292-293.
63 Collie, *The Chinese Classical Work Commonly Called the Four Books*, xii.
64 Collie, *The Chinese Classical Work Commonly Called the Four Books*, 9 and 14.
65 Collie, *The Chinese Classical Work Commonly Called the Four Books*, 14.
66 Collie, *The Chinese Classical Work Commonly Called the Four Books*, 70.

While avoiding a direct comparison between the Confucian and Christian golden rules, Collie herein called attention to the superiority of Christianity over Confucianism in terms of "the doctrine of the God of love." The original question "what may be said of rewarding hatred by kindness" (*yi de bao yuan* 以德報怨) in the *Lunyu* 14.34 is certainly reminiscent of Jesus' commandment of "love your enemies." As seen above, one of the central issues for the earlier advocates of the golden rule was how to resolve the logical and practical conflicts between the golden rule and the "love-your-enemies" commandment in the *New Testament*. Note that Confucius's answer "Reward bad treatment with justice, and kindness with kindness" is distinct not only from this commandment but also from the retributive formulation of *lex talionis*.

It seems that Collie's sectarian evaluation of the Confucian golden rule drastically transformed the attitude of John Francis Davis (1975-1890) toward Confucianism, who would later serve as the second Governor of Hong Kong from 1844 to 1848. In his 1824 article, he identified Confucius as a man who "was truly deserving of the title of Philosopher," while characterizing Taoism and Buddhism as fictitious and fanatical. He further stated with veneration that "the purity and excellence of some of his precepts" "bear a comparison with even those of the gospel," although he did not directly refer to the golden rule.[67] Contrastingly, in *The Chinese*, published in 1836, Davis defined the teachings of Confucius as "the moral doctrines," thus refusing to treat it as a branch of religion. Again, he singled out Confucianism among "Oriental" moral doctrines to extol Confucius as the one who had "obtained the universal assent of mankind, and which cannot be surpassed in excellence as rules of conduct," and, this time, referred directly to Confucius' *shu*. Nonetheless, he immediately compared it with "the *lex talionis*" by quoting the statement "'Not to live under the same heaven' with the slayer of his father" (*fu zhi chou fu yu gong dai tian* 父之讎弗與共戴天) from the *Liji* 禮記 (the Book of Rites) so as to highlight that "there is much to condemn in the principles of the Chinese sage."[68] Later, the sectarian comparisons of Collie and Davis were readily adopted by Legge to argue for the superiority of Christianity over Confucianism.[69]

Nonetheless, the sectarian attitude was not predominant in the early- and mid-18th century. W. H. Medhurst (1796-1857), an English missionary to China,

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[67] Davis, "Memoir Concerning the Chinese," 5.
[68] Davis, *The Chinese*, 41.
[69] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 135.

published *China: Its State and Prospects* in 1833, which inspired many would-be missionaries to China. He therein plainly uttered that Confucius "lays down the golden rule" without additional notes. From a perspective of comparative religion, he paid attention instead to "filial piety" as the most characteristic feature of Confucianism. He said, "he (that is, Confucius) should have overlooked the reverence due to the Father of our spirits."[70] Besides, upon witnessing the rapid increase of opium import into China, he employed the golden rule to dissuade European, especially English merchants, from opium trade.[71]

The sectarian evaluations of Collie and Davis generated a strong reaction as well. Thomas Thornton (1786-1866), a member of the Royal Asiatic Society, publicly displayed his sympathetic attitude toward the moral and religious teachings of Confucius, which, he lamented, "has seldom been properly appreciated."[72] Despite his "slight and superficial" "acquaintance with the language of China," his knowledge and appraisals were based on "much of Chinese literature. . . transferred to European tongues" by English, French, and German sinologists and missionaries, and particularly *Une grande collection: Mémoires concernant les Chinois* (A Grand Collection: Memoirs concerning the Chinese: 1776-1814).[73] This collection includes *Vie de Confucius* (Life of Confucius) by Joseph-Marie Amiot (1718-1793), a French Jesuit Missionary to Beijing, which Thornton quoted.

Thornton was hardly swayed by a sectarian motive. Whereas he estimated that "his (that is, Confucius') metaphysics and psychology are obscure and contradictory" "by the test of modern knowledge," Thornton tried to do justice to the religious aspects of Confucianism, which, according to him, "has been assailed by well-meaning persons in Europe."[74] Concerning the golden rule, he consulted Abel Rémusat's (1788-1832) French and Latin translation of the *Zhongyong* published in 1817, particularly the Latin renderings of *zhong* 中 (centirality) and shu in Chapter 13.[75] On this basis, Thornton attached the following statement right after quoting Davis' sympathetic account from 1824, where he said that "the purity and excellence of some of his precepts. . . bear a comparison with even those of the gospel":

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70 Medhurst, *China*, 155.

71 Medhurst, *China*, 156-157.

72 Thornton, "The Life, Times, and Doctrines of Confucius," 375-376. This article was incorporated into his *A History of China*.

73 Thornton, *A History of China*, vi-vii.

74 Thornton, "The Life, Times, and Doctrines of Confucius," 376-378.

75 Rémusat, *L'Invariable Milieu. . .* , 49; Thornton, *A History of China*, 209-210.

> It may excite surprise, and probably incredulity, to state, the golden rule of our Saviour, "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you," which Mr. Locke designates as "the most unshaken rule of morality, and the foundation of all social virtue," had been inculcated by Confucius, almost in the same words, four centuries before.[76]

This bold, religiously neutral claim provoked Legge not merely to directly rebut it but also to delve into explicating the differences between the Confucian and Christian golden rules.[77]

Thornton's reaction did not cause an echo at the time. Joseph Edkins (1823-1905), a British Protestant missionary, also took a neutral stance and simply recognized the parallelism between the Confucian and Christian golden rules. The chapter on "Morality" in his 1859 text *The Religious Condition of the Chinese* begins with the sentence "All the world knows that the Chinese have a system of morality which, in theory, is remarkably pure."[78] He took a critical stance with regard to its consequence, saying that "Thus the Confucian morality, though good in theory, has not been successful in bringing the nation to a good moral condition."[79] Concerning the golden rule, however, he simply delivered the message that "[t]he Jesuit missionaries, when they arrived in China, in the reign of our Queen Elizabeth, were charmed with the excellent doctrines of Confucius. They found there the Golden Rule of our Saviour in a slightly different form."[80]

Some exceptional cases existed in the divide between the sectarian and sympathetic attitudes toward Confucianism. Charles Hardwick (1821-1859) simply ignored the parallelism, although his primary objective was "an historical inquiry into some of the chief parallelisms and contrasts between Christianity and the religious systems of the ancient world."[81] In contrast, Charles Bradlaugh (1833-1891), a political activist and atheist, enthusiastically welcomed the discovery of the parallelism. He contended "that which Jesus taught which was good was not new" by quoting the translations of *zhong* and *shu* in the *Lunyu* 4.15—"in possessing rectitude of heart, and in loving one's neighbour as one's self." This "iconoclastic" claim provoked immediate repudiations among the Christian societies of the time.[82]

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76 Thornton, "The Life, Times, and Doctrines of Confucius," 376.
77 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 110.
78 Edkins, *The Religious Condition of the Chinese*, 154.
79 Edkins, *The Religious Condition of the Chinese*, 163-164.
80 Edkins, *The Religious Condition of the Chinese*, 154-155.
81 Hardwick, *Christ and Other Masters*.

The other exceptional case was Richard Whately (1787-1863), an English theologian who endeavored to defend the moral validity of the golden rule philosophically at a far distance from the religious convulsion of the time. He responded to the 18th-century philosophical criticisms by providing a novel reinterpretation of the merits and demerits of the golden rule. According to him, the golden rule in the *Bible* "will serve to explain, if rightly understood, the true character of moral instruction." He acknowledged its defects as "the first notions of right and wrong" or "[the] sole guide as to what you ought to do and to avoid in your dealings with your neighbor."[83] In this vein, he cited a list of counterexamples, which former philosophers provided to argue against the golden rule. Nevertheless, he highlighted that this defect originated mostly from a misunderstanding of the golden rule as a principle for considering "what you might *wish* in each case" instead of "what you would regarded as *fair*, *right*, *just*, *reasonable*, if you were in another person's place."[84] In line with this so-called reversibility-based reinterpretation, he argued that "the real design of it (that is, the golden rule) is to put us on our guard against the danger of being blinded by self-interest," since "[a] good person who has a good general notion of what is just may often be tempted to act unfairly or unkindly towards his neighbors, when his own interest or gratification is concerned, and to overlook the rightful claims of others."[85] Additionally, he substantiated the validity and necessity of the golden rule by pointing out that either conscience or reason alone is "far from being an infallible guide."[86] His reinterpretation would later considerably inspire 20th-century proponents of the golden rule such as Marcus G. Singer (1926-2016), thus bridging the vast philosophical gap between the 18th-century criticism and the 20th-century revivalism.[87] Nonetheless, his philosophical approach produced almost no resonance among his religiously-oriented contemporaries, including Legge.

During this centuries-long transition, the focus of attention on the parallelism shifted from universality and supremacy to discrimination and superiority. Despite the criticisms of the 18th-century philosophers, for 19th-

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[82] In his debate with Bradlauch, T. D. Matthias, a Welsh Baptist minister, still insisted on the originality of Jesus by vainly returning a question, "will my friend prove that that teaching of Confucius was not derived from bible sources?" (Matthias and Bradlaugh, *The Credibility and Morality of the Four Gospels*, 79-80 and 87-88).

[83] Whately, *Introductory Lessons on Morals, and Christian Evidences*, 25.

[84] Whately, *Introductory Lessons on Morals, and Christian Evidences*, 26.

[85] Whately, *Introductory Lessons on Morals, and Christian Evidences*, 27.

[86] Whately, *Introductory Lessons on Morals, and Christian Evidences*, 28.

[87] For example, see Singer, "The Golden Rule."

century Christian Sinologists and missionaries to China, because the authority of the golden rule was already well established in Christian societies, it hardly mattered to them on what grounds they could buttress its status as the supreme moral principle. Instead, as knowledge of the world religions rapidly grew along with accelerated global interactions, one of their main concerns seems to have been placed on the matter of how they could substantiate the superiority of Christianity over other religions. In the same vein, they had to deal with the indisputable fact that "the golden rule of our Saviour had been inculcated by Confucius, almost in the same words, four centuries before." This problem had more implications than historicity; if they had acknowledged the parallelism between the Confucian and Christian golden rules, it might have amounted to recognizing the equality between the two religions in terms of the overall ethical system at the most fundamental level. In addition, if they had accredited the originality of the formulation to Confucius, that of Jesus would have been demoted to the inferior status of a replica. Nonetheless, the awareness that the historical fact was irrefutable brought them into frustrations, controversies, and divisions. James Legge's monumental works were undertaken against this background.

## 4. Legge and Christian Sectarianism

In 1861, Legge released the first edition of the first volume of *The Chinese Classics* out of a desire for "some Works on the Classics, more critical, more full and exact, than" the previous translations contemporaneously available.[88] For him, whose "directly missionary labours are the chief business of his life, and require of course his chief attention,"[89] the open-ended diversity in dealing with the parallelism between the Confucian and Christian golden rules, to say nothing of Confucianism in general, indicated a significant disorientation of the Christian society of the time. Especially, the advent of explicitly sympathetic attitudes toward Confucianism, promoted by a spreading recognition of the parallelism, was too great a threat to the authority, originality, and supremacy of Christianity to leave it as a matter of historical fact. He showed outwardly a strong confidence in the objectivity of "his views," saying "He (that is, Legge himself) hopes also that the time

[88] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), vii-viii.
[89] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), ix-x.

is not very remote, when among the Chinese themselves there will be found many men of intelligence, able and willing to read without prejudice what he may say about the teachings of their sages."[90] Nonetheless, as seen below, his sectarian standpoint is widely detected in his works, including his newly devised method of differentiating the Christian golden rule from its Confucian counterpart.

The "Prolegomena" to the 1861 edition of *The Chinese Classics* has a section entitled "His (that is, Confucius') Influence and Opinions." Legge therein concentrated on expounding his views on Confucius' thought and its influences over the Chinese up until then. Evidently, his appraisals are consistently negative throughout the section. Its concluding paragraph deserves a careful reading:

> But I must now leave the sage. I hope I have not done him injustice; but after long study of his character and opinions, I am unable to regard him as a great man. He was not before his age, though he was above the mass of the officers and scholars of his time. He threw no new light on any of the questions which have a world-wide interest. He gave no impulse to religion. He had no sympathy with progress. His influence has been wonderful, but it will henceforth wane. My opinion is, that the faith of the nation in him will speedily and extensively pass away.[91]

Each sentence herein amounts to a summary of his assessments of each subject discussed in the section. For example, the evaluation "He was not before his age" was drawn from his assessment of the roles that Confucius played in his lifetime as "the preserver," "exemplifier," and "expounder" of the legacies of antiquity, thus attributing retrospective and stagnant characteristics to Confucius' teachings.[92] In the same vein, he provided a negative answer to the question raised by Hardwick, that is, "whether he did not make changes in the ancient creed of China." On the one hand, specifically by the statement "He threw no new light on any of the questions which have a world-wide interest," Legge meant that Confucius could not be counted as a great original thinker.[93] According to him, Confucius "did not treat" "the great problems of the human condition and destiny," such as "the creation of things or the end of them," "the origin of man or his

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[90] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), ix.
[91] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 113.
[92] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 90-94.
[93] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 98-99.

hereafter," and "physics or metaphysics."[94] On the other hand, in the same fashion, Legge depicted Confucius as a man who was "unreligious, unspiritual, and open to the charge of insincerity," and these characteristics, according to Legge, had unfavorable influences on the Chinese up until then, for instance "the charge of atheism," the denial of "the existence of any spirit," and "a habit of deceitfulness."[95] Concerning "Confucius' views on government," he stated that "Confucius' idea then of a happy, well-governed State did not go beyond the flourishing of the five relations of society," which made the Chinese "adapted to a primitive, unsophisticated state of society."[96]

Legge's negative assessments culminated in a discussion of the golden rule, which is located at the end of "His Influence and Opinions." His ultimate objective was to demonstrate the limitations of the Confucian version of the golden rule and the superiority of its Christian counterpart. Concerning the irrefutable fact that "the golden rule of our Saviour … had been inculcated by Confucius, almost in the same words, four centuries before," Legge began with laudatory comments. After directly quoting Thornton's praiseful remark cited above, he reaffirmed the originality of the Confucian golden rule. He said, "I would be far from grudging a tribute of admiration to Confucius for it. . . . it is not found, in its condensed expression at least, in the older classics. The merit of it is Confucius' own."[97]

The overall tone, however, changed sharply when it came to "a comparison" between the Confucian and Christian golden rules. In the translations of the *Lunyu* and *Zhongyong*, he consistently associated *shu* with the concepts of reciprocity and benevolence.[98] Especially, concerning the *zhong-shu* 忠恕 compound in the *Lunyu* 5.11 and *Zhongyong*, while rendering *zhong* into "the principles of our nature" in accordance with its etymological compound of *zhong* 中 as "middle" and *xin* 心 as "the heart," he interpreted *shu* as "the benevolent exercise of them (i.e., the principles of our nature) to others," "on the principle of reciprocity."[99] Although this interpretation itself seems positive and objective, his ulterior intention was to show the "unreligious" aspect of Confucius' teachings in a pejorative sense. At the note to the *Lunyu* 5.11, he states as follows:

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94 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 98.
95 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 99-102.
96 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 102-109.
97 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 110.
98 For example, Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 165.
99 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 34 and 258.

> The chapter is important, showing that Confucius only claimed to unfold and enforce duties indicated by man's mental constitution. He was simply a moral philosopher.[100]

Returning to his "comparison," Legge approached it from three interrelated standpoints to show the "narrowness" of the Confucian golden rule. First of all, he came up with a distinction between the positive and negative formulations. He asserted that whereas the Confucian golden rule is enunciated mainly in its negative form,[101] "the rule laid down by Christ" is in "the positive form."[102] As seen above, although it was not unprecedented, a demarcation had never been drawn between the positive and negative formulations as clear-cut as Legge's. This distinction was to make a contrast. Whereas "[t]he lesson of the gospel commands men to do what they feel to be right and good," "[t]he lesson of Confucius only forbids men to do what they feel to be wrong and hurtful."[103] He thus also disputed the originality of Confucius' formulation of the golden rule by saying that the negative form "was to be found substantially in the earlier revelations of God," which refers to the maxim of Hillel in the *Old Testament*.[104]

Second, Legge argued that the Confucian golden rule was qualified by the cardinal familial and social relations. He said, "Confucius, it seems to me, did not think of the reciprocity coming into action beyond the circle of his five relations of society."[105] He did not deny that a series of reformulations in the *Zhongyong*, which starts with the imperative that "What you would require of your son, use in serving your father," was "the rule virtually in its positive form."[106] He also commented in an approbatory tone that "Confucius recognizes the duty of taking the initiative,—of behaving himself to others in the first instance as he would that they should behave to him."[107] Nevertheless, pointing to the fact that the reformulations are embedded in the so-called cardinal human relations in Confucianism, he immediately reversed this favorable notice, saying that "there is a certain narrowness, indeed, in that the sphere of its operations seems to be confined

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[100] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 34.
[101] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 31, 34 and 110.
[102] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 110.
[103] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 110.
[104] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 110
[105] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 111.
[106] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 49.
[107] Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 49.

to the relations of society."[108] For the sake of contrast, he described the correlation between reciprocity and the golden rule in Christian ethics by saying that "[t]he rule of Christ is for man as man, having to do with other men, all with himself on the same platform, as the children and subjects of the one God and Father in heaven."[109]

Lastly, Legge directly employed Davis' comparison of the Confucian golden rule with "the *lex talionis*" in conjunction with Collie's derogatory interpretation of "what may be said of rewarding hatred by kindness?" in the *Lunyu* 14.34.[110] As mentioned above, even the negative formulation is substantially different from the retributive formulation of *lex talionis*. Nonetheless, by using this highly sectarian analogy, he attempted to demonstrate "[h]ow far short Confucius came of the standard of Christian benevolence." In this vein, he also said, "His (i.e., Confucius') morality was. . . not the gushings of a loving heart, responsive to the promptings of Heaven, and in sympathy with erring and feeble humanity."[111] Rather, according to Legge, Confucius "affirmed the duty of blood-revenge in the strongest and most unrestricted terms," and "The bad effects of it are evident even in the present day. . . . [W]hole districts are kept in a state of constant feud and warfare."[112]

On the grounds of these strong sectarian interpretations, Legge concluded his appraisal of Confucius' teachings with the prediction that "My opinion is, that the faith of the nation in him will speedily and extensively pass away."[113] As seen below, this harsh concluding "opinion" was replaced with a more honorific statement in the 1892 revised version, but only limitedly and rhetorically. To sum up, Legge desired to verify the limited scope of the Confucian golden rule, its lack of a genuine understanding of reciprocity, equality, and benevolence, and, ultimately, the superiority and originality of the Christian golden rule.

Legge's appraisal was immediately echoed by the English Christian societies of the time. In 1862, one year after the publication of *The Chinese Classics*, the Evangelical Alliance of the UK published a summary of his

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108 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 49.

109 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 111.

110 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 111-112. Legge said, "The lex talionis is here (i.e., a passage at the Second Chapter, the *Book of Rituals*) laid down in its fullest extent."

111 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 111.

112 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 112-113.

113 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1861), 113.

arguments in its monthly journal, *Evangelical Christendom.*[114] The anonymous author therein defended Legge's prolonged dedication to the study of Chinese classics by saying that it was not produced "at the cost of sacrificing other and higher duties and labours" such as "his directly missionary labours."[115] Particularly, the author praised highly Legge's comparisons between the Christian-positive and Confucian-negative formulations. To recapitulate it, the author contended that "Dr. Legge's splendid publication" brought to light that the Confucian golden rule "is something to be disabused of certain erroneous or exaggerated fancies as to the real attainments of Confucius, which have ere now been assiduously circulated in desired disparagement of the unapproached morality of the New Testament."[116] In short, Legge's work marked a textual, philosophical, and religious breakthrough for those who were desperate to defend the superiority of Christianity over Confucianism in the face of the indisputable fact that Confucius' teachings "are views and moral maxims of sound common sense, and often of a shrewd originality."[117]

In a similar vein, Frances Power Cobbe (1822-1904), a female Irish social reformer, recognized that "The same aphorism is used literally by Isocrates. . . and (what is most remarkable) in both its negative and positive form by Confucius." Nonetheless, this remark is added only as a note. Her main objective was to underline the novelty of Christian ethics. She said, "One of the most prominent features in the morality taught by Christ is the introduction of the idea of the positive character of duty. He transposes the Golden Rule just quoted from the Rabbi's negative to the affirmative form."[118]

In his later years, Legge's depreciative criticism of Confucianism seemed to be considerably toned down, but only in a rhetorical sense. In a talk at a missionary conference held at Shanghai in 1877, he esteemed Confucius' formulation of the golden rule as "the greatest service to his country." He then withdrew his earlier depreciation of it as the negative formulation only and admitted that the pairs of imperatives in the thirteenth chapter of the *Zhongyong* testified to Confucius' understanding of the positive formulation as well.[119] This short talk was developed into a series of lengthy lectures in 1880, published in the same year as a voluminous

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114 Evangelical Alliance, "The Chinese Classics," 13-19.
115 Evangelical Alliance, "The Chinese Classics," 14.
116 Evangelical Alliance, "The Chinese Classics," 17.
117 Evangelical Alliance, "The Chinese Classics," 17.
118 Cobbe, *Studies New and Old of Ethical and Social Subjects*, 12.
119 Legge, *Confucianism in Relation to Christianity*, 9.

monograph under the title of *The Religions of China: Confucianism and Tâoism Described and Compared with Christianity*. Legge therein called special attention to the expression attributed to Confucius in the *Zhongyong* "The ways of a *junzi* 君子 (a man of morality) are four, and I [Confucius] have not yet mastered even one of them" to assert that although it sounded like "the language of humility," it was, in truth, Confucius' confession of his "infirmity" in carrying out this set of the positive formulations. He further contended that Confucius' original formulation of the golden rule far before the Christ, which might frustrate most of Christians, was rather a sign of "the distinguishing endowment given to him by Heaven, or God."[120] Instead of insisting on the self-deceptive disparagements from the 1860s, Legge tackled this historically indisputable, but religiously frustrating, fact by disguising his sectarian motivations with the rhetoric of the natural law.

Legge's comparative studies had a strong impact on the English and Scottish Christian Societies, but his way of arguing for the superiority of Christianity seemed to fail in winning over sweeping approval; it could not completely preclude the spread of public interest directed towards Confucianism. In the late 19th century, Confucius himself, together with his *shu* formulation, began to appear in books for public audiences as well.[121] Besides, George Matheson (1842-1906), a Scottish minister, gave a lecture on Confucianism in 1882 at St Giles' lecture series on "the faiths of the world." Like Legge, his overt objective was to demonstrate the superiority of Christianity over Confucianism. His lecture, however, began with a historical description of the continuity and prosperity of Confucianism in China, and ventured to answer the self-posed question "What has been the cause of its [i.e., Confucianism's] success?"[122]

In so doing, Matheson overtly and unequivocally affirmed "that Confucius is the author of this precept [i.e., the golden rule] is undisputed, and therefore it is indisputable that Christianity has incorporated an article of Chinese morality."[123] The historical "evidence" that Confucius had formulated it centuries before Christ drove him to contend that the apprehension that "the originality of its Divine Founder were impaired by consenting to borrow a precept from a heathen source" "would destroy Christianity." According to him, the glory and superiority of Christianity

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[120] Legge, *The Religions of China*, 138-139.

[121] For example, see Parton, *People's Book of Biography*, 408-418.

[122] Matheson, "Religion of China: Confucianism," 73-82 and 87.

[123] Matheson, "Religion of China: Confucianism," 83.

should be found elsewhere than the originality of the golden rule; for instance, the Christian theological explication of the immanence of the precept in human hearts, the limitations of Confucian morality to "the wellbeing of the state," and Chinese collectivism in lack of "human individualism."[124] He continued to argue that the success of Confucianism attested to "some truth of the doctrine," which had made "a real contribution to the science of natural religion."[125] He particularly accentuated the idea that in Confucian thought, "there is a moral order in the world as well as beyond it."[126] It seems the ultimate goal of his lecture was to convince the audience that the genuine importance of religion lied in "the establishment of human civilization" on "the foundation of a kingdom of God" here and now rather than in the sectarian dispute for superiority and originality, especially in the age of pluralistic "faiths of the world."[127]

Legge immediately responded to Matheson's compromising approach, saying "their advocacy is damaging rather than beneficial to Christianity."[128] Apparently, he toned down the former sectarian disparagement to a certain degree and gave more credit to Confucianism. Nonetheless, the focus of comparison was still placed on corroborating the superiority of Christianity over Confucianism. For that purpose, Legge, first of all, employed the positive-negative distinction once again. According to his analysis, "the Confucian system is not a morality merely, but also a religion," but it "was very defective in what it required of man to God."[129] According to Legge, contrary to Matheson's argument, "the general rule in which Confucius summed up all his inculcation of the duties of the human relations" "is negative, while Christ's is positive."[130] Whereas the negative formulation sprang out of a negative understanding of human nature, such as self-centeredness, "the secret" of Christ's positive formulation was "the essence of the two commandments, to love God supremely, and to love our neighbours as ourselves."[131] Then, he reiterated his statements from 1861; from

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124 Matheson, "Religion of China: Confucianism," 83-84 and 101.

125 Matheson, "Religion of China: Confucianism," 89 and 97.

126 Matheson, "Religion of China: Confucianism," 94-95.

127 Matheson, "Religion of China: Confucianism," 107-08.

128 Legge, "Christianity and Confucianism Compared in Their Teaching of the Whole Duty of Man," 23.

129 Legge, "Christianity and Confucianism Compared in Their Teaching of the Whole Duty of Man," 19 and 22.

130 Legge, "Christianity and Confucianism Compared in Their Teaching of the Whole Duty of Man," 19-20.

131 Legge, "Christianity and Confucianism Compared in Their Teaching of the Whole Duty of Man," 20-21.

the viewpoint that "[a]ccording to Christianity, therefore, the whole duty of man is comprised in the one little word Love," he epitomized the superiority of Christianity into a comparison that "it (i.e., the Christian positive formulation) is the outgushing demand of love, while the other (i.e., the Confucian negative formulation) is the constrained expression of justice."[132]

Additionally, Legge enumerated five more aspects to defend the superiority of Christianity over Confucianism. Apart from saying that "they deserve our esteem," the Chinese were characterized to be "less enlightened" and "more conservative, thinking much of the past, and little of the future."[133] The essay concluded with an emphasis on the significance of the golden rule in interacting with non-Christians "politically, commercially, and in other ways" in accordance with "the principles of love and righteousness, which blend in 'the golden rule'" at the dawn of globalization in the late 19th century.[134]

Legge published a revised second edition of the *Chinese classics* in 1892, where his sectarian views were not significantly changed. The harsh concluding "opinion" in the first edition was replaced with the moderate and respectful statement that "the more I have studied his character and opinions, the more highly have I come to regard him. He was a very great man, and his influence has been on the whole a great benefit to the Chinese, while his teachings suggest important lessons to ourselves who profess to belong to the school of Christ."[135] Critical scholarly reviews of his first publication apparently compelled him to amend the serious "injustice" of his views.[136] Nonetheless, this change was rhetorical rather than substantial; it was limited to the concluding remarks only. His estimations, analysis, and comparisons as to the golden rule in the 1861 edition were reprinted with almost no changes in the 1892 revised edition. Instead, his revisions were focused on improving the accuracy of translations, typographs, transliterations, and proper names.[137] Legge was consistent in his view on the superiority of the Christian golden rule over its Confucian counterpart throughout his entire scholarly career without any noteworthy amendments.

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132 Legge, "Christianity and Confucianism Compared in Their Teaching of the Whole Duty of Man," 6, 21, and 26.

133 Legge, "Christianity and Confucianism Compared in Their Teaching of the Whole Duty of Man," 24-35.

134 Legge, "Christianity and Confucianism Compared in Their Teaching of the Whole Duty of Man," 35-36.

135 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1893), 111.

136 Girardot, *The Victorian Translation of China*, 60.

137 Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (1893), x-xi.

Legge's framework shaped subsequent discourses on the golden rule to a large degree. It was then disseminated widely through influential reference books such as *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1892).[138] Especially, the entry for "Golden Rule' in the *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* (1906) and the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (1914), both of which were edited by James Hastings (1852-1922), a Scottish United Free Church minister and biblical scholar, adopted the positive-negative distinction as the main theme and strategy to attest the superiority of Christian ethics.[139] Nonetheless, apart from his monumental translations of the Confucian Classics, Legge's "opinion" of Confucianism and the Confucian golden rule eventually failed to bring an end to century-long debates. It seems Legge's perspective has not been seriously challenged until now, not because its philosophical legitimacy has maintained a strong endorsement, but rather mainly because the authority and significance of his translations have continued to enjoy a strong reputation and great popularity, while his strongly sectarian motives have remained submerged below the surface of modern philosophy.

## 5. Concluding Remarks

In the 17th century, the theory of the natural law was the principal springboard for the initial rise of the golden rule. On this basis, the advocates of this terse precept then concentrated on constructing its universality and supremacy, which cannot be restricted in terms of time and space. In this milieu, the discovery of equivalents to the golden rule in non-Christian traditions was regarded as positive evidence to support its universality. Therefore, they were ready not only to recognize but also to welcome its existence elsewhere than in the *New Testament*. The authority of the golden rule in Christianity was gradually undermined, first internally by the rise of modern philosophy, and then externally by recognition of the preceding formulations by Confucius and his followers. Chronologically, 18th-century philosophical critics like Locke made the golden rule largely (albeit not perfectly or permanently) dissociated from the idea of the natural law.[140]

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138 *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 9th ed. (1892), s.v. "Confucius," 264.

139 Tasker, "Golden Rule,", 653-654; Spooner, "Golden Rule," 310-312.

140 In late 18th century England, Granville Sharp (1735-1813) still recognized the counterparts of the Christian golden rule in Confucianism and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and used them to argue for the accordance between the Law of Nature and this precept in the *Bible*

Entering the 19th century, consequently, the bond between them came to barely subsist in rhetorical contexts even within Christian discourses of the golden rule. The vacancy of the theoretical foundation was filled instead with strong Christian sectarianism at the time.

The 19th-century discussion of the golden rule was neither monotonous nor unanimous, but its dominant focus shifted from universality and supremacy to discrimination and superiority. Although it is highly exceptional, Whately's novel reinterpretation of its merits and demerits bridged the vast philosophical gap between the 18th-century critics and the 20th-century revisionists. On the other hand, those who took a neutral stance on Confucianism, like Marshman, Medhurst, and Hardwick, avoided directly comparing Confucius' *shu* to the Christian golden rule. Some who had a sympathetic attitude instead separated the ethical aspects of Confucianism and reduced its merits to "the moral doctrines," thus indirectly pointing to its deficiency in comparison to Christianity. Most conspicuously, strong sectarianism drove Collie to characterize Confucius' *shu* as an inferior formulation that is incompatible with "the doctrine of the God of love," while Davis derogatorily compared it with the retributive formulation of *lex talionis*. These sectarian interpretations were immediately adopted by Legge. For them, Thorton's overtly sympathetic evaluation of *shu* and Confucianism was not only exceptional but also as provocative as the iconoclastic view of Bradlaugh.

In response to the previous vacillating views toward the originality of the Confucian golden rule, Legge placed an unprecedented emphasis on the differences between the positive and negative formulations of the golden rule. He thus provided a novel method of distinguishing the Christian golden rule from its Confucian counterpart, in a way that was anticipated to bring an end to the perplexity and division up till then, and, ultimately, to defend the superiority and originality of Christianity.

Nonetheless, Legge's works ignited new theoretical controversies rather than bring an end to them. Especially, the positive-negative distinction in conjunction with the superiority-inferiority dichotomy grew as one of the central issues in 20th-century studies of the golden rule.[141] Most recently, however, Gensler has argued, "logically, that both forms are equivalent, and historically, that the Confucian and Jewish traditions don't have a negative

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(Sharp, *A Tract on the Law of Nature, and Principles of Action in Man*, 73-75).

141 For a summary of the century-long debate on the differences and superiority between the positive and negative formulations of the golden rule, see Gensler, *Ethics and the Golden Rule*, 163-171.

ethics," although the difference may be psychological.[142]

Within the field of Confucian studies, Legge's influence remains especially strong. In response to Legge's sectarian assessment, Feng Youlan implicitly intended to verify that ancient Confucianism had independently formulated the full-fledged theory of the golden rule on the grounds of humanity or *ren* 仁. He cited several passages from *Sisu* as the Confucian variants of the golden rule, but did not refer to the term "golden rule" at all. Instead, he used the term "measuring square" (*xieju* 絜矩) in the *Daxue* and thus implicitly argued that ancient Confucianism also had a concept equivalent to the golden rule. In addition, taking advantage of Legge's explications, Feng employed the positive-negative distinction as the main criterion for categorizing the Confucian variants. Like Legge, he also included the imperative in the *Lunyu* 12.2 and the measuring square in the *Daxue* in the category of the negative formulation, while including a series of specified prescriptions in the *Lunyu* 6.28 and another set of specified prescriptions in Chapter 13 of the *Zhongyong* in the category of the positive formulation.[143] Then, he correlated the positive and specified formulations with *zhong* and the negative formulations with *shu*, respectively, and integrated them into "the principle of *ren*"[144] Likewise, Wing-tsit Chan presented an extended list of the positive and negative formulations of the Confucian golden rule.[145] On the contrary, David Nivison and P. J. Ivanhoe focused on revealing the significance of the negative formulation in Confucianism.[146]

Besides, as it turned out to be a historically indisputable fact, the ubiquity and universality of the golden rule rather became a pressing 'problem' that sectarian Christian scholars had to tackle in order to defend the superiority of their religion. Concurrently, the commercial trade between China and the West rapidly turned into a full-scale commercial and military invasion of China by the Western powers. Specifically, a historically significant question remains unexplored: What does it mean that in the beginning of the 19th century, this intellectual shift with regard to the golden rule coincided exactly with the sharp and constant increase of the English export of opium to China? As Medhurst testified, the opium export was

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142 Gensler, *Ethics and the Golden Rule*, 163 and 168.

143 Ames and Hall, *Focusing the Familiar*, 94.

144 Feng and Bodde, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, 43-44.

145 Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 27-28.

146 Nivison, "Golden Rule Arguments in Chinese Moral Philosophy," 62-63; Ivanhoe, "Reweaving the 'One Thread' of the Analects," 26.

absolutely contradictory to the golden rule, if the English had viewed the Chinese with the lens of brotherhood, equity, and love.

Around the beginning of the 20th-century the main focus of discussions of the golden rule reversed to universality and supremacy. The first World's Parliament of Religions was held in 1893 at Chicago in conjunction with the World's Congress of Religions at the World's Columbian Exposition. The awareness of the universal feature of the golden rule facilitated its organization to a large degree. According to Charles C. Bonney (1831-1903), the president of the 1893 World's Congress of Religions, the parliament not only embraced the diverse branches of Christianity but also claimed to have represented all leading religions including Buddhism, Shintoism, Taoism, and Confucianism.[147] The principal objective of the allegedly all-inclusive gathering was to "to unite all religion against all irreligion; to make the golden rule the basis of this union."[148] Bonney explicated it as follows:

> The Parliament of Religions was an exemplification of monism in religions. For it showed that with all differences in the forms of religion, there is, nevertheless, something underlying them all, which constitutes an incorruptible and indestructible bond of brotherhood, which, like a golden cord, binds all the races of men in one grand fraternity of love and service.[149]

Here, the golden rule was presented as the principle of "brotherhood" for binding all religions. Nonetheless, by "the golden rule," the parliament referred exclusively to that "of Christ."[150] Pung Kwang Yu (Peng Guangyu 彭光譽: 1844-?), the first secretary of the Chinese Legation in Washington D.C., made a speech at the parliament as the representative of Confucianism. In the speech, he specified Confucius' *shu* as well as its reformulations in the *Zhongyong* as the precept that "puts in a nutshell all the requirements of sincerity, charity, devotion and honor; in other words, of humanity itself ."[151] Nonetheless, the parliament completely brushed its ubiquitous presence in other religious traditions aside. Instead, it obscured this irrefutable fact by mingling the sectarian motivation with the rhetoric of the natural law: "[T]here is an influx from God into the mind of every man," but "the light

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147 Bonney, "The World's Parliament of Religions," 330 and 335.
148 Bonney, "The World's Parliament of Religions," 325, 334 and 343.
149 Bonney, "The World's Parliament of Religions," 323.
150 Bonney, "The World's Parliament of Religions," 324-325.
151 Hanson, *The World's Congress of Religions*, 481.

of divine revelation is differently received by different minds, and hence arise varieties in the forms of religion."[152]

A sense of impending crisis of religion as a whole "against irreligion" compelled the organizers of the parliament to embrace all religious traditions, most of which they used to denounce and attack the heathens and heretics. Against this background, the organizers convened the parliament to "unite and strengthen the forces" of "theism," which was rapidly encroached by the rise of modern, atheistic science and philosophy, which Bonney called "a material philosophy of the universe."[153] Although they did not bring it to the fore, it is unquestionable that the growing knowledge of the ubiquity of the golden rule provided them with a foundational rationale for uniting all religions under the motto of brotherhood.

Entering the 20th century, the general line of the golden-rule discussions was redirected more directly toward universality and supremacy. The 1993 Parliament of the World's Religions, as mentioned in Introduction, declared a global ethics principally on the basis of the golden rule by way of unambiguously and publicly announcing its ubiquity across various religions. Apart from the religious and philosophical fields, cultural anthropologists have recently confirmed that this terse precept, or similar forms, have been formulated and used not only in most world religions but also in primitive cultures like African tribes.[154] More recently, neuroscientists claim to have proven that the golden rule stems from the brain structure common to humankind.[155] On the other hand, the golden rule itself has lost the glory that it enjoyed in the 17th to 19th century as result of its overshadowing by modern ethics and the spread of pluralistic views.

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[152] Bonney, "The World's Parliament of Religions," 326.

[153] Bonney, "The World's Parliament of Religions," 330.

[154] Neusner and Bruce, *The Golden Rule*.

[155] For example, see Field, *Altruistically Inclined?*; Pfaff and Wilson, *The Neuroscience of Fair Play*.

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# “我們的救主的黃金律… 四個世紀之前，幾乎在同一個詞中，已被孔子諄諄教誨了”——在17-19世紀英國基督教與儒家黃金律的衝突

李 定 桓

**中文摘要**

在17世紀英格蘭，基於什麼理由將新約中的簡潔規則昇格爲最高和普遍的道德原則意義上的“黃金律”? 儒家對手—恕—的發現—更具體地說，歐洲基督教社會意識到“我們的救主的黃金律…，四個世紀之前，幾乎在同一個詞中，已被孔子諄諄教誨了”這般命題—給他們帶來了什麼樣的影響? 他們是如何回應的?

本研究旨在通過探索歐洲（尤其是英格蘭）黃金律的歷史來回答這些問題，從17世紀的最初興起到19世紀英國商業和傳教活動急劇升級時，儒家對手的發現所帶來的挫折，爭議和分歧。本研究表明的是雖然黃金律興起的最初跳板包括其無所不包的普遍性，但其權威性和有效性部分地受到現代哲學的挑戰，部分地從孔子表述先例的認識受到嚴重破壞。因此，進入19世紀討論的主要焦點從自然法理論的普遍性和至上性轉向教派關注的歧視和優越性。此外，本研究也對詹姆斯·萊格（James Legge）的紀念性作品所包含的基督教傳教動機和他對儒學的看法表明了新的亮點。本研究還關於萊格對儒家黃金律的看法如何有助於減輕當時基督教社會的困惑，由此證明了據稱基督教黃金律而克服儒家恕的優越性，以及他通過捍衛基督教的專屬權威來提供一個說明的原委。

**關鍵詞**：黃金律，恕，普遍性，優越性，基督教，儒學，詹姆斯·萊格（James Legge）

# A New Approach to the Sasang Constitutional Theory of Yi Je-ma

HEO Hoon

## Abstract

Sasang constitutional medicine (SCM) is unique in oriental medicine's history. Traditional oriental medicine was established mainly under the influence of Taoism, while the ideological basis of SCM is Confucianism. In SCM, existing oriental medicine is disguised as Confucianism.

Accordingly, Sasang philosophy, the philosophical background of SCM, is composed of Neo-Confucian metaphysics or primitive Confucian content. So SCM is derived from traditional oriental medicine, and Sasang philosophy is derived from Neo-Confucian metaphysics (primitive Confucianism).

SCM, existing oriental medicine, Sasang philosophy, and traditional Confucianism all naturally differ from one another. If traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) consists of Taoism (A) and medicine (B), then SCM consists of medicine (B) and Confucianism (C). To compare the two or find differences in their content, the B in SCM should be explained as the B in existing Chinese medicine (B in SCM≒B in TCM). In other words, it is difficult to compare the B of conventional Chinese medicine with the C of SCM (B≠C), so the gap between them becomes larger. In addition, the comparison between the A in TCM and the C in SCM is unjust (A≠C) and thus we naturally conclude that they are essentially different. Of course, one can mention A or C together while discussing B, due to the necessity of examining the theoretical or ideological change process. However, if one talks about the B in SCM and the A or C while ignoring the B of existing Chinese medicine, one will reach the wrong conclusion.

SCM researchers compare Sasang philosophy with TCM and SCM with Confucianism. Thus, the gap between the comparative objects grows, and the conclusion that SCM is "fundamentally" different from existing Chinese medicine (or Neo-Confucianism) is drawn.

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* HEO Hoon was a lecturer at Chung-Ang University's College of Education (huhhoon@sen.go.kr).

This paper focuses on correcting errors in SCM research caused by the specificity of SCM's philosophical background, and revealing the merits of SCM compared with existing TCM.

**Keywords:** Yi Je-ma, traditional Chinese medicine, Sasang constitutional medicine, Sasang philosophy, Neo-Confucianism

## 1. Introduction

At the end of the Joseon dynasty (1392-1910), Dr. Yi Je-ma 李濟馬 (1837-1900) invented Sasang[1] constitutional medicine (SCM). In 1894, he wrote the *Dongui susebowon* 東醫壽世保元 (Longevity and Life Preservation in Eastern Medicine), the foundational text of SCM.[2] Another important, relevant text is the *Gyeokchigo* 格致藁 (Manuscript of Science).

Its significance lies in the fact that, like *Dongui susebowon*, *Gyeokchigo* contains Confucian thought, primarily within a chapter entitled "Yuryak" 儒略 (Summary of Confucianism).[3]

We should pay attention to the following point: although Dr. Yi Je-ma was a medical doctor, he was fundamentally a Confucian scholar. To be precise, Dr. Yi was originally a Confucian scholar, not a doctor. As a Confucianist and medical scholar, Dr. Yi rebelled against the rampant abuse of Neo-Confucianism and created his own Sasang philosophy based on the ideals of Reformed Confucianism.

Syndrome medicine, generally called "traditional Chinese medicine" (TCM), is based on the theories of Taoism whereas in contrast, SCM was created from Dr. Yi's research on Confucianism. SCM is based on the principle of "cultivating oneself and providing service to others" in Confucianism. The principle of "cultivating oneself" develops into the "constitutional self-rectification" of SCM.

Thus, the two basic practices of Confucianism are self-cultivation and providing service to others. These teachings are mentioned in the books *Zhongyong* 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean) and *Daxue* 大學 (Great Learning).

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[1] The word *Sasang* 四象 refers to *taeyang* 太陽 (Big Yang), *soyang* 少陽 (Little Yang), *taeeum* 太陰 (Big Yin), and *soeum* 少陰 (Little Yin). It comes from the *Zhouyi* 周易 (*I Ching* 易經, Changes of the Zhou). However, it is used with an extended meaning in Yi Je-ma's Sasang Theory. It is reinterpreted as "*sa* 事 (activity), *sim* 心 (mind), *sin* 身 (body), and *mul* 物 (matter)." He could interpret the world using these four categories.

[2] *Dongui susebowon* was completed by Yi Je-ma in 1894. This is the bible of SCM, and all of the basic principles of SCM are based on this text.

[3] Yi Je-ma began his philosophical book, *Gyeokchigo*, when he was 45 years old. Ten years later, he completed the chapter called "Yuryak." At the age of 47, he wrote another chapter called "Dokhaengpyeon" 獨行篇 (Self-Cultivation) which contains a methodology on how to know others. The *Gyeokchigo* was completed in 1893 after 14 years of work and is comprised of 3 chapters: "Yuryak," "Banseongjam" 反誠箴 (Cautions on Insincerity), and "Dokhaengpyeon."

In other words, this philosophy is based on the spirit of "self-cultivation and governing others" (*xiuji zhiren* 修己治人) which came from the reinterpretation of original Confucianism. Therefore, SCM stems from the idea of cultivating one's mind and body to follow in the spirit of Confucianism.

To understand SCM, one must understand its philosophical basis. In fact, Sasang medical theory arose from Sasang philosophy. The original intention of Dr. Yi was to develop Sasang philosophy rather than SCM.

Thus, Sasang constitutional theory has an ideological background (i.e., Confucianism) that differs from the existing TCM, and this point should not be overlooked in the method of study as it is difficult to compare Sasang philosophy based on Confucianism with the existing TCM. As mentioned, TCM is based on the theories of Taoism.

However, existing studies have overlooked this point and instead highlighted the fact that Sasang philosophy has a unique characteristic compared to TCM, which is based on Taoism. In this paper, I will try to make a reasonable comparison between the existing TCM and SCM, as well as between traditional Confucianism and Sasang philosophy.

## 2. Confucian Background of Sasang Philosophy

As mentioned in the introduction, two of Dr. Yi's major books are *Dongui susebowon* and *Gyeokchigo*, and these books are based on Confucian thought. In fact, there is even a chapter entitled "Yuryak" in *Gyeokchigo*. Yi regarded the summarization of Confucianism as part of the "*sa* 事 (activity), *sim* 心 (mind), *sin* 身 (body), and *mul* 物 (matter)" theory, and continued to apply it in the "Banseongjam" (Cautions on Insincerity) part of *Gyeokchigo*.

This is usually described as follows: "*Sa* are events that occur in human society, *sim* is the basis for controlling greed and the nature and the feelings, *sin* is the body, and *mul* are all the objects except me."[4] He thought that the world could be classified, understood, and interpreted using these four categories.

Therefore, the quaternary structure of SCM appears as a concept of "*sa*, *sim*, *sin*, and *mul*" that is consistently applied in *Gyeokchigo*, which can be found in the *Zhongyong*. It says the following:

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[4] Jeonguk Hanuigwa Daehak Sasang Uihak Gyosil, *Sasang uihak*, 41; Heo, "Dongmu Yi Je-ma-ui sasangseol-gwa Ken Wilber-ui sasanghak ilgochal," 421.

> Only the person who is very sincere in the world will fulfill his character. If I can satisfy my character, another person can satisfy his character. If you do the character of another person, you will fulfill the character of the matter. If he will fulfill the character of the matter, he will fulfill the character of things. And if he does everything he does, it helps to cultivate the heavens and the Earth. If he helps to cultivate the heaven and Earth, he will be equal to heaven and Earth.[5]

In other words, the view that Dr. Yi stuck to the four categories of the "Yuryak" in *Gyeokchigo* as an attempt to interpret the world is based on the *Zhongyong*.[6] Confucianism teaches that heaven bestows upon human beings their nature. The first chapter of the *Zhongyong* states: "That which is bestowed by heaven to human beings is called *xing* 性 (nature); acting in accordance with this *xing* is called *dao* 道 (the Way); and the cultivation of *dao* is called *jiao* 教 (teaching)."[7] However, in the case of "*sa*, *sim*, *sin*, and *mul*" which is consistently applied in *Gyeokchigo*, it turns into "*tian* 天 (heaven), *ren* 人 (human beings), *xing* 性 (nature), *ming* 命 (destiny)" in *Dongui susebowon*. In the end, Dr. Yi's ideas on the structure of the Four Elements based on the *Zhongyong* are very evident in his books.[8]

Unlike the modern Western worldview, which presupposes the dual separation of mind and matter, the worldview of Confucianism is based on the fundamental identity of the mind, the object, the inner world, and the outer world. Confucianism holds an anthropocentric viewpoint from the perspective of nature and human beings. One thing to note is that there is a human being at the center of the viewpoint of the universe, nature, and society. This tells us that we grasp nature through a "human subjective attitude," and not as human beings who are bound by the laws of nature in space as in Taoism or the *Huangdi neijing* 黃帝內經 (The Yellow Emperor's Manual of Corporeal Medicine).[9]

At the same time, what is directly mentioned as the theoretical basis of SCM is the *Mengzi* 孟子 (Works of Mengzi), as well as the *Zhongyong*. First of all, Dr. Yi established his own philosophical system by studying the classics, especially the *Mengzi*; in fact, his philosophy was inherited from the *Mengzi*.

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[5] *Zhongyong* 8.22: "惟天下至誠, 爲能盡其性, 能盡其性, 則能盡人之性; 能盡人之性, 則能盡物之性, 能盡物之性, 則可以贊天地之化育, 可以贊天地之化育, 則可以與天地參矣."

[6] Heo, *Dongmu Yi Je-ma-ui cheolhak sasang*, 48.

[7] *Zhongyong* 8.1: "天命之謂性, 率性之謂道, 脩道之謂教."

[8] Heo, *Dongmu Yi Je-ma-ui cheolhak sasang*, 49.

[9] Heo, *Dongmu Yi Je-ma-ui cheolhak sasang*, 49-50.

His rationale was found to have been taken from the *Mengzi*, including "Seongmyeongnon" 性命論 (A Discourse on Nature and Order), "Sadannon" 四端論 (A Discourse on the Four Principles), and "Hwakchungnon" 擴充論 (A Discourse on the Establishment and Supplement) which appeared in the formation of *Dongui susebowon*. In the "Yuryak" in *Gyeokchigo*, there is an old phrase that evidences Dr. Yi's enthusiasm for the *sadan* 四端 (four moral sprouts):

> Mengzi said, a man's *siduan* are like a man's limbs. To say that you cannot do it yourself with four moral sprouts is hurting yourself. "Said 'That is not true.'"[10]

Drawing on the ideologies of Kongzi and Mengzi, Dr. Yi developed his ideas based on the new explanation of Chinese classics. Sasang constitutional theory is based on the *Mengzi*.[11] Dr. Yi held Mengzi in the highest esteem.

The terms that appear in *Dongui susebowon* such as "Sadannon" and "Hwakchungnon," the four original natures—*ren* 仁 (benevolence), *yi* 義 (righteousness), *li* 禮 (propriety), and *zhi* 智 (wisdom)—, and the four feelings—*ai* 哀 (sorrow), *nu* 怒 (anger), *xi* 喜 (joy), and *le* 樂 (pleasure)—, all originated from Mengzi. Dr. Yi specifically mentioned the meaning of the Sasang theory (four principles, four natures, and four feelings), which is linked to physiology and pathology.

It is therefore understandable why SCM is called Four Principles medicine.[12] The ultimate goal of *Gyeokchigo*, which can be called a moral book—and of course *Dongui susebowon*, which is Dr. Yi's representative work—is the realization of Kongzi's world, or the way of the true king.[13]

The mind of a sage is said to exist without desire.[14] However, the absence of desire does not imply the *jimie* 寂滅 (state of nothingness) or enlightenment that was achieved by Laozi or Buddha. Rather, it means that

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[10] Yi, "Yuryak," in *Gyeokchigo*, 1:2: "孟子曰, 人之有四端, 猶其有四體也. 有是四端而自謂不能者, 自賊者也. 不其丁寧之乎?"

[11] Heo, "Dongmu Yi Je-ma-ui seonjin yuhak jeongsin," 112.

[12] Song, *An Introduction to Sasang Constitutional Medicine*, 110. Song ll-byung translated and published the Korean book *Algi swiun sasang uihak* as an English book called *An Introduction to Sasang Constitutional Medicine*.

[13] Heo, "Dongmu Yi Je-ma-ui seonjin yuhak jeongsin," 90.

[14] Yi Je-ma defined human desires by classifying them using the Confucian theory of *junzi* 君子 (gentleman) and *xiaoren* 小人 (commoner). For example, Mengzi said "biased words," "vulgar words," "lewd words" and "evasive words" as well as the "angry mind," "fearful mind," "pleasure-loving mind" and "anxious mind."

the sage is deeply concerned about the chaos of the world, and so there is no time for selfish desires. Thus, the sage learns *xue bu yan* 學不厭 (without losing his thirst for knowledge), and *jiao bu juan* 教不倦 (teaches without tiring), which indicates that the sage has no desires. If even the slightest selfish desire exists in the mind, it cannot be the same mind as the sage kings Yao 堯 and Shun 舜. If the mind, even for a moment, has no concern for the world, it is not as the mind of Kongzi or Mengzi.[15]

As mentioned, a mind without desires does not mean that there is a complete absence of desires, as is the case in the state of nothingness or enlightenment that was achieved by Laozi or Buddha; a mind without desire is not the goal of Buddhism or Taoism, but the goal of Confucianism. It means a state of mind in which one constantly worries whether or not the world is being governed with compassion, which leaves no room for selfish desires. In other words, SCM is not Buddha's Buddhism or Laozi's Taoism: it is Confucianism.

Dr. Yi viewed health as a state of mind in which there are *wuyu* 無慾 (no desires). Based on the practical spirit of Confucianism, he regarded human beings as active and self-regulating beings who emphasize the *zexin zeqi* 責心 責氣 (rebuking of their minds and bodies). This can be achieved by overcoming the desires of the mind.[16] This was practiced by King Yao, King Shun, Kongzi, and Mengzi, and is what Dr. Yi refers to as a state of health. What it emphasizes is an extremely unselfish state of mind that is acquired through selfish desires, like the benevolent and altruistic spirit of "learning without losing your thirst for knowledge and teaching without being tired."

> Only in the world can we be very true and true and there must be no lies to fulfill the nature, and after that, we can know the truth and lies of others. King Yao, King Shun, Kongzi and Mengzi, and various saints did this.[17]

Mengzi's principle—that is, *zhixin zhengji* 治心正己 (regulating the mind to rectify oneself)—is the background of Sasang philosophy, embodied in aspects such as the "spirit of self-reflection," "spirit of self-rectification" and

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15 Yi, "Sadannon" 四端論 (A Discourse on the Four Principles), in *Dongui susebowon*, 8-9.

16 Song, *An Introduction to Sasang Constitutional Medicine*, 187.

17 Yi, "Dokhaengpyeon" 獨行篇 (Self-Cultivation), in *Gyeokchigo*, 3:58: "盖己誠未盡, 則人僞難悉, 己僞猶存, 則人誠亦疑. 惟天下至誠不僞, 能盡其性者然後, 可以悉人之誠僞. 如此者, 堯舜也. 孔孟也. 衆聖也."

"redemption from the self-indulgent mind." The sage is the ideal figure, and the ordinary person aspires to become the ideal. Yi described King Yao and King Shun as ideal figures for humanity and stated that the highest goal of human beings is to become sages like these two kings.

It has been said that Sasang philosophy, the cornerstone of SCM, is the epitome of Reformed Confucianism. The fundamental concept and ultimate goal of SCM is to cultivate the mind in order to achieve the proper balance of mind and body, which will lead to good health and longevity.

## 3. The Difference between Traditional Oriental Medicine Theory and Sasang Constitutional Medicine

TCM originated from the *Huangdi neijing* according to the tradition of the Huang-Lao 黃老 (Yellow Emperor and Laozi) sect. SCM is a new and original theory developed by analyzing and researching the *Lingshu* 靈樞 (spiritual, vital Axis)[18] of the *Huangdi neijing*. SCM is based on Confucianism rather than on the Taoism of the Huang-Lao school. This is the significance of SCM:

> I was born after the beginning of the history of medicine and a thousand years later, I read the book of a saint and by chance realized internal organs and the reason for the nature of a constitutional person. And I wrote one book and named it *Susebowon*.[19]

*Dongui susebowon* is very different from the *Huangdi neijing* from the field of Chinese medicine. There are "*taeeum*, *soeum*, *taeyang*, *soyang*, and the *ohaengin* 五行人 (man with five elements)" on the side of the *Lingshu* of the *Huangdi neijing*. In that book, there is a story about approximate appearance, but there is no mention of logic. The views on *taeeum*, *soeum*, *taeyang*, and *soyang* were very ancient, but they were not studied precisely.[20]

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[18] Chapter 72 of the *Lingshu* of the *Huangdi neijing* references the Theory of the Five Body Types. These five body types are *taeeumin* 太陰人 (Big Yin man), *soeumin* 少陰人 (Little Yin man), *taeyangin* 太陽人 (Big Yang man), *soyangin* 少陽人 (Little Yang man), and *eumyang hwapyeong-ji in* 陰陽和平之人 (the *yin-yang* harmonized person).

[19] Yi, *Dongui susebowon*, 2:26.

[20] Yi, *Dongui susebowon*, 4:141: "靈樞書中, 有太少陰陽五行論, 而略得外形未得臟理. 蓋太少陰陽人, 早有古昔之見, 而未盡精究也."

Within Dr. Yi's philosophical system, he questioned the way people lived and accomplished their goals in life following the practical ethics of Confucianism and extended the idea of Reformed Confucianism. This was not only a matter of mind but also of body. Accordingly, it developed into a question of conflict between the mind and body (mental and physical conflicts) and finally led to serious diseases. These ideas led to the formation of SCM.

Dr. Yi studied the classifications of the five constitutions written in the *Huangdi neijing*, and then added his own interpretations and revisions. He said, "I was referencing the old writings of Eastern medicine which originated over five thousand years ago, and was able to discover the physiological characteristics of the internal organs of the four constitutions by chance."[21]

Scholars of different disciplines differ in their views on the concept of constitution. Constitution is defined as follows: "The function is connected to the form, and the forming element of the genetic constitution and the living environment element are formed in harmony."[22]

Dr. Yi classified the *sasangin* 四象人 (constitutional types of human beings) into *taeyangin*, *taeeumin*, *soyangin*, and *soeumin*.[23] Following this, he researched physiology, pathology, treatment methods, and health cultivation for each constitution. There are three very important factors that distinguish the constitution in SCM: external appearance, mental characteristics, and disease symptoms.

On the other hand, the theory of *liu jing bing* 六經病 (Six Channel Disease) of Zhang Zhongjing's 張仲景 (150-219) *Shanghanlun* 傷寒論 (Discourse on Cold Damage Disorders) came from the perspective of syndromes. The *liu jing bing* classifies diseases into *san yang* 三陽 and *san yin* 三陰 categories, which are *taiyang* 太陽, *shaoyang* 少陽, *yangming* 陽明, *taiyin* 太陰, *shaoyin* 少陰, and *jueyin* 厥陰. However, these are classifications of diseases, not people.

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21 Yi, *Dongui susebowon*, 2:26: "余, 生於醫藥經驗五千載後, 因前人之述, 偶得四象人臟腑性理, 著得一書, 名曰, 壽世保元."

22 Lee, *Taeyangin*, *soyangin*, *taeeumin*, *soeumin*, 11. Lee Eui-ju translated and published the Korean book *Taeyangin*, *soyangin*, *taeeumin*, *soeumin* as a Chinese book called *Xiang hanguoren yiyang baojian* 像韩国人一样保健 (Chinese book title). The meaning of the title is "Health Care Like Koreans."

23 Yi Je-ma named the four Sasang constitutions *taeyangin*, *soyangin*, *taeeumin*, and *soeumin* and explained their differences in the chapter "Sadannon" found in *Dongui susebowon*. Song, *An Introduction to Sasang Constitutional Medicine*, 202.

TCM is "syndrome medicine." It treats disease through the methods of tonification and sedation based on the principle of "supplementing the righteous energy and eliminating pathogenic factors." In contrast, SCM is a method of self-cultivation of the "constitutional self-rectification" of the Sasang constitutions.

In short, TCM is symptomatic medicine whereas SCM is constitutional medicine. Before the development of the concept of the Sasang constitution, both East and West were unsure about the concept of the constitution. Consequently, much of constitutional theory was not practically applied to treat diseases. Traditional Medicine focuses on such environmental factors as stress and germs, while SCM focuses on hereditary factors.[24]

> The Sasang constitutional theory of Dr. Yi Je-ma is arguably the most comprehensive systematized constitutional theory in the world.[25]

In SCM, the *sadan* constitute the core medical theory.[26] Yi saw humans in the organic relation of the "*sa*, *sim*, *sin*, and *mul*." Here, the body and mind are identified as the counterparts of the object.[27] The ultimate goal of SCM is to view the constitution using the philosophy of the "Golden Mean" or "Middle Path" and to guide the inherently tilted prenatal body to the "center" through postnatal efforts.[28]

The excellence of SCM as clinical medicine is as follows. First, it has a rapid effect on acute disease. Second, fundamental treatment is possible. Third, the treatment period is shortened. Fourth, there are no side effects from drugs. Fifth, the time it takes to diagnose is reduced. Sixth, the aspect of preventive medicine is excellent.[29]

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[24] Song, *An Introduction to Sasang Constitutional Medicine*, 236.

[25] Song, *An Introduction to Sasang Constitutional Medicine*, 21.

[26] Choi, *Dongui susebowon yeokhae*, 117-120. Choi claimed that "Yi Je-ma has a theoretical basis for thought in Confucianism, but he explains humans from a completely different perspective from traditional Confucianism. 'Sadannon' has also been developed in this context."

[27] Song, *An Introduction to Sasang Constitutional Medicine*, 28.

[28] Song, *An Introduction to Sasang Constitutional Medicine*, vi.

[29] Noh and Akiko, *Uri-ga jeongmal arayahal sasang uihak*, 120-122. 17. Noh and Akiko stated that "Not many people know the historical importance that SCM is a synthesis of oriental medicine with 4,000-5,000 years of long history and tradition, and that it has led oriental medicine to the front door of science and has pioneered unprecedented levels of medical principles and coordinates."

## 4. The Peculiarity of Research Approaches to Sasang Philosophy

Western medicine, which was combined with philosophy until the end of the eighteenth century in the course of the transition from classical medicine to modern medicine, was the first to break with philosophy, although the combination was never close.

However, human beings are made up of a combination of the body and the mind, and the medical science treating them must ultimately encompass not only the human body but also the mind; additionally, the value system embodied in society cannot be excluded. When human society develops, ethics and morality emerge. Human beings at the stage of manifestation of ethics and morality have characteristics that make them manifest, and these characteristics are as important as the genes that affect human mental and physical conditions. On the other hand, in this regard, as an ethical medical theory on the close union of mind and body, SCM is fundamentally different from Western medicine.[30]

> In terms of ethical medical theory of the close bonds of mind and body, SCM has not yet lost some of the insights lost by Western medicine.[31]

In short, while traditional oriental medicine was mainly established under the influence of Taoism, SCM has a theoretical basis in Confucianism. SCM is traditional oriental medicine wearing Confucian clothing.

SCM is a methodology that developed from the process of mental cultivation, but it is not simply a medicine intended to cure disease. Therefore, SCM has very different origins and contents from the syndrome medicine of *Huangdi neijing*. This is what confirms SCM as Dr. Yi Je-ma's unique features of medicine.

Thus, Sasang philosophy, which is the philosophical background of medicine, is composed of Neo-Confucian thought or original Confucian content. In other words, SCM was derived from traditional oriental medicine, and Sasang philosophy was derived from Neo-Confucian thought (original Confucian content). Therefore, it is a natural consequence that SCM and the existing oriental medicine are different and that Sasang philosophy and Neo-Confucian thought are different from each other.

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[30] Lee, *Taeyangin*, *soyangin*, *taeeumin*, *soeumin*, 10.
[31] Lee, *Taeyangin*, *soyangin*, *taeeumin*, *soeumin*, 10.




When Dr. Yi Je-ma's Sasang constitution is associated with medicine, it is called Sasang constitutional medicine (= B′), and when constitutionalism is connected with philosophy, it is called Sasang philosophy (= C′).

As mentioned above, traditional oriental medicine consists of the constituent elements of A (Taoism) and B (medicine). On the other hand, SCM consists of the elements of B (medicine) and C (Confucianism).

If you want to compare the two, or if you want to find the differences in content, the B in SCM should be explained as the B of existing oriental medicine.

In other words, it is difficult to compare the B of traditional oriental medicine with the C of SCM, so the gap between them becomes larger. In addition, the comparison between the A in traditional oriental medicine and the C in SCM is unfair. Thus, we naturally conclude that both are essentially different.

However, if there is some difference between the B in traditional oriental medicine and the B in SCM, it should be possible to reveal how much the difference is, or the contents of the difference. Of course, it is possible to mention A or C together when discussing B, under the necessity of examining the theoretical or ideological change process. Comparisons of A, B, and C should not be neglected.

However, if you talk about the B in SCM and talk about A or C without talking about the B of existing oriental medicine, you will reach the wrong conclusion.

In short, it is difficult to compare the medical contents (B) of SCM with those of previous Confucianism (or original Confucianism, C), rather than comparing it with existing oriental medicine (B).

Likewise, the comparative object of Sasang philosophy (C′) is not oriental medicine (B) but previous Confucianism (original Confucianism, C). By the same logic, the comparative subject of SCM (B′) is not previous Confucianism (C) but oriental medicine (B).

Nevertheless, what would happen if we compared Sasang philosophy with traditional oriental medicine? Also, what would happen if we compared SCM with Confucianism? It is easy to come to the conclusion that the gap would become bigger and that SCM is "intrinsically" different from existing oriental medicine (or Neo-Confucian thought).

However, in most previous research papers, not only comparisons of B and B' but also of B and C', A and C', and C' and B' are mentioned. Also, based on this, the difference between SCM (Sasang philosophy) and previous Neo-Confucianism or traditional oriental medicine is derived. So, the gap will surely get bigger.

> SCM is known to us as a new form of medical thought that is different from traditional oriental medicine. However, oriental medical science often classifies SCM as medical thought that belongs to the category of oriental medicine. Because of this classification, SCM is seen as a branch of oriental medicine, but its content also fits in the category of oriental medicine, although that does not mean that this classification is equivalent to the theory of two medical ideas. This is because the same category does not include the identity of theory. I believe that both medical ideas have fundamentally different philosophical backgrounds.[32]

However, it is difficult to find an anti-Neo-Confucian metaphysical inclination in Dr. Yi's work. He does not directly rail against Neo-Confucian metaphysics anywhere in his book. In other words, the fundamental view *li-qi* 理氣 (dualistic position of Zhu Xi) theory is not very different from Zhu Xi. Although he did not have an active interest in li-qi theory, he tended to follow the principle of learning of Master Zhu, to the extent of suggesting that the concept of *haoran zhi li* 浩然之理 (magnanimous *li*)[33] corresponds to *haoran zhi qi* 浩然之氣 (magnanimous *qi*), but Dr. Yi Je-ma's philosophical backgrounds is often misleading as he use new concepts that are different

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[32] Choi, *Yi Je-ma-ui cheolhak*, 15-16.

[33] This term is used by Dr. Lee in a creative way. In addition, he creates and uses some new terms—*sasangin* 四象人 (four kinds of constitutional man), *jangni* 臟理 (principle of the internal organs), *jangbu seongni* 臟腑性理 (human nature and natural laws of the internal organs), etc. However, these terms was made as necessary in the process of linking Confucianism and Medicine, not entirely new.

from the existing Neo-Confucian metaphysics while attempting to combine the foundations of Confucianism and medical science. Fundamentally, he only developed ideas under the influence of the classics. Therefore, the argument that Dr. Yi created an original thought system solely by emphasizing the uniqueness of his ideology is hardly convincing.[34]

Scholars are divided on whether or not Yi Je-ma accepted the *wuxinglun* 五行論 (Five Elements theory), which is the basis of oriental medical theory. There are three main views on Yi's stance on the *wuxinglun* First, there is the opinion that Yi denied the *wuxinglun*. Some think that Yi did not take the theory seriously because it is not present in the *Dongui susebowon* or *Gyeokchigo*. The second view is that the existing *wuxinglun* system can be applied to Yi's theory. The third view is that it is possible to understand Yi's theory using a new *wuxinglun*, but not the existing one. Han Dong-seok's 韓東錫 (1911-1968) *Dongui susebowon juseok* 東醫壽世保元註釋 (*Dongui susebowon* with Annotation) is the representative case.[35]

As is well known, the theory of oriental medicine is based on the *wuyun* 五運 (doctrine of the Five Circulatory Phases) and the *liuqi* 六氣 (Six Seasonal Influences) based on the *yin-yang* and *wuxinglun*. It is all based on the *wuxinglun* that separates the viscera into *wuzang* 五臟 (five viscera: heart, liver, spleen, lungs, and kidneys) and *liufu* 六腑 (six entrails, the six viscera [bowels]), and explains their interrelationships as *xiangsheng* 相生 (five elements producing one another) and *xiangke* 相剋 (five elements destroying one another).

Consequently, previous research into SCM has been largely based on the *yin* and *yang wuxinglun*. However, based on the fact that no mention of the *wuxinglun* can be found in SCM, it is argued that SCM is a new type of medicine with different philosophical grounds; it has broadened its horizons by overcoming the *wuxinglun* and establishing its own medical theory.[36] This argument exists because D and D′ are considered different. Researchers who consider that there has been a fundamental change in traditional medicine due to the influence of C understand that D and D′ are different. Of course, Yi Je-ma's SCM started on the basis of Confucianism, but it is far removed from the traditional approach to Confucianism in its contents.[37]

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[34] Heo, *Dongmu Yi Je-ma-ui cheolhak sasang*, 111.
[35] Heo, *Dongmu Yi Je-ma-ui cheolhak sasang*, 153-154.
[36] Choi, *Yi Je-ma-ui cheolhak*, 16-17.
[37] Choi, *Yi Je-ma-ui cheolhak*, 36.

However, it should be noted that when it comes to the *wuxinglun*, the views of A and C were no different from each other from the beginning.

Generally, it is said that SCM was formed based on the study of Confucianism and TCM, which were formed mainly under the influence of Taoism. So, what is the difference between Taoism and Confucianism? There are many differences, but previous researchers focused on the *wuxinglun*. In this case, we should ask: "Does Confucianism deny the *wuxinglun*?"

Let us assume that it is possible and reasonable to argue that "the SCM founded on studying Confucianism denies the *wuxinglun* because Confucianism denies the *wuxinglun*." However, the Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi says that "The harmony of the five phases of change and the beginning and ending of all things are subject to dominance in *yin* and *yang*."

One should consider that "the five phases of change were created from *yin-yang* in a constant order." Further, in *Yixue qimeng* 易學啓蒙 (Instruction for Beginners on the Study of the *Changes*), "fifty-five" is the number of the *Hetu* 河圖 (Chart of the Yellow River), and all of them are the will of Kongzi and are the doctrine of Confucianism. Therefore, as far as the Five Elements theory is concerned, it is unreasonable to compare Confucianism with oriental medicine, which accepts the *wuxinglun*.

Although there may be some disagreement as to whether or not Yi Je-ma accepted the *wuxinglun* which is the basis of oriental medicine, it is clear that he developed his arguments based on the *yin-yang* theory. This is in contrast to the views of some scholars of the realist school of Confucianism, who deny the *yin-yang* theory and the *wuxinglun*.[38] As mentioned above, "the five phases of change were created from *yin-yang*."

## 5. Conclusion

Dongmu 東武 Yi Je-ma has been called the last Confucian scholar of the Joseon dynasty. At the end of the nineteenth century, he created SCM, a new and unique constitutional medicine. Taking a wider view, it seems reasonable to say that his theory, which emphasizes practical morality, could be considered as a new attempt at Zhu Xi philosophy. He identified four Sasang constitutions: *taeyangin*, *taeeumin*, *soyangin*, and *soeumin*.

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[38] Heo, *Dongmu Yi Je-ma-ui cheolhak sasang*, 147.

His cultivation has, in actuality, accomplished the goal of good health but, in the end, the true goal is to become a sage.[39] In other words, it can be said that the goal is to acquire the traditional Confucian spirit according to the reinterpretation of *Sishu* 四書 (Four Books) and *Sanjing* 三經 (Three Classics). It can also be understood that he drew not only on Mengzi, but also on the *Zhongyong* and the *Daxue*.

He presented the treatment principles of SCM. He said that an unwavering mind is characteristic of a virtuous person; the unwavering mind is the starting point. Specifically, this entails balancing and living in harmony with the environment. This is the middle path known as the Golden Mean; it is like understanding the true nature of people (knowing others).

As previously mentioned, his treatment principles originated from the spirit of "regulation based on the Golden Mean" of Confucianism. In this way, Sasang constitutional theory has as its background the Confucianism that had been set forth in Korea. The social situation of the time greatly influenced its formation.

During Dr. Yi's time, there was much social abuse of the Neo-Confucian philosophies and he strongly felt that it was his mission to transcend this and create a new thought and philosophy. SCM and the Sasang philosophy were the results of this mission. SCM is based on the theory of the *sawon gujo* 四元構造 (Four Principles) and, rather than being tied to Taoism, it has an intimate relationship with Confucianism. The concepts of SCM are not borrowed from the Inner Classic, but rather are derived from the *sa*, *sim*, *sin*, and *mul* theory of Confucianism.

SCM differs from TCM in its creation. While searching for self-cultivation methods that adhered to Confucian principles, Yi Je-ma realized that the spiritual characteristics of individuals were different. In short, TCM came from the perspective of syndromes, but Sasang constitutional theory is a new theory based on humans themselves; TCM was mainly established under the influence of Taoism, whereas SCM based its rationale on Confucianism.

In other words, Sasang philosophy consists of either Neo-Confucianism or original Confucianism. Specifically, SCM was derived from traditional oriental medicine, and Sasang philosophy was derived from Confucianism (Neo-Confucianism).

Therefore, if you want to compare the two, SCM should be compared with existing Chinese medicine. Likewise, Sasang philosophy deserves to be compared

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[39] Heo, "Dongmu Yi Je-ma-ui seonjin yuhak jeongsin," 112.

to Confucianism. However, SCM researchers have historically compared Sasang philosophy with TCM or studied SCM in the context of Confucianism.

Thus, it has been concluded that the gap between comparators is great, and that SCM is fundamentally different from TCM. This paper focused on the study of SCM, correcting errors caused by the specificity of the philosophical background of SCM and revealing the advantages of SCM compared to conventional medicine.

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# 李濟馬四象體質論新的詮釋

許 勛

**中文摘要**

四象醫學在漢醫學史上具有獨特的特徵。傳統的漢醫學主要在道教的影響下成立，而四象醫學的思想基礎是儒家思想和性理學。四象醫學是傳統漢醫學換上儒學的衣服而來的。因此，作爲四象醫學哲學背景的四象哲學由性理學或原始儒學的內容構成。換句話說，四象醫學是從現有的漢醫學中誕生的，四象哲學是從性理學(原始留學)中誕生的。因此，四象醫學和現有漢醫學，四象哲學和性理學各有不同，在理論，內容上具有隔閡是必然的。

如果說現有的漢醫學由A(道教)和B(醫學)構成(內容)要素構成，那麼四象醫學則由B(醫學)和C(儒學)要素構成。而且如果你想比較兩者，或者如果你想要尋找內容上的不同點，四象醫學的B應該用現有漢醫學的B進行說明。

也就是說，現有漢醫學的B和四象醫學的C很難進行比較。那麼，兩者之間的差距會更大。另外，現有漢醫學的A和四象醫學的C的比較不合理。這樣，自然得出了兩者在本質上就完全不同的結論。當然，在研究理論或思想變化過程的情況下，討論B，可以同時提及A或C。但是在說四象醫學的B時，不說現有漢醫學的B，而只說A或C，就會得出錯誤的結論。

但是，現有的四象醫學研究者們將四象哲學與現有的漢醫學進行比較，或者將四象醫學與儒學(性理學)進行比較。因此，比較對象之間的隔閡越來越大，人們得出的結論是，四象醫學與現有的漢醫學(或性理學)“本質不同”。本論文主要着眼於糾正四象醫學研究中，由于四象醫學哲學背景的特殊性而產生的誤區，與現有醫學相比，揭示四象醫學所具有的優點。

**關鍵詞：**李濟馬，四象體質醫學，四象哲學，漢醫學，新儒學

# 錢時《論語》詮釋的特色

唐 明 貴

**中文提要**

錢時《融堂四書管見》中的《論語》詮釋，是陸九淵心學一派《論語》學的代表作。他所做《論語》詮釋，一方面注重訓詁，不僅重視對字詞的注音，而且重視對名物典制的釋義，具有濃厚的漢學底蘊。另一方面，又注重義理闡發，不僅重視心學本體論的建設，而且重視從工夫論的角度思考內聖外王問題，具有鮮明的心學特色。這在《論語》詮釋史上可謂獨具特色。

**關鍵詞**：錢時，融堂四書管見，論語，詮釋，心學

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* 唐明貴：聊城大學哲學系教授，中國社會科學院哲學所博士後（13370968787@163.com）

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## 一、序言

錢時(1175-1244), 字子是, 號融堂, 南宋淳安縣蜀阜(今浙江淳安縣蜀阜)人。幼年即奇偉不群, 讀書不爲世儒之習, 絕意科考。因遊陸九淵弟子楊簡門下, 遂成爲心學學派中人。著有《周易釋傳》、《尚書演義》、《學詩管見》、《春秋大旨》、《融堂四書管見》等。其中《融堂四書管見》包括《論語》十卷,《孝經》、《大學》、《中庸》各一卷, "俱先列《經》文, 略加音訓, 而詮釋其大旨於後。《孝經》用古文。《大學》但析爲六章, 不分《經》、《傳》。蓋時之學出於楊簡, 簡之學出於陸九淵, 門戶迥殊, 故不用程朱之本"。[1] 茲以《論語》十卷爲本, 管窺錢時詮釋《論語》之特色。

## 二、略加音訓

音訓, 是指對古籍中的字詞注音釋義。由於錢時《融堂四書管見》是"因講習積而成編", 是"傳之家塾"[2] 之作, 故而注重對字詞的注音和釋義。

(一) 注音。在古代, 中國沒有拼音字母, 所以古人要標識難讀的漢字, 只能借助其他的漢字來進行。於是乎便先後產生了如字法、直音法、反切法等注音方式。這在錢時《融堂四書管見·論語》中多有體現。

第一, 如字法。當字同義異而有兩個或兩個以上讀法的時候, 要以習慣上最通行的讀音讀, 按照最通常的意義解釋, 叫如字。如:

《爲政篇》"吾十有五而志於學, 三十而立, 四十而不惑, 五十而知天命, 六十而耳順, 七十而從心所欲, 不逾矩"章, 錢時指出, "七十而從心所欲"中的"從"如字。[3]

《里仁篇》"苟志於仁矣, 無惡也"章, 錢時指出, "無惡也"中的"惡"如字。[4]

《述而篇》"多聞, 擇其善者而從之, 多見而識之, 知之次也"下, 錢時指出, "多見而識之"中的"識"如字。[5]

《先進篇》"魯人爲長府"下, 錢時指出, "長府"中的"長"如字。[6]

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1 永瑢等,《四庫全書總目》, 頁271-272。
2 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁580。
3 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁584。
4 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁593。
5 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁610。
6 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁626。

《微子篇》“齊人歸女樂, 季桓子受之”下, 錢時指出, “齊人歸女樂”中的“歸”如字或作饋。[7]

第二, 直音法。所謂直音法, 即用同音字來注音。如：

《學而篇》“學而時習之, 不亦說乎？有朋自遠方來, 不亦樂乎”章, 錢時指出, “不亦說乎”中的“說”讀作“悅”, “不亦樂”中的“樂”讀作“洛”。[8]

《爲政篇》“人而無信, 不知其可也。大車無輗, 小車無軏, 其何以行之哉”章, 錢時指出, “小車無軏”中的“軏”讀作“月”。[9]

《八佾篇》“子入大廟, 每事問”章, 錢時指出, “子入大廟”中的“大”讀作“太”。[10]

《公冶長篇》“子貢問曰：‘賜也何如？’子曰：‘女器也。’曰：‘何器也？’曰：‘瑚璉也’”下, 錢時指出, “女器也”中的“女”讀作“汝”, “瑚璉”中的“瑚”讀作“胡”。[11]

《鄉黨篇》“食不厭精, 膾不厭細“下, 錢時指出, “食不厭精”中的“食”讀作“嗣”。[12]

《先進篇》“千乘之國, 攝乎大國之間, 加之以師旅, 因之以饑饉”下, 錢時指出, “因之以饑饉”中的“饑”讀作“機”、“饉”讀作“僅”。[13]

第三, 反切法。反切即拼讀的意思, 用兩個漢字相拼給一個漢字注音。其中第一個字(反切上字)注聲母, 第二個字(反切下字)注韻母和聲調。如《論語·先進》“子路、曾晳、冉有、公西華侍坐”章, 錢時注曰：

> 子路、曾晳[星曆切]、冉有、公西華侍坐[才臥切]。子曰：“以吾一日長乎爾 ,毋吾以也。居則曰：‘不吾知也！’如或知爾 ,則何以哉？”子路率爾而對曰：“千乘之國 ,攝乎大國之間 ,加之以師旅 ,因之以饑饉；由也爲之 ,比[必二切。下同]及三年 ,可使有勇 ,且知方也。”夫子哂[詩忍切]之。“求！爾何如？”對曰：“方六七十 ,如五六十 ,求也爲之 ,比及三年 ,可使足民。如其禮樂 ,以俟君子。”“赤！爾何如？”對曰：“非曰能之 ,願學焉。宗廟之事 ,如會同 ,端章甫 ,願爲小相焉。”“點！爾何如？”鼓瑟希 ,鏗[苦耕切]爾 ,舍瑟而作。對曰：“異乎三子者之撰[士免切]。”子曰：“何傷乎？亦各言其志也。”曰：“莫春者 ,春服既成。冠者五六人 ,童子六七人 ,浴乎沂[魚依切] ,風乎舞雩 ,詠而歸。”夫子喟然歎曰：“吾與點也！”三子者出 ,曾晳後。曾晳曰：“夫三子者之言何如？”子曰：“亦各言其志也已矣。”曰：“夫子何哂由也？”曰：“爲國以禮 ,其言不讓 ,是故哂之。”“唯求則非邦也與？”“安見方六七十如五六十而非邦也者？“唯赤則非邦也與？”“宗廟會同。非諸侯而何？赤也爲之小 ,孰能爲之大？”[14]

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7 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁668。
8 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁581。
9 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁588。
10 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁591。
11 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁597。
12 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁622。
13 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁629。

在這段文字中, 錢時利用反切法對其中的“晢”、“坐”、“比”、“鏗”、“撰”、“沂”進行了反切注音。

（二）注聲調。聲調又叫字調, 是指聲音的高低升降的變化。它具有區別意義的作用, 聲調不同, 字就不同。如《學而篇》“其爲人也孝弟, 而好犯上者, 鮮矣”下, 錢時對“弟”、“好”、“鮮”的讀音予以了注解, 其中“弟”、“好”爲“去聲”, “鮮”爲“上聲”。[15] 又,《子路篇》子貢問“何如斯可謂之士矣”章, 錢時對孔子所言“使於四方”中的“使”、“鄉黨稱弟焉”中的“弟”、“行必果”中的“行”的讀音進行了說明, 指出三者都當讀爲“去聲”。[16]

（三）釋義。爲求得經文之確義, 錢時在《融堂四書管見·論語》中還運用了聲訓、義訓兩種訓解詞義的方法。

先看聲訓, 如《爲政篇》“爲政以德, 譬如北辰, 居其所而衆星共之”下, 錢時注曰：“政者, 正也, 所以正人之不正也。德者, 得也, 不失其本心之謂也。”[17]《八佾篇》“夏禮吾能言之, 杞不足徵也；殷禮吾能言之, 宋不足徵也。文獻不足故也, 足則吾能徵之矣”下, 錢時注云：“徵, 證也。”“獻, 賢也。”[18] 上述兩例中的“政者, 正也”、“德者, 得也”、“徵, 證也”、“獻, 賢也”, 都是通過運用漢字聲音的相同或相近來探求和詮釋詞義, 亦即因聲求義。

再看義訓, 它是指以通語、常言去解釋不易知的文語、古語或方俗語。其方式主要有直訓和義界兩種。直訓就是用一個義同或義近的字直接去解釋另一個字。如《子罕篇》“子罕言利與命與仁”下, 錢時注曰：“罕, 少也。”[19]《顏淵篇》“草上之風, 必偃”下, 錢時注曰：“偃, 仆也。”[20]《子路篇》“使於四方, 不能專對”下, 錢時注曰：“專, 獨也。”[21] 義界就是揭示並確定經典中字詞的涵義的界限。如《八佾篇》“八佾舞於庭”下, 錢時注曰：“佾, 舞列也。天子八, 諸侯六, 大夫四, 士二。每佾八人。”[22]《雍也篇》“子華使於齊, 冉子爲其母請粟。子曰：‘與之釜。’請益。曰：‘與之庾。’冉子與之粟五秉。子曰：‘赤之適齊也, 乘肥馬, 衣輕裘。吾聞之也, 君子周急不繼富。’原思爲之宰, 與之粟九百, 辭。子曰：‘毋！以與爾鄰里鄉黨乎’”下, 錢時注曰：“釜, 六斗四升。庾, 十六斗。秉, 十六斛。九百, 九百斛。五家爲鄰, 五鄰爲里, 萬二千五百家爲鄉, 五百家爲黨。”[23]《鄉黨篇》“鄉人飲酒, 杖者出, 斯出矣”下, 錢時注曰：“杖者, 老人也。六十杖於鄉。”[24]《先進篇》“千乘之國, 攝乎大國之

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14 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁629。
15 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁581。
16 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁639。
17 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁584。
18 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁590。
19 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁616。
20 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁634。
21 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁636。
22 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁589。
23 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁601-602。

間, 加之以師旅, 因之以饑饉；由也爲之, 比及三年, 可使有勇, 且知方也”下, 錢時注曰：“二千五百人爲師, 五百人爲旅。穀不熟曰饑。菜不熟曰饉。”[25]

通過和朱熹《論語集注》的比較, 我們不難發現, 錢時雖然是心學派的傳人, 但吊詭的是, 其音訓基本上是承襲了朱子的《集注》, 而少有改變, 頗具漢學色彩。這顯然是與寫書的初衷──家塾講習之作息息相關。這在“論語學史”上也是頗爲值得關注的一個方面。

## 三、闡發本心論

作爲南宋心學派的代表人物, 錢時在詮釋《論語》時, 既秉承了陸九淵和楊簡的“本心論”思想, 又在此基礎上有所引申和發揮。

心學的主要特徵就是不僅把心視爲具有思維功能的一個器官, 而且將其視爲具有萬物本源性質的抽象本體。錢時的思想亦是如此。

一方面, 他承認心是人體的一個器官, 具有思慮的功能。在詮釋“君子有九思：視思明, 聽思聰, 色思溫, 貌思恭, 言思忠, 事思敬, 疑思問, 忿思難, 見得思義”時, 他指出：“此一章正是行著習察精密處, 人之行已, 那一事不就不思上壞了。其目雖九, 其本則一。何謂一？曰由乎心。不明乎心而欲逐項正救, 難矣。思明則非禮勿視, 思聰則非禮勿聽, 思忠則非禮勿言。此外大抵非禮勿動之事也。”[26] 也就是說, 思明、思聰、思溫、思恭、思忠、思敬、思問、思難、思義皆由心而生。這實際上與《孟子·告子上》所說的“心之官則思”異曲同工。

另一方面, 他又提出了“心之本體”, 並以此作爲構建學術思想體系的基本範疇。这里的“心之本體”亦稱“心本”, “心本”猶“本心”。《漢書·郭解傳》曰：“既已振人之命, 不矜其功, 其陰賊著於心本發於睚眥如故云。”顏師古注云：“心本, 猶言本心也。”在錢時看來, “心之本體, 與天同運, 自強不息, 所以配天”, [27] 本體之心可以與天相比並, 具有天的屬性。它無邊無際, 無所不在, 無所不通, “心本未始不廣大也”, [28] “心本虛明, 無方無體, 範圍天地, 其大無外, 只爲有我”, [29] “本心昭融, 通於神明, 光於四海, 無所不通”。[30] 此虛明之心, 至大無外, 將天地都囊括在內, 一切萬物都源於此, “物物皆我心”, [31] 心外無物。在錢時看來, 本心不存在時間和種族的差別, “此心萬古

24 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁623。
25 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁629。
26 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁660-661。
27 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁666-667。
28 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁586。
29 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁630。
30 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁585。

同, 本無夷夏殊”。[32] 在詮釋《衛靈公篇》“有教無類”章時, 他更指出, 無論貧富、貴賤、智愚、善惡, 人同此心, 心同此理。他說：“種類雖或不同, 然同有此心, 則同有此理。”[33] 這裏更多的是對前人的承襲。

在詮釋過程中, 錢時還對本心予以了多角度的解讀, 賦予了其更多的內涵。一是“仁即人之本心”。[34] 在詮釋《學而篇》“巧言令色鮮矣仁”章時, 錢時說：“仁, 人心也。”“得其本心, 斯謂之仁。”[35] 仁是人心所固有的, 人之本心就是仁。因此, 欲求仁, 需覺其本心, 而覺就是指內心的感悟。他說：“覺其本心而至於常, 覺常明者仁。”[36] 心欲求仁, 則仁自至, 不假外求。他說：“仁, 人心也, 豈遠於人哉？然而舉世茫茫, 不啻數千萬里之隔者, 人自遠之耳。欲仁, 仁至, 非有物自外而來也。”[37] 在錢時看來, 仁者應“用心高遠, 以廣惠愛爲仁”, 努力做到“己欲立而欲人之皆立, 己欲達而欲人之皆達, 此仁者之心也”。[38] 他進而指出, 仁者不能失去本心。在詮釋《衛靈公篇》“志士仁人, 無求生以害仁, 有殺身以成仁”時, 錢時說：“仁者, 不失其本心之謂。義所當死而幸生苟免, 則本心亡矣。生猶無生也。當死而死, 浩然無愧, 乃所以成仁。雖然各惟其可而已。苟可以不死而勇於自殺, 則與求生害仁者, 均一失也。豈志士仁人之所爲哉？”[39] 義當該死, 而苟活於世, 就失去了本心, 就有害於仁。

二是禮爲本心之妙用。在錢時看來, 禮樂與人心關係密切。他說：“禮者, 人心之大閑, 天則之不可逾者, 故立於禮。樂所以養人心之和, 使無非僻之侵, 故成於樂。”[40] “仁, 人心也。禮者, 履此而已。樂者, 樂此而已。非徒玉帛鐘鼓之云也。不仁則何以爲禮樂？此爲前二者發。”[41] 如此一來, 錢時就把禮樂和人心搭掛了起來, 二者也成了人心中先天固有的元素。在《新安州學講義》中, 錢時通過對《顏淵篇》“顏淵問仁”章予以了詳細的講解, 進而探討了禮和本心的關係。他說：“禮者, 天則之不可逾者也, 一逾此, 則無非己私。有一毫己私, 即不足以爲禮, 有一毫非禮, 即不足以爲仁。先聖於此, 不曰克己爲仁, 而曰‘克己復禮爲仁’, 非於禮之外而他有所謂仁也, 曰‘復禮爲仁’者, 所以明復禮之即仁也。大哉, 禮乎！分而爲天地者此也, 轉而爲陰陽者此也, 變而爲四時者此也, 列而爲鬼神者此也, 此即本心之妙, 即所謂仁也。克己即復禮矣, 復禮即爲仁矣。夫以天地之廣大, 陰陽之闔辟, 四時之運

31 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁656。
32 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁656。
33 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁657。
34 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁630。
35 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁581。
36 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁599。
37 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁611。
38 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁605。
39 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁652。
40 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁614。
41 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁589。

行, 鬼神之變化, 而此禮實爲之則。一日克己, 豁然清明, 道心大同, 範圍無外, 謂之天下歸仁, 良不爲過。”[42] 禮之所以能成爲天地、陰陽、四時、鬼神運行變化的規則或規律, 關鍵就在於人之本心發揮了作用。

三是本心具有正直、無邪、不偏不倚的特點。在錢時看來, 本心是正直無邪的。他說：“本心本直本無邪。”[43] 本心是不偏不倚的, 他說：“本心虛明, 略無偏倚, 是之謂中。”[44] “本心本中, 本無偏也。抑其過, 勉其不及, 則中。”[45]

正是由於本心具有上述屬性, 所以錢時才在承襲陸九淵“學問之要, 得其本心而已”[46] 思想基礎上, 將“本心”作爲構建學術思想體系的基本範疇。他之所以不直接用“心”, 而使用“本心”, 主要是爲了“強調道德意識是每個人心的本來狀態, 它存在於任何時代任何人身上, 是永恆的和普遍的”。[47] 这無疑是進一步發展了陸九淵和楊簡的學說。

## 四、抉發修養工夫論

在錢時看來, 仁義忠信等道德原則是人的天性所固有的, 不是外鑠的。他說：“天爵良貴, 天之所以予我, 而人之所以自別於禽獸者。”[48] 此處的“天爵良貴”出自《孟子·告子上》, 指的就是仁義忠信等道德原則。正是因爲這些道德原則是天賦的, 所以錢時主張修養工夫在於求諸內, 在於存養。具體方法是：

第一, 內省。所謂內省, 就是對自己的所思所爲進行內在的反思, 看其是否合乎道德規範的要求。錢時非常重視內省工夫。在他看來, 仁義忠信等道德原則之所以在某些人身上丟失了, 關鍵就在於這些人不知自我反省。他說：“我之所固有者, 乃茫然不知自反。”[49] 他們“甘心自棄, 溷溷於蛆蠅糞壤而不知反”。[50] 因此, 人民欲提高自己的道德修養, 就必須進行自反內省。他說：“學者誠切己而反求, 庶不繆其所趨向矣。”[51] 在錢時看來, “君子務內, 只是自反”, [52] “君子所可致力者, 盡其在我而已”。[53] 只有內省, 才能自得, “聖人之

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42 黃宗羲、全祖望,《宋元學案·慈湖學案》, 頁2486。
43 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁604。
44 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁676。
45 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁628。
46 陸九淵,《陸九淵集》, 頁519。
47 陳來,《宋明理學》, 頁191-192。
48 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁639。
49 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁646。
50 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁639。
51 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁605。
52 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁654。

心, 無入而不自得也”, [54] “一旦感悟, 心通內明, 乃自得耳”。[55] 只有內省, 才能改過遷善, “內省則改過”[56]；只有做到無愧於內心, 才能恢復心的本然狀態。在詮釋《顏淵篇》“內省不疚”時, 他指出：“不疚者, 此心澄然, 無纖毫疵病之謂。素其位而行, 無入而不自得, 何所憂懼乎？……內省二字, 是用力處。”[57] 只有發自內心的自我拷問, 才能知錯改錯。在詮釋《公冶長篇》“吾未見能見其過而內自訟者也”時, 錢時注曰：“是非之心, 人皆有之。鮮有過而不知者, 不能訟, 故不改耳。發於本心, 自悔自罪, 痛自咎責, 如抱冤屈以求伸者焉, 方可謂之內自訟。念念不舍, 過無由生, 訟不由中, 改必不力。夫子以爲未見而發‘已矣’之歎, 警動學者改過之機, 至深至切。”[58] 看到自己的錯誤, 能發自本心的自我反省, 才能徹底改掉。

第二, 居敬。錢時非常重視居敬的修養工夫。在他看來, “人患不能敬耳”, [59] 只有持身恭敬, 才能敬行其事, “所居者敬, 則所行無非敬”。[60] 因此, 修身需以敬爲主。錢時在詮釋《憲問篇》“子路問君子”章時指出：“修己以敬, 正《大學》之要旨。所謂治國之道及平天下, 皆本於是。子路不能切實內省, 意若未足, 而再三問之。夫子既答以安人, 又答以安百姓, 次第推究, 不離修己二字。又恐其未喻也, 直以堯舜猶病答之。嗚呼！敬哉！外此而求, 多也哉？”[61] 這就是說, 保持敬心, 維持敬意是修身第一要務。而此敬心, 是人固有之本心。他說：“孩提之童, 知愛其親, 本未始不孝也, 惟不敬, 故失之。敬則私意斷絕, 本心昭融, 通於神明, 光於四海, 無所不通, 於是乎在養。而不敬, 與獸畜之者無異, 謂之孝可乎？雖然指能養者而言耳。”[62] “斯民尊君親上之心, 本未始不敬, 本未始不忠, 本未始不勸。上之人無道以臨之, 遂使民彝泯亂, 不獲盡其分。季康子, 魯大夫也, 由是而知所以臨民, 則善矣。抑思敬忠以勸, 所以事其君哉？”[63] 孝親尊上之心爲人所固有, 或受私意蒙蔽, 或因無道之治的影響, 才導致此心的斷絕。修養的過程就是摒棄外來的干擾, 保持敬心。“若以利祿先入, 其心只是私意, 安得能敬？”[64] 如何保持敬心呢？需從小教之以禮。錢時說：“賊, 仁者謂之賊, 侈然自放則本心亡矣。非賊而何？然其病則自不孫弟始。方其童幼, 傲然莫知有敬事其長上之

53 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁631。
54 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁609。
55 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁620。
56 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁595。
57 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁631。
58 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁601。
59 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁657。
60 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁601。
61 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁648-649。
62 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁585。
63 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁587。
64 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁657。

道, 不孫不弟, 習以性成。及其長也, 又無一善之可稱。果何貴於食天地之粟, 而謂是人也？老而不死是爲賊耳。因原壤踞肆, 推明三節以諭之, 復叩其脛以警之。夫子教人未有如此章之切直者。然則童蒙之日, 可不以孫弟爲先務, 而使習於禮訓也哉！”[65] 只有自幼道之以禮, 才能習以性成, 使之熟知“敬事其長上之道”。

第三, 心有所主。在錢時看來, “人之心, 固各有所主也”。[66] 只有心有所主, 才能言行不放逸, 才能屏去聞見思慮的煩擾, 才能強化自己的內心涵養。他說：“才不放逸, 則本心本自無害。居處恭, 不放逸於暗室屋漏之地也。執事敬, 與人忠, 不放逸於交事應物之時也。然有須臾間斷, 便不可。”[67] 而“一失所主, 橫流奔放, 其禍有不可勝言”。[68] 心無所主, 人之視聽言動就會毫無約束, 就會使本心受到傷害。在詮釋《里仁篇》“以約失之者鮮矣”章時, 他指出：“約, 不放逸也。約則有守, 自然寡過。才放逸, 便失了。”[69] 言行不放逸, 則表明心有所守, 自然過錯少；如果稍有放逸, 則會有害於本心。他說：“始昏始虧, 放逸乎天則之外, 而本心蝕矣。”[70] 如果過於放逸, 則會導致本心的消失, “侈然自放, 則本心亡矣”。[71]

既然“心有所主”如此重要, 那麼該主於什麼呢？錢時指出, “惟主於忠信, 方是立德之本”, [72] “所主者忠信, 大本立矣”。[73] “主忠信”在《論語》中先後出現了三次, 錢時認爲這體現了孔子的良苦用心, “主忠信凡三出, 示人立德之本, 至深切矣”。[74] 在他看來, 孔子所教也是以忠信爲主。在詮釋《述而篇》“子以四教：文、行、忠、信”章時, 錢時指出：“非文不著, 非行不實, 非忠信不立, 名四而實一。忠信爲主, 行次之, 文又次之。”[75] 進一步彰顯了忠信的地位。在他看來, 如果心主忠信, 則愛惡就不能爲所欲爲。他說：“《洪範》曰：‘無有作好, 遵王之道；無有作惡, 遵王之路。’愛惡皆私意也。死生有命, 豈他人私意所能爲哉？此惑之大者, 才主忠信, 自無此事。”[76] 主於忠信, 則能勝私爲公, 使私意無所施。

錢時指出, 作爲立身之本, 忠信在日常生活中斷不可一時一刻無之。他說：“日用工夫, 往往多就交際應酬上走作, 故曾子三省, 以忠信爲先。《記》

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65 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁649。
66 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁620。
67 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁638。
68 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁620。
69 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁596。
70 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁630。
71 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁649。
72 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁620。
73 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁582。
74 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁632。
75 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁610。
76 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁632-633。

曰：‘忠信大道。’《易》曰：‘忠信所以進德。’謀不忠, 交不信, 則所以傳而習之者, 何事哉？”[77] 因此, 孔子“或言或不言, 雖各有宜, 無往而非忠信篤敬也”。[78] 不惟聖人如此, 即使在州里蠻貊, 忠信之道也成爲人們遵奉的行爲規範。在《憲問篇》“子張問行”注中, 錢時對此予以了闡發：“子張嘗問干祿, 嘗問達, 此又問行, 大抵皆務外, 以求遂其所欲。夫子一使反求諸己, 就言行上切實用功, 正切子張之病而教之也。遠而蠻貊, 近而州里, 習俗雖異, 本心則同, 忠信篤敬感無不通。見其參前, 見其倚衡, 則是無時而非忠信篤敬也, 無往而非忠信篤敬也。舉天地萬物, 萬變萬化, 皆我忠信篤敬之妙也。行矣, 雖百世以俟, 聖人而不惑矣。何州里蠻貊之間哉？子張書紳, 惜乎未領。”[79] 把忠信視爲了本心固有的道德原則。

忠信不僅是修身之本, 而且在爲政之本。在錢時看來, “不欺於心爲忠”。[80] 他在詮釋《顏淵篇》“子張問政”章中孔子所言“居之無倦, 行之以忠”時, 指出：“無倦則不息, 以忠則不欺, 爲政之本也。一言以蔽之, 曰誠而已矣。夫子之告子張, 大抵如此。居是心之所安處。”[81] 執行政令時忠誠無欺, 不折不扣, 此之謂爲政之本。同時, 錢時還指出, “信則事事皆實, 無信則事事皆虛”, [82] 因此, 信無論是對個人而言, 還是對國家而言, 都具有重要的意義。在詮釋《顏淵篇》“子貢問政”章時, 他對此進行了詳細的解釋：“人之所信, 如木有根。其根一撥, 隨即僵朴。是故父子無信, 則無以親。君臣無信, 則無以義。夫婦無信, 則無以別。長幼無信, 則無以序。綱淪法斁, 人道泯滅矣。何自而能立哉？夫子始論爲政, 謂斯民不得其養, 不安其生, 則非空言所可孚耳, 非謂信在兵食之後也。兵食, 即所以信也。子貢直就三者反復問難, 究見根底。此聖門之所以善學歟。論食則兵爲輕, 論信則死爲輕。”[83] 信於人道、治道都舉足輕重, 決定著人能否立於世, 國能否長治久安。有鑒於此, 他建議爲政者存心於信, 以取信於民。他說：“寬則爲衆所歸, 信則爲民所賴, 敏則與天同運故有功, 公則一視同仁故說。此四者, 夫子所常言, 而帝王之所以治國平天下也。”[84] “寬、信、敏、公, 大抵是言其存心處。”[85] 這就是說, 只有心中懷信, 才能爲民所賴。

第四, 去意。楊簡“以不起意爲宗”, [86] 在他看來, 人心本清明, 動於意欲, 始有過。錢時繼承和發展了乃師的觀點。他認爲孔子所言“毋”乃是所以

77 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁582。
78 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁621。
79 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁651。
80 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁581。
81 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁633。
82 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁588。
83 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁632。
84 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁676。
85 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁677。
86 黃宗羲、全祖望,《宋元學案·慈湖學案》, 頁2479。

絕之意, “絕”乃是去之意。他說：“意、必、固、我皆私也, 大抵都從意上起, 一節深一節。本心澄然虛明, 如何著得此四字。絕者, 去之。毋者, 所以絕也。”[87]

在錢時看來, 人先天固有之心, 清虛純潔, 澄然清明：“本心虛明純然”, [88] “心本洞然, 萬里昭徹, 無纖毫凝滯也”, [89] “君子之心, 虛明洞然, 無毫髮意念”。[90] 認爲只要“起意”, 便會導致本心的偏離。他說：“本心本直, 微起意, 即失之流俗。”[91] “心本直也, 有一點私意, 便失其直。”[92] 他還把仁、本心與意聯繫起來, 指出：“不違仁者, 無纖毫意念蔽其本心也。”[93] 而一旦意起, 便會違仁, 便會蒙蔽本心：“念慮之微, 纖毫微動, 便是違仁, 豈若小人之所謂不仁者哉？顛冥人欲橫流之中, 醉生夢死, 浮沉溷溷, 安知本心之本仁也？”[94] 意起欲興, 使人喪失澄明之心, 害道甚矣。錢時進而對意起之後的危害進行了剖析。在《新安州學講義》中談到《顏淵篇》“顏淵問仁”章時, 他指出：“仁, 人心也。此心即仁, 虛明渾融, 本無虧闕, 爲意所動始失其所以爲仁, 爲物所遷始失其所以爲仁, 爲習所移始失其所以爲仁, 爲欲所縱始失其所以爲仁, 狂迷顛倒, 醉生夢死, 昏昏憒憒, 日用而不知, 皆己私爲之窟宅, 非本心然也。”[95] 在他看來, 如果本心上有私意, 就不能躬行恭寬信敏惠之事：“本心上有纖毫私意, 如何行得此五事？能行五者於天下, 即爲仁矣。恭則誠, 寬則裕, 信則實, 敏則不懈, 惠則溥。”[96] 如果率意而爲, 則與禽獸無別：“率意妄作, 幾無以自別於禽獸。”[97]

既然“起意”有害於本心, 那麼如何才能做到不起意, 從而保持本心的虛明純然之態呢？一是覺其本心, 以仁守之, 以禮行之。在詮釋《學而篇》首章時, 錢時注曰：“學者, 覺其所固有而已, 故曰：‘大學之道, 在明明德。’心本無體, 虛明無所不照；爲物所誘, 爲意所蔽, 爲情所縱, 而昭昭者昏昏矣。是故貴於覺也, 不覺則何以習？”[98] 這里, 錢時將“學”釋爲“覺所固有”, 並強調心本來虛明澄澈, 但易爲物所誘、爲意所蔽、爲情所縱, 所以“覺”就是使心恢復虛明澄然的原初狀態。他進而指出, 人要想成就內聖外王之業, 就必須在覺此本心的基礎上, 守此本心, 去除意欲念動, 做到臨民時端莊, 舉措施爲時唯禮是從。在解釋“知及之, 仁不能守之, 雖得之, 必失之。知及之, 仁能

87 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁616。
88 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁602。
89 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁627。
90 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁612。
91 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁600。
92 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁654。
93 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁602。
94 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁642。
95 黃宗羲、全祖望,《宋元學案·慈湖學案》, 頁2486。
96 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁663。
97 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁648。
98 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁581。

守之, 不莊以蒞之, 則民不敬。知及之, 仁能守之, 莊以蒞之, 動之不以禮, 未善也”章時, 錢時說：“知及之者, 覺此本心之謂也。覺則至矣, 故曰知及。大學之道, 在明明德。《晉》之《象》曰：‘君子以自昭明德。’明此, 斯謂之知。守此, 知而不失, 斯謂之仁。舊習蔽錮, 安能盡淨, 意欲念動, 如雲忽興, 兢業不繼, 用力微懈, 雖得必失。昏昏如, 故甚可畏也。仁能守矣, 至於臨民則又不可不莊矣, 至於舉措施爲則又不可不以禮。知及仁守, 所以成己也。莊蒞禮動, 所以經世也。異端之教, 自謂識心見性, 而呵佛罵祖, 果莊已乎？離倫絕類, 果禮已乎？”[99] 只有覺其本心, 且持之以恆的守之以仁、行之以禮, 才能盡除私意雜念, 才能做到既能成己又能經世。二是克己, 就是約束自己。錢時在詮釋“顏淵問仁”章時, 闡述了詳細的克己工夫。他說：“大凡意念雖各不同, 未有不從我上起, 有我則百邪交叢, 無我則百念皆空, 是故貴於克也。己克則心本無恙, 天則不逾。所謂復禮也, 非復禮之外又有仁也, 復禮即所以爲仁也。故曰：‘克己復禮爲仁。’誠能一日克己復禮, 霾霧披掃, 清明洞然, 而天下皆歸吾仁矣。非今日而始歸也, 天下本在吾仁中。昔蔽而今悟也。雖然用工切實, 則誠在我, 豈他人所能致其力哉？下文視聽言動之目, 即爲人由己之事也。且如視時, 是雖欲視, 動於一念, 隱然未露, 知其非禮, 隨即滅然, 是之謂克。以至曰聽, 曰言, 曰動, 未有不息念慮之微, 而致其力者。非制之於口耳, 制之於事爲, 而後謂之勿也。”[100] 在他看來, “己克”則無我, 無我則私心雜念無由起, 私心雜念無由起則視聽言動皆依於, 從而天下歸仁。

第五, 力行。在陸九淵看來, 心正則行直, 致知重在“力行”, [101] 故其特別重視踐履之學。[102] 錢時亦是如此。在他看來, “本心上有纖毫欠闕, 所行必有不慊處”, [103] 本心出了問題, 行動上也一定會出問題。在心正的基礎上, 就需著力考慮力行的問題。錢時指出, 力行首在立志。他說：“匹夫有志尚不可奪, 況志學者乎？此是力行第一個字。”[104] 志爲力行第一要義, 決定著人們的價值取向：“人之趨向, 全在立志。苟志於仁, 即念念在仁矣, 自然無惡。”[105] 只有篤志力行, 才能“博學於文而約以禮”, [106] 才能“不求安飽, 能敏事慎言”。[107] 其次, 力行貴在持之以恆。在詮釋《述而篇》“善人吾不得而見之矣！得見有恆者, 斯可矣。亡而爲有, 虛而爲盈, 約而爲泰, 難乎有恆矣”時, 錢時指出：“善人者,

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99 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁655-656。
100 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁630。
101 樊浩,《道德之“民”的誕生》, 頁10-23。
102 張品端,《朱熹與陸九淵哲學思想之比較》, 頁1-5。
103 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁668。
104 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁620。
105 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁593。
106 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁605。
107 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁583。

無不善之名。有常者, 不變之謂。惟能不變, 方可進學而純於善耳。然而亦不易得也, 故曰斯可矣。如下文所言三者, 虛誕無實, 乃後學之通患。如之, 何其有常哉？聖門工夫只一‘常’字, 是力行之要, 所以拳拳乎此。”[108] 惟能有恆心, 才能日進其德。再次, 力行貴在致知。在錢時看來, 要想力行, 需先知道力行下手處, 這就需要致知, 即明理。他說：“畢竟仁在何處, 如何是不違, 如何是必於是, 知乎此, 則知所用力。”[109] 認爲致知後力行, 才能不斷進步, “知所以說則知所以用力, 知所以用力則自強不息, 日進無疆矣。”[110] 在《論語》詮釋中, 錢時還進一步探討了致知與力行的關係, 他說：“學而不思, 則無致知之功, 故罔。思而不學, 則無力行之實, 故殆。”[111] “知, 所以致知也。勇, 所以力行也。知則仁矣, 仁則勇矣。三者只一事。”[112] 頗有知行合一的味道。又次, 力行貴在少言多行。在錢時看來, “與其言浮於行也, 不若行浮於言也”, 孔子之所以說“君子恥其言而過其行”, 就在於警告學者勿言過於行, “夫子於言上著一恥字, 於行上著一過字, 大抵學者空言多, 力行少, 所以警切之”。[113] 錢時指出, 人們應“以躬行不逮爲恥”, [114] 應“實見實履, 不在言語上”。[115] 他說：“大率先言者, 未必能行。誠力行, 雖不言可也。”[116] 認爲要想成爲道德高尚之人, 必須“實履”。在詮釋《先進篇》“子張問善人之道。子曰：‘不踐跡, 亦不入於室’”時, 他說：“踐跡, 實履也。入於室者, 入善人之室也。堂堂乎張, 未必實履, 徒問之何益？所謂善人者, 念念無惡之人耳。然非實履, 則亦不能自造其奧也。踐跡二字, 正切子張之病, 箴之。”[117] 只有切實按照善人的標準去做, 才能深造自得；徒問之, 而不行之, 無益於個人品行的提升。最後, 力行應著力於打造細節。如在對父母孝的問題上, 錢時認爲關鍵在於如何做到敬和和顏悅色, 尤其是敬。在詮釋《爲政篇》“色難。有事弟子服其勞, 有酒食先生饌, 曾是以爲孝乎”時, 他說：“得父母於容色之間, 非先意承志者不能。然須識所以難者何在。若嘻嘻媚悅, 不以其道, 則非所難也。服勞具饌, 亦皆人子事, 但不可專以是爲孝耳。和氣浹洽, 天性昭明, 骨肉之間, 無非大順。四子問孝, 答之不同, 而其人品亦自可見。游、夏, 聖門高弟, 違禮節、危父母之事, 宜無有也, 故直以敬與色難警策之。即此, 便是學問用力精微處, 且未有不敬而能順色者也。四者皆當以敬爲主。”[118] 又, 在求仁的過程中, 錢時認爲應努力做到“不遷怒, 不貳過”。他

108 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁610。
109 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁594。
110 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁603。
111 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁586。
112 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁620。
113 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁646。
114 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁596。
115 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁596。
116 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁586。
117 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁628。
118 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁585。

說：“不遷怒, 不貳過, 真用力於仁者。聖門之好學如此哉！旁遇他事, 微有未平, 即所謂遷；萌於隱微, 斬截不果, 即所謂貳。此二語工夫極精密。”[119] 從細微處入手, 才能將力行工夫做得精密。

由上可見, 在修身問學中, 錢時一方面主張以“內省”、“居敬”、“去意”、“心有所主”等作爲內聖的工夫, 從而爲人們淨化心靈、提升道德境界提供了一套獨特的指導方法；另一方面, 他又主張“力行”, 試圖通過實功而進行心性修養, 從而將屬於“內聖”範圍的實功即實修的思想, 轉化爲“實行”、“實踐”的“外王”行爲, 爲造就“內聖外王”型的真正聖人提供了新的路徑。[120]

## 五、結語

錢時所做《論語》詮釋, 一方面注重訓詁, 不僅重視對字詞的注音, 而且重視對名物典制的釋義, 具有濃厚的漢學底蘊。另一方面, 又注重義理闡發, 不僅重視心學本體論的建設, 而且重視從工夫論的角度思考內聖外王問題, 具有鮮明的心學特色。這在《論語》詮釋史上可謂獨具特色。

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119 錢時,《融堂四書管見》, 頁601。

120 劉曉梅,《溯源本心實體 尋找達用工夫──楊簡修身問學方法論探討》, 頁97-100。

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# The Characteristics of Qian Shi's Interpretation of the *Lunyu*

TANG Minggui

## Abstract

*The Rongtang's Humble Opinion on The Four Books* Vol. II written by Qian Shi is the representative work of the Lu school of mind which focuses on the interpretation of the *Lunyu*. When interpretating the *Lunyu*, on one hand, Qian Shi centered on the interpretation of ancient texts, not only attached great importance to the phonetic notation of Chinese characters, but also laid emphasis on the paraphrasing of wares and institutions, taking on great sinological connotations; on the other hand, he focused on the interpretation of the meaning and theory of the *Lunyu*, not only paying attention to the construction of idealism, but also advocating the inner sageliness characterized by "self-examination," "the act of respect" and "meditation," and outer kingliness characterized by "doing" and "practicing," taking on distinctive features of mind philosophy. His work can be described as unique in the history of the critical study of the *Lunyu*.

**Keywords:** Qian Shi, *Rongtang's Humble Opinion on The Four Books*, Mind philosophy, *Lunyu*, interpretation

# “後具”抑或“本具”？
# ——關於朱子“心具衆理”命題之再詮釋

陳 雙 珠

**中文提要**

“心具衆理”是朱子處理“心與理”關係的重要命題之一，朱子在《四書章句集注》中提出該命題，此後又在《文集》、《語類》中有許多相關的詮釋，直至朱子去世前的晚年還對此命題有諸多論述。對此命題，學術界已有一定的注意，但因衆學者對朱子學的理解和關注的重點各有不同，以至最終詮釋的結果有所分歧，大致以牟宗三的“後外具說”、唐君毅的“能具內說”、錢穆的“後內具說”以及陳來的“本內具說”爲代表。從基本立場來看，牟、錢都是“後具”，與唐、陳的“本具”形成鮮明立場；並且牟之“外具”與唐的“具內”、陳的“內具”也形成明顯差異。本文通過對朱子相關文本的梳理，發現“心具衆理”本身蘊含了兩個向度的涵義，一是心未發而爲中時，理本內具於心的狀態，此是“結構義”；二是心爲知覺全體時，能將理具于內而居主宰地位，此是“功能義”，並且在朱子處，結構義優先於功能義。但無論從哪一種向度上言說，“心具衆理”這一命題都是限於存有層面言說，並未走向工夫層面。

**關鍵詞**：心具衆理，理具，心具，本具，後具

* 陳雙珠：復旦大學哲學系中國哲學專業博士生（shuang_313@163.com）

# 一、序論

朱子“心具衆理”的相關表述見於朱子《四書章句集注》、《晦庵文集》多處, 在《語類》中也有許多討論, 可見“心具衆理”這一命題在朱子哲學佔據重要位置。因“心具衆理”是“心與理”關係的重要組成部分, 故“心具衆理”成爲研究朱子哲學不可繞開的一個命題。對此, 學界已作許多探討, 其中不乏研究朱子學的大家, 如牟宗三、唐君毅、錢穆、陳來等學者更在專著中花費一定筆墨討論這一問題, 牟宗三先生更甚, 然而, 這些朱子學者並沒有形成一致的結論。由於“心具衆理”並不是朱子思想中一個孤立的命題, 其牽涉到朱子對“心”、“理”等概念的界定及“心與理”關係的理解, 衆學者對“心具衆理”這一命題的不同詮釋其實也是建立在對朱子“心與理”關係乃至整個朱子學的把握之上, 所以最終導致“心具衆理”有截然不同的詮釋結果。本文旨在梳理朱子“心具衆理”的命題的形成過程, 發掘朱子“心具衆理”命題提出的意義所在, 並在總結衆學者對朱子“心具衆理”的不同詮釋觀點的基礎上, 對朱子“心具衆理”的命題作進一步的詮釋, 以發現朱子“心具衆理”命題的本義所在。

# 二、朱子“心具衆理”觀點的形成

## (一) “性具於心”、“理具於心”的醞釀

朱子對此命題的提出並不是突然的, 而是經歷了許多前期的討論。剛開始, 朱子有“性具”、“理具”的提法。朱子40歲時作《已發未發說》, 提出喜怒哀樂未發之時“即是心體流行, 寂然不動之處, 而天命之性體段具焉。”[1] 在《與湖南諸公論中和第一書》中說：“當此之時, 卻是此心寂然不動之體, 而天命之性當體具焉。”[2] 在《答張欽夫書》中說：“然方其靜也, 事物未至, 思慮未萌, 而一性渾然、道義全具。”[3] 此三處, 朱子皆以“性具”來描述心未發時寂然不動的狀態。同年, 在《答林擇之》中則有“理具”的提法, 他說：“恐此亦指未感物而言耳。蓋當此之時, 此心渾然, 天理全具, 所謂中者狀性之體, 正於

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1 朱熹, 〈已發未發說〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁3267。《已發未發說》作於乙丑年春, 朱子40歲。束景南, 《朱熹年譜長篇》, 頁406。

2 朱熹, 〈與湖南諸公論中和第一書〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁3130。此書作於乙丑年春。陳來, 《朱子書信編年考證》, 頁69。

3 朱熹, 〈答張欽夫書〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁1419。此書亦作於1169年。陳來, 《朱子書信編年考證》, 頁60。

此見之。”[4] 可見, 此心渾然, 是爲心未感物時未發的狀態, 朱子用“性具”、“理具”來描述心未發而爲中的狀態, “理具”與“性具”只是提法不同, 實質並無區別, “理”就是“性”。在《樂記動靜說》中, 朱子說：“蓋人受天地之中以生, 其未感也, 純粹至善, 萬理具焉, 所謂性也。”[5] 在《答張欽夫》(《論仁說》)中, 朱子說：“蓋人生而靜, 四德具焉, 曰仁曰義曰禮曰智, 皆根於心而未發, 所謂理也, 性之德也。”[6] 可見, 在此階段, 朱子皆是“理具於心”或“性具於心”的表述, 還沒有出現“心具衆理”的說法, 而前種表述的思想核心在於心未發不動而爲中的狀態。

## (二) “心具是理”的思想雛形

前文可見, 朱子此前都是“性具於心”或“理具於心”的表述, 並沒有“心具理”或“心具性”的說法。但在1171年朱子42歲時作《盡心說》, 開始有“心具理”的提法。朱子說：

> 蓋天者 ,理之自然而人之所由以生者也。性者 ,理之全體 ,而人之所得以生者也。心則人之所以主於身而具是理者也。天大無外而性稟其全 ,故人之本心 ,其體廓然亦無限量 ,惟其梏於形器之私 ,滯於聞見之小 ,是以有所蔽而不盡。人能即事即物 ,窮究其理 ,至於一日會貫通徹而無所遺焉 ,則有以全其本心廓然之體 ,而吾之所以爲性與天之所以爲天者 ,皆不外乎此而一以貫之矣。[7]

由上文可見, 朱子認爲, 天是理產生的根源, 理落在人身上就是性, 人得性故能生生不息, 心則是主宰並具性之理。朱子又認爲因爲天理無所不包, 性又稟受了天理的全部, 所以人之本心的體量從理論上說是廣闊無限的, 即心之體量實與天同, 但由於受到形器和後天的聞見的影響, 導致心之體受到遮蔽而導致心之體量不能窮盡。朱子又認爲要使心體恢復完整, 就要做窮理工夫以實現心與理的重新貫通, 而“盡心”就是心與理貫通的境界。此處, 雖沒有“心具衆理”的表述, 但“心具衆理”的思想主旨已基本完備。朱子此處對“心”不再關注“心”之未發而寂然不動的狀態, 而重在強調心的主宰地位以及心之全體廓然無限量的特點。依朱子中和新說理論, “未發之前爲心之體, 已發之際乃心之用”, [8] 可知“心具理”與“理具於心”二者是一個心, 二者的涵義沒有衝突, 但是不同提法所強調的側重點不同, “心具理”之心也是未發爲中, 但朱子並沒有去描述心未發的狀態, 而是在說明心之全體的特點。所以, 二者的不同在於“理具於心”主語是理, 心是“理具”的狀態；而“心

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4 朱熹, 〈答林擇之〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁1979。此書作於1169年。陳來, 《朱子書信編年考證》, 頁66。
5 朱熹, 〈樂記動靜說〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁3263。
6 朱熹, 〈答張欽夫〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁1409。此書作於1172年。陳來, 《朱子書信編年考證》, 頁94。
7 朱熹, 〈盡心說〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁3273。
8 黎靖德, 《朱子語類》, 頁99。

具衆理”主語是心, 心不僅是“具理”的狀態, 也是“具理”的能力, 說心具理的狀態時, 心有結構義, 當論心具理的能力時, 心有主宰義。

## (三) “心具衆理”的提出

1175年朱子46歲, 朱子明確提出了“心具衆理”的說法：

> 心具衆理,變化感通,生生不窮,故謂之易,此其所以能開物成務而冒天下也。圓神方知變易,二者闕一,則用不妙。用不妙,則心有所蔽而明不遍照。洗心正謂其無蔽而光明耳,非有所加益也。寂然之中,衆理必具而無朕可名,其密之謂歟？必有怵惕惻隱之心,此心之宰而情之動也。[9]

朱子在此提出“心具衆理”時, 心變化感通, 理生生不窮, 所以叫“易”, 故能開物成務, 此是“心具衆理”之“妙用”的表現。如果“心具衆理”之用受到阻礙, 則是心受到遮蔽的原因, 而“洗心”就是去蔽的工夫。朱子此處強調, 心雖爲寂然之中, 但卻“衆理必具”而爲“密”, 說明了心雖未發而爲寂然, 但卻已居主宰的地位, 其重點仍落在了“心”之能力而非心之狀態。1177年朱子序定《四書章句集注》, 對《孟子》“盡其心者, 知其性也”一句的詮釋中, “心具理”的能力得到進一步說明：

> 心者,人之神明,所以具衆理而應萬事者也。性則心之所具之理,而天又理之所以出者也。人有是心,莫非全體,然不窮理,則有所蔽而無以盡乎此心之量。故能極其心之全體而無不盡者,必其能窮夫理而無不知者也。既知其理,則其所從出,亦不外是矣。[10]

由上文可見, 此段朱子解“盡心”與其早前所作《盡心說》的表述有承接關係, 但在心、性、理的關係上出現了重大調整。彼時朱子以天理爲始, 以天理、性、心爲順序, 此時朱子以心爲始, 以心、性、天理爲順序, 在“心具理”的表達中, 心成爲重心。此時朱子提出了“神明”這一概念來形容心的能力, 因爲心如神明一樣, 所以即具衆理又應萬事。並且, 對於具衆理之“心”, 朱子從“天大無外……故人之本心, 其體無限量”轉變至“天又理之所出者, 人有是心, 莫非全體”, 明確了心爲全體, 心雖爲全體, 但要窮理才能盡得心之體量。朱子說能盡得心之全體, 則必能窮理致知, 如此心則成爲最終的檢驗標準, 心的主宰性確立起來。朱子認爲“所具之理”是“性”, 與之前的表述一慣, 但重點是心“神明”的能力。更進一步說, 彼時的“理具於心”是以未發之心體狀“性”, 是理具之心, 但此時“心具理”則是能具理之心, 這就說明此時重點不在於“性”, 而在於“心”, 故“心具理”與“性具於心”、“理具於心”作爲狀態的

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9 朱熹, 〈問張敬夫〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁1395。

10 朱熹, 《四書章句集注》, 頁349。

描述, 涵義相同, 但語義上各有側重。彼時“理具於心”是理具於心的狀態, 此時“心具衆理”則是在說心有具理的能力。由此可知, “心具衆理”這個命題隱含了“理具於心”與“心能具理”的兩個向度, 從“理”上說是“理具於心”, 從“心”上說是“心能具理”。

## 三、現代學者對“心具衆理”的幾種詮釋

### （一）牟宗三的“後外具說”

牟宗三認爲朱子“心之理”可以分兩面說, 一種是橫說, 即心認知地所攝具之理, 另一種是縱說, 即“心氣之然”之所以然之理。他認爲通常朱子說“心之理”, 如“心之德愛之理”中之“心之德”, 或“心具衆理”是“心認知地攝具之”。[11] 如此, 牟宗三將“心具衆理”作了“認知地攝具理”的詮釋。其將“心”界定爲“認知之心”是基於其對朱子“心爲氣之靈”的宇宙論的判斷, 他說：“心是氣之靈, 是氣之精爽, 此是對於心作實然的解析, 此實然的解析即曰宇宙論的解析。”[12] 因爲“心”都作“認知”解, 牟先生對朱子之“心之理”、“心具衆理”、“心與理一”都詮釋爲“心認知地攝具之理”、“心認知地攝具理”、“心認知地攝具之一。”[13] 根據牟先生對朱子“心與理”關係之間架, 朱子“心與理一”、“心具衆理”只能在工夫後完成, 而“不是本體論地自發自具之一”。[14] 牟先生界定了兩種“具”, 一種是性具, 一種是心具。他說：“‘性具’是分析地具, 必然地具, 性即理。而心具則不是分析地具, 必然地具, 心不即是理。心具是綜和地關聯地具, 其本身亦可以具, 亦可以不具。其具是因著收斂凝聚而合道而始具, 此是合的具, 不是本具的具。此即所以爲靜涵靜攝系統之故。”[15] 所以朱子的“心具衆理”與“心即理”不同, 他說：“這種‘具’, 是認知地、管攝地、關聯地具, 並非是‘心即理’之實體性的心之自發自律地具。”[16] 可見, 牟先生定朱子之“心”爲“認知”, “具”爲“外具”、“後具”, 理是外具之理, 他認爲這種理即使具有道德性, 也沒有能動性, 是“靜涵靜攝之理”。他說：“朱子不加分別, 一概由存在之然以推證其所以然爲理, 而此理又不內在於心而爲心之所自發, 如是其所言之理或性乃只成一屬於存有論的存有之理, 靜擺在那裡, 其于吾人之道德行爲乃無力者, ……而最大之弊病即在不能說明自發自律之道德, 而在流於他律之道德。此即爲性之道德義之減

11 牟宗三,《心體與性體》下, 頁423-424。
12 牟宗三,《心體與性體》下, 頁425。
13 牟宗三,《心體與性體》下, 頁426。
14 牟宗三,《心體與性體》下, 頁426。
15 牟宗三,《心體與性體》下, 頁134。
16 牟宗三,《心體與性體》下, 頁339。

殺。”[17] 由此, 牟宗三對朱子的道德形態作“他律道德”的判定, 筆者且將牟先生此種論點命名爲“後外具說”。

## (二) 唐君毅的“能具內說”

唐君毅認爲朱子的“心”是兼綰理氣的概念, 他說：“朱子之言心, 實以心爲貫通理氣之概念。心乃一方屬於氣, 而爲氣之靈, 而具理於其內, 以爲性者。心之具理以爲性, 即心之體之寂然不動者。……故依朱子, 心之所以爲心, 要在其爲兼綰合理氣。”[18] 對於心與理的關係, 唐認爲朱子“以氣言心”, 所以心與理不能是合一。他說：“然如以其通於氣爲起點, 則必歸於即氣之靈而言心之說。故朱子雖屢言佛氏以心與理爲二, 吾儒以心與理爲一, 而終不能真建立心與理之合一。”[19] 他認爲朱子的“心與理一”是工夫後之境界, 而非本一, 他說：“唯在象山重在教人自悟其心與理之一, 則爲一正面的直接工夫, 而不同于朱子之欲去此使心理不一之間隔, 以使心與理一。”[20] 對於“心具衆理”, 他說：“朱子在心性論上, 確定此心體之自存自由, 而依此心體之虛靈明覺, 以言其內具萬理, 以主乎性, 外應萬事, 以主乎情。”[21] 可見, 唐先生認爲“心具衆理”是從心性論上講, 並且心能內具萬理是依靠心體之虛靈明覺的作用, 可見唐從心性論上理解“心具衆理”, 具則是存有上之能具, 而非“後具”, 臺灣學者陳佳銘亦指出唐先生所詮釋之“具”是“內具”、“本具”。[22] 但更準確地說, 唐先生所言之“具”是“能具”, 而非“本具”。他說：“由朱子之重言此心之能具理以爲性, 盡心以知此性, 而此理即天；故有心之人與萬物, 即不同其類。萬物雖亦依此理以生, 然不似人之有此心者, 能自覺其內具此理爲性, 而自盡其心以知之。”[23] 很明顯, 唐先生所詮釋之“心具衆理”是“自覺內具此理爲性”, “具”爲“能內具”。唐先生之所以從“能具”而不是從“本具”角度理解“心具衆理”命題, 這是因爲唐認爲朱子之“心”是先有氣稟, 才有理具, 他說：“朱子之以心爲氣之靈, 無形中即顯出一重心與氣之關係, 而輕心與理之關係之色彩, ……即吾人之生乃先由天以稟得此氣, 而後可言理具於其中, 以爲其性。”[24] 由此可知, 因爲唐先生認爲朱子之心先有氣稟後才有理具, 所以朱子之“心”是先爲“氣之靈”, 先有了“知覺”的功能之後才有“內具此理”, 如此實質上也就是說唐先生的“內具此理”, 是心有了知覺的能力後將理

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17 牟宗三,《心體與性體》下, 頁221。

18 唐君毅,《中國哲學原論 · 導論篇》, 頁501。

19 唐君毅,《中國哲學原論 · 導論篇》, 頁498。

20 唐君毅,《中國哲學原論 · 原教篇》, 頁204。

21 唐君毅,《中國哲學原論 · 原教篇》, 頁204。

22 臺灣學者陳佳銘教授提出：“如唐君毅先生云‘朱子固亦謂心性中具萬理, 以爲其與生俱生之明德’, 可說是‘本具’或‘內具’之義。” 陳佳銘,《朱子的“心中之理”之研究》, 頁1-32。

23 唐君毅,《中國哲學原論 · 導論篇》, 頁501。

24 唐君毅,《中國哲學原論 · 導論篇》, 頁502。

具於內的意思。可見, 唐先生所表述的“能自覺內具此理爲性”實質上是“能自覺將此理具於內爲性”, 也就是說唐先生的“能內具”之說本質上是“能具內”之意, 唐先生所理解的朱子“心具衆理”的命題, 更傾向於強調“心能具理”的能力, 這表現在唐先生在理解朱子心與理的關係時仍然也是從強調心對理的統攝能力理解的, 他說：“則吾人當說自性理之爲理看, 其所具之理, 應爲無窮無盡。因所謂理皆爲吾人心思之所知或所求知者。”……而終不能溢出此“求知而能開拓其知”之心思之所能統攝者之外。[25] 可見, 從唐先生對朱子心與理關係的理解來看, 其更強調心對理的統攝的能力, 故其所詮釋“心具衆理”之觀點且名爲“能具內說”。

## （三）錢穆的“後具”說

錢穆對朱子“心具衆理”命題也作了一定的詮釋, 但是其理解經歷了“舊說”和“新說”兩個階段。舊時錢穆說：“朱子既說心具衆理, 卻又教人以心觀物則物之理得, 似乎又在主張理在物不在心, 這是朱子學說本身一大罅縫。”[26] 晚年則改爲：“今朱子既說心具衆理, 卻又教人以心觀物則物之理得, 似乎又主張理在物不在心, 此似朱子學說本身一大罅縫。但朱子意, 須心與物交始見理, 外了物, 人心之理更於何見。……朱子意實未有罅縫, 未可輕議也。”[27] 可見他早年以朱子心與理爲二, 而晚年認同朱子“理之在心”。錢穆亦認爲朱子之“心具衆理”之心是“氣之靈”。他說：“朱子釋心, 曰知覺, 曰虛靈, 曰神明。知覺虛靈神明皆屬氣一邊事。故人心雖同具此明德, 同有此靈覺, 而亦不能無明昧。”[28] 錢穆認爲心皆屬氣一邊, 所以朱子嚴辨心性, 他區分了心即理與性即理, 他說：“朱子分說理氣, 性屬理, 心屬氣, 故心之於性有辨, 可分言, 亦可合言。若心性分言, 則亦可謂心即理。若心性合言, 則只可說性即理, 不復說心即理。”[29] 依此邏輯, 錢穆又區分了“心即理”與“心具衆理”, 他說：“此謂心具是理, 非謂心即是理。謂性存於心, 亦不謂心即是性。”[30] 在此, 錢穆將“心具衆理”解爲“理存於心”。但是, 錢穆的存有卻不是本來存有。他說：“就其本始言, 則是心與理一。就其終極言, 亦是心與理一。就其中間一段言, 則人生不免有氣稟物欲之蔽, 非可不煩修爲, 便是具衆理而可以應萬事。”[31] 明顯, 錢穆認爲“心具衆理”不是“心與理一”, 而是工夫上的修爲, 是達到“心與理一”的條件。故他又說：“故朱子言心與理一, 則必有工夫條件。心能知覺, 能主宰, 格物窮理所以盡其知, 居敬涵養所以全其主也。”[32]

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25 唐君毅,《中國哲學原論 · 原性篇》, 頁379-380。
26 錢穆, 〈朱子學術述評〉,《思想與時代》, 第47期。
27 錢穆,《中國學術思想史論叢》(五), 頁167。
28 錢穆,《朱子新學案》第二冊, 頁93。
29 錢穆,《朱子新學案》第二冊, 頁90。
30 錢穆,《朱子新學案》第二冊, 頁90。
31 錢穆,《朱子新學案》第二冊, 頁97。

可見錢穆雖然將“心具衆理”解爲理之存有, 但卻是工夫後的存有, “心具衆理”作爲“心與理一”的條件, 成爲所有修養工夫的統稱, “具”是“後具”而非“本具”, 且將此觀點稱爲“後具”說。

## (四) 陳來的“內本具”說

陳來提出“心具衆理”是朱子“心與理”關係的基本觀點的論斷。[33] 對此, 陳來區分了兩種心, 一種是一般的認識主體, 一種是心作爲道德意識活動的主體, 他認爲：“朱子‘心具衆理’命題是建立在其對心與理、心與性既區別又聯繫的認識基礎上。心與理的區別從構成論上說是‘心包萬理’, 心是一個系統, 而理卻只是這一系統的一個方面、一種屬性或本質, 而不是整個系統本身。”[34] 陳來進一步分析心與理兩個概念, 從而對朱子“心即理”命題中心與理的關係作了分析, 他說：“心是一個標誌現象總體的範疇, 性則是一個標誌本質的範疇。這兩個概念及其所用以表徵的物件絕不是同一個層次上的。用傳統的範疇來分梳, 心之體是性, 但不可說心即是性, 即是理。”[35] 在此基礎上, 陳來對“心具衆理”進行了詮釋, 他說：“‘心具衆理’是指人的內心先天地具有道德的品質和屬性。所以‘心具衆理’是指‘理’先天地內在人心, 並不是說‘心具衆理’是經過修養之後才達到的一種道德境。朱熹認爲‘心具衆理’即孟子萬物皆備之說。……這些都是強調理先天具備于人心之中。”[36] 所以, 陳來界定“具”爲“內具”、“本具”, 是孟子的“性善說”。陳來還進一步對朱子“心具衆理”與“心與理一”命題的區別作了分析, 他說：“人心昏蔽之時, 道德本性不能完全得到表現, 意識活動也就不可能完全合理。這時候雖是‘心具衆理’, 但不是‘心與理一’, 更不是‘心即理’。”[37] 由此可見, 陳來認爲“心具衆理”是存有論上言說的, 而“心與理一”則是後天之境界, 雖然人人都可以“心具衆理”, 但要達到“心與理一”則要通過工夫, 陳來說：“人心中包含各種不合理義的思維情感, 但理作爲本質始終在心中潛存, 爲了使人的現實意識完全變爲道德意識, 受到性理的完全支配, 理學要求人要在修養境界上作到‘心與理一’。”[38] 于此, 陳來將朱子“心具衆理”詮釋爲“理潛存於心”, 筆者且將陳來觀點名爲“內本具”說。

綜上分析, 牟先生認爲“心具衆理”是“心認知地攝具理”, 所以“具”是綜合的、不必然的“後具”、是關聯的“外具”。唐先生認爲“心具衆理”是“心能將理具於內”, 實質上是仍是“本具”, 與牟一樣皆是認爲“後具”與“外具”形成

32 錢穆,《朱子新學案》第二冊, 頁107。
33 陳來,《朱子哲學研究》, 頁221。
34 陳來,《朱子哲學研究》, 頁222。
35 陳來,《朱子哲學研究》, 頁222。
36 陳來,《朱子哲學研究》, 頁224。
37 陳來,《朱子哲學研究》, 頁224-225。
38 陳來,《朱子哲學研究》, 頁224。

區分。錢穆將“心具衆理”理解爲“心與理一”的工夫條件, “具”則成爲工夫的過程, 實爲“後具”。陳來則認爲心具衆理“理潛存於心”, 是本質上的存有, 而非現象上的實有, 所以“心具衆理”不是工夫後的境界, 而爲存有之“本具”、“內具”。從基本立場來看, 牟、錢是“後具”, 與唐、陳來“本具”形成鮮明立場, 牟的外具與唐的具內、陳的內具也形成鮮明差異, 各家觀點皆有所分歧。對此, 當代學界也是衆口不一, 觀點紛呈, 即便是在臺灣, 港臺新儒家的重鎮, 觀點也未見一致, 如此說明這一命題的詮釋存在諸多理論上的困難, 仍有很大的詮釋空間, 孰是孰非則須回到朱子的本義中去判定。

## 四、“心具衆理”之再詮釋

### （一）具衆理之“心”

1、“心”之體狀：未發之中而爲心體之全

朱子以“心統性情”命題來建構心性論, 中和新說後, 心有未發已發兩種狀態, 朱子又以“體用”關係來說明“未發已發”, 他說：“心有體用, 未發之前是心之體, 已發之際乃心之用。”[39] 可見, 心之未發即心之體, 即是性；心之已發即心之用, 即是情。而對於“心具衆理”之心的體狀, 朱子則說：“性主‘具’字、‘有’字, 許多道理, 昭昭然者屬性；未發理具, 已發理應, 則屬心；動發則情。”[40] 可見, “心具衆理”說明了心未發時理具於心的狀態, 而“心統性情”與“心具衆理”則是貫通而言的, “心統性情”說明了心未發已發兩種狀態時的心性情關係, 心未發時, 心之全體即是性, 此時萬理俱足, 而心感物而動時, 心即發爲情。對於“心具衆理”之“心”, 朱子作了許多描述, 他說：“心之全體湛然虛明, 萬理具足, 無一毫私欲之間。”[41] 可見, 理具於心時, 心爲心之全體而湛然虛明。另外, 朱子也以“虛明不昧”來形容具理之“心”, 他說：“虛明不昧, 便是心；此理具足於中, 無少欠闕, 便是性；感物而動, 便是情。”[42] 在《大學章句序》中, 朱子還以“虛靈不昧”來形容“明德”, 他說：“明德者, 人之所得乎天, 而虛靈不昧, 以具衆理而應萬事者也。但爲氣稟所拘, 人欲所蔽, 則有時而昏, 然其本體之明, 則有未嘗息者。”[43] 可見, “明德”就是具衆理之“心”, 都是屬於虛靈不昧之心之全體。晚年時朱子還更明確地說“心具衆理”之“心”爲未發之前“中”的狀態, 他說：“蓋未發之前, 萬理皆具, 然乃虛中之實、靜中之動, 渾然未有形影著莫, 故謂之中。”[44] 朱子又說：“夫中立不倚

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39 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁1499。
40 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁95。
41 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁94。
42 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁94-95。
43 朱熹,〈大學章句序〉,《四書章句集注》, 頁3。

者, 湛然在中, 無所偏倚, 而義理全具者也。”[45] 可見, 心具衆理之“心”, 不僅爲未發之心之全體, 也是未發之中。

2、“心”之能：“氣之靈 ”而能知覺

朱子以氣釋心的說法在《語類》中出現, 他說：“心者, 氣之精爽。”[46] 對此, 後人常以此句爲據言朱子“以氣言心”, 言朱子之“心”是“氣心”。然需要注意的是, 朱子以氣言心, 是從“形器”的角度說心, “氣”在此處不具有道德的色彩, 就如牟宗三先生所言, 此是從“宇宙論的”、“實體”的角度解析心, 而非氣質之偏正上言心。且需要明確的是, 朱子將心釋爲“氣之靈”, 實是爲心的“知覺”之能尋找形質上的原因, 朱子說：“所覺者, 心之理也；能覺者, 氣之靈也。”[47] 可見, 朱子言心是“氣之靈”, 是爲了證明“心”能“覺”, “覺”即“知覺”, 朱子又說：“心之知覺, 又是那氣之虛靈底。”[48]又說：“知覺正是氣之虛靈處, 與形器、渣滓正作對也。”[49] 以上皆說明朱子以“氣之靈”解“心”, 是在爲心之知覺尋找形質上的原因。同時, 也正是因爲心是“氣之靈”, 朱子一方面認爲心能知覺, 所以能與理貫通, 另一方面又嚴辨心性、理氣之別。

> 所喻心性分別 ,不知後來見得如何？性只是理 ,情是流出運用處 ,心之知覺即所以具此理而行此情者也。以智言之 ,所以知是非之理則智也 ,性也所以知是非 ,而是非之者情也 ,具此理而覺其爲是非者心也。此處分別 ,只在毫釐之間 ,精以察之 ,乃可見耳。”[50]

由此可見, 朱子認爲因心能知覺, 所以心之體“具衆理”, 心之用“運用情”。更進一步說, 是因爲“知覺”能判斷是非, “性”是“所以爲是非的道理”, 又心具理爲性, 即“心”具備了所以爲是非的道理, 所以“心”能判斷是非。而朱子強調：無論是心具備所以爲是非的道理, 還是心去判斷是非, 都需要心之知覺來完成。心能知覺理之所以然, 即是心之體具此理；心能知覺何爲是非, 即是心之用行此情。由此可知, “心具衆理”即是說因爲心能知覺理之所以然, 所以才能具理。“心具衆理”之心是知覺之心, 但朱子又強調“心能知覺”並不能等同於“心是知覺”, 朱子說：“蓋仁者心有知覺, 謂知覺爲仁則不可, 知覺卻屬智也。”[51] 可見, 朱子將“知覺”歸爲智一邊, 說明“知覺”只是心能力的

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44 朱熹, 〈答徐彥章〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁2580。此信作於1191年, 爲朱子62歲。陳來, 《朱子書信編年考證》, 頁338。

45 朱熹, 〈答萬正淳〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁2390。

46 黎靖德, 《朱子語類》, 頁95。

47 黎靖德, 《朱子語類》, 頁85。

48 黎靖德, 《朱子語類》, 頁1430。

49 朱熹, 〈答林德久〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁2944。

50 朱熹, 〈答潘謙之〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁2590。

51 朱熹, 〈答張欽夫〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁1939。

一部分, 並不是全部, 不能將知覺直接等同於心。所以, “心具衆理”不能直接詮釋爲“知覺之心具衆理”, 只能理解爲“心之知覺能具衆理”, 此處應該仔細分辨。

3、“心”之地位：主宰

在心、性、情三者的關係中, 朱子認爲“心”是居於主宰地位, 朱子說：“心者, 性情之主。”[52] 又說：“心者, 主乎性而行乎情。”[53] 皆是在說明“心”對於性、情的主宰地位。“心具衆理”作爲“心統性情”思想的一部分, “心”仍是居於主宰地位。朱子說：“心是神明之舍, 爲一身之主宰。性便是許多道理, 得之於天而具於心者。發于智識念慮處, 皆是情, 故曰‘心統性情’也。”[54] 可見, 無論是心處未發狀態還是已發狀態, 心都是“主宰”。對“心”爲何能主宰, 朱子說因爲心是“神明”之安宅處。而對於“神明”, 朱子又進一步解釋說：“若夫知則心之神明, 妙衆理而宰萬物者也。”[55] 可見“神明”就是“知”, 就是心之“知覺”, 心之神明能夠妙衆理, 即是在說心之知覺能運用衆理, 故能主宰外物。如此可見, 心的主宰地位是通過心之知覺實現的。對此, 朱子曾說：“‘心則於斯二者有所知覺而能爲之統御者也。未動而無以統之, 則空寂而已；已動而無以統之, 則放肆而已。’此數句卻好。但必以不動爲心, 則又非矣。”[56] 可見, 朱子雖然反對馮作肅以心爲不動, 認爲心貫通未發已發, 但卻十分贊同心有知覺而能主宰的說法。其實在朱子處, 知覺與主宰關係十分緊密, 甚至時常將二者連用, 他說：“一家自有一個安宅, 正是自家安身立命主宰知覺處。”[57] 朱子認爲, 每個人是道德的主體, 正如每家都有一安宅一般, 讓人可以安身立命, 而這安身立命處就是主宰知覺, 人的道德主體性就在於人能主宰知覺。

4、心之三義的共存與先後

結合以上分析可知, “心具衆理”之“心”有結構義和功能義兩個向度的涵義, “具衆理”之心不僅是未發之心之全體, 又是氣之靈而能知覺, 如此說明心未發時具備“知覺”的能力。此種推理與朱子觀點相合, 朱子說：“(呂子約)又須說心有指未發而言者, 方說得‘心’字, 未說得‘性’字, 又須說是耳無聞、目無見、心無知覺時, 方是未發之中, 其說愈多, 愈見紛拏。”[58] 可見, 知覺作爲心之能, 貫徹於已發未發, 不可認爲心未發時無知覺。甚至, 朱子常將二者合起來說, 將未發之本心與知覺一體相連, 早時朱子就說：“本心

52 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁89。
53 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁94。
54 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁2514。
55 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁511。
56 朱熹,〈答馮作肅〉,《朱子全書》, 頁1851。
57 朱熹,〈答張敬夫〉,《朱子全書》, 頁1392。
58 朱熹,〈答黃直卿〉,《朱子全書》, 頁4654。

知覺之體光明洞達、無所不照耳。”[59] 到晚年時, 朱子則更爲明確地說：“人心之體, 虛明知覺而已。”[60] 可見, 心爲發而爲全體時, 此中只有虛明之知覺, 心之全體與知覺本是一體。如此可知, 朱子此前所說“虛靈知覺”、“虛靈明覺”, “神明”其實都是在說未發之心之全體。然而需要注意的是, 朱子雖將虛明知覺與心之全體視爲一體, 但二者似乎從邏輯上有先後之分。朱子說：

> 人得形氣之正 ,故心虛而體全 ,心之知覺便周流貫徹 ,在處通得去 ,形之運動便千變萬化 ,是般做得去。是以於其理之精微 ,知亦知得盡 ,做亦做得盡。人之所以可爲堯舜 ,可參天地 ,皆爲有此體質 ,盡做得。但患不爲 ,或爲之而有不充 ,卻無不能之理。物得形氣之偏 ,故心塞而體拘 ,心之知覺便拘礙而不能通 ,形之運動便短狹而不能周。是以於此理之本體 ,知亦知得淺狹 ,做亦做得淺狹 ,被形氣局定 ,更開不來 ,所以求爲人之所爲不得。[61]

可見, 朱子認爲心之全體、心之知覺都決定於“心”所稟受的形氣, 都具有先在性。人與動物的區別就在於人稟受的形氣是正的, 所以心虛體全, 心之知覺就周流貫徹, 能知得盡, 因爲人心皆有此“體質”, 所以每個人都有成爲聖賢的可能。而動物因所稟受的形氣不正, 心之體被阻塞拘束而不全, 心之知覺也拘礙不通。可見, “心具衆理”即指每個人心爲“心虛體全”而知覺周流貫徹, 朱子以此來說明每個人都有成爲聖賢的潛質。然而朱子此處隱含了一個邏輯, 即是先有形氣之正, 才有心體之全, 再有心之知覺, 邏輯上是先有心體之全, 才有心之知覺。朱子這裡的邏輯進路, 用現代哲學的話語來說, 即是結構先於功能, 即是須先有心之全體的結構, 才有心之知覺的能力。所以嚴格地說, “心具衆理”是理先具於心, 此心未發爲中而爲心體之全, 而後心能知覺。故“理具於心”是結構, 而“心具理”則是心的能力, 心先有理具的結構, 才有具理的能力, 而同時具備結構和功能兩個涵義之後, “心具衆理”命題才能成立。所以, 在“心具衆理”命題中, 心之體狀爲心之第一義, 心之知覺爲心之第二義。而對於心之主宰義, 朱子認爲主宰是通過知覺實現的, 主宰義亦在心之體狀義之後, 知覺與主宰, 二者都是從心之能力所來的, 故二者同爲第二義。因心之三義並存, 如此說明“心”在未發時, 能知覺, 能主宰。正如朱子所說：“但以吾心觀之, 未發而知覺不昧者, 豈非心之主乎性者乎？”[62] 而因爲知覺貫通未發已發, 所以主宰也貫通未發已發, 朱子說：“然人之一身, 知覺運用, 莫非心之所爲, 則心者固所以主於身而無動靜語默之間者也。”[63] 如此, “心”的主體性得以確立。

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59 朱熹, 〈答潘文叔〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁2289。

60 朱熹, 〈答董叔重〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁2361。此書作於1189年, 朱子60歲時。陳來, 《朱子書信編年考證》, 頁300。

61 朱熹, 〈答李孝述繼善問目〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁4811-4812。

62 朱熹, 〈答胡廣仲〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁1902。

63 朱熹, 〈答張敬夫〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁1419。

（二）心具衆理之“具”

1、具：本具、實具

承接上文, “心具衆理”之“心”有三義, 而無論心從哪個角度言說, 朱子之“心具衆理”都是“本具”, 而不是“後具”。朱子說：

> 未發之前 ,萬理備具。才涉思 ,即是已發動；而應事接物 ,雖萬變不同 ,能省察得皆合於理處。蓋是吾心本具此理 ,皆是合做底事 ,不容外面旋安排也。今說爲臣必忠、爲子必孝之類 ,皆是已發。然所以合做此事 ,實具此理 ,乃未發也。[64]

此處, 朱子明確提出未發之前, 萬理已備具心中, 此時心尚未發動, 是心與理關係之最初始的狀態。朱子又進一步說, 心一旦涉及了“思”便是已發, 而人能在已發後應之萬變當中事皆合於理, 原因即在於“心本具理”。因爲心本具此理, 所以心在已發後能皆合此理, 而不由外力安排的。如此, 朱子說明了“心具衆理”是“本具”, 是未發前“已具”, 是已發後心合於理的前提與基礎, 所以可知“心具衆理”是從結構上說工夫前之“本具”、“已具”, 而不是工夫後之“具”。並且, 朱子強調, “心具衆理”作爲工夫前之“本具理”, 是工夫後之“能合理”的所以然, 也就是說“心具衆理”是道德行爲的依據所在, 並且“心具衆理”作爲道德依據並不是一種懸空的假設, 而是實實在在地存在。正如朱子所說：“此心虛明, 萬理具足, 外面理會得者, 即裡面本來有底, 只要自大本而推之達道耳。”[65] 可見, “心具衆理”是成德的起點, 有了“大本”才能推至達道, 如果沒有“心具衆理”, 就沒有了成德的底子, 道德行爲也無從開始, 這就是“心具衆理”的意義所在。如此可知, “心具衆理”雖是未發前之具, 但卻不是“虛具”, 而是“實具”。“本具”的作用不是預設, 不是想像, 而是實實在在進行的, 正因爲如此, 朱子的“心具衆理”並不是道德的預設, 而是成德的起點。

2、本具：存心、窮理的前提

如上分析, “心具衆理”之“具”爲“本具”、“實具”, 是成德的起點, 從理論上說明了人人都有成爲聖賢的可能, 但並不代表人人都已經是聖賢。所以朱子說的“實具”是存有層面上之實有, 而非道德行動之實行。在朱子這裡, “心具衆理”是人未發前的狀態, 是從理論上說因爲“心具衆理”, 所以每個人都有成德的理想狀態, 都應該成德, 然而事實上每個人卻必須要受到後天氣稟或物欲的影響, 而使“具衆理”之“心”受到昏蔽而不能盡其所能, 如此朱子便提出要真正實現成德就必須做“窮理”的工夫, 由此就爲成德的工夫開闢了路徑。朱子說：

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64 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁1509。

65 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁2763。

> 此心本來虛靈 ,萬理具備 ,事事物物皆所當知。今人多是氣質偏了 ,又爲物欲所蔽 ,故昏而不能盡知 ,聖賢所以貴於窮理。又曰：萬理雖具於吾心 ,還使教他知 ,始得。……盡得此心者 ,洞然光明 ,事事物物無有不合道理。[66]

由上文可知, 朱子認爲“心具衆理”, 心本虛靈, 萬理本具於心, 所以從理論上說本來人人應當知曉萬理, 但卻因爲大多數的人都受“氣質”和“物欲”的影響, 而使本心受到遮蔽而不能盡知心中所具之理。朱子又進一步補充說雖然萬理已具, 但並不是說萬理已知, 從“具”到“知”還需要做“窮理”的工夫, 通過“窮理”才能“盡心”, “盡心”後則事事物物皆合道理, 即是成德。可見, “心具衆理”不是成德的工夫卻是工夫的前提, 正因爲每個人的“心”是“具衆理”的, 如此“窮理”的工夫才有了可能, 且“窮理”工夫才能達到“盡心”的境界, 朱子還說：“一心具萬理。能存心, 而後可以窮理。”[67] 又說：“心包萬理, 萬理具于一心。不能存得心, 不能窮得理。”[68] 可見, 朱子認爲在“窮理”工夫之前, 須下“存心”工夫, 以“存心”工夫存得“具衆理”之心, 如此才有可能窮得心中所具之理, 如果先沒有存得“具衆理之心”, 便沒有窮得“心所具之理”的可能, 如此可知, 存心工夫在窮理工夫之前, “心”的工夫先於“理”的工夫。也由此可知, “心具衆理”是“存心”和“窮理”工夫的前提, 而非工夫本身, “具”是爲存有層面之“具”而非工夫層面之“具”, 正如陳來所說的“具”是“理潛存於心中”。在對“具”的討論中, 朱子還有“心妙衆理”的提法：

> 或問“心之神明 ,妙衆理而宰萬物”。曰：“神是恁地精彩 ,明是恁地光明。”又曰：“心無事時 ,都不見；到得應事接物 ,便在這裡；應事了 ,又不見：恁地神出鬼沒！”又曰：“理是定在這裡 ,心便是運用這理底 ,須是知得到。”[69]

“心妙衆理”是朱子早年借鑒胡宏“心妙性情之德”而提出的, 朱子認爲以“神明”形容“心”, “神”形容了是心應用理之精彩, “明”形容了心湛然光明, 並且“心妙衆理”形象地說明了心未發已發間神出鬼沒的神妙的特點。朱子最後又補充說必須要明白的是, “心妙衆理”之“理”是“定在這裡”的, 心是對這個理的“運用”, 如此可知, 朱子最後“心妙衆理”之“理”的先在性進行了強調, 也即是說“心妙衆理”形象地說明了心對理運用的神妙的特點, 但心所運用之理原是定在心中的。正因爲朱子對“定在之理”的強調, 所以當晚年時朱子門人問及“心妙衆理”是否能代替“心具衆理”時, 朱子的回答是否定的, 他說：“‘妙’字便稍精彩, 但只是不甚穩當, ‘具’字便平穩。”[70] 可見, 朱子認爲雖然

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66 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁1425。
67 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁154。
68 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁155。
69 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁382。
70 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁382-383。

“心妙衆理”也是與“心具衆理”意思相近, 但“妙衆理”卻傾向於強調心對理之應用, 而未突出所妙之理是“定在之理”, 固顯得不穩當。對此, 朱子在晚年對“妙衆理”的討論中又作了強調：

> 德元問：“何謂‘妙衆理’？”曰：“大凡道理皆是我自有之物 ,非從外得。所謂知者 ,或錄此下云：‘便只是理 ,才知得。’便只是知得我底道理 ,非是以我之知去知彼道理也。道理固本有 ,用知 ,方發得出來。若無知 ,道理何從而見！”[71]

由引文可知, 朱子在解釋“心妙衆理”時提出理是我自有之物, 理本存於心中, 而所謂 “知理”, 就是因爲是知“心中之理”才能知, 才能得。朱子強調“知理”並不是以我之知去知“心外之理”, 而是通過“知”將心中本固有之理發出來, 運用到事事物物上。如果沒有“知”的作用, 道理就不會顯現。這是朱子對“心妙衆理”的解釋, 此前朱子解釋“心妙衆理”時, 說明了心對理之運用的神妙特點可稱爲“妙”, 此時朱子在說“心妙衆理”時, 已不再強調此“妙用”的特點, 而是強調其所妙之理, 所知之理是心中本有之理, 更加強調理的“定在”與“固有”, 正因爲如此, 朱子認爲“妙”不如“具”平穩, 故而沒有改變“心具衆理”的說法。

3、具：結構包藏內容

朱子以“氣之靈”釋知覺, 說明心是“兼氣”說, 因此朱子嚴辨心性、理氣, 朱子說：“靈處只是心, 不是性。性只是理。”[72] 所以一方面, 在朱子那裡, 心理不能等同, “心不是性”。然而雖然心理不能等同, 卻也不能說心理爲二, 因爲朱子認爲心理本來貫通爲一。

> 問：“心是知覺 ,性是理。心與理如何得貫通爲一？”
> 曰：“不須去著實通 ,本來貫通。”
> 問：“如何本來貫通？”
> 曰：“理無心 ,則無著處。”[73]

朱子認爲“心”雖是“知覺”, 是“氣之靈”, 但心與理本來貫通, 因爲理虛而無形, 心是氣聚有形, 所以理能以心爲載體, 心能爲理提供著落。如果沒有心, 則理無從安放, 如此理也無法發揮作用。在此, 朱子是從結構上說明心與理的關係, 是爲心與理關係之始終。從這個意義上理解, “心具衆理”可解爲“心包藏理”, 朱子經常有“心包萬理”的說法, 他說：“心包萬理, 萬理具

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71 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁382。此條爲沈僩錄, 爲戊午後錄, 時年朱子69歲。黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁15。

72 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁85。

73 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁85。

于一心。”[74] 心包理, 從結構上說是心在外, 理在內, 對此, 朱子還引用了邵雍“郛郭”的比喻, 他說：“邵康節《擊壤集序》云：‘性者, 道之形體也；心者, 性之郛郭也；身者, 心之區宇也；物者, 身之舟車也。’”[75] 此外, 朱子還有“心將性做餡子模樣”[76] 的比喻, 這些都是朱子用來說明“心具衆理”之心在外, 理在內的結構構成, 理在心內這一結構是爲心與理關係之始終, 所以“具”作爲包藏之義, 仍是“本具”而不爲“後具”。

然而, 朱子對“心具衆理”所理解的“包藏”, 並不僅僅是結構上的“包藏”, 朱子進一步探討了心包藏理中心與理之間的關係。這體現在朱子後來對邵雍的說法進行了修正中, 他說：“如邵子又謂‘心者性之郛郭’, 乃爲近之。但其語意未免太粗, 須知心是身之主宰而性是心之道理, 乃無病耳。”[77] 如此可見, 朱子認爲在心與理之間, 心主宰性, 而性又是心之理, 這說明心能主宰是因爲心所包藏的性是心之理的緣故, 這也就是說因爲心包藏了心之理而使心具有了主宰的地位, 如此, 理就成爲心的本質。所以, 以“心包萬理”來解釋“心具衆理”, 說明了心是包藏理的結構, 而理作爲心所包藏的內容, “心包萬理”形象地說明了心作爲現象是在外, 理作爲本質在內, 現象在外, 本質在內, 但是實質上卻合二爲一, 不可相離, 就如同沒有結構的內容無從安放, 沒有內容的結構失去意義一般, “心具衆理”中, 無心則理無從安放, 無理則心不成爲心, 二者雖爲二物, 卻始終爲一。

4、具：非具於心之端

由上分析可知, “心具衆理”說明了心與理是結構包藏內容的關係, 所以可知“心具衆理”之“具”不是靜態之“具”, 就像內容與本質最終要通過形式與現象表現出來一樣, 在“心具衆理”中, 理雖然是潛存, 但卻能發而爲情；“理”雖是靜的, 但卻是“靜中有動”, 並不是如牟宗三所說的“靜擺在那裡”而缺乏道德動力。所以朱子常引伊川的“心如穀種”來解釋“仁”爲“心之德”。但是朱子強調“心具衆理”, “心”還是“穀種”, 所以不能用已發來理解“心具之理”, “理”還不是“四端”。朱子晚年致信方賓王大段論述“具”非“具於心之端”, 即是因爲方賓王說：“夫仁者, 天理之統體而存乎人者, 蓋心德之合而流動發生之端緒也。心之具衆理, 猶穀種之包容生意, 而其流動發生之端即此謂生之性, 故曰‘惻隱之心, 仁之端’而‘元者, 善之長’也。”[78] 可見, 方賓王認爲“仁”是天理存于人心, 心與德由此相結合而使德處於發動的開端。方賓王進一步通過“穀種”之喻, 認爲“心具衆理”中心與理的關係就像谷種包容生意一樣, 生意發生的開端就是此穀種生的性質, 以此詮釋孟子的“惻隱之

74 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁155。
75 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁1382。
76 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁89。
77 朱熹,〈答姜叔權〉,《朱子全書》, 頁2460。
78 朱熹,〈答方賓王〉,《朱子全書》, 頁2655。

心, 仁之端”。對此, 朱子認爲方賓王是將理與四端混淆, 實質是認性爲情, 這也是朱子思想中性情之辨的重要內容：

> 所論“仁”字 ,大概近之。而以發生流動之端緒爲仁 ,則是孟子所謂“惻隱之心”、程子所謂“陽氣發處” ,皆指情而言之 ,不得爲仁之體矣。又所謂事物之理皆“具於流動之端” ,然後見“義之名所以立而體用所以兼備” ,此語亦似微有義外之病。……仁義禮智同具於性 ,而其體渾然 ,莫得而見。至於感物而動 ,然後見其惻隱、羞惡、辭遜、是非之用 ,而仁義禮智之端於此形焉 ,乃所謂情 ,而程子以謂“陽氣發處”者此也。……大抵仁義禮智 ,性也；惻隱、羞惡、是非、辭遜 ,情也；心則統乎性情者也。以此觀之 ,則區域分辨而不害其同 ,脈絡貫通而不害其別 ,庶乎其得之矣。[79]

由引文可見, 朱子並沒有對方賓王之說全面否定, 他認爲方賓王與自己論仁大概相近, 比如其對二程心如穀種, 生之性謂仁等說法的肯定, 但是朱子認爲方賓王最致命的問題在於不辨性情, 朱子認爲其所說的流動發生之端爲仁, 此是從孟子所說的“惻隱之心”和伊川所說的“陽氣發處”, 都是從“情”上而言, 並不是仁之體。朱子進一步指出其將“心具衆理”解釋爲“具於流動之端”, 而後見義如此則體用兼備, 似乎是將義放在心之外。朱子認爲“心具衆理”, 此理包括仁義禮智四性, 仁義禮智同具於性, 而與性渾然一體, 當心與外物發生感通之後, 惻隱、羞惡、辭遜、是非發用出來則是仁義禮智的端緒, 此就是“情”, 也是伊川所言“陽氣發處”。朱子最後指出仁義禮智是性, 惻隱、羞惡、辭讓、是非是情, 如此分辨性情, 則不會將性情混同, 並且還能知道性情二者是脈絡相通的。同年, 朱子又對方賓王說：“仁義禮智, 性也, 體也；惻隱、羞惡、辭遜、是非, 情也, 用也；統性情、該體用者, 心也。今曰流動發生之端即所謂生之性, 又曰‘萬事之理莫不具於流動發生之端, 此義之名所以立而體用所以兼備’, 似未安也。蓋孟子所謂四端, 即程子所謂‘陽氣發處’, 不當以是爲性。”[80] 在此, 朱子又再一次明確性情之辨, 提出“心具衆理”之理並不是具於流動發生之端, 理就是仁義禮智之性, 是未發, 但是其能發爲四端, 與情脈絡相通。

## 五、結論：對以往詮釋之檢查

綜前所述, 朱子“心具衆理”蘊含了結構層面的“理具於心”和功能層面的“心具理”兩個向度, 在“心具衆理”命題中, 心爲未發之全體, 故而虛靈明覺, “心”能知覺, 故而能主宰；“具”爲未發之前之“本具”、“已具”而成爲“窮

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79 朱熹, 〈答方賓王〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁2658-2659。

80 朱熹, 〈答方賓王〉, 《朱子全書》, 頁2661。

理”、“妙用”的前提；“理”雖爲“潛存”, 但卻因“心如穀種”而具備了生發的能力。依此爲參考, 則可以對牟、唐、錢、陳等四家的詮釋作如下些許檢查：

首先, 朱子以“氣之靈”釋“心”, 是在爲“心”能知覺尋找形質上的根據, 此處之“氣”即是形而下之器, 作爲人與物的區別, 此“氣”作爲“形氣之正”, 是每個作爲人都具有的“質料”, 此處之“氣”止于這一步, 還沒有落實到“氣稟”之後“氣質”, 還不具有道德上善惡的色彩。再者, 朱子認爲“心”有形體, 而理無形體, 但是心又是形體中的靈的部分, 所以能爲無形之理提供著處, 故而心能具衆理。所以, “心”爲“氣之靈”, “氣”應爲“形器”義, 還沒有進入道德領域。牟宗三認爲“氣之靈”是對“心”實然之宇宙論上的解釋, 符合朱子本義。但是, 牟宗三以“認知”解心, 即從功能上理解心, 抓住了朱子釋心爲氣之靈的主旨是爲了說明“心之能”, 但是牟宗三並沒有認識到“心之能”的前提在於“心爲未發之全體”, 只從“認知”上說心, 從心之用入手, 顯然缺失了結構的前提, 按朱子的話說, 則是“妙”不如“具”來得穩當。並且牟將“知覺”詮釋爲“認知”, 將“認知”等同於“知覺”, 忽略了“心”之“覺”的部分能力, 對“知覺”的理解有偏失, 而且“知覺”是存於內而認知是發於外的, 牟宗三將“心具衆理”詮釋爲“心認知地具理”, 將“心具衆理”從存有層面曲解爲工夫層面的格物窮理, 顯然與朱子思想本義嚴重不符。

唐君毅所闡釋的朱子之“心”是貫通理氣的概念, 心兼理氣;因心是氣之靈, 所以能具理爲性;心具衆理之心是寂然不動之心之體;所具之理都不超過心“知”的範圍等結論, 都符合朱子本義。但是, 唐先生認爲朱子之“心”重氣而輕理, 恐有失朱子本義, 因爲朱子認爲理是先在的, 心因是氣之靈才成爲理之著處, 所以唐先生說“先稟氣才可以言理具”固然無誤, 但以此說朱子之心偏氣一邊則不當, 因爲氣稟先於理具並不能說明氣稟先於理, “理具後於氣稟”並不能說明理後於氣。朱子說：“(心)不專是氣, 是先有知覺之理。理未知覺, 氣聚成形, 理與氣合, 便能知覺。譬如這燭火, 是因得這脂膏, 便有許多光焰。”[81] 可見, 朱子說心是“氣之靈”, “氣”雖是實說, 但“靈”只是虛說, 心能知覺並非因爲心真的“靈”, 而是因爲心與理相結合產生的作用, 所以朱子是“兼氣”而不是“專氣”說, 而朱子認爲理對氣是絕對的先在與主導, 故唐先生判定朱子之心重氣輕理不符合朱子本旨。

錢穆認爲朱子論心時所用的“知覺”、“神明”、“虛靈”都是氣一邊事, 所以心與性要進行分辨, 符合朱子本旨, 因爲朱子以氣之靈說明心能知覺, 虛靈、神明都是知覺不昧的另一表達。錢穆又提出心能知覺, 能主宰, 是心與理一的條件, 均無誤, 但錢穆認爲朱子性屬理、心屬氣, 恐將心性分得太開, 因爲如前文所說, 朱子以“氣之靈”解心是“兼氣”而不是“專氣”, 若直言朱子“心屬氣”恐落入“專氣”說, 唐先生之“心兼綰合理氣”說顯然比錢穆“心屬氣”更爲妥當。又錢穆對朱子之“心”的詮釋多是圍繞“知覺”義展開, 因其

81 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁85。

對“知覺義”的重視, 所以也把握到心的主宰地位, 但錢穆卻未注意到心之體狀與心之知覺爲一體, 而失了對“心”之第一義的把握。陳來認爲心是一個系統, 是標誌現象總體的範疇, 理是系統中的一部分, 是心的本質, 顯然也是對心作宇宙論的解釋, 說明了心與理、現象與本質的關係, 符合前文所分析的本旨。

其次, 對於“心具衆理”之“具”, 牟宗三基於其對“心”的理解而認爲朱子心與理不一, “心具衆理”不是“本體論的自發自具”, 而是工夫後之“外具”、“後具”的結論。牟先生借用了康得的“分析判斷”與“綜合判斷”的概念, 分析判斷爲先天必然, 而綜合判斷則有先天和後天之分, 先天綜合判斷是必然, 後天綜合判斷則不是必然, 顯然牟宗三是將“心具衆理”命題判定爲後天綜合判斷的命題, 故“具”不具有必然性, 具與不具是由工夫來決定。如果依牟先生的脈絡, 遵循康德的命題判斷, 心具衆理, 從心與理的概念和內涵上說心理確爲二物, 所以心包含理當然不是分析判斷。但是“心具衆理”也不是後天綜合判斷, 因爲在朱子那裡, 心包含理不是通過經驗來證明的, 而是通過“直觀”去認同, “心具衆理”是朱子所設定的人人本有的事實, 人要保護這個事實不被破壞, 所以要“存心”, 朱子說：“能存得自家個虛靈不昧之心, 足以具衆理, 可以應萬事。”[82] 因爲“心具衆理”是先在的, 所以才要“存這個具理之心”。所以, 如果依牟先生的分析話語, “心具衆理”應屬於先天綜合判斷, 心與理雖爲二物, 卻因是人人本有的事實而具有先在性、必然性。回到朱子的脈絡, 本存於心之理, 是心是否爲心的本質, 決定了心能否爲心, 如果沒有理具, 那麼這個表面上看似心的形器就沒有了心的能力, 心就不能成爲一身之主, 所以, “具”不可能爲“外具”、“關聯地具”, 而爲“內具”。朱子一再強調理本具於心, 而非外力爲之, 所以是“自具”, 顯然牟先生對“具”判定與朱子本義相距甚遠。並且, 牟先生對朱子“他律”的判定還建立在其對朱子“氣稟”思想的注意, 這也是牟先生以“氣”解“心”的原因所在。在朱子這裡, “心”不能免除“氣稟”和“物欲”的影響, 所以雖然人人“心具衆理”, 卻仍要去“窮理”, 由此決定朱子的成德路徑是“下學而上達”, 這也是牟先生判定朱子道德是“他律”道德的重要原因, 然而牟先生顯然沒有注意朱子對“窮理”和“格物”的限定, 在朱子這裡, 所窮之理、所知之理皆是心中本具之理, 以“本具”限定“後具”的範圍, 使“格物”、“窮理”不是泛然心外的工夫, 顯然是朱子“心具衆理”作爲成德起點的重要意義所在。

唐君毅亦是從實體解“氣之靈”, 認爲朱子心與理不爲一, 其將“心具衆理”從功能角度理解, 由此來說其理解朱子無誤。但因爲唐先生從功能角度釋心, 所以從表述上其雖是“內具”, 但實爲“能具”、“具內”, 故其解釋缺失了“理本具於心”的結構義前提。錢穆亦將“心具衆理”、“心即理”、“心與理一”進行分別, 與牟、唐不同, 錢穆認爲“心與理一”是本始和境界, 其強調心

82 黎靖德,《朱子語類》, 頁265。

與理是本一的, 只是中間一段是不一, 但他並沒有說這個“本一”就是“心具衆理”, 所以錢穆認爲“心具衆理”不是心與理關係的本始狀態, 將“心具衆理”界定爲達到心與理一的工夫過程, 顯然與朱子本義相距甚遠。

陳來雖對朱子“心具衆理”命題有所注意, 但並未如牟先生等人對此命題作出建構性詮釋。陳來認爲“心具衆理”是存有層面之心與理一, 心即理是境界層面心與理一, 顯然抓住了朱子心性論與工夫路徑的主旨, 其將“心具衆理”界定爲心與理關係之初始的狀態, “具”爲“本具”、“理”是潛存, 符合本文從“結構義”層面對“心具衆理”的理解, 然而陳先生沒有依此“結構義”進一步剖析至“功能義”, 如此也沒有凸顯朱子“心具衆理”命題所關懷的“心”的能力和主宰地位, 這主要是因爲其沒有全面考察朱子“心具衆理”命題的脈絡, 陳來的觀點雖然缺乏充分的論證, 但其對此命題的判定顯然抓住了朱子“心具衆理”命題的第一義, 這在之前衆多朱子學家對朱子“後具”、“外具”判定的格局之下, 爲後世學者重新認識朱子的思想提供了新的參考。需要進一步反省的是, 朱子“心具衆理”命題蘊含著豐富的哲學意義, 不同的人對此命題的詮釋是建立在自身對整個朱子學的理解之上, 而因其所關注的重點不同、所詮釋的方法不同, 而對朱子“心具衆理”命題或有發揮或有偏失, 但是無論詮釋如何, 最合理的方法則是要回到朱子本義, 遵從朱子的脈絡, 而這不僅是詮釋“心具衆理”最合理的詮釋方式, 更是理解朱子思想的關鍵所在。

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# *Hou Ju* 後具 or *Ben Ju* 本具?: A Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi's Proposition "*Xin Ju Zhong Li*" 心具衆理

CHEN Shuangzhu

## Abstract

*"Xin ju zhong li"* 心具衆理 is one of the important propositions of Zhu Xi 朱熹 to investigate the relations between mind (*xin* 心) and principle (*li* 理). Zhu Xi first proposed this term in the *Sishu zhangju jizhu* 四書章句集注, and later further elaborated it in the *Wenji* 文集 and the *Yulei* 語類, and even till the later years before his death. As it has had much attention from the academia, because of scholars'different understandings and focuses on studying Zhu Xi's thinking, the results of the final interpretations became divergent. There were Mou Zongsan's 牟宗三 "*hou wai ju shuo*" 後外具說 which means principle is embraced by mind through practices, Tang Junyi's 唐君毅 "*neng ju nei shuo*" 能具內說 means the mind originally has the ability to embrace principle. Qian Mu's 錢穆 "*hou ju shuo*" 後具說 means principle embraced by mind as oneness through acquired practices. Chen Lai's 陳來 "*ben nei ju shuo*" 本內具說 means principle is innately and originally embraced by mind. Basically, Mou and Qian both suggest "*hou ju*" while Tang and Chen took a stand on "*ben ju*" 本具. Also, Mou's "*wai ju*" 外具 shows significant contrast against Tang's "*ju nei*" 具內 and Chen's "*nei ju*" 內具. It can be found that the meaning of "*xin ju zhong li*" contains two dimensions by researching through a combination of Zhu Xi's related texts. First is called "*jie guo yi*" 結構義 meaning when mind is in the undisturbed status, principle is innate together with mind as one,. Second is called "*gong neng yi*" 功能義 meaning when mind is the entity with complete consciousness, it has the ability to become dominant and embrace the principle into itself as one. In Zhu Xi's works, the "*jie gou yi*" takes precedence over the "*gong neng yi*." However, no matter from which direction it is examined, Zhu Xi's proposition of "*xin ju zhong li*" is confined to the ontological level rather than the practical level.

**Keywords:** Zhu Xi 朱熹, *xin ju zhong li* 心具衆理, *li ju* 理具, *xin ju* 心具, *ben ju* 本具, *hou ju* 後具

# 從工夫論的角度論陽明哲學中良知與氣的關係

李 彬

**中文提要**

當前學界對陽明哲學的研究以“良知”爲中心而漸次展開, 宋明理學中“理氣”或“性氣”的對立, 在陽明心學中被轉換爲“良知”與“氣”的關係。“氣”在陽明哲學中的地位相比宋代理學那裡, 有了極大的提高。首先, 良知“以其流行謂之氣”命題的提出；其次, 對“生之謂性”的重新評價, 重申“性即氣, 氣即性”, 故良知發用不能“外了氣”；再次, “萬物一體”以“同此一氣”或“一氣流通”爲前提。但經過進一步考察我們發現, 首先, “致良知”不致力於對治氣稟之雜, 而是從本體上做工夫, 自然達到“不動氣”的效驗。其次, “萬物一體”的本體論基礎仍然是“良知”, 而非一般認爲的“氣”。再次, 良知雖不可離氣而言, 但終究是良知決定氣, 而非氣決定良知。因此, 陽明雖然重視“氣”, 但他用“良知”吸納“氣”的做法, 實際上消解了“氣”的客觀性。

**關鍵詞**：陽明, 良知, 氣, 本體, 工夫論, 萬物一體

* 李彬：復旦大學哲學學院博士研究生（16110160009@fudan.edu.cn）

# 一、序言

當前學界對陽明學的研究以“良知”爲中心而展開。但應當注意的是，作爲宋明道學的繼承者與批判者，陽明學需要置於宋明道學的整體學術脈絡中來考察。這就意味著，陽明學的核心概念如“良知”，也需要置於與其他道學核心概念如“理”、“氣”、“心”、“性”等的關係中來考察。

在明代心學那裡，對“析心與理而爲二”[1] 的不滿，導致對理氣、性氣二分的不滿和批判，倡導“心即理”、重視“心”的地位和作用、重新評價“生之謂性”、重提“以生釋仁”等思想傾向，都導致了“氣”的地位的提升。[2]

陽明固然不像朱子那樣過於重視討論理氣的關係問題，但朱子哲學中的理、氣對舉基本上被陽明保留下來。[3] 但陽明用“良知”綜合了宋明道學“理”、“氣”、“心”、“性”等諸多核心概念，並將之貫通爲一。“良知”的含義得到了極大的豐富，不僅“超越了一般所謂的意識範圍”，而且“徹上徹下，由道德本體直通宇宙本體”，甚至“連意識所不及、而爲元氣元精元神所貫穿之身體展現，也都是良知的變相”。[4] 而不管是“宇宙本體”還是“身體”，無疑都指向“氣”。

因此，在陽明哲學中，“良知”與“氣”的關係應該得到考察。首先，在討論“良知”的“造化”與“流行”時，“氣”不能被忽視。其次，在“萬物一體論”中，“同此一氣”與“一氣流通”如何可能及其與“萬物一體”的關係，也應該是關注的重點。再次，從工夫論上來看，在解釋惡的產生、以及討論對治氣稟的工夫問題時，“氣”仍然是一個無法被忽視的因素，如何“循理”而不“動氣”，仍然是陽明工夫論關心的問題。

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1 “朱子所謂‘格物’云者，在‘即物而窮其理’也。即物窮理是就事事物物上求其所謂定理者也，是以吾心而求理於事事物物之中，析心與理而爲二矣。”王守仁，〈答顧東橋書〉，《傳習錄中》，條135，文中引《傳習錄》所標條數，以鄧艾民《傳習錄註疏》爲準。

2 除了以氣學名家的王廷相、王夫之之外，像陽明及其後學亦極爲重視氣的地位和作用。此外，一般被視爲“朱學後勁”、“紫陽功臣”的羅欽順，基於理氣是一、“理只是氣之理”（羅欽順，《困知記》續卷上，頁89）的觀點，在理氣觀上也反對朱子，批評朱子“終身認理氣爲二物”（羅欽順，《困知記》卷下，頁38），故有“理與氣決是二物”、“氣強理弱”、“若無此氣，則此理如何頓放”等“小有未合”的論斷（羅欽順，《困知錄》卷上，頁7）。關於“氣”在宋明理學中發展演變的具體論述，可以參見楊儒賓，《儒家身體觀》，重點參見第七、第八章；楊儒賓，《異議的意義──近世東亞的反理學思潮》，重點參見第三、四、八章。

3 上田弘毅認爲：“王守仁對朱熹的區分心和理進行了徹底的批判，而對理氣分離則未加批判。即使在主要講究理氣一體的後期，也可發現幾處分離理氣作爲對立物的場所。”上田弘毅，〈明代哲學中的氣──王守仁和左派王學〉，《氣的思想》，頁429。我們認爲，“理氣”無論如何一體，也首先是不同的，即使在主張心即理、理氣一體的良知說中，理和氣也不能被混淆成沒有任何本質區別的東西，理無疑具有規範性的面相，而氣則更強調其活動性，理氣一體不過是說在良知那裡，理氣不可截然二分，而是體用一如的，理與氣是良知的不同規定和面相。

4 楊儒賓，《儒家身體觀》，頁305-307。

可見, 在宋儒那裡“理氣”或“性氣”的對立, 在陽明這裡轉換爲“良知”與“氣”的關係。不管是在本體、心性或工夫層面, 考察“良知”與“氣”的關係, 對我們進一步理解陽明心學及其對宋代道學的繼承與發展都有重要意義。

## 二、陽明論“心”及其與朱子的差異

王陽明對朱子的理氣論討論的並不多, 他對朱子的批評主要集中在後者認理在外導致的“析心與理爲二”。更重要的是, 在陽明那裡, “心”的內涵及其與“理”的關係, 其實已經大異於朱子。

簡單來說, 不同於朱子那裡將“心”看作“氣之靈”, [5] 更多地強調其作爲功能結構的作用而非實體性存在。[6] 陽明那裡的“心”不僅具有“虛靈不昧”的結構狀態和“神明不測”的功能作用, 不僅“含具衆理”、與理發生關係, 而且含納萬事萬物, 既具有實體性存在, 又具有本體論地位。

這個“衆理具而萬事出”[7] 之“心”, 用更加具有陽明色彩的術語表達就是“良知”, “良知”或“致良知”在陽明那裡即是學問的“大頭腦”。[8] 但心或良知還有其他規定性, 如“夫良知一也, 以其妙用謂之神, 以其流行謂之氣, 以其凝聚謂之精”, [9] 妙用、流行、凝聚都是良知的不同的發用或存在狀態, 而神、氣、精則是因事立名, 對其不同狀態的描述, 但最終指向的其實是一個東西, 即良知或心。[10]

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5 黎靖德,《朱子語類》卷5, 頁85。

6 楊儒賓認爲：“朱熹說心是氣之靈, 王陽明不一定會反對, 但他反對氣之靈的‘氣’只是理氣二分系統下的氣。如果氣指的是種流行, 其地位略同《易傳》所謂‘神’, 那麼, 王陽明是會贊同朱熹的觀點的。” 楊儒賓,《儒家身體觀》, 頁305。這一洞見無疑來自牟宗三, 牟氏即認爲“心與神決不可一條鞭地視爲氣”, 而朱子言心、言神的問題亦即在此處(牟宗三,《心體與性體》第二冊, 頁19、24及以下)。但楊儒賓不同於牟宗三之處在於, 牟氏強調的是“心、神”不僅可以屬氣, 亦可以屬體或道(同上, 頁28-29), 但楊儒賓則是認爲即便是“氣”, 本身就不僅是經驗性的, 也可以有一種“另類的氣”——即可以上下其講的“先天之氣”, 屬“神”之氣。(對“先天之氣”的具體闡述與辨析, 楊儒賓,〈兩種氣學, 兩種理學〉,《異議的意義——近世東亞的反理學思潮》, 頁127-168。這種看法起碼在明道那裡是有根據的, 明道即言“氣外無神, 神外無氣”(程顥、程頤,《河南程氏遺書》卷十一,《二程集》, 頁121)強調神與氣的圓融不離。

7 “虛靈不昧, 衆理具而萬事出。心外無理, 心外無事。” 王守仁,《傳習錄上》, 條32。朱子《大學章句》注“明明德”曰：“明德者, 人之所得乎天, 而虛靈不昧, 以具衆理而應萬事者也。” 朱熹,《四書章句集注》, 頁3。並在《語類》卷14中說：“禪家但以虛靈不昧者爲性, 而無以具衆理以下之事。”陽明此處顯然又從“心即理”的立場出發, 更動了朱子之語, 將此一命題改成了典型的心學命題, 正如佐藤一齋所說：“心外無理, 故衆理具；心外無事, 故萬事出。晦庵舊語, 點鐵成金。”《傳習錄欄外書》頁32, 鄧艾民,《傳習錄註疏》, 頁34。

8 “‘致良知’是學問大頭腦, 是聖人教人第一義。” 王守仁,〈答歐陽崇一〉,《傳習錄中》, 條166。“頭腦”這個說法雖然早已出現在朱熹那裡(如《語類》卷9：“凡看道理, 要見得大頭腦處分明。”), 但得益于陽明的強調, 使“頭腦”這個說法極具陽明色彩, 陽明在《傳習錄》中也屢屢提及, 可以視爲良知的同義詞。如“先生謂學者：‘爲學須得個頭腦, 工夫方有著落’。” 王守仁,《傳習錄上》, 條102。又“先認聖人氣象, 昔人嘗有是言矣, 然亦欠有頭腦。” 王守仁,〈答周通道書〉,《傳習錄中》, 條144。又如“文公‘格物’之說, 只是少頭腦。” 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條212。

9 王守仁,《傳習錄中》, 條152。

在這個意義上, 我們就可以理解, 在朱子哲學中具有首出性意義的理、氣概念, 在陽明那裡則成了第二位的, 就像斯賓諾莎那裡思維和廣延不過是上帝這一唯一實體的不同存在樣式, 理、氣(包括其他的心、性、命、道、精、神、誠、中、極、易等)也不過是對良知這一唯一本體的不同描述, [11] 良知本身是一切規定性的根據和來源, 是"天理之昭明靈覺處, 故良知即是天理"。[12]

因此, 正如有的學者指出的"陽明在這裡所說的良知已經超出了人之德性的範疇, 而是指宇宙天地之精神, 類同於'天地之心'。"[13] 陽明那裡的良知具有一種作爲事物和義理之根源的生生不息、發育生成萬物的"太虛本體"的形象。良知指向的就不只是主觀的心靈或知覺, 而是作爲宇宙之本體的大全。在這個意義上, 再去看陽明對良知的一些看似匪夷所思甚至充滿神秘主義的描述就不是那麼難以理解了：

> 良知是造化的精靈。這些精靈生天生地 ,成鬼成帝 ,皆從此出。真是與物無對。人若復得他完完全無 ,無少虧欠 ,自不覺手舞足蹈 ,不知天地間更有何樂可代！[14]

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10 陽明關於"良知流行爲氣"的這一經典表述, 實際上是爲了回應學生陸澄關於"元精、元氣、元神"這一仙道內丹養生學上的具體問題, 在道家內丹學、養生學和傳統的中醫理論看來, "精、氣、神"應該是具有實存樣態之物, 而不是單純的邏輯範疇或空洞的概念。但王陽明在回信中, 並沒有直接回應陸澄的問題, 而是用自己的良知理論將陸澄的問題做了一個轉換, 指出道家內丹學所謂的"精、氣、神"不是別的, 就是"良知"的一個面向而已, "妙用"、"流行"、"凝聚"皆是"良知"的發用, 三者"只是一件", 即只是一個"良知"。因此, 不能像道家內丹學或中醫理論所理解的那樣, 將之看成三種有構成要素和能量狀態不同的身體之"丹藥", 故存在"煉精化氣"、"煉氣化神"、"煉神還虛"三個不同的修養煉化階段, 而只需要做"致良知"的工夫即可。因此, 陽明用他的良知學, 將道家內丹－養生學都進行了良知學轉化。具體來說, 陽明用"良知"將道家、養生家那裡的"氣", 進行"理氣論"的改造, "精、氣、神"這些道家內丹學最重要的術語皆被宋明儒學"理氣"對舉下的"氣"概念所涵攝, 進而又作爲"體用"對舉下的"用"被作爲"體"的"良知"所容納, "氣"由於附屬或附隨於"良知"而地位得到了提升, 而"良知"也由於"氣"的納入, 內涵變得豐富起來。關於王陽明與道家關係的進一步論述, 可以參見柳存仁先生《明儒與道教》、《王陽明與道教》、《王陽明與佛道二教》三文。(收入柳存仁,《和風堂文集(中冊)》)楊儒賓也注意到了道家內丹學與陽明心學中"氣"的關係, 在《兩種氣學、兩種儒學》中所劃分的"氣"的含義的第三種, 即"性命之學所說的'先天之氣'", "如果更精緻的區分, 即是所謂的元精、元氣、元神", "丹道之士往往視" "這種極精微的身體爲縮結天人之際的通道, 理學家一般不會將此種先天之氣當作工夫的最高層概念, 但理學家(尤其是王陽明之後的儒者)對此路數倒不陌生。依據晚近學者的研究, 理學工夫論和丹道工夫論的關係比我們以往理解的要深許多。" 楊儒賓,《異議的意義》, 頁133。

11 "所謂'心即理'也者, 以其充塞氤氳而言謂之氣, 以其脈絡分明而言謂之理, 以其流行賦界而言謂之命, 以其稟受一定而言謂之性, 以其物無不由而言謂之道, 以其妙用不測而言謂之神, 以其凝聚而言謂之精, 以其主宰而言謂之心, 以其無妄而言謂之誠, 以其無所倚著而言謂之中, 以其無物可加而言謂之極, 以其屈伸消息往來而言謂之易, 其實則一而已。"《稽山承語》條10, 陳來,《〈遺言錄〉、〈稽山承語〉與王陽明語錄佚文》,《中國近世思想史研究》, 頁724-725、《明儒學案》卷二十五《南中王門學案一 · 明經朱近齋先生得之》,《明儒學案》, 頁585-586, 文字有個別差異。

12 王守仁,《傳習錄中》, 條167。

13 吳震,《〈傳習錄〉精讀》, 頁137。

14 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條239。

陽明從“造化的精靈”角度論述“良知”, 甚至從宇宙生成的角度界定良知的功能：“生天生地”、“成鬼成帝”。但這些說辭與其說是宇宙論或生成論的如實表述, 不如說是一種形象化的表達, 用象語言來強調良知的本體地位和作用：天地鬼神、萬事萬物“皆從此出”, 意味著良知是萬物之存在的本體論基礎和意義的原初根源。但良知的“造化”生成必須是以實體之“氣”的形象展開和出現的, “氣”在其中的地位不言而喻。

更重要的是, 正如有學者指出的, 陽明用“心”取代朱子哲學中“性”的地位, 也改造了“性”的性格：

> 在朱熹的用法中,性、氣絕對分開,性不可能有任何的活動義。但王陽明既然可以用“心”稱呼兼具道德義與存在義的實體,可見他強調的本心原本即具有活動義。而王陽明的用法中,任何形上、形下的活動都可以用氣形容之,因此,心即理即氣。[15]

關於朱子哲學中性氣是否絕對分開、性是否不可能有任何活動義的問題, 我們暫且不論。但在陽明那裡, 確實可以用“心”稱呼“兼具道德義與存在義的實體”, 因爲“心”在陽明那裡是具有實體性存在的。而良知本體毫無疑問是具有“活動義”的, 並且是以“氣”的形態發用流行。

## 三、陽明論“性氣關係”

陽明的“理論關心”雖然“並不在於宇宙論意義上的理氣問題”, [16] 但對於心性論意義上的性氣關係問題, 他還是傾注了不少的注意力, 對宋儒關於性氣問題的討論, 陽明基於其良知學做了一系列的批判和總結。

如對於古來衆說紛紜的人性善惡問題, 陽明即用其良知理論對諸種性論做了一個綜合和評判：

> 問：“古人論性,各有異同,何者乃爲定論？”先生曰：“性無定體,論亦無定體。有自本體上說者,有自發用上說者,有自源頭上說者,有自流弊處說者。總而言之,只是一個性,但所見有淺深爾。若執定一邊,便不是了。性之本體,原是無善無惡的。發用上也原是可以爲善、可以爲不善的。其流弊也原是一定善、一定惡的。……孟子說性,直從源頭上說來,亦是說個大概如此。荀子性惡之說,是從流弊上說來,也未可盡說他不是,只是見得未精耳。衆人則失了心之本體。”問：“孟子從源頭上說性,要人用功在源頭上明徹；荀子從流弊說性,功夫只在末流上救正,便費力了。”先生曰：“然。”[17]

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15 楊儒賓,《儒家身體觀》, 頁371。

16 吳震,《〈傳習錄〉精讀》, 頁205。

17 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條286。

> 夫子說“性相近”,即孟子說“性善”,不可專在氣質上說。若說氣質,如剛與柔對,如何相近得？惟性善則同耳。人生初時善,原是同的,但剛的習於善則爲剛善,習於惡則爲剛惡,柔的習於善則爲柔善,習於惡則爲柔惡,便日相遠了。[18]

可見, 陽明仍然是繼承了從先秦一直到宋代, 學者關於性善性惡、以及“氣質”問題的討論。在他看來, 性只是一個性, 但這個性並無一定之體, 故人由於所見不同, 或見其本體、或見其發用、或見其源頭、或見其流弊, 因此有種種論斷, 但從本體層次上来說, “性之本體, 原是無善無惡的”。而對於宋儒認爲孔子所言“性相近”之“性”乃是從氣質上說性的觀點, 陽明提出了反對, 他認爲此相近之“性”, 就是孟子“性善”之“性”。正因爲人性皆善, 故才能說“近”, 否則從氣質上說, 人性的剛、柔只能是對立的, 而不能說相近。陽明顯然只是在人性的剛柔、緩急這種經驗層面理解宋儒的“氣質之性”概念。因此, 他雖然反對宋儒“性相近”是說氣質之性, 但還是承認宋儒說的人之氣質有剛柔、厚薄之不同：

> 良知本來自明。氣質不美者,渣滓多,障蔽厚,不易開明。質美者,渣滓原少,無多障蔽,略加致知之功,此良知便自瑩徹,些少渣滓,如湯中浮雪,如何能作障蔽？[19]
> 先生曰：“氣質猶器也,性猶水也。均之水也,有得一缸者,有得一桶者,有得一甕者,局於器也。氣質有清濁、厚薄、強弱之不同,然其爲性則一也。能擴而充之,器不能拘矣。”[20]

可見, 王陽明認爲, 從心性本體上講, 一方面, 氣質的美惡不同、渣滓多少, 固然會成爲良知的“障蔽”, 另一方面, 氣質的清濁、厚薄、強弱不同, 也會造成現實人性的善惡不齊。但“良知”或“性”都仍然在本體上未被沾染或破壞：“良知本來自明”、“其爲性則一”。故從工夫上來說, 要在源頭上“加致知之功”, 將本然之“性”“擴而充之”, [21] 即可恢復良知本來之“明”、人

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18 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條313。

19 王守仁,〈答陸原靜〉,《傳習錄中》, 條162。

20 陳榮捷,《傳習錄拾遺》, 條31, 頁329。陽明此段論性所舉的水與盛水之容器的例子, 朱子亦曾用過：“人物之生, 天賦之以此理, 未嘗不同, 但人物之稟受自有異耳。如一江水, 你將杓去取, 只得一杓；將碗去取, 只得一碗；至於一桶一缸, 各自隨器量不同, 故理亦隨以異。”黎靖德,《朱子語類》卷4, 頁58。不同的是, 陽明強調“性之一”, 注重“擴充”的工夫, 朱子側重“稟受”上的不同導致“理亦隨以異”。

21 這裡的工夫實際上包含了先天直悟本體的“頓教”和後天“漸教”的合一, 首先, 從源頭上入手“加致知之功”, 即是“從本源上悟入”、“一悟本體, 即是工夫”的頓教, 而“擴充”工夫無疑是一種漸修, 但陽明這裡的“漸修”也是從良知上用功, “在良知上實用爲善、去惡功夫” 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條293。所謂“上乘兼修中下。” 王畿,〈天泉證道記〉,《王畿集》卷一, 頁2。因此陽明“致良知”的工夫, 固然是“即本體即工夫”的頓教工夫, 但“頓不廢漸”, 陽明“致良知”的工夫, 即包含著“擴充”的漸修工夫, 只不過這裡要擴充的不是別的, 就是作爲本體的良知本身, 亦可以說是良知的自我擴充。陽明在“良知”本體上做“漸修”之工夫的話頭極多, 如《傳習錄下》條189：先生問九川：“於‘致知’之說體驗如何？”九川曰：“自覺不同。往時操持常不得個恰好處, 此乃恰好處。”先生曰：“可知是體來與聽講不同。我初與講時, 知爾

性本來之“性”。可見, 陽明雖然亦承認“氣質”對人性的負面影響, 但其在工夫的取徑上則是直接從源頭或本體入手做工夫, 而不是孜孜於對治氣稟。這一工夫論取向無疑更接近由明道—象山一脈相傳而下的易簡直截、頓教的工夫路數, 與伊川、朱子的下學上達、漸修的工夫路數差別較大。[22]

同時在“性氣關係”的問題上, 陽明也確實更傾向明道而非伊川、朱子。如對於來自於告子的“生之謂性”這一在朱子學者看來判別是否正統儒家的指標性命題, 陽明一反朱子以來的否定性解釋而直追明道, 對之進行了重新肯定。針對“生之謂性”而展開的性氣關係的討論中, “氣”就不再只具有消極的意義：

> “生之謂性” ,“生”字即“氣”字 ,猶言氣即是性也。氣即是性 ,人生而靜以上不容說 ,才說氣即是性 ,即已落在一邊 ,不是性之本原矣。孟子性善 ,是從本原上說。然性善之端須在氣上始見得。若無氣 ,亦無可見矣。惻隱、羞惡、辭讓、是非 ,即是氣。程子謂：“論性不論氣 ,不備；論氣不論性 ,不明。”亦是爲學者各認一邊 ,只得如此說。若見得自性明白時 ,氣即是性 ,性即是氣 ,原無性氣之可分也。[23]
> 一問：“生之謂性 ,告子亦說得是 ,孟子如何非之？”先生曰：“固是性 ,但告子認得一邊去了 ,不曉得頭腦。若曉得頭腦 ,如此說亦是。孟子亦曰：‘形色 ,天性也。’這也是指氣說。”又曰：“凡人信口說 ,任意行 ,皆說此是依我心性出來 ,此是所謂‘生之謂性’ ,然卻要有過差。若曉得頭腦 ,依吾良知上說出來 ,行將去 ,便自是停當。然良知亦只是這口說 ,這身行。豈能外得氣 ,別有個去行去說？故曰：‘論性不論氣 ,不備；論氣不論性 ,不明。’氣亦性也 ,性亦氣也。但須認得頭腦是當。”[24]

陽明基於他的良知理論, 在“見得自性明白”、“認得頭腦是當”的前提下, 重新肯定了告子“生之謂性”這一命題, 並提出“氣即是性, 性即是氣, 原無性氣之可分”、“氣亦性也, 性亦氣也”的主張。伊川、朱子性、氣二分的

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只是忽易, 未有滋味。只這個要妙再體到深處, 日見不同, 是無窮盡的。”可見, 在陽明看來, “致良知”的工夫, 不能僅僅耳聽口說、理論上致思、“懸空想個本體”, 而須實實在在的做工夫去“體來”, 方有“滋味”, 不至於“忽易”, 此良知之“要妙”“體到深處”, 方能“日見不同”, 良知本體“無窮盡”, 工夫自然也“無窮盡”。

22 明道是由“識仁”入手, 先識仁體, 然後“以誠敬存之”, 故“不須防檢, 不須窮索”, 即從“直接體認本體入手, 即本體即是工夫”, 而橫渠、伊川、朱子則基本上要求“以工夫湊合本體, 以至於非要在工夫之極致之後才能體會到本體”, (郭曉東,《識仁與定性》, 頁113-114)故朱子反對湖湘學派“先察識後涵養”的工夫路數。陽明“致良知”的工夫固然是從本體入手, 但其不同於明道之處在於, “良知”即是工夫所要指向的“本體”, 同時也是做工夫的主體, 而且在陽明那裡, 最根本的工夫即是“本體工夫”：“功夫不離本體, 本體原無內外。……如今正要講明功夫不要有內外, 乃是本體功夫”(王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條182)本體是貫通“內外”、包含工夫在內的, 因此工夫不僅要在本體上做, 而且做工夫的就是本體, 故陽明反復申說：“合著本體, 方是工夫。做得工夫, 方是本體。又曰：做得工夫, 方見本體。又曰：做工夫的, 便是本體。”《稽山承語》條20,《中國近世思想史研究》, 頁726。對本體與工夫的探討愈加精微和綿密, 歸根結底, 在陽明那裡, “本體是良知之本體, 工夫是致良知之工夫”, 故能“合一”、亦能“原無內外”。

23 王守仁,〈答周道通書〉,《傳習錄中》, 條148。

24 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條220。

立場被陽明打破, 重新回到了明道性氣一元的立場上。[25]

陽明將性氣重新綰合到一起, 無疑使“氣”的地位得到了極大的提高。但正如上面提到的, “性氣”合一的前提是“見得自性明白”或“曉得頭腦”、“認得頭腦是當”, 否則說“生之謂性”即是“認得一邊去了”。也就是說, 陽明所肯定的“生之謂性”, 並不是自然意義上、不受任何倫理規定的“無分於善惡”、“決之東則東, 決之西則西”的屬氣之“性”, 這種“只落在”自然或生物本能“一邊”、不受“良知”規範和約束, 而倡言“信口說, 任意行, 皆說此是依我心性出來”意義上的“生之謂性”, 是“要有過差”的。因此, 只有“認得頭腦是當”或“見得自性明白”而能夠“依吾良知上說出來, 行將去”, 方才“自是停當”。但同時, “良知”之“說”、之“性”, 亦不能外得此“口”、此“身”, 即不能“外得氣”。“性”不外“氣”而在, 故“氣亦性”, “性”或“良知”須主宰或約束“氣”, 故“性亦氣”。

可見, 在宋儒那裡的性氣關係問題, 在陽明這裡被轉化成“良知”與“氣”的關係問題。而在朱子學那裡被嚴格分開的“性”和“氣”, 也經由其良知理論, 被重新綰合在一起。附隨於“良知”, “氣”的地位也得到了提高。而實際上“良知”的內涵, 也由於其與“氣”的密切關係, 到了豐富和充實。

## 四、陽明論“萬物一體”

根據我們上文對“良知”與“氣”之關係的考察, 可以得出以下結論, 一方面, 相對朱子學而言, “氣”的地位附隨“良知”得到了一定的提升, 另一方面, “良知”的內涵由於“氣”這一具有活動性和客觀性概念的引入, 而變得更加豐富。有學者指出, “氣作爲一種功能存在, 爲良知──天地精神提供某種介在作用, 換言之, 良知在表現形式上可以以氣的妙用、流行、凝聚等形態出現。”[26]可見, 氣在使陽明的良知概念“超出人之德性的範疇”方面, 具有決

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25 陽明將明道“性即氣, 氣即性”的命題重新表述爲“氣即是性, 性即是氣”, 無疑否定了朱子站在性氣二分的立場上, 認爲明道“性即氣, 氣即性”意謂“性便在氣稟上。稟得此氣, 理便搭附在上面”(黎靖德,《朱子語類》卷59, 頁1388)的說法, 也否定了牟宗三認爲明道那裡的“即”字不能作判斷詞“是”解, 而應作“不分離”解, 因此要把“性即氣, 氣即性”理解作天命之性與氣質之性的不可分離性, 即所謂“性氣滾在一起”、“性氣混雜、夾雜在一起”(牟宗三,《心體與性體》第二冊, 頁164)的說法, 但這裡的“即”或“即是”也不能看成全稱命題式的、內涵和外延完全一致的相等, 而可以借用牟宗三先生的術語, 將之理解爲“圓頓之表示”, “即表示氣外無性、性外無氣”, 明道本身即有“氣外無神, 神外無氣”(程顥、程頤,《遺書》卷11,《二程集》, 頁121)的說法(郭曉東,《識仁與定性》, 頁93-94), 而陽明“心外無X”的說法更是其用語的一大特色, 晚年也有“事外無心”(《陽明先生遺言錄上》條36,《中國近世思想史研究》, 頁718)的提法。

26 吳震,《〈傳習錄〉精讀》, 頁137-138。按照陽明的觀點, 說氣爲良知提供“某種介在作用”, 或說“氣具有載體功能, 能爲良知的發用流行提供一種外緣性助力”(同上), 其實已經有析良知與氣爲二的嫌疑, 氣並非良知的“載體”, 良知須以氣的形態出現, 氣乃良知之實體, 無氣則良知

定性的意義, 正是由於良知以氣爲其實體而呈現, 良知不再只是一個心性論或道德哲學的主觀範疇, 而是具有客觀性、超越性的本體概念。[27]在這個意義上, 可以理解陽明"良知之在人心, 亙萬古, 塞宇宙, 而無不同", [28] "自聖人以至於愚人, 自一人之心以達於四海之遠, 自千古之前以至於萬代之後, 無有不同"[29] 這類說辭。

但對陽明將良知天理化、或天道化的做法, 即使在當時也並非沒有疑問, 如同時期的羅欽順就對此提出了質疑：

> 今以良知爲天理 ,即不知天地萬物皆有此良知否乎？天之高也 ,未易驟窺 ,山河大地吾未見其有良知也。萬物衆多 ,未易遍舉 ,草木金石吾未見其有良知也。求其良知而不得 ,安得不置之度外邪！[30]

羅欽順實際上質疑陽明將良知實體化的傾向："良知恐難做實體看", 這提示我們"良知天理化"是有問題的, 不同於"良知"的主觀性, 天道、天理的客觀性維度更強, 故可說萬物皆有"理", 而很難說萬物皆有"良知"。"理"可能只是萬物存在之合理性, 之"宜", 不必指向"好惡是非"的判斷能力, 而這則是"良知"所具有的根本規定性。[31]

如果說羅欽順屬於"朱學後勁", 其質疑尚有可能出於學派立場的不同, 屬外部批評, 但在心學內部, 也有學生對良知是否遍在於一切事物提出了自己的疑問：

> 朱本思問："人有虛靈 ,方有良知。若草木瓦石之類 ,亦有良知否？"

這個疑問其實跟上述羅欽順對"山河大地吾未見其有良知也"、"草木金石吾未見其有良知也"的質疑如出一轍, 都是認爲良知乃是屬人的, 都對陽明將良知泛化、普遍化提出了某種擔心。對此陽明答道：

> 人的良知 ,就是草木瓦石的良知。若草木瓦石無人的良知 ,不可以爲草木瓦石矣。豈惟草木瓦石爲然 ,天地無人的良知 ,亦不可爲天地矣。蓋天地萬物與人原是一體 ,其發竅之最精處 ,是人心一點靈明 ,風

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亦無可見, 無法發用流行。氣也不是一種"外緣性的助力", 良知之發用流行乃是無須外力推動、自我推動的, 良知自身即是動力、目的, 但良知雖然以氣的形態出現, 但並非氣, 而是氣中的"頭腦"或"主宰", 是"神妙不測"的"氣之靈", 若無"頭腦", 則會"爲氣所亂"、"動氣"。

27 "良知"概念出自《孟子》："人之所不學而能者, 其良能也；所不慮而知者, 其良知也。"朱子注曰："良, 本然之善也。"程子曰："良知良能, 皆無所由；乃出於天, 不繫於人。"(朱熹,《四書章句集注》, 頁353)可見, 即使在程朱那裡, "良知"也具有超越性的來源。

28 王守仁,〈答欧阳崇一〉,《傳習錄中》, 條169。

29 王守仁,〈書朱守乾卷 · 乙酉〉,《王陽明全集》卷八, 頁311。

30 羅欽順,〈答歐陽少司成崇一 · 又〉,《困知記》, 頁160。

31 問題還是出在對"天理"的理解不同上。"天理"到底是什麼？"性即理"與"心即理"是兩個對"理"的不同理解進路, 陽明說"良知即天理", 無疑更加將天理向主觀性維度拉, 陽明之工夫強調"立志", 亦可見出一些端倪。

> 雨露雷、日月星辰、禽獸草木、山川土石 ,與人原只一體。故五穀禽獸之類 ,皆可以養人；藥石之類 ,皆可以療疾 ,只爲同此一氣 ,故能相通耳。[32]

學生朱得之(字本思, 號近齋)認爲有良知的前提是有“虛靈”, “虛靈明覺”是陽明那裡心的特徵, [33] 也即是說, 有心方才能有良知。因此, 朱得之質疑草木瓦石之類是否有“良知”, 因爲無論如何, 不能說草木瓦石之類有“虛靈”之心。陽明對朱得之所認爲的有心才能有良知的觀點並未提出質疑, 我們有理由認爲, 陽明不反對良知乃人所獨具, 非草木瓦石之類所能有者。但是他指出“人的良知, 就是草木瓦石的良知”, [34] 不唯如此, 甚至草木瓦石之爲草木瓦石、天地之爲天地, 都要取決於人的良知、以人的良知爲依歸：“若草木瓦石無人的良知, 不可以爲草木瓦石矣。豈惟草木瓦石爲然, 天地無人的良知, 亦不可爲天地矣”。而之所以如此的原因則是“天地萬物與人原只一體”, 而“其發竅之最精處, 是人心一點靈明”, “人的良知”無他, 即是此“人心一點靈明”。

可見, 良知天理化或者說萬物是否有良知, 這一問題的關鍵在於“良知”或“靈明”與“萬物一體”的關係。而“氣”則只是陽明用來從經驗層面(五穀禽獸之類, 皆可以養人；藥石之類, 皆可以療疾)證明人與萬物之間能夠“相通”或者說具有真實的實踐關聯的一個原因：“只爲同此一氣, 故能相通”。但“氣”顯然不是“萬物一體”中的決定性因素。

儘管天地萬物與人“原只一體”或“原是一體”, 但陽明並沒有否認萬物之間實然的差別：在此“一體”中“風雨露雷、日月星辰、禽獸草木、山川土石”的區別是實然存在、不容淆亂, 並非混沌不分的無別之“一體”。因此, 這個“一體”並不是基於“氣”的同質化的“一體”, 而是有差異的、分殊的一體。也就是說, 這種一體和分殊的統一, 無法由“同此一氣”得到解釋, 而只能從“理”的層面得到解釋。

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32 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條252。

33 吳震教授認爲朱得之此處“人有虛靈”的“虛靈”, 乃是“實指而非狀態描述語”, 且這個“實指”所指向的不是別的, “當是指‘氣’而言”, 如此, 這個說法就變成了“人之有良知是由於人之有‘氣’的緣故, 換言之, 良知與氣形成了某種結構關係。”(吳震,《〈傳習錄〉精讀》, 頁135)吳教授此處指出“良知與氣”的“某種結構關係”, 誠爲有見。但朱氏此處的“虛靈”與其說“實指”向“氣”, 不如更具體的說是指向“心”, 當然在朱子的理氣結構中, 心是屬氣的, 但由於“氣”的含義太廣, 不僅指有生命物而言, 甚至一切有形之物都可以說是“氣”, 萬物無非一氣流行, 如荀子說“水火有氣而無生”(《荀子·王制》), 如果“虛靈”實際指“氣”, 則“人有氣, 方有良知”的說法顯得不夠諦當。

34 這種觀點應該是宋明理學家共享的,《遺書》卷一, 李端伯記云：“天地之間, 非獨人爲至靈, 自家心便是草木鳥獸之心也, 但人受天地之中以生爾。”(一本此下云：“人與物, 但氣有偏正耳。獨陰不成, 獨陽不生。得陰陽之偏者爲鳥獸草木夷狄, 受正氣者人也。”)(程顥、程頤,《二程集》, 頁4)《朱子語類》中, 游敬仲也記錄了“天地間非特人爲至靈, 自家心便是鳥獸草木之心, 但人受天地之中而生耳”(卷4, 頁59)的這句話, 看來是朱子稱舉並贊同的。所不同的是, 程朱那裡的“自家心”主要是從“氣之靈”的角度而言, 而陽明這裡的“良知”則是理氣一體的。

這個“理”不是別的, 即是“良知即天理”意義上的“良知”或“天理”, 不是良知使天地萬物“生成”爲天地萬物, 而是它使天地萬物“成其爲”, 或曰“展現爲”這一秩序井然的“一體”中, 具有不同的規定性的天地萬物。因此, 不管是草木瓦石的“不可以爲草木瓦石”、還是天地的“不可爲天地”, 都不是實在論或存在者狀態意義上的“無法成爲”, 而是存在論意義上的無法呈現其爲“草木瓦石”或“天地”。

因此, 就不難理解, 當有人從經驗意義上、“血氣流通”的角度看待“人心與物同體”的觀點時, 陽明則提醒問者應該“在感應之機上看”：

> 問：“人心與物同體 ,如吾身原是血氣流通的 ,所以謂之同體；若於人便異體了 ,禽獸草木益遠矣！而何謂之同體？”
> 先生曰：“你只在感應之機上看。豈但禽獸草木 ,雖天地也與我同體的 ,鬼神也與我同體的。”請問。先生曰：“你看這個天地中間 ,什麼是天地的心？”對曰：“嘗聞人是天地的心。”曰：“人又什麼教做心？”對曰：“只是一個靈明。”“可知充天塞地中間 ,只有這個靈明。人只爲形體自間隔了。我的靈明便是天地鬼神的主宰。天沒有我的靈明 ,誰去仰他高？地沒有我的靈明 ,誰去俯他深？鬼神沒有我的靈明 ,誰去辨他吉凶災祥？天地鬼神萬物離卻我的靈明 ,便沒有天地鬼神萬物了。我的靈明離卻天地鬼神萬物 ,亦沒有我的靈明。如此便是一氣流通的 ,如何與他間隔得？”[35]

既然人心與萬物“同體”, 需要從“感應之機”上看, 而“感應之機”的關鍵是心之“靈明”, 甚至“充天塞地”的並非流通之“一氣”, 而“只有這個靈明”。因此, “一氣流通”的具體含義, 也要落實到“感應之機”上去理解。在陽明上述語境中, 天地萬物“一氣流通”與否, 要看“我的靈明”如何“主宰”“天地鬼神萬物”, 具體體現在：“我的靈明”如何仰天之高、俯地之深、辨鬼神之吉凶災祥。可見, 這裡“我的靈明”對於“天地鬼神萬物”之“主宰”, 更多是指“天地鬼神萬物”與“我的靈明”、即與人具有切近的實踐相關性, 並非說“我的靈明”具有造物主意義上的神或上帝的功能和地位。實際上, 在中國古人眼中, 沒有客觀、自在意義上的天地萬物, 一切都處在與人的實踐關聯中, 處在一個充滿意義、彼此息息相關的世界中。而這個“意義”在陽明看來, 無疑是由人的“靈明”或“良知”來規定和揭示的。因此, 陽明說“如此便是一氣流通的, 如何與他間隔得？”“間隔”就是不通, 明道認爲“人則能推, 物則氣昏, 推不得”, [36] 王陽明則認爲“萬物”之間是“一氣流通”的, 不存在不能“推”的地方。但是根本上來說, 還是要在“感應之機”上看, 這個“感應之機”則體現在具有主體能動性的“靈明”或“良知”與萬物的感通無礙之上。

可見, 不管是“同此一氣”還是“一氣流通”, “氣”在王陽明“萬物一體”的結構中並未起到決定性的作用, 實際上只成一虛脫之“一氣”, 更多是在象

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35 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條315。

36 程顥、程頤,《遺書》卷二上,《二程集》, 頁34。

徵、類比或經驗層面講“一氣流通”, 而其實義則落在“良知”或“靈明”與“天地萬物”的“感通”上。

由此可見, “萬物一體”的本體論基礎與其說是“氣”, 不如說是“良知”, “靈明”或“良知”是那“同此一氣”或“一氣流通”中起決定性作用的“頭腦”或“主宰”：“良知才是氣乃至於萬物之中的本體存在”。[37]

## 五、陽明論工夫

儘管如此, 陽明時常借用橫渠氣論的“太虛”概念來描述“良知”的存在狀態, 可見他對良知的客觀、超越維度的強調：

> 良知之虛 ,便是天之太虛；良知之無 ,便是太虛之無形。日月風雷、山川民物 ,凡有貌象形色 ,皆在太虛無形中發用流行 ,未嘗作得天的障礙。聖人只是順其良知之發用。天地萬物 ,俱在我良知的發用流行中 ,何嘗又有一物超於良知之外 ,能作得障礙？[38]

在陽明看來, 正如太虛之中無物不有, 皆是有形有象之事物, 也即只有一氣流行造化萬千。同樣, 在良知之虛中, 也無非一氣流行, “衆理具而萬事出”。[39] 理不外於事或氣而存在, 理就體現在氣之流行發用之條理中：“理者, 氣之條理；氣者, 理之運用”[40]；良知“豈能外得氣”, 良知的“妙用”、“流行”、“凝聚”都需要以“氣”的形式出現, 良知就體現在氣之發用流行的條理有序、無絲毫紊亂之中, 乃是氣之發用流行的“主宰”或“頭腦”。良知“生天生地, 成鬼成帝”的造化, 不是造物主式的無中生有或開天闢地, 而是只看天地鬼神、萬事萬物的如此這般的存在, 即是良知造化的證明, 若無良知在背後爲之主宰, 天地鬼神萬物之生成造化何故如此衝漠無朕、萬象森然？造化最精妙之物莫過於人, 因此說“人爲天地之心”, [41] 而良知也最突出的體現在人身上。

但這不代表人的一切知覺、念頭、慾望都是良知的發用, 陽明仍然在某種程度上接受宋儒那裡理善氣惡的對舉。[42] 惡的產生是由於心之本體或

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37 吳震,《〈傳習錄〉精讀》, 頁138。關於陽明“萬物一體”思想的進一步討論, 還可以參見拙文《論明道與陽明的“萬物一體”思想──以“氣”與“仁”的關係爲中心》, 待刊稿。

38 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條247。

39 王守仁,《傳習錄上》, 條32。

40 王守仁,〈答陸原靜書〉,《傳習錄中》, 條151。

41 “人者, 天地萬物之心也；心者, 天地萬物之主也。” 王守仁,〈答季明德 · 丙戌〉,《王陽明全集》卷6, 頁238。

42 如“循理便是善, 動氣便是惡”、“循理之謂靜, 從欲之謂動”。王守仁,〈答倫彥式〉,《明儒學案》卷十, 頁188。

良知被形氣之私引發的私慾或私意所遮蔽。因此, 不能將人的主觀、任意的私慾或私意冒充爲良知, [43] 或者說一旦被私慾或私意蔽隔, 人的良知即不再是作为“全體之知”[44] 的良知。表面看來, 惡產生的根源仍然與宋儒所認爲的一樣, 主要來自於“氣”, 關於“理氣”、“善惡”的討論,《傳習錄上》條101, 薛侃所錄“侃去花間草”一條頗堪玩味。

薛侃因除花間之草的行爲, 發出“善難培”、“惡難去”的感慨, 但在陽明看來, 薛侃如此看待善惡正是所謂的“從軀殼起念”, [45] 即基於一己之私心來判斷對我有用或有利的爲善, 對我無用或不利就是惡。而從“天地”大公無私的角度來看, 則只見“天地生意, 花草一般”, 並無“善惡之分”。但這是不是意味著陽明否認善惡之間的界限, 甚至贊同佛、老“無善無惡”的觀點？其實不然, 在陽明看來, 佛、老認爲既然“無善無惡”就索性“一切皆不管”, 消極的怠惰“不可以治天下”, 而“聖人無善無惡, 只是無有作好, 無有作惡, 不動於氣”。而聖人的“無有作好”、“無有作惡”又不是如“無知覺的人”那樣“全無好惡”, 而是“好惡一循於理”, 如此即是“如好好色、如惡惡臭”的“誠意”, 而非“從軀殼起念”的“私意”, “誠意即是循天理”, 即是“廓然大公”, 如此“方是心之本體”。這即是陽明“四句教”前兩句：“無善無惡心之體, 有善有惡意之動”[46] 的具體所指。

因此, 陽明並非否認倫理道德意義上的善惡的分別, 而是否定那種出於個人主觀私意的善惡之別。強調“無善無惡”其實是強調“天理”之公而無私, 只有在作爲大全的“天理”層面上, “善惡”的區別才具有實然的意義。陽明並不過多強調“天理”的客觀超越維度, 而是側重“心體”的“無善無惡”, 進而強調要從本體上做“循理”的工夫, 自然能夠“不動於氣”, 如此方能達到心體“至善”的效驗和境界：“無善無惡者理之靜, 有善有惡者氣之動。不動於氣, 即無善無惡, 是謂至善。”[47]

因此, 陽明一方面並不否定現實層面人的各種具體的實踐行爲：“草有妨礙, 理亦宜去, 去之而已”；另一方面, 他又提醒人們在實踐活動中仍須保持“心體”的“理之靜”：“偶未即去, 亦不累心, 若著了一分意思, 即心體便有

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43 “凡人信口說, 任意行, 皆說此是依我心性出來, 此是所謂『生之謂性』, 然卻要有過差。” 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條220。

44 “一节之知, 即全体之知；全体之知, 即一节之知。” 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條200。

45 “軀殼上起意”爲陽明常用之語, 明道即有此用法：“人只爲自私, 將自家軀殼上頭起意, 故看得道理小了它底。” 程顥、程頤,《遺書》卷二上,《二程集》, 頁33。

46 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條293。

47 陽明將心體看成“無善無惡”的, 與明道所謂的“善惡皆天理”實則有異曲同工之妙, 只不過陽明是從否定的意義上指出不能用價值判斷意義上的善惡來指稱“廓然大公”的“心之本體”, 而明道則是從肯定的意義上指出不管是原初意義上的善, 還是派生意義上的惡, “皆共同地來之於天理這一本源”, 而“既然善具有一種原初性, 那麼說作爲本源之天理爲純粹至善亦無不可, 如湖湘學派所認爲的, 本然之善, 不與惡對。” 郭曉東,《識仁與定性》, 頁85、頁86。陽明“無善無惡, 是謂至善”, 則是把“至善”看得超越於“意之動”產生的派生意義上的的善惡。

貽累, 便有許多動氣處”。可見, 陽明的工夫全在“心之本體”上做, 不管是“循理”還是“不著一分意思”、“不動於氣”, 都是要努力使此心體保持“廓然大公”的狀態。既然善惡“全不在物”、“只在汝心”, 那麼世儒“捨心逐物”、“終日馳求於外”, 自然是“將格物之學看錯了”, 最終“只做得個義襲而取”的支離工夫。

因此, 雖然人心“著了意思”, 便易爲“氣”所“動”, 不能“一循於理”, 故所行所爲不能皆善。但並不代表在陽明那裡“氣”本身即是惡的, 或者有“氣”就一定會產生惡, 因爲正如我們上文已經提到過的, 在性氣關係問題上, 陽明是贊同“性即是氣, 氣即是性”[48]的, 即使是“良知亦只是這口說, 這身行。豈能外得氣, 別有個去行去說”。[49] 而“不動於氣”關鍵不在於在“氣”上做持敬涵養或省察克治的工夫, 而只須在心體上做“致良知”的本源工夫, 使吾心“好惡一循於理”, 自能“不動些子氣”。[50] 陽明那裡, 工夫要在心體上做, 而不須在“氣”上做。“不動於氣”上並無工夫, 而只是“好惡一循於理”、“不著一分意思”的自然效驗。看來, 陽明那裡, 千言萬語, 終究是要使此氣質之身依理而行, 方可無礙。陽明固然將氣的地位提高了, 但仍然是重理而非氣。

所以, 表面看來, 在陽明那裡, 氣具有兩個層面的意義, 一爲本體宇宙論意義上的, 一爲人性氣質層面的, 一爲積極, 一爲消極。但實際上, 兩個維度的氣, 不管是積極還是消極的, 並非兩個氣, 只是“一氣”, 其貫通的關鍵在於良知, 良知既具有主觀維度, 又具有客觀屬性, 既是做工夫所指向的本體, 又是做工夫的主體。因此, 不管哪種意義上的“氣”, 關鍵看其能否依理或良知而行。因此, 良知雖不可離氣而言, 但終究是良知決定氣, 而非氣決定良知。

## 六、結語

通過前文的考察, 我們對陽明心學中“氣”的地位和作用有了一定的認識和把握。

首先, 不同於宋儒, 尤其是橫渠、伊川將“性、氣”看成對立的, 陽明則是像明道一樣, 將性氣綰合爲一。氣、氣質、氣稟從與性、理相對的地位, 變成了從屬於良知、心的地位。“氣”變成了“性即氣, 氣即性”之氣, “氣質變成了良知之氣質”, 而良知非他, 不過是性氣一如、理氣一如的如如呈現。因此, 儘管陽明仍然接受宋儒尤其是朱子那裡理氣的對舉, 認爲循理善, 動氣惡, 但“氣”本身不是惡的或產生惡的根源, 而工夫也不以對治氣稟爲核心。

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48 王守仁,《傳習錄中》, 條148。

49 王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條220。

50 問“有所忿懥”一條。王守仁,《傳習錄下》, 條213。

其次, 以良知之“流行”謂其爲“氣”, 以良知之“妙用”謂其爲“神”, 以良知之“凝聚”謂其爲“精”, 實際上是以屬“氣”的精、氣、神三者因“良知”發用之不同而稱名不同。精、氣、神只是用來形容或描述良知的不同的狀態和發用, 附屬於良知而不具有獨立的地位。不同於朱子那裡理氣二分的模式, “良知”與“氣”是即體即用、體用一如的, 因而工夫需要在“良知”上做, 而做工夫的主體亦即是良知本身。

再次, 陽明借用張載的“太虛”概念類比“良知”：“良知之虛, 便是天之太虛；良知之無, 便是太虛之無形”, 而在橫渠看來“太虛無形, 氣之本體”。因此, 正如“太虛”是本體宇宙論意義上的“氣之本體”, 良知亦是心性本體論意義上氣的本體。因此, 雖然在實然層面或在構成上, 萬物皆是“同此一氣”, 因而在實踐層面上萬物之間可以“相通”, 但“同此一氣”卻是以“萬物一體”爲前提的, 而非相反。而“一氣流通”也是基於良知或靈明與萬物的感應才得以呈現。因此, 恰恰是“良知”或“一體之仁”使“萬物一體”成其爲“一體”, 而非通常認爲的“同此一氣”或“一氣流通”之“氣”。也即是說, 在陽明那裡, “萬物一體”的本體論基礎只能是“靈明”或“良知”而不是“氣”。

因此, 最後, 我們發現, 在陽明的思想中, 只能從心性工夫而非宇宙本體上理解陽明的“良知即天理”, 不能將良知冒充爲宇宙本體。在宇宙本體論面, 良知的客觀化、實體化實際上並不成功, 良知無法徹底吞噬和吸納具有客觀維度的“氣”。從思想史上來說, 陽明思想中對“氣”的這種處理的不徹底, 也爲後世氣學思潮的興起埋下了伏筆。

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# The Relationship between Conscience and *Qi* in Yangming's Philosophy

LI Bin

## Abstract

At present, the study of Yangming's philosophy is centered on conscience 良知. But "conscience" in Yangming's philosophy is not a purely moral concept, but an ontological concept. In the Neo Confucianism of Song and Ming Dynasties, the opposition between *qi* 气 and *li* 理 or *qi* and "human nature" (*xing* 性) was converted to the relationship between "conscience" and *qi* in Yangming's philosophy. The status of *qi* in Yangming philosophy has been greatly improved compared with the Song Dynasty. But for Yangming, "extending the conscience" (*zhiliangzhi* 致良知) is not committed to change *qi* in the human body, but to extend the conscience itself. The ontological foundation of "all things share one body" can only be "conscience" instead of *qi*. Therefore, conscience can not be separated from *qi*, but after all, conscience determines *qi* rather than *qi* determines conscience. Investigating the relationship between "conscience" and *qi* is of great significance for us to further grasp Yangming's philosophy and its inheritance and development of Neo-Confucianism with in the Song Dynasty. Therefore, although Yang ming attaches great importance to *qi*, his attempt to absorb *qi* with his conscience actually dispels the objectivity of *qi*.

**Keywords:** Yangming, conscience, *qi*, Noumenon (*benti* 本體), teachings of self-cultivation (*gongfulun* 工夫論), the unity of all things (*wanwuyiti* 萬物一體)

# 朝鮮正祖朱子選本編纂與中國文獻關係芻論
## ─以佚本《朱子選統》爲中心

林 侑 毅

**中文提要**

自朝鮮王朝建立以來, 大力推行“崇儒抑佛”政策, 儒學發展進入前所未有的全盛期。十八世紀後, 被譽爲朝鮮王朝文藝復興君王的正祖, 尤其推崇朱子學作爲儒學的重要一環, 並親自進行朱子選本的編纂, 自世孫時期至1800年辭世的27年間, 共編纂十冊朱子選本。

本文就正祖文集《弘齋全書》所收《群書標記》中, 正祖對各朱子選本親撰的解題, 考察正祖朱子選本的文獻來源與編纂方式, 可知正祖並非直接就《朱子大全》、《朱子語類》摘錄成書, 而是多以前人選輯成果爲基礎, 參校《朱子大全》、《朱子語類》二書, 進行重新編排與刪削增補的作業。其中《朱子選統》一書雖已亡佚, 然而藉由《群書標記》中〈朱子選統三卷〉一文目次, 對比中國現存朱子選本, 發現正祖《朱子選統》與康熙《御纂朱子全書》二書目次幾乎一致。康熙《御纂朱子全書》一書的編纂動機, 乃欲編成一部富國安民、統一學術的重要典籍, 與正祖完成“一通之書”, 以朱子學教化天下的心願頗爲吻合。本文認爲, 在《御纂朱子全書》傳入朝鮮後, 正祖見康熙已完成一部“朱子全書”, 興起效尤之心, 乃以此書爲本進行《朱子選統》的編纂。通過本文新發現的史料關聯, 將可提供正祖朱子學研究一項新的資料。

**關鍵詞**：正祖, 康熙, 朱子選統, 御纂朱子全書, 朱子學

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* 林侑毅：韓國高麗大學國語國文學系漢文學專攻博士候選人(lice520@gmail.com)

** 本文曾以〈朝鮮正祖朱子選本的編纂與中國文獻的關係──以《朱子選統》爲中心〉爲題, 於2014年7月由中國成都杜甫草堂會、四川師範大學韓國研究中心、韓國漢文學會共同主辦之“韓國漢文學會2014年度國際學術大會──東亞視野中的杜甫詩學”會議上發表。會中獲與會學者諸多寶貴意見, 使本文得以更臻完善, 謹此致謝。

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# 一、引言

朱子學傳入朝鮮半島, 最早可追溯自高麗王朝(918-1392)的學者安裕(1243-1306)。安裕於高麗忠烈王16年(1290)入元, 手抄朱子書攜回高麗, [1] 是目前所知朱子學傳入朝鮮半島之始。[2] 同一時期入元留學燕京, 師從朱子五代傳趙孟頫(1254-1322), 學習朱子學而歸的高麗學者白頤正(1260-1340), [3] 以及兩度入元學習朱子學, 歸國後致力推廣普及朱熹《四書集注》, 促使高麗儒學由漢唐儒學轉向朱子學的權溥(1262-1346), [4] 亦對朱子學在朝鮮半島的發展興起推波助瀾之功。日後經李齊賢(1287-1367)、李谷(1298-1351)、李穡(1328-1396)、鄭夢周(1337-1392)等人的演繹與闡發, 逐漸奠定朱子學在朝鮮半島的地位。[5]

自李成桂(1335-1408, 在位1392-1398)率兵發動政變, 推翻以佛教爲國教的高麗王朝, 於1392年建立朝鮮王朝(1392-1897)後, 在開國功臣鄭道傳(1342-1398)等人的主導下, 以"成均館"爲根據地, 戮力推行"崇儒抑佛"政策, 朱子學始尊爲正宗。被譽爲十八世紀朝鮮王朝文藝復興君王的正祖(李祘, 1752-1800, 在位1776-1800), 堪稱朝鮮王朝歷史上對朱子學的發揚貢獻最大的統治者。正祖於8歲(英祖35年, 1759)受冊封爲王世孫, 自世孫時期即已展開朱子選本的編纂作業, 將《朱子大全》、《朱子語類》化博爲約, 使朱子初學者"便於省覽而專於致力也"。[6]

正祖一生勤於讀書, 著作豐富, 在位期間一方面試圖強化君權, 一方面推動"文治"政策, 爲朝鮮王朝最著名的"君師"。[7] 其學問尤其於朱子書用力最深, 自世孫時期至1800年辭世的27年間, 共編纂十冊朱子選本, [8] 依年代先後

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1 "安子之生, 當宋之淳祐三年癸卯, 距朱子歿四十歲後。四十八歲庚寅如元, 得見朱子書, 知其爲孔子嫡傳, 手抄以歸, 即朱子歿後九十一年。" 李商永, 〈晦軒先生實記跋〉, 《國譯晦軒先生實記》卷5, 頁501。

2 鄭卜五, 〈韓儒李退溪與中國儒學之關係〉, 頁108。

3 金起賢, 《朱子學在朝鮮朝的流衍及其影響之研究》, 頁5。

4 李甦平, 〈朱子學在高麗時代的傳播與發展〉, 頁2。

5 李甦平, 〈朱子學在高麗時代的傳播與發展〉, 頁1。

6 "近世新學小生, 多不從事於性理之書, 予甚惜之。朱書百選之亟令印布, 蓋欲簡其卷帙, 使學者便於省覽而專於致力也。" 正祖, 《日得錄》四, 《弘齋全書》卷164, 頁3。

7 金鎬, 〈《古今圖書集成》在朝鮮的傳播與影響〉, 頁245。

8 朝鮮半島的朱子選本, 最早始於李滉的《朱子書節要》, 其後亦有大量民間朱子選本的出現。"我朝則正廟御纂《朱子會選》、《紫陽會英》、《紫陽手圈》、《朱書百選》, 此其大概也。其他華東儒賢所纂朱書, 開列于後, 俾我後昆, 雖在窮峽, 知有紫陽之書, 已備於我云爾。……《朱子大全箚疑》二十卷(尤庵先生宋時烈纂)、《朱子大全箚疑補遺》八卷(金敏材、金潤秋、閔彝烈同輯)、《朱子大全箚疑後語》十卷(李宜哲輯)、《朱子語類》五十卷、《語類抄》八卷(我東所抄)、《朱子語類考解》十卷(李宜哲輯)、《節酌通編》二十卷(尤菴宋先生輯)、《節酌通編補遺》五卷(俟考)、《朱子會選》二十四卷(正宗朝御纂)、《紫陽子會英》(正宗朝御纂)、

爲《朱子會選》48卷(1774)、《兩賢傳心錄》8卷(1774)、《紫陽子會英》3卷(1775)、《朱子選統》3卷(1781)、《朱書百選》6卷(1794)、《朱文手圈》10卷(1798)、《雅頌》8卷(1799)、《朱夫子詩》12卷(1800)、《朱子書節約》20卷(1800)、《御定朱書分類》12卷(1800), 惟其中筆寫本《紫陽子會英》、筆寫本《朱子選統》、筆寫本《朱子書節約》三冊皆已失傳, 僅能透過《群書標記》所收各書解題, 一窺該書目次及編纂方式。本文擬就正祖文集《弘齋全書》所收《群書標記》中, 正祖對各朱子選本親撰的解題, 概略考察正祖朱子選本的文獻來源與編纂方式, 並就其中已亡佚的《朱子選統》一書, 發掘其與中國文獻的關係, 藉此一窺正祖編纂《朱子選統》的意圖。期待此一新發現的史料關聯, 提供正祖朱子學研究一項新的材料。

## 二、正祖朱子選本的文獻來源與編纂方式

正祖自幼喜讀朱子書, 即位後亦持續不懈,《朝鮮王朝實錄》及《群書標記》皆有相關紀錄。

> 上自春邸 ,喜讀朱子書 ,就《大全》、《語類》手加彙選爲《選統》、《會選》、《會英》諸書。至是取其書牘 ,約之爲《百選》。[9]
> 余自辨志以後 ,酷好朱子書 ,繙閱不釋手 ,誦念不絕於口 ,講究思索 ,不忘乎心。[10]

正祖何以喜讀朱子書, 究其原因, 乃朱子深得儒學之旨, 足爲後世學者典範。正祖嘗言："學者欲得正, 必以朱子爲準的。"[11] 又言："孔子之道, 大明於朱子……故欲觀孔子之道者, 必先考質於朱子。"[12] 朱子求學之道條理明確, 更堪爲學者精深儒學的依歸。

> 朱子定著經說 ,明白的確 ,所以往復發明者 ,其於道理精粗 ,功夫次序 ,委曲詳盡 ,無復餘蘊 ,學者但當依其門路 ,尋繹脈絡。[13]

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《紫陽手圈》(正宗朝御纂)、《朱書百選》二卷(正宗朝御纂)、《朱書分類》八十卷(姜浩溥輯)、《朱書入門》十卷(鄭履煥輯)、《朱子書節要》二十卷(退溪先生李滉輯)、《朱文酌海》一卷(愚伏堂鄭經世輯)、《朱子纂要書說》(磻溪柳馨遠輯)、《朱書記疑》二卷(俟考)、《朱子言論同異考》四卷(南塘韓元震輯)、《朱書講錄刊補》六卷(李栽撰)、《朱子抄選》二卷(俟考)、《朱子學的》二卷(俟考)、《朱書要類》六卷(俟考)、《朱子封事》二卷(俟考)、《朱子奏箚》一卷(俟考)、《朱子年譜》二卷(俟考)、《朱子語錄解》一卷(俟考)。"李奎景：〈朱子晚年定論辯證說〉,《五洲衍文長箋散稿》上冊, 卷12, 頁907-908。

9 《正宗大王實錄》卷41, 18年(1794, 甲寅)12月25日(戊寅), 第2條記事, 頁534。

10 正祖, 〈朱子書節約二十卷〉,《弘齋全書》卷182,《群書標記》, 頁21。

11 正祖,《日得錄》五,《弘齋全書》卷165, 頁3。

12 正祖,《春邸錄》,《弘齋全書》卷4, 頁18。

13 正祖,《日得錄》五,《弘齋全書》卷165, 頁3。

然《朱子大全》112卷、《朱子語類》140卷, “其卷帙既博, 領略甚難, 不可無反約常目之資”, [14] 初學儒學者, 必不能短時間內一窺朱子思想全貌, 又因“今人之患, 在於博而寡要, 擇而不精, 故欲令其先從約處下手, 亦升高自卑, 行遠自邇之意”, [15] 於是“欲簡其卷帙, 使學者便於省覽, 而專於致力”。[16] 其最終目標, 在於藉由朱子選本的編纂作業, 達到“博以至於約, 約以至於大成之義”[17]的目標, 進而編成一部“一通之書”。[18] 正祖爲各朱子選本所撰解題, 多收入《弘齋全書》卷179-184的《群書標記》中, 〈表一〉依各篇朱子選本解題所列目次, 考察其文獻來源。其中除《朱子會選》爲徐命膺(1716-1787)承正祖之命所撰, 屬“命撰”[19] 書外, 餘書皆爲正祖親撰。

〈表一〉正祖各朱子選本目次及文獻來源

| 時間 | 書名、卷數 | 目次 | 文獻來源 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1774年 | 《朱子會選》48卷 | 詞、詩、封事、奏劄、議狀、奏狀、辭免、書(時事出處、汪張問答、呂劉問答、陸陳辨答、問答論事、問答、知舊門人門答)、雜著、記、跋、序、銘、箴、贊、碑、墓誌銘、行狀、公移、續集、別集、補編(書)、外編(詞、跋) | 《朱子大全》 |
| 1774年 | 《兩賢傳心錄》8卷 | 書、封事、奏劄、疏劄、議狀、誌文、說、碑、序、跋、銘、傳、賦、詩 | 《朱子大全》《宋子大全》 |
| 1775年 | 《紫陽子會英》3卷 | 時事、問答、古事、儒先、學、敬、誠、戒懼謹獨、性、仁、心、中、忠恕、浩氣、論辨、經、史、科舉、詩學、象數、書籍、雜記、詩文(各體鈔附其下) | 先《朱子大全》, 後《朱子語類》 |
| 1781年 | 《朱子選統》 | 小學、爲學之方、存養、持敬、 | 先《朱子語 |

14 正祖, 〈朱子選統三卷〉, 《弘齋全書》卷179, 《群書標記》, 頁21。

15 民族文化推進會, 《國譯國朝寶鑑》卷74, 正祖甲寅18年12月, 頁14。

16 正祖, 《日得錄》四, 《弘齋全書》卷164, 頁3。

17 正祖, 〈五子手圈十卷〉, 《弘齋全書》卷181, 《群書標記》, 頁21。

18 “予於朱子, 尊慕而表章之者, 靡所不用其極。……但念朱子平生纂述極其廣博, 自經書《集傳》、《集註》、《章句》、《通解》、《或問》以外, 片言單辭之散見而錯出者, 何莫非精義達辭? 則彙括廣蒐, 又將不知其爲幾何。每欲勒爲一通之書, 集其大成, 纖悉靡遺, 以其事鉅而工博, 有未可以遽議而驟圖也。嘗所斷斷而姑未之克就, 有志者事竟成, 會當有遂此苦心之日矣。”正祖 : 《日得錄》五, 《弘齋全書》卷165, 頁12。

19 “《群書標記》分‘御定’和‘命撰’兩類, 前者爲其(正祖)親自編定, 後者爲其命閣臣編定, 但也往往親撰序引。” 張伯偉, 〈二十六種朝鮮時代漢籍書目解題(上)〉, 頁74。

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 3卷 | 靜、知行、致知、力行、克己改過、立心處事、理欲義利君子小人之辨、出處、教人、人倫師友、讀書法、讀諸經法、論解經、讀史、史學、大學、論語、孟子、中庸、易、書、詩、春秋、禮、樂、性理、理氣、鬼神、道統、諸子、歷代、治道、賦、詞、琴操、古詩、律詩、絶句、詩餘、贊、箴、銘 | 類》，後《朱子大全》 |
| 1794年 | 《朱書百選》6卷 | 摘錄朱子大全所收百篇書信 | 《朱子大全》 |
| 1798年 | 《朱文手圈》10卷 | 封事、奏劄、經筵講義、議狀、奏狀、申請、辭免、書、劄、雜著、序、記、跋、銘、箴、贊、表、疏、啟、婚書、上樑文、祝文、祭文、碑、墓表、墓誌銘、行狀、事實記、年譜、遺事、傳、公移 | 《朱子大全》 |
| 1799年 | 《雅頌》8卷 | 詞、賦、琴操、五言絕句、六言絕句、七言絕句、五言古詩、七言古詩、五言律詩、七言律詩、五言排律、銘、箴、贊、題辭、文 | 《朱子大全》 |
| 1800年 | 《朱夫子詩》12冊 | 詞、賦、操、五言古詩、七言古詩、五言律詩、七言律詩、五言排律、五言絕句、六言絕句、七言絕句 | 《朱子大全》 |
| 1800年 | 《朱子書節約》20卷 | 學、性理、理氣、鬼神、經籍、禮、樂、道統、諸子、歷代、治道、文藝、賦、詞、琴操、古詩、律詩、絕句、詩餘、贊、箴、銘、題辭 | 先《朱子語類》，後《朱子大全》 |
| 1800年 | 《御定朱書分類》12卷 | 理氣、性理、學、經籍、禮、樂、聖賢、諸子、異端、歷代、治道、賦、詞、琴操、古詩、律詩、絕句、詩餘、贊、箴、銘、題辭、文 | 先《朱子語類》，後《朱子大全》 |

如〈表一〉所見，正祖朱子選本的文獻來源，除《兩賢傳心錄》抄朱熹《朱子大全》與宋時烈（1607-1689年）《宋子大全》“兩集中心法照應者，書若干篇，封事奏疏若干篇，雜著序跋若干篇，詩賦若干篇，合爲一書”，以見朱熹與宋時烈“兩賢心法之無不同”[20] 外，其餘或以《朱子大全》爲本，或兼採二書。

然而根據《群書標記》所載各篇朱子選本解題, 不難發現正祖編纂朱子選本的方式, 並非直接就《朱子大全》、《朱子語類》摘錄成書, 而是多以前人選輯成果爲基礎, 參校《朱子大全》、《朱子語類》二書, 進行重新編排與刪削增補的作業。例如今已不見原書的《紫陽子會英》, 在正祖親撰的解題中, 已闡明該書以李滉(1501~1570年)所編《朱子書節約》爲本。[21] 此外, 亦有朱子選本序文中不見其所本, 仍可透過其他文獻發現選本依據者, 如《朝鮮王朝實錄》純祖初年有以下紀錄："《兩賢傳心錄》……乃正宗朝抄出朱子書及先正臣宋時烈遺集, 御定彙編也。"[22] 表示正祖編纂《兩賢傳心錄》, 以朱子書及宋時烈遺集爲本。然而據《朝鮮王朝實錄》正祖三年記載, 正祖曾向宋時烈第五代孫宋德相(1710-1783)出示《兩賢傳心錄》, 言"其中朱文, 即先正所抄也。待其校讎, 而正其訛誤。"[23] 換言之, 正祖所謂朱子書, 非《朱子大全》、《朱子語類》二書, 而是依據宋時烈摘錄李滉《朱子書節要》、鄭經世(1568-1633)《朱文酌海》, 編成作爲肅宗朝經筵講義之用的《朱文鈔選》。正祖復以此書爲本, 編成第三手資料的《兩賢傳心錄》, 自有校對正誤的必要。[24] 又如正祖編纂《朱書百選》, 於該書解題嘗言："予既選《語類》、《大全》爲《選統》、《會選》、《會英》諸書, 復取其書牘, 約之爲百選。"[25] 曾任奎章閣閣臣的李晚秀(1752-1820), 亦曾提及此次選本編纂作業："粤自春邸時, 手編朱書, 刪定序次, 千取其百, 命之曰'朱書百選', 即吾夫子博文約禮之意也。"[26] 可見《朱書百選》的編纂應是以《朱子大全》、《朱子語類》二書爲本。然而正祖在〈華城聖廟告由文〉中, 已明確揭示《朱書百選》依李滉的《朱子書節要》爲準。[27]

值得注意的是, 透過目次的比較, 亦不失爲考察正祖朱子選本的編纂方式及其所本的辦法。如現今僅存唯一一冊, 收藏於奎章閣的筆寫本《御定朱書分類》6卷, 該書並無序文、跋文、刊記及刊行年、作者。[28] 奎章閣另藏有姜浩溥(1690-1778)編《朱書分類》54卷, 共計十二項分類, 分別爲理氣、性理、學、經籍、尚論、異端、歷代、君道、臣道、治道、人倫、人

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20 正祖, 〈兩賢傳心錄序〉, 《弘齋全書》卷9, 頁18。

21 "予於乙未, 讀《朱子節要》, 每讀必幾十遍。每訖一卷, 必首尾紬繹, 以竟一帙。既竟帙, 又手鈔之爲三冊……總名之曰《紫陽子會英》。" 正祖, 〈紫陽子會英三卷〉, 《弘齋全書》卷179, 《群書標記》, 頁13。

22 《純宗大王實錄》卷1, 即位年(1800, 庚申)12月2日(庚戌), 第1條記事, 頁344。

23 "上以《兩賢傳心錄》出示宋德相……曰：'此冊凡四篇, 而其中朱文, 卽先正所抄也。待其校讎, 而正其訛誤, 當以一本賜卿矣。'"《正宗大王實錄》卷7, 3年(1779, 己亥)1月29日(甲寅), 第5條記事, 頁90。

24 金文植, 《正祖的經學與朱子學》, 頁252。

25 正祖, 〈朱書百選六卷〉, 《弘齋全書》卷180, 《群書標記》, 頁32。

26 李晚秀, 〈頒降《朱書百選》、《雅誦》于八道校宮關文〉, 《屐園遺稿》卷6, 關文, 頁112。

27 "選百朱書, 節要是準。準我大儒, 以詔後進。" 正祖, 〈華城聖廟告由文〉, 《弘齋全書》卷23, 祭文, 頁15。

28 奎章閣韓國學研究院, 〈《御定朱書分類》解題〉。

事, 各分類下再分爲各細項。二書相比,《御定朱書分類》除刪去君道、臣道、治道、人倫、人事, 增加禮、樂兩項分類外, 其餘完全一致。[29] 此一比較, 可資證明《日省錄》正祖22年4月19日的紀錄。

> 予教右議政李秉模(1742-1806)曰："卿曾見故知事姜浩溥所謄朱書乎？"秉模曰："臣曾未見之矣。"予曰"九十老人手自謄出 ,並與《箚疑》而無一闕漏。予方得此 ,而將欲參用於朱書編輯時矣。"[30]

由上述引文可知, 正祖曾留意姜浩溥所編《朱書分類》, 做爲日後朱書編輯之參考, 至於用於何書, 該紀錄並未明確提及。藉由《朱書分類》與《御定朱書分類》二書目次相比, 證實正祖以姜浩溥所編《朱書分類》爲本, 經過某種程度的修正, 編成《御定朱書分類》一書。

正祖朱子選本中,《朱子會選》、《紫陽子會英》、《朱子選統》三書今已失傳, 未能見其原貌。《朱子會選》、《紫陽子會英》二書的編纂方式, 本節已經有相關討論, 然而目前僅知《朱子選統》的文獻來源爲《朱子大全》及《朱子語類》, 卻未能證實該書即是由正祖自二書摘錄編成, 而沒有依前人選輯成果爲基礎進行編纂。是否可利用《群書標記》卷179所收《朱子選統》解題, 進行目次上的比對, 找出與他書的關聯, 進一步考察正祖編纂《朱子選統》的方式, 便成爲一項值得研究的課題。

## 三、正祖《朱子選統》與中國文獻之關係

關於《朱子選統》較完整的資料, 現今僅存《群書標記》卷179一篇正祖親撰的解題。該篇解題節錄如下：

> 朱子書 ,有《大全》,有《語類》……予於甲午年間 ,嘗熟復《大全》,以及於《語類》,閱屢朔工告訖。然其卷帙既博 ,領略甚難 ,不可無反約常目之資。辛丑 ,更取《大全》、《語類》,手自選錄 ,分門類編。其目曰小學、曰爲學之方、曰存養、曰持敬、曰靜、曰知行、曰致知、曰力行、曰克己改過、曰立心處事、曰理欲義利君子小人之辨、曰出處、曰教人、曰人倫師友、曰讀書法、曰讀諸經法、曰論解經、曰讀史、曰史學、曰大學、曰論語、曰孟子、曰中庸、曰易、曰書、曰詩、曰春秋、曰禮、曰樂、曰性理、曰理氣、曰鬼神、曰道統、曰諸子、曰歷代、曰治道、曰賦、曰詞、曰琴操、曰古詩、曰律詩、曰絶句、曰詩餘、曰贊、曰箴、曰銘。以蠅頭細字 ,淨寫三冊 ,庸作巾衍之藏。若使分編成書 ,當爲十餘卷 ,而先賢文字之以己意取捨 ,實有汰哉之嫌 ,則秖備予著工之要符足矣。

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29 金文植,《正祖時代的思想與文化》, 頁144。

30 〈諭三餘御課五經刻役刻手等料布磨鍊題給〉,《日省錄》正祖22年戊午(1798)4月19日(癸丑), 頁386。

利用上述引文的目次, 比對早於正祖1781年編纂《朱子選統》前的其他代表性朱子選本, 如李滉《朱子書節要》、鄭經世《朱文酌海》、宋時烈《節酌通編》等書, 並未發現目次上的關聯。然而根據本文第二節分析, 正祖朱子選本的編纂多依前人選輯成果爲本, 非直接就《朱子大全》、《朱子語類》摘錄編成。據此原則, 筆者認爲朱子書既出於中國, 內容廣博繁多, 必有後世學者化博爲約, 編成朱子選本以垂後世, 而正祖以中國所出朱子選本爲本, 亦不無可能。考察正祖論及朱子書的言論中, 與中國朱子選本相關的紀錄, 有一條值得關注的文獻。

> 朱子書雖有康熙所編《全書》及我東《節要》、《酌海》、《通編》等名目 ,《語類》與《文集》終未有合成一書者 ,予甚恨之。[31]

如前所述, 正祖自世孫時期開始朱子選本的編纂, 其最終目的在於編成一部"一通之書"。由此可見, 朱子選本的編纂, 可說是爲完成此"一通之書"預作準備, 而以前人選輯成果爲本, 自然是爲蓄積化博爲約的實力。引文列舉康熙所編《全書》, 乃康熙於康熙45年(1706)命大學士熊賜履、李光地[32]等人, 以《晦庵先生文集》、《朱子語類》爲底本, 進行"汰其榛蕪, 存其精粹"[33] 而編成之《御纂朱子全書》, 該書於康熙53年(1714年)8月以66卷刊印。康熙於康熙52年(1713)6月所纂的〈朱子全書序〉中, 闡明了編纂該書的動機。

> 至於朱夫子 ,集大成而緒千百年絶傳之學 ,開愚蒙而立億萬世一定之規。窮理以致其知 ,反躬以踐其實。……朕讀其書 ,察其理 ,非此不能知天人相與之奧 ,非此不能治萬邦於衽席 ,非此不能仁心仁政施於天下 ,非此不能外內爲一家。讀書五十載 ,只認得朱子一生居心行事 ,故不揣粗鄙無文 ,而集各書中凡關朱子之一句一字 ,命大學士熊賜履、李光地素日留心於理學者 ,彙而成書 ,名之《朱子全書》,以備乙夜勤學。雖未能幾於寡過 ,亦自勉君親之責者。[34]

康熙命纂《朱子全書》, 將此書視爲知人知天、安定百姓、治理國家、統一學術的重要典籍。此一編纂動機, 正與正祖編纂"一通之書", 欲成就以朱子學教化天下的目的頗爲吻合, 由此不禁令人好奇二書之間的關係。請見〈表二〉。

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31 正祖,《日得錄》五,《弘齋全書》卷165, 頁7。

32 "(清康熙)四十五年丙戌公六十五歲。……五月承修《朱子全書》。" 李清植纂,《李文貞公(光地)年譜》, 頁181-182。

33 〈御纂朱子全書提要〉,《文淵閣本四庫全書》電子版, 子部一, 儒家類。

34 康熙, 〈御纂朱子全書 御製序〉,《文淵閣本四庫全書》, 子部一, 儒家類。

〈表二〉《御纂朱子全書》與《朱子選統》之比較

| | 御纂朱子全書 | | 朱子選統 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 學 | 卷一<br>學一 | 小學 總論爲學之方 | 小學 爲學之方 |
| | 卷二<br>學二 | 存養 持敬 靜 | 存養 持敬 靜 |
| | 卷三<br>學三 | 省察 知行 致知 | 知行 致知 |
| | 卷四<br>學四 | 力行 克己改過 雜論立心處事<br>理欲義利君子小人之辨 論出處 | 力行 克己改過<br>立心處事<br>理欲義利君子<br>小人之辨<br>出處 |
| | 卷五<br>學五 | 教人 人倫師友 | 教人 人倫師友 |
| | 卷六<br>學六 | 讀書法 讀諸經法 論解經<br>讀史 史學 | 讀書法 讀諸經<br>法 論解經<br>讀史 史學 |
| 大學 | 卷七<br>大學一 | 總論 聖經 | 大學 |
| | 卷八<br>大學二 | 傳十章 | |
| | 卷九<br>大學三 | 論或問 | |
| 論語 | 卷十<br>論語一 | 總論學而第一 | 論語 |
| | 卷十一<br>論語二 | 爲政第二 | |
| | 卷十二<br>論語三 | 八佾第三 里仁第四 | |
| | 卷十三<br>論語四 | 公冶長第五 | |
| | 卷十四<br>論語五 | 雍也第六 | |
| | 卷十五<br>論語六 | 述而第七 泰伯第八 | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 卷十六<br>論語七 | 子罕第九 鄉黨第十 | |
| | 卷十七<br>論語八 | 先進第十一 顔淵第十二 | |
| | 卷十八<br>論語九 | 子路第十三 憲問第十四<br>衛靈公第十五 | |
| | 卷十九<br>論語十 | 季氏第十六 陽貨第十七 微子第十八<br>子張第十九 堯曰第二十 | |
| 孟子 | 卷二十<br>孟子一 | 總論 梁惠王 公孫丑 滕文公 | 孟子 |
| | 卷二十一<br>孟子二 | 離婁 | |
| | 卷二十二<br>孟子三 | 萬章 告子 | |
| | 卷二十三<br>孟子四 | 盡心 | |
| 中庸 | 卷二十四<br>中庸一 | 總論第一章 | 中庸 |
| | 卷二十五<br>中庸二 | 第二章至末章 | |
| 易 | 卷二十六<br>易一 | 綱領上 | 易 |
| | 卷二十七<br>易二 | 綱領下 | |
| | 卷二十八<br>易三 | 乾履 | |
| | 卷二十九<br>易四 | 泰至離 | |
| | 卷三十<br>易五 | 咸至未濟 | |
| | 卷三十一<br>易六 | 繫辭上 | |
| | 卷三十二<br>易七 | 繫辭下 說卦 序卦 雜卦 | |
| 書 | 卷三十三<br>書一 | 綱領 虞書 夏書 | 書 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 卷三十四<br>書二 | 商書 周書 | |
| 詩 | 卷三十五<br>詩 | 綱領 三百篇 | 詩 |
| 春<br>秋 | 卷三十六<br>春秋 | 綱領 經傳附 | 春秋 |
| 禮 | 卷三十七<br>禮一 | 儀禮 周禮小戴禮 大戴禮 | 禮 |
| | 卷三十八<br>禮二 | 論考禮綱領 冠 昏 喪 | |
| | 卷三十九<br>禮三 | 祭 | |
| | 卷四十<br>禮四 | 雜儀 | |
| 樂 | 卷四十一<br>樂 | | 樂 |
| 性<br>理 | 卷四十二<br>性理一 | 性命 性 人物之性 | 性理 |
| | 卷四十三<br>性理二 | 氣質之性命才附 | |
| | 卷四十四<br>性理三 | 心 | |
| | 卷四十五<br>性理四 | 心性情 定性 情意 志氣志意 思慮 | |
| | 卷四十六<br>性理五 | 道 理 德 | |
| | 卷四十七<br>性理六 | 仁 | |
| | 卷四十八<br>性理七 | 仁義 仁義禮智 仁義禮智信 誠 忠信<br>忠恕 恭敬 | |
| 理<br>氣 | 卷四十九<br>理氣一 | 總論 太極 天地 陰陽 五行 時令 | 理氣 |
| | 卷五十<br>理氣二 | 天文 天度曆法附 地理潮汐附 雷電<br>風雨雪雹霜露 | |
| 鬼<br>神 | 卷五十一<br>鬼神 | 總論 論在人鬼神 論祭祀祖考神祇<br>雜論祭祀鬼神 | 鬼神 |

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="6">道統</td><td>卷五十二<br>道統一</td><td>聖賢諸儒總論 孔子 顏曾思孟 孔門弟子 周子</td><td rowspan="6">道統</td></tr>
<tr><td>卷五十三<br>道統二</td><td>程子 張子 邵子</td></tr>
<tr><td>卷五十四<br>道統三</td><td>程子門人 楊氏門人 羅氏門人 胡氏門人</td></tr>
<tr><td>卷五十五<br>道統四</td><td>自論爲學工夫 論自著書</td></tr>
<tr><td>卷五十六<br>道統五</td><td>自著書序跋</td></tr>
<tr><td>卷五十七<br>道統六</td><td>訓門人</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">諸子</td><td>卷五十八<br>諸子一</td><td>老子 列子 莊子 墨子 管子 孔叢子 子華子附 申韓 荀子 董子揚子 文中子 韓子 歐陽子</td><td rowspan="3">諸子</td></tr>
<tr><td>卷五十九<br>諸子二</td><td>蘇氏 王氏 呂伯恭 陳君舉 陳同父</td></tr>
<tr><td>卷六十<br>諸子三</td><td>陸氏釋氏附</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">歷代</td><td>卷六十一<br>歷代一</td><td>唐虞三代 春秋 戰國 秦 西漢 東漢 三國 晉 唐 五代</td><td rowspan="2">歷代</td></tr>
<tr><td>卷六十二<br>歷代二</td><td>宋</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">治道</td><td>卷六十三<br>治道一</td><td>總論 王伯 封建 論官 用人</td><td rowspan="2">治道</td></tr>
<tr><td>卷六十四<br>治道二</td><td>財賦 賑恤 學校貢舉 論兵 論刑 諫諍 禎異</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="2">卷六十五 論文 論詩 字學 科舉之學論醫學附</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="2">卷六十六 賦 詞 琴操 古詩 律詩 絶句 樂府 贊 箴 銘</td><td>賦, 詞, 琴操, 古詩, 律詩, 絶句, 詩餘, 贊, 箴, 銘</td></tr>
</table>

儘管二書的編纂皆強調以《朱子大全》與《朱子語類》爲本, 然而〈表二〉所呈現的, 是兩書目次幾乎一致的事實。《御纂朱子全書》完成於康熙52年(1713),《朱子選統》完成於正祖5年(1781), 就時代先後而言, 正祖《朱子選統》一書的編纂, 應是以康熙《御纂朱子全書》爲本。欲證明此一影響關係,

必先考察《御纂朱子全書》的東傳時間。據《群書標記》紀錄, 正祖即位後, 興建作爲收藏中外圖書所的奎章閣, 並命閣臣徐浩修爲奎章閣藏書編目, 即今筆寫本《奎章總目》一書。該書卷3"皆有窩丙庫"子部儒家類中, 正好收有《御纂朱子全書》一書。[35]

> 予於丙申初載 ,肇建奎章閣于內苑 ,以奉謨訓峙圖籍。既又購求九流百家之昔無今有者 ,幾數千百種 ,遂命閣臣徐浩修著之爲目。每書之下 ,標其撰人姓名及所著義例 ,或節取序跋 ,以見其規模之槩略。……凡經之類六十、史之類一百二十、子之類一百四十八、集之類二百七十九。繼此而購得者 ,將隨得隨錄也。[36]

由上述引文可知,《奎章總目》所收書目爲當時奎章閣之藏書, 由正祖於辛丑年(正祖5年, 1781)命徐浩修編目, [37] 正好與《朱子選統》完成年代相同, 可知在徐浩修編目前, 該書必然早已藏於奎章閣。實際考察《通文館志》第四冊卷十〈紀年續編〉, 於"景宗大王三年癸卯"一條下, 出現如下紀錄。

> 禮部咨雍正元年七月二十日。皇帝賜朝鮮國王《御纂周易折中》全部、《御纂朱子全書》全部、御製法瑯碗十箇…… ,交與正使密昌君李樾等 ,相應知會該國王祗承可也。[38]

景宗3年(1723), 密昌君李樾(1677-1746)任登極陳賀使, 與副使徐命均、書狀官柳萬重於當年四月出發, 前往北京祝賀雍正登極。雍正帝於同年七月二十日召見朝鮮使臣, 賜給朝鮮國王《御纂周易折中》、《御纂朱子全書》及各項珍寶, 密昌君李樾於同年攜回朝鮮。至此可以確定, 康熙《御纂朱子全書》於1723年已傳入朝鮮, 正祖編纂《朱子選統》即是據此爲本。由此可見, 正祖素有就朱子書編成一部"一通之書"的心願, 在《御纂朱子全書》傳入朝鮮後, 見康熙已完成一部"朱子全書", 興起效尤之心, 乃以此書爲本進行《朱子選統》的編纂。《朝鮮王朝實錄》中, 正祖對經筵諸臣的一席話, 證明了此一意圖。

> 上謂筵臣曰："夫子嘗曰『述而不作』,予之平生工夫 ,在於一部《朱書》。予年二十時 ,輯《朱書會選》,又與春、桂坊抄定註解 ,又點寫句讀於《語類》。三十時 ,編《朱子會統》,又証定故儒臣韓億增所編《朱書》,又編《紫陽會英》及《朱書各體》。四十後編閱《朱書》者多 ,而近年又輯《朱書百選》。而昨年夏秋 ,取《朱子全書》及《大全》、《語類》,節略句語 ,又成一書 ,名曰《朱子書節約》。近又留意於《朱子大全》及《語類》,與其外片言隻字之出於夫子之手者 ,欲爲集大成 ,編爲一部全書。待其編成 ,將別搆一室于宙合樓傍 ,奉安朱子真像 ,竝蔵全書板本於其中。予於朱夫子 ,實有師事之誠 ,所以欲如是也。"[39]

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35 徐浩修,《奎章總目》卷3, 皆有窩丙庫, 子部, 儒家類, 頁190。

36 正祖,〈奎章總目四卷〉,《弘齋全書》卷183,《群書標記》, 頁9。

37 "辛丑秋, 命原任直提學徐浩修撰《奎章總目》。"《奎章閣志》(再草本), 尊閣第六, 藏書, 頁402。

38 金慶門,〈紀年續編〉,《通文館志》下, 第4冊, 卷10, 頁13。

正祖之於朱子, 實有師事之誠, 其平生之功夫在於一部《朱書》, 自幼勤讀朱子書, 即位後據前人選輯成果彙編各類朱子選本, 以作爲最後編成一部集大成朱子書的嘗試。從今日流傳下來的正祖朱子選本, 不難窺見正祖這樣的意圖。然而其中《朱子會選》、《紫陽子會英》、《朱子選統》三本朱子選本早已失傳, 僅能透過《群書標記》中正祖的解題考察編纂動機與書中目次。本文由佚本《朱子選統》著手, 取得該書目次訊息, 再從正祖多依前人選輯成果爲本, 重新分類或刪削增補以編成朱子選本的編纂方式, 與早出《朱子選統》的中國、韓國現存朱子選本相比, 發現《朱子選統》依據康熙《御纂朱子全書》編成的事實。康熙命纂《朱子全書》, 將此書視爲知人知天、安定百姓、治理國家、統一學術的重要典籍。此一編纂動機, 正與正祖編纂"一通之書", 欲成就以朱子學教化天下的目的頗爲吻合。足見正祖藉由效法康熙《御纂朱子全書》編成《朱子選統》, 以作爲日後編纂"一通之書"的嘗試。這項史料關聯的發現, 不僅證實正祖對海內外朱子書的廣泛閱讀, 也證明正祖朱子選本所本跨足海內外文獻, 更確認了正祖亟欲就朱子書編纂"一通之書"的積極態度。

## 四、結語

自朝鮮王朝建立以來, 大力推行"崇儒抑佛"政策, 儒學發展進入前所未有的全盛期。十八世紀後, 被譽爲朝鮮王朝文藝復興君王的正祖, 尤其推崇朱子學作爲儒學的重要一環, 並親自進行朱子選本的編纂, 自世孫時期至1800年辭世的27年間, 共編纂十冊朱子選本。

正祖編纂朱子選本的原因, 在於朱子書卷帙繁浩, 初學者不能短時間內掌握朱子思想要旨, 又深感時人"博而寡要, 擇而不精"的缺點, 於是親纂朱子選本, 欲達到"博以至於約, 約以至於大成之義"的目標, 而其終極目標, 更在於成就"一通之書"。正祖朱子選本的文獻來源, 雖皆爲《朱子大全》、《朱子語類》, 然而考察其編纂方式, 並非直接摘錄上述二書, 而是依前人選輯成果爲本, 再由正祖重新分類或刪削增補。由此可見, 正祖朱子選本的編纂, 亦可說是爲完成此"一通之書"預作準備, 而以前人選輯成果爲本, 自然是爲蓄積化博爲約的實力。正祖所編十冊朱子選本, 今日僅存七冊, 其中《朱子會選》、《紫陽子會英》、《朱子選統》三冊已經失傳。幸而正祖親撰三冊朱子選本之解題, 仍收錄於正祖詩文集《弘齋全書》卷179至卷184的《群書標記》中。

本文利用《群書標記》所收《朱子選統》解題, 與他書目次相比, 發現在韓國雖沒有目次相似的書籍, 在中國卻與康熙《御纂朱子全書》的目次極其

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39 《正宗大王實錄》卷48, 22年(1798, 戊午)4月19日(癸丑), 第1條記事, 頁81。

相似。考察二書完成時代,《御纂朱子全書》成書較《朱子選統》早70年, 並於1723年傳入朝鮮。又康熙《御纂朱子全書》一書的編纂動機, 乃欲編成一部富國安民、統一學術的重要典籍, 與正祖完成“一通之書”, 以朱子學教化天下的心願頗爲吻合。本文認爲, 在《御纂朱子全書》傳入朝鮮後, 正祖見康熙已完成一部“朱子全書”, 興起效尤之心, 乃以此書爲本進行《朱子選統》的編纂。這項史料關聯的發現, 將可提供未來正祖朱子學研究一項新的資料。

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# A Comparative Study on the Compilation of Zhu Xi's Books by King Jeongjo and Chinese Philology: Focusing on the *Juja Seontong* 朱子選統

LIN Yu-Yi

## Abstract

In this paper, I examined the source and compilation method of collected works of Zhu Xi by King Jeongjo through the articles in the *Gunseo pyogi* 群書標記 written by King Jeongjo. I found that King Jeongjo used to refer to many previous collected works of Zhu Xi by Joseon scholars, instead of using the original source of *Zhuzi daquan* 朱子大全 and *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 directly when he compiled collected works of Zhu Xi.

Among the collected works of Zhu Xi compiled by King Jeongjo, the *Juja seontong* 朱子選統 was lost but the preface remains in the *Gunseo pyogi*. By this article, the contents can be confirmed. By comparing the contents of Jujaseontong with the previous collected works of Zhu Xi, which are remaining in Korea and China, I found out the *Juja seontong* by King Jeongjo and the *Yuzuan Zhuzi quanshu* 御纂朱子全書 by Emperor Kangxi both share exactly the same table of contents. This paper argues that King Jeongjo found out Emperor Kangxi already completed Zhu Xi's works, *Zhuzi daquan* 朱子大全 and *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類, after the *Yuzuan Zhuzi quanshu* was brought into Joseon. King Jeongjo planned to compile the *Juja seontong* based on this book as a trial to compile the most perfectly collected works of Zhu Xi for Joseon scholars. The analysis of the new relationship between the historical data can provide us with new material for the study of Neo-Confucianism by King Jeongjo.

**Keywords:** King Jeongjo, Emperor Kangxi, *Juja seontong*, *Yuzuan Zhuzi quanshu*, Neo-Confucianism

# 牟宗三論社會主義

陳 迎 年

**中文提要**

牟宗三對什麼是社會主義、如何建設社會主義等問題有著持續而深入的思考, 並將其與自己的“道德的形上學”建構嵌套在了一起。牟宗三看重資本主義向社會主義的過渡, 認爲這是實現儒家“大同”的必然要求, 其論述主要有四個方面：一是社會主義經濟上的公有和拘束, 必須從資本主義的自由經濟中“孳乳”出來；二是無產階級的自由、民主等既要能向“垂直”方向上的“天德”或“神性”伸展, 同時又以保障“水平面”上的集會、結社、言論、出版、罷工等的自由爲條件；三是社會主義以經濟權利、政治權利等作爲底子, 但目標卻在精神生活的自由, 社會主義必定非常重視文化建設；四是實現了經濟權利、政治權利、文化權利的社會主義, 才可說“有中國特色的社會主義”, 即“質的社會主義”, 才最有利於實現人的社會權利。牟宗三的這些論述既體現了當時的某些共識, 也反映了他的政治哲學的獨特性, 可爲今天社會主義建設的借鏡。

**關鍵詞**：牟宗三, 社會主義, 政治哲學, 經濟權利, 政治權利, 文化權利

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* 陳迎年：華東理工大學哲學研究所副教授（chenpingch001@163.com）

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# 一、序言

一般而論, 對於現代新儒家牟宗三的關注, 大都集中於“道德的形上學”。有個別人研究牟宗三“政治哲學”, 也大都在“良知坎陷”、“內聖開出新外王”的框架下展開。但實際上, 牟宗三的面相是寬廣的, 論題是開放的, 他不僅有“心性儒學”, 而且有“政治儒學”[1]；其政治哲學不僅是“自由主義”的, 而且也是“社會主義”的。然而非常可惜的是, 在以往的研究中, 牟宗三的“社會主義面相”卻幾乎未曾得到專題揭示。

本文的目的除了拾遺補缺、揭示牟宗三的“社會主義面相”之外, 其意義還在於：牟宗三對於社會主義的討論, 既爲我們提供了研究儒家傳統、自由主義、社會主義三者關係的絕好材料, 又爲發掘儒學中的現代政治哲學資源提供了極佳個案, 而能夠扭轉把牟宗三政治哲學視爲“民主政治啦啦隊”的成見。牟宗三所堅持和表現出來的原則, 是既不困於中國傳統之道德上的自由、經濟上的均平與政治上的禪讓等, 也不囿於西方現代話語體系之經濟上的自由主義與政治上的民主主義等, 而要求必須對此衆多訴求做出恰當的融通。撇開具體論證上的優劣得失, 牟宗三的這個原則反映了20世

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1 感謝三位專家的評審意見, 其肯定讓我惶恐, 其否定促我奮進。牟宗三哲學中內聖與外王、心性與政治之關係的討論, 一直是牟宗三研究的重點和熱點之一。長期以來, 無論是把牟宗三的“心性儒學”與“政治儒學”判爲兩截而否定之, 還是視其爲一渾然的整體而肯定之, 研究者往往都順著“內聖開出新外王”的思路把兩者視爲“從上面說下來”或“自上而下”的關係。且不論包遵信、張灝、何信全等人先行的研究, 當下的研究也是這樣。楊澤波2014年出版的五卷本《貢獻與終結──牟宗三儒學思想研究》一書, 資料詳實, 持論有故, 論述全面, 第一卷即爲《坎陷論》。其重要成果, 就是區分了“開出科學和民主的坎陷”與“建構兩層存有論的坎陷”之不同, 並判定後一坎陷是“例外”, 從而能夠主要在前一種意義上使用坎陷概念, 認定“坎陷論具有相對的獨立性”, “與其他的作品在內容上並沒有直接的聯繫”, 需從“讓開一步”、“下降凝聚”、“攝智歸仁”這三個基本要素出發來理解。彭國翔2006年前後即開先河, 重視牟宗三哲學的“現世關懷”, 並於2016年集結出版爲《智者的現世關懷──牟宗三的政治和社會思想》一書。他特別強調：“‘良知坎陷’說的確是牟宗三外王思想的理論基礎, 對其哲學內涵的瞭解必須深入整個牟宗三思想甚至整個中國哲學的脈絡, 不是‘對塔說相輪’的一些所謂批評便能夠搔到癢處的。但問題的關鍵在於, 牟宗三‘外王’的一面或者說其政治社會關懷是否是‘良知坎陷’、‘三統並建’說所能概括的了？若其‘外王’的一面或其政治社會關懷僅在於此, 招致抽象之譏自然在所難免。然而, 正如本文所述, 牟宗三‘外王’的一面其實並不限於其‘良知坎陷’的理論和思辨。” 彭國翔：〈牟宗三的共產主義批判──以《全集》未收之〈共產國際與中共批判〉爲中心〉, 《中國文哲研究通訊》, 第62頁。也就是說, 彭國翔一方面看到牟宗三哲學不僅僅只是“從上面說下來”, 而且也本質性地必然包括了“從下面說上去”, 一方面同楊澤波一樣把“良知坎陷”視爲“從上面說下來”。這是把牟宗三“政治社會關懷”或者說“外王”一面的關鍵, 安置於“良知坎陷”的“外面”。余英時“別開生面”(“本書之所以‘別開生面’便在於它的探討物件不是牟宗三的哲學系統, 而是他的‘現世關懷’, 這是以住研究者極少觸及的一面”)的評論從一個側面印證了這一點。本文在時賢先進研究的基礎上堅持兩個觀點：一是牟宗三的哲學系統與現世關懷的統一, 二是牟宗三“從上面說下來”與“從下面說上去”的統一。當然, 這只是本文的背景, 而無法詳盡展開。

紀中國一流學者的共識, 而應該成爲21世紀的今天在討論儒家政治哲學時的一個前提。

## 二、經濟權利：社會主義與自由主義

在發表於1992年12月20日《聯合報》的〈鵝湖之會──中國文化發展中的大綜和與中西傳統的融會〉一文中, 牟宗三強調, "講'社會主義'一定要照〈禮運〉篇那個'大道之行也, 天下爲公'來講"。[2] 把《禮運》篇定義爲社會主義的, 這並非是牟宗三晚年的一時之會。早在1954年7、8月間, 牟宗三就已經要求把"政權、治權皆天下爲公, 選賢與能"與"經濟方面, 則求均平"結合起來, 以真正實現〈禮運〉篇所肯定的"質的社會主義"。[3]

如何理解這種"質的社會主義"？政權、治權方面的"公"下節再論。怎樣實現經濟上的均平呢？在更早的發表於1934年8月1日《再生》半月刊第2卷第11、12期合刊的《復興農村的出路何在？》一文中, 牟宗三把這個問題與"挽救資本主義的病態"聯繫起來, 認爲必須在與資本主義的比較中來確立社會主義的本質：

> 資本主義的合理主義是自然的合理主義 ,社會主義的合理主義是當然的合理主義。前者是合科學之理 ,後者是合道德之理。前者是自然的趨勢 ,後者是發自於不忍之心。前者是獸性 ,後者是神性。前者是無所謂的 ,後者是有所謂的。前者是放任的 ,後者是拘束的。社會主義就是來拘束資本主義放任之流弊的。[4]

所謂"自然的合理主義", 是說資本主義由自由經濟而來, 強調個人、自由、比賽, 各竭所能, 各享所得, 猶如動物界的弱肉強食, 終會生出兩極分化、人而不人的流弊, 因此需要管一管。在"管一管"處, 社會主義應運而生, 其"當然的合理主義"對資本主義的"挽救"和"拘束"主要表現爲經濟上的均平, 即要求對經濟有所"計畫"。牟宗三把它歸結爲六條：

> (一) 所謂計畫也是對付自然活動之病態而產生的。(二) 因爲自然的合理主義之發於人性而不可磨滅 ,故確定資本主義之限度：凡在均富或均貧的狀態範圍之內而無可造成特殊之富與特出之窮者 ,皆允許其在資本主義的合理主義之下活動。(三) 因爲當然的合理主義之發於人性而不可厭抑 ,故確定社會主義之限度：凡在均富或均貧的狀態範圍之內 ,有可以造成特殊之富與特殊之窮者皆收回使其在社會主義的合理主義之下活動。(四) 凡個人所不能辦不宜辦 ,並足以妨礙

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2 牟宗三, 〈鵝湖之會〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第27冊, 頁458。

3 牟宗三, 〈政道與治道〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊, 頁12。

4 牟宗三, 〈復興農村的出路何在？〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第26冊, 頁773-774。

> 社會公道的，皆在社會主義的範疇之下活動；凡人所能辦所宜辦而並不妨礙社會公道的，皆資本主義的範疇之下活動。(五) 無論在資本主義之下活動，或是在社會主義之下活動，都須按照國家的一貫計畫發展。需要計畫的當然要計畫，不需要計畫的當然也不必無事忙白費力氣。需要計畫與不需要計畫都在自覺的一貫的狀態之上活動，這便是計劃經濟的特色，這個特色也總名之便即是理性的。(六) 在資本主義與社會主義兩範疇的合作情形之下，再加上國家的計畫與整理之運用，則公道的社會即出現。[5]

這六條, 在發表於1935年第3卷第8期《再生》雜誌的〈國內兩大思潮之對比〉一文中又被表述爲五條, 但行文大體上沒有變化, 只是取消了原來的第一條而代之以“公有私有之轉移”這一前提, 再以“自由與私有”替代了“資本主義”, 以“公有與拘束”替代了“社會主義”。[6]

這裡牟宗三論從資本主義向社會主義的過渡, 似頗有些唯物史觀的味道。但是一般而論, 牟宗三是不認同唯物史觀的。不過牟宗三也看到, “唯物史觀”即是“經濟史觀”, “經濟史觀不過是從經濟方面看社會發展就是了”, 即是“歷史的經濟觀”或“歷史的經濟解析”, 也即是“社會進化史底經濟解析”。[7] 這是不能否認的。因此, 牟宗三所反對的, 不過是流俗化、教條化了的唯物史觀, 即“經濟定命論”。[8] 在這一點上, 牟宗三與馬克思又是相通的, “馬氏的觀點是史的、動的、活的、全的、過程的、具體的。這是我五體投地地承認, 並且也是近代各方面思潮中的一種共同趨向”, [9] 而強調在人的衆多聯絡關係中, “經濟組織是其他方面的托命線”。[10]

圍繞這個“托命線”, 牟宗三在〈從社會形態的發展方面改造現社會〉(1934年)、〈中國土地分配與人口分配之原則〉(1935年3月15日)、〈中國農村生產方式〉(1935年5月15)、《歷史哲學》第一部第一章等多篇文章中, 研究了儒家政治傳統中比較傾向於社會主義, 即著重於經濟方面的公平的內容, 主要包括由助變貢加賦、賦稅助籍兼用的變化過程, 以及從井田制到爰田制、提封疆等土地制度的發展等。在分析過程中, 牟宗三特別強調了經濟權利相對於其他權利的基礎性地位, 而要求先富後教, 即從經濟權利中“孳乳”出其他：

> 我們讀的書，受的教育，那一句話不是教我們作好，作聖賢，作偉人，作有道德的人，結果怎樣？越受教育的人越是自私的人，然則以公的精神來教育農民是並不能去掉他們的私的。所以，窮、私、愚、弱是不能以教育能改正的。這種辦法只是道學家的教訓，聽了這個教訓，

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5 牟宗三, 〈復興農村的出路何在？〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第26冊, 頁774-775。

6 牟宗三, 〈國內兩大思潮之對比〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第26冊, 頁839-840。

7 牟宗三, 〈社會根本原則之確立〉、《從社會形態的發展方面改造現社會》, 《牟宗三先生全集》第26冊, 頁638、697。

8 牟宗三, 〈任重而道遠〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第26冊, 頁799。

9 牟宗三, 〈社會根本原則之確立〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第26冊, 頁642。

10 牟宗三, 〈復興農村的出路何在？〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第26冊, 頁750。

> 在當時未始不怦然心動，但時過境遷，仍是依然故我。所以我們認爲現在的農村運動必須改個面目，決不可只從教訓式的教育方面來聯絡，我們當從經濟關係方面組織他們。…… 經濟的聯結是實現我們的認定的工具。[11]

牟宗三不會以道德判斷取代歷史判斷，指責往聖前賢沒能在此“托命線”處著實用功。實際上，經濟權利的異軍突起是一個歷史事件。牟宗三看到，資本主義的發達，與十七、十八世紀的啟蒙思想發展出個人主義、自由主義，兩者相互疊加激蕩，於是民族國家的獨立、人權運動、民主政治等也相繼出現，這種經濟的聯結才發達起來。[12]

在此，牟宗三無疑肯定了自由經濟、私有制的合理性。不過，自十九世紀後半期以至二十世紀以來，資本主義的經濟生產出現了漏洞，貧富差距過大，經濟危機頻發，引生了很大的社會問題。牟宗三因此承認，“資本主義有問題，勞苦大衆應解放”，[13] 而要求確立資本主義自由經濟的限度，不致其無限自由下去。這就走向了社會主義。

對於資本主義的“挽救”和“拘束”，無疑強化了社會主義的經濟性質。這裡的社會主義，並非只如〈禮運〉篇所言僅爲一理想或原則，生產力發展水準的問題更加突出。牟宗三以1918年到1924年蘇俄的合作社運動爲例，指出若不能尊重自由經濟的合理性，大力發展生產力，而是爲拘束而拘束，爲挽救而挽救，那麼國家經濟機關的管理註定要失敗，這也就是後來大家所熟知的社會主義計劃經濟的那種“一放就亂、一管就死”的怪圈。[14]

可見，無論是就中國土地分配、財稅制度的歷史變遷而言，或者是從資本主義的發達、社會主義的實踐等方面來看，牟宗三都傾向於相信，社會主義的均平是從經濟權利中孳乳出的：社會主義都並不是一味反對經濟自由，而只是反對經濟自由的濫用；社會主義也並不是要在經濟組織之外另立“托命線”，而是要實現和完成每個人的經濟權利。

## 三、政治權利：社會主義與民主主義

按照馬克思的觀點，經濟基礎與上層建築是辯證統一的。牟宗三也強調，社會主義要實現和完成人的經濟權利，就必須承認經濟上的自由主義的合理性，同時承認政治上的民主主義。即是說，若沒有政治上的民主主義，則社會主義對於資本主義、經濟自由主義的揚棄必不可得。社會主義必肯

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11 牟宗三，〈復興農村的出路何在？〉，《牟宗三先生全集》第26冊，頁750-751。
12 牟宗三，〈道德的理想主義〉，《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊，頁220。
13 牟宗三，〈政道與治道〉，《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊，頁176。
14 牟宗三，〈復興農村的出路何在？〉，《牟宗三先生全集》第26冊，頁771-772。

定人的政治權利。按牟宗三理解, 這是有傳統依據的,〈禮運〉篇的“大道之行也, 天下爲公”必然同時包括經濟權利和政治權利的雙重性之“公”。在發表於1990年12月28日《聯合報》的〈當代新儒家──答問錄〉一文中, 牟宗三把這種“雙重性的公”理解爲“儒家政治傳統的兩條支流”：

> 儒家政治傳統有兩條支流：一是比較傾向於民主政治 ,像講禪讓、公天下、反對家天下 ,以及明末黃梨洲的思想便是；一支比較傾向於社會主義 ,即著重於經濟方面的公平 ,主要是土地問題 ,但承認自由經濟。[15]

一般說來, “民主政治”與“社會主義”兩個概念是有交叉的, 因而牟宗三上說似含混而不確。但細究牟宗三的意思, 社會主義當有廣狹之分。狹義的社會主義, 指經濟上的社會主義, 要挽救資本主義自由經濟的流弊, 以實現每一個人的經濟權利。廣義的社會主義, 則既包括經濟上的社會主義, 同時也指涉與其相適應的政治上的社會主義和文化上的社會主義。對此廣義的社會主義, 特別是側重於政治權利的社會主義, 牟宗三在1949年12月發表的〈理想主義的實踐之函義〉一文中的理解是：

> 無論是資產階級作主的社會或無產階級作主的社會 ,民主制度皆必須肯定。此誠如陳獨秀所說的：“無產階級民主不是一個空洞名詞 ,其具體內容也和資產階級民主同樣要求一切公民都有集會、結社、言論、出版、罷工之自由。特別重要的是反對黨派之自由 ,沒有這些 ,議會或蘇維埃同樣一文不值。” 他又說：“政治上的民主主義和經濟上的社會主義是相成而非相反的東西。民主主義並非和資產階級及資本主義是不可分離的。無產政黨若因反對資產階級及資本主義 ,遂並民主主義而亦反對之 ,即令各國所謂無產階級革命出現了 ,而沒有民主制做官僚制之消毒素 ,也只是在世界上出現了一些史大林式的官僚政權：殘暴、貪污、欺騙、腐化、墮落 ,決不能夠創造什麼社會主義。所謂無產階級獨裁 ,根本沒有這樣的東西 ,即黨的獨裁；結果也只能是領袖獨裁。任何獨裁都和殘暴、蒙蔽、欺騙、貪污、腐化的官僚政治是不能分離的。”[16]

即是說, 與經濟上的社會主義的均平要承認資本主義自由經濟的合理性一樣, 政治上的社會主義的天下爲公也需承認資本主義民主政治的合理性。依此, 牟宗三認定社會主義的民主主義的“內在的本質”有二：“一、允許人們有思想、言論、出版、結社等之自由；二、依憲法而施行的制度基礎之確立。”[17]這是“廣度地”保障“一般人民”的集會、結社、言論、出版、罷工等的自由。除此之外, 社會主義的民主主義還必須“深度地”保障“天才”。牟宗三相信, 唯民主主義可以保障天才, 它包括兩層意思：

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15 牟宗三,〈當代新儒家──答問錄〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第24冊, 頁438。

16 牟宗三,〈道德的理想主義〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊, 頁62-63。

17 牟宗三,〈道德的理想主義〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊, 頁73。

> 一、人的天才不能以作政治領袖爲唯一的出路。天才的充分發展可以讓其轉爲科學、哲學、藝術、宗教方面的,即轉爲文化的,此是在社會文化上以追求真理而充分發展其天才,而實現其對於人類之貢獻。而這種天才之能在社會上得其充分的發展,惟有民主制度的政治始能允許之、保障之。如果人的天才在文化上不能得其出路,則只有集中於政治權力之爭奪。此決非人類之福。…… 二、民主政治不但保住社會上天才之文化的發展,而且在政治上亦不許有以天才英雄自居而得以充分發揮其權力欲者。"天才"二字直不許用於政治領袖或政治家。…… 政治家不能孤峭獨特的,他必須順俗從衆,謀及庶人。他必須爲公共利益而守法尊制度,依法而退,依法而進。他的境界不能太高。政治不能不講法度,法度就限制了他不能爲天才。他有政治的天才,只能說他有適應法度運用法度的本事,他是在限制中運用他的才具的。[18]

簡單地說, 第一層意思是縱的衝破橫的, 允許人們在遵守憲法、法律等前提下向上無限伸展, 達致自己的自由高度；第二層意思是橫的鎖住縱的, 以政治法度拘束政治天才的任性揮灑, 防止政治上的弱肉強食, 保障人的自由水平線。縱橫交錯, "民主政治就是一方面讓天才轉爲文化的, 一方面禁止政治權力欲之無限的發展", [19] 以保障每個人的政治權利。

這兩層意思, 一方面肯定了民主主義, 一方面又反顯出了資本主義、民主主義的不足。牟宗三強調, 衡之以儒家傳統的純然德性生命觀, 人的自由, 包括縱的和橫的, 其實都是無限伸展的：

> 在印證那純神性上,它是在垂直方向上直向超越境而上達,上達天德或神性。在"與人爲徒"的機應上,它是在水平面的舒展面上,滿足人之所需要於"道成肉身"者。無論是垂直的方向上,或是在水準的舒展面上,它總是那純然的德性生命之自己。這就是宗教或聖賢型的人格。[20]

由此, 牟宗三講"聖王政治"和"政治神話", 表彰儒家的聖王德治傳統, 認爲它標明了政治的"極致"：

主觀敞開, 服從客觀, 則客觀方面即全散開而落在"存在的生命個體"之"各適其性, 各遂其生"之"各正性命"上。無騷擾、無矯揉、無懸隔、無設計, 個體落實地還其爲個體, 此爲儒者"理性之內容的表現"之德治之極致。此種全幅讓開散開的德治亦可以說是內容表現上如實如理的個體主義之極致。[21]

"如實如理的個體主義"即"徹底散開的個體主義", 有如馬克思的"自由人聯合體"中的個體。由此個體主義, 牟宗三講民主主義即是自由主義：

> 所謂自由主義(liberalism)的基本精神還是個體主義(individualism)。個體主義不是講究自私自利的個人主義。個體主義所重視的"個體",

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18 牟宗三,〈道德的理想主義〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊, 頁66-67。

19 牟宗三,〈道德的理想主義〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊, 頁67。

20 牟宗三,〈政道與治道〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊, 頁78。

21 牟宗三,〈政道與治道〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊, 頁132。

> 是政治的意義，是由權利義務規定的“個體”。譬如國民享有國家所保障的權利，同時他也對國家負有應盡的義務，像當兵納稅就是。獨立的“個體”，才能享權利、盡義務；如果不是獨立的“個體”，也就沒有權利義務可言。這些都是政治上的觀念。因此，在這種個體主義的意義下，自然就包含了自由主義的意義。自由主義由此而來，這才是自由主義的基本精神。[22]

而牟宗三之所以強調只有儒家的聖王德治傳統才標明了政治的“極致”，正是因爲這種政治不滿意於資本主義、民主主義中對人縱貫向上的自由伸展的“允許”，而欲將其發展爲一種絕對“義務”，因此強化了“教化”的意義。換言之，在牟宗三看來，社會主義的民主主義不僅要確保人的消極自由，而且要充分發展人的積極自由。由此“教化”與“積極自由”，牟宗三要求對“泛民主主義”進行“挽救”和“拘束”：

> 政治上的民主下散流走而轉爲社會日常生活上無律無守的泛民主主義。民主裡面含有自由、平等兩觀念，如是自由、平等亦失掉它政治上憲法上的意義，而下散流走，轉爲日常生活上無律無守個人自私的泛自由泛平等。……師生之間講民主，則先生無法教學生。父子之間講民主，則父兄不能管教其子弟。夫婦之間講民主，則夫妻之恩情薄。民主氾濫於社會日常生活，則人與人間無真正的師友，無真正之人品，只是你不能管我，我不能管你，一句話是“你管不著”。民主本是政治上對權力的大防，現在則轉而爲掩護生活墮落的防線。[23]

綜上所述，結合古今中西兩方面的經驗，牟宗三相信，社會主義對人的政治權利的肯定，一方面要學習和吸收資本主義民主主義的合理性，實現政道的民主，解決以往儒家聖君賢相系統對於君與民這兩端無積極的辦法的難題，另一方面要堅持和轉化儒家德化的治道，以悱惻之心、盡倫盡性踐仁的積極實踐爲基礎，防止民主的下散流走，真正達致“乾道變化，各正性命，保合太和，乃利貞”的境地。

需要注意的是，這並不是說，儒家德化的治道已經與社會主義接軌合流了，而是說，儒家政治傳統、民主主義、社會主義能夠相互扶持。而且，上述兩方面經驗的結合之所指，並非如很多人所講的那樣，是爲了挽救西方現代及後現代社會的病痛。牟宗三或許不反對這種功效，但其目光所在，首先一定是中國社會自己的事情。中國的事情當然並沒有完結，一切才剛剛開始。就政治權利而言，有兩條需要提及：

> 假定相應政權有政道，民主政治成立，使政權與治權離，則此種治道當更易實現，且反而使自由民主更爲充實而美麗。以前相應政權無政道，故此種德化的治道實在是有時而窮，而其實現亦受阻。此實爲中國歷史文化之大癥結。[24]

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22 牟宗三，〈“五四”與現代化〉，《牟宗三先生全集》第24冊，頁264-265。

23 牟宗三，〈道德的理想主義〉，《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊，頁331-332。

> 聖人作政治領袖也是最好的。……柏拉圖所想的“哲王”(philosopher king),以及以往儒家所想的君,皆有此理想。但究竟在人類自有歷史以來,這類的哲王從未出現,聖人亦從未作過皇帝或政治領袖。……我想,聖人若作了皇帝,那時便是天國,而不是地國,而亦無所謂政治了。在天國未實現以前,民主政治仍是最可貴的制度。我們還是讓聖人掌教化,而亦唯民主政治始能保障聖人而尊仰之。[25]

第一條的“假定”表明, 學習和吸收資本主義、民主主義的合理性, 尚還有很長的路要走。第二條的“天國”, 有如共產主義社會, 在進入共產主義社會以前, 社會主義還是保持政教分離爲宜。

## 四、文化權利：社會主義與國家主義

牟宗三把經濟上的自由主義與政治上的民主主義區分開了, 除了強調經濟組織是其他方面的“托命線”之外, 便是要肯定民主主義的精神性。即是說, 民主主義“內在的本質”, 思想、言論、出版、結社的自由以及對公權力的限制等, 與個人的物質訴求、經濟利益直接相關, 首先表現物質生活的自由, 但除此之外, 民主主義還有“外在的開明之德量”, 表現精神生活的自由。兩相結合, 始能形成健全的民主主義, 才是真正的社會主義。牟宗三強調, 社會主義始於追求經濟上的均平, 而必終於道德的理想主義：

> 社會主義增進人類現實生活的幸福,民主主義保障人類精神生活之自由,使天才有其充分之發展,在文化內之發展。這後面的基本精神是道德的理想主義。若爲現實生活的幸福而必否決民主主義,則現實生活的幸福亦不可得,社會主義亦必不可實踐,而所謂麵包第一,其所成者亦不過是齊於物的純然動物而已,結果,麵包亦吃不成。[26]

在牟宗三看來, 無論是經濟權利、政治權利等都需要以精神生活的自由作爲底子, 若沒有這個底子, 所謂的經濟自由、政治自由等雖僥倖得之而必將終失之。在此, 牟宗三把理想、理性、精神生活的自由等等縱貫向上的人性素質都歸結爲文化的, 而與國家相系：“民主主義與社會主義, 若必歸結爲文化的, 則亦必歸結爲國家的”。[27] 牟宗三的論證分爲兩個部分。

首先是“超越的證明”或者說“形而上學的證明”。

文化跟真理一樣, 都是普遍的或普世的, 皆希望肯定人性、尊重人道, 有功於全人類至善至美生活樣法的建設, 因此文化工作者似乎不必要講

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24 牟宗三,〈政道與治道〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第10冊, 頁36。
25 牟宗三,〈道德的理想主義〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊, 頁68。
26 牟宗三,〈道德的理想主義〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊, 頁73。
27 牟宗三,〈道德的理想主義〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊, 頁74。

到民族國家。不過這只是文化的一個面相。若就文化的鑄造而言, 文化又是多樣的, 是不同民族的聖哲所鑄造的不同的文化。再就文化的實現而言, 普世的文化必於個人、家庭、國家等特殊的東西中成其自己。即以儒家文化而言, 仁即表現了儒家文化的普世性, 是萬物一體之仁, 也是天理、天倫之仁, 與天地合德, 與日月合明, 直接對應的是"大同"、"天下"或"宇宙"等, 一體平鋪, 各正性命。到此道德秩序與宇宙秩序同一, 便是聖賢人格的絕對精神、天地氣象。但是, 仁的鑄造顯然離不開孔子, 仁的實現則強調愛有差等、施由親始, 而特別重視家庭和國家。"家庭是骨肉之親之結合, 藉之以實現仁, 即仁之'情的表現'。""國家是家庭以外的實際生活之結合, 藉之以實現仁, 即仁之'義的表現'。"[28] 即是說, 仁是個人、家庭、國家等的"超越的根據", 個人、家庭、國家等則是仁的"內在的根據"。由此即普遍即特殊、即超越即內在、即理即氣, 牟宗三說"形而上學的證明":

> 從文化的創造,真理的實現方面說,民族的氣質、個人的氣質,是它的特殊性,是它實現之限制而又是它實現之具體的憑藉,因此,家庭國家就是實現真理創造文化之個體,它們是普遍者與特殊者結合而成的。普遍者作爲構成它們的一成分,因而即是在它們之中呈現。呈現即實現。實現真理即是創造文化。普遍即是它們的理性根據,即上文所說的"超越的根據"。此即是仁,或道德的理性。我們根據這個理性的實現,既能成就文化的創造,亦能成就家庭國家天下等之肯定。[29]

只有社會主義, 而非資本主義、封建主義等, 才真正滿足仁的形而上學規定性。由此出發, 社會主義一方面肯定文化, 表現仁的超越性和普世性, 一方面肯定民族國家, 表現仁的內在性和特殊性：兩方面諧和, 真正呈現出作爲生化之理的仁的"自然條理", 經濟上的均平和政治上的民主也才能自然而然地合一, 猶如天設地造一般。

其次是"道德實踐的證明"。

牟宗三首先反駁了康有爲"春秋公羊學的社會主義"及時人習知的"大浪漫的社會主義"。兩者的共同問題, 是把"大同"理解爲純粹散列的個體, 不但要消滅家庭, 清除人類的自然情感, 至"男女皆至平無別"、"無復男女之異"及"人人平等, 人人自立"之境, 而且還要由此發展到"破國界去國義", 以達致世界主義的"聯合太平世"。即是說, 對這兩派社會主義而言, 欲消滅國家, 必先消滅家庭；唯消滅家庭國家, 方能成就社會主義。牟宗三認爲, 這是夢想的大同, 是把人看成機器零件的大同, 是毀滅一切的癡呆大同：

> 這個毀滅一切的癡呆大同是私的個體所投射的一個影子：一面是極端的私,赤裸裸的個體,一面就是極端的公,沒有價值,沒有意義的齊於物的大同。這兩者是一而二、二而一,而且是互爲因果的。在現實

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28 牟宗三,〈道德的理想主義〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊, 頁76。

29 牟宗三,〈道德的理想主義〉,《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊, 頁78。

> 上以其氾濫衝破一切而無安頓的人就憧憬那個大同 ,而憧憬那個大同的人 ,一落到現實上 ,就是不顧一切極端自私的人。[30]

在牟宗三看來, 這種大同走在了盲爽發狂的路上, 走在了極端專制的路上, 而不知黑格爾主觀精神、客觀精神與絕對精神這三個環節之與人的道德實踐的必然性和重要性。道德實踐要有個觸發點和起點, 這便是家庭的骨肉至親關係中的"情之至親"。但是, 孝弟之情所表現的重在主觀精神, 尚無法達到家庭之外, 道德實踐還需要在"義的分位"關係即國家政治的組織中表現, 即表現客觀精神。牟宗三說：

> 人類之實踐若無客觀的表現 ,則連家庭之情的表現亦不能維持於永久 ,必馴至枯餒以死。故客觀精神是一個重要的關鍵 ,是由家庭過渡到天下(大同)的重要而不可少的通路。它是使吾人的價值生活出乎家庭骨肉以外而擴大至天下的一個媒介。沒有這個媒介 ,天下是一個荒蕪的觀念 ,完全是無生活意義的 ,而家庭亦必枯槁困頓委靡以死。馴致一切歸於荒煙蔓草 ,此即所謂天地閉 ,賢人隱。[31]

在這裡, 牟宗三並沒有單純反對和協萬邦、國際主義或世界歷史, 而是把客觀精神視爲由主觀精神到大同絕對精神的關節點, 強調其不可或缺性。從道德實踐的這些環節出發, 牟宗三強調, 天下、大同等當然是絕對而至大無外的, 但它是一個水準的、橫的王道系統, 需要縱貫之根, 需要一個一個的民族國家以其歷史文化的縱貫線來支撐它。

縱貫之根, 便是國家的超越根據, 便是仁。在這裡, "道德實踐的證明"便與"形而上學的證明"合一了。通過這種合一, 牟宗三兼顧自由精神的形而上學之本體和道德實踐之流行, 而強調社會主義的經濟均平與政治民主相成而非相反, 強調社會主義與家庭、民族國家的肯定相成而非相反：唯有通過國家、法律等客觀精神, 才能一方面維持住公民的自由民主, 保障公共生活的良好秩序, 一方面又不以民主政治爲滿足, 而是強力以求上達至"仁者與天地萬物爲一體"的境界, 而保任人歸宿於最後的絕對精神之自己的那種可能性。

## 五、社會權利：質的社會主義

一般而論, 社會主義通過對資本主義的"挽救"和"拘束", 來進一步保障人的經濟權利、政治權利和文化權利, 以實現人的最大限度的自由, 呈現和擴充人性的積極面相。但相比較而言, 經濟權利與文化權利的保障更強調國家"計畫"、"教化"的意義和作用, 而可以稱之爲國家社會主義(其中強調儒

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30 牟宗三, 〈道德的理想主義〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊, 頁80。

31 牟宗三, 〈道德的理想主義〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第9冊, 頁82。

家文化傳統重要性的一支, 又可以單獨稱之爲儒家社會主義)；政治權利的保障則更重視個人的自覺意識和自我選擇, 而可以稱之爲民主社會主義。

然而, 我們卻不能據此判斷, 牟宗三所講的社會主義就是“民主社會主義”、“國家社會主義”或“儒家社會主義”。毋寧說, 牟宗三之所以要把經濟權利、政治權利、文化權利統合著講, 正是欲消除一般所講的“民主社會主義”、“國家社會主義”及“儒家社會主義”等的種種偏失。在發表於1948年7月《理想歷史文化》第2期的《荀學大略》一文中, 牟宗三表達了他對相關偏失的防範：

> 吾人今日講國家性之出現 ,必不可與自由民主爲對立；而講自由民主之出現 ,亦必不可與國家爲對立。講個人 ,不可流於泛個人主義；講社會 ,不可流於泛社會主義；講天下大同 ,不可流於空頭之清一色的荒涼的大同 ,凡此皆足以導致極權而互爲因果 ,而其總歸皆虛無主義也。[32]

“民主社會主義”的偏失, 在把政治民主、經濟自由與國家的安排與教化相對立, 而易流於“泛個人主義”；“國家社會主義”的偏失, 在把國家性與自由民主相對立, 而易流於“泛社會主義”；“儒家社會主義”的偏失, 在只有空頭的自由精神、民族國家等, 而無客觀精神以實之, 而易流於“荒涼的大同”。三者雖來源有異表現不同, 但卻都是偏而不正, 無法成就真正的個體、真正的集體, 最後的結局往往是縱貫向上的精神盡失, 而與現實中的極權專制政治共舞。

因此牟宗三一直強調, 社會主義必然重視政治權利、經濟權利、文化權利等諸方面不同要求的協同聯合, 是一個縱橫交織的有機整體。在發表於1990年12月28日《聯合報》的〈當代新儒家──答問錄〉一文中, 牟宗三把這個有機聯合的社會主義稱之爲“質的社會主義”：

> 社會主義的意識必須籠罩在道德、理性、歷史文化、自由、民主等價值觀念之下 ,對經濟問題採取經驗主義態度 ,這才可說“有中國特色的社會主義” ,即“質的社會主義”。[33]

與“質的社會主義”或者說“有中國特色的社會主義”針鋒相對的, 就是那種把社會主義限定在純粹的經濟領域、只承認物質的均平、先驗地要求經濟權利的齊一的“量的社會主義”。在牟宗三看來, “量的社會主義”立理以限事、以理殺人, 本欲消除資本主義的罪惡, 而實際上只能造成更大的罪惡, 兩極分化更加嚴重, 無產階級生活更加困苦, 新權貴更加窮奢極欲。因此牟宗三強調, 社會主義所要求的經濟上的公平只能採取經驗主義的態

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32 牟宗三, 〈名家與荀子〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第2冊, 頁213。

33 牟宗三, 〈當代新儒家──答問錄〉, 《牟宗三先生全集》第24冊, 頁439。

度, 國家隨時針對問題進行調整、改良。換言之, 這種經驗主義的調整和改良只能是承認經濟自由而欲約束之, 因而需要以政治上的民主主義、文化上的保守主義爲前提。

牟宗三相信, 只有綜合了經濟上的經驗主義、政治上的民主主義、文化上的保守主義, 兼顧到人的經濟權利、政治權利、文化權利, 人的社會權利方能統籌兼顧, 社會才能真正和諧。這也便是中國的現代化道路, 便是返本開新, 便是古今中西的融通之道。

事實上, 如果說社會主義隨20世紀資本主義重重問題而變得更加耀眼, 成爲一種最爲重要的社會思潮, 那麼中國人對社會主義的思考, 特別是考察其與中國傳統特別是儒家思想的關係, 也就顯得自然而然了。而牟宗三對"質的社會主義"的多重論述, 對人的社會權利的綜合強調, 既反映了20世紀衆多一流學者的某些共識, 也表現了他自己的一些特點。由於論題的限制, 這裡只能稍加展開, 只講兩點共識和一點爭論。

第一點共識, 是社會主義對於自由經濟的那種拘束。如梁啟超也以"經濟問題"、"國民生計"爲關注點, 認爲"社會主義雖不敢謂爲世界唯一之大問題, 要之爲世界數大問題中之一而占極重要之位置者也", "社會主義一問題, 無論以世界人類分子之資格或以中國國民分子之資格, 而皆不容以對岸火災視之"。[34] 他認爲, 由於事涉每個人的經濟權利, 社會主義最精要的論據, 應該是孔子講的"均無貧和無寡", 孟子講的"恆產恒心", 實質即是干涉主義："社會主義者, 其外形若純主放任, 其內質則實主干涉者也。將合人群使如一機器然, 有總機以紐結而旋掣之, 而於不平等中求平等。社會主義, 其必將磅礴於二十世紀也明矣。故曰二十世紀爲干涉主義全勝時代也。"[35] 同樣, 胡適之所以承認社會主義, 其中重要的一點, 也是因爲他認定："資本主義之流弊, 可以人力的制裁管理之"。[36]

第二點共識, 是社會主義與儒家文化的那種內在關聯。這是把古今中西問題結合起來, 相信儒家與社會主義是本質同一的, 比如康有爲、梁啟超等春秋公羊學者。而與牟宗三同屬熊十力學派的徐復觀甚至斷定："在財富這一觀念上, 中國只能和社會主義相通。"[37] 這裡的相通, 並不是說兩件東西有其交叉的部分, 而是說, 儒家文化中的仁的呈現、儒家的社會理想的實現等, 必須以社會主義爲前提條件。這其實也是以經濟權利爲出發點和基石, 而要求實現人的政治權利、文化權利等。徐復觀強調："孔子的思想, 在專制政治下不能實現, 在資本主義也不能完全實現, 可能要在社會主義之下才能實現。"[38] "孔孟之道, 只不過教人以正常的人生態度, 及教人以人與人正

34 梁啟超, 〈社會主義論序〉, 《飲冰室合集》第3冊, 頁1。
35 梁啟超, 〈干涉與放任〉, 《飲冰室合集》第6冊, 頁87。
36 胡適, 《胡適日記全編》第4冊, 頁239。
37 徐復觀, 《徐復觀雜文三：記所思》, 頁232。
38 徐復觀, 《徐復觀雜文三：記所思》, 頁100。

常相處的態度。甚至可以說, 孔孟所建立、所要求的上述正常的態度, 只有在真正的社會主義社會中才能普遍地實現。”[39]

一點爭論則主要涉及社會主義與自由民主是否並存的問題。自由與民主無疑是有不同的, 如上文第一、二兩節就分別說經濟上的自由主義與政治上的民主主義。但兩者又常常被等量齊觀, 問題因此也就變得更加複雜了。若簡言之, 可以胡適爲例。1926年, 胡適在俄德諸國旅行時, 曾與蔡和森有過辯論, 並結合自己的觀察, “頗有作政黨的意思。我想, 我應該出來作政治活動, 以改革內政爲主旨。可組一政黨, 名爲‘自由黨’。充分承認社會主義的主張, 但不以階級鬥爭爲手段。共產黨謂自由主義爲資本主義之政治哲學, 這是錯的。歷史上自由主義的傾向是漸漸擴充的。先有貴族階級的爭自由, 次有資產階級的爭自由, 今則爲無產階級的爭自由”。[40] 此時胡適傾向於認爲, 蘇俄社會主義的無產階級專政才真正爭取了最大多數人的自由, 而英美等資本主義國家名爲尊崇自由, 實是戴假面具, 一旦微嗅得一點自己的自由受到限制的危險, 就會將那假面具撕下來。因此胡適的“自由黨”便要“充分承認社會主義的主張”。他爲此還專門畫了一個自由直角三角形, 用來說明貴族自由到資產階級自由再到無產階級自由的那種享受自由的人數不斷擴大的過程。但是到了1953年, 胡適的意見發生了重大改變, 認爲社會主義與自由民主不能共存：

> 我在二十年前 ,尚以爲Socialism is a logical sequence of the democratic movement[社會主義是民主運動的邏輯發展] ,近十年來 ,我漸見此意之不是。……我是一個自由主義者 ,其主要信條乃是一種健全的個人主義[individualism] ,不能接受各種社會主義信條。[41]

應該看到, 牟宗三瞭解社會主義與自由民主能否共存的那些爭論, 認同和重視自由主義者健全的個人主義信條的那種防範意識, 也承認中國傳統政治的專制性格及過往儒家德化的治道的不足等, 但卻長期堅持社會主義, 一貫主張經濟上的經驗主義、政治上的民主主義、文化上的保守主義等在“質的社會主義”中的保任和提高, 因此其思考中似乎多少顯出了一些和稀泥的色彩。實則不然。牟宗三在堅持和主張“質的社會主義”的同時, 對“量的社會主義”有斬釘截鐵的認知和毫不留情的批評, 衡之以社會主義的歷史實踐, 相互印證處比比皆是, 很多甚至可謂是孤明先發, 由此可證牟宗三並非是閉門造車的冬烘先生。牟宗三思考社會主義的深刻之處正在於, 他既有堅強的原則, 毫不猶豫地以仁、自由、理性精神等建立社會主義的超越根據, 又著眼於世俗生活, 把社會主義的托命線安置在物質財富、生活幸

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39 徐復觀,《徐復觀雜文三：記所思》, 頁76。
40 胡適,《胡適日記全編》第4冊, 頁237-239。
41 胡適,《胡適日記全編》第8冊, 頁320。

福、肉體自由等的上面。前者兩事並爲一事做，一方面力圖復活傳統，另一方面致力於確立社會主義的文化縱貫線。後者亦然，一方面是一種世俗化的過程，另一方面要求確保社會主義的經濟、政治水平線。

## 六、結語

牟宗三相信，唯有縱橫交錯、以橫構縱、縱貫縱講的社會主義才是“質的社會主義”，才最有利於實現人的社會權利。這是牟宗三論社會主義的特點。在此有三點需要注意。其一，自由民主與社會主義的深度融通問題，決不是20世紀90年代後才開始自覺出現的。其二，在回顧社會主義接受史，討論社會主義與自由主義、民主主義關係這一重大課題的時候，尤其需要關注那些曾經以“保守主義者”之名而被排除在外的學者。[42] 其三，今人對於自由經濟、民主政治、社會權利等的理解或許已經超過了牟宗三，但是，牟宗三在古今中西的衝撞中尋求“重疊共識”的那種博大和精深，恐怕依然指明了堅定文化自信的必由之路。[43] 假定已經走在了這條道路上，那麼我們就有理由相信，“有中國特色的社會主義”、“質的社會主義”必將在理論和實踐兩方面都結出更爲豐碩的成果。

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42 張君勱曾與唐君毅、徐復觀、牟宗三共同發表了〈爲中國文化敬告世界人士宣言〉，他對社會主義也有著一系列的論述，而要求把社會主義、自由主義、傳統文化等結合起來，其思想在多個方面對牟宗三產生了重要影響。不過，鑒於張君勱社會主義思想演變過程的複雜性及本文的論題限制等，這裡並沒有涉及他。

43 大陸學者“儒教自由主義”的主張、“大陸新儒家”的崛起等，讓這個話題變得更加有意義。若再對比西方研究，如幾十年前熊彼特的“兼收並蓄”等，則更加有意味。留待來者吧。

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# Mou Zongsan's Concept of Socialism

CHEN Ying-nian

## Abstract

Mou Zongsan's concept of socialism is closely linked to his moral metaphysics. He emphasized the importance of transition from capitalism to socialism and regarded it as the inevitable for the realization of Confucian concept of *datong* 大同. There were four main aspects of his discourse: First, capitalist free economy breed public ownership and the plan of the socialist economy; second, the capitalist free politics breeds proletarian freedom and proletarian democracy; third, and yet the goal of socialism is the freedom of spiritual life, and socialism must require cultural construction; last, only then can we say that socialism with Chinese characteristics, namely qualitative socialism, is most conducive to the realization of human rights. These arguments of Mou Zongsan reflect not only common sense at that time, but also the characteristics of his political philosophy, which can be used as a mirror for today.

**Keywords:** Mou Zongsan, Socialism, Political philosophy, Economic rights, Political rights, Cultural rights

# Regulations of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture

## Ⅰ. General Regulations

1. (Name)
   The official name for the institute is "Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture" (hereafter, ICPC), which an organization that belongs to the Academy of East Asian Studies (hereafter, AEAS) at Sungkyunkwan University.
2. (Objective)
   ICPC primarily conducts research in the field of Confucian thought. It also covers general Confucian culture, as well as its development and modernization, in an attempt to provide fundamental guiding principles for humanity in a rapidly developing society.

## Ⅱ. Organization

3. (Constitution)
   ICPC is constituted of the following: 1) the director, 2) the management committee, and 3) an editorial board.
4. (Director)
   1) The director must be a full-time professor of Sungkyunkwan University, with a specialization that conforms to the objective outlined in article I of this document. The director must be nominated by the university president and appointed by the chairman of the board.
   2) The director, representing ICPC, controls the general affairs of ICPC.
   3) The basic term for the director is 2 years, which is extendable.
5. (Assistant Director)
   1) The director may appoint (an) assistant director(s) to assist with the director's various tasks.
   2) Assistant director(s) must be a research member of ICPC, nominated by the director of ICPC and appointed by the director of AEAS.
   3) The basic term for the assistant director is 2 years, which is extendable.
6. (Office)
   1) ICPC may assign (an) office(s) according to different research area(s).
   2) The head of the office must hold a position equivalent to or greater than that of a research professor. The head must be nominated by

the director of ICPC, approved by the management committee, and appointed by the director of AEAS.

## Ⅲ. Management Committee

7. (Constitution)
   1) ICPC may establish a management committee in order to discuss and make important decisions regarding general management.
   2) The management committee shall be no larger than 10 persons. The director will serve as the head of the management committee.
   3) Members of the management committee must be research members of the ICPC, nominated by the director and appointed by the director of AEAS.
8. (Agenda)
   The agenda for the management committee includes:
   1) Establishing basic plans for management and research.
   2) Declaring and/or eliminating various rules and regulations.
   3) Settling the budget and accounts.
   4) Other relevant management.
9. (Call for Meeting)
   1) The director must call for any meetings of the management committee.
   2) Meetings are valid only when more than half of all members are present. In order to settle an agenda, more than half of all members present at a meeting must agree to any decision or action.

## Ⅳ. Editorial Board

10. (Constitution)
    1) ICPC includes an editorial board which discusses and makes decisions regarding ICPC publications.
    2) The editorial board includes the editor-in-chief and noted scholars both in Korea and abroad. The editor-in-chief is the director of ICPC.
    3) Each editorial board must be appointed by the director. The basic term is 2 years.
    4) Each year, the editorial board will publish the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*. Rules and dates for publication are established separately.
11. (Call for Meeting)
    More than half of the editorial board members present at the meeting must agree in order to settle an agenda.

* The above regulations take effect from March 1, 2000.

# The Code of Management for the Editorial Board of the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*

## Ⅰ. General Regulations

1. (Objective)
   This regulation is established according to article IV-10-4 of the Regulations for the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (hereafter, ICPC). It comprises the regulatory guidelines for publishing the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture* (hereafter, *JCPC*).
2. (Mission)
   1) To supervise publication of *JCPC* and the related affairs of acceptance, review, editing, and so on.
   2) To set up rules and regulations for publishing *JCPC*.

## Ⅱ. Organization of Editorial Board

3. (Constitution)
   The editorial board is comprised of editorial advisors, editorial councils, the chief manager (the director), the editor-in-chief, the head of the editing team, and other editing team members.
4. (Appointment of Editorial Advisors and Members)
   The director of ICPC appoints editorial advisors and members among noted scholars of highest achievement, both in Korea and abroad.
5. (Terms)
   The basic term for editorial board members is 2 years, extendable when necessary. The editor-in-chief is tenured by principle, in order for the journal to maintain its congruity.
6. (Chief Manager)
   The director of ICPC is also the chief manger and supervises the editorial board.
7. (Editor-in-chief)
   The editor-in-chief is appointed by the director of ICPC and is responsible for all editorial issues.
8. (Head of Editing Team, Editing Team)
   The head of the editing team and the editing team's other members are appointed by the director of ICPC. The head of the editing team is responsible for general issues concerning editing, and the assistant head is responsible for assisting with related editorial matters.

## Ⅲ. Publication of *JCPC*

9. (Numbers and Dates of Publication)
   *JCPC* is published twice in one year: on August 31 and February 28.
10. (Circulation)
    The size of circulation for *JCPC* is determined by the editorial board.
11. (Size)
    The standard size for *JCPC* is 176mm × 248mm.
12. (Editorial System)
    1) Academic articles written in either Chinese or English.
    2) Academic articles include: title, abstract, keywords, contents, bibliography, an abstract written in Chinese or English, keywords written in Chinese or English.
    3) The English title and name of the author must be specified.
    4) The affiliation of the author must be specified.
    5) Regulations, bulletins, and materials other than academic articles may be included according to the decision of the editorial board.

## Ⅳ. Submission of Articles and Management

13. (Subject and Character of the Submitted Article)
    The subject of article includes:
    1) Confucian thought and culture in Korea and abroad.
    2) Analysis of books, translations, or research articles on related subjects published in Korea or abroad. It may include dissertations.
    3) Critical reviews on academic trends, mainly in the arts and humanities, related to Confucianism and East Asian studies.

    No certain qualification for submission is required.
14. (Number of Words)
    1) A length of each article is limited to 25,000 characters for Chinese and 12,000 words for English, including the abstract, footnotes, bibliography, etc.
    2) The number of words permitted for materials other than academic articles and reviews are to be determined by the editorial board.
15. (Submission Guidelines)
    1) A general call for papers is always extended, but only articles submitted at least three months prior to the publication date are usually subjected to the review process for a specific issue.
    2) Submissions should be forwarded to jicpc@skku.edu as an email attachment.
    3) Abstracts in Chinese and English must include five or more keywords.

4) If written jointly, the first (main) author and the second (joint) author, as well as their respective name, affiliation, area of research, part(s) of writing, must be noted.
5) E-mail address(es) and phone number(s) must be provided for all authors.

16. (Control of Submitted Articles)
    1) Submitted articles are, as they arrive, subject to a controlled process.
    2) Submitted articles are not returned, and copyright for published articles belongs to ICPC.

## Ⅴ. Reviewing Submitted Articles

17. (Obligation to Review)
    All submitted articles must pass the reviewing process.
18. (Regulations for Reviewing Board)
    1) In principle, the editorial board will select three outside reviewers for each submitted article and commission them to evaluate the article. If two of the reviewers agree, the article can be published.
    2) In specific situations, the editorial board can precede the reviewing process by selecting two outside reviewers. If only one of the reviewers recommends publication, the editorial board can decide whether to publish or reject the article based on the journal's academic standards. In such cases, the editor-in-chief is supposed to make a written report to the chief manager (the director).
    3) If submitted articles do not meet the basic requirements of the journal (e.g., in terms of length, subject, etc.), the editorial board can decide not to proceed with the reviewing process and return the submission to the author(s). The editorial board can also ask the author(s) to resubmit after revision.
    4) In principle, the board of reviewers must maintain a just and fair attitude, and should not review articles written by scholars with whom they are personally affiliated.
    5) For the sake of fairness, the review process will remain anonymous.
19. (Standard of Review)
    1) Articles will be reviewed for basic format (20%), originality (20%), clarity of subject (20%), logic (20%), and congruity (20%).
    2) The result will divide the articles into two groups: publishable and not publishable.
    3) Articles evaluated as not publishable cannot be re-submitted with the same title.
20. (Feedback time)
    Reviewers must submit their feedback on each article to the editorial

board within two weeks from it was assigned to them.

21. (Reporting Back the Result)
The editorial board must report back to the author(s) as soon as the results of the reviewing process have been received.

## Ⅵ. Revision of Regulations

22. (Principle)
This code of management is subject to change when 2/3 of the editorial board agrees, provided that more than half of the editorial board's members are present at the time of voting.

## * Other Regulations

23. (Others)
1) Other issues not written in this code will be treated following customary practices.
2) The above regulations take effect from December 20, 2006.
3) The editorial board will determine and deal with all other details concerning the above regulations.

# The Code of Ethics and Management for the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*

## Ⅰ. General Regulations

1. (Objective)
   This regulation is established in order to define the ethical principles and standard of management of the Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture (hereafter, ICPC).
2. (Application)
   This regulation is applied to prevent any unjust act within academic agenda of ICPC, and to provide a framework for systematic investigation, management, and resolution if an unjust actions occur. At the same time, it is geared toward protecting the creativity of academic research and strengthening an ethical spirit within academia.

## Ⅱ. Research Ethics

3. (Ethical Code for Authors)
   1) All authors who submit their articles to the *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture* (hereafter, *JCPC*) must follow this code of ethics.
   2) All research outcomes that are mainly based on faked or fraudulent research or upon already published work without providing any new insight are regarded as forged.
   3) Any close imitation of another author's ideas and arguments without giving explicit and objective credit to that author is regarded as plagiarism.
   4) Submission of one's own work that has already been presented and published elsewhere as the first research outcome is regarded as duplication or self-plagiarism.
   5) Sponsored articles must follow the regulations of the sponsor before submission.
   6) Authors must take full responsibility for their presented articles.
   7) Co-authors must make it clear which parts of the essay each author has contributed to, and take responsibility for those parts of the essay.
4. (Ethical Code for the Editorial Board)
   1) The editorial board members of *JCPC* must follow this code of ethics.
   2) Editorial board members must participate in editorial meetings and

assume responsibility for receiving articles, the election of reviewers, and the selection of articles for publication,

3) Editorial board members must be silent about any personal information of all authors submitting articles. Otherwise, it will be regarded as a misuse of their rights.
4) Editorial board members must strictly follow regulations in confirming submissions and selecting reviewers, etc., lest it should arouse any conflict between reviewers and general board members.
5) If any doubt or questions concerning ethical matters arise, the editorial board must immediately call for an investigation by the ethics committee.

5. (Ethical Code for the Reviewing Committee)
   1) Members of reviewing committee of *JCPC* must follow this code of ethics.
   2) Reviewers must follow the established regulations for providing an objective and fair review of the submitted article, and provide their honest feedback to the editorial board. If a reviewer feels that they cannot review an article assigned to them for an objective reason, they must promptly notify the editorial board.
   3) Reviewers must rely on academic standards and their own conscience in reviewing submitted articles. Reviewers cannot reject an article based on their own personal standpoints without sufficient basis, and cannot conclude the review without scrupulously reading the whole article.
   4) Reviewers must keep the author's personal information as well as the content of the article confidential throughout the process of review.

## Ⅲ. Establishment and Management of Ethics Committee

6. (Ethics Enforcement)
   This regulation is established according to the general regulation, and is already in effect. The director will decide on establishing specific rules to applying these regulations.
7. (Constitution of Ethics Committee)
   The Ethics Committee is constituted of the director of Ethics Committee, the editor-in-chief, and up to five members of the editorial board. The director of ICPC is also the director of the Ethics Committee.
8. (Function of Ethics Committee)
   1) Upon a suspected violation of the ethical code, the ethics committee will proceed to conduct an investigation and issue a decision, notifying the accused of the opinion of the committee. It will also report the issue to the editorial board.

2) When investigating the violation, the ethics committee must secure sufficient evidence and keep the whole process confidential.

9. (Accusation of Violation)
   1) An accuser must secure specific evidence when reporting an act of violation. Even if the report turns out to be false, the ethics committee can continue an investigation if other evidence is discovered.
   2) The same process of accusation applies to both editorial board members and reviewers.
10. (Investigation and Decision)
    1) If accused of violating the ethical code, the accused must comply with the investigation conducted by the ethics committee. Noncompliance is regarded as acknowledging the accused violation.
    2) All articles under investigation will be postponed for publication until the investigation has been completed and a report issued to the editorial board. Investigations are to be completed before the next term for publication.
11. (Chance of Defense)
    The accused has right to defend their article. Their defense can be made before the general members of the editorial board, if the accused wishes to do so.
12. (Forms of Penalty)
    Penalties which the ethics committee can impose include warnings, submission restrictions, and expulsion from membership. Already published articles can be deferred or pulled out completely. Sponsored articles, when used unfairly or warned by the sponsor, may also be subject to penalty.
13. (Revision of Regulations)
    Any revisions made to this regulations must follow ICPC's revision principles.
14. (Others)
    Regulations not written in the above will follow customary practices.

## * Other Regulations

This regulation is established according to the article 21 of ICPC.
It is agreed by the editorial board (October 20, 2007), and is in force since January 1, 2008.

# Submission Requirements for Contributors

## Ⅰ. Submission

1. Manuscripts should be written in docx file and are to be submitted as an email attachment to jicpc@skku.edu.
2. Type in "Author's Contact Information" on top of the title of your manuscript, which includes your academic title, affiliation, e-mail address, telephone number(s), and mailing address.
3. On the first page of the body text, make an abstract of about 300 words (including five keywords or more)
4. Unless specially invited, a length of each manuscript (including footnotes) should be around 8,000 words, and should not exceed 12,000 words (font: Times New Roman; font size: 12 pt.; line space: double).

## Ⅱ. Style Guidelines

1. In general, we follow the editorial guidelines established in the 16th edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Please consult the online information of it at www.chicagomanualofstyle.org.
2. The citation style required by the Journal is short references in footnotes and complete citation data in the REFERENCES section. Short references contain only the author's last name, title of work (shortened if necessary), and page number(s) as in the following example: 1. Fingarette, *Confucius*, 15-16.
3. Imagine that the readers of your article have little understanding of Asian philosophical and cultural background. Provide explanations for technical terms as well as any words or concepts which are essential to a clear understanding of your article.
4. When romanizing Chinese terms, use pinyin system. Terms in Korean should be romanized according to the romanization system established in 2000 by the Korean government. For Japanese terms, follow the Hepburn romanization system.
5. When historic figure(s) and state(s) are first mentioned, provide their dates in parenthesis as follows: Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), Han 漢 (206 BCE-220 CE).
6. When you quote a passage in pre-modern Chinese texts, put the English translation in the body and the original Chinese text in the footnote.

* For a more detailed submission guideline, please contact us at jicpc@skku.edu.

# 儒教文化研究所章程

## 第一章 總則

第一條（名稱）

本研究所的正式名稱爲“儒教文化研究所”（以下簡稱“研究所”），是成均館大學東亞學術院的下設機關。

第二條（目的）

本研究所以研究儒學思想爲主，同時兼顧整個東亞的儒學文化研究，並對儒學的傳統進行現代化的解釋和發展，使之成爲指引人類發展的基本理念。

## 第二章 組織

第三條（機構）

研究所的機構如下設置：1. 所長，2. 運營委員會，3. 編輯委員會。

第四條（所長）

1. 所長必須由符合第一章規定中目的的專業的本校教授擔任，由學校校長提請理事長任命。
2. 所長代表研究所，總體掌管研究所的事務。
3. 所長的任期爲2年，可以連任。

第五條（部長）

1. 爲了協助所長，並分擔所長的一部分業務，所長下面可以設置部長。
2. 部長從研究委員中產生，由所長提請學術院院長任命。
3. 任期爲2年，可以連任。

第六條（研究室）

1. 研究所可以根據研究領域的不同而設置研究室。
2. 研究室長由研究教授以上的人擔任，須經運營委員會的審議通過，再由所長提請學術院院長任命。

## 第三章 運營委員會

第七條（構成）

1. 爲了便於審議和決定與研究所運營相關的重要事項，研究所可以設置運營委員會。

2. 運營委員會由所長和10人以內的委員構成, 委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員從研究所的研究委員中產生, 由所長提請學術院院長任命。

第八條(審議事項)運營委員會主要審議以下事項：

1. 基本運營計劃的確立以及與研究計劃相關的事項。
2. 研究所諸規定的制定與廢除問題。
3. 預算以及結算等諸問題。
4. 其他與研究所運營相關的事項。

第九條(會議)

1. 會議由委員長召集。
2. 會議要有過半數以上的在職委員出席才可以召開, 出席委員過半數同意才可以決議。

## 第四章 編輯委員會

第十條(構成)

1. 爲了審議決定研究所刊行的出版物的編輯事宜, 故設立編輯委員會。
2. 編輯委員會由委員長和國內外的知名學者構成, 委員長由所長擔任。
3. 委員由所長任命, 任期爲2年。
4. 編輯委員會每年刊行《儒教文化研究》, 論文的刊行原則以及刊行日期等規定另行制定。

第十一條(會議)

編輯委員會會議要有出席編輯委員的過半數同意才可以決議。

附則(施行日)本規定自2000年3月1日起施行。

# 《儒教文化研究》編輯委員會運營章程

## 第一章 總則

第一條(目的)

本規定是根據儒教文化研究所文件中第4節編輯委員會(以下簡稱委員會)第27條第1項研究所刊行物的出版條目中《儒教文化研究》的相關規定而制定的。

第二條(任務)

1. 主管《儒教文化研究》的發刊和相關論文的策劃、接收、評審、編輯等工作。
2. 制定與《儒教文化研究》的發刊相關聯的一系列規定。

## 第二章 編輯委員會構成

第三條(構成)

委員會由編輯顧問、編輯委員、主任(委員長)、主編、編輯部主任(編輯室長)和編輯構成。

第四條(編輯顧問和委員的選任)

編輯顧問和編輯委員由儒教文化研究所所長從世界各國有卓越研究業績的權威學者中選擇並任命。

第五條(委員的任期)

委員任期爲2年,必要時可以連任。但爲了保證學術雜誌的長期穩定性,主編原則上是連任的。

第六條(主任)

主任(委員長)由儒教文化研究所長兼任,主管編輯委員會。

第七條(主編)

主編由研究所所長任命,總體負責所有的編輯事務。

第八條(編輯部主任、編輯)

編輯部主任(編輯室長)和編輯由研究所所長任命。編輯部主任全面負責編輯事務,編輯輔助主任處理相關的編輯事務。

## 第三章《儒教文化研究》的發刊

第九條(發行的次數和日期)

《儒教文化研究》每年兩次刊行, 出版日期爲8月31日和2月28日。

第十條(發行數量)

《儒教文化研究》的發行數量由委員會決定。

第十一條(開本)

實行176mm×248mm開本。

第十二條(編輯體制)

1. 學術論文使用中文或英文制作。
2. 學術論文的編輯順序原則上分爲論文題目、提要、關鍵詞、正文、參考文獻、中英文抄錄、中英文關鍵詞。
3. 必須注明學術論文的英文題目和作者姓名。
4. 必須注明作者的所屬單位、職務和具體的聯系方式。
5. 學術論文以外的各種文章以及會則、會報的刊載與否由委員會決定。

## 第四章 論文的投稿和管理

第十三條(投稿論文主題和資格)

1. 投稿範圍是以儒學思想爲中心的世界各國的儒學文化。
2. 對國內外刊行的相關儒學著作、翻譯著作以及研究類刊物的分析。
3. 對國內外的儒學和東亞學等人文科學類相關論文(包括學位論文)的論評和研究動向報告。
4. 不限論文投稿資格。

第十四條(原稿字數)

1. 一般情況下按照中文15,000字 / 英文8,000words左右(包括腳注、參考文獻、抄錄等)的標準。
2. 論文以外的原稿字數由委員會決定。

第十五條(論文投稿要領)

1. 隨時可以提交論文, 但以本刊出版3個月前到達的論文作爲該版的審查對象。
2. 論文使用中文或英文格式, 投稿時須提交電子版。
3. 中英文的抄錄需各附5個以上的關鍵詞。
4. 如果是共同研究的論文, 需要分別標出責任研究員和共同研究員, 並且須分別注明姓名和所屬單位、研究領域、執筆範圍和分擔的領域。
5. 來稿須注明作者的電子郵件地址以及聯絡電話。

第十六條(投稿論文的管理)

1. 投稿論文按照來稿順序,建立文檔進行統一有序的管理。
2. 來稿論文概不退還,所刊載論文的著作權歸研究所所有。

## 第五章 投稿論文的審查

第十七條(審查義務)

刊載論文必須經過審查。

第十八條(審查委員規定)

1. 對於投稿的每篇論文,原則上編輯委員會將選定3名評審委員,並委託給他們評審。論文經過審查委員2/3以上的贊成才可刊登。
2. 特殊情況下編輯委員會可選定2名評審委員進行論文審查。2名審查委員中只有一名贊成刊登時,編輯委員會可以通過內部會議決定該論文的刊登與否。而且,編輯部主任要以書面形式向研究所的主任報告編輯部的決定。
3. 若投稿論文的長短或內容遠遠達不到本刊的基本要求,委員會可以不進行評審而通告投稿者不可刊載,或要求修訂後再次投稿。
4. 原則上,審查委員應堅持公正、公平的作風。而且不得審查與自己同一單位的投稿者的文章。
5. 爲了保證審查的公正性,審查全部採取匿名制。

第十九條(審查標准)

1. 審查按照基本格式(20%)、獨創性(20%)、主題明確性(20%)、邏輯性(20%)、完整性(20%)來進行綜合評定。
2. 審查結果分爲刊載可、否兩類。
3. 被評爲不可刊載的論文,不得再以同一題目向本會投稿。

第二十條(審查結果報告)

審查委員從收到評審論文之日算起,應於2周內將審查結果報告給委員會。

第二十一條(審查結果通告)

委員會收到審查結果報告書後,立即告知投稿者。

第二十二條(稿費支付)

對於刊載文章,支付給作者一定的稿費。

## 第六章 章程的修訂

第二十三條(原則)

本章程的修訂要有過半數編輯委員參加,並且經參加人員2/3以上的同意方可施行。

## 附 則

第二十四條(其他)

1. 以上沒有列入章程的事宜按照慣例處理。
2. 本規定自2006年12月20日起生效並施行。
3. 本規定在施行過程中發生的細部事項由委員會來決定並處理。

# 《儒教文化研究》研究倫理及運營規定

## 第一章 總則

第一條（目的）

本規定的目的在於闡明儒教文化研究所（以下簡稱“本研究所”）學術研究活動的研究倫理和運營基准。

第二條（作用）

本規定的作用在於抵制研究活動中的不正當行爲，以及不正當行爲發生後體系性的追查，並且保護有創意性的學術研究，提高學問的倫理性。

## 第二章 研究倫理

第三條（作者倫理）

1. 凡是向本研究所刊行的《儒教文化研究》投稿的作者都應該遵守運營規定。
2. 虛造研究成果或將以前的研究成果刪改變用的一律視爲偽造、編造。
3. 對他人的觀點或主張缺乏客觀分析而直接拿來用作自己的觀點，此種行爲視爲剽竊。
4. 將自己已經發表的研究成果拿來用作首次發表，此種行爲視爲重複刊載或自我剽竊。
5. 接受研究經費資助的論文只有遵守資助單位的管理規定才可投稿。
6. 對於自己公式發表的論文，作者要負全面責任。
7. 共同研究的情況要注明每個人分擔的部分，以此來各負責任。

第四條（編輯委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的編輯委員應該遵守運營規定。
2. 編輯委員要積極參與編輯會議，要對論文的接收、選定評委以及刊載與否負責任。
3. 編輯委員對於投稿者的個人信息要保密，不得利用私權。
4. 編輯委員要嚴格按照既定的標准來確認論文的投稿以及評審情況等，注意不要引發審評者以及一般會員間的是非。
5. 編輯委員會一旦發現研究倫理上的問題要立即通報倫理委員會。

第五條（審查委員倫理）

1. 本研究所《儒教文化研究》的論文審查委員應該遵守審查規定。
2. 審查委員要根據所定的審查規定對投稿論文進行客觀、公正的

審查, 並將審查結果通報給編輯委員會。若自己因客觀情況不能審查, 則應及時通報編輯委員會。

3. 審查委員要根據學者的良心和學問的客觀基準來審查論文。在缺乏充分根據的情況下, 不能一味地依據自己的學術觀點來判定“不可刊載”, 也不能不仔細通讀全文就擅作審查。
4. 審查委員對於審查過程中所知道的作者的個人情況要進行保密, 不能私自公開或利用審查論文的內容。

## 第三章 倫理委員會設置以及運營

第六條 (倫理規定的遵守)

本規定依據本會的會則制定, 一經施行, 立即生效。只是與此相適應的施行細則由委員長決定。

第七條 (倫理委員會的構成)

倫理委員會由所長、主編和編輯委員 (5人左右)組成, 所長兼任委員長。

第八條 (倫理委員會的職能)

1. 對於違反本規定的行爲, 倫理委員會要進行調查和議決, 並將相關意見通告給當事人, 然後報告給編輯委員會。
2. 在審議違反規定的行爲時, 要確保能夠充分掌握證據並對事情的經過保密, 不到最後時刻不能公開審議意見。

第九條 (違反倫理規定行爲的揭發)

1. 若有違反倫理規定的事實, 揭發者可以持具體的事實證據向倫理委員會揭發。若揭發的事實是虛偽的, 倫理委員會可以繼續維持決議。
2. 編輯委員或審查委員在評審過程中若發現有違反倫理規定的事實也依據如上方法揭發。

第十條 (調查以及審議)

1. 會員若被揭發有違反本研究所倫理規定的行爲, 則應積極配合倫理委員會的調查, 若不配合, 其行爲則視爲違反倫理規定。
2. 對於被揭發的有違反倫理規定的論文, 在事實查清以前應採取保留措施。調查審議應在下一期學術期刊發行前結束。

第十一條 (解釋的機會)

對於被揭發有違反倫理規定事實的會員, 要給與其充分的解釋機會。解釋的方式可依據當事者的意願公開。

第十二條 (處罰的類型)

倫理委員會的處罰類型有警告、限制投稿、解除委任等。對於已經投稿或刊載的論文可以採取保留或撤銷的措施。對於接受研究經費資助的論文, 若因不正當的使用而受到資助機關的警告, 也屬於處罰對象之列。

第十三條(規定的修改)

此規定的修改要遵守本研究所的修改原則。

第十四條(其他)

以上規定中沒有涉及的事宜依據慣例處理。

## 附則

本規定依據本研究所會則第21條制定,並經過編輯委員會(2007年10月20日)的審議,於2008年1月1日起施行。

# 投稿須知

1. 中文一律使用繁體, 英文按照一般慣例。來稿一律使用中文(或英文)制作, 請提交電子版(jicpc@skku.edu)。
2. 論文的格式順序原則上依次分爲論文題目、中文提要(300-400字)、中文關鍵詞(5個以上)、正文、參考文獻、英文題目、英文摘要(大略300words)、英文關鍵詞(5個以上)等。
3. 作者簡介可置於文章的最後, 須注明作者的性別、所屬單位、職務、Email、聯系地址以及具體的電話聯系方式, 以便編輯部聯絡。必要時可附上自己的簡歷。
4. 正文內容請用10.5號字, 行間距爲1, 文章字數以15,000字爲宜, 可以適當地增減。但最好不要超過25,000字。
5. 文章的章節可以用“一、二、三……”來表示, 若還要細分, 則請用“(一)、(二)、(三)……”來表示。章節題目一律左側對齊, 使用黑體加粗字體。
6. 文章內提到的一切書籍, 都要在正文後的“參考文獻”內注明。參考文獻標記序次如下：作者,《書名》, 出版地: 出版社, 出版年度。
   如：楊伯峻,《春秋左傳注》, 北京：中華書局, 1981。
   6.1. 需要標記編者或譯者時：作者,〈章節/論文〉, 編者/譯者編/譯《書名》, 頁碼, 出版地: 出版社, 出版年度。
   如：張立文,〈程朱思想的時代精神〉, 楊曉塘編《程朱思想新論》, 頁1-8, 北京：人民出版社, 1999。
   6.2. 引用期刊內容時, 請依次注明：作者, 文章名, 刊物名(包括期數), 文章所在頁碼。
   如：蒙培元,〈儒学是宗教吗?〉,《孔子研究》, 2002年第2期, 頁39-46。
7. 文章正文的引用文, 採用簡式腳注標記。腳注標記方式如下：作者, 論文名稱/書名, 引文所在頁碼。
   如：楊伯峻,《春秋左傳注》, 頁56。
   蒙培元,〈儒学是宗教吗?〉, 頁42。
8. 若作者本人有對文章題目、文章內容的說明, 請放在當頁用腳注表示。
9. 來稿一經採用, 即付稿酬。不採用的稿件, 一律不退, 也不奉告評審意見。三個月內未接到採用通知的, 作者可自行處理。
10. 本刊對採用的稿件有刪改權, 不同意刪改者, 請在來稿中申明。
11. 本刊刊發的文章, 作者著作權使用費與稿費一次性付清。如作者不同意文章轉載, 請在來稿時聲明。

# 共同規約：
## 成均館大學、輔仁大學、馬來亞大學三校聯名學刊

本刊與《哲學論集》及《漢學研究學刊》訂定聯名期刊, 互相推薦論文共同約定事項：

1. 締約雙方接受前揭兩學術期刊之間互相推薦優良的學術論文, 並得接受同一作者相近論題的論文同時在兩刊物發刊。細部規定如下：
   1）作爲同一作者在聯名期刊同時發表的論文, 其論文題目允許在同一專業課題之下, 使用兩個性質相關而又可以分辨的不同的題目, 分別出現在兩個期刊之中。
   2）根據以上規定訂定題目的兩篇論文, 其內容差異性應高於百分之八十。
   3）根據以上兩規定而提出的論文, 不接受作者自行投稿的方式, 只接受互爲聯名期刊任一方編輯部或編輯委員會的推薦論文。
   4）提出推薦兩刊同時發表論文的編輯委員會, 應向接受推薦方提出該論文的審查意見書, 以及預計在雙方同時刊登的兩篇論文全文, 以供接受推薦方的編輯委員會驗證。接受推薦方的編輯委員會, 保有是否接受經由以上程序所產生的論文, 在己方刊物出版的決定權。
2. 雙方所屬研究單位成員可以在以上規定之外, 以個人名義自由向前揭刊物的任一方投稿。
3. 經由以上兩種方式投稿的稿件, 均應依照刊登該論文的學術期刊的規定格式撰寫論文。
4. 前揭聯名期刊的雙方同意所有論文以使用中文、英文撰寫的論文爲優先接受的論文。

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**Mailing Address**

*Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture*
600th Memorial Bldg. Rm 404
Sungkyunkwan University
25-2 Seonggyungwan-ro, Jongno-gu,
Seoul, South Korea 03063

**地址**

03063 韓國 首爾市 鍾路區 成均館路 25-2
成均館大學 六百周年記念館 404號
儒教文化研究所
《儒教文化研究》編輯部

Email: jicpc@skku.edu
Website: http://ygmh.skku.edu
Tel: +82-2-760-0787~8
Fax: +82-2-760-0789

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Director SHIN Jeong-Keun
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Editorial Office Institute of Confucian Philosophy and Culture
600th Memorial Bldg. Rm 404, Sungkyunkwan University
25-2 Seonggyungwan-ro, Jongno-gu.
Seoul, South Korea 03063

編輯室 03063 韓國 首爾市 鍾路區 成均館路 25-2
成均館大學 六百周年記念館 404號
儒教文化研究所
Tel 82-2-760-0787~8 Fax 82-2-760-0789

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